




00108678



108078

62



00108678

AFGHANISTAN.

RETURN

(On an Address of the House of Lords, dated 28th February 1881.)

FOR

COPY OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DESPATCH, No. 40, of 9th March 1877, with other PAPERS.

No. 40 of 1877.

Government of India.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

POLITICAL.

TO THE MOST HON. THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, the 9th March 1877.

In continuation of our Despatch No. 120, dated the 12th of June 1876, and with reference to our proceedings marginally noted, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the correspondence noted in the accompanying abstract of contents, on the subject of Kohat Pass affairs, and to append a brief statement of the principal events which have occurred in connexion therewith since the date of our last report.

2. In the month of June 1876 a body of about 50 men committed a serious raid in British territory in the neighbourhood of Shumshuttoo on the Southern Mohmund frontier of the Peshawur District. As the raiders, if not actually belonging to the Hassan Khel section of the Adam Khel tribe, must at any rate have passed through their territory, and as other outrages had occurred on the Southern Mohmund frontier, for which the Hassan Khel had been more or less responsible, it was determined by the Punjab Government to call on that tribe, and also on the Asha Khel* who had been concerned in the Shumshuttoo affairs, to follow the example of the Jowakist and Daulatzai,† and furnish hostages for good behaviour and strict neutrality in the Pass road dispute, under penalty of inclusion in the blockade if they refused compliance. The two tribes having declined to accede to the demand,

* A sub-division of the Adam Khel section of the Afridi tribe.

† A section of the Afridi tribe, occupying territory in the vicinity of the Kohat Kotal.

‡ A section of the Orakzai tribe.

were, at the end of August, included in the general blockade of the Afridi tribe, and warned not to trade in British territory.

3. Meanwhile other outrages had been committed. On the morning of the 15th of July a water party proceeding to Fort Muhammadzai, an outpost near Kohat, was attacked by a band of Afridis in ambush, who killed one of the mounted troopers in charge of the party, and made off with his rifle, accoutrements, and ammunition. On the night of the 20th of August Private Thomas McNeill of the 51st Regiment was

5. In the month of October the only outrages reported were the murder near Eymul Chabutra, an outpost on the Peshawur side of the Kohat Pass, of a foot constable by some Pass Afridis, and an unsuccessful attack made by that tribe on a body of workmen employed on the construction of a new tower near Fort Garnett.

6. On the 4th of November the headmen of the Jowaki Section of the Pass Afridis came into Kohat and tendered their submission, which was accepted on payment of a fine of nearly Rupees 2,000. The general state of affairs, however, did not improve. On the night of the 13th of November three outlaws from Janakur made a raid on Chuppi. They were driven off with the loss of their Chief "Nasir," supposed to be the man who shot Private T. McNeill. Two more raids were committed on the 15th. In the first case a body of 60 men came down from the Kohat Pass and carried off 65 sheep, 70 goats, and 4 donkeys from the village of Mattani on the Mohmand border. In the second case a party of five Afridis captured three head of cattle from the village of Hagi on the Khalil border.

7. About this time his Excellency the Viceroy, who was then on tour, arrived at Peshawur; he found that the blockade on the Peshawur side of the Kohat Pass was not maintained with sufficient strictness, and, after consultation with his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the Commissioner of Peshawur, and other officers, decided that the blockade on the Peshawur side of the Kohat Pass should be made more effective, and that on communications with Kohat should be improved by putting in order the route between Kohat and Attock, *via* the Nilabgashah and the Quarra jungles, and making it suitable for the passage of guns, and by the establishment of a bridge of boats over the Indus at Kushalghar, and of a mail-cart service between Kohat and Rawul Pindi, *via* Kushalghar.

8. During the month of December other raids took place. The Afridis made a demonstration on the Peshawur side of the pass, firing on Fort Mackeson and the Eymul Chabutra Police Post; more thefts were committed in British territory. Eventually some daring outrages by a gang of the Hassan Khel induced the Commissioner of Peshawur to recommend the despatch of an expedition against the recalcitrant tribes. As it transpired from the reports which reached us of this matter that the Commissioner of Peshawur had delayed giving effect to the orders of his Excellency for increasing the stringency of the blockade, we expressed our disapproval of his neglect in this respect, and desired that the measures decided on by his Excellency at Peshawur should be immediately adopted. At the same time we expressed our concurrence in the objections entertained by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor to the despatch of a military expedition. Further, with reference to an order issued by the Government of the Punjab for the employment of troops for the more effectual enforcement of the blockade on the Peshawur side, we prohibited their use for this purpose, except in such a manner as would not involve them in the active duties of the blockade, it being undesirable that they should be exposed to risks of collision where they could not act with decisive effect, but we sanctioned an increase being made, if necessary, to the police, and their being armed with Enfield rifles; we further sanctioned the issue of smooth-bore arms and ammunition to the villagers of the Southern Mohmand border.

9. Whilst the above orders were under consideration and despatch, intelligence was received of a daring attack having been made on the Nowshera Cantonment Sudder Bazaar by a party believed to have been composed of Hassan Khel and Pass Afridis under the leadership of one Gulfiroz, a Nowshera outlaw, resident in the Hassan Khel country. We also continued to receive reports of the almost daily occurrence of aggressive acts by the Afridis of a more or less serious character, and we therefore

Colonial Secretary to Government dated the 26th of January

circumstances under which the local officers were permitted to treat with the Hassan Khel, and the terms they were offered and have accepted, are set forth in the papers herewith forwarded.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord Marquis,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servants,
(Signed)

LYTTON.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.

Enclosure 29 in the foregoing Despatch.

No. 25 (a.) C.P., dated Peshawur, 25th November 1876. Confidential.

RESOLUTION by the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Proceedings of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, dated Peshawur, 25th November 1876.

Having conferred with his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the Commissioner of Peshawur, and other officers, on the subject of the blockade of the Pass Afridis, the Right Honourable the Governor-General is pleased to Resolve, that :

1. The blockade on the Peshawur side be made more effective, and that for this purpose the Commissioner of Peshawur be authorised to entertain a reasonable number of mounted and foot levies.
2. That measures be taken for more effectively preventing supplies being furnished to the blockaded sections by traders from British territory.
3. That a mail-cart service be established between Kohat and Rawal Pindi; the road between Kushalghar and Pindi, and the approaches to the ferry, being put into order for that purpose, and that a bridge of boats be established in lieu of a ferry.
4. That the route between Kohat and Attock *via* the Nilabgashah and the Quarra jungles be put in order and made suitable for the passage of guns.

No. 26, C.P.

Ordered, that a copy of the above Resolution be sent to Military Department for information.

No. 27 C.P.

Ordered, that a copy be sent to the Government of the Punjab for information and guidance.

No. 28, C.P.

Ordered, that a copy be sent to the Financial Department for information and the issue of the necessary orders to the Postal Department.

EXTRACTS of Military Proceedings of the Government of India for March 1877.

GENERAL MEASURES for the Equipment of the Force for Service on the North-West Frontier, and selection of Corps.

No. 224, Confidential. From Colonel H. K. Burne, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster-General, Field Operations, dated Fort William the 16th.

I am directed to inform

Excellency the Commander-in-Chief with whom the President in Council has been in direct telegraphic communication, others are not.

2. It was decided that the force shall be held in readiness to move to, or to assemble at, Kohat or its neighbourhood, and that it should consist of the following troops :—

- A field battery of Royal Artillery.
- A mountain battery, Royal Artillery.
- A mountain battery of the Punjaub Frontier Force.
- Two companies of Sappers and Miners.
- A regiment of British Cavalry.
- Two regiments of Native Cavalry.
- Two regiments of British Infantry.
- Four regiments of Native Infantry.

3. The Inspector-General of Ordnance has been instructed to make the following arrangements :—

- I.—To provide 200 rounds of reserve ammunition for each of the batteries of field and mountain artillery in addition to what is with the batteries, including that in the spare ammunition waggons of the field battery, and giving a double proportion of case shot (as recommended by Colonel Russell) to the mountain batteries.
- II.—To despatch to Rawul Pindi, if not already complete, the full service proportion of ammunition for the cavalry force detailed in paragraph 2.
- III.—To complete the infantry of the force to 60 rounds in pouch, 240 in first reserve, and 300 in second reserve.
- IV.—To supply the field battery and the British cavalry and infantry with the proper complement of double fly-bell tents, leaving for hospital purposes European privates' tents in the following proportion :—
 - Two for the field battery.
 - Four for British cavalry.
 - Six for each British infantry regiment.
- V.—To supply pāls for followers in the following proportion :—
 - One for syces and one for grasscutters for each troop of British cavalry, and double this number for the field battery, and pāls for doolie bearers to the extent of one for the field battery, two for the cavalry, and three for the infantry regiments.

4. The mountain battery is already equipped for field service as respects tents.

5. It is not quite understood what is meant by "first reserve," which term has been taken from the Commander-in-Chief's telegram. In Indian warfare heretofore the first reserve has been the regimental ammunition, but this point can be settled hereafter.

6. The Commissary General has been instructed to make the following arrangements :—

- I.—To equip with carriage the troops detailed for service, substituting mule for camel carriages as far as may be readily practicable, withdrawing no carriage from Peshawur, and replacing any taken from Rawul Pindi as soon as possible.
- II.—To send a commissariat officer to Kohat to collect three months' supplies for the force, and at once to entertain carriage for one month's supplies.
- III.—To provide carriage for the ammunition ordered.
- IV.—To procure as early as possible 10,000 blankets, 4,500 neemchas, and 500 postteens.
- V.—To detail commissariat officers for the force to be in readiness to join when wanted, and to direct the senior commissariat officer to report himself at Delhi for instructions on the 20th instant.

The Punjaub Government has been requested to direct its officers to aid the force in the collection of supplies and carriage.

The orders of Government on the subject of this force have been issued, but I am to point out that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has ordered batteries for a

GENERAL MEASURES for the Equipment of the Force for Service on the North-West Frontier, and Selection of Corps.

No. 230. (Confidential.) From Major-General F. S. Roberts, C.B., V.C., R.A., Quartermaster-General in India, to Colonel H. K. Burne, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Camp Delhi (No. 380 C.), *Field Operations*, dated Camp Delhi, the 21st December 1876.

With reference to the concluding paragraph of Military Department Letter No. 902, *Field Operations*, dated 16th instant, I am instructed by the Commander-in-Chief to submit a revised list of corps his Excellency would propose to hold in readiness for field service on the North-West Frontier in the place of those telegraphed by Sir F. Haines before his Excellency was in possession of the further views of the Government on the subject.

Royal Artillery.

G. Battery 8th Brigade at Rawul Pindi.
No. 6 Battery 13th Brigade do.
Hazara Mountain Battery at Kohat.

Cavalry.

4th Huzzars at Rawul Pindi.
Guide Cavalry at Murdan.
12th Bengal Cavalry at Jhehun.

Infantry.

2nd Battalion 9th Foot at Rawul Pindi.
4th " Rifle Brigade at do.
Guides at Murdan.
20th Punjab Infantry at Peshawur.
32nd Pioneers at Jhehun.
5th Goorkhas at Abbottabad.

Sappers and Miners.

1 Company at Rawul Pindee.
1 Company at Roorkee.

231. (Confidential.) From Colonel H. K. Burne, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster-General in India (No. 19 C. D.), *Field Operations*, dated Camp Delhi, the 22nd December 1876).

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 380 C. of the 21st December 1876, and in reply to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the corps therein detailed, which it is proposed to hold in readiness for field service, are approved by the Honourable the President in Council.

4th March 1881

ENFIELD.

Under Secretary of State for India

RETURN

(To an Address of the House of Lords, dated
28th February 1881.)

FOR

COPY OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DESPATCH, No. 40,
of 9th March 1877, with other Papers.

(The Earl of Lytton.)

Ordered to be printed 4th March 1881.

(41.)

Under 1 oz.

AFGHANISTAN.

6x451



1350

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THAT OF
AFGHANISTAN

SINCE THE ACCESSION OF

THE AMEER SHERE ALI KHAN.

Published by Order of the Secretary of State for India.



LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY,
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1878.

Price 2s. 10d.

LIST OF PAPERS.

No.	—	From.	To.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1		Treaty between the British Government and the Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan, dated 3 March 1855.				1
2		Articles of Agreement between the Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan and Sir John Lawrence and Lieutenant-Col. Edwardes, dated 26 January 1857.				1
3	Letter - -	Government of India.	Secretary of State	1863. 28 July (No. 5.)	Accession of Shere Ali Khan	3
	with	4 enclosures.				
4	" - -	" "	"	23 Dec. (No. 44.)	Recognition of Shere Ali Khan	4
	with	8 enclosures.				
5	" - -	" "	"	1866. 21 April (No. 73.)	Relations with Mahomed Azim Khan.	8
	with	1 enclosure.				
6	" - -	" "	"	30 June (No. 121.)	Attitude to be observed towards the contending parties in Afghanistan.	10
	with	5 enclosures.				
7	" - -	" "	"	1867. 28 Feb. (No. 44.)	Recognition of Mahomed Afzul Khan as Ameer of Cabul.	12
	with	3 inclosures.				
8	" - -	" "	"	27 March (No. 66.)	Relations between Cabul and Bokhara.	15
	with	4 enclosures.				
9	" - -	" "	"	20 June (No. 105.)	Progress of events. Relations with Shere Ali Khan.	16
	with	2 enclosures.				
10	" - -	" "	"	3 Sept. (No. 3.)	Same subject. Position of Russia in Central Asia.	18
	with	1 enclosure.				
11	" - -	" "	"	7 Dec. (No. 178.)	Death of Afzul Khan. Recognition of Mahomed Azim Khan as successor.	22
	with	8 enclosures.				
12	Despatch -	Secretary of State	Government of India.	26 Dec. (No. 15.)	Policy of Her Majesty's Government.	24
12A	Letter -	Government of India.	Secretary of State	1868. 14 Feb. (No. 29.)	Memorandum by Mr. T. H. Thornton on British position towards Cabul and the Afghan Tribes.	26
	with	1 enclosure.				
12B	Memorandum by Sir H. Rawlinson			20 July	The Central Asian Question -	31
13	Letter -	Government of India.	Secretary of State	16 Oct. (No. 179.)	Recognition of Shere Ali Khan as Ameer.	42
	with	3 enclosures.				
14	" - -	" "	"	1869. 4 Jan. (No. 1.)	Observations and Minutes on Sir H. Rawlinson's Memorandum.	43
	with	12 enclosures.				
14A	" - -	" "	"	19 Jan. (No. 27.)	Correspondence between the Ameer and Sir John Lawrence.	82
	with	4 enclosures.				
15	" - -	" "	"	13 March (No. 78.)	Proposed meeting between the Viceroy and the Ameer Shere Ali Khan.	84
	with	6 enclosures.				

No.	—	From.	To.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
16	Letter - - with	Government of India. 2 enclosures.	Secretary of State	1869. 20 March (No. 98.)	Arrival of Ameer Shere Ali Khan at Peshawur.	87
17	" - - with	" " 4 enclosures.	"	3 April (No. A.1.)	The Umballa Conference -	88
18	Despatch -	Secretary of State	Government of India.	14 May (No. 6.)	Views of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the proceedings at Umballa.	91
19	Letter - -	Government of India.	Secretary of State	1 July (No. 213.)	Explanation of Lord Mayo's Government.	92
20	Despatch -	Secretary of State	Government of India.	27 Aug. (No. 8.)	Reply to the above - -	100
20A	Letter - - with	Government of India. 1 enclosure.	Secretary of State	1873. 28 March	Agreement with Russia as to the northern boundary of Afghanistan.	101
21	Telegram -	Viceroy -	"	27 June	Proposed declaration to the Ameer.	102
22	Letter -	Government of India.	"	30 June (No. 60.)	Review of negotiations with Russia.	103
23	Telegram -	Secretary of State	Viceroy - -	1 July	Proposed declaration to the Ameer.	104
24	" - -	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State	24 "	The Ameer's fear of Russia. Assurance to be given him.	104
25	" - -	Secretary of State	Viceroy - -	26 "	Reply to the above - -	108
26	Letter - - with	Government of India. 7 enclosures.	Secretary of State	15 Sept. (No. 75.)	Conference at Simla with Noor Mahomed Shah.	109
27	" - - with	" " 2 enclosures.	"	1874. 23 Jan. (No. 4.)	Nomination of Sirdar Abdoola Jan as heir apparent.	117
28	" - - with	" " 2 enclosures.	"	23 Jan. (No. 7.)	Correspondence between the Viceroy and the Ameer.	119
28A	" - - with	" " 3 inclosures.	"	6 March (No. 17.)	Return of Mr. Forsyth from Kashgar.	120
29	" - - with	" " 3 enclosures.	"	1 May (No. 28.)	Same subject - - -	122
30	" - - with	" " 6 enclosures.	"	20 Nov. (No. 70.)	Arrest of Yakoob Khan -	124
30A	" - - with	" " 2 enclosures.	"	1875. 1 January (No. 1.)	Same subject - - -	127
31	Despatch -	Secretary of State	Government of India.	22 Jan. - (No. 2.)	Proposed establishment of a British Agency at Herat.	128
32	Letter - - with	Government of India. 13 enclosures.	Secretary of State	7 June - (No. 19.)	Reply to the above, objecting.	129
33	Despatch -	Secretary of State	Government of India.	19 Nov. - (No. 34.)	Directing despatch of a Mission to Cabul.	147
34	Letter -	Government of India.	Secretary of State	1876. 28 Jan. - (No. 10.)	Reply to the above, objecting.	149

LIST OF PAPERS.

v

No.		From.	To.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
35	Despatch - with	Secretary of State 1 enclosure.	Government of India.	1876. 28 Feb. - (No. 3A.)	Instructions as to affairs in Afghanistan.	156
36	Letter - with	Government of India. 52 enclosures.	Secretary of State	1877. 10 May - (No. 13.)	Conference at Peshawur be- tween Sir L. Pelly and Syud Noor Mahomed Shah.	160
37	Despatch -	Secretary of State	Government of India.	4 October (No. 64.)	Reply to the above. Views of Her Majesty's Government.	222
38	Memorandum by	Lord Napier of Magdala -	-	1878. 30 May -	Occupation of Quetta. British relations with Afghanistan.	225
39	Telegram -	Viceroy -	Secretary of State	7 June -	Rumoured Russian Mission to Cabul.	226
40	" -	" -	" "	19 June -	Same subject -	226
41	" -	" -	" "	1 July -	Russian military movements towards the Oxus.	227
42	" -	" -	" "	30 July -	Arrival of Russian Mission at Cabul.	227
42A	" -	" -	" "	1 Aug. -	Same subject -	227
43	" -	Secretary of State	Viceroy -	1 Aug. -	To verify fact -	228
44	" -	Viceroy -	Secretary of State	2 " -	Confirmation of news -	228
45	" -	" -	" -	2 " -	Proposal to insist on reception of British Mission at Cabul.	228
46	" -	Secretary of State	Viceroy -	3 " -	Reply to above, approving -	229
47	" -	Viceroy -	Secretary of State	5 " -	Reference home will be made before hostile action.	229
48	Letter - with	Government of India. 8 enclosures.	" "	5 " - (No. 53.)	Reports as to Russian Mission at Cabul.	229
49	" - with	" - 4 enclosures.	" "	19 " - (No. 61.)	Appointment of Sir N. Cham- berlain as British Envoy to Cabul.	231
50	" - with	" - 3 enclosures.	" "	26 " - (No. 67.)	Death of Sirdar Abdulla Jan, the Ameer's heir apparent.	233
51	Telegram -	Viceroy -	" "	8 Sept. -	Movements of the Nawab Gholam Hussein.	234
52	Letter - with	Government of India. 2 enclosures.	" "	9 " - (No. 79.)	Sir N. Chamberlain's Staff -	234
53	Telegram -	Viceroy -	" "	17 "	Arrival of Nawab Gholam Hussein at Cabul.	236
54	" -	" -	" "	21 "	Advance of the British Mission	236
55	" -	" -	" "	22 "	Repulse of the Mission at Ali Musjid,	236
56	" -	" -	" "	23 "	Guarantee of protection given to the Khaiberrees.	237
57	" -	Secretary of State	Viceroy -	24 "	Regret at news. Further particulars requested.	237
58	" -	Viceroy -	Secretary of State	26 "	Reply to above. Dissolution of Mission.	237

No.	—	From.	To.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
59	Letter - with	Government of India. 25 enclosures.	Secretary of State	1878: 26 Sept. (No. 93.)	Report of proceedings in connection with Mission.	238
59A	" - with	" " 1 enclosure.	"	3 Oct. (No. 96.)	Letters from Nawab Gholam Hussein.	246
60	" - with	" " 4 enclosures.	"	" " (No. 95.)	Reports by Major Cavagnari and Lieut-Col. Jenkins.	247
61	Telegram -	Viceroy -	"	19 Oct.	Ameer's reply to Viceroy's letter.	252
62	" -	" -	"	"	Explanation of passages in the above.	253
63	" -	" -	"	"	Unsatisfactory nature of Ameer's letter.	253
64	" -	" -	"	"	Proposed military measures -	253
65	Telegram -	Secretary of State	Viceroy -	25 Oct.	Ultimatum to be addressed to the Ameer.	254
66	" -	"	" -	30 "	Text of the Ultimatum -	254
67	" -	"	" -	" "	Instructions as to procedure -	255
68	" -	Viceroy -	Secretary of State	31 "	Enquires views as to military operations.	255
68A	Letter -	Government of India.	"	" " (No. 116.)	Sir N. Chamberlain's Report	255
69	Telegram -	Secretary of State	Viceroy -	1 Nov.	Reply to the above -	260
70	" -	Viceroy -	Secretary of State	4 "	Despatch of Ultimatum -	260
71	" -	" -	"	5 "	Course to be followed in case of refusal of Ultimatum.	260
72	" -	Secretary of State	Viceroy -	7 "	Reply to the above -	260
73	Despatch -	"	"	18 " (No. 49.)	Reviewing the course of events in Afghanistan.	260

CORRESPONDENCE.



No. 1.

TREATY between the BRITISH GOVERNMENT and His Highness Ameer Dost MOHAMMED KHAN, Walee of Cabul and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession; concluded on the part of the British Government by JOHN LAWRENCE, Esquire, Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, in virtue of full powers vested in him by the Most Noble JAMES ANDREW, Marquis of DALHOUSIE, K.T., &c., Governor-General of India; and on the part of the AMEER of CABOOL, DOST MOHAMMED KHAN, by Sirdar GHOLAM HYDER KHAN, in virtue of full authority granted to him by His Highness.

ARTICLE I.

Between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness Ameer Dost Mòhummad Khan, Walee of Cabul and of those countries now in his possession, and the heirs of the said Ameer, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship.

ARTICLE II.

The Honourable East India Company engages to respect those territories of Afghanistan now in His Highness's possession, and never to interfere therein.

ARTICLE III.

His Highness Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan, Walee of Cabul and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, engages, on his own part and on the part of his heirs, to respect the territories of the Honourable East India Company, and never to interfere therein, and to be the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company.

Done at Peshawur this 30th day of March 1855, corresponding with the 11th day of Rujjub, 1271 Hijree.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner of the Punjab.

Seal.

Seal of Gholam
Hyder, heir-
apparent.

As the representative of Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan, and in person on his own account as heir-apparent.

Ratified by the Most Noble the Governor-General at Ootakamund, this 1st day of May 1855.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

No. 2.

ARTICLES of AGREEMENT made at Peshawur on the 26th January 1857 (corresponding with Jumadee-ool-Awul 29th, A.H. 1273), between Ameer Dost MOHAMMED KHAN, Ruler of Cabool and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, on his own part, and Sir JOHN LAWRENCE, K.C.B., Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. EDWARDES, C.B., Commissioner of Peshawur, on the part of the Honourable East India Company, under the authority of the Right Honourable CHARLES JOHN VISCOUNT CANNING, Governor-General of India in Council.

1. Whereas the Shah of Persia, contrary to his engagement with the British Government, has taken possession of Herat, and has manifested an intention to interfere in the present possessions of Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, and there is now war between the British and Persian Governments, therefore the Honourable East India Company, to aid

Amir Dost Muhammed Khan to defend and maintain his present possessions in Balkh, Cabul, and Kandahar against Persia, hereby agrees, out of friendship, to give the said Amir one lac of Company's rupees monthly during the war with Persia, on the following conditions:—

2. The Amir shall keep his present number of cavalry and artillery, and shall maintain not less than 18,000 infantry, of which 13,000 shall be regulars, divided into 13 regiments.

3. The Amir is to make his own arrangements for receiving the money at the British Treasuries, and conveying it through his own country.

4. British officers, with suitable establishments and orderlies, shall be deputed, at the pleasure of the British Government, to Cabul or Kandahar or Balkh, or all three places, or wherever an Afghan army be assembled to act against the Persians. It will be their duty to see generally that the subsidy granted to the Amir be devoted to the military purposes for which it is given, and to keep their own Government informed of all affairs. They will have nothing to do with the payment of the troops, or advising the Cabul Government, and they will not interfere in any way in the internal administration of the country. The Amir will be responsible for their safety and honourable treatment while in his country, and for keeping them acquainted with all military and political matters connected with the war.

5. The Amir of Cabul shall appoint and maintain a wakil at Peshawur.

6. The subsidy of one lac per mensem shall cease from the date on which peace is made between the British and Persian Governments, or at any previous time at the will and pleasure of the Governor-General of India.

7. Whenever the subsidy shall cease the British Officers shall be withdrawn from the Amir's country; but at the pleasure of the British Government a wakil, not a European officer, shall remain at Cabul on the part of the Government, and one at Peshawur on the part of the Government of Cabul.

8. The Ameer shall furnish a sufficient escort for the British Officers from the British border when going to the Ameer's country, and to the British border when returning.

9. The subsidy shall commence from 1st January 1857, and be payable at the British Treasury one month in arrears.

10. The five lakhs of rupees which have been already sent to the Ameer (three to Candahar and two to Cabul) will not be counted in this Agreement. They are a free and separate gift from the Honourable East India Company. But the sixth lakh now in the hands of the mahajuns of Cabul, which was sent for another purpose, will be one of the instalments under this Agreement.

11. This Agreement in no way supersedes the Treaty made at Peshawur on 30th March 1855 (corresponding with 11th of Rajjab 1271), by which the Ameer of Cabul engaged to be the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company, and the Ameer of Cabul, in the spirit of that Treaty, agrees to communicate to the British Government any overtures he may receive from Persia or the allies of Persia during the war, or while there is friendship between the Cabul and British Governments.

12. In consideration of the friendship existing between the British Government and Ameer Dost Mohammad Khan, the British Government engages to overlook the past hostilities of all the tribes of Afghanistan, and on no account to visit them with punishment.

13. Whereas the Ameer has expressed a wish to have 4,000 muskets given him in addition to the 4,000 already given, it is agreed that 4,000 muskets shall be sent by the British Government to Tull, whence the Ameer's people will convey them with their own charge.

Seal.

Seal.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.

Seal.

(Signed) HERBERT B. EDWARDS,
Commissioner of the Peshawar Division

No. 3.

Secret, No. 5.

To the Right Honourable Sir CHARLES WOOD, Bart., G.C.B., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Foreign Department,

Simla, dated 28th July 1863.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a communication from the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, and of its enclosure to my address from Sirdar Shere Allee Khan of Cabul, announcing the death of his father.

2. I have directed the issue of the necessary instructions to the British Vakeel of the receipt of Sirdar Shere Allee Khan's letter, and that a reply will be sent to it for delivery through him.

3. It is my intention to await further information from Afghanistan before taking a formal step in acknowledgment of Sirdar Shere Allee Khan as the successor to Dost Mahomed, and as charged with the maintenance of the friendly relations existing between the two Governments.

4. If it be true that Mahomed Ufzal Khan is raising an army it will not be long before the contest for power begins. Meanwhile, the acknowledgment by the Vakeel of the receipt of the letter, and that a reply will be sent, as also the presence of the Vakeel with Shere Allee Khan, will be regarded as indications that the British Government are not indisposed to accept Dost Mahomed's election of his successor, provided the latter is in a position to uphold the authority thus conferred upon him.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

No. $\frac{111}{524}$ of 1863.

From the OFFICIATING SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of the PUNJAB and its DEPENDENCIES to the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General, dated the 11th July 1863.

FORWARDS copy of the annexed letter from the Commissioner of Peshawur, No. 122, dated 7th instant, with enclosed communication from Sirdar Shere Allee Khan, announcing his father's death on the 9th ultimo, to the address of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General.

By order, &c.

(Signed) T. D. FORSYTH,
Officiating Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

COPY of a LETTER, No. 122, dated 7th July 1863, from the COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT of Peshawur Division to SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, Punjab.

I BEG to enclose a Morasilah just received from Sirdar Shere Allee Khan, announcing his father's death on the 9th of June, to the address of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General.

2. My telegram of to-day's date will have given you the heads of the Despatch just received; further translations will follow to-morrow.

(True copy.)

(Signed) W. KIRKE,
Assistant Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from Sirdar SHERE ALI KHAN to His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL, dated Herat (Friday), 24th Zeelhej 1279, A.H., corresponding with 12th June 1863.

(After compliments.)

I BEG to inform your Excellency that as death is the common lot of man, my revered father, 14 days after the capture of Herat and its dependencies, died of a chronic illness at sunrise on Tuesday the 21st of Zeelhej (9th June).

In accordance with the wishes of my father to give intimation to your Excellency of everything, whether trifling or important, I beg to apprise you that as long as I live I will, please God, follow the

laudable example of my father in maintaining the strong ties of friendship and amity subsisting between the British and this State.

I trust that your Excellency, setting your mind at ease in every respect, will continue to gratify me from time to time with gracious letters.

I have thought it expedient to stay here a few days, in order to appoint a ruler of Herat, and to make boundary settlements, and afterwards I will take my departure for Cabool.

(True translation.)

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

No. 441.

From the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA with the Governor-General to the OFFICIATING SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of the PUNJAB and its DEPENDENCIES, dated Simla, the 22nd July 1863.

Foreign Dept.
Poll.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. $\frac{111}{524}$, dated 11th July, forwarding a letter to the address of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General from Sirdar Shere Allee Khan of Cabool, announcing the death of his father.

2nd, In reply, I am directed by his Excellency to request that the British Vakeel may be informed, through the Commissioner of Peshawur, of the receipt of Shere Allee Khan's letter, and told that a reply will be sent to it for delivery through him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General.

Simla, the 22nd July 1863.

No. 4.

Political, No. 44.

To the Right Honourable Sir CHARLES WOOD, M.P. and G.C.B., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIR,

Foreign Department,
Fort William, dated 23rd December 1863.

IN continuation of the letter to your address, No. 5., dated 28th July, we have the honour to forward, for your information, copy of a letter to the address of His Highness Shere Ali Khan, Chief of Cabul, recognizing him as successor to the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan.

2. Copies of letters from the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, are likewise forwarded.

(Signed) W. T. DENISON.
R. NAPIER.
H. B. HARRINGTON.
H. S. MAINE.
C. E. TREVELYAN.
W. GREY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

No. 189.

From the SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB and its DEPENDENCIES, to the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA in the Foreign Department with the Governor-General, dated Lahore, the 28th October 1863.

Political.

SIR,

I AM directed to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General, copies of the Commissioner of Peshawur's letter, No. 185, dated 15th instant, and diaries of the Cabul Wakeel, extending from the 15th September to the 1st instant.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor desires to draw his Excellency's attention to Colonel Taylor's 4th paragraph relative to the anxiety of Shere Ali Khan to be recognized by the British Government as the late Ameer's successor, and to the Commissioner's concluding opinion that it is advisable that this recognition should be accorded. His Honour inclines to the opinion that some such action will hereafter be desirable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. H. DAVIES,
Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

COPY of a LETTER from COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division, to SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, Punjab, No. 185, dated 15th October 1863.

I BEG to forward the accompanying documents.

With reference to the translation forwarded of the Cabul Diary from the 22nd to the 24th September, I beg to note two points.

1st. It will be observed that the Ameer asks the Vakeel, rather anxiously, whether he has received letters from the Commissioner of Peshawur regarding affairs connected with the country, and subsequently he adds that he refrains from writing again till he receive replies to his first letters. The letters alluded to are those forwarded with my letter of the 17th September 1863 to your address, and no doubt the Ameer counts on the tenour of the answer from the Supreme Government acknowledging him as Ameer of Cabul and successor to the same relations as existed between the late Ameer and the British Government.

2nd. I have also to bring to notice that on the 2nd of August I wrote by direction to the Vakeel, instructing him to inform Ameer Shere Ali Khan that his letter announcing his father's death had been received, and would be subsequently answered.

In the same Diary of the 24th September mention is made of Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan having sent a messenger of his own to me from Gurdez with a letter. This is fact. The messenger arrived about the 12th September at Abbottabad, bringing the letter; while the messenger was still with me, however, intelligence was received through the Vakeel that a reconciliation had been effected between the reigning Ameer and Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, and copies of the agreement entered into and signed by the parties were forwarded by the Vakeel. I made all these over to the messenger, allowing him to read them. I then dismissed him with the letter, and a small "zyafut" for his expenses on the road. I was just leaving for Murree at the time, and the man was anxious to be gone. I trust that under the circumstances my action will be approved. It appeared to me that at the time no other course could be adopted. I am well aware that, ordinarily, all such communications should be referred for ruling. I may note that, should there be any wish to open up communication with Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, an opportunity is given by his letter forwarded by the Vakeel, but I do not recommend the course, and would rather advocate that Shere Ali Khan be at once acknowledged as his father's successor.

Enclosure 3 in No. 4.

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION of a "MURASILAH" or LETTER, without date, from Sirdar MAHOMED AZIM KHAN (son of the late Ameer of Cabul) to the COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR.

AFTER compliments. Seeing that during the lifetime of the late Ameer the administration of affairs in Afghanistan was greatly facilitated and strengthened by the friendship subsisting between the Ameer and the British Government, Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan was desirous that this state of things should continue, and with this view he used every exertion on the death of his father to maintain it. Shere Ali Khan (the present Ameer), however, notwithstanding the advice tendered by Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, began to oppress his brothers and the people generally. The British authorities are not unacquainted with Shere Ali Khan's disposition. In the conjuncture just alluded to the writer had no alternative but to separate himself from his brother at Isfizàn, and to betake himself to Zoomut. Shere Ali Khan is ruining the administration and oppressing

those whose relatives are serving in Turkistan to induce them to recall their friends. Much injury will accrue to the whole army from a continuance of such proceedings. It is very probable that Sirdar Mahomed Afzul Khan will, in consequence of Shere Ali Khan's measures, proceed to Cabul, thus imperilling the security of his hold upon Turkistan. It remains to be seen what the result will be. Considering that the prosperity, or otherwise, of this country (Afghanistan?) depends so much upon the pleasure of the British Government, Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan begs that the Commissioner of Peshawur will write and express his views on the state of affairs, advising the writer of the best course to be pursued, in order that the country may be saved from calamities and remain in peace.

(True Extract.)

(Signed) A. A. MUNRO,
On special duty with Commissioner.

Enclosure 4 in No. 4.

REPLY of the COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR to communication from Sirdar MAHOMED AZIM KHAN.

AFTER compliments. Acknowledges the receipt of a communication intimating the occurrence of misunderstandings between the Sirdar and Shere Ali Khan, and expresses much regret at the intelligence. Before the departure of Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan's messenger information of the agreement entered into between Ameer Shere Ali Khan and Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan at Zoormut was received through the Cabul Vakeel. The Commissioner is highly gratified to hear of this amicable settlement of the dispute, and writes by the messenger to congratulate the Sirdar upon the issue, which has happily rendered any further allusion to the original communication unnecessary.

(True Extract.)

(Signed) A. A. MUNRO,
On special duty with Commissioner.

14th October 1863.

Enclosure 5 in No. 4.

EXTRACT from Diary of the CABUL VAKEEL for the half week from the 22nd to the 24th September 1863.

THE Vakeel was accosted by the Ameer and asked whether any letters regarding public affairs had lately been received from the Commissioner of Peshawur. The reply was that none had been received, and that the Vakeel would have at once communicated the contents to the Ameer had any communications come to hand. The Ameer said he deferred writing again until replies should be received to his former communications. He seemed somewhat anxious as to the cause of non-receipt. Intelligence has been received that a confidential servant of Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan had reached the Commissioner of Peshawur, and made certain overtures. It is reported the messenger was informed that Afghanistan is in a manner subject to the English Government, and that the appointment or approval of a Cabul ruler rested with the British. That this was said by way of qualifying Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan. The Ameer on hearing this was further troubled in spirit, and he ascribes his not having received replies to his communications to some such cause as is here alleged.

Lall Mahomed Khan, who had been sent by the Ameer, had returned from Turkistan with letters from Sirdar Mahomed Afzul Khan. He was accompanied by a Nazim of the Sirdar, and delivered his despatches. The contents will be communicated next week, or when ascertained.

(Signed) GHALAM HUSSAIN KHAN,
Alizai.

(True Extract.)

(Signed) A. A. MUNRO,
On special duty with Commissioner.

Enclosure 6 in No. 4.

COPY of a LETTER, dated 14th November 1863, from the COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division, to the SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, Punjab.

I HAVE the honour, in forwarding the diary of the Cabul Vakeel for the half week from the 16th to the 19th of October, to call attention to the two passages I have marked.

I have before brought to notice that the present Ameer was led to expect an answer to his letters announcing his father's death, I having been directed to inform him that they had been received, and that an answer would be subsequently sent.

His Honour will observe the tenour of Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan's letter to me and also of the allusions to Sirdar Mahomed Afzul Khan.

I have previously reported the nature of Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan's communication and of my reply to it (to which the Sirdar alludes), in which of course I avoided offering any kind of advice, merely saying that I was glad that a reconciliation had been effected between himself and his brother.

What appears to me the evil of our not acknowledging the de facto ruler of the country is, that the other Sirdars, to whom the fact of our keeping the matter in suspense is well known, will be inclined to think that we have other intentions; that we have in fact selected some successor other than the present one whom we mean to favour; and such a belief can only foster distrust and dissension, while it will greatly weaken the present Ameer's hands.

Enclosure 7 in No. 4.

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION of LETTER from Sirdar MAHOMED AZIM KHAN to the COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR. No date, but reference made to it in Vakeel Diary of 8th October 1863.

AFTER compliments, Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan states that he formerly communicated with the Commissioner on the state of affairs generally throughout Afghanistan, and his own particular relations thereto, but had not received a reply which was calculated to guide him. He had mentioned the impossibility of arranging matters with his brother Shere Ali Khan, and the necessity there was for his (Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan) maintaining his own ground. Shere Ali Khan, however, anticipating him, brought a force to meet him, but finding the Sirdars and Chiefs favourably disposed towards Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, and unprepared for a contest, Shere Ali Khan proposed an arrangement of differences, and the Chiefs, with reference to the great distance of Sirdar Mahomed Afzul Khan, recommended Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan to accede to it. Since then a reply has been received from Sirdar Mahomed Afzul Khan to a requisition by Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan for aid. The former Sirdar reminds his brother that the Cabul Government has derived much strength from its alliance and good understanding with the British, and he advises Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan to be mainly guided by the counsel which he may receive from the British authorities, whom he wishes his brother to consult as to the propriety, or otherwise, of his own retention of the management of affairs in Toorkistan.

Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan further states that in the present temper of the Sirdars and Chiefs, and in the absence of particular recommendations from the Commissioner of Peshawur, he has restricted himself to one interview with his brother Shere Ali Khan, and does not consider it advisable to renew the conference. Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan further states that his brother (the present Ameer) drew out the written agreement in accordance with his own views, avoiding reference to the settlement of Toorkistan affairs; that he has already infringed the terms of the paper of reconciliation by interdicting the British Vakeel from visiting him (Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan) to condole, according to Mahomedan custom, on the death of the late Ameer, and that the Ameer has in other ways shown an inclination not to abide by the conditions which he himself imposed. Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan therefore hopes for a reply calculated to guide him in the particular juncture, and he does so with the greater boldness, as he has all his life entertained friendly feelings towards the British Government, and has obtained many marks of favour from the British authorities.

He intimates that his brother Sirdar Mahomed Afzul Khan is equally anxious with himself for an expression of Commissioner's views on the state of affairs.

(True Abstract.)

(Signed) A. A. MUNRO,
On special duty with Commissioner.

Enclosure 8 in No. 4.

To His Highness Ameer SHERE ALI KHAN, Walee of Cabul, &c. &c., dated
23rd December 1863.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.

YOUR friendly letter communicating the melancholy tidings of your father's death was received by my lamented predecessor, Lord Elgin, with the utmost regret for the loss of so firm and constant an ally of the British Government.

You will have learned from my separate letter of the death of the late Viceroy and Governor-General, an event which was preceded by a severe and protracted illness, during which a formal reply to your announcement was necessarily postponed.

My separate letter will also have informed you that I have assumed the office of Governor-General, and I take this early opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of your Khurreeta, in which you intimate your succession to the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, and your desire, as Ruler of Affghanistan, to maintain the same friendly relations with the British Government as have heretofore existed.

You may rest assured that the British Government participate in this desire, and I sincerely trust that under your rule Affghanistan may possess a strong and united Government, and that the good understanding and friendship which prevailed during the lifetime of the late Ameer, your predecessor, may continue to gain strength and stability under your own administration.

Moved by a sincere wish for the permanent welfare of your rule and of the people of Affghanistan, I deem it advisable to commend to your careful consideration and attention the words of the late Viceroy when acknowledging, in his letter of the 3rd July last, the announcement made by the late Ameer of the capture of Herat by storm under your Highness' leading. I feel that I cannot too strongly press upon your attention the necessity for your taking the utmost care to prevent any of your Highness' officers on the Persian frontier from permitting themselves to be led into any measures or enterprizes which could justly give umbrage to Persia. I am confident that your Highness, conscious how greatly the interests of yourself and the Affghan people are at stake in this matter, will be solicitous to maintain peace and order on your own frontiers, and will countenance no aggressions on the part of any persons over whom your Highness' officers have influence.

In conclusion, &c.

(Signed) W. DENISON.

No. 5.

No. 73.

To the Right Honourable the EARL DE GREY AND RIPON, Her Majesty's Secretary of
State for India.—(Extract.)

Foreign Dept.

Political.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 21st April 1866.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter, No. 355, dated 17th instant, addressed under our instructions to the Government of the Punjab, from which it will be perceived that, in consequence of our Vakeel at Cabul having unwarrantably overstepped the limit of his functions as a news-writer, and taken upon himself to make overtures of friendship and alliance between the British Government and Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, we have been compelled to order his recall.

2. We have at the same time communicated to the Lieutenant-Governor our view as to the policy by which the relations of the British Government with the contending factions in Affghanistan should be regulated. The cause of the Ameer Shere Ali is by no means finally lost, and we consider that, until such a result is reached, we are bound equally by good faith and by considerations of policy to recognise no other Chief as Ameer of Affghanistan. Should the present contest terminate in a disruption of the kingdom into two or more principalities, it will be time enough to give these our recognition when they develop themselves in a form having some appearance of stability. In the meantime we intend maintaining an attitude of strict neutrality, leaving the Affghans to choose their own rulers, and prepared to accept with amity whatever Chief may finally establish his power in the country.

3. Her Majesty's Government will observe that Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, wishing to feel his way with the Government of India, has addressed overtures to the Commissioner of the Peshawur Division, and that Colonel Becher's reply, couched in terms of general courtesy, without any reference to the object which the Sirdar had at heart, is in the tone which we conceive proper to the occasion.

We have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
W. MANSFIELD.
H. S. MAINE.
W. GREY.
G. N. TAYLOR.
W. N. MASSEY.
H. M. DURAND.

Enclosure in No. 5.

From the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General, to the SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB, No. 355, dated Simla, the 17th April 1866.

WITH reference to the direct communications from the Commissioner of Peshawur noted in the

1. Docket dated 30th ultimo, forwarding translation of letter from Cabul Moonshee, dated 23rd idem.
2. Copy of letter marked L., dated 1st instant, to the address of the Punjab Government, forwarding translations of a morasila from Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan and of the Moonshee's Diary, dated 15th ultimo.
3. Memorandum, dated 1st instant, forwarding translation of letter from the Moonshee, dated 23rd ultimo.

margin, I am directed to convey to you, for the information of the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor the views held by the Government of India upon the present state of affairs in Afghanistan.

2. The Governor-General in Council has reason to believe that Colonel Becher replied to Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan's letter in terms of general courtesy. His Excellency in Council approves of this proceeding.

3. As regards the conduct of the Moonshee at Cabul, it is clear that he has exceeded his powers. He had no authority to assume the functions of a Representative of the British Government; his duty was simply to watch and report events and cultivate friendly relations with all parties. The course which he has adopted is certainly premature, and may prove embarrassing.

4. When the Moonshee made his first mistake the Government of India directed his recall, but subsequently modified these instructions at the request of the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commissioner of Peshawur. It will be inconvenient to recall him, as we shall then have no person at Cabul to report events, and the recall may give offence to Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan. Nevertheless, his Excellency in Council thinks that the step must be taken; it is the simplest way of putting matters on a proper footing, and the Commissioner of Peshawur may, perhaps, be able to make other arrangements for obtaining intelligence from Cabul. The Government of the Punjab will therefore issue without delay the necessary orders for giving effect to this decision.

5. It is difficult, the Governor-General in Council observes, to foresee what may be the turn of events in Cabul. The Ameer Sher Ali may recover his power.

6. Already it is said that Mahomed Rufeek Khan, the ablest Chief in the country, whose desertion was probably one of the main causes of the collapse of the Ameer's party at Cabul, is discontented with Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, and has come to an understanding with the Ameer.

7. The Ameer himself has shown that he in many respects possesses the qualities of a ruler; but he has also considerable defects. There can be little doubt that he has alienated from himself most of the influential Chiefs; and his conduct towards his brother, Sirdar Mahomed Afzul Khan, whom he treacherously imprisoned after the most solemn promises and oaths of full security, shows that no faith can be placed in him. Still Afghan chiefs are not to be judged by the principles of Christendom, nor can we be sure that the nobles and people may not again rally round the Ameer if he shows resolution and vigour.

8. In the opinion of his Excellency in Council, sound policy dictates that we should not be hasty in giving up the Ameer's cause as lost. We should await the development of events and for the present continue to recognise Sher Ali as the Ameer of Afghanistan. If the Ameer fail in his attempt to recover Cabul, and Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan establish his power and make overtures to the British

Government, the latter can then be recognised as the ruler of such parts of the country as he may possess. It should be our policy to show clearly that we will not interfere in the struggle, that we will not aid either party, that we will leave the Afghans to settle their own quarrels, and that we are willing to be on terms of amity and good-will with the nation and with their rulers de facto. Suitable opportunities can be taken to declare that these are the principles which will guide our policy, and it is the belief of the Governor-General in Council that such a policy will in the end be appreciated.

No. 6.

No. 121.

To the Right Honourable the EARL DE GREY AND RIPON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Foreign Dept.Political.

MY LORD,

Simla, 30th June 1866.

WE have the honour to transmit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of further papers relative to the state of affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

JOHN LAWRENCE.

W. MANSFIELD.

H. S. MAINE.

W. GREY.

G. N. TAYLOR.

W. N. MASSEY.

H. M. DURAND.

Enclosure 1 in No. 6.

No. 275.

From W. KIRKE, Esq., Assistant Secretary to Government, Punjab, to W. MUIR, Esq., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

Political.

SIR,

Murree, 15th June 1866.

I AM directed to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy in Council, copies of a letter and its enclosure from the Commissioner of Peshawur Division, No. 58, of the 11th instant, and of the reply thereto, regarding the state of affairs in Afghanistan.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

W. KIRKE,

Assistant Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Enclosure 2 in No. 6.

From Colonel J. R. BECHER, C.B., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to T. H. THORNTON, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated 11th June 1866, No. 58.

THE EX-Governor of Jalalabad, Shah Murd Khan, came into Peshawur on 20th May with a party of horsemen, giving no further notice than a message when he entered the first British village. He brought a letter from Sirdar Futtah Mahomed Khan (nephew of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan and son of the late Wuzer Mahomed Akbur Khan), lately commanding the Jalalabad force which was dispersed near Cabul.

This letter stated that the Sirdar had been obliged to fly, and asked permission to proceed through British territory to Shikarpore to join the Ameer.

On 27th May a party of two generals of artillery and one general of infantry and fifteen men came into the British border at Spersung without giving previous notice; they said they had been sent in by the Sirdar to Shah Murd Khan to know why there was

delay, and moreover that they were in fear of their lives beyond the border. I allowed them to put up with Shah Murd Khan.

On 29th May permission was accorded to Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan. I did not write, but communicated through Shah Murd Khan that the Sirdar was at liberty to come or not to come into British territory, and that a passage would be given to him; the intimation does not, however, seem to have satisfied him entirely.

The Sirdar, when he wrote, was at Koonur; he has never made his appearance, but has instead been entering into negotiations with the Cabul Government, while Shah Murd Khan, as his vakeel, has remained at Peshawur, first on the excuse of waiting for the Sirdar; lately he has decided himself to return, but in order to keep with both sides wishes his son to go to Shikarpore with the three Generals.

On 9th June a letter was sent from Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan to Shah Murd Khan, a translation of which I annex; it shows that the Sirdar was entering into negotiations with the Cabul party for a road to Khilat by Cabul; it asks for a *letter from me to assure him that he may come in*. As the Sirdar has been doing everything that is calculated to embroil us with the present Government of Cabul by separating himself from his Generals, and instead of coming in at once has been delaying and going to Jalalabad and entering into negotiations, I have now directed Shah Murd Khan to inform him that, as the circumstances of the case are quite changed from the time when he represented himself as a defeated refugee, he must no longer count on the Shikarpore road.

Probably he will make his way to Candahar by Cabul, or else there is another road through the hills. He speaks in his letter of calling the Generals to him if he be given a road by Cabul, and I hope he will, for it is very embarrassing to know what to do with them. In their character of refugees in fear of their lives it is not right to expel them beyond the border; their going by Shikarpore (although of course without an overt assistance) lays us open to offending Mahomed Afzul Khan, and opens out a dangerous precedent for the future; for I apprehend that others will be making their escape to the Ameer Shere Ali Khan at Candahar.

I will each day report what further occurs in this matter.

Enclosure 3 in No. 6.

LETTER of Sirdar FUTTEH MAHOMED KHAN to Shah MURD KHAN, ABOO AHMUD KHAN, ABDOL KURREEM KHAN, and HUFEEZOOLA KHAN.

GREETING,—

FROM the day I left I have heard nothing of you. I have remained in consequence of not hearing from you. When I received your note I immediately marched by the road of Koonur to have an interview (zearut) with the Akhvond of Swat, and then come into Peshawur; but before I left a note came to the Badshah (of Koonur) desiring that I should not be let go, but come by his road. They made objections; I saw that they would not let me have a way from fear of their lives. I returned thence to Jalalabad. Sultan Mahomed Khan Momund was in the city; a letter also came to him, and he also made objections. Sirdar Mudut Khan and Sirdar Abdool Khalik Khan sent an agreement to me from Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan to the effect that if I wished to go to Khilat I should go by the road of Cabul. I sent back these messengers saying that if I was not to be annoyed with service and paying of my respects, and if I were given a road by Soorkhab or Lohgurb, I would join them. After six days I get information; if they give me a road, I will give information to you and to the Commissioner and go by that road. If they insist on service I will set off as a single horseman and reach Peshawur. You should quickly let Aboo Ahmud Khan, Abdool Kurreem Khan, and Hufeezoolla Khan go, that they may quickly reach the Ameer Shere Ali. Rest assured of all matters in these parts, and let me know of your welfare.

P.S.—A kossid from Khilat states that the Ameer Shere Ali came and remained two nights in Khilat, and then left for Candahar after strengthening the garrison of the fort. Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan and Sirdar Mahomed Ibraheem two days previously had entered Candahar with Syud Noor Mahomed Shah. For the rest all is well.

P.S.—I receive information from Cabul after six or seven days.

If General Aboo Ahmud Khan and Abdool Kurreem Khan and Hufeezoolla Khan be delayed it is well, so that they may hear what is the state at Cabul. If they give me a road I will let you know, and if not I will alone night and day come in. If you consider it right *send me a letter quickly from the Commissioner, and I will come in quickly as a single horseman*. For the rest all is well.

Enclosure-4 in No. 6.

From ASSISTANT SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, Punjab, to the COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division, No. 511, dated 15th June 1866.

In reply to your letter No. 58, dated 11th instant, I am directed to state that the Lieutenant-Governor considers you are quite right to watch carefully the progress of events in Afghanistan, and to act accordingly.

2. In the present constantly changing state of matters, and without full cognizance of the temper of the parties concerned, it is not possible to give in a satisfactory manner definitive instructions in anticipation. But should Futteh Mahomed Khan be constrained to enter our territory as a refugee, and desire to join the Ameer through British territory, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks he may be allowed to avail himself of the privilege heretofore conceded him by his Excellency the Viceroy, though His Honour does not think this permission should be extended to any large number of his followers.

3. His Honour's own feeling is that it is more important that we adhere strictly to our engagements with the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, so long as any prospect remains of his resuming authority, than that we endeavor to secure the friendship of the party which is now in the ascendant and may perhaps permanently retain power. On the other hand, His Honour would use every legitimate means to satisfy that party that beyond what we deem incumbent on us in fulfilment of our engagements we have no desire or intention to uphold one party against the other.

Enclosure 5 in No. 6.

No. 664.

From the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA to the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of the PUNJAB.

Foreign Dep.
Political.

SIR,

Simla, 25th June 1866.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 15th instant, No. 275/512, submitting copies of correspondence with the Commissioner of Peshawur regarding the attitude to be observed towards the contending parties in Afghanistan, and in reply, to state that His Excellency the Governor-General in Council approves the tenor of the Lieutenant-Governor's communication to the Commissioner.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. MUIR,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 7.

No. 44.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Foreign Dept.
Political.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 28th February 1867.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, further papers relating to the affairs of Afghanistan.

2. Your Lordship will perceive that we have at last recognised Sirdar Mahomed Uzful Khan as Ameer of Cabul and Candahar, and have invited him in that capacity to tender his adhesion to the Treaty engagements which were concluded by his father, Dost Mahomed Khan, with the British Government.

3. Ameer Shere Ali has fled to Herat, and so long as he retains possession of that province and desires to be on good terms with the British Government, we shall continue to recognise him as Ameer of Herat and to reciprocate his friendship.

4. The rising of Sirdar Fyz Mahomed Khan in Balkh is not yet suppressed ; but it is doubtful whether he will be able to hold out much longer now that the decisive defeat of the Ameer Shere Ali has left the Cabul troops free to operate in force towards the north. On the whole, the brothers now in power at Cabul appear more likely than any other party to consolidate their power in Affghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
W. R. MANSFIELD.
H. S. MAINE.
W. GREY.
G. N. TAYLOR.
W. N. MASSEY.
H. M. DURAND.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

From T. H. THORNTON, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, to J. W. S. WYLLIE, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Calcutta, No. 116-75, dated Lahore, 15th February 1867.

I AM directed to forward herewith an open khureeta from Sirdar Mahomed Ufzul Khan to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy announcing the complete defeat of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan and the occupation of Candahar by the Cabul troops. A translation is also enclosed.

2. As there now appears to be no doubt that Ufzul Khan is in full possession both of Cabul and Candahar, the fact having been corroborated from various authentic sources, it appears to the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor that, in conformity with the tenor of former letters, the concession of the title of Ameer in our correspondence with him should no longer be withheld, even although it is yet uncertain what may be the fate of Herat, and Faiz Mahomed Khan still holds out in Turkistan. It appears to His Honour that Ameer Shere Ali Khan, who is generally considered not to be in his right mind, can no longer hope to regain power, and Ufzul Khan, if not completely established in the Chiefship of Affghanistan, is nearly so, and much more likely than anyone else to consolidate his power, unless by misgovernment he should alienate the bulk of the people.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

TRANSLATION of a KHUREETA from Sirdar MAHOMED UFZUL KHAN, styling himself AMEER of AFFGHANISTAN, to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA, dated 28th Ramzan (3rd February 1867).

My brother Ameer Shere Ali Khan was defeated at Saidabad, and he fled to Candahar, and I took possession of the throne at Cabul. Information of this was duly communicated to you. In consideration of our relationship I let him alone at Candahar, and took no steps to expel him from there ; but he was not long there when my brother again prepared himself for a contest. He sent inflammatory letters to the Chiefs and people of this country ; he excited my brother Faiz Mahomed Khan, who was under great obligations to me, and whom my son had left as his substitute in Turkistan when he himself came to Cabul, to rebel against me, and that ungrateful man acted on his instigation. It became therefore necessary to punish Faiz Mahomed and to secure the comfort of the people ; I accordingly sent my brother Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, and my son, Abdul Rahman Khan, with a strong force against Candahar. They had gone just beyond Makar, which is situated half way, when Ameer Shere Ali Khan with his troops marched to Kilat and prepared to fight. Some of the Ameer's troops who had advanced to oppose the progress of my force were repulsed, but on Wednesday (9th Ramzan), 16th January, a battle was fought, which lasted four hours, and in which Ameer Shere Ali Khan was completely defeated. Shere Ali Khan then took to flight, and his artillery, &c. fell into our hands, and his men were made captives. On the 19th of Ramzan (26th January) my brother and son entered the city of Candahar and took possession of it.

I congratulate my old friends on this success, and send intimation of it to you, because it is necessary that friends should be informed of it.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7.

KHUREETA to His Highness AMEER MAHOMED UFZUL KHAN, Walee of Cabul and Candahar, dated Fort William, 25th February 1867.

I HAVE received your Highness's friendly letter informing me that your Highness's troops under the command of Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan and Sirdar Abdool Reyman Khan have completely defeated Ameer Shere Ali Khan, and have followed up this victory by capturing and occupying the city of Candahar.

Your Highness must pardon my saying that I feel pity for Ameer Shere Ali Khan personally. He succeeded your Highness's renowned father as the ally of the British Government, and he adhered to the alliance, giving me no cause of offence at any time. Nevertheless, the general welfare of the great Barukzye house and of the Affghan people has higher claims upon my consideration. With great sorrow and solicitude I have, for three years past, seen that house and people a prey to the most calamitous dissensions. I am disposed therefore to hail hopefully any event which may tend to bring Affghanistan nearer to the attainment of a stable peace and strong government under one of the sons of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan. And in this spirit I beg to tender to your Highness my congratulations on the recent victory secured for your Highness's arms by my friend Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan and your Highness's gallant son, Sirdar Abdool Reyman Khan.

My friend! the British Government has hitherto maintained a strict neutrality between the contending parties in Affghanistan. Rumours, I am told, have reached the Cabul Durbar of assistance having been granted by me to Ameer Shere Ali Khan. I take this opportunity to request your Highness not to believe such idle tales. Neither men, nor arms, nor money, nor assistance of any kind, have ever been supplied by my Government to Ameer Shere Ali Khan. Your Highness and he, both equally unaided by me, have fought out the battle, each upon your own resources. I purpose to continue the same policy for the future. If unhappily the struggle for supremacy in Affghanistan has not yet been brought to a close, and hostilities are again renewed, I shall still side with neither party.

My friend! as I told your Highness in my former letter, the relations of the British Government are with the actual Rulers of Affghanistan. Therefore, so long as Ameer Shere Ali Khan holds Herat and maintains friendship with the British Government, I shall recognise him as Ruler of Herat, and shall reciprocate his amity.

But upon the same principle I am prepared to recognise your Highness as Ameer of Cabul and Candahar, and I frankly offer your Highness, in that capacity, peace and the good-will of the British Government. I shall expect your Highness in return to recognise as binding on your Highness's Government of Cabul and Candahar the engagements concluded between the British Government and your Highness's father, the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, as contained in the Treaty of 30th March 1855, and that part of the Treaty of 20th January 1857 which is still in force.

My friend! it will give me much pleasure if your Highness consent to this proposal and accept the alliance of the British Government. Confidently anticipating that your Highness will appreciate the advantages of such a course, I desire to bring to your Highness's notice the provision made in Article 7 of the Treaty of 1857 to the effect, that, "at the pleasure of the British Government, a Vakeel, not a European Officer, shall remain at Cabul on the part of the British Government." Your Highness is aware that since my last Agent was recalled to India three years ago, my communications with the Cabul Government have been carried on through a Moonshee whom the Agent left behind for the purpose. This arrangement was never intended to be otherwise than temporary, and it has been found inconvenient in practice. Accordingly, if your Highness has no objection, I shall at once depute a Mahomedan gentleman of rank and character to be my representative at your Highness's Court.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.

No. 8.

No. 66.

To the Right Honourable Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE, Bart., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Foreign Dept.
Political.

SIR,

Fort William, 27th March 1867.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 44, dated 28th ultimo, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, further papers relating to Afghanistan affairs.

We have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
H. S. MAINE.
G. N. TAYLOR.
W. N. MASSEY.
H. M. DURAND.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

From T. H. THORNTON, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, to J. W. S. WYLLIE, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort William, No. 163-90, dated Lahore, 1st March 1867.

I AM directed to forward, for the information and orders of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, copies of a letter from the Commissioner, Peshawur, No. 17, dated 26th ultimo, and its enclosed communication from the Cabul Moonshee.

2. The Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor presumes the Moonshee may be informed that the British Government can by no means advise the Rulers of Cabul to afford assistance to Bokhara at the present time, but will always be glad to receive intelligence regarding the progress of events, and will gladly accept this evidence of friendly confidence.

3. I am to add that in a recent demi-official communication from Sir Henry Green it is stated that "Ameer Shere Ali Khan has left Candahar for Herat with the expressed determination of continuing the struggle and of seeking the assistance of Persia and Russia." It seems to the Lieutenant-Governor highly probable that, under existing circumstances, he will seek for aid from every quarter whence he may entertain any hope of obtaining it; and it is, therefore, desirable that this Government be put in possession of the views of His Excellency in Council as to the course which it will be advisable to pursue in the event of his application being favourably received and responded to by those to whom he may address himself.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

COPY of a LETTER from Major F. R. POLLOCK, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to T. H. THORNTON, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, No. 17, dated 26th February 1867.

AGREEABLY to instructions conveyed in your No. 4, dated 4th January 1867, and enclosure, I wrote to the Cabul Moonshee, directing him, with reference to Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan's "Rookha," which furnished news of the recent proceedings of Russia in Central Asia, to inform the Cabul Rulers that the British Government had no reason to suppose that Russia would molest those who are in friendly relations with England, and that between England and Russia there existed most friendly relations.

2. Last evening I received from Cabul a communication, translation of which is annexed, and I have to solicit instructions as to what answer should be sent to the enquiry which I have italicised.

Enclosure 3 in No. 8.

From CABUL MOONSHEE, dated the 14th February 1867.

ACKNOWLEDGES receipt of reply to his communication which contained a "Rookha," in original, from Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, on the subject of Russian proceedings in Central Asia.

States that on the 14th he communicated to the Walee the reply from Peshawur, and that the Walee said that now his apprehensions regarding Russian proceedings had been removed, and that formerly his only object in writing as he did was to keep the English informed as to what was passing; that he comprehended all that had been written in reply from Peshawur, but that it might be well to ask one question, *viz.*, *Supposing that Bokhara, in consequence of the ancient friendship subsisting between her and Cabul, should seek assistance from Cabul, what should be said in reply?* and that he had, during the last few days, heard that Sirdar Fyz Mahomed Khan, Governor of Balkh, had of his own action entered into communication with the Russian Governor at Tashkend, and that although the English said they were satisfied that Russia had no unfriendly intentions towards people who were allied with them (the English), still he thought it as well to mention what Sirdar Fyz Mahomed Khan had done; and that he would continue to report all such matters as they came to his knowledge.

He also mentioned that Sirdar Fyz Mahomed Khan had agreed with his troops that they should, when the Ramzan came to a close, , but that nothing recent had been learnt of his doings. It appeared from what the Walee said that the Ameer Shere Ali was about 14 days ago at Washere, and bent on proceeding thence to Herat. Washere is 80 coss from Candahar.

Enclosure 4 in No. 8.

From J. W. S. WYLLIE, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT of the PUNJAB, No. 242, dated Fort William, the 12th March 1867.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 163-90, dated 1st instant, and, in reply, to state that, as regards Bokhara, the Governor-General in Council approves of the answer which His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor proposes to send to the Cabul Moonshee.

2. With reference to Ameer Shere Ali Khan's proceedings, His Excellency in Council desires me to state, for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor, that a cousin and prominent partisan of the Ameer's, bearing the same name as the Ameer, has arrived at Kurrachee, commissioned to ask for assistance on his master's part. The Commissioner of Scinde has been instructed to hear and report all that the Sirdar has to say, but to do nothing more. When, on receipt of the expected report, the Government of India shall have come to a conclusion as to the course which it may be most expedient to adopt in the matter, a further communication will be made to the Lieutenant-Governor. Meanwhile no action should be taken inconsistent with the Government's steady resolve to abstain from all interference in the struggle now going on in Affghanistan.

No. 9.

No. 105.

To the Right Honourable Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE, Bart., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Foreign Dept.
Political.

SIR,

Simla, 20th June 1867.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of further papers relating to Affghanistan affairs.

2. There are three points in these papers on which a few remarks from us may be advisable.

3. In the first place, the Ameer Ufzul Khan, writing from Cabul, under date April the 22nd, has replied to the letter in which the Governor-General recognised him as

Ruler of Cabul and Candahar. Ufzul Khan expresses his appreciation of the friendly feelings of the British Government towards the Barukzye family generally, and consents to receive a native gentleman as the representative of the British Government at his Court. This reply is satisfactory. But when it was first received, we doubted whether, with reference to the possibility of Ufzul Khan being ousted from Cabul by Fyz Mahomed before our Vakeel could arrive, it might not be advisable to await the issue of Fyz Mahomed's adventure so that the credentials to be borne by the Vakeel might be addressed to the party whom he would find actually in power at the Bala Hissar. Our next intelligence represented Fyz Mahomed as still lingering in his northern possessions. At the same time, we took into consideration that the want of a competent representative at Cabul, in the present disturbed condition of Affghanistan, kept the Government of India under a great disadvantage; and that, whatever chief might be in possession of the capital, we could reckon with tolerable assurance on his welcoming and protecting our Agent. Therefore, on the 29th ultimo, we telegraphed to the Punjab Government discretionary authority for the immediate despatch of the Vakeel by a safe route to Cabul. Atta Mahomed Khan is the name of the Vakeel, and we have full confidence in his discretion and fidelity. We have just heard that the Lieutenant-Governor, acting on this discretion, has thought it expedient again to defer the departure of the Agent.

4. Secondly, the Ameer Shere Ali Khan has left Herat and personally effected a junction with Fyz Mahomed Khan in Balkh. Until this step had been actually taken it was difficult to guess what reliance could be placed on the rumoured alliance between the two chiefs. In 1865-66 Fyz Mahomed had traitorously connived at Abdool Rahman's passage from Bokhara through Balkh to capture Cabul; and his full brother, Wullee Mahomed, has for some time past been a hostage in the hands of the Ameer Ufzul Khan. It was doubtful therefore how far Fyz Mahomed, in his new character as champion of the Ameer Shere Ali's cause, could be regarded as sincere. Even now it is probable that he acts more from motives of self-aggrandisement than from any devotion to his nominal lord. But it seems none the less certain that he is now advancing across the Hindoo Koosh with serious design to attack Cabul in the name of the Ameer Shere Ali; and that, whether Shere Ali accompany him or not to the actual assault, the expedition has considerable chances of success. Ameer Ufzul Khan's son, Abdool Rahman, has arrived at Cabul from Candahar, and, in view to organizing a defence against the northern invader, urgent messengers have been despatched for the recall of Aazum Khan to the capital; but the old jealousy subsisting between the latter and his nephew, Abdool Rahman, still divides the counsels of Ufzul Khan's party. In short, Shere Ali, at a time when his fortunes were at their lowest ebb, has received from a most unexpected quarter such an accession of strength as may carry him again for a time to the chief power in Affghanistan. Whatever happens, we contemplate no divergence from our settled policy of neutrality; unless indeed Shere Ali or any other party should throw themselves into the hands of Persia, and obtain assistance from the Shah; and even in this event nothing would be done without previous reference to Her Majesty's Government. You are aware that even in the same document in which we recognized Ufzul Khan's possession of Cabul and Candahar, we expressed sorrow for the fall of our original ally, Shere Ali, and announced our determination still to recognise him as Ameer of any portion of Affghanistan which might continue in his power. Thus, whether the brothers, Ufzul Khan and Aazum Khan, maintain their hold on the Bala Hissar, or whether Shere Ali, with Fyz Mahomed's aid, regain the throne of his inheritance, our relations with Affghanistan remain on their first footing of friendship towards the actual rulers, combined with rigid abstention from interference in domestic feuds.

5. Lastly, we may notice the fact of the journey to Meshhed undertaken by the Shah of Persia, and the rumour that he will be met there by an Affghan agent of rank, Meer Mahomed Ufzul Khan. Her Majesty's Envoy in Persia appears to be satisfied that the Shah's object is a religious one, unconnected with the politics of Affghanistan; and necessarily Mr. Alison must be the best judge on this point. We are aware that Shere Ali has at various times, and especially before his accession to the throne, shown marked proclivities towards a Persian alliance, and it would be only natural if after his recent defeat at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, and in his despair of any material aid from British India, he had applied to the Persian Government for assistance against his foes. But we have reason to believe that Meer Mahomed Ufzul Khan, the officer designated as Shere Ali's Envoy to Meshhed, is still at Furrak, a city on this side of Herat; unless therefore Shere Ali should have two distinguished partisans of the same name, our information tends, to some extent, to discredit the rumour that Meshhed is likely to be the scene of a political intrigue between the Shah of Persia and Shere Ali. At any

rate we have no reason to doubt the correctness of Mr. Alison's views, as to the absence of ambitious designs on the Shah's part.

We are, &c.
(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
W. MANSFIELD.
H. S. MAINE.
G. N. TAYLOR.
W. N. MASSEY.
H. M. DURAND.
G. U. YULE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 9.

From Ameer MAHOMED AFZUL KHAN to His Excellency the VICEROY OF INDIA,
dated 16th Zilhij 1283 A. H. (the 22nd April 1867).

ACKNOWLEDGES receipt of his Excellency's letter, stating that during the time that dissensions prevailed in Affghanistan the British Government maintained strict neutrality, and gave no sort of assistance to Ameer Shere Ali Khan, and that the same policy would be acted upon in future, and countenance given to neither party.

States that he is certain that it has been the desire of the British Government to see the dissensions among the members of the Barukzye family put a stop to and the Affghan nation in prosperity and comfort; and His Highness appreciates the kind intentions of the Government.

As regards the friendship between the two States alluded to in the letter of his Excellency, it has subsisted since the time of his late father, and His Highness hopes it may continue as formerly, and nothing will be done on his part prejudicial thereto.

His Excellency has alluded to the advantages of friendly relations with the British Government. His Highness admits that friendly relations with the powerful British Government will surely be productive of great advantage. His Excellency is desirous of sending a Vakeel to the Court of His Highness; and as friendship exists between the Governments, the Vakeel may be sent. He should, however, proceed to Cabul by the Koorrum route.

Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

SERVICE MESSAGE.

From Simla, dated the 29th May 1867.
From Foreign Secretary.
To Lahore.
To Secretary to Government.

"If Lieutenant-Governor sees no special objection, Viceroy approves Vakeel being now sent to Cabul, due precaution being taken for his reaching safely."

No. 10.

No. 3.

To the Right Honourable Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE, Bart., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (Extract.)

Foreign Dept.

SIR,

Simla, 3rd September 1867.

In the Cabul diary from 20th to 30th July, the following passage occurs:—

"The Wālee (of Cabul) has heard from Sirdar Mahomed Aazum Khan as follows:—
"The Shah of Persia, on arriving at Meshed, told off a force of 16,000 men for Seistan,
"and wrote to Mahomed Yacoob Khan, Governor of Herat, requiring him to restore to

“ Persia all the munitions of war, guns, and small arms that Persia in former days made over to a former Wālee. The Sirdar excused himself from replying to this demand, till he could hear from his father, Ameer Shere Ally.”

2. Again, the same diary says,—

“ The Wālee has sent by the hand of the Meer Moonshee (Secretary of the Durbar), in original, a letter he has received from Sirdar Mahomed Aazum Khan relating to affairs at Herat; it is submitted herewith. The Meer Moonshee stated verbally, by order of the Wālee, that the Ameer of Bukhara had several times sought assistance from the Wālee against Russia; but that the Wālee, out of motives of friendship towards the British Government, had not responded, and had reported to the British Government who, in reply, intimated that the proceedings of Russia had caused them no annoyance owing to the terms of amity existing between the Russian and English Governments. Subsequently to that, the Wālee had still sent no answer to Bukhara, and now it was seen what the proceedings of the Ameer Shere Ally were.”

3. The following is said to be a translation of the Sirdar's letter containing the above information :—

“ From Herat, it appears, by the report of a messenger I sent there, and who has now returned, that an Elchee (envoy) brought a letter from Meshed from the Shah of Persia, to Sirdar Mahomed Yacoob Khan, Governor of Herat, to the effect that if he was loyally and friendly disposed, he should come and pay his respects. The Sirdar replied that his conduct must be guided by the wishes of his father, and sent Mahomed Oomr, special messenger to the Ameer, who replied by express, that he had prayed God for such a turn of affairs, and that he (the son) should lose no time, but mount and wait on the Shah. Accordingly, Sirdar Mahomed Yacoob Khan, taking several horses with rich caparisons, and Cashmere dresses and other gorgeous presents, left for Meshed. He must have started thirty-four days ago; there is no doubt as to the fact. It remains to be seen how events will develop themselves, and what God will ordain.”

4. On receipt of the above intelligence we despatched the following message in cypher to Her Majesty's Embassy at Teheran :—

“ It is reported that on reaching Meshed the Shah wrote to Governor of Herat demanding restoration to Persia of certain guns, arms, and munitions of war, made over by Persia to a former Governor, also inviting the Governor to pay his respects to the Shah. The Governor, with sanction of Ameer Shere Ally, is reported to have set out with suitable presents for the Shah.

“ Pray ascertain what is the real state of the matter.”

5. It is impossible for us, at the present moment, to say what amount of truth there may be in the above reports. On the one hand, it is for the interest of the party now in power at Cabul, to seek our good offices by representing their opponent Ameer Shere Ally as in league with Persia; and the tenor of the Durbar Moonshee's communications, in delivering Sirdar Mahomed Aazum Khan's letter to our news-writer, evidently points to such considerations as being uppermost in the Wālee, Ameer Afzul Khan's mind. “ Bukhara,” he said, “ had made repeated advances to him for aid against Russia, which had been refused from his desire not to offend the British Government; now his enemy was intriguing with Persia;—” implying that the Ameer by this conduct had placed himself beyond the pale of our alliance, while the party now in power at Cabul deserved our countenance and aid. Such being the views of the dominant party, it is quite possible that the intelligence, if not fabricated altogether, is yet much exaggerated and over-coloured. On the other hand, Ameer Shere Ally has long been said to look for aid from Persia, on finding that he could get none from us. And, with the struggle for the mastery at Cabul impending, and the Shah with a large army on the Affghan frontier, with the known desires also of Persia to have an interest in the administration of Herat, it is far from improbable that the Ameer Shere Ally should have been tempted to open negotiations with the Shah.

6. In this uncertainty as to the facts, we should have waited for the reply of Mr. Alison, who with much foresight has deputed a British Officer to be in attendance on the camp of the Shah and watch the proceedings of the Court of Persia in the direction of Affghanistan. But we may not receive a reply for some time. Unless the officer in question should already have reported the state of things to the Embassy, it will probably take several weeks before the facts are ascertained. We have thought it right, accordingly, not to delay communicating our sentiments to you, in order that we may be in timely possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government, and be able to act with promptitude on the possible contingency that Shere Ally throws himself into the arms of

Persia, and that the Shah takes measures to support him, and practically becomes again master of Herat.

Should the rumour prove untrue, of course the necessity for any present action will no longer exist. But if it should turn out to be founded on fact, that is, if it should be ascertained that Ameer Shere Ally has made overtures to Persia, and that in consequence terms of mutual aid and concession have been concluded between the two powers, then in that event we think that it might be highly for the interests of British India to declare the treaty at present existing between us and Ameer Shere Ally at an end; and to openly assist the party in power at Cabul, if at the time being that party should appear to be in a condition likely, with such assistance, to hold its position against Ameer Shere Ally. Our aid would be confined to a moderate subsidy of money, and a supply of arms and accoutrements. The moral and material help thus rendered would go a great way to give the party at Cabul, in such active alliance with ourselves, a clear and unassailable supremacy.

7. Ameer Shere Ally has been already warned what the consequences of an alliance with Persia would be, and could not justly complain if we, under the supposed circumstances, adopted the course above sketched out.

8. Although the Affghans are proverbially fickle and venal to the last degree, yet we apprehend that there would be motives rendering such action on our part not displeasing to them. The inhabitants of Herat are allied more to the Affghan race than to that of Persia. Any predominance of Persian interests would be unpalatable to the chiefs of Affghanistan. The Persians are disliked in consequence of both national and religious antipathies. An alliance of the Affghan chiefs with ourselves (so as it did not rouse suspicion and bigotry by the presence of European officers) would be far from unpopular, especially if it were known to be the only alternative to the Persian proclivities of Ameer Shere Ally.

9. In considering the possibilities of the future, it might turn out that Ameer Shere Ally, having entered into negotiations with Persia, should regain the throne of Cabul. In that event, we think that the value he is known to attach to the countenance of the British Government, would enable us to detach him from any such engagements. But if otherwise, and it were ascertained that he continued bound to Persia in a manner inconsistent with his relations to us, it would only remain for us to call the attention of Persia to her engagements in reference to Herat, and to insist upon their faithful observance.

10. It is also a probable contingency that the party now in power at Cabul, even if aided and countenanced by us, should, under the present shifting phase of Affghan affairs, in its turn pass away, and be succeeded either by Shere Ally or by some other combination of the Sirdars. We are of opinion that any such change need in no degree affect the British line of policy. Our relations should always be with the de facto ruler of the day, and so long as the de facto ruler is not unfriendly to us, we should always be prepared to renew with him the same terms and favourable conditions as obtained under his predecessor.

In this way we shall be enabled to maintain our influence in Affghanistan far more effectually than by any advance of our troops—a contingency which could only be contemplated in the last resort, which would unite as one man the Affghan tribes against us, and which would paralyze our finances.

11. Such are our views on the present state of affairs, and we are anxious to have a very early expression of the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government in reference to the action we propose adopting, should the contingencies we have adverted to take any definite shape.

12. The intelligence now communicated suggests the discussion of another subject, which has latterly from time to time forced itself on our attention. We allude to the present position of Russia in Central Asia. From circumstances which Russia alleges to have been to a great degree beyond her control, and to have forced upon her an aggressive policy, her advances have been rapid. And by the late victory she is reported to have achieved over Bukhara, her influence will no doubt soon, if it has not already, become paramount at Samarcand and Bukhara, as it has for some time past been in Kokand. However, some of her own statesmen assert that the true interests of Russia do not consist in the expansion of her posts and frontier among the bigoted and uncivilized population south of the Oxus, and they aver that the late advances have been prosecuted, not in fulfilment of any predetermined line of aggressive progress, but by the hostile attitude and schemes of Bukhara, and in opposition to her normal policy. If these representations be a correct exposition of the views of Russia, then it is as much in harmony with her interests as it is with those of British India, that up to a certain border the relations of the respective Governments should be openly acknowledged and admitted

as bringing them into necessary contact and treaty with the tribes and nations on the several sides of such a line. If an understanding, and even an engagement, of this nature were come to, we, on the one hand, could look on without anxiety or apprehension at the proceedings of Russia on her southern frontier, and welcome the civilizing effect of her border government on the wild tribes of the Steppe, and on the bigoted and exclusive Governments of Bukhara and Kokand. While Russia, on the other hand, assured of our loyal feeling in this matter, would have no jealousy in respect of our alliance with the Affghan and neighbouring tribes.

13. If such be the line of policy advantageous to the interests of both Empires, the time would now appear to have come when the subject might with great advantage be brought under discussion in Her Majesty's Cabinet. And, should you coincide with us in these views, we would respectfully suggest that a communication might be made in the sense of what we have now written to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

We have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
W. H. MANSFIELD.
H. S. MAINE.
G. N. TAYLOR.
W. N. MASSEY.
H. M. DURAND.
G. U. YULE.

Postscript.—Since this letter was written a reply has been received from Teheran. A copy of Mr. Alison's message is subjoined. In spite of the protestations of the Persian authorities, we think the simple fact of the Governor of Herat having visited the Shah's camp at Meshed strong evidence that there is an understanding between the King of Persia and Ameer Shere Ally Khan. Unless it were so, the Ameer's son Sirdar Yacoob Ally Khan would scarcely have paid this visit, particularly at a moment when the Affghan force in Herat must be very weak. Accordingly, we are of opinion that some arrangement connected with Herat, which time only can develop, has probably been entered into between the two parties. A rumour is current at Cabul that Persian troops have already occupied Herat. We doubt the correctness of this rumour, and think it more likely that any assistance rendered by Persia would be in a form less direct and less calculated to attract our attention.

Our Native Agent for Cabul is still at Peshawur. The Lieutenant-Governor has been unwilling to despatch him to that Court while an early attack from Ameer Shere Ally Khan was expected. But we have this day explained to his Honour that, unless the Agent himself should anticipate danger in proceeding to Cabul, we desire that he should set out upon the journey at once. The Moonshee at Cabul has done very well. But the presence of a Puthan of good family, of considerable ability, and of tried experience, such as Khan Buhadoor Atta Muhammad Khan, would at this juncture be valuable at Cabul. He will be able to form a correct judgment of the feelings of the parties in Affghanistan, and of the probable result of the impending contest, on which points it is most important that we should possess the best information.

Enclosure in No. 10.

Copy of Message.

From Teheran.
From Alison.

To Simla.
To the Viceroy of India.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs says that he does not believe that the Shah demands restoration of these guns, etcetera; but he will inquire and clear up that point. Mr. Thomson does not report anything on the subject. The Shah left Meshed on the 21st ultimo. Before leaving, Yakoob Ally Khan came with presents on the part of latter and received equally valuable presents in return. Shah had sent me the assurance that, whatever representations might be made to him by Yakoob Ally Khan on the part of Shere Ally Khan, the greatest care should be taken that nothing was done by the Persian Government to transgress or encroach upon the stipulations of the Treaty regarding Affghanistan. 26th, 7-15 P.M.—27th, 0-45.

No. 11.

No. 178.

To the Right Honourable Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE, Bart., Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

Foreign Dept.

Political.

SIR,

Fort William, 7th December 1867.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of further papers relating to Afghanistan affairs.

2. It will be seen that Sirdar Mahomed Afzul Khan is dead, and that Sirdar Mahomed Aazam Khan, brother of the deceased, has been elected Ruler of Cabul.

3. We have made a communication to the new Ameer condoling with him on the death of his brother, and congratulating him upon his accession. Our Vakeel will proceed at once to assume his functions at the Court of Cabul.

We have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
G. N. TAYLOR.
W. N. MASSEY.
H. M. DURAND.
G. U. YULE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

Service Message, dated 11th October 1867.

From SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, Punjab, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Deputy Commissioner, Peshawur, reports that Afzul Khan died on 7th instant.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

Service Message, dated 19th October 1867.

From SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, Punjab, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

INTELLIGENCE received that Mahomed Azim Khan has been formally acknowledged as Ruler of Cabul in open Durbar, not only by the chiefs and nobles generally but by his nephew Abdul Rahman Khan, who has made over his father's sword to Mahomed Azim Khan, but continues to hold the post of commander of the forces.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

Service Message, dated 22nd October 1867.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, Punjab.

The credentials of the Vakeel will be postponed until we hear further from Cabul.

Enclosure 4 in No. 11.

From T. H. THORNTON, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General, Simla, No. 387-817, dated Murree, the 19th October 1867.

I AM directed to submit, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, and for any orders that may be deemed necessary, copies of a letter and its enclosure from the Commissioner, Peshawur, No. 83, dated 16th instant, communicating

the formal recognition of Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan as Ruler of Cabul in succession to his brother, the late Muhammad Afzal Khan; and of my reply thereto of this date, conveying the orders of the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor in regard to the despatch of our Agent, Atta Muhammad Khan, to Cabul.

Enclosure 5 in No. 11.

From Major F. R. POLLOCK, Commissioner, Peshawur Division, to T. H. THORNTON, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, No. 83, dated the 16th October 1867.

I HAVE the honour to annex translation of a communication received this day from the Cabul Munshi, to effect that the defeat of the troops under Sardar Fyz Muhammad Khan, the death of that Khan, the retreat or flight of the Amir Sher Ali Khan, and the death of the Wali Muhammad Afzal Khan from dropsy, have been rapidly followed by the open and formal recognition at Cabul of Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan as Wali or Amir in his brother's place.

2. Previous accounts showed that ill-feeling between Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan and his nephew, Sardar Abdul Rahman Khan, continued to exist, and the news now reported can only be taken to mean that Sardar Abdul Rahman Khan has for a time yielded to the force of circumstances and temporised with his uncle. The previous history of the uncle and nephew render it, in my opinion, extremely unlikely either that Sardar Abdul Rahman Khan would voluntarily consent to waive his right of succession, or that Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan can succeed in consolidating his power permanently and outlive his reputation for tyranny and deceit. I beg, however, at once to solicit instructions on the subject of sending condolences to the Barakzye family on the deaths of Sardar Fyz Muhammad Khan and Muhammad Afzal Khan; also as regards the recognition of Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan and deputation to Cabul of the British Agent, Khan Bahadoor Atta Muhammad Khan.

3. Whether the Agent be despatched or not, I presume that letters as above indicated may be despatched, and, perhaps, it will be considered desirable to leave the matter of the despatch of Agent for a few days pending receipt of a letter, which may be very shortly looked for, from Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan, announcing his accession to the throne, and courting a friendly recognition from the British Government as the ally of his late father, Amir Dost Muhammad Khan.

Enclosure 6 in No. 11.

TRANSLATION of a Communication received from Cabul Munshi, under date the 9th October 1867.

SARDAR Abdul Rahman Khan at first entertained the belief that on the demise of his father, the Wali (Sardar Muhammad Afzal Khan), he would succeed to the throne, his uncle, Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan, taking the second place in the conduct of affairs as Naib; but Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan, sending for his nephew and Abdool Rahim Khan (Abdool Rahman Khan's confidential servant), explained in a private audience that, in event of his (Sardar Abdool Rahman Khan's) being able to undertake the responsibilities of the Government, he (Azam) was willing to bow to his will, and reside at Candahar or Khooram, or any other place he might indicate, except Cabul, waiting on him at Cabul if sent for on emergency; and that it was with Ameer Sher Ali Khan alone that he (Azam) could not agree, and that he would always look on him (Abdool Rahman Khan) as his son, and would do nothing to injure his own family. The Sardar, owing to his isolation (tunhaee) and to the diversity of opinions at Cabul, replied that he would give way to his uncle, and consider him in the light of a parent; accordingly, to day, after the conclusion of third day's mourning for the Wali, the Sardar Abdool Rahman Khan in public Durbar made over the sword of his deceased father to Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan and tendered his allegiance to him, which was followed at once by a similar submission on the part of all the Sardars and Notables. Briefly, the Government was made over to Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan, and Sardar Abdool Rahman Khan assumed formal charge of the Commander-in-Chief of the army.

Enclosure 7 in No. 11.

From T. H. THORNTON, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, to Major F. R. POLLOCK, Commissioner, Peshawur Division, No. , dated the 19th October 1867.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 83, dated 16th instant, relative to the formal recognition of Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan as Ruler of Cabul in succession to his brother; and, in reply, to state that, in the event of your receiving in time the expected letters from the Cabul Ruler indicative of a desire to maintain intimate relations with the British Government, you should regard this as sufficient authority for carrying out at once the orders for the despatch of our Agent, communicated in letter of the Supreme Government, No. 1028, dated 11th instant, without waiting for a special reply as to the wishes of the Ruler on this point, which was prescribed on the supposition that his real wishes might be still uncertain.

2. The tenor of the instructions to be given to the Agent have already been communicated to you; and the credentials promised by the Supreme Government will be forwarded hereafter, when they should be despatched so as, if possible, to overtake him. In the meantime, he should be introduced by a letter from yourself to the address of the Amir, remarking, with reference to the latter's expected letter to your address, that it is hoped the presence of our Agent at Cabul will be regarded as evidence that the British Government is desirous, as it has ever been, of maintaining intimate relations of friendship with the accepted ruler of that territory, and promising to forward replies to his other letters when received.

Enclosure 8 in No. 11.

KHUREETA to the Address of His Highness Ameer MAHOMED AAZUM KHAN, Walce of Cabul and Candahar, dated the 13th November 1867.

I HAVE received from my news-writer at Cabul intimation of the sickness and death of your Highness' brother, the late Ameer Mahomed Afzul Khan, and of your Highness having succeeded to the Ameership.

My friend! I offer to you my sincere condolence on the distress which has been occasioned to your Highness' illustrious family from this painful event.

At the same time it has given me much satisfaction to learn that, with the consent of the son of the late Ameer, Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan, and the approval of the chiefs and people of the country, you have been installed as the successor of your late brother.

And, my friend! it is my earnest hope that this auspicious event may tend towards the consolidation and prosperity of the kingdom.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.

No. 12.

Copy.

Secret, No. 15.

To the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR GENERAL of INDIA. (Extract.)

India Office, London,

26th December 1867.

SIR,

1. HER MAJESTY'S Government have had under their consideration the important political questions to which your Excellency has lately directed their attention in various letters.

2. These questions relate, firstly, to the position of affairs in Afghanistan, and the course to be pursued towards the ruler of that country by your Excellency's Government; and, secondly, to the progress of Russia in Central Asia, and the diplomatic action which might advantageously be taken with respect to it by Her Majesty's Government in Europe.

3. Although these questions are to some extent interlaced with and dependent upon each other, it is desirable that they should be separately treated.

4. With respect to the first question, Her Majesty's Government observe that, on the death of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, his son Shere Ali Khan, who had been nominated Heir-apparent, was recognised by the British Viceroy of the day, as the de facto Ruler of Afghanistan. The Treaty rights to which the Sirdar thus succeeded were those which resulted from the engagements contracted between the British Government in India and Ameer Dost Mahomed, when your Excellency as Chief Commissioner of the Punjab in 1855, met the Sirdar Hyder Khan at Peshawur. But there was nothing in this Treaty rendering it incumbent on the British Government to support the pretensions of Shere Ali Khan, or of any other chief, if, in the progress of events, it might appear that his policy was not such as to promote the interests of the Afghan nation by securing the internal tranquillity and independence of the country and the preservation of the peace of the frontier.

5. There has, therefore, been no breach of faith in the decision adopted by your Excellency to recognise the late Sirdar Mahomed Afzul Khan as de facto Ruler of Cabul, when the course of events in Afghanistan placed him in that position; nor can there be any impropriety in your equally acknowledging his son and successor Abdul Rahman Khan, if it appear that he is the chief preferred by the nation.

6. It is the desire of Her Majesty's Government not to interfere in the internal conflicts of the Afghans, so long as they do not jeopardize the peace of the frontier, or lead to the formation of engagements with other powers dangerous to the independence of Afghanistan, which it long has been and still is the main object of our policy in that part of the world to maintain. If, however, your Excellency should see reason to believe that either party in the State is endeavouring to strengthen itself against the national feeling by invoking foreign aid, and especially if you should observe any disposition to make territorial sacrifices, or otherwise to compromise the integrity of Afghanistan for the sake of obtaining such aid, it is quite right that you should warn those who may evince such an inclination that by such a course they may compel the British Government to give material support to their rivals.

7. I learn from the despatch under reply that your Excellency has already given such a warning to Shere Ali Khan, and I approve of your proposal, should you ascertain that this Chief has entered into any compact with Persia involving the interference of that power in Afghan affairs, to give support in the form of a subsidy or of a supply of arms to the de facto Ruler of Cabul, declaring at the same time that the Treaty with Shere Ali Khan is at an end.

8. Her Majesty's Government, however, cannot anticipate that the Persian Government will enter upon a course of policy distinctly renounced in the Treaty of Paris, and they take for granted that even if Shere Ali Khan should have made overtures of the character you describe they will have been declined by the Government of the Shah.

9. Her Majesty's Government entirely agree with your Excellency in the opinion that if any aid at all is given to the Ruler of Cabul, it should be in the form of a subsidy or of a grant of arms, and not by any advance of our troops. Such an advance would in all probability give occasion for grave misapprehensions as to our intentions, and might lead to serious complications.

10. Having thus conveyed to your Excellency the general views of Her Majesty's Government, I have only to add that they place the most implicit confidence in your prudence, and in your intimate acquaintance with the political condition of Afghanistan, and feel assured that they may safely leave it to your discretion to act as you may think right upon any emergency that may arise.

11. I now proceed to the second question, to which your Excellency refers, namely, whether it is desirable to make any communication to the Government of Russia, in order to obviate any possible inconvenience that might be apprehended from the progress of that power in Central Asia.

12. Upon this point Her Majesty's Government see no reason for any uneasiness or for any jealousy. The conquests which Russia has made, and apparently is still making in Central Asia, appear to them to be the natural result of the circumstances in which she finds herself placed, and to afford no ground whatever for representations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the part of this country. Friendly communications have at various times passed between the two Governments on the subject, and should an opportunity offer Her Majesty's Government will avail themselves of it for the purpose of obviating any possible danger of misunderstanding either with respect to the

proceedings of Russia, or to those of England. This is all that it appears necessary or desirable to do.

(Signed) S. H. NORTHCOTE.

No. 12A.

No. 29 of 1868.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Political.

TO HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

SIR,

Fort William, the 14th February 1868.

WITH reference to suggestions made by our late colleague, Sir George Yule, for the purpose of improving our position in respect of the Cabul Government and the Affghan tribes on the border, a memorandum on the subject has been, under our instructions, prepared by Mr. T. H. Thornton, Secretary to the Punjab Government, and this we have now the honour of submitting for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

We have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
W. R. MANSFIELD.
G. N. TAYLOR.
W. N. MASSEY.
H. M. DURAND.
W. MUIR.
H. S. MAINE.

Enclosure in No. 12A.

MEMORANDUM, dated 18th November 1867.

THE design of the present memorandum is to describe the measures taken since the annexation of the Punjab for promoting the growth of friendly relations between the British Government and the Affghan nation generally, and in particular the Patan tribes of the north-west frontier; to state the result of those measures; and to indicate the measures in contemplation for giving further encouragement to friendly intercourse between the people of Affghanistan and the Punjab.

2. To enable the reader to form a fair estimate of the measure of success which has been achieved, it is necessary, in the first instance, to describe briefly the number and character of the tribes referred to, and their relations with the Government of the Punjab *previous* to annexation.

Enumeration of Patan tribes
on the frontier.

3. The Patan tribes immediately adjacent to the Punjab frontier are the following:—

Adjoining frontier of Hazara District.	} Hassanzais.
Adjoining frontier of Peshawur District.	} Juduns. Bonairwals. Swatis. Ranizais. Osmankheydis. Upper Momands.
Adjoining frontier of Peshawur and Kohat Districts.	

Adjoining frontier of Kohat District.	of	{ Buzotis. Sepahs. Orakzais. Zaimusht Affghans. Turis.
Adjoining frontier of Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan Districts.	of	{ Waziris.
Adjoining frontier of Dera Ismail Khan District.	of	{ Sheoranis. Oshteranais.
Adjoining frontier of Dera Ghazee Khan District.	of	{ Khetrans.

4. Their character is graphically portrayed in the following extracts from Mr. Temple's Report on the independent tribes of the north-west frontier:—

“ Now *these tribes are savages*, noble savages perhaps, and not without some tincture of virtue and generosity, but still absolutely barbarians nevertheless. They have nothing approaching to government or civil institutions; they have for the most part no education; they have nominally a religion, but Mahomedanism, as understood by them, is no better, or perhaps is actually worse, than the creeds of the wildest races on earth. In their eyes the one great commandment is blood for blood, and fire and sword for all infidels, that is, for all people not Mahomedans. They are superstitious and priest-ridden. But the priests (Mullas) are as ignorant as they are bigoted, and use their influence simply for preaching crusades against unbelievers, and inculcate the doctrine of rapine and bloodshed against the defenceless people of the plain. The hill-men are sensitive in regard to their women, but their customs in regard to marriage and betrothal are very prejudicial to social advancement. At the same time they are a sensual race. They are very avaricious; for gold they will do almost anything, except betray a guest. They are thievish and predatory to the last degree. The Patan mother often prays that her son may be a successful robber. They are utterly faithless to public engagements; it would never occur to their minds that an oath on the Koran was binding if against their interests. It must be added that they are fierce and blood-thirsty. They are never without weapons: when grazing their cattle, when driving beasts of burden, when tilling the soil, they are still armed. They are perpetually at war with each other. Each tribe, and section of a tribe, has its internecine wars, every family its hereditary blood-feuds, and every individual his personal foes. There is hardly a man whose hands are unstained. Each person counts up his murders. Each tribe has a debtor and creditor account with its neighbours, life for life. Reckless of the lives of others, they are not sparing of their own. They consider retaliation and revenge to be strongest of all obligations. They possess gallantry and courage themselves, and admire such qualities in others. Men of the same party will stand by one another in danger. To their minds hospitality is the first of virtues. Any person who can make his way into their dwellings will not only be safe, but will be kindly received. But as soon as he has left the roof of his entertainer, he may be robbed or killed. They are charitable to the indigent of their own tribe; they possess the pride of birth, and regard ancestral associations. They are not averse to civilization whenever they have felt its benefits; they are fond of trading, and also of cultivating; but they are too fickle and excitable to be industrious in agriculture or anything else. They will take military service, and, though impatient of discipline, will prove faithful, unless excited by fanaticism. Such, briefly, is their character, replete with the unaccountable inconsistencies, with that mixture of opposite vices and virtues, belonging to savages.”

5. To establish enduring relations of peace and amity with tribes so bigoted, so fickle, and so treacherous, is in any case a matter of the greatest difficulty; but the difficulty is enhanced in the case of Patan tribes by two notable characteristics, *viz.*, their essentially republican constitutions and everlasting factions. In dealing with such tribes the Government has to deal, not with a single recognized Chief or a united clan, but with a house divided against itself. Friendship with one section of the tribe is apt to be enmity with another; and treaties ratified one day are repudiated the next.

Nothing seems to unite them but a common danger, and a common jealousy of the intrusion of strangers into their tribes.

6. The policy pursued by the Sikh Rulers towards these tribes was not such as to encourage friendly intercourse. When occupying a frontier district they would build a small fort somewhere in the centre of the tract, and then leave the whole country to the mercy of the border tribes, who were permitted to carry on their petty feuds with impunity so long as they wrought no material injury against the Government. A heavy revenue was demanded from independent tribesmen holding lands within the Sikh border, and obnoxious cesses, such as the capitation tax of the Bunnu District, were levied from those who might visit the markets of the plains.

7. As for trade and communications, there was not a road worthy of the name, and the whole country was threaded with a net-work of preventive lines, and these lines were dotted with innumerable posts for the collection of every kind of tax, direct and indirect. No article of home or foreign manufacture could traverse the kingdom in its length or breadth, nor could enter any large market, without paying the duty a dozen times over. Trade with Cabul through the Peshawur passes was reduced to the lowest ebb, while the caravans which travelled from Ghuzni were forced to follow the most difficult and circuitous routes.

8. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the relations of these tribes and the Sikh Government were not of a friendly character; they were, in fact, those of deadly hostility. On the north the Yusufzais and Khataks never abated a determined resistance to Sikh authority; in so much so that General Avitabile, the Governor of Peshawur, dared not leave his capital except accompanied with a large force. On the west the Wazir border was rife with raids and forays, fortified villages were beleaguered, and pitched fights took place with considerable loss of life. Further south the Sheoranis were the terror of the border. They would carry off not only cattle, but men and women; they once sacked the town of Drabund, though defended by a small Sikh garrison, and for miles the border was laid waste by their depredations, or deserted for fear of their attacks.

9. Such, briefly, was the state of affairs on the border previous to the annexation of the Punjab. I proceed to describe the progress and results of British Administration.

10. One of the first acts of the British Government was to *abolish all customs duties*, and render the trade with Cabul and the frontier *altogether free*; it discontinued the capitation tax; reduced the land tax upon holdings of independent tribes in British territory, and at the same time confirmed whatever fiefs they may have held from former Rulers; and while it organized a strong military force for the defence and pacification of the frontier, it issued standing instructions to its administrative officers to cultivate friendly relations with the frontier tribes; to receive their "Jeergahs," or deputations of elders, with consideration, and entertain them hospitably: in the event of hostilities, to act, in the first instance, purely on the defensive, and to strive to conciliate and reason into submission before resort to coercive measures. Such has been the policy continuously pursued, and up to the present day much of a frontier officer's time is taken up in interviews with the representatives of border tribes, in patiently hearing their representations and endeavouring to adjust their differences; and some thousands of rupees are spent annually in showing them consideration and hospitality.

11. The Government has further freely admitted men of Afghanistan and the border into the ranks of the public service, whether military, police, or civil.

12. It has established all along the border charitable dispensaries open free of charge to men of all nationalities and all creeds, where men of frontier tribes are not only treated, but *fed*, at the public expense. One of these dispensaries is at Abbottabad, in the Huzara Hills, another at the old Sikh Cantonment of Hurripore, another at Murdan in the Yusufzai country, another at Peshawur, another at Kohat, with branches at Hungu and Tiri, another at Bunnu, with a branch at Lakki, in the Esakheyi District, another at Dera Ismail Khan, with a branch at Kolachi on the extreme western frontier of the Punjab. Fully

one-tenth of those who receive medical aid at these dispensaries are members of independent frontier tribes. At Dera Ismail Khan in 1863, of 11,309 persons receiving medical aid, 1,423 were Patans from beyond the border, chiefly Povindahs from Ghuzni; at Murdan considerable numbers of patients, both in-door and out-door, come from Bonair, Swat, Bajawar, Kunar, and Kashkar, and not a few from Cabul and from Ghuzni. "A member of a frontier tribe," wrote the Inspector General of Dispensaries in 1863, "will in a case of sickness depute a messenger to travel on foot scores of miles in order to obtain medicines or advice. In surgical cases requiring an operation they place the most implicit faith in the skill of the English operator, and submit themselves to the knife with perfect confidence."

13. With a view of still further popularising these institutions, arrangements have been made for affording a medical education to students speaking Pushtu, the language of the Affghans, and five young Patans are now pursuing their studies in the Lahore Medical School; their expenses to and from their homes are defrayed, and they are allowed a liberal stipend during their stay at Lahore.

14. A Pushtu primer and vocabulary, for the use of village schools, has been published by the Educational Department; and encouragement has been given to the study of Pushtu by English officers, both civil and military, by institution of a reward of Rupees 500 for all who can pass a satisfactory examination in that language; and copies of Dr. Bellew's new Pushtu grammar and dictionary have recently been distributed to every regiment and every district officer on the north-western frontier.

15. It remains to notice the efforts which have been made to improve and facilitate communications by land and water.

I have not yet succeeded in obtaining from the Public Works Department a detail of imperial works, but the following improvements to communications have been made from local funds in the frontier districts within the last five years:—

In Peshawur new roads have been made from Peshawur to Hurripore *via* Pehoa Ferry and Murdan; from Jehangiree on the Cabul River to Kotah in Yusufzai; from Murdan to Loondkhor and up the Loondkhor Valley; from Peshawur Cantonment to Boorj Hurree Sing. A bridge of boats has been erected over the Cabul River at Nowshera, to facilitate the salt traffic of the Khuttuk Hills and the countries beyond the border. The roads to Kohat and to Michnee and Doaba have been improved, and the Nissutta and Jullozye roads have been bridged. A house has also been purchased at Peshawur for the accommodation of vakeels and foreigners of distinction.

In Huzara new roads have been made from Abbottabad to Murree, opening up the Kurrul country; from Murdan to Torbela; from Gurhee on the Nainsookh to Bukkote on the Jhelum; and from Kirplian to Torbela; while the road to Kaghan has been improved.

In Kohat and Bunnu the roads from Bunnu to Khooshalgurh and the roads from frontier posts have been raised and bridged, and serais built at Goombela, Peyzoo, Lukkee, Esaukheyl, Guzneekheyl, Kalabagh, and Nikkee. The timber trade by the Koorum River has been opened.

In Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazee Khan, also, various frontier roads with serais and rest-houses have been constructed, of which a detail appears unnecessary.

16. Weekly steam communication has long been established between Kotree, the Indus terminus of the Sind Railway, and Multan, and for the last four years the steamers of the Punjab Government Steam Flotilla have been running on the Upper Indus between Sukkur and Makkudd, whence there is water communication as far as Attok on the Indus, and up the Cabul River as far as Pubbeh within 14 miles of Peshawur. The steamers of the flotilla are at present three in number, the *Jhelum*, the *Chenab*, and the *Byas*. Of these, the two former belonged to the late Government Flotilla of the Lower Indus, and are of too great a draught to ply successfully on the shallow waters of the Upper Indus. The *Byas* is a new vessel, built at Liverpool expressly for her present service. She is constructed on the stern-wheel principle, draws only two feet laden, most of her cargo being carried in flats. She has already proved herself the fastest vessel in the service, and with a few alterations will be all that can be desired. A new steamer on the same principle, but with improvements suggested by experience, is, it is believed, under construction, and will be shortly added to the flotilla. Meanwhile, the Indus pilots are daily improving in their knowledge of the river, and the average duration of each voyage has been considerably reduced. The earnings of the flotilla (which aggregate Rupees 50,000 per annum) do not, as yet, suffice to cover much more than

one-fourth of the expenditure ; but this is to be expected at first, as the experience of the Ganges and other rivers shows that it takes some years before native shippers take confidence and trade is diverted into new routes ; but the amount realised each voyage is *steadily increasing*, and now averages some Rupees 5,000 per voyage ; and last year *for the first time* Povindah merchants from Ghuzni availed themselves of the flotilla for the conveyance of their goops. Meanwhile efforts are being made to improve the navigation ; a River Conservator has been appointed ; snags have been removed ; rocks destroyed by blasting ; navigable channels widened and deepened ; and improvements effected in the towing paths from Mukkudd to Attok. In short, there is every prospect that, if tolerably regular steam communication is kept up between Sukkur and Mukkudd, the trade will largely increase.

Improvements of the Indus Channel.

17. The above sketch of the measures taken to improve our relations and develop commercial intercourse with the countries beyond the border, though far more meagre than could be wished, will suffice, I trust, to show that the assumption that "we have done nothing to improve our position with the Affghans" is destitute of foundation.

18. But, it may be asked, are there any tangible results of the policy and measures taken ? Are our Affghan neighbours more amicably disposed or less hostile than before ? Has trade been developed ? Has our influence increased ?

19. To all these questions a reply may at once be given in the affirmative. We have not yet succeeded in making the leopard change his spots. The Patan in his native hills is still bigoted, fickle, and treacherous, but the constant and deadly hate of the days of Sikh rule is a thing of the past. Raids, which once were chronic, are now exceptional ; tracts under the hills which a few years back were a wilderness are now a broad sheet of cultivation, which is rapidly extending, not only in the richer and more civilised parts of our frontier districts, but in its most distant and rugged corners, and even to glens and passes beyond our own immediate frontier ; numbers of frontier clans pray for our protection, and for permission to settle in our territories ; the people of Upper Meranzai have voluntarily become our subjects ; the people of Dour have more than once sought to be transferred to British rule ; and within the last two years sections of the Waziri tribe, the most warlike and most predatory of the frontier tribes, have agreed to settle down as peaceful cultivators on the Tank border, and the Bithunnis, a robber clan, are quietly cultivating lands in Bunnu as subjects of the British Government ; disputes are voluntarily referred by contending factions of independent tribes for the arbitrament of British officers ; and service in our armies and militia is eagerly sought after. The trade through the Peshawur passes, which at annexation was at its lowest ebb, is steadily increasing ; in 1862 it was valued at 277,156*l.* for the year ; during the months of June, July, August, and September of the past year (the latest period for which I have returns) trade between Cabul and Peshawur alone was valued at rupees 1,90,000. The proceeds of the tolls on the Attok bridge in 1866-67 was rupees 11,110 and the tolls on all the ferries on the Indus have risen from rupees 4,002 in 1857 to rupees 19,842 in 1859-60, and Rupees 24,736 in 1866-67. The tonnage on the Upper Indus has increased from 818 boats, with cargoes aggregating 265,000 maunds in 1855 (the earliest period for which statistics are available) to 3,153 boats, with cargoes aggregating 1,190,129 maunds, valued at Rupees 66,20,838, in 1865-66.

Diminution of raids.
Extension of cultivation.
Frontier clans settle in our territories.
Increase of trade.
Vide Mr. Davies' Trade Report.

20. Lastly, of the increasing influence of British prestige beyond the border we have a signal instance in the recent capture of Koura Khan, the Kusrani Chief (the captor of Lieutenant Grey), who was pursued, caught, and delivered up to justice, not by force of arms or of blockade, but by the united action of independent frontier tribes, set on foot at the bidding of a British officer.

21. It remains to notice briefly the further measures in contemplation for carrying out the policy which has been described above, *i.e.*, the policy of promoting, as far as practicable, friendly intercourse between the Affghan nation and ourselves. In the first place, it is believed that the establishment of Pushta Schools in the interior of frontier districts will in time do much towards civilizing the lawless inhabitants of those parts, and through them their independent neighbours on the border ; and measures are being

Further measures contemplated.

taken to establish at Peshawur and Dera Ismail Khan mercantile fairs, such as that which has recently been successfully started at Palumpore in the Kangra Valley.

(Signed) T. H. THORNTON,
Secretary to Government, Punjab.

No. 12B.

MEMORANDUM ON THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION.* (Extract.)

WHEN Russia began to recover from the torpor and exhaustion consequent on the Crimean War, her first care was to repair and strengthen her position in Asia. She had suffered a grievous blow in Europe, but she had escaped a still greater calamity in Asia, where, if a British force had been employed instead of a Turkish, and means had been taken to utilize the co-operation of the Circassians, she might have lost all her Trans-Caucasian provinces. To obviate the possible recurrence of such a danger required her immediate attention; and as the Treaty of Paris had left the Circassians exposed to the full burst of her hostility, 150,000 soldiers were accordingly soon arrayed in line against them. In 1859, Gounib, the stronghold of the mountaineers, was stormed, and Shamil was taken prisoner. Success followed on success, till the disheartened Circassians, preferring expatriation to submission, abandoned their native mountains, and sought a refuge in the Turkish territory.

The importance of this extinction of Circassian nationality was certainly not recognized at the time; it has hardly perhaps been recognized at the present day, yet it was the turning point of Russian empire in the East. So long as the mountaineers resisted, they formed an effective barrier to the tide of onward conquest. When they were once swept away, there was no military or physical obstacle to the continuous march of Russia from the Araxes to the Indus.

The termination of the Circassian difficulty was immediately followed by renewed activity to the eastward. Whether, when Russia began to feel her way across the steppe in 1847-8, and to erect fortresses on the Irghiz and Turgäi rivers, she was merely obeying a natural law of increase, or whether she was deliberately resuming an old traditional scheme of territorial conquest, is really a matter of very little moment. One thing alone is manifest,—and must always have been manifest to so astute a power,—that her advance from Orenburg to the Jaxartes, the transfer of her frontier from the northern to the southern limit of the steppe, was a certain prelude to bitter and interminable war. As long as the Kirghiz steppe, which is a zone of almost uninhabited desert, stretching 2,000 miles from west to east, and nearly 1,000 miles from north to south, intervened as a “buffer” between the military colonies of the Orenburg and Siberian lines and the swarming centres of Mahomedan population beyond the Aral, so long peace was possible in Central Asia; but when once the “debateable ground” was passed, and Russian garrisons jostled against Uzbek posts upon the Jaxartes, there was no longer a possibility of quietude or amicable relations. No sooner was one portion of Uzbek territory annexed than the Russian outposts came in collision with the tribes beyond. One extension begot another, with the unerring certainty of a law of nature.

Between 1853, and 1863, notwithstanding the interference of the Crimean war, Russia gradually worked her way from the Sea of Aral through the saline marshes of the lower Jaxartes, to the confines of the alluvial valley above the desert; but she did not, during these years, attempt the actual invasion of Kokand; it was only at the latter period, when her hands were freed by the pacification of the Caucasus, that she entered on a death struggle with the Uzbeks. Advancing into the rich and populous districts shut in between the river and the northern mountains, she took in rapid succession the great cities of Turkistan, Chemkend, Tashkend, and Khojend; not, perhaps, in accordance with any definite plan of aggrandisement, but, rather, as she herself asserted, from the actual necessity of the case. An attempt, indeed, was made, and apparently in good faith, after the occupation of Chemkend, to arrest the tide of conquest. Negotiations were set on foot for a delimitation of frontier, and a manifesto was published by Prince Gortchakof in November 1864, proclaiming that the late territorial acquisitions had been brought about by “imperious necessity” and against the wish of the Government, and asserting, with categorical precision, that the expansion of the empire had now reached its limit. But, as has been well said, the ink was hardly dry with which this manifesto was written, before its pacific promises were completely stultified. Hostilities indeed were resumed upon the Jaxartes early in 1865, and they have been continued ever since

* Sent to the Government of India, by order of the Secretary of State, in a letter from the Political Secretary, dated 21st August 1868.

with little intermission, and, as might have been expected, to the uniform advantage of Russia. Various pretexts have been alleged for so flagrant a departure from Prince Gortschakof's manifesto. In the first instance, the Bokharians, with whose outposts the Russians came in contact after the capture of Chemkend, are said to have challenged the invaders, and to have forced on a battle, in conjunction with the Kokandis, in the vicinity of Tashkend, which led to the capture of that city. The detention of certain Russian officers in Bokhara, where they had been sent to negotiate, brought on a renewal of hostilities in 1866. In this campaign, conducted by General Romanofski, the town of Khojend was taken, and the power of Kokand was completely crushed, one half of the territory being incorporated in the new Russian province of Turkistan, while the other half was left to be administered by a native Chief (Khudáyár Khan), pending good behaviour and almost as a Russian feudatory.

The next step in advance was the direct invasion of the Bokhara territory in 1867, General Romanofski's avowed object being to establish a "tête-de-pont" beyond the desert country skirting the Jaxartes, which should immediately threaten Samarcand and Bokhara, and should thus, as it was supposed, protect the frontier. But if Romanofski's aim had been to exasperate rather than to conciliate, he could not have devised a more effective expedient than this establishment of a fortified post at Jezzak, almost within hail of Samarcand; bearding the Amir, as it were, in the high place of his power, encouraging the malcontents throughout the province, and holding out a standing menace of invasion. That the Uzbek Chief, indeed, under such circumstances should act in good faith, and execute the treaty of peace which was offered for his acceptance was an unreasonable expectation. He believed himself marked out for destruction, and naturally, therefore, in default of better means of defence, resorted to intrigue and duplicity in order to prolong his existence. Russia may have had very good grounds, both strategically and politically, for provoking the recent contest. No military commander, indeed, could allow a force of 40,000 men to be concentrated within an easy distance of his position without taking measures for opposing it, and General Kaufman no doubt, when the crisis arrived, acted judiciously in assuming the offensive instead of waiting to be attacked; but to attribute the war, as has been done in the Russian official papers, to the bad faith of the Amir, is simply to confound cause and effect.

Another point of some importance to the true appreciation of the Central Asian question is the relation which exists between the local commanders and the central Government at St. Petersburg. Russia has always attributed to her military chiefs a degree of power in influencing the national policy which in this country we find it difficult to realize. She used to explain the slow progress that was made in subjugating the Caucasus by pointing to the self-interest of the army, which forbade the premature closing of so fertile a source of promotion and honours. The same antagonism of feeling between the Civil and Military authorities is said to have existed in Turkestan from the first outbreak of hostilities. General Tcherniaief, the captor of Tashkend, was recalled from his command, avowedly in consequence of the aggressive character of his policy; and, a few years later, his successor, Romanofski, was deprived of all military rank for the similar offence of having invaded the Bokhara territory against orders. General Kaufman, too, is likely to be publicly rebuked for his recent brilliant success. But, are these marks of the Emperor's displeasure real, or are they intended merely to satisfy the clamours of a peace party in Russia, and to anticipate foreign complaint? It is well known that Tcherniaief, notwithstanding his apparent disgrace, received a diamond-hilted sword from the Emperor, as the conqueror of Tashkend, and Romanofski is understood to be about to be restored to his full rank and honours. General Kaufman, also, is pretty sure to be rewarded for his military achievements, at the same time that he is reprimanded for his undue political activity; the result of this double action being that, while Russia maintains,—or, at any rate, claims to maintain,—her character for moderation and unselfish views, and while she also respects the feelings of those politicians who honestly believe her territorial extension to be a source of weakness rather than of strength, her progress, nevertheless, is as constant and uniform as if she were really the grasping and unscrupulous power which her enemies represent her to be.

The latest intelligence received from Central Asia confirms the announcement of General Kaufman's occupation both of Samarcand and Bokhara, and foreshadows, as the inevitable fate of the Government of the Amir, that gradual absorption into the Russian Empire which, in spite of disclaimers,—in spite, perhaps, of real disinclination,—has already been carried out to its full accomplishment in regard to the greater portion of the territory of Kokand. In fact, whatever may be the policy for the moment of the Court of St. Petersburg, it is the "manifest destiny" of Russia to absorb

the Uzbek States. Her present position is another illustration of the old doctrine that, when civilization and barbarism come in contact, the latter must inevitably give way. She has advanced to a point from which retreat is impossible; and thus, whether the final consummation occur this year, or next year, or five years hence, or even 10 years hence,—come it soon or come it late,—we may take it for granted that nothing can prevent the extinction of the three independent Governments of Kokand, Bokhara, and Khiva, and the consequent extension of the Russian frontier to the Oxus.

The question then arises, how will this new distribution of power in Central Asia affect our interests in India? Will it strengthen us or weaken us? Is it, in fact, to be encouraged or deprecated? A large portion of the thinking public, including the optimist class of Anglo-Indian politicians to a man, will declare in favour of the Russian advance. On general grounds, they hold that the substitution of order and civilization, and a Christian Government, for the ignorance, the cruelty, the anarchy of the fanatical Uzbeks must be advantageous; and they further point to the impetus that would be given to trade by an increased security and facility of communication, as well as by the increased wants of a settled and improving community. But, in such a view of the case sufficient weight seems hardly to be given to special political considerations. Public opinion in Russia, with a truer instinct, has declared itself in a different sense. It is, indeed, well worthy of notice that, whilst the Press in this country, with a few exceptions, has expressed satisfaction at the Russian progress in Central Asia, and has encouraged her to continue in the same course, the Russian Press has decided, with an equal unanimity, that such an advance must be distasteful, if not dangerous, to us, and has accordingly been speculating on the steps that we are likely to take in order to arrest the movement, or, at any rate, to neutralize its effects.

It is not worth while, perhaps, to quote articles from the Russian papers, as they may be supposed merely to represent the views of a party, but the letters of M. Grigorieff, the late Governor of Western Siberia, who has been personally and practically connected with the Eastern question for the last 20 years, are a more serious authority, and may be regarded, indeed, almost as an official exposition of the sentiments and policy of the Government. The following extracts, therefore, from these letters, which were published in the "Moscow Gazette" of last year, may be read with interest.

"England is the only country that can assist the Bokharians in a war with Russia. It is, therefore, very probable that the Amir, preferring a remote to an impending danger, will apply for co-operation against us to the British Government in India. According, indeed, to our most recent intelligence, envoys have been actually sent to Calcutta with solicitations for money, guns, artillerymen, and even troops, offering in return the most sincere attachment to British interests, an acknowledgment of an English protectorate over Bokhara, and, in fact, anything else that may be thought desirable. Such a line of action on the part of Bokhara may affect our relations with England; for the English, being thus applied to, and having a real interest in the independence of Bokhara, will hardly refrain from interfering between us and that country, if not materially, at any rate diplomatically. But, however probable that interference may be, it is no less probable that any diplomatic action of England in favour of Bokhara would meet with the same fate which some years ago befel their intervention in favour of the Polish insurgents. If they charged us with aggression on Bokhara, we could retort on them with a reference to their own conduct in India; we could read them a lesson in this respect that would be exceedingly bitter to them; and happily, too, the time has passed when we regarded diplomatic notes with the same terror as we regarded the approach of the cholera, and when we were prepared to sacrifice the material interests of the empire rather than be subjected to them. Our Foreign Office is now sufficiently 'fire-proof' in this respect; it is accustomed to hostile remonstrances from European Governments, and will be well able to answer any fresh attempt of such a nature with becoming dignity.

"Or it is possible that England may content herself with affording underhand assistance to the Bokharians in arms and money. Against this we cannot guard, and it is useless therefore to discuss the question; but we may remind the English that exciting or fostering revolt is a game that two can play at, and that if underhand assistance should be rendered to the dissatisfied Bokharians, we might retaliate by applying the same disturbing agency to various weak points upon the Indian frontier. Such a mode of conflict would be possible, but would be advantageous to neither one party nor the other. It would involve a large expenditure, would be derogatory

“ to the dignity of two great nations, and would, after all, lead to very poor results; for
 “ by no such means could the Uzbegs be enabled to cope with the Russians, nor the
 “ Indians to cope with the English.”

* * * * *

“ It is hardly to be expected that England will assist Bokhara with troops, not that
 “ there is any physical obstacles to prevent this, for the road from Peshawar to the
 “ valley of the Oxus has been found to be practicable not only for light forces, but
 “ even for heavy artillery; but the route lies through the yet independent country of
 “ Cabul, and the Afghans would never permit the march of a foreign army through
 “ their territory. And the English, moreover, have not yet forgotten the terrible lesson
 “ of 1842. They will think seven times, therefore, before venturing on such a step,
 “ and risking its consequences.”

* * * * *

“ But that Bokhara, furnished with moral support and encouragement from the south,
 “ may endeavour to stir up a general and combined Mahomedan movement against
 “ us, is more than probable. Khiva and Kokand may be expected, under certain cir-
 “ cumstances, to unite their forces with her; but this will only lead to the more speedy
 “ destruction of the whole three provinces. In every contest, a portion of the Uzbek
 “ territory will be lost, until their independence is entirely gone, and they are ultimately
 “ swallowed up in the Russian empire.”

Now, these extracts are of value not only because they show the impression which prevails in Russia, that we shall regard her advance as a hostile movement, but because they also indicate the precise danger with which that advance is threatened. M. Grigorief no doubt gives us credit for too much sensitiveness, in supposing that we shall either resort to an unavailing diplomatic protest, or that we shall assist the Uzbegs by force of arms in resisting their invaders; but, at the same time, he really suggests a serious matter for our reflection, in hinting at the possibility of an Uzbek defensive league; more especially as the continued restlessness of Russia may be expected to incline the neighbouring independent States in favour of such a league, and as the three Uzbek principalities, supported on one side by Yakúb Kúsh-begí, of Kashgar, whose power is daily on the increase, and on the other side by Persia, and backed by the Afghans, whose relations with Bokhara have long been of the most intimate character, would present a truly formidable—and, whilst maintained, an unassailable—confederacy.

Before we can form any sound opinion, however, as to the advisability of promoting such a confederacy, or adopting any other precautions, we must be satisfied as to the present and proximate position of Russia in Central Asia, and to this point accordingly an inquiry will be now directed.

Russia has proceeded throughout this Central Asian movement with the utmost caution and temper. Although steadfastly making progress year by year,—whether from accident or design is immaterial,—she has never placed her foot beyond that point from which she could, if required, conveniently withdraw it. A demonstration has been sometimes made in advance, as on the occasion of General Tcherniaeff's invasion of the Bokhara territory in February 1866, but permanent occupation has only resulted from slow and careful arrangement. Russia has always had her reserves in readiness, and has not only secured her communications with her base, but has also looked to her lateral supports, so as to combine the whole forward movement in one harmonious operation. It thus happened that nearly a year elapsed between the capture of Tashkend and the attack upon Khojend, the interval being occupied in establishing communication between the new settlements in Turkestan and the old colonies of Fort Vernöe and Kopal, near the Mongolian frontier to the eastward; and, in the same way, now that Samarcand and Bokhara have been occupied, we may be sure that Russia's first care will be to strengthen and support that occupation by opening out lines of communication to the west. General Romanofski, indeed, the conqueror of Khojend, who was removed from his command last year, in consequence, as it was said, of his aggressive tendencies, and who is supposed to have been immersed ever since in the drudgery of a notary-public's office at Moscow, has just brought out a pamphlet on the Central Asian question, which has made a most profound impression in military and political circles at St. Petersburg. In this “brochure” he points out the brilliant future that is opening to the enterprise of Russia, settled as she now is on the Oxus and Jaxartes, in the very “garden of Asia,” provided that no administrative or strategic errors are committed, and he suggests various measures for improving and strengthening the position.

The point, however, on which he mainly insists, as the pivot on which the whole question turns, is the immediate establishment of direct communication between the Caucasus and Turkestan, by which means the latter Government, instead of remaining as an outlying and unimportant dependency, would become an integral portion of the empire, and through which also the military resources accumulated in the western province, and now no longer required there, might be utilized by being transferred to the Oxus and Jaxartes. Romanofski suggests three different routes for this line of communication, the object of which would be to connect the Caspian with the Aral. The southern line would leave the Caspian in Krasnovodsk Bay, and would follow up the old bed of the Oxus, in which water is always found, to the present embouchure of that river in the Aral. This line would be the easiest of all in respect to the physical character of the country, but before it would become a safe route for traffic Khiva must be absorbed into the empire, and the Turcoman tribes must be brought under subjection. The northern line would be drawn from the mouth of the Emba at the north-east corner of the Caspian, and would circle round the north of the Aral to Kazala on the Jaxartes. It would present no natural difficulties, but the route would be long and circuitous, and a considerable outlay would be required in providing water along the skirts of the Kara-kúm desert. According to Romanofski's view, by far the most eligible route would be a middle line which would cross the 'Ust-'Urt waste between the Caspian and the Aral at its narrowest point, from Mertvi-kultuk Bay on the one sea to Chernishef Bay on the other. The distance across this neck of land scarcely exceeds 200 miles, and it has long been in the contemplation of the Russian Government to carry out a plan, suggested in the first instance and recommended by Prince Bariatinski, of laying down a line of rails over this interval. Were the waterless waste of the 'Ust-'Urt to be thus bridged over by a railroad, the military position of the Russians in Turkestan would be entirely altered. At present, as Romanofski remarks, it requires nearly two years to move troops and stores from the Volga across the Khirghiz steppes to the advanced posts beyond the Bokhara frontier, whereas with steamers on the Caspian and the Aral, a railroad connecting the two seas, and boats of light draught navigating the Oxus and Jaxartes, a few weeks would suffice for the transport of a force from the over-crowded camps of the Caucasus into the heart of Asia, the one river being practicable for steamers as high as Khojend, and the other to the neighbourhood of Balkh.

Now this is certainly no visionary scheme. On the contrary, so practical is it considered to be, that it is thought likely at St. Petersburg that Romanofski, who has been restored to favour, will be sent out again to Turkestan to work out his own recommendations, and in the mean time, in order to prepare the way for this junction of the Caucasus with Turkestan, so as to present a continuous Russian front to the south, extending from the Black Sea to the frontier of China, great efforts are being made to conciliate the Turcomans, who hold all the lower part of the desert between the Caspian and the Aral, and who, if they are ever reclaimed from brigandage and brought under military control, will furnish a far more formidable cavalry to a Russian army than even the Cossacks of the Ukraine and the Don.

The position, then, which, on the soberest calculation, Russia may be expected to occupy at the close of ten years from the present time, and supposing that during this period we abstain from all active interference against her, will be something as follows.

The Caspian and the Aral will be connected either by a railway, or by military roads, protected by forts, and amply furnished with water and supplies. Turkestan will thus be brought into easy and direct communication, not only with the Caucasus, but with the Russian cities on the Volga, and even with St. Petersburg. The independent Uzbek Governments will have ceased to exist, and in their places, will have been established Russian provincial Governors, the seat of central authority being probably at Bokhara. The country will be administered under the joint control of Russian and Native officials, according to the system which has long been successfully practised in the Trans-Caucasian provinces. Mahammedanism will be respected, though the extravagant bigotry and fanaticism of the Bokhara priesthood will, no doubt, have been retrenched. Trade will prosper; manstealing, the present bane of the country, will be suppressed; cultivation will be increased; and the condition of the people generally will be improved. The mouths of the Oxus and Jaxartes will have been dredged and deepened, and flotillas of steam boats will have been established on both rivers. The strength of the permanent garrison will be regulated by the wants of the country, as well as by its resources. At present, 16,000 men are sufficient to hold the extent of country which Russia has subdued, and which is scarcely a third of that which will ultimately come into her possession. The future garrison, therefore, when Khiva and Eastern Kokand

have both fallen in, and Turkestan is bounded on the south by the Oxus, can hardly be estimated at less than 40,000 men, of which 5,000 would be allotted to Khiva, 15,000 to Kokand, including the populous cities of the valley of Ferghāneh, and 20,000 to Bokhara and its dependencies; and there can be little doubt that the resources of the country would be ample to meet this amount of military expenditure.

Let us now consider the effect of this position upon India. As long as Russia remained in her present strength to the northward of the Oxus, and confined her attention to the consolidation and improvement of her newly acquired territory, we should have no occasion to complain of her neighbourhood. In fact, beyond the gradual exclusion of our commerce from the markets of Central Asia, her neighbourhood would exert little or no influence on our affairs. But would it be possible for her, even with the best intentions, to maintain this passive and innocuous attitude? Could she, if she wished, divest herself of the responsibilities and obligations, the temptations to interference, inseparably associated with her new position? This is what it may be permitted to doubt. Intermediate, it must be remembered, between her position beyond the Oxus and our own frontier, broadly marked by the valley of the Indus, would lie the strong and independent country of the Afghans. To pretend that it is physically impossible for Russia, entrenched upon the Oxus, and wielding the resources of Bokhara, to exercise an influence on Afghanistan, as boldly asserted in a recent number of the "*Invalide Russe*," is simply false and fatuous. To apprehend, on the other hand, with the Indian alarmists, that, while Cabul still maintains its independence, we shall be subjected to the full inconvenience of Russian contiguity, is equally unreasonable. The truth lies between the two extremes; we are, no doubt, exposed to a certain danger from the advance of Russia to the Oxus, and that danger approaches us through Afghanistan, but the danger is *not* immediate, and it is evitable.

The close connexion which exists, and has for a long time past existed, between Bokhara and Cabul is not generally known in England, yet it is an important element in the consideration of the Central Asian question; the most important element, indeed, since it is this circumstance alone which forces us into contact with Russia. The connexion between Bokhara and Cabul is both geographical and political. The two provinces march with each other for many hundred miles. The cities of Balkh, Khulúm, and Kundúz, which, for the last 30 years, have been held by the Afghans, belong properly to Bokhara. Other districts, such as Mymench, Sir-i-Púl, and Andkõi, are in dispute between the two States. Russia, in fact, in possessing herself of Bokhara, will inherit a multitude of Afghan grievances and embarrassments, from which she cannot shake herself free. The political relations, again, of the two countries are even more intimate than the geographical. For the last 30 years, Bokhara has largely influenced the fortunes of Cabul. When we drove Dost Mahomed Khan from power, in 1839, he took refuge with the Ameer, and it was from Bokhara that both he returned in 1841, and his son in 1842, to attack us in Cabul. In all the recent Afghan revolutions, also, Bokhara has played a prominent part. It was chiefly by means of an Uzbek contingent that Abdur-Rahman Khan, who has married a daughter of the Ameer of Bokhara, expelled his uncle, Shir Ali Khan, from Cabul, in 1865, and, since that time, Bokhara has swarmed with Afghan refugees. It appears, indeed, that it was a body of these refugees, 500 or 600 in number, who, having transferred their allegiance to Russia, in consequence of oppressive treatment by the Uzbeks, led the Russian troops to the recent attack upon the Ameer's forces, and fought in line with them at the battle of Samarcand.

The implication of Russia in Afghan affairs is therefore no longer a matter of speculation. She has an Afghan contingent in her service, commanded by a grandson of Dost Mahomed Khan's. She is the mistress of a country which, on more occasions than one, has been the arbiter of the destinies of Cabul. It will depend on her discretion, whether she interfere to the extent of regulating the succession and directing the Government, or whether she merely offer friendly counsel, and cultivate general relations of amity.

The next point, then, to consider is, in what shape danger can come upon us from this Russian connexion with Cabul. The idea of invasion from such a quarter, which used to be brandished before us "*in terrorem*," may be dismissed as almost chimerical. If a foreign army ever does descend upon the Indian frontier, it will be by way of Herat and Candahar, where the roads are open and traverse districts that have been called "the granary of Asia," and not through the sterile and difficult passes between Cabul and Peshawer. But it is not invasion from any quarter, or in any form, that we have at

present to guard against. The presence of Russia will make itself felt in a less obtrusive, though perhaps in a not less effective, way. If she establish a mission at Cabul,—and she can hardly do less, should we fail to preoccupy the ground,—the effect of such an establishment will be at once perceptible in India. The intrusion, indeed, of a foreign European element within the restricted circle of our Indian relations will of itself exert a disturbing influence through the country of a most mischievous and even dangerous tendency. Already the Maharaja of Cashmere, taking offence at our efforts to promote trade by insisting on a reduction of the transit duties in his dominions, has been negotiating with the authorities of Tashkend, and urging them to appoint Commerical Agents at Yarkend on the immediate frontier of Thibet, and if the Russians were more accessible, his example would be followed by scores of others. There can, indeed, be no doubt that if Russia once assumes a position which, in virtue either of imposing military forces on the Oxus, or of a dominant political influence in Afghanistan, entitles her, in native estimation, to challenge our Asiatic supremacy, the disquieting effect will be prodigious. Every Chief throughout Northern India, who either has,—or fancies he has,—a grievance, or who is even cramped or incommoded by our orderly Government, will at once commence intriguing in the hopes of relieving himself from our oppressive shadow. It is not that the natives of India, whether Mahommedans or Hindoos, have any particular affection for the Russians, or believe that their rule would be more kindly and beneficial than our own. On the contrary, the followers of the Prophet everywhere regard the Russians as more incorrigible infidels than the English, from their uncleanly habits and their supposed worship of pictures; but, on the other hand, the approach of a rival European Power betokens change, and to the active, gambling, reckless spirit of Asiatics change is always exciting and agreeable.

There is, however, a still more important point of view from which the subject must be regarded. Hitherto, the argument has proceeded on the assumption that Russia is friendly to England, and has not contemplated the acquisition of any direct advantage over us from her career of Asiatic conquest. She must, of course, be conscious that her new position gives her a means of political leverage against us which she did not before possess; and that she is thus relatively so much stronger than she was at the time of the Crimean war, but it would be unfair to impute this result to her as the motive of her recent aggressions. Supposing, however, that owing to complications in Turkey it should be the policy of Russia to weaken and embarrass us, to find, indeed, such employment for our armies in the East as should prevent our active interference in Europe,—let us consider, under this altered aspect of affairs, how her position at Bokhara and her relations with Cabul would affect us. Now, in order to appreciate the danger which might thus beset us, it is necessary to look our position in India fairly in the face, and for this purpose we cannot have a better or more authentic guide than the series of Reports recently presented to Parliament under the title of “(East India) Systems of Government.” Here amid much that is satisfactory, amid a mass of evidence of the highest character, which tends to show that the agricultural populations of India are in general contented and prosperous, and that with these classes our administration is popular, there is also much of a very different complexion, much that furnishes abundant food for reflection and uneasiness.

There is unfortunately, at the present time in the Afghan territory a machinery of agitation singularly well adapted for acting on what has been called the “seething, fermenting, festering mass” of Mahommedan hostility in India. The fanatics of Sittana, who gave us so much trouble a few years back, are now showing signs of renewed vitality. They have been joined by the notorious Feroze Shah, who, as the last representative of the throne of Delhi, assumes the title of “King of Hindustan,” and proclaims himself our implacable enemy, and they are known to be in active communication with the Wahabis and other Mahommedan malcontents in Upper India. It is certain, then, that if Russia desired to embarrass us, and were sufficiently strong at Cabul to require the Governor of that city to set in motion against us the Sittana confederacy, directing and encouraging the movement through the Akhond of Swat and other Afghan spiritual chiefs, and supporting it by inroads and forays of the mountain tribes along the whole line of frontier, we might be placed in a position of very considerable difficulty, of such difficulty, indeed, as to require extensive reinforcements from England, and thus to fulfil the very object which Russia had in view from the commencement.

With this prospect before us, with the knowledge that we present a vulnerable front, and that if Russia were so disposed she might, in the natural course of events, be enabled severely to injure us, are we justified in maintaining what has been sarcastically, though

perhaps unfairly, called Sir John Lawrence's policy of "masterly inactivity"? Are we justified in allowing Russia to work her way on to Cabul unopposed, and there to establish herself as a friendly power, prepared to protect the Afghans against the English? It has been said by the advocates of inaction, that in competing for the good will of the Afghans, the power which appears last in the field will be the most successful; that the first armies will be naturally regarded as enemies and those who follow as deliverers; but this leaves out of sight the fact that there is already a national feud between the English and the Afghans, which has been rather deepened of late years by our withdrawal of the subsidy, and our persistent refusal to mingle in their internecine quarrels; while, on the other hand, the Russians, having never exerted any military pressure on the country, or otherwise offended the pride of the mountaineers, are regarded by them, if not with friendly feelings, at any rate without animosity or fear. The main argument, however, against interference of any sort in the affairs of Afghanistan, has hitherto been that the country is a hotbed of anarchy and disorder, that in supporting one candidate we provoke the enmity of his rivals, and throw them into the arms of Russia, whose appearance on the scene would be thus accelerated rather than retarded; but this is hardly a fair representation of the case. If we do nothing, Russia is sure in due course of time to secure a political footing at Cabul, as a necessary consequence of her occupation of Bokhara. By some, indeed, it is suspected that the pending revolution in Afghanistan is due to her instigation, Shir Ali Khan having been launched from Herat as a sort of pilot balloon, preparatory to her own advance on Bokhara; and, if this be true, it may be difficult, in the event of Shir Ali's success, which seems now almost certain, to prevent a very rapid development of her plans; but if, as is more probable, she is at present merely watching the progress of affairs, nursing her little nucleus of Afghan refugees, and expecting by their means to establish her influence at Cabul, then it would seem to be our bounden duty at once to step forward and forestall her. No one, probably, will dispute that Lord Auckland's famous doctrine of "establishing a strong and friendly power on our North-West frontier," has always been the true policy for India, though of late years too often neglected, and once fatally mismanaged in execution. No one will question but that this policy would be advantageous at present, if it could be carried out without any considerable risk or expense. And why should there be any serious risk? Is it true that our intervention in Afghanistan would lead to "confusion worse confounded?" Is it borne out by experience that disorder is the normal condition of the country? Is it not notorious, on the contrary, that from the time of our evacuation of Cabul in 1842 to the year 1863, a period of more than 20 years, Afghanistan was perfectly tranquil and contented under the strong and friendly rule of Dost Mahommed Khan? This chief, having a firm belief in our power and a scrupulous regard to his own engagements, repressed on all occasions the turbulence and unfriendliness of his subjects, and, in fact, conducted himself towards us, throughout his long career, with such perfectly good faith and orderly procedure, as to make us doubt whether the revolution and counter-revolution which have distracted the country ever since his decease, to the injury of trade and the constant disturbance of our own frontier, may not be owing, as much to our persistent non-interference, as to the incompetence of the old chief's successors, or the natural indocility of the Afghans. It is asserted by many authorities, fully competent to form an opinion, that if, in deference to Dost Mahommed's nomination, we had acknowledged and assisted Shir Ali Khan from the commencement, continuing to him the same subsidy which we had granted to his father, and according him our general support, he would have summarily suppressed the opposition of his brothers and nephews, and would have retained his power unbroken to the present day. Another opportunity now presents itself. The fortunes of Shir Ali Khan are again in the ascendant. He is already in possession of Herat, Candahar, and Ghizni, and is expected, either in person, or as represented by his son, Mahommed Yacub Khan, to be soon installed at Cabul. He should be secured in our interests without further delay. Provided that he is unentangled with Russia, the restoration of his father's subsidy and the moral support of the British Indian Government would probably be sufficient to place him above all opposition and to secure his fidelity. If he has been already tampered with, his expectations, of course, will be higher. It may, indeed, be necessary to furnish him with arms and officers, or even to place an auxiliary contingent at his disposal; but whatever the price it must be paid, of such paramount importance it is to obtain at the present time a dominant position at Cabul, and to close that avenue of approach against Russia. Whether the time is come for the re-establishment of a mission at Cabul, charged with the distribution of the subsidy and the direction of our quasi-protectorate of the country, is a question that can only

be decided on the spot. It is a position that we must inevitably occupy sooner or later, unless we are prepared to jeopardize our Indian Empire, and when once we have acquired the goodwill and confidence of the Governor, there can be no great risk attached to it. The success, indeed, of Major Lumsden's mission in 1856, has already shown that British Officers, of firm but conciliatory bearing, may traverse our old battle-fields without exciting any special or dangerous hostility, and the prestige of our recent Abyssinian triumph would, no doubt, give an additional personal security to our envoy.

There is one other argument, relating to this branch of the subject, which it may be worth while to notice. Putting aside all consideration of the Russian advance, and the danger of their establishment at Cabul, it would seem to be a duty which we owe to our subjects in the Punjab to make serious efforts for the consolidation of a strong and friendly Government in Afghanistan. Anarchy is contagious, and, with the spectacle of constant bloodshed and rapine about the passes, it is impossible to preserve order and content among the frontier tribes. In the interests, then, of peace, in the interests of commerce, in the interests of moral and material improvement, it may be asserted that interference in Afghanistan has now become a duty, and that any moderate outlay or responsibility we may incur in restoring order at Cabul will prove, in the sequel, to be true economy.

Hitherto the argument has been confined to a practical consideration of the effects of Russia's present and proximate position in Central Asia; but if we look a little ahead, and take in a somewhat more general view of the subject, we shall find many topics of equal, or even greater, interest. Any one who traces the movements of Russia towards India on the map of Asia cannot fail to be struck with the resemblance which these movements bear to the operations of an army opening parallels against a beleaguered fortress. The first parallel would, thus, be the Russian frontier of 20 years back, stretching from the upper end of the Caspian, by the Orenburg and Siberian lines, northward of the steppe, to the Irtish. This may be considered strategically as a mere line of observation. The second parallel, which would constitute her line of demonstration, would be the frontier which she is now preparing to take up, and which, according to Romanofski's plan, would be drawn from Krasnovodsk Bay, about the centre of the Caspian, south of Khiva, to the Oxus, and along the course of that river to the Pamir plateau, thus including the whole of the Uzbeg territory, and placing at her command the entire waterway of the Oxus and Jaxartes. This parallel is above 1,000 miles in advance of the first line, but it does not directly menace India, inasmuch as the intervening Afghan mountains constitute a strong military defence. The third parallel, which would be the natural result of the preceding preliminary operations, and which, if Russia survive revolution in Europe and catastrophe in Asia, she will assuredly some day attempt, would be drawn from Asterabad, at the south-east corner of the Caspian, along the Persian frontier to Herat, and from thence through the Hazareh uplands, to the Oxus, or possibly by Candahar to Cabul. Established upon such a line, her position would indeed be formidable. Troops, stores, and material might be concentrated to any extent at Asterabad. The country between that port and Herat is open, and admirably supplied. A line of military posts would connect the two positions, and effectually control the Turcomans, thereby conferring an essential benefit on Persia, and securing her goodwill and co-operation. Herat has been often called "the key of India," and fully deserves its reputation as the most important military position in Central Asia. The earthworks which surround the town are of the most colossal character, and might be indefinitely strengthened. Water and supplies abound, and routes from all the great cities to the north, which would furnish the Russian supports, meet in this favoured spot. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that, if Russia were once established in full strength at Herat, and her communications were secured in one direction with Asterabad through Meshed, in another with Khiva through Merv, and in a third with Tashkend and Bokhara through Mymeneh and the passage of the Oxus, all the forces of Asia would be inadequate to expel her from the position. Supposing, too, that she were bent on mischief,—and it is only hostility to England that would be likely to lead her into so advanced and menacing a position,—she would have the means of seriously injuring us, since, in addition to her own forces, the unchallenged occupation of Herat would place the whole military resources of Persia and Afghanistan at her disposal.

It is not in general sufficiently considered that, in a political struggle with Russia of this nature, we should not engage her upon at all equal terms. We have no natural claim on the affections or allegiance of the intermediate nations, no inducement to hold out to them, as affecting their own interests, which should lead them to prefer our alliance

to that of our rivals ; whereas Russia has only to point to India as the traditional plunder ground of Central Asia, as the prize which has ever rewarded the victorious hordes rushing down from the northern mountains, and she at once enlists their passions in her behalf. The pleasant memories of the sack of Delhi by Nadir Shah, and of Ahmed Khan Abdalli's successful campaign against the Mahrattas, have hardly faded from the minds of the present generation of Persians and Afghans. Such visions possess irresistible attractions for them, and would always, unless counterbalanced by some special considerations, incline them to side with the invader rather than the invaded. It is thus quite within the bounds of possibility that, some years hence, if Russia found herself engaged in another war with us, she might launch upon India, from her Herat base, a force of 50,000 Persian " Sirbaz," disciplined and commanded by Russian officers, and thus fully competent to cope with our best Native troops ; supporting such a force with 20,000 Turcoman and Afghan horse, than whom there is no better irregular cavalry in the world ; and, if she were really in earnest, detaching also a small auxiliary body of her own picked troops, to give strength and consistency to the invading army.

Now, an attack of this nature might not lead to any serious result, might not jeopardise, that is, our hold upon India ; for our garrisons, reinforced from England, would probably be equal to the emergency ; but, at any rate, we should have to fight for our lives, and should be quite powerless to strike a blow against Russia in return. Are we justified, then, in disregarding this danger, merely because it is remote ? Ought we not rather, while there is yet time, to provide against the possibility of being thus taken at a disadvantage ? Russia could never establish herself at Herat, and keep up her communications with Asterabad, without the co-operation of Persia, and against that co-operation our efforts should be accordingly directed. The doctrine which prevails at present in our Eastern diplomacy is simply this, that Persia is too weak and faithless to justify any extraordinary expense in keeping up cordial relations with the Shah. We are content for awhile to occupy a subordinate position to Russia at Teheran, trusting that, when the time comes for action, we may regain our lost ground by increased expenditure and redoubled activity ; but this is, after all, a very short-sighted policy. The good will of a nation,—that which we once possessed, but have now lost in Persia,—is not to be purchased in a day. It is the growth of time, of steady unremitting attention. If we desire, then, to check the advance of Russia towards India, if we desire, above all, to render impossible,—or at any rate, indefinitely to postpone,—her occupation of Herat, it is indispensable that we should bestir ourselves in Persia at once. The vast expenditure that we incurred in the days of Harford, Jones, and Malcolm, in expelling the French from Teheran, is no longer required. What is required is an indication of renewed interest in the country, and a disposition to protect it against Russian pressure. Our officers should be again placed in positions of influence and power with the Persian troops, as in the days of Christie, of Lindsay, and of Hart. Presents of improved arms, and perhaps artillery, would testify to our awakened interest. The Persian nobles should be encouraged to send their sons for education to London, rather than to Paris. Investments of English capital in banks, in railways, in mining operations, and other commercial enterprises are freely proffered, and if supported by our authorities would create a further bond of union between the countries.* Among a people, again who are so fond of display, and attach so much value to outward forms, it is of the first importance that our mission should be kept up on a very liberal scale, and that presents should be freely distributed, that the diplomatic establishment, in fact, at Teheran, should be Oriental rather than European. A further opportunity has occurred for creating a very favourable impression, and, in fact, inaugurating the new system which is recommended, in the Shah's application for our aid in creating and keeping up a Persian naval force in the Gulf. Considering the singular maritime inaptitude of the Persians, it is not likely that this scheme, notwithstanding our countenance and support, will ever realize the Shah's expectations, but our acquiescence in the proposal would, at any rate, very much strengthen our influence at Court, and might aid even in developing that community of interests which our joint telegraphic establishment has already initiated.

In connexion with these suggested reforms in our Persian diplomacy, it is important to consider whether our relations with that country ought not to be again placed under the India Office. Now, there can be no doubt, that Persian diplomacy is essentially an Eastern question, and mainly dependent on considerations of Indian policy. It is the advance of Russia towards India, and her demonstrations against Cabul and Herat, which seem now to require our more active interference at Teheran. Every measure of defence, referring either to Persia or Afghanistan, must be organised *in* India and executed *from* India. If troops were required they would be supplied from Peshawer or Sind. Officers

for the Shah's forces would be drawn from the Indian Army. Bombay would furnish the naval material for the Gulf. The Persian telegraph is an Indian establishment. The Indian revenues contribute a sum of 12,000*l.* per annum towards the expenses of the Persian mission. There is no single element, indeed, of European diplomacy connected with Persia, except the relations of that country with Turkey, and even these relations, referring almost exclusively to frontier grievances, come more naturally under the jurisdiction of Bagdad or of Erzeroum than of Constantinople. It may further be questioned whether the traditions and practice of the Foreign Office, admirably adapted as they are to European diplomacy, are fitted to deal with the peculiarities of Eastern character. Teheran is an Oriental Court, of the same type and temper as the Courts of Cabul, of Lahore, of Delhi, Lucknow, or Hyderabad, where the eye must be addressed rather than the reason, and where individual character is of so much more importance and effect than the forms and precedents of office. It may be doubted if the duties of the Teheran mission, reorganized as a powerful machine of Indian defence, could be carried out by an ordinary staff of Foreign Office attachés. At any rate it would be infinitely better to employ Indian Officers, accustomed to the Native character, acquainted with the language, and who would look to Persian and Afghan service as their career in life, instead of pining for the luxuries and leisure of Paris and Vienna. One thing may be confidently predicted, that if we neglect the present occasion for re-transferring the Persian mission to the India Office, the growth of Indian interests, and complications arising from the continued extension of Russia towards India, will render such a transfer obligatory at a later period, and probably after we are involved in difficulties from which it will require all the vigour and practised skill of our Indian authorities to effect our extrication.

In conclusion, the remedial measures recommended for adoption in the present state of the Central Asian question may be briefly recapitulated. They are few, but not unimportant. Shir Ali Khan should be subsidised and strengthened at Cabul, our position at that capital being rendered as secure and paramount as would have been Burnes's position at the Court of Dost Mahomed Khan in 1847, if he had been supported by the full weight of Lord Auckland's authority and resources. The next step should be to recover our lost ground in Persia, so as to prevent the possibility of Russia making use of that country as an instrument to facilitate her own advances towards India. Locally also our communications with the Afghan frontier, considered especially as military lines, should be completed and improved. It is a crying reproach to us that up to the present day no progress should have been made in laying down a railway from Lahore to Peshawer, and that we should still be dependent on the dilatory and uncertain Indus navigation for our communications between Mooltan and the sea.

The only other point refers to the proposed establishment of a fortified outwork at Quetta above the Bolan pass, a measure which has been strongly advocated in some quarters, and as strongly opposed in others. No one will be inclined to question the military advantage of such a work. As a *place d'armes*, it would cover the frontier, and being held in too great strength to admit of being masked, would, in the event of invasion, delay an enemy sufficiently to enable us to mass our full forces in the rear. Perhaps, also, under present circumstances, the erection of such a fortress would have a salutary effect upon the native mind in India. Our friends are now said to be dispirited at our inactivity, while our enemies acquire fresh confidence and power. Breaking ground at Quetta would cheer the one class, and would check the other. It would show that our repose had been the repose of strength, that we were fully alive to the gravity of the situation, and prepared to move immediately that the occasion arose. But, on the other hand, it is doubtful how such a proceeding would be regarded at Candahar and Cabul. If our position were already secured with Shir Ali Khan, and he could thus be led to look upon the Quetta post as a support to his own power, then we should hardly be deterred from undertaking the work by mere considerations of expense; but if, as is more probable, the tribes in general regarded this erection of a fortress,—above the passes, although not on Afghan soil,—as a menace, or as a preliminary to a further hostile advance, then we should not be justified, for so small an object, in risking the rupture of our friendly intercourse.

H. C. RAWLINSON.

London, July 20, 1868.

No. 13.

(Copy.)

No. 179.—Political.

To the Right Honourable Sir STAFFORD H. NORTHCOTE, Baronet, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIR,

Government of India, Foreign Department,
Simla, 16th October 1868.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a translation of a Persian letter from the Ameer Shere Ali Khan of Cabool, and a copy of our reply to His Highness.

2. We would draw the special attention of Her Majesty's Government to this correspondence, which, politically, may prove of the highest importance.

We have, &c.

(Signed) J. LAWRENCE.
W. R. MANSFIELD.
G. N. TAYLOR.
H. S. MAINE.
J. STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.
H. W. NORMAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 13.

TRANSLATION of Letter from the BRITISH VAKEEL at Cabul to the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR, dated September 1868.

AT the time of writing the Government despatches, the Ameer, with the outward appearance of the most esteemed friendship, was pleased to remark that "although notwithstanding the many trials and misfortunes of every kind that I have endured, nothing has up to the present day proceeded from me which should be a cause of offence to the British Government. Further, I have neither by hint or sign, nor openly or secretly, made cause with any other power except the powerful English Government. For instance, during the Swat and Boneyr difficulty (Ambeyla Campaign), simply for the purpose of pleasing the British Government, I ruined my own son-in-law Saadut Khan, Mohmund, and caused myself to be abused throughout Islam for such an act. But from the British Government, I have received comparatively no friendship or kindness with reference to my success in this miserable civil war, until God Almighty of his own favour has again bestowed upon me the country of my inheritance. Now it is my desire to send some of my trusted and reputable representatives, or else proceed myself in person with a small party to Calcutta for the purpose of a meeting, and to show my sincerity and firm attachment to the British Government, and make known my real wants. At present writing letters on my part is of little avail in every way until I first receive congratulating letters from the British Government."

Upon this, certain of the Ameer's who are well-wishers to the British Government represented to him that "at the present moment it is not advisable for your Majesty to exceed the bounds of the treaty made by the late Ameer and formerly by yourself, but it will be better in every way merely to intimate your desires by letter, so that they may act as seems best in their judgment in respect to an interview, and in order that the former friendly relations may become more securely permanent."

At length the Ameer agreed to the writing of the letters intimating his wishes. To-day three letters have been written and brought to the Agency. They are herewith forwarded in original.

Enclosure 2 in No. 13.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from AMEER SHERE ALI KHAN, Walee of Cabul, to the GOVERNOR GENERAL, dated Cabul, 26th Jumadil-Awul 1285 A. H., corresponding with 14th September 1868.

(After compliments.)

I BEG to state for your Excellency's information that by the grace and help of the Almighty God, my flag safely reached the metropolis of Cabul on Tuesday the 20th (8th September 1863) Jumadil Awul.

As the relations of friendship and amity subsist between the two States, I beg to communicate this intelligence for the gratification of my sincere friends.

By the blessing of God every thing is right in this part of the country, and I am defended by divine favour.

I hope that your Excellency will continue to gratify me with the welcome tidings of your good health.

Enclosure 3 in No. 13.

TO AMEER SHERE ALI KHAN of Cabul.

I HAVE received your letter, informing me of your safe return to Cabul, and the recovery of your kingdom. I congratulate your Highness on your success, which is alone due to your own courage, ability, and firmness. I sincerely hope that your Highness will now be able to re-establish and consolidate your authority. I trust that you will deal leniently with those who have fought against you, particularly when there may be reason to believe that they were carried away by the difficulties of their position, and the course of events, when they can give you assurance of future fidelity. By kindness and generosity in this respect, your Highness will take the best mode of establishing your rule throughout your dominions. It has always been to me a cause of sorrow that the family of your great father, the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, should have broken up into contending factions, who have resorted to civil war, causing the ruin of many brave chiefs, and the general weakening of Afghan power. I trust that your Highness will be able, by the exercise of those excellent virtues, kindness, foresight, and good management, to restore peace and prosperity to your country. I am prepared not only to maintain the bonds of amity, and good will, which were established between Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan and myself, acting on the part of the British Government, but so far as may be practicable to strengthen those bonds. In all cases of this kind, it is essential that both parties should act with sincerity and truth, so that real confidence may exist between them.

Sinla, 2d October 1868.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

No. 14.

No. 1 of 1869.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Political.—Confidential. (Extract.)

To His Grace the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Fort William, the 4th January 1869.

WE have the honour to transmit a series of Minutes, with annexures, as per accompanying Abstract of Contents, bearing on the important political question raised in the confidential Memorandum of Sir H. C. Rawlinson, which was forwarded, under Sir Stafford Northcote's instructions, in Mr. Kaye's letter of 21st August last. The Honourable Mr. Maine wishes it to be understood that he concurs entirely in the Minute of the Viceroy.

2. The various proposals brought forward in that Memorandum, in order to counteract, in some measure, the advances of Russia in Central Asia, and to strengthen the influence and power of England in Afghanistan and Persia, have received from us that careful

consideration which is due to the well-known career and abilities of the writer, and to the magnitude of the events and interests of which he has treated.

3. A careful perusal of the Memorandum forwarded to us, and a further discussion of the subject in all its bearings, has not led us to recommend any substantial alteration in the course of policy to be adopted on the frontier, or beyond it. On the contrary, the closer and more constant the attention which the subject receives at our hands, the more settled is our conviction that any serious departure from the principles which we have already enunciated, would be the cause of grave political and financial embarrassments, and would probably involve us in doubtful undertakings, the issue or duration of which no statesman could venture to predict.

4. We solicit a full consideration of our subjoined Minutes. They have been penned with reference to every available source of information, after careful observation of the protracted struggle for supreme authority in Afghanistan, which is not yet terminated, and under a deep sense of our responsibility for the welfare of all classes in India, and for the permanence of the British power. In these Minutes the consequences of any deviation from our established policy have been viewed by us under various aspects, and your Grace will observe that due regard has been paid to the division and conflict of parties in Afghanistan, and to the peculiar national characteristics of the people; to the difficulties of establishing, supporting, and supplying troops in isolated positions, and at a distance from our own territories; to the financial outlay which any strategic advance beyond our own border, or even the formation of a Native Contingent, would certainly entail; and to the probable effects of such measures on the feelings and wishes of those classes of Her Majesty's subjects in India itself whom it is our object to attach to us by just and kind treatment, or, if necessary, to control by salutary awe. These considerations deserve fully as much attention as the gradual advance of Russia in Central Asia, and her military occupation of the cities and territories of Samarcand and Bokhara, on which many writers have been led too exclusively to dwell.

5. We venture to sum up the policy which is recommended or supported, in various language and by various arguments in our Minutes, somewhat as follows:—We object to any active interference in the affairs of Afghanistan by the deputation of a high British officer, with or without a contingent, or by the forcible or amicable occupation of any post or tract in that country beyond our own frontier, inasmuch as we think such a measure would, under present circumstances, engender irritation, defiance, and hatred in the minds of the Afghans, without in the least strengthening our power either for attack or defence. We think it impolitic and unwise to decrease any of the difficulties which would be entailed on Russia, if that power seriously thought of invading India, as we should certainly decrease them if we left our own frontier, and met her half way in a difficult country, and, possibly, in the midst of a hostile or exasperated population. We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is, to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control.

6. Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or, what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security, would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Cabul, Candahar, or any similar outpost; in full reliance on a compact, highly-equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories, or on our own border; in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses; in the sense of security of title and possession, with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal Chief and the Native aristocracy; in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political and military strength; in husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying our resources; in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard; and in a trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt.

7. We think it necessary to dwell strongly on this part of the policy of the Government of India, because the subject has lately been revived in the public prints, and

because some writers possibly imagine that a change in the Head of the administration may be a fit occasion for a change in our foreign or domestic policy.

8. It is not difficult for public writers, who are often wanting in detailed and accurate information, and who may write without a full sense of political or financial responsibility, to advocate or suggest measures which, for a moment, may delude or influence the public.

9. The following are the only fresh measures which we could bring ourselves to recommend:—We think that endeavours might be made to come to some clear understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg, as to its projects and designs in Central Asia, and that it might be given to understand, in firm but courteous language, that it cannot be permitted to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan, or in those of any State which lies contiguous to our frontier. We are aware that this subject was pressed on Sir Stafford Northcote in the despatches from us, which were all reviewed by him in his letter of the 26th of December 1867, No. 15, but without any result. The subject, however, is of such paramount importance, that we think ourselves justified in again pressing it on Her Majesty's Government. The truth appears to us to be, that the advances of Russia, coupled with the constant allusions made in the newspapers to her progress as compared with what is called the inaction of the British Government, have produced, in the minds of Europeans and Natives, what we believe to be an exaggerated opinion of her resources and power. A mutual good understanding between the two Powers, though difficult of attainment, would enable us to take means to counteract unfounded rumours and to prevent unnecessary alarms.

10. Then, we think that our relations with the Court of Teheran should be placed entirely under the Secretary of State for India; and that we should be empowered to give to any de facto Ruler of Cabul some arms and ammunition and substantial pecuniary assistance, as well as moral support, as occasion may offer, but without any formal offensive or defensive alliance. We have already authorised the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to give Shere Ali six lakhs of rupees, and we shall further be prepared to supply him with some thousand stand of arms. We should be glad, therefore, if a discretion were given us, at once to act on any emergency on the above principles, without any special reference to Her Majesty's Government at home.

11. In the event of Ameer Shere Ali proving successful in the struggle now going on between him and his nephew, Sirdar Abdool Rahman, should His Highness desire to meet the Governor General, we think it would be politic that his request should be complied with. If any such arrangement were inconvenient for the Governor General, his place could be supplied by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The meeting might, with most advantage, take place at Peshawur, which is easier of access than more remote parts of the border, and where there is a large force to represent British power and influence. On this occasion the Ameer could explain fully his views, his hopes, and his desires; and thus place us in possession of a great deal of valuable information, which it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain in any other way. If, however, as is now very unlikely, Abdool Rahman Khan, or any other chief, prove victorious, we must wait and see whether he can consolidate his possession of the supreme power in the country.

12. With these remarks we would suggest further that opportunity be taken by Her Majesty's Government to lay down a course of action which will avoid the perpetual recurrence to these exciting topics, and which will strengthen the hands of those who have to conduct the affairs of India on the spot, by, as we hope, endorsing views which, in the best interests of all parties, we have carefully considered, and to which we respectfully and firmly adhere.

We have, &c.

(Signed), JOHN LAWRENCE.
W. R. MANSFIELD.
H. S. MAINE.
J. STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

REMARKS ON SIR H. RAWLINSON'S MEMORANDUM ON CENTRAL ASIA.

His Excellency the Viceroy and the Governor General having requested me to give my opinion on a memorandum by Sir H. Rawlinson on the Central Asian question, I beg to record my cordial agreement with the author in his general views of the subject.

2. Every one who has an intimate acquaintance with Afghanistan and its Rulers, and has thought over the probable effects of the advance of Russia from the banks of the Oxus, must, I think, agree with me, that, however desirable it was on the death of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan to allow the Affghans to select their own Ruler, the time has now arrived for prompt and effective support being given to Shere Ali Khan, the nominee of the late Ameer, and now triumphant head of the people.

3. Experience has demonstrated that a subsidy, however large, paid in cash to the Ameer, has no lasting effect on the Government, but only goes to swell the allowances of the immediate relations of the Ruler; and I consider General Rawlinson's suggestion of a contingent to be raised, paid, and equipped by us, as the cheapest and most effective support that we can, under the circumstances, give the Ameer.

4. The great difficulty in the way of a cordial understanding with the Ameer will be the innate distrust which is so large a portion of every Affghan's character, but definite, well-matured propositions, tending to his own advantage, laid clearly and candidly before him, must, in the end, convince even Shere Ali Khan that our interests are identical with his own, and that all we desire is a really strong Affghan Government between us and our western neighbours.

5. Whatever determinations are come to by Government, it is evident that the situation admits of no delay, if we are in earnest, and really wish to secure that paramount political influence in Afghanistan, which all authorities agree to be our best safeguard against Russian intrigue.

6. As a first step towards bringing about a thorough understanding with Ameer Shere Ali Khan, I would suggest a Durbar on the largest scale being held for a meeting between His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India and Shere Ali Khan, which would proclaim to Asia the cordial renewal of treaty relations with Afghanistan and its Rulers.

7. As Ameer Shere Ali Khan could not conveniently, under existing circumstances, be so long absent from Cabul as a visit to the mouth of the Khibar would involve, the meeting might be arranged to take place at Kooram.

8. Once in face to face communication with the Ameer, the questions of an Envoy at his Court, the amount and nature of the support proposed to give him, &c., &c., could easily be arranged, and the meeting alone would be of incalculable advantage to him in his present position, and go far to correct public opinion in India as to his Russian proclivities.

9. My propositions to him would be,—

1st. To keep up for him five regiments of Infantry and two batteries of guns, to be raised, paid, and equipped by us, one regiment to be a depôt, one constantly in our own provinces, and relieved annually.

2d. An Envoy with suitable staff and escort at his Court, through whom the force would be regularly paid.

10. When by the above measures a thorough understanding has been established between the two Governments, I would guarantee him Cabul, on condition that (to enable us to do so) he makes over Koorum and Khost to us for an annual payment of one lac of rupees (he does not get more than 15,000 from it now); we could then establish a cantonment in the Koorum valley, only eight marches from the capital, the last four of which are in the plains of Cabul.

11. Thus, without entering a single pass, or in the slightest degree endangering our communications, we should be in a position to completely command the Paiwar Pass, and make our influence felt at the capital, while the advantage to Shere Ali Khan would be not only an appreciable increase of revenue, but also the release of a considerable body of his own troops now required to hold Khost and Koorum.

12. It may be hinted by some that "this proposition is on a par with the Quetta scheme, only at the other end of our line," but there is no parallel between them, as Koorum is only 48 miles in advance of our present border, in the open valley, with communications ensured at all times, and within easy reach of support from Kohat or Bunnoo.

13. With reference to the dangerous influence which might be brought to bear on the Mahomedan portion of our own subjects through Feroze Shah and the nest of Wahabee refugees beyond our border, alluded to by General Rawlinson, I would suggest that, now that we have an adequate force on the spot under General Wilde, the opportunity might be taken, not only to rid the border for ever of these pests, but also to settle accounts with all blockaded tribes.

14. I would proclaim our determination to rid the border of these Hindoostanee Wahabees, and to punish severely any tribe assisting them with men, supplies, or asylum, and would carry out my threat to the letter. This would doubtless prolong operations a little, but I maintain that it is cheaper and more politic to settle with all recusants at one effort, than to have a series of concentrations of troops on the border year by year, which, however well conducted and successful, have the appearance of failures from their frequency. No one can calculate the benefit to be derived from our thoroughly rousing ourselves into action on a frontier which has never yet felt the effect of a blow in earnest from the British Government.

15. Equal in importance with our relations with Afghanistan and our other neighbours is the question of our influence at the Persian Court, so ably advocated by General Rawlinson. I most cordially agree with him in all he says on this head, and consider that the recovery of paramount influence there at the present juncture would be cheap at a heavy outlay.

16. In conclusion, I would beg to enter my protest against the habit, so universally indulged in by almost every writer on the subject of the defence of India, as well as by General Rawlinson, of looking on the Khibar and Bolan routes as the only two inlets for an invading army on to the plains of the

Punjab, and utterly ignoring in their calculations the almost equally good Golarie Pass openings on the Derajat. If any one doubts the practicability of this route, I would refer him to "Havelock's Narrative of the War in Afghanistan," 1838-39, page 205, vol. II.

17. As for the project of occupying Quetta as a *place d'armes*, pushed 250 miles beyond its nearest supports, with nothing in front, and its only communication through a long, difficult, and, in many places, waterless pass, flanked all the way by wild and warlike tribes, the idea suggests to my mind nothing but a wanton throwing away of troops and resources which would be of immense value elsewhere.

18. Since writing the above remarks, I have seen a pamphlet by Dr. Bellew, which is useful, in so far as it shows the general feeling in favour of immediate political action, but the stupendous move proposed is simply impossible.

19. To take all the passes into our own hands, subdue 100,000 warlike men in their own hill fastnesses, and keep them under at the same time that we are repelling a serious invasion from the west, with a probable rising in the heart of our own provinces, is an undertaking which no one but a doctor, with a writing mania on him, would think of proposing to a too confiding public.

H. B. LUMSDEN,
Brigadier-General.

Simla, 21st September 1868.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

MEMORANDUM on Paper by Sir HENRY RAWLINSON on Central Asian progress of Russia.

WITH the exception of the suggestion in regard to occupation of Quetta, I entirely agree in the practical conclusions arrived at in this able paper. But I do not wholly concur with the writer in some of the views urged in the body of it. I cannot pretend to so intimate an acquaintance with the characteristics and relations of the tribes inhabiting those regions as Sir Henry evidently possesses, and it is consequently with diffidence that I state the reasons why I differ from him, more or less, on some points.

2. That a profound impression is produced on the minds of the inhabitants of Northern India, especially by the rapid advances of Russia during the past few years, there can be no doubt. The general impression, too, on the minds of our Indian subjects, undoubtedly is, that we are, and must be, hostile to the Russians, an impression confirmed, if not created, by the comments of a large portion of the Indian Press, and very many of them, I believe, are convinced that we dread them as a superior and more powerful nation.

3. But I do not think it can be fairly said that the races with whom Russia is now coming newly in contact regard her without animosity or fear, while the Afghans consider themselves to have a national feud with us.

4. As regards the former point, all the information I have been enabled to obtain on the subject leads me to believe that there exists, throughout Central Asia, in the minds of all the most influential and best informed of its populations, a wide spread feeling of distrust and dislike of the Russians, as an aggressive and unscrupulous power, who have brought their co-religionists to ruin and humiliation in almost all quarters where their dominion has been established. Many who go on pilgrimage to Mecca visit Constantinople and the southern provinces of Russia, containing Mahomedan populations, and I have myself heard from some of these expressions of horror at the tyranny and oppression exercised by Russian Governors and officials. That Russia can hold out sufficient attractions to win over some portions of the people she subdues to her side and to enlist them in her service I have no doubt. But, nevertheless, I feel assured that the general feeling entertained towards her is far more unfavourable than that entertained towards ourselves.

5. Passing on to the second point, I very greatly doubt the correctness of the opinion expressed, that the Afghan nation generally considers itself to have a national feud with us, whatever may have been the case in the past; I believe they now fully appreciate the uniform civility and protection which their traders or travellers experience in our territory, and the bearing of Amir Shere Ali Khan, since he has regained the throne of Cabul, certainly shows anything but a disinclination to be on friendly terms with us so far as he has hitherto pronounced himself. He complains of our not having assisted him, or shown him any sympathy during the troubles through which he has passed. But on every suitable occasion he has dwelt on the friendship of late years existing between the Afghan Government and ours, has emphatically declared that he has never swerved from it, or applied to any other power whatever for support, and has evinced and avowed a strong desire to meet the Viceroy in person.

6. That it is the destiny of Russia to subdue the Sarts and Uzbeys, the Kirghiz, and the Kipchaks of Tartary and the Steppes, I think far from improbable, and from the comparative inexperience and disinclination for regular warfare of the populations of "Mawar-un-Nahr," at all events during later times, their utter inability to oppose disciplined troops, and the fertility of their country, it is quite possible that Russia may, in the end, be able to make the conquered territory pay. But I believe that people will find it a long and arduous task to establish themselves so securely as to admit of their raising a regular revenue of any considerable amount from races which have heretofore enjoyed so much license for ages past, and I feel sure that the difficulties of the Russians will increase, with each extension of territory, especially if their rule is found to be productive of such desolation and stagnation of national life as are said to have resulted from their occupation of the territories bordering on the Euxine.

7. In short, I believe that, in spite of the semi-Asiatic character of the Russians, and the constant feats of military prowess on their part, which must be anticipated for some years, the contrast between an aggressive power and a non-aggressive one will become more and more conspicuous, and will tell more and more in favour of the latter in the general estimation, the more frequent become the opportunities, and the greater the incentives to compare the policy and conduct of the Russian Government with those of British India at the present time.

8. The paper dwells much on the irresistible inducements to Russia to advance beyond the Oxus when once established on it. But I would observe that, on coming in contact with the Affghans on their own ground, she will meet with a very different race from the comparatively luxurious populations occupying the country between the Jaxartes and the Oxus (or "Mawar-un-Nahr"), a race inured to war from their youth; and pretty certain to offer resistance to anything like conquest or intrusion, more formidable than what Russia experienced much nearer home, for a long season of years, from the Circassians, while the country could never repay the outlay which any tampering with it might involve. That portion of Affghanistan which is designated Turkistan, including Balkh and Kunduz, might perhaps offer some temptation, but any interference with it would probably rouse the hostility of the entire Affghan nation. And I should doubt very much the disposition of that people even to cultivate intimate diplomatic relations with a power which has steadily carried on a series of aggression on, and ultimately appropriated, all the countries up to its border, unless driven to that course by causes which, with the most ordinary prudence on our part, can hardly occur.

9. If, on the other hand, Russia should endeavour, as Sir H. Rawlinson suggests she might do, to arouse the cupidity of the races north of Hindustan, by representing the latter as the traditional plunder ground of Central Asia, of which, with her aid, they might possess themselves, the people of India would not be slow to realize the results which must ensue to themselves from the carrying out of such a project, seeing that they would necessarily be the chief sufferers from inroads similar to, but much more formidable than, those which have devastated their lands and cities in former times; and with the populations of India on her side, England can have nothing to fear.

10. The arguments used by Mr. Grigorief as to the course which it is open to Russia to adopt to counteract a presumed line of action on the part of our Government have, in all probability, I am disposed to think, been drawn largely from the comments of our own newspapers, and the writings of English authors. The assumptions which his letter contains, however, have been entirely negatived by facts, and, as remarked by Sir H. Rawlinson, he gives us credit for too much sensitiveness in supposing that we will either resort to unavailing diplomatic protest, or assist the Uzbeks in resisting Russia. Should Russia avow its determination to pursue its conquests up to our border in a spirit hostile to England, then the whole position will have become changed. The seemingly inevitable absorption of barbarous races by contiguous ones far more advanced in civilization, will no longer hold good, and it is not on Asiatic ground that the chief conflict will be carried on.

11. There are two other remarks in the above paper which appear to me open to correction; one relates to Cashmere, the other to the Mahommedan fanatics from British India, located in Swat and Boner.

12. In regard to Cashmere, Sir H. Rawlinson remarks that the Maharajah, "taking offence at our efforts to promote trade by insisting on a reduction of the transit duties in his dominions, has been negotiating with the authorities of Tashkand, and urging them to appoint commercial agents at "Yarkand, &c." But in point of fact, whatever rumours to the above effect may have arisen, and I do not believe they ever assumed any very definite form, date from a period anterior to the action on our part, which is supposed to have given offence, and I myself entirely disbelieve those rumours, which, in all probability, resulted from the fact that the Maharajah, at our request, made inquiries through traders and confidential agents as to the state of matters at Tashkand and elsewhere. In Gilgit, Hunza, and elsewhere, the Maharajah has had abundant experience of the difficulty of dealing with wild Mahommedan races bitterly opposed to a Hindu Government established in their midst; and I am convinced that the very last thing he would desire to see, would be the encouragement of such races on his border to assume an aggressive attitude, which he would assuredly expect to be the result of Russian influence.

13. His Serene Highness Prince Frederick of Schleswig Holstein, who has spent the rainy season in Cashmere, has become very intimate with the Maharajah, and mixes much with the people, wrote a short time ago to Simla, that the Cashmere Chief was in great alarm about the expected advent of the Russians into his immediate vicinity. The confidential Minister of the Maharajah was questioned on this point by our representative for the season in Cashmere, and his reply was, that he had no doubt Russia would, within two years, take possession of Yarkand, but that the Maharajah, being under the shadow ("zer sayah") and protection of the British Government, had nothing to fear; and this I firmly believe to indicate correctly his real feeling.

14. He has no doubt been much disturbed by the unscrupulous writings of some English authors, and by the remark of a portion of the public Press. While not having yet attained to an entire faith in the benefits of free trade, he has been apprehensive lest serious detriment should result to him and his territory from the "pashm" or fine wool of Turfan and Kuchar finding its way into British territory. But I believe, nevertheless, that the relations between the Cashmere Government and ours were never more cordial than at the present time; that the suspicions of the Maharajah, who is naturally of a very amiable disposition, are beginning to wear away; and his mind to open to the convictions that the British Government is, in reality, his sincere friend. The officials around him no doubt dislike the interference with the perquisites heretofore yielded by the Ladakh trade, which necessarily results from the presence of our representative at Le; but the Maharajah himself seems really anxious to meet our views, and begins even to evince an interest in the marked increase of trade which is resulting from the measures which have been adopted in deference to our wishes.

15. The true position of the Wahabees from Hindustan, whom Sir H. Rawlinson designates "the fanatics of Sitana," and believes to be now showing increased signs of vitality, appears clearly not to be understood. The tenets of advanced Wahabeeism render it degrading, and a reproach in the estimation of its professors, to be subjects of any but a Mahommedan Power, and hence they have left our territory to seek an asylum amongst co-religionists, however uncongenial. Happily, however, Wahabeeism, from its ascetic and strict character, has never found favour with the people of the Punjab, and least of all with the Affghan races, so that this colony has always remained, amongst the latter, by sufferance only. At Ambela, where their assistance was gladly accepted by the tribes, the latter showed how little affection they felt for them, by a contemptuous disregard for and neglect of the corpses of those who fell. Since that time, the colonists appear to have presumed upon the assistance

then rendered by them, and to have become a source of irritation, insomuch that the Akhund of Swat, with the help of the Ashazais and other tribes of Boner and Swat, after defeating them in fight, and killing and wounding a considerable number, has recently entirely expelled them, and the great bulk are now in a very dejected state, in a locality on the left bank of the Indus belonging to independent tribes of Hazara, where it may be hoped that we shall shortly be able to come to an understanding with them, whether by bringing our forces now in the field in their immediate vicinity to bear upon them, or by permitting them to return to their homes in Hindustan. The person calling himself Feroz Shah, of whom mention is made in connexion with them, has also, from whatever causes, left Swat, and reached Cabul, where, so far as we have yet learned, he has received but a sorry welcome from Amir Shere Ali.

16. From the above remarks, it will be seen that I do not regard the position by any means in so serious a light as Sir Henry Rawlinson appears to do, provided we adhere strictly to the non-aggressive and disinterested policy which has been inaugurated of late years, and of our determined adherence to which, notwithstanding the remarks of Mr. Gregorief, which may be true enough in regard to portions of our past history, we have of late years given to the world such notable proofs, that we can safely afford to abjure the antecedents which antagonists may lay to our charge.

17. Having said thus much, however, I would repeat what I have said above, that with one exception, I cordially concur in the practical conclusions arrived at in this remarkable paper. While deprecating any rash interference in the civil strifes of Afghanistan, I believe that both considerations of good policy as regards our own interests, and of friendliness as regards those of Afghanistan, require that we should assist and show our sympathy with the rightful Ruler, when satisfied that he is the most acceptable of existing candidates to his nation generally; and this may, I think, be emphatically stated at the present time in respect to Amir Sher Ali, whose chief adviser and relative, Mahomed Aslam Khan, was not long ago a refugee in British territory, and warmly appreciates the kindness and attention he then experienced at the hand of British officers. I may add, too, that while I deem it our only wise policy to maintain friendly relations with Afghanistan, to assist her to every reasonable extent, and, if necessary, to guarantee her independence, I deem it to be only second in importance that we endeavour to occupy a somewhat similar relation in regard to Yarkand, which, though not contiguous to equally inflammable material within our border, nevertheless affords an inviting and, in some respects, an easy mode of access to British India, and is likely hereafter to play an important part, as regards the trade of Central Asia, from her position and resources.

18. I think also that it would be wise on our part to evince more preparedness than we have hitherto shown to enter into friendly relations with all the tribes on our frontier, however rude, and to exercise liberality and kindness towards them, whenever fitting opportunity may occur. It would, I think, be well worth while to endeavour to conciliate Boner (already friendly on the whole), Swat and its Akhund, Dher, Chitral, the Afridis, and Orakzias of Teerah, and all other tribes, not immediately subordinate to either Cabul or Cashmere, and a few timely and appropriate presents, occasionally conferred on their Chiefs and principal men, would have a most salutary and decided effect. We cannot, I think, be too careful at the same time to avoid taking undue offence at occasional misdoings on the part of some of their members, and, where coercion becomes necessary, to resort to every available form of it before making a hostile entry into their country. I have elsewhere advocated the formation of a frontier militia for the Peshawur District, to be recruited chiefly from these tribes, and I believe that this measure, if adopted, besides greatly increasing our immunity from frontier marauders, would, as in the Derajat, have a most important effect in improving our relations with the border tribes.

19. I think it of importance further to remark, in connexion with this matter, that the responsibilities and labours of the Commissioner of Peshawur have greatly increased, and are increasing, with the increased importance of Central Asian politics, and in connexion with them, of those of our frontier tribes, our relations with whom are necessarily watched over and directed by that officer, and to enable him to do justice to these duties, I consider that it has now become absolutely necessary that he be relieved from the pressure of judicial duties by the permanent appointment of a Sessions Judge, who shall relieve him of the great bulk of judicial work, and when absolutely necessary, of such portions also of the executive duties of the Division as may be made over to him, acting, however, at all times under the general control of the Commissioner.

20. I fully agree with Sir H. Rawlinson in the opinion he has expressed as to the expediency of endeavouring to regain in full the goodwill of Persia, which we formerly possessed, by the exercise of steady unremitting attention, and by liberally conferring on her ruler and nobles, from time to time, liberal grants and presents as occasion may require. What class of officers are most likely to place our relations with that country on a satisfactory footing it must rest with Government to determine, but Sir Henry Rawlinson's suggestions on this head appear to me to be well deserving of attentive consideration.

21. He has alluded also to the vast importance of completing, at the earliest possible date, railway communication from Peshawur to Lahore and to the seaboard. And I need hardly add that I most heartily concur in this view. The former work has at length been undertaken by Government itself, but communication with the seaboard must remain in a most unsatisfactory state until the comparatively short and easy line connecting Multan with Kotri is sanctioned, and this existing gap filled up. It is, I think, almost impossible to over-estimate the importance to the Punjab at the present time of both these works, and as on the Punjab must necessarily devolve, in the first instance, the defence of the frontier, the imperial interests must be regarded as intimately bound up with those of this province.

22. I have said above that I by no means advocate the occupation of Quetta as a strategic military position, however important this position may be deemed by some from a political point of view. Sir Henry Rawlinson admits that we should not be justified in taking this step if we should thereby run the risk of the loss of our friendly intercourse with either Cabul or Belochistan. And as I feel fully convinced that it would cause extreme suspicion and uneasiness on the part of the former, at all events I would strongly deprecate all thoughts of this or any analogous scheme for obtaining a footing in foreign territory until it shall be absolutely forced upon us by aggression, and by the occurrence of a

state of things not now existing. I believe it to be quite essential, both for our own credit and interests, and for the future well being of the territory committed to us, that we abstain in the most scrupulous manner from evincing any desire whatever for future territorial acquisitions.

23. There is but one further remark which I would wish to make in conclusion, viz., that it appears most unsatisfactory that our newspapers, English and vernacular, and our authors on Oriental subjects, should be allowed the opportunity of writing in a strain eminently calculated to create and foster a spirit of suspicion and hostility between Russia and ourselves, without an effort being made by our Government to disabuse the public of the idea that such a feeling exists or must exist. The actuating motives of Russia appear to be but imperfectly understood. But those of our countrymen who know that country best, or at all events some of these, appear to think the most favourably of those motives, so far at least as affects us. The civility and confidence shown to our officers everywhere in Russia, the willingness with which the geographical and topographical information obtained by its officers is communicated to us, and the freedom with which the Russian newspapers discuss the events occurring in Central Asia, all seem to indicate that she has no wish to conceal her movements from us. And, however desirous she may naturally and very properly be to secure an entrance and safe conduct for her trade with those regions, I am unwilling to believe that she would attempt or desire to exclude our trade seeking to find its way into the same countries. There is, I believe, abundant room for both. In many ways each might benefit the other. And I believe that a friendly rivalry, avowed and encouraged on both sides, would be productive of most beneficial results.

(Signed) D. F. McLEOD,
Lieutenant-Governor, Punjab.

Murree,
10th October 1868.

P.S.—In the foregoing remarks, I have confined myself to the question of political or military precautions to be adopted by us with reference to the progress of Russia in Central Asia. There can, however, I think, be no question that the devising of means by which our own internal administration of India may be rendered more popular than at present, and by which to prevent its becoming distasteful to the mass of the people, is of far more importance as a means of securing us immunity from dangers of whatever kind than all other considerations whatever. I have long been of opinion, and have urged it heretofore, that the best, if not only, means of effecting this object, is to give to the yeomanry, middle classes, and gentry of the country a much larger share in the details of administration, especially of what may be termed the social administration of the country, than they at present possess. A good beginning has been made in the formation of municipal committees, zaildars, &c., and I sincerely trust that further efforts will be made in the same directions, and their importance appreciated.

I believe that by acting on this principle, and introducing it on a large scale, two great objects will be gained. Firstly, we shall in a great measure emancipate the people from a feeling of thralldom, which at present depresses them, and create a much more vigorous, practical, and, I may add, loyal race, as well as one much more likely to value knowledge for its own sake, than the inexperienced professors of an exotic literature, whom our educational system is at present raising up, and teaching to criticise their rulers in a most unamiable, impractical, and self-sufficient spirit;* secondly, we shall afford more leisure to our European officers to cultivate an intimate acquaintance with the people, as they will be relieved of much detail, which under the vastly increased precision of system, and exact observance of legal forms now required, leaves them leisure or inclination for little beyond the decision of cases, and supplying of returns and reports. * It is vain to suppose that an Oriental race can be satisfactorily governed by foreigners while this continues to be the state of the case, and it is yearly becoming more and more so, to the serious prejudice of the best interests of the country.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

MEMORANDUM by Colonel R. TAYLOR, Commissioner, Umbeylah.

Sir Henry Rawlinson's Minute very fully describes the whole position in Central Asia, and the paper is so clearly and forcibly written that it must command attention.

One point noticed by Sir Henry appears to me of great force and importance, namely, that it is probable that the political and territorial connexion between Bokhara and Affghanistan is very considerable, and that this is almost sure to lead to the possessors of the former State, if the stronger being ere long led into meddling in the affairs of the latter.

This is the result of his view, though it is not expressed in the above words. I am writing without having the paper to refer to.

I believe that this opinion will undoubtedly prove correct; there is, in fact, an immediate bone of contention ready to hand in the province of Balkh, only comparatively recently wrested by the Affghans from Bokhara.

Supposing that its restoration were not demanded by a power that obtained complete mastery in Bokhara, it would still be almost certain that other questions, territorial or political, would arise, which would be settled when convenient (and they would probably not be allowed to arise till it was convenient also to dispose of them), in very much of the wolf and lamb style.

* If any proof or illustration be required to establish the fact that what may be called the administrative training of a people tends in the most marked manner to promote their intellectual culture, I believe that such may be found in the history of every country which has made much progress in elevating the character of the bulk of its population, and that it may easily be shown from the evidences thus supplied that a share in their social administration is, in fact, quite indispensable to render a people generally intellectually vigorous. A recent instance appears to be afforded in the case of Russia since the emancipation of her serfs, as attested from many sources. Thus, the "Journal de Moscou," as quoted by the Calcutta "Englishman" of the 14th July 1868, remarks "a desire for popular education is springing up rapidly in these parts of Russia where the peasants take part in the system of self-government."

For this is a point on which I find that, on such experience and observation as I am able to apply to the subject, my views differ considerably from those of most of the writers whose minutes and memoranda I have been allowed to peruse. I allude to the estimation formed of the military status of the regular Afghan forces, those troops, I mean, that would have to move to a given point, and fight a battle to prevent an invading force occupying Cabul.

The tone generally adopted is that the Affghans, being hardy, manly, and warlike, would, if properly trained and directed, oppose a formidable obstacle to Russian progress; and this assumes that they would be able to meet the latter in the more open parts of the country, such as the Russians would, of course, as far as they were able, select for their lines of approach.

But I do not believe that the regular armies of Afghanistan, namely, its half-trained artillery and infantry, and wholly untrained, though well mounted and individually brave and efficient bodies of cavalry, would stand for one half day's struggle with the Russian troops, or against any disciplined force, officered mainly by Europeans, and led on with judgment by an experienced General.

Why should we suppose that the men from whom our, at the time, over-taxed troops wrested the strong fortress of Ghuznie by a *coup de main*, and who, in the hour of their own triumph, flushed with success, and commanded by the victorious Chief, a Prince of the land, who had just destroyed an English army, albeit of helpless fugitives, suffered a garrison of toil-worn and partially dispirited men to march out and put them to shameful rout, camp, baggage, the Chief's tent, all being left *non bene* as spoil to a weakened British brigade,—I say, why should we suppose that these men, who have never checked us in a fair field, will be able to oppose any real barrier to the advance of the Russians, when the latter have resolved to move into the Afghan territory?

Much the same results as those noticed above occurred at Candahar, Tezeen, Istalif, Guzerat, and elsewhere.

In fact, I know of no instance of the Afghan troops gaining a success in an open fight against disciplined soldiers in fair order and properly led. At Begmaroo our troops were already demoralized, and at Purwan-Durrah the success which was achieved by Dost Mahomed Khan in person, with the flower of Afghan swordsmen around him, was over a body of Native Cavalry of questionable efficiency, poorly armed, and with little self-confidence to support them; the event therefore, proves nothing.

My own belief, then, is that, subsidise and drill the Affghans through Native instructors as much as you choose, no efficient opposition to the onward move of Russian aggression would be the result, when once the Russians had made their arrangements in the rear, and were resolved to advance on Cabul. It might be different, I allow, if the Afghan troops were officered by Englishmen, and provided with an efficient artillery, similarly commanded; and only a force thus composed would, as far as my judgment goes, have any chance of checking the Russian troops when they moved on.

Of course, this onward movement would not be made till they had made matters snug and firm in the rear. The base would probably be a good system of fortified posts on the Bokhara frontier, which would have been thoroughly well stored from the rear with all that was necessary for the enterprise. It is of no use our dwelling on the long distance to be accomplished, and the desert and difficult tracts over which these munitions of war must be brought. This is nothing to Russia, if the road be all her own, which she has made it, or certainly will make it. Opinions as to her ultimate success or otherwise may sway to and fro, but she can afford to bide her time, and go on for ever quietly pushing on all she needs for her struggles in the front. She has the advantage of being upstairs in the attics, and descends to her work; those occupying the tracts below her feeling to a certain extent overcrowded by her very position.

We are unfortunately downstairs and out in the street, and must ascend narrow and difficult flights of steps, with no good landing-places on them, in order to get even up to the first floor. Our efforts in this way must always be convulsive. We might and should certainly push our convoys through, but it would be done with exertion and trouble, and we should have to congratulate ourselves on each occasion, on having got them successfully past the dangers of the road. All this would be quite opposed to the quiet systematic manner in which Russia, with no local Presses eager to publish all her doings to the world, could go on feeding her advanced positions, along her own roads, across her own seas, and up her own rivers, with all that she deemed necessary for their support and development.

It is quite true that she may overdo the thing in the matter of extension by and bye, and may break her own back, but we cannot count upon when that may happen, and for a long period her arms and progress will probably be crowned with success and *éclat*; she may yet have to learn the unpleasant lesson, which we have twice had, of the confusing and overpowering effect on even the best soldiers of suddenly finding the whole of the world in their immediate neighbourhood up in arms against them, and that far from home and from the hope of succour within a moderate time. In this way, Mahomedanism may yet exhibit a throe which may put the Muscovite on his mettle, and throw back his game for a long period to come.

I confess that I dislike Islamism so much that, in prospect, it gives me no satisfaction to contemplate the possibility of such an accident, and I would that, by some treaty or compact between the two sister nations of Christendom, we might be so circumstanced as to be able and inclined to look upon a misfortune to Russia in Asia as a mishap to civilization and progress, and, therefore, as an unmitigated evil, instead of having to rejoice at the wilderness being left again to itself.

I think this attitude towards one another on the part of two Christian nations meeting in the wilds of Central Asia would be more creditable to our civilization and mutual faith, than talking of hounding on Mahomedan populations and barbarous hordes to rise on our rivals and embarrass them in every way, if not to hurl them back with slaughter and ruin.

I can easily understand that it may be next to impossible to obtain such a treaty. Russia possibly does not think she needs it; and if we should obtain it, we might find that it involved inconveniences, such as the necessity of dealing with infringement, and also of preventing aggression on Russian territory by the classes occupying what should be decided to be the *buffer tract*: this latter we could not undertake to do. The least flaw or mistake in the Russian arrangements would be immediately taken advantage of by the powerful clans around her, whose strength is especially shown in at once

detecting and falling on a weak point, and it would be utterly impossible for us, occupying the position we do, to undertake to repress this action on the part of the Affghans, or any other tribe or class concerned.

It is, therefore, I believe impossible for us to enter into any rigid compact with Russia regarding the manner in which she is to be bound to conduct herself in Central Asia, nor could she, on her part, bind herself to refrain from this or that policy or step, as it might be very shortly forced upon her in a way that would admit of no hesitation or avoidance, and we could not undertake to relieve her of the pressure which might be causing the evil.

Still, I think some general declaration of principles on both sides might be obtained, and Russia might well bind herself to respect the limits of Afghanistan, *unless aggressed upon by its rulers or people*, and then, if this latter did occur, and was beyond our control, we must abide by the consequences. With even a native envoy at Cabul, we could not be deceived as to the real character of the offensive movement on either side. If Russia aggressed in an unprovoked manner contrary to her agreement, the character of her action would be at any rate sufficiently declared, and we must deal with it as best we may.

I think it might be well for Russia to accede to an arrangement which should allay the excitement and uneasiness felt by the Affghans, as well as ourselves, regarding her advance, as that uneasiness may force measures upon us which cannot but have a disturbing effect on the minds of the Affghan people and others.

After a considerable pause we may be induced to reopen our purse-strings, and commence to pay again; the Affghan will know very well that this is not merely in affection for him. "What is it then?" "We are uneasy about the Russians and their progress;" this being recognised as the screw that moves us, it will not fail to be sufficiently worked; when the silver stream once begins to flow, it will be kept up to its full volume, if it be not increased from year to year by tricks and false representations.

I would give the Affghans, as a body, credit for a genuine wish to keep out the Russians, and they will, no doubt, do something without money in the right direction by drilling their troops, strengthening their fortresses, &c.; and it is possible, as things progress and a better feeling and more confidence grows up between us, that they may ask for European Officers and Artillery. All this, then, if directed against Russia, will be really disadvantageous to her, and, perhaps, lead to a collision between us long before there was any necessity for it, or when it might have been avoided entirely.

It is on the above account that I think that Russia might do wisely in allaying anxiety and by giving us some trustworthy guarantee, which, by setting our minds at rest regarding her intentions and projects, might obviate the necessity of our expending men and treasure in educating these half barbarous but brave classes so as to enable them to hang efficiently on her advance, opposing her to the uttermost, and to be ready, as they would be, to lend vigorous aid to their co-religionists in taking signal and fatal advantage of any unlooked for accident of war, famine, or pestilence, which befel her sons, and thus reduce her distant detachments to some of those unforeseen straits and emergencies that have at times overtaken ourselves on Asiatic soil.

Islamism has much warlike vitality in it, yet we are enlarged, and dwell in its tents, and by superior knowledge, character, system, and method, and let me add, by the will of Heaven, we hold our own, and control them so far that we are able to make use of these teeming masses of men, inured to the use of arms from their childhood, as if they were born to do our bidding; but there may come convulsive efforts to break this chain, and the Russians, with their extended communications held by troops which for years will be comparatively new to the work, may feel the strain when it comes as much or more than we are likely to do. Large bodies of men among the Mahomedans in our own territory live only on the hope of successfully accomplishing this effort, and are most bitter in their hatred to us. Could we be assured that Russia's designs are not directed against us, it would be much better for us to have a Christian and civilised nation sitting on the head of Central Asian Mahomedanism, crushing its power and rendering nugatory its boast of an endless background of true believing nations and peoples from the Indus to Constantinople, than, perhaps, to see that civilised power worsted and obliged to fall back, while barbarism and the faith that opposes all progress and improvement should triumph.

I should then, certainly, like to see some reliable understanding come to with Russia which should limit her approach towards us, for it is truly very necessary for peace and quiet that there should be a good belt of independent country between us, and then surely we have both of us plenty to do in the civilising and consolidating way, without distracting and weakening one another by threats of direct and indirect hostility.

Such a compact need not embrace a time when the two nations might be at war in Europe.

It is true that, in the cause of civilisation, it might be creditable to both nations if they would consent to enter into a purely Asiatic treaty, in order, if it might be, to obviate the evils that would attend our coming into collision when surrounded by half civilised nations of a bitterly hostile faith, who would be eager to take advantage of any weakness which our unseemly jealousy of each other might cause to either side.

But perhaps this amount of philanthropy and forbearance is not to be hoped for. Russian politicians, no doubt, think that her advanced position in Asia will give her a hold over us in case of an European war, and this they will be loth to forego.

I do not see why we should feel anxiety on this point. We are not likely to go to war with Russia in Europe single-handed, and she herself, therefore, is likely to have her hands tolerably full at or near home, and in that case, would not have much leisure or surplus material to send on the hazardous enterprise of advances through the Affghan passes to attack us at the base of the mountains or on the line of the Indus.

And here I must notice, that because I have written above in a depreciating manner of the regular Affghan army, it must not be supposed that I in the least undervalue the difficulty that any nation of aliens would experience in dealing with the independent Affghan tribes inhabiting the rough belt of mountains through which an invader of Hindostan would have to make his onward way, and also to secure his retreat. It is these men who constitute the strength of Affghanistan in some senses, its

weakness in others ; it is a mistake to confound them with the armies of the rulers for the time being. The latter may, indeed, be largely recruited from the mountain tribes, but the commanders and instructors of the Affghan troops have not the faculty possessed by our British officers in so remarkable a degree of imparting a new and increased power to such men, by giving them a certain sufficient amount of discipline, coupled with a thorough knowledge of and dexterity in using superior arms, while they are careful to retain and foster all the natural vigour and instinctive intelligence in these wild recruits which are the qualities which constitute their especial fitness for mountain warfare.

The rough tribesman on entering the ranks of the regular Affghan army, separates himself from his own native hills, where alone he can fight to the best advantage. If he is allowed to retain his own arms, they are clumsy and poor tools to use in open country and against trained infantry. If a new weapon is supplied to him, it is one that he does not care about or know the use of, and no one takes the trouble to teach him.

The Sikhs, who could do nothing against the Mahomedan hill tribes in their own fastnesses and invariably made miserable failures of their attempts to coerce them, always signally defeated the Affghans when the latter attempted to meet them in the open.

I have above, then, given distinctly the opinion that the Affghan army, though drilled and paid by us, if only led by its own countrymen, will not hold the Russian troops in check for a day ; but, on the other hand, I am perfectly aware that it would be a most hazardous attempt for the Russians to advance through the Affghan passes, leaving them in their rear, to attack us. Not merely defeat, but a check of a few days, would place them in a very critical position. A reverse would be utter and irretrievable ruin.

From any other kind of army recruited in Asia, and hounded on to attack us, we should have nothing to fear. In fact, I should think it very doubtful whether Russian injunctions or incitement would induce the classes of Central Asia, who know our power and their own weakness in a fair stand up fight perfectly well, to make the attempt unaided by disciplined troops.

I began by saying that Russia in Bokhara would be led on into Affghanistan, and that she would soon there find her position and power to be that of the wolf dealing with the lamb, and act accordingly. She would thus, at the outset at any rate, find that she could hold Cabul, Ghuznee, and Candahar, as we could have held them if proper arrangements and preparations had been made, and the force had not been placed in a false and dubious position, which was calculated to disincline its leaders from taking with firmness those necessary precautions, which they would of course have taken in regard to a force entirely dependent on its own resources.

Russia, with our example before her, will commit no such mistake ; she will take care that her troops trust to themselves alone, and that they shall thus be able to hold themselves free of treachery and its paralyzing consequences ; and setting about the matter in this way, I feel certain that she would at first find comparatively little difficulty in holding the open portions of the country, which would be all that she would care about in the first instance.

Like us, however, she would ere long wear out her welcome and must look out for squalls. The large mountain clans occupying and controlling important passes would prove the same thorn in the side to her that they did to us, and such, in fact, as they habitually are to their own co-religionist rulers. The novelty wearing off, the Affghans would sigh, plot, and plan, to get rid of the intruders ; and though as I have said, they could not face the Russian brigades for a day in open fight, still, in revolt, and when favoured by severity of season and other circumstances, they would prove as formidable to the Russians as they did to us, and as they would to any other nation ; let but things go against the occupying army for a few weeks, or even days, and the whole country, hill tribes and all, would be up and swarming like a hive of bees around the perplexed detachments of the invader ; outposts would be cut off or have to fall back rapidly on the main body, and have difficulty in executing the movement, so actively would they be beset by the guerilla swarm, composed of men who a fortnight before had not appeared to have the spirit to strike the faintest blow against their conquerors.

The upshot of my view then, is that, although I believe that Russia could establish herself in Affghanistan and hold the main points of influence and control in that territory, for a time, with comparative ease, yet that her position would be subject to the same great difficulties and weakness that others have felt, and that she would be as liable as any other nation in the same position would be to be thrown on her haunches by serious revolt ; and it is a part of my general opinion of the case, that Affghanistan, in hearty revolt against the alien holder of the main points or positions of influence, such as Cabul, Ghuznee, and Candahar, would always be a formidable difficulty to deal with, and therefore, that it would not be a wise act for the politicians of any European nation to thrust its armies into a position from which so little honour and advantage was likely to be obtained, while so much of real risk was to be incurred.

There remains the possibility, which I have before alluded to, of Russia being drawn on against her will and intention, and being thus forced into an advance on Affghanistan. This sort of thing has happened so often to ourselves, that we could little blame Russia for acting as we have been obliged to do in so many remarkable instances, and it therefore becomes necessary to consider well what would be the result of an event which, though perhaps depreciated and struggled against by the politicians of both nations, may yet, perhaps, happen, in spite of their wishes and endeavours to the contrary.

Supposing Russia by force or treaty to become mistress of Affghanistan, she would naturally take possession of the valleys of Khoorrum and Khost, and thus her most advanced detachments would come at once almost in sight of our outposts. It is necessary to look this point in the face.

The question, then, is, what action is open to us in order to ward off this undoubted evil ? Could the influence of Russia be effectually confined to her present limits, I would much rather have her where she is than away ; but it is, however, equally certain that it would be very inconvenient to have her in Affghanistan.

There appear to be several lines of policy under discussion with the above object.

Sir Henry Rawlinson's proposition is to make friends with Affghanistan and Persia, re-establishing our influence with both. He would give European Officers for the Persian Army, and I think (I write

from memory), he makes mention in one place of giving material support to Affghanistan, if necessary, though he would prefer our efforts being confined within the limits of diplomacy.

If Persia can thus be made ours in feeling by aid given to her by us in establishing a naval force in the Gulf; and if her army can be drilled and commanded by British Officers, at any rate there would be a game worth playing, and, situated as the Persian territory is, such a position must have a certain influence on Russian proceedings in Central Asia, while it would tend to our honour and influence in Asiatic politics generally.

Whether this attitude can be accomplished without an enormous and well nigh ruinous outlay for a structure which might crumble to pieces when submitted to real pressure, for I have, I confess, a very poor opinion of the Persian troops, I am not in a position to judge. Persia has always appeared to me to be so overcrowded and exposed, as regards Russia, that I have never felt it likely that we should be able to cope successfully with the latter in Persian diplomacy, and thus that what favour we obtained for a time would only be to keep us in play and draw our money. But there may be wheels within wheels, which I am not aware of, which may really incline Persia to look for friendship farther from home. The hereditary domestic tyrant, the domineering elder brother, may be the least loved member of the circle, and, if so, by all means let us take advantage of the opening, for, indeed, from our unfortunate position making action so difficult, we do want every help to give us a lift in the estimation of all classes in Asia in this especial matter.

If we do not advance into Affghanistan to meet the Russians and thus play the forward game, we must appear to await attack at the foot of the mountains, and that appearance itself is an evil and misfortune. If, however, the rumour got abroad that we were strong in Persia, there would be an appearance of life, and we should be supposed to know very well what we were about in other divisions of the game.

The second portion of Sir Henry Rawlinson's plan is to subsidize Affghanistan, cultivate friendship with its Ruler, and, I think he means, if it should prove necessary, lend our Officers, and give it other material support.

I have no objection to the subsidy, if we can afford it, and if it is to be within reasonable limits, and not subject to periodical enhancement; but it is the commencement of a system which, unless jealously watched, may suck our blood to a dangerous extent, and in some measure sap our prestige, as the Affghans and others will know well that we are induced thus to pay by some apprehension connected with our own interests. With regard to this, however, I feel satisfaction in the remembrance that we have already once stopped the subsidy, so the Affghans are on this account not likely to fall into the mistake of supposing that it is from any anxiety regarding them that we begin to pay again.

On the other hand, against the objections which may be truly urged to a system of paying heavily for a doubtful benefit may be set the decided advantage of its being known that we are on friendly terms with the Ruler of Affghanistan—a state of things which would always be popular with our own troops, and which also would have an appreciable effect on our relations with the border tribes. No real material power would be conferred, perhaps, by the Ameer's friendship; neither he nor we would be one whit nearer the mark of actual supremacy over the tribes, or be assisted in the task of coercing them, and yet the fact of its being known that we were on friendly terms with Affghanistan would have a certain sedative effect on the independent belt of mountains between us, and would prevent refugees and adventurers, professedly hostile to us, being received with favour at Cabul, and publishing from thence lying assertions that the efforts of their friends on the border against us had the countenance and sympathy of the Affghan authorities.

This advantage, coupled with the rumour throughout the lands that, in addition to a revived influence in Persia, the British have a hold on Affghanistan, and are on friendly terms with its Ruler, also the comfort of being up and doing something, so as not to be entirely passively looking on at the progress of Russia, and in a manner awaiting attack from her—a position which I confess would be extremely dispiriting and trying to our Officers and men if Russia is to approach much nearer to us; these, I say, may be looked upon as real benefits to be derived by us in return for our heavy outlay of hard coin. But, as I have before noted, I have no hope that subsidized Affghanistan would be able to resist the progress of Russia when once an onward movement had been resolved on; it is, however, quite possible that such a show of strength might be made that Russia might not feel inclined to venture into so rough a country, garrisoned by a known warlike people on friendly terms with and subsidized by us, and thus attack might possibly be avoided, and the attention of the aggressive power be turned elsewhere.

This is the favourable side of the picture, and the hope might be fulfilled; but the Affghans are so greedy of money, and are such adepts at trickery and evasion of solemn agreements, and withal are so reckless and mischievous, that it is certainly possible that they might act very differently; thus, finding money going on both sides, they might play off one rich nation against the other, greatly enjoying the result as it affected themselves; or they might even, with deep design, based on their own general *Khanah-ba-dosh* character and power of finding secure retreat, if necessary, in mountain fastnesses in which they could safely "jok and let the jaw go by," if their plans happened to explode unfavourably. I say they might, even at some stage of the proceedings inconvenient to both Russia and ourselves, bring about a collision betwixt the two intruders, with the intention of profiting by the result, whichever way matters happened to fall out.

There is a deep under-current of religious fanaticism in all these Mahomedan classes which is ready to blaze out whenever opportunity offers for a successful display of it. Thus it may seem strange, as we are working against Russia, but I consider it to be certainly true, that, supposing we had taken up an advanced position beyond the passes, nothing perhaps, would be more unfavourable to our power and influence in the country we were occupying, if it did not render our position critical, than a complete collapse of Russian influence in front of us, coupled, perhaps, with disaster to her advanced detachments. The Mahomedan spirit would immediately be in the ascendant, and one set of intruders would be regarded as distastefully as another.

Brigadier-General Harry Lumsden and his brother, Colonel Peter Lumsden, the Quartermaster-General of the Army, than whom no two men in the country know better what they write and speak

about when Affghan and Central Asian affairs are the subject under discussion, are strongly in favour of taking up a position at Khoorrum. This to be done by an arrangement with the Ameer, who, it is proposed, should lease the two districts of Khoorrum and Khost to us for a handsome yearly rent.

Brigadier-General Lumsden couples the plan with the proposed establishment of a British Envoy at Cabul and the formation of a contingent of Native troops, Artillery and Infantry, to be watched over and paid by the English Officer in the position of Envoy.

The position at Khoorrum would be in a fine open valley within a couple of marches of parts of our present border, while it would be only eight from Cabul.

The proposition, as a whole, as might be expected from the source from which it emanates, is quite practicable, and many of the expected results would probably be derived from it.

I say as a whole, because I do not think that we could with any wisdom seize the Khoorrum valley and hold it by force; hold it we might, but our communications with the rear would immediately become involved in difficulty. These communications would lie through the Meeranzye valley to Hungoo and Kohat on one side, and to Bunnoo, by the bed of the Khoorrum, on the other; there is nothing impracticable in either route. Meeranzye has, indeed, given us a good deal of trouble first and last, and the defile of the Khoorrum is stiff and liable to be infested by the Wuzeeree tribes, but acting, as we should, in concert with the Ruler of Cabul, no real difficulty would, I am of opinion, be experienced in keeping open our communications with our advanced position in the Khoorrum valley.

I understand from General Lumsden's memorandum that he would locate the force about four miles on this side of the Peiwar Kothul, the ascent of which on the eastern side is comparatively short, while the descent into the Loghur valley is long. This, I allow, gives the command of the pass rather to the forces on the eastern side of the pass than to those on the west, but I note that it is not an easy thing for a force to leave its cantonment and occupy a pass, as we have found at Kohat, and, therefore, as a rule, I should dislike a position immediately under a pass: it is not convenient to march out and perch yourself upon it: it is equally inconvenient to have it occupied against you.

But the result of carefully thinking out the Khoorrum plan is a conviction in my mind that the garrison of Khoorrum would in reality be only used as a substantial point for a much larger force to march on in case of need, and I must allow that, from position and facilities, it affords the best possible attitude for us to assume if our desire be to be so situated as to be able to lend material succour to Affghanistan in a case of emergency, or merely to preserve a material influence over the counsels of its rulers in ordinary times.

There is also the point that I have noted elsewhere, namely, that whoever makes himself master of Affghanistan becomes possessor also of the Khoorrum and Khost valleys immediately above Bunnoo and Meranzye. The Dost's son, Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, descended from Khoorrum on Bunnoo with a fully appointed force provided with field guns, &c., in 1848-49, and the same route could undoubtedly be taken by a large invading army. This fact has never given us any anxiety while the Affghan armies alone were our neighbours, as our ordinary frontier force could have dealt with them, but, supposing Affghanistan to be held by the disciplined armies of an European nation, the case might become very different, and the Russians, for instance, holding a position in the Khoorrum valley, would undoubtedly be extremely inconvenient to us. On the other hand, unless our position in Khoorrum meant thoroughgoing material support to the Affghan army beyond the passes, I should not see the use of taking it up, as it certainly would not be likely to prove a convenient position for us to meet a large force descending for invasion, and, further, it would immediately and perhaps prematurely bring us into collision with the conquerors of Affghanistan, as we should be actually on Affghan soil, and the new comers, who claimed to have acquired Affghanistan in its integrity, could not afford to let us alone.

I hope I have above given fairly the advantages of the Khoorrum position; it is an unsatisfactory task to dwell on the disadvantages and risks that would attend our thus moving in to occupy a wild Affghan valley, surrounded by powerful tribes that we have hitherto had nothing to do with; these drawbacks can be imagined, and need not be detailed. The game we have to play is no easy one, and we must not expect that any plan of action we enter upon will be devoid of risk and difficulty, but there is one point which I must be allowed to lay particular stress upon, and that because it appears to me to be extremely important.

I allude to the fact that a forward movement of this sort involves the absolute necessity of more extended operations when the actual strain should come.

As long as we keep to our own line of border and adhere to our policy of not advancing from it, the Affghans can have no plea for calling on us for material assistance beyond the passes. We have practically declared what we will defend, and could not be justly taunted with inactivity or indifference, if we resolved to wait till we are assailed; but if, on the other hand, departing from this sober line of policy, we commence pushing up our detachments into Affghan valleys, professedly because our doing so will give us useful and commanding positions with regard to the Affghan theatre in front of us, then I think we should be considered by the world around us to have accepted the whole responsibility of a more active policy of resistance to Russian aggression.

Imagine a British Officer Envoy at Cabul, a Russian force advancing from Bokhara, first lapping up Bulkh and then moving on Cabul, driving in the Affghan advanced detachments and threatening a decisive battle at or near Bameen, and the Affghan troops in good faith marching to the front to fight the battle on which so much would hang affecting both their interests and ours. What, I would ask, under such really momentous circumstances, would the fine and efficient force, for such it would be, at the head of the Khoorrum valley be doing? resting at ease in its cantonment, and awaiting tidings of the result? This would be poor work, and I think it probable that, long ere the actual collision occurred, we should, on the solicitations of the Envoy and on our own convictions of the vital importance of the crisis, have moved on to back up our allies, and share the warlike dangers and political risks of a struggle by the results of which we were so greatly to profit or suffer.

It would, I think, have become specially incumbent on us to act thus if, up to that time, we had buoyed up the Affghans with the hope of material support when the actual hour of difficulty should come, and if the general belief in the country, in the Affghan army, and our own, had been that such

would be our action, for if after having, by our previous line of conduct, raised such hopes we should prove a broken reed to them when the hour for action arrived, we should incredibly injure our own honour and prestige, and cut down the *morale* of our troops.

I should say, then, that if such a conjunction of circumstances as above described should occur, then to go forward would be the right thing, but this would involve our fighting above the passes—no such great matter, perhaps, if we are provided with men and money, and have the full sympathy of the Affghans for the time being. We have fought on the same ground before, and not without honour, and we could undoubtedly do the same again, but it is, at any rate, a very serious matter, and the advantages and disadvantages of making the plains of Affghanistan our arena in such a struggle should be well and carefully weighed before we place ourselves in positions which must, I believe, lead us on directly to such a result when, perhaps, we might not fully have contemplated occupying such an extended field of operations.

My feeling, therefore, is that the occupation of Khoorrum, as proposed by the Lumsdens, coupled with the establishment of a British Envoy and contingent at Cabul, must, if any strain occurs, involve us in that very active interference in the military position beyond the passes which it would appear that Colonel Peter Lumsden, in his Memorandum of October 1867, was inclined greatly to deprecate.

If I am right in the above conclusion, the simple question is, are we prepared to fight above the passes?

We should not probably have to meet any very large body of disciplined troops, and Russia would fight at as great risks as ourselves; that is, she could as ill bear reverse as we could. Bear or lion would be all one to the wolves if overtaken by misfortune. Russia's retreat under defeat, through Bulkha and Bokhara, would prove as disastrous as ours would be, under similar circumstances, to Khoorrum and Bunnoo (here I would allow that the Khoorrum position would stand us in good stead), probably worse, as from our neighbourhood, and the position we hold permanently in Meeranzye, the tribes might fear retribution.

In the matter of risk, then, we should be about on an equality, and our troops, aided by a drilled Affghan army, would be a formidable body for the Russian or any other power to attack under the circumstances of the case.

There would be, therefore, nothing to be especially anxious about were the possibility of an actual collision with the Russians on the plains of Affghanistan the only contingency which it was necessary to be prepared for.

But there are difficulties and actual dangers which would beset our occupying so extended a position for a long period which are not merely military in character.

In the first place, we should have to work with what the Scotch would call very kittle materials.

My general views regarding our position in the country, and the risks we may have to encounter in coming years from internal conspiracy, disloyalty in the army or among the Native Chiefs, &c., are sufficiently set forth in a paper I lately wrote on a proposal to throw open military cantonments, which, I am aware, has been perused by his Excellency the Viceroy.

But I do not distrust the Native army. The men mean loyally by us, and would at first go eagerly about a new and interesting service, as this would be. The Affghans in our ranks, and they are numerous, would be delighted, and they could be trusted until we got into very great straits, and would not, in fact, desert us then if serving under Officers who had managed to attach them by previous kindness and interest. The Sikhs would be proud to find themselves in Affghanistan and in the open Cabul valleys; one regiment of them would deal with three times their number of Asiatics, whatever their name and prestige in their own hills might be. The Ghoorkhas would grieve over leaving their wives and children, but would go cheerfully at first, and be interested in seeing the new hill country. The soul of the Poorbeah would sicken at the sight of Affghan passes again, but he would be supported by the cheerful bearing of his more hardy and adventurous brethren. The English Officers would be in high spirits, and all for a year or more would go "merry as a marriage bell."

But when the novelty wore off the separation from families would be felt painfully by the Sikh, Ghoorkha, and Poorbeah soldiers; the expense of two establishments would press upon them, more pay would be wished for at first, then asked for, and finally perhaps demanded. Our Native army is comparatively small now, and the Cabul duty would recur frequently, regiments would go once, twice, contentedly; the third time they would do anything they could to get off it. The passes would always be a difficulty; convoys would have to be forced through them, ill-protected property, parties, or individuals moving up to join the army would be plundered, if not murdered, though we were supposed to be the allies of the Affghans, and no real satisfaction or reparation would be obtainable.

In Affghanistan itself our troops would very likely ere long, at the solicitation of its rulers, become involved in the task of bringing this or that tribe to its senses for the general weal, and thus there would be much work and service for the troops, and not very clearly in our own quarrels.

The whole thing from beginning to end would be detested by a class of rather influential characters in Asiatic warfare, known as camp followers; they have an old grudge against Affghanistan, not without cause, poor fellows, as their lot there, as elsewhere, was usually to come in for a share of any kicks that were going, while their scale of remuneration is, as a rule, not such as to foster an enthusiasm for distant and hazardous service.

Our camp followers are not mere "dumb driven cattle," without opinions of their own; they form, at times, strong views for themselves, and hold them in opposition to, or entirely independent of, those of the troops they are serving with.

At Umbeylah (I do not think that I have mentioned it to above two persons since the affair) the camp followers became extremely disloyal. The surwuns (camel drivers) abused the Mussulman soldiery, as they turned out to fight, for siding with infidels against the true faith. I myself heard a ring of camel drivers and domestic servants round a fire joking over a fresh batch of doolies full of dead and wounded going down to the plain. On another occasion, when the pickets were being relieved, I heard a party of men talking together when a bugle sounded from one of the pickets. "Hallo!" said one fellow, "what are they bugling about already?" "Oh, that's for 'mudud'" (assistance), said another, and then there was a general laugh. Small matters, but they contained the fact that a large proportion

of these wretches, who actually exist by hanging on to our camps, are at heart disloyal to us, or care so little about us, that a few days of real difficulty and hard fighting is liable to estrange them.

Well, I think, as a nation, we care as little about these uncertainties as men well can; but when we embark in distant expeditions, and move far from our base, making ourselves so greatly dependent on the loyalty and zeal of men whose affection for us has so little root that a few days only of not complete success undermines it, I confess that our position is rather unsound. I must say, however, that in Afghanistan the camp followers, if once landed in the country, are pretty sure to stick to their colours, for much the same reason that Claverhouse felt confident of his dispersed life-guardsmen finding their way to the head-quarters of the regiment after his defeat at Drumclog.

But, though remaining in their duty, they might exhibit much discontent, and their murmurings would, after a time, affect the troops, and thus we might have extremely delicate and difficult matters to deal with, affecting pay and extra allowances, and the general necessity of keeping the troops in good temper at critical moments, which might, with our new Native army, as was the case with the old, be the commencement of a dangerous knowledge of strength on the one side, and of virtual confession of the lack of it on the other, and this might bear bitter fruits in our own internal management both of our army and territory after a time.

Circumstanced then as we are, I do most firmly believe that we cannot in wisdom go beyond the passes to occupy the stage, and prepare to fight the Russians. I fully feel and allow that it would be the true policy of any nation playing its own game with its own nine-pins, and thus if we could afford to keep a fine preponderately European force above the passes without injuriously weakening our garrison of India, and were ready to keep this force up to full strength by recruits and detachments from below when necessary, then that would undoubtedly be the game to play. Our troops have once held Candahar against all comers under most adverse circumstances and could surely do it again; our prestige on that plain is good, and, with due military arrangements, our position holding the left of the line, with the friendly Affghans holding the right at Ghuznee and Cabul, would be very strong, and the front shown would be a formidable one for any nation to meddle with that had its own rear communications to look to, and other risks and uncertainties to provide for. But, unfortunately, we must needs in prudence shape our garment to suit the especial breadth and quality of the material of which it is to be made. It is natural enough for men at a distance merely to count pips, and write of men in thousands, but it is, I conceive, absolutely necessary for us on the spot to pause and consider what, in a few years or less time, would be the feeling of the large bulk of our army regarding this, to them, distant and disagreeable service.

The mistake must not be made of regarding it as a service near home, because our Native troops have gone cheerfully to more distant places, such as China and Abyssinia, by sea. The character of such services is somewhat different; men or regiments usually volunteer for the duty, they are in consequence made a good deal of, and enjoy the *éclat* of the thing; every care is taken of their comfort, and the difficulty usually occupies a limited period, after which the regiment is conveyed back to near their own homes, with a good name, and in high good humour with itself. The Affghanistan duty, on the contrary, would be only a great, and, to our Native troops, after a time, highly distasteful extension of ordinary marching duty, the *éclat* would wear off the toil, and absence and other disagreeables would remain, and the evils I have above noted would, I believe, without doubt, be ere long the result, and, under these circumstances, I would avoid those positions which might against our will entangle us in Affghan affairs to such an extent that, on the strain coming, we must either go forward and fight at disadvantage, or hold back, and thereby, from better hopes having been entertained of us, lose good name and prestige, and, perhaps, mar the *morale* of our own troops at a critical time.

My inclination, then, in making any arrangement with the Affghan Chiefs, would be to let them know distinctly that we have no intention of advancing beyond our own border. Of course, if we found it convenient, we could do so eventually, but I would guard against any possibility of the Affghans having it in their power to say that we had proved a broken reed to them when their difficulties came to the worst point, and that thus the help they had counted on had failed them.

Having fully warned them of our intentions, I should see nothing but good in being friends with them, and if we can afford it without having to tax our own subjects to provide money for this rather unproductive field, I should see no objection to a moderate subsidy being given. I do still dislike it, but I would be content, as it may do some good, and cannot do much harm. It will have an appearance of life, and satisfy those who appear to regret that we did not provide Shere Allee Khan with the means of dealing with his brothers, and securing himself on the throne. Why this should be considered to have been in any way our duty I cannot conceive. Sir Henry Rawlinson mentions the uninterrupted friendliness of the father, Dost Mahomed Khan, apparently forgetting, or, perhaps, purposely passing over the very unfriendly attempt of the latter to take advantage of our difficulties in 1848-49, by assisting the rebellion of the Sikhs against us, his troops besieging Attock, and fighting against us at Guzerat.

During the Persian war the Dost received a large subsidy, and I quite agreed in the policy of giving it to him at that time, as the name of his being friendly was good for our object; but could reliable information be obtained as to how the money was spent, it would not probably be found that much had been done with our treasure towards furthering our design in giving it. After the war the subsidy was, I have always thought rightly, stopped, it being natural and not derogatory for us to pay for a special object, but decidedly undignified, and lowering to our prestige to continue to do so when there was no particular advantage to be gained, and only as it would have appeared to the surrounding classes to conciliate the weak-handed Ruler of Affghanistan who could not meet a division of our troops in the field.

In the present instance, if we pay, the Asiatic world will know that we do so in order to be generally on friendly terms with the Affghans, and this with reference to the progress of Russia in Central Asia, so there is not likely to be any mistake regarding our motives; especially as we had stopped off the supply when there was no *quid pro quo* to be expected. I know that this may be represented to be a niggardly and selfish policy, but in combating this objection I must really stand on my knowledge of

the Affghan character, and assert that, in dealing with them, it is the only line of conduct by which we shall preserve our dignity and prestige, and I am further inclined, if the view I have expressed is to be stigmatised as wanting in liberality and generosity, to ask what claim in honour or chivalry the Affghans can have on us; they have twice behaved towards us in a treacherous and unfriendly way, and would do so again if it suited their game, even after taking our money; and I cannot help further adding my conviction that were there no Russians in Central Asia, and the Affghans were believed to be as weak for aggression as I know them to be, it would not be a large amount of our hardly collected revenues that English politicians would recommend should flow monthly up the Affghan passes.

In Shere Allee's case, on his father's death, we recognised Shere Allee Khan as his successor, as he was his father's nominee, but it surely was not incumbent on us to make arrangements which would have greatly taxed and embarrassed us to see that he retained the throne. He now, after a considerable and gallant struggle, though marked, as might be expected, with acts which I think it was well that we were free of even the most distant connexion with, greatly needs help and countenance; and as we have an object of our own in view, and our meddling is, therefore, in the eyes of all natural and not unwarrantable, I see no insuperable objection to our affording him a certain amount of assistance. I would fix the subsidy to be given at a sum which should be a sufficient earnest of our good-will, and be a solid assistance to him, while it should not overtax and burden us or those who contribute to our Exchequer, for, if the Cabul subsidy were known to be a heavy item, the tax-payers of Hindoostan would not be long in crying out that they, being loyal subjects, were being squeezed to supply the wants of the Affghans, who rendered no tangible service in return, and had never been known in all their history to do any good to anyone, and the taunt would not be easily answered.

I wish briefly to notice one or two points in Sir Donald McLeod's memorandum, in the general tenor of which I agree most fully.

I do not think that the Affghans dislike us individually. English Officers would always be on hearty terms of good-fellowship with Affghan Sirdars; the latter are frank and free, and manly in ordinary intercourse; they are devoted to the love of well-made fire-arms, horses, dogs, sport, &c., and in all these matters are inclined to look on us as "oostads." There is no race antipathy between us, and if they are proud of having by fair means and foul destroyed an army that occupied a part of their country on the understanding of support from a considerable Affghan contingent, which failed in the hour of need, the Englishman can quietly congratulate himself on the fact that the whole clan hill tribes, and all united and aided by the natural strength of their country, were quite unable to prevent an avenging force from moving into the heart of the country and doing as it liked.

But an Affghan Chief's friendship is a very superficial matter, and can be only calculated to last as long as is quite convenient to him,—I speak of the class generally; I know that in our former connexion with Afghanistan there were one or two brilliant exceptions.

But as a class they are politicians from their youth up, and must and will adopt the side which appears to be best for their own interests.

On the other hand, as a body, the Affghans do distrust us, and the re-appearance of fair faces in the streets of Cabul would not be popular, as they would be regarded as the forerunners of occupation; there would, however, even then be a large body of men who would, as Sir Donald McLeod imagines, feel kindly towards us as the protectors and promoters of trade and lords of order and justice, but they would be in a minority; the national feeling would be one of suspicion and dislike, and possibly we have ourselves to thank for it. The hostile animus might not be displayed at once if we approved them as friends and at a time of general stirring interest; but it would smoulder and be liable to break out if any cause of dissatisfaction arose.

It must always be remembered, however, in justice to the Affghans, that they behaved with chivalry and kindness to our women and prisoners. The men have many fine qualities, and life among them is pleasant and genial, but they are not to be trusted when the political horizon is clouded.

Sir Donald McLeod is again further anxious that we should adopt a more conciliatory policy towards the hill tribes.

This is the stated opinion of many, but usually, I think, of men who have lately come from England, and who are, therefore, ignorant of the long and really important struggle that we have gone through with these men.

Sir Donald McLeod's appearing to endorse the opinion may have the effect in England of inclining those in high authority to think that the idea given by certain writers on frontier matters to the effect that the character of our administration of it has been too harsh and unbending is correct, and I think this would be extremely unfair on all the Officers who have laboured in the field.

Sir Donald McLeod, I know full well, is as thoroughly acquainted with the difficulties of the case as any man. He has had the Kohat Pass, the Hussunkail, and the Bezotee troubles to deal with, and has lately had to go to war with the Black Mountain; he knows then pretty well the difficulty that attends the not very dignified task of holding out your hand all day to a man who declines to take it. I therefore take Sir Donald's remarks as only an expression of that hearty wish that we must all feel—that a better understanding could be come to with the tribes.

I myself would gladly see conciliation carried to its utmost point, but I know how very difficult it is to conciliate without being mistaken.

How are we to begin? I allude especially to the Puthan tribes. Our whole relations with the Belooch tribes on Dera Ghazee Khan and Scinde border are on a different footing; land is more plentiful, and water in some instances can be made available; and in these localities I believe that much might be done by encouraging the tribes to settle partially in our territory.

But in the case of the Puthan tribes, as I say, where are we to begin? I do not know any important class along the border, the conduct of which would entitle it to be the first to receive our favours, and I do not know one that would not probably misunderstand such advances. If you give to one you must give to all, and what rule or limit can you fix. Those that got least and thought they ought to have

got more would immediately take measures to induce you to fill up their measure for peace and quietness sake.

Our only experience with paying has been in the Kohat Pass, and surely the result there has not been such as to encourage us to adopt the system elsewhere.

A generally conciliatory bearing I would of course greatly advocate, and I am sure it has not hitherto been wanting; one of the moves, however, most necessary for promoting this very desirable object is, as proposed by Sir Donald McLeod, that the Commissioner of Peshawur should be set free of ordinary judicial work, so that he may have leisure to give more attention to his political duties, and thus have more time for seeing and conversing with political visitors, outsiders from the hills, &c. He should be also left pretty free-handed in toshakhanah matters, and be allowed to entertain visitors of note during their stay at Peshawur, and to send them away with suitable petty presents of loongies and the like. All this would enhance our popularity, be limited in its character, and be fully understood and appreciated; but even this must not be set about at first in a lavish way, otherwise, if the news spread that the Commissioner kept open kitchen, he would be persecuted by all the useless drones of the neighbourhood—men who would either scorn upon our hospitality, or go away discontented if not kept at free quarters as long as they expected.

But what I deprecate is anything approaching in the smallest degree to the black-mail system, anything in fact that may lead the easily inflated Puthan brain into the mistake that would be natural to it under the circumstances, namely, that we were anxious to purchase its owner's good-will because we regarded his displeasure with some anxiety. Wherever liberality can be shown without raising this idea it might be well bestowed.

After a rather toilsome, but, I think, honourable struggle of 20 years, we have shown the hill men that we can hold our own, and do not, in a military point of view, care the flourish of a fife for their hostility, and if now a time has come when we can afford to treat them more liberally, let it be at once taken advantage of; but, as I have said, in mentally glancing down the border, I do not see the portion of it where much can be done without incurring the above-noted risk of leading the recipients and their neighbours into the mistake of thinking that our liberality is in reality based on weakness.

In the case of the Puthan tribes we have not an inch of land to give them; every culturable acre in front of their mountains is held, and has been held for ages, by men who are now our subjects, and who, before they became such, held these wells, springs, and lands, with varying fortune and at the expense of much loss of life and other sufferings, in defiance of the powerful hill tribe above them. I presume that no Englishman who knew what he was writing about would counsel our taking these lands from their gallant defenders to make them over to their hereditary enemies. I am very sure that Sir Donald McLeod would not advocate such a policy.

Along the whole border our conduct has been uniform. Under real difficulties at times, and at much expense and trouble throughout, we have assisted the occupiers of the soil, whom we found in possession, to carry on more effectually and fully, and, as at present, with complete success, the game that had been handed down to them from generations, of holding the fertile springs and well lands of the plains against the lawless and overbearing hill tribes above them, and I need not say that this was the line of action most calculated in the end to redound to our honour along the Affghan border.

There is one other case I would notice, as it might be brought forward in favour of a liberal policy. I allude to the revenue settlements in Hazarah.

I quite allow that liberality in this case was wise and has borne excellent fruit, but the distinction I would draw is that these men were to be our subjects, and, under such circumstances, it was open to us to be as liberal to them as we pleased in money matters, as we held ourselves in readiness to enforce obedience with a strong hand, if necessary, in all other ways.

I have lately written notes on our connexion with the Kohat Pass, and on the Bezotee affair; if these matters, close to our border and affecting only one or two tribes, are matters of real difficulty to us, how can we, with any wisdom, contemplate grasping the whole mountainous belt that divides us from the Affghan valleys? It is one of the remarkable anomalies of the case that we could hold the open valleys of Affghanistan with the central points of influence, although so much more distant from our base, more easily than we could occupy and control the Khyber Pass and the Teerah Mountains, which are both of them in sight of our cantonment at Peshawur.

I have thought it right to give exactly what was in my mind on this difficult point. I am aware that, from the perplexities of the case, I have scarcely done more than state the dilemma we are in without proposing any tangible remedy. The last thing I should wish to do would be to appear to set up my judgment against that of others like Sir Donald McLeod and the Lumsdens, who have had more experience, the latter having seen the interior of Affghanistan, which I have not. I am, I think, entitled to write of the border, having spent ten good years of my life on it, and I have wished to draw more distinctly than is usually done the distinction between the Affghan regular armies and the mountaineer warriors of the independent belt of rough country in front of our outposts, who prove so formidable when assailed in their own fastnesses, but who are almost powerless for aggression or for war in open ground, and who, therefore, would prove but weak and inefficient defenders of the Affghan territories against the disciplined armies of an European power.

R. TAYLOR, Colonel,
Commissioner, Umballah.

23rd November 1868.

Enclosure 4 in No. 14.

MEMORANDUM by Sir J. LAWRENCE.

I HAVE deferred until now making any comments on the able and exhaustive paper by Sir Henry Rawlinson, setting forth his views on the great question of the position and progress of Russia in Central Asia, and of their effect upon India. I had hoped that the response which I had made to Ameer Shere Ali in the early part of October last, expressing my readiness to meet him at Peshawur or Rawul Pindie, would have led ere this to a friendly interview between us, when I purposed to offer him some material assistance in the shape of money, arms, ammunition, and accoutrements to enable him to strengthen his hold on his country. But I have been disappointed in this anticipation. The Ameer, though desirous of meeting me, is at present unable to do so. He is now threatened with an attack by the combined forces of his brother, Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, and of his nephew, Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan (the son of his late brother, Mahomed Afzul Khan), a Chief who has already gained the reputation of a soldier of ability, enterprise, and spirit. It seemed probable, and it was generally supposed, that Abdool Rahman would have delayed his advance on Cabul until the spring. But whether it be that he has judged it more expedient to give his uncle no time to organize his resources and recruit his army, or that urged by his Officers and soldiers, many of whose families are at the mercy of Ameer Shere Ali, and exasperated perhaps, too, at the treatment of his mother, the famous Beebee Muwareed, it is certain that he has resolved on an immediate attack, and by the latest accounts he was on his march for Cabul. Indeed, before I left Umballa, on the morning of the 16th instant, I received a telegram from the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, then at Peshawur, announcing a current rumour in the bazaar there, that the Ameer's troops had been defeated. It was added, that the report required confirmation, and as it has not yet been confirmed the probability is that it is unfounded.

2. I think it right here to remark that, whatever may be the value of the arguments for or against the early recognition of Shere Ali as Ameer of Cabul, after the death of his father, that matter had been disposed of before I arrived in India in December 1863. Some time, no doubt, was intentionally allowed to elapse before the Government of India formally recognized Shere Ali's accession to power. And bearing in mind the personal character of this Chief, and the formidable combination, headed by his two elder brothers, which then threatened him, I do not think that it can be fairly said that the conduct of the Government was unreasonable, and not justified by circumstances.

3. I do not share the opinion—it is mere conjecture—that, had Ameer Shere Ali been aided by us earlier in the day, it would have enabled him to beat down the opposition he subsequently encountered, and to which he, for a time, succumbed. It is more reasonable, I think, to infer that his misfortunes were mainly due to the defects of his own character, and were the natural consequences of his misrule. His eldest brother, Mahomed Afzul Khan, turned out to be a sot and an imbecile. Mahomed Azim Khan, the second brother, though a man of more character than Afzul Khan, has proved himself unfit to rule, and a soldier of little capacity and courage. The Ameer's most formidable antagonist was his late brother, Mahomed Ameen Khan, the son of the same mother. To a certain extent the interests of these two brothers were identical, and a very moderate amount of good management on the part of the Ameer would probably have attached this Chief to him. The Ameer, however, made no real attempt to accomplish this important object. The brothers were soon at war. In the battle which ensued, Mahomed Ameen Khan slew with his own hand Mahomed Ali Khan, his nephew, the brave and enterprising but wayward son of the Ameer, and fell himself a moment afterwards, shot dead by a private soldier. In this action the Ameer thus lost his eldest son, the chief hope of his party, and almost immediately afterwards, by his capricious and harsh conduct, he drove into rebellion the best and most trusty General in his service, Mahomed Rufeek Khan, who had up to that time served him with ability and devotion. In short, as I have already said, the Ameer's loss of Cabul and Candahar was clearly due to his own great defects. At one time he was capricious, violent, and headstrong; on other occasions, when energetic and prompt decision was essential, he would himself give no orders, and would not allow others to act. It is said that he had already ample ground to distrust his son Yakoob Ali Khan, and he has now, I believe, but few Officers of mark on his side. Since his return to Cabul, when he was welcomed very generally as a deliverer (so obnoxious had Mahomed Azim Khan become during his short rule), Ameer Shere Ali has lost, I hear, his recently acquired popularity. Indeed, such has been his action, that the report is again current, which was rife for some time while the Ameer was shut up idling in Candahar, that his mind is affected with the taint of insanity. It is right that I should, however, add that the Ameer has certainly some counterbalancing good qualities. He evidently possesses great courage and determination, and is said to be popular with the soldiers and common people.

4. Looking to the character and position of the Ruler, Ameer Shere Ali, to the resources and prospects of his rivals for power, his brothers Mahomed Afzul Khan and Mahomed Azim Khan, was it unreasonable that the Government of India should feel it to be the wise and prudent course to allow them unmolested to fight out their own battle? It appeared to me, I confess, at the time, and it still appears to me, that this was in every view the wisest and most politic course to pursue. When I met Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan at Peshawur in February 1857, he told me that it was his wish, and the earnest desire of all Affghans, that we should not interfere in their quarrels, but should allow them to manage their own concerns, and to fight out and settle their own domestic broils in their own way. The Chiefs and people of Affghanistan, he assured me, one and all, mainly dreaded, and would ever most strongly resent, interference on our part in such affairs. It would also have proved very inconvenient for us to have found ourselves supporting the cause of the unsuccessful candidate to the throne of Cabul.

5. But, setting aside the views and wishes of the Affghan people, had there been a Chief of real mark or character among the Affghans, whom the great body of the people was really willing to accept as their Ruler, there would, I admit, have been some, perhaps I may say strong, grounds for helping such a Chief with money and war material to maintain his position. In point of fact, however, the

very reverse was the case. It was impossible to make a really good selection between the contending factions, and the wise course was, I submit, to leave both parties alone. Latterly, when the Ameer Shere Ali had recovered his throne, and had apparently got the better of all his enemies, and was even welcomed back to Cabul by the very soldiers and people who had deserted him, the time seemed at length to have arrived when we might, with some show of reason, help him to render firm his recovered position, and to consolidate his power.

6. It is, I own, impossible, I may say it is not wise, altogether to disregard the views and arguments of those who advocate a different policy to that which has been followed. I frankly confess that I cannot, however, bring myself to see the formidable character of the danger with which we are said to be threatened by the presence of the Russians in Central Asia, whilst, on the other hand, I can perceive much real danger to which we are exposed from various circumstances within our own borders in India, more particularly if we adopt a policy in Affghanistan from which it may prove difficult hereafter to recede. I think, too, even if it be admitted that danger may arise to us in the future from Central Asia, the real difficulty is to decide what, under our peculiar position in India, is the true policy to adopt in view to meeting it. It has lately appeared to me that the time had arrived when we might reasonably endeavour to ascertain whether the Ameer of Cabul, tried by adversity, and grown more wise, it might be supposed, from misfortune, might not feel earnestly desirous of entering into friendly relations, and of receiving from us some moderate aid, with a view to maintain what still remains of Affghanistan under his rule. Now it would seem as if at the moment when we are about to make the experiment the power of the Ameer begins again to crumble to pieces. It would be vain to endeavour to forecast what may be the result of the revived contest in Cabul amongst the Baruckzais, and what may be the eventual fate of the country. And until we have grounds for the formation of some reasonable conclusion on this point, there is nothing for it but to hold our hand until one or other regain the mastery. This seems to me to be the only way to avoid serious difficulties and complications. And it is, moreover, the very line which, by the last letter received from the Ameer, he himself says he wishes to be pursued. He tells me that when he has put down the present movement against him he will be prepared to meet the Governor-General and explain his views and wishes.

7. It appears to me, also, that it will always be found exceedingly difficult, for any extended period, to maintain a united and strong Government in Affghanistan. The genius of the Chiefs and people, as evinced in the independent Pathan communities of the border, is evidence to this effect. A Chief may now and then arise, who may for a time unite the different provinces under one rule, but when he has passed away the tendency again will be to separation. With the single exception of the pressure of a common enemy, and even this circumstance will not always avail, there appear to be no ties to bind the Affghans together. The history of the country is a history of anarchy and civil war. The Suddozai brothers were always each other's worst enemies. Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan had the advantage of succeeding to a family which was hated and despised. He was at feud with some of his brothers, with whom he waged war, and whom he expelled the country. He had the utmost difficulty in controlling the others. He barely maintained a semblance of order to the end of his life. Long before his death, every one had foreseen, he had himself predicted, commotion, conflict, and war to the death between his own sons. Can there really be a hope that we can bind together such discordant elements? Is there any Chief likely to come to the front whom it would be right for us to endeavour to maintain in full power over the country?

8. Sir H. Rawlinson's vast experience and great knowledge of all matter connected with the past history of Affghanistan, Persia, and Central Asia generally render me somewhat diffident in adopting views and coming to conclusions which do not accord with those which he has expressed. But I have been brought a deal in contact, during my career, with Officers who served in Cabul at one time or another, and in the last twenty years have had many opportunities of studying the character of the Affghans and other Pathan races, and of forming an estimate of the difficulties which beset a right solution of the present question.

9. No one, of course, can deny that the advance of Russia in Central Asia is a matter which may gravely affect the interests of England in India. No person can doubt, I admit, that the approach of Russia towards our North-Western frontier in India may involve us in great difficulties, and this being the case, it will be a wise and prudent policy to endeavour to maintain a thoroughly friendly power between India and the Russian possessions in Central Asia. Nevertheless, it appears to me clear that it is quite out of our power to reckon with any degree of certainty on the attainment of this very desirable end, while I believe that there is very great danger that some of the very measures which Sir Henry Rawlinson recommends towards securing that object may lead to opposite results, and that, on the whole, our wisest course is not to attempt much beyond our frontier, but to consolidate our power in India, to do all we can to improve our administration, and to reconcile the people to our rule. We might also endeavour to come to some mutual arrangements, and to an understanding with Russia; and, failing that, we might give that Power to understand that an advance towards India, beyond a certain point, would entail on her war, in all parts of the world, with England.

10. The conquests of Russia in Central Asia have doubtless of late advanced with gigantic strides, and will in all probability be still further pushed. But it appears to me that we have not the right openly to question or impede this advance so long as it is not clearly directed against our interests, and that any such attempt of ours in this quarter of the world would be made in vain. Possibly the danger which some anticipate may never arise. But, admitting that it may, any serious attempt to restrain Russia's advance by active measures on our part in Affghanistan would seem to me certainly to lead to a policy resulting in our eventual occupation of that country, as was the case in 1838. Most people would, I should think, deprecate this result, and would affirm that this is the last object which they desire. Nevertheless, the real point is, whether an interference in the affairs of Affghanistan, however moderate and limited in character in the first instance, is, or is not, likely to lead to such a result.

11. While the difficulties which the vicinity of Russian power may bring upon India are expatiated on in vivid and graphic terms by Sir H. Rawlinson, it strikes me that the precarious nature of Russia's tenure of Central Asia is a good deal understated. Would not Russian difficulties increase in proportion as she enlarged her borders? If dangers and complications may be anticipated from the approach of

Russia to our North-Western frontier in India, will not Russia likewise be met by similar difficulties in her possessions in Central Asia? The population of her territories is, on the whole, more hardy, more intractable, and more fanatic than the mass of the people of British India, whose character, in comparison, indeed, may, generally speaking, be described as docile, and imbued with a strong respect for authority. It is, as a rule, only on our western border, or among tribes descended from races such as those of that border, that we meet with the spirit of independence, violence, and contempt of the governing power, which generally prevails among the people of Central Asia.

12. Surely, if Russia attempts an advance on India in any force she will be severely taxed to provide for the maintenance of her own communications, and for the security of the vast area which her troops would leave behind them. Would not the opportunity be naturally seized by the predatory and restless races of those tracts to throw off her yoke? The danger which is likely to arise to Russia in those countries is rather when she has completed her conquests than when she is making them. So long as the bulk of her forces are in the country, well in hand, and dealing blows, there seems to be little or nothing capable of offering anything like effective opposition. But when these conquests have been completed, when she has to hold the country by the dispersion of her armies, when she has to elaborate an efficient system of administration, in a word, when she attempts to make the people pay the cost of their own subjugation, then it appears to me that her complications will begin.

13. At first sight it may appear as if the objects described as necessary for the consolidation of Russian power in Turkistan are not difficult of attainment. But, in point of fact, they are prodigious. They would require the expenditure of vast sums of money, which Russia has not to spend: they would occupy many years, and would probably then be liable to crumble into dust on any serious reverse of fortune. We may judge what all this would cost Russia, by a review of the labour, expenditure, and time we have devoted to the development of our rule in India, even with the great advantages which we have found in the accessibility of the country, in an industrious and generally civilized people, and in a fertile soil.

14. Sir Henry Rawlinson points to the irresistible temptations which India presents to the predatory races of Central Asia, and of Afghanistan in particular. I quite concur in these views. It is for these very reasons, as well as on account of their general character as a lawless, plundering, faithless people, that I feel hopeful of no good results, but foresee rather much evil from any close communication with them. I feel no shadow of a doubt that, if a formidable invasion of India from the west were imminent, the Afghans *en masse*, from the Ameer of the day to the domestic slave of the household, would readily join in it.

15. But all such hordes, all such bodies, however hardy, however resolute, however bent on plunder, could make no real impression on the drilled and iron ranks which we could oppose to them in the plains of the Punjab and India. In infantry and artillery (I allude to Central Asian levies) they could have nothing worthy of the name of soldiers for such a foreign war. Their best cavalry, it has often been proved, could not cope with our Native horsemen when led by a few English Officers.

16. Let us only, however, be careful to maintain a sufficient, though moderate, force of British troops in India, and so long as we do so we can have always, under suitable conditions, a Native army to supplement those troops, and the two combined will sweep from before them all the invading hosts which may venture for a moment to appear in the field.

17. I do not attempt to deny that the approach of a hostile invader in force on our western border might lead to insurrections and trouble of various kinds. But after all we have only a choice of difficulties, and our plain course is to examine and determine clearly on which side the advantages preponderate, where the advantages are fewest, and to adopt that line of policy. It has been the character of the various races in India (if I read its history aright) not hurriedly to join contending powers; but, on the contrary, to hold aloof, often too long for their own interests, until they could see which gained the mastery, and then to submit to the conqueror. I think it is probable that this is the course which, under the circumstances contemplated, would be generally pursued. And, admitting, as I do, the truth of the character and disposition of various classes of Mahomedans, as depicted by Sir R. Temple, and quoted by Sir Henry Rawlinson, it must be remembered that the vast majority of the people of India, including the Chiefs, are Hindoos, both by race and by religion. No people in all India are more hostile to Mahomedans than the Sikhs of the Punjab and the Goorkhas of Nepal, two of the most warlike races of the country. The Sikhs, we know, under the rough form of confederacies, almost altogether consisting of village yeomen and peasants, under leaders of the same class, not only broke the power of the Mahomedans in the Punjab, but, as they became better trained and more confident in their strength, resisted invasion from the west. And if we maintain a proper balance of power in the shape of a suitable British force in India, is it likely that these Sikhs will be less faithful and less stubborn on our side, knowing that, in the one case, the prestige of a hundred victories surrounds our banners, and, on the other, the success of the invaders would prove the spoliation of their homes and the devastation of their fields. By a series of foolish and impolitic acts we may bring about a state of things when every race in India of warlike and aspiring temperament may be tempted to endeavour to carve out for themselves an independence; but assuredly, on the other hand, if we are true to ourselves, we shall ever, by God's blessing, be able to assert our own supremacy in India, whoever may be the invader.

18. I will now endeavour to explain my views on the specific propositions which Sir Henry Rawlinson has made. These appear to be that we should occupy Quetta in front of the Bolan Pass; that we should place a British Agent with his staff of Officers in Cabul, and, if necessary, organize a contingent for service in that country; that the control of the Mission in Persia should be transferred to the Secretary of State for India; that British Officers should be encouraged to enter the Persian service; and that that Mission should be placed on a larger and more expensive footing than at present. I will take up first the suggestions regarding Persia. I am in favour of the transfer of the Persian Mission to the control of the Secretary of State for India, for the reasons given by Sir Henry Rawlinson, provided that the arrangement becomes permanent. But I do not support the recommendation that English Officers be encouraged to enter the Persian service, and am altogether opposed to the policy of spending much money out of Indian revenues in Persia. I believe that such a system

would prove of no real advantage in strengthening our influence in Persia, and I certainly think that such an expenditure would prove more beneficial on our own frontier. Persia appears to me to be so weak in herself from various causes that she is practically under the control of Russia, and utterly unable to resist the influence of that power. In any great struggle connected with Afghanistan Persia would certainly follow the behests of Russia, even though unwilling on some grounds to do so.

19. Persia has often shown a strong desire to gain possession of Herat. Whatever may be her real motive for such a policy, she asserts that such possession is essential to the security of her Khorassan border, in order to enable her to defend her people from the attacks of the Turcomans. To me this appears a mere subterfuge. What Persia really requires on that frontier, as, indeed, in other parts of her territories, is a strong Government and a good military organization.

20. In respect to the occupation of Quetta, I am still firmly of opinion that this would be quite a false move. It would assuredly be looked on by the Affghans as the forerunner of our advance to Candahar, and, perhaps, to Herat. I do not, moreover, believe that the presence of a force at Quetta would be acceptable to the Chiefs and people of Khelat; and unless that force were large, and composed of a considerable proportion of British troops, placed in a strong fortified position, it would, in the event of a formidable invasion, be liable to be cut off. Under such circumstances we should have to occupy Sinde, not, as now, with the minimum number of troops, but in considerably increased force, so as to provide support to Quetta. Our occupation of Quetta would be an unpopular measure both to British and Native Officers and soldiers.

21. Further, I am opposed to the appointment of a British Agent in Cabul and to the organization of a contingent for service in Affghanistan. If anything of the latter kind be decided on, then I prefer the arrangement described in a note by Brigadier-General H. Lumsden, which I will annex to this Minute. His suggestion is, that all the officers, as well as men, of the contingent should be Affghans or natives of Cabul and the adjacent countries. This point is not quite clear from the terms of his note, but I have learnt from personal communication that such is his meaning.

22. I do not think that British Officers, with a Native contingent, at a distance from any material support in the shape of British troops, would be safe, or would be able to exercise a proper influence over their men. And a contingent officered and composed purely of Native soldiers would be a dangerous force to our own representative at Cabul, and a source of distrust and irritation to the Ruler of the country.

23. No doubt it is correct, as observed by Brigadier-General Lumsden, that if we give a subsidy to the Ameer he will employ the money for his own purposes, and not in the manner we may desire. But, after all, our object must be to strengthen his position, and to secure his good-will, as the Ruler of the country. On the whole, he must be the best judge of the necessities of his position. A contingent paid directly by a British Agent would be looked on by the Ameer as a body of our troops. He would certainly himself intrigue with the Officers and men. His enemies would attempt to tamper with them, in order to employ them to subvert his power. Under such circumstances the Ameer would learn to regard the British Agent as his rival rather than his friend, in which light he should look on the representative of a friendly Government, while the Agent himself would probably be complaining to his Government of the radical insecurity of his own position. I feel a strong conviction that such an experiment would certainly fail, though the failure would not produce such disastrous results as if the contingent were officered by Englishmen.

24. As regards the appointment of a British Agent in Cabul, I firmly adhere to the views which I expressed last October. I much prefer, whilst circumstances remain as they are, having Native Agents in such dangerous positions. I believe that Native Agents can efficiently perform all the duties which we require; and that, in some important particulars, and under such circumstances as those under consideration, they are to be preferred to British Officers. My belief is that Major H. Lumsden and the Officers with the Mission at Candahar in 1857 were in great personal danger, and that so it will usually be with Agents similarly situated, especially in times of commotion. Nay, more, I am persuaded that they were utterly helpless, and in a condition of practical imprisonment. They could have done more at Peshawur than they were able to do at Candahar. A native would not be in personal danger in such case, and he could make friends and acquire influence and information in a manner impossible with a European.

25. In respect to Brigadier-General Lumsden's suggestions for the punishment of the hill tribes who have given us just cause of offence, as well as to the proposals of Dr. Bellew, copy of whose pamphlet I will annex to this Minute, I would remark how much more easy it is for even an accomplished and highly experienced soldier, like the former, to advocate plans for coercing the hill tribes than for others to enforce the execution of such plans. No force, superior in discipline, equipment, and numbers, has probably been employed in any of our hill expeditions on the North-West frontier to that which has lately operated on the Black Mountain and the adjacent valleys. Brigadier-General Wilde is an officer of ability and great experience in mountain warfare. He has been present in most of the expeditions which have penetrated these hills on the western border since the annexation of the Punjab. The particular objects of the late expedition embraced some of the particular points noted by Brigadier-General Lumsden, and yet what has been the result? The Hindostani fanatics, on the appearance of our troops, at once recrossed the Indus, and the offending tribes dispersed, and came to terms. Though we were unable, however, to inflict severe punishment, still the main object of the expedition, namely, to show the offenders that we could invade their country, and punish them, if necessary, was obtained. The result will assuredly be beneficial, and the probability is that we shall not have to repeat the attack for some years.

26. And so it has been generally with such expeditions against offending hill tribes on the North-West Frontier. The effect of our policy has been to overawe without unduly irritating them. We have done much to conciliate them, when conciliation has been practicable; and we have duly impressed them with a respect for our power. Most of the Officers, Civil or Military, who are cognizant of the true nature and character of that policy, believe that it has proved beneficial. For my part I consider that it has been the proper policy to pursue. Many circumstances might be adduced to show

that the conduct and bearing of these tribes towards us have greatly improved. So far back as the time of the mutiny, when the border was greatly denuded of troops, this feeling was conclusively shown. Numbers of these hill men take service in the Native Army, and show themselves obedient and steady soldiers. But we cannot expect in a few years to change the nature of men, who, like the border hill men, belong to a race which has lived self-reliant from generation to generation, in habits of rapine, violence, and bloodshed.

27. I altogether deny that the frontier is in an unsatisfactory condition, and is not fairly protected. I believe that it is, on the contrary, generally speaking, fairly secure, and that to improve the present state of things would entail a considerable addition to our already very large outlay. It must be remembered that the inhabitants of the plains have their villages close up to the very foot of the mountain ranges, and among the valleys and glens which indent these ranges; that their flocks and herds cannot forego the pastures in these localities; and that, moreover, these people can, and do, assist in their own protection. Indeed, were it not for the robbers and outlaws of the plains, who, with their relatives, make common cause with the hill men, the security of the lowlands would be still more complete than at present.

28. If any change in our western frontier is desirable it is to reduction rather than extension of its limits that I should look. It is altogether a mistake to suppose that the occupation of Jellalabad would strengthen our position. Whatever might be the first impression in the minds of people at such extension of our frontier, the move being a false one, the defects would soon become apparent. It would greatly enhance our present difficulties. It would at once entail a considerable addition to our troops, British and Native, while it would revive in the minds of the Affghans the fear of our encroachments, which is now partially at rest.

29. To overawe and control the border tribes our troops must occupy suitable positions, ready to move out at an hour's notice. Even under present circumstances, with the advantage of operating generally in the plains and open valleys, it is not always easy to bring up an adequate force at a short warning; but for a hill campaign the necessary arrangements always require serious consideration. Every rugged hill can be converted into a fortress; every steep declivity is easy of defence. By degrees it has come to be considered that it is necessary to have large bodies of troops brought together if we are to operate in the hills with security and good effect. After the late misconduct of the Sipahs section of the Afreedee tribe, when Captain Ruxton was killed, it was under contemplation to invade and punish these offenders. I understand that General Wilde estimated that a force of 20,000 men would have been required for the purpose. Colonel Reynell Taylor, who knows the frontier remarkably well, confirmed this view. He assured me that any movement into that part of the hills would surely lead to a combination against us of all the various sections of the great Afreedee tribe. I have seen this part of the border, and can well understand the formidable character of the opposition which our troops would have to encounter. We may judge of the character of the warfare by the difficulties we have experienced in dealing with the Afreedees of the Kohat Pass. Even Sir Charles Napier attacked them with but scant success. Since then we have blockaded them; we have subsidized them; we have fought with them; we have tried every means to make them abide by their engagements, and maintain friendly relations with us, but with no permanent effect. We may gather from this experience, which might be indefinitely multiplied, how our difficulties would be increased if we enlarged our border. One kind of complication would not be changed for another by going onwards; but all our difficulties would be immensely enhanced. I do not think that I exaggerate when I affirm that it would probably take the whole army of this Presidency, British and Native, to conquer and hold in subjection the hill tribes along the North-Western Frontier of the Punjab. And even if we succeeded for the time we should only obtain many thousands of warlike and disaffected subjects, ready to break out at the first opportunity. If the border is now unsafe and unprotected it would be a hundredfold more so under such a system.

30. A position at Jellalabad, in adequate force, would no doubt command the direct route from Cabul to Peshawur, as well as that by the Tarterra Pass; but such occupation cannot have any influence, it is obvious, on those by Swat and Chitral, or those through the Khurreem Valley over the Pywar Pass; nor on the passage of troops through the different defiles leading to the Derajat, the submontane tracts of the Trans-Indus. When General Pollock made his advance through the defiles of the Kyber the possession of Jellalabad had no influence in his favour. Our troops under General Sale were cooped up in that place, barely able to hold their own, and with difficulty at last sallied out and drove back their assailants. Had General Sale, after the defeat of Mahomed Akbar Khan, endeavoured to force the passage of these defiles, he would have had to fight his way to Peshawur, just as Generals Pollock and Nott had to do on their return from Cabul. And so it would prove with any garrison we might place in Jellalabad. It would have to be sufficiently strong to meet all comers; to keep open the defiles from Peshawur to Cabul, and also to control the surrounding country; and, in the event of any serious invasion from Cabul, it would certainly prove a source of great anxiety to us. All the objections to the occupation of Quetta would apply still more forcibly to the occupation of Jellalabad.

31. So far as I can judge, it is generally admitted, at least by the inhabitants of India, that the Affghans are superior in courage, hardihood, and force of character to all other races of Central Asia. I am inclined to think that this opinion is correct; and that the Affghans, if united, bearing in mind the remarkable strength of their country, could hold their own against any enemy which might come against them, more particularly if that enemy's army were not largely composed of European troops of the best class. One could hardly, I admit, reckon on such united action. The probability, however, is that the invaders, coming with hostile intent, would be resisted by the mass of the nation. It is much easier to perceive the weakness and insecurity of the present state of things in Affghanistan than to apply a remedy. So long as a rival to the Ameer can induce a strong party to follow him, and renew the war, the present struggle will continue. And in such internecine wars the struggle can only cease by the utter destruction of one party, for there is no hope of compromise and reconciliation. Whichever party is defeated will be ready to call for foreign aid.

32. It does not appear to me that the assistance which Mahomed Afzul Khan and Mahomed Abdool Rahman may have obtained from Bokhara or elsewhere in Turkistan has had much influence on the war. The Ameer, as I have already said, defeated both of them, as well as Mahomed Ameen Khan, and it was mainly from the disaffection of his own Chiefs and soldiers, and from the assistance of the Affghan population, who from various causes flocked to the standards of his brothers, that the Ameer failed to maintain his power.

33. Then, again, it is sometimes asserted that Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan was badly treated by us when he found refuge in the Punjab. But there are no valid grounds for this imputation. No doubt the Chief was dissatisfied with his treatment, and expected more than he received at our hands. But if any party had just cause of complaint it was the Ameer, and not Mahomed Azim Khan. The Ameer, indeed, must have felt that it was the laxity of our surveillance over Mahomed Azim Khan, and the circumstance that he was allowed to remain so near the frontier as Rawul Pindie, which enabled the latter to intrigue with his adherents and the disaffected party in Cabul, and finally to return there to wage war with the Ruler of the country. The fact was that, owing to the alleged part which Mahomed Azim Khan adopted during the mutiny in our favour at Cabul, it was generally believed that he was well disposed towards us. And probably he expected, or, at any rate, he affected to hope, that we should espouse his cause against the Ameer. When, however, he succeeded in driving that Chief from power, and became the leading Chief in Affghanistan, he showed in many ways that he was really at heart hostile to us, and complained of harsh treatment when in the Punjab. And so it is likely ever to be, sooner or later, with exiled Chiefs, who cannot obtain the means from us of attempting to recover their lost authority, however generous and considerate may be our conduct towards them.

34. In all probability, if Ameer Shere Ali were driven from Cabul, and were to take refuge in British territory, he would try to convince us that the Treaty of 1856 was made with his father, the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, individually, and that its advantages ought to be limited to his son, his successor; and if we did not act on this construction he would, when opportunity offered, resent our conduct as Mahomed Azim Khan has done. That Ameer Shere Ali has not already adopted this course can only be due to the circumstance that he had not given up the expectation of our eventually affording him assistance; and mainly, perhaps, because that, in recognising Mahomed Azim Khan, we distinctly reserved the right of Shere Ali to those parts of the country of which he still held possession.

35. I am myself inclined to doubt whether the Native community in Upper India really feels that strong dread of Russian advances on India which some Englishmen suppose. I have never observed much system of such a feeling, and believe that, as a rule, they place great confidence in our power and resources. On the other hand, I am certain that no sympathy exists among Natives towards Russia. On the whole, I am of opinion that much of the interest which at times has been expressed by Native journalists in India regarding the movements of Russia in Central Asia is simply the reflected opinions of the English press, in which the Natives take little interest. Thus, during Dewan Jawalla Sahai's visit to me at Simla last month, he made no allusion whatever to anything bearing on the subject, and when direct inquiry was made, repeated very much what is said to have been his reply to Sir D. McLeod. The Dewan's mind during his different interviews with me was full of matters relating solely to his master's relations with the British Government, and the opinions which had lately been expressed in British journals regarding the administration of Cashmere and Jummoo. I judge that the Maharajah, therefore, has no anxiety in respect to the movements of Russia, but is strongly impressed with the fear that some day we shall interfere with his authority. Indeed, I have reason to believe that His Highness even thinks that the newspaper criticisms are only preparatory to some such impending interference.

36. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab has expressed an earnest feeling in favour of a liberal and generous policy towards the people of the frontier, whether they are British subjects or not. To a considerable extent I concur in these views; and I have a strong impression that such has always been our policy. I believe that, whether we consider our administration on the one side, in the shape of light taxation, or on the other, in the form of a large amount of service and a fair proportion of privileges and advantages in favour of the better classes of the people on the border, our policy has been of the character I have described. That many persons on the border districts are discontented, from one cause or the other, I can well understand, but I believe that this arises mainly from political and religious grounds. Such evils inevitably accompany foreign rule, especially among such fierce, independent, and fanatical people as these now referred to. And the further we extend our possessions, especially in a western direction, the greater will be our difficulties in this respect. I have more than once indicated to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab that I am ready to consider any measures which he may think desirable in favour of the people of the frontier. And as regards his specific suggestions to extend the system of a militia to the Peshawur valley, I have requested him to report in detail what he would suggest.

37. Lastly, while I am by no means confident that the plan of subsidising and otherwise assisting Ameer Shere Ali will work well, and produce decisive results, such as are anticipated, I think that the time has come when it should be tried. Should the Ameer succeed in defeating his nephew, Abdool Rahman Khan, he will soon be in a position to meet the Governor-General or his representative, and to explain in person his views and wishes. If at that time I am still Governor-General of India, I shall be prepared, time admitting, to return to the Punjab with this object. If, however, I cannot do this, it will rest with my successor to decide what course shall be adopted. If it were decided that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab should be empowered to meet the Ameer, and arrange matters with him, general instructions should be prepared and sent for Sir D. McLeod's guidance; and any difficult points which occurred during the interviews could be settled by telegraphic communication.

38. I do not think it would be politic to do more than renew generally the engagements of 1856 between the British Government and the Affghan State. I would on no account recommend that we

should accede to a request which the Ameer will probably make, for an offensive and defensive alliance between him and the British Government. I would not consent to any engagement which might imply responsibility on our part for the maintenance of his authority. I would not even guarantee the payment of an annual subsidy for a term of years. I would rather suggest that we simply engage to give the Ameer a certain sum annually, so long as we are satisfied with his bearing and conduct towards us. I don't think it would be expedient that this sum should be less than 10 or 12 lacs of rupees. I would annex no conditions beyond general fidelity in his relations towards us, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, but I would lead the Ameer to understand distinctly that these conditions must be fully observed. Thus I would make him understand that simple professions of amity to the British Government, and courtesy to the Native Agent accredited to the Court of Cabul, would not suffice; but that the Ameer must exercise such a control over all of the tribes on the frontier which are subject to him as will prevent their making raids at any time into British territory, and that he will not allow these tribes to give asylum to criminals from our districts. And I would further stipulate that we may send Native Agents also at any time to Candahar, Herat, or other important places within the Affghan territories, should we desire to do so. These conditions might be drawn up in the shape of articles of agreement, and signed by the representatives of both Governments.

39. I also propose that we should give the Ameer a supply of arms, accoutrements, and ammunition. I have directed that 6,000 stand of arms should be collected at Peshawur for this purpose.

40. While strictly refusing to enter into anything like an offensive and defensive alliance with the Ameer of Cabul, I think it should be carefully explained to him that we are interested in the security of his dominions from foreign invasion, and that, provided he remain strictly faithful to his engagements, we are prepared to support his independence; but that the manner of doing so must rest with ourselves.

41. The inconvenience of all engagements with an Affghan Chief, situated as the Ameer of Cabul must be, arises from the circumstance that he will be disposed from time to time to make excessive demands on us, and that, if disappointed, he will be disposed at a suitable opportunity to repudiate these engagements, and act against us, if it appeared to be his interest to do so. This being in all probability the policy which the Ameer will adopt, should danger press him from any quarter, it is desirable that our relations with him shall confer real and substantial benefits, which it is obviously his interest to retain, while they should not be of a character to shackle us in case we discovered that he was not acting towards us in good faith. An open arrangement such as this, whilst only fair to ourselves, would, I am disposed to think, be as binding on the Affghan Chief as one more strictly drawn. Indeed, it appears to me that the more dependent he felt on us for the maintenance of such beneficial relations, the stronger would be his desire to do all in his power to retain our good-will. Unless the Ameer fairly fulfilled his engagements to the British Government, the payment of a subsidy to him would be derogatory to our character, and detrimental to our prestige.

Calcutta, 25th November 1868.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.

P.S.—Since the completion of this Minute, I have received a memorandum from Colonel Reynell Taylor, the Commissioner of the Umballa Division, whom I had consulted on the Central Asian question, and its bearings on the interests of India. Having written so very fully on this subject, and being anxious to see it disposed of, if practicable, before I leave India, I will now say no more at present than to commend this paper to the careful attention of those interested in the subject, and to add that I concur generally in much which Colonel Taylor has advanced.

Enclosure 5 in No. 14.

MINUTE by the Hon. Sir R. TEMPLE, dated 8th December 1868.

I HAVE heard this subject discussed by the most experienced persons of the time, both European and Native, ever since the year 1852; and, as Secretary to the Punjab Government for some years, I necessarily had an intimate acquaintance with these affairs. I therefore might have much to write thereon; but the whole question has been so well treated in the papers before us, and the policy which I, for one, have always believed to be the best, is so strongly set forth by his Excellency the Governor General (Sir John Lawrence), that I shall not now attempt to do more than record my testimony, or opinion, for what it may be worth, on the principal points at issue.

Before the Crimean war, in 1854, the fear of Russia was considerable in the minds of the political classes of Upper India. After that this feeling abated, the belief being that Russia had been beaten. But since 1865 the successes of Russia in Central Asia have caused the old fear to revive among the political classes of Natives all over India. Meanwhile, our own power and prestige in India have risen, and the Natives, while somewhat struck by the progress of Russia, are yet impressed by notions of British resources; and, on the whole, hardly know what to make of the matter. Still, a sort of uneasiness with some, of excitement with others, and of uncertainty with many, is gaining ground, and will grow more and more if Russian power in Central Asia shall further expand. The growth of any such feeling among its subjects could not properly be disregarded by the British Government in India.

Again, recent events have caused a real accession to Russian power in Asia. Doubtless, Russia is acquiring a new sovereignty over some of the most unmanageable or untameable classes in the world; never will she conciliate those fanatic Mahomedans. On the other hand, some classes in the population of those regions can be conciliated by good government. The country is in many parts fine, with natural and artificial capabilities. The means of military communication may be made considerable, by means of steamers on the Aral, the Jaxartes, and the Oxus, and by the extension of the railways

either under construction or projected. The consolidation of Russian power in that quarter has become easier than it was since the subjugation of Circassia. Thus, although, on the one hand, Russia may be courting difficulties and overstraining her resources, still she may, on the other hand, by patience and sagacity, succeed in establishing herself.

Further, such establishment really brings her into a contiguity that might prove inconvenient to us. From some points of view we might be glad to see Russian rule substituted for the political evils of Islamism; we might even regard Russia as a better neighbour, in respect to trade and peaceful communication, than the existing Native Governments. We might grieve to think of such a spectacle being afforded to the barbarians as an internecine contest between two Christian nations for dominion in Asia. But, unfortunately, such contests have happened, and may easily happen again. And for these we ought, on our side, to be prepared. Perhaps Russia has no hostile designs towards us at present; certainly her public Press indicates no such national feeling. No doubt she has been driven on by circumstances, and may be driven still further. Probably she has no present idea of advancing on India, well knowing the hopelessness of such attempt under existing circumstances. But she may calculate that circumstances may change, and that an advance upon India, for a long time to come impossible, may ultimately become possible. But even if she should never be in a position to try such a conclusion with us, still her acquisitions in Central Asia would give her a vantage ground over us in the event of any general contest. Although it were found that she had weakened herself by taking up more area than she could hold, still she might be able to harass us, to stir up trouble for us, to compel us to lock up large forces in the East, to distract our efforts, and thus to lower our status in the world generally. This much she could effect even in these the days of our strength, and she might regard this as a political gain, so far secured anyhow, and as a sufficient modicum of result for the efforts made. Perhaps she may be able to essay more, in the days of our weakness, if these shall ever come. If her establishment on the Oxus shall not open the way to India, never mind; it is worth her while to get even that far, for the sake of the advantage over us in the event of general war; so far well for her. If hereafter, by some chances not now foreseen, the establishment on the Oxus shall open the way to India, better still for her. Thus she may have two advantages: one proximate and probable or certain, the other contingent and uncertain. If the second should be for ever unattainable, still that would not invalidate the first.

To those, therefore, who regard with apprehension the progress of the Russians in Central Asia it would not suffice to answer that the invasion of India is impossible. Let this impossibility for the present be fully granted, and still there remains ground for grave reflection in respect to recent events.

The above impossibility, however, is by no means so clear as is often supposed. For although it is true that, nation to nation, we are more than strong enough to repel all and any attacks from Russia, yet why should Russia be so rash as to trouble us, when we have nothing else to do but to bring our whole strength to bear upon her? She will rather choose some occasion when we may be engaged with other powers. When we should be thus occupied and distracted, then would arise Russia's opportunity in respect to India.

When the Khans of Kokan and of Bokhara sent ambassadors to us, the former in 1854, the latter in 1865, they foresaw their coming fate of absorption into the Russian Empire. We probably could never have prevented this; certainly we cannot now prevent it; perhaps we should have no right even to try to do so. Nothing can apparently stop Russia from settling on the Oxus, overlooking Bulkh, or from reaching the passes which command the road from Kokan to the plains of Yarkand. Thus soon there will remain nothing but Afghanistan between us and Russian Bokhara, and nothing but Yarkand between us and Russian Kokan.

Having got thus far, Russia would, no doubt, begin to intermeddle with Afghanistan and Yarkand, unless we can succeed in interposing in some way or other. If we cannot succeed in preventing Russia from doing this, then we must be prepared for much political trouble. Russia might be more troublesome to us in Afghanistan than in Yarkand. But she would be troublesome enough, even in Yarkand, as that is conterminous with the territory of the Maharajah of Jummoo and Cashmere, which, though administered by a Native sovereign, is really a dependency of the British Empire. The presence of Russian agents, the spread of Russian influence, in either of these two countries, must be seriously inconvenient, as causing all manner of doubts to arise in the minds of our Indian subjects, as strengthening the hopes of all our enemies, and as being likely to occasion manifold complications in time of war; in short, as being dangerous to us in every respect.

Without, therefore, at all objecting to what Russia is doing in Bokhara, we have a right to ask, for our own interest and safety, that she abstain from all interference in Afghanistan (including Herat) and Yarkand. As our relations with Russia are at present friendly, we might, I submit, make diplomatic representations to her on the subject. As the reasonableness of our demand could not openly be denied, her answer, if it were vague and unsatisfactory, could hardly be unfriendly. And the fact of such a demand being made would warn her in time, as she has experience of the sort of action with which British demands of this nature might in extreme necessity be followed up. If after that she persisted in interfering within the prohibited limits, it could only be with a view of injuring us, and our Government would know how to take the steps which alone could properly be taken under such circumstances. In that case Russia would have to look to her own safety in various parts of the world.

At the same time, I would recommend that the Native Governments in Afghanistan and Yarkand should be informed that we intend to respect their independence ourselves, and desire to see them independent, and would afford them such help in that view as we might see fit. Beyond this I would grant these Native Governments no promise whatever; no offensive and defensive alliance supporting a Ruler of the day against his own subjects or family; no positive programme of what would or would not be done by us; and no fixed subsidy. Indeed, what exact measures should be adopted in the event of their independence being threatened or infringed by Russia could not be foreseen even by us, and must depend on the circumstances of the moment. It is probable that they would not be fully content with assurances qualified as above. But, under the circumstances, it would be inexpedient to concede more.

Having given this much of assurance to these Native Governments, but having carefully abstained from any specific engagements, I would concede such subsidies in money as might at any time seem proper, and also arms and ammunition, such assistance to be understood to be temporary and provisional, solely at the pleasure of the British Government of the day. But the amount of such pecuniary aid should be carefully limited; if moderate, it might do good (though that is very uncertain); if lavish, it would do harm, and would lead to fresh difficulties.

I would gladly see the appointment or the continuance of Native Political Agents at the Courts of the Rulers of Affghanistan and Yarkand; such officials are very useful, while their presence excites no jealousy.

In connexion with this subject it is impossible, of course, to overlook the position of Persia. It is needless for me here to enter into the various considerations, past and present, involved in this. But there are two points adverted to in these papers, of immediate consequence, relating to the Persian Court and the Persian Gulf, both of which would be of great importance to the British Government in its relations with Russia.

One point is the placing of the British Embassy at Tebran entirely under the Viceroy of India and the Secretary of State for India. I am entirely in favour of this. The British Minister at that Court is there mainly for the sake of the British interests in India, and the important work will be done best under the supervision of the Government of India. Such expense as might be necessary for the prestige of such a mission in the eyes of Orientals might be allowed, provided always that it were kept within reasonable limits, and that no undue extravagance were permitted. I would be chary of spending any considerable amount of Indian money in Persia. By all recent accounts, some apparently reliable, that country is very weak in resources, and is rather waning in power; it is hardly a promising field for the outlay of British money. And although we ought certainly to strive to maintain and augment our influence there, still we cannot hope to effectually rival Russia in that quarter.

The other point is the maintaining of a British naval force, at as moderate a strength as might be consistent with efficiency, in the Persian Gulf. The Shah of Persia recently applied for such a force, to be paid by his Government. This proposal could not exactly be complied with, because the Shah could not really pay for the force, and any such liability on his part would lead to fresh complications. But the British Government might well take the opportunity of assuring the Shah that it would maintain, as an ally, such naval force as might be needed. An additional reason for doing this might be the apprehension that, if we hold back, some other European naval power might step in. And we have actual information that something of this kind has been thought of by at least some French authorities.

While endeavouring, however, fully to estimate the real danger arising to British interests from Russian proceedings in Central Asia, and while advocating, as above, certain measures to counteract that danger, I am unable to advocate certain other measures which have been mentioned in these papers, some of which I regard as detrimental to the best interests of British India. To these I will very briefly advert.

I deprecate the sending of a single British Officer or a single British soldier into Affghanistan, in time of peace, at all events. What might or might not be necessary in time of war need not now be discussed. But to attempt this in time of peace would, I apprehend, do more harm than good. So clear, indeed, are the evils which would result to us from the military occupation of Affghanistan,—from the national feud which we would establish with the Affghans, from the cruel drain there would be on our resources, from the bloodshed and revolution which would constantly occur,—that probably nobody goes so far as to recommend this, especially after the warnings of the past. Nevertheless, measures are often proposed which, when examined, are found to lead directly or indirectly to this result. Such measures are the formation in some shape or other of an Affghan Contingent; the occupation of the valleys of Khost and Koorrum; the appointment of a British Officer as Envoy to Cabul; the occupation of Quetta; and, generally, the maintaining of a strong Native Government in Affghanistan in British interests.

The study of British political affairs in Asia generally, and on the north-west frontier of India in particular, impresses me with a sense of the onward tendency which ever impels us. So long as some rigid bounds are observed it is just possible (and no more) to check this tendency. Once those bounds are over-passed the tendency becomes irresistible. If British Officers cross the Affghan border troops will follow sooner or later. If one part of Affghanistan is occupied the occupation will spread to other parts, till the whole is occupied, or until some tremendous consequence arises. The very energy and spirit of enterprise which happily distinguish our countrymen generally would in this case prove irrepressible. And the Government, once embarked on such a course, would be committed by the proceedings of its own servants, if by nothing else, to go on and on. Moreover, a large section of public opinion has been, is now, and probably will be, in favour of advancing. Considerable pressure is even now put on Government in this direction. It is easier now to resist all this, because a clear line is drawn, and it can be consistently argued that so far will we go and no further. But if this line were overstepped, that is, if we crossed into Affghanistan, the consistency of the argument becomes lost; and it would be no longer possible to define the lengths to which we should or should not proceed. Then, indeed, the pressure of public opinion would be more difficult to be resisted, and the reasons for advancing more and more would be harder to answer.

The formation of a strong and friendly Government in Affghanistan is often spoken of, as if it were reasonably possible, whereas it is next to impossible. Such a thing has been very rare in the history of that country, and has perhaps never existed save through the genius or fortune of an individual. The whole character of the people militates against anything of the sort. Any attempt to effect this on our part would be almost sure to end in failure, and would be quite sure to lead to vast expense and to political trouble.

The despatch of a British Envoy to Cabul would surely lead to further troubles. So high a functionary could not be left unsupported. He must be backed by some force, and then some sort of military occupation would result. Moreover, such an Officer would be really surrounded by difficulties, from which he could hardly extricate himself without recommending some onward move. He might

possess all the forbearance and skill and self-control, as well as the courage and fortitude, for which British Political Officers are so often distinguished, but he would be sorely tried, and tempted to extend our political ramifications farther and farther.

It may be true that the Affghans have no national feud with us, that in some respects they are even friendly to us. But it is certain that they cannot bear the presence of Europeans in their country, and that this feeling, however smothered for a time by fear or greed, would, sooner or later, burst forth like a flame, in a more or less terrible form, according to opportunities.

The formation of an Affghan Contingent is beset with difficulties. If it is to be paid for by or even through the agency of the Ameer, the payments will be irregular; then a series of disputes would arise with the Ameer, and the troubles in this respect, so well known at Hyderabad and elsewhere in India, would be repeated at Cabul. If it is to be paid by the British Government through a British Officer, then it will be regarded by the Ameer as a body of foreign troops, and jealousy or disquietude must follow. Suppose a Contingent had been formed, what side is it to take in such civil wars as those which have happened within the last few years, when one Ameer is beaten and another succeeds, who in his turn has to give way to the original Ameer, who again, on his accession to power, is seriously threatened with a loss of it. If it be kept on one side throughout, and if the majority of the Chiefs and people were on the other side, then the British Government would be in the position of maintaining an unpopular Government in Affghanistan. And how would that help us in a struggle with Russia? Nor would there be any hope that such a Contingent would enable the Affghans of themselves to oppose Russian invasion. The Affghans, though brave and warlike, cannot in the least degree cope with any European troops in the open country, or even in such open country as might be afforded by the valleys.

As to the leasing of the districts of Khost and Koorrum from the Ameer,—*firstly*, he would never consent to lease them to us, or, if he did consent in words, in his heart he must necessarily be dissenting. Similarly, his people would regard our position there as an invasion of their country. We know but too well how they have regarded such steps in the past; why should they regard this in any other way. And, having incurred the ill-will and distrust of such a people as the Affghans, how would that help us in a struggle with Russia? Moreover, it is probable that, if Russia were to be marching through Affghanistan on the way to India, an advanced position in Kost or Koorrum would commit us to the policy of fighting the Russian force somewhere in Affghanistan, instead of choosing our own battle field near Peshawur.

Much the same remarks would apply to the proposed occupation of Quetta. - This would be a cause of fear to Khelat, and would be regarded as a menace by Candahar. Here, again, we should have the disadvantage of inspiring the Affghans with distrust till the war with Russia comes, and when that does come we shall be obliged to move on from our advanced post at Quetta, instead of selecting our own ground near the mouth of the Bolan Pass.

The cost of all or any of these operations which might be undertaken would, of course, have to be defrayed from the revenues of British India. Whatever expenses are really necessary for the safety of the country must be met in this way. But it is a serious thing to expend large sums of money, drawn from the people of India, beyond the borders of India itself, in foreign and alien countries. Under Providence we are trustees for the public funds of India, and we are responsible for the careful application of them. When there are so many objects of certain usefulness and necessity within India itself on which to expend this money, it is a grave thing to expend such money in foreign regions on objects of doubtful expediency. How many millions of Indian money were sunk in Affghanistan, and with what return to the people of India? At present, Russia, with all her resources in men, is deficient in money; in that respect being very inferior to us. Besides other advantages, we possess as yet a decided superiority in financial resource and credit, the benefit of which would be sensibly felt if we came to try conclusions with Russia. But this advantage we should lose if, unfortunately, we were ever induced to dissipate our treasure in such a country as Affghanistan. In short, by retarding the progress of India, and by impoverishing our exchequer to a level of that of our enemies, we should be just playing their game for them.

Again, even if the money were found, where are the troops to come from for the occupation of places beyond our borders? India cannot spare them. And Great Britain has difficulty enough already in maintaining an army of sufficient strength for the occupation of India, without furnishing any force for Affghanistan. It might be said that excellent Asiatic troops could be raised on our north-west frontier. But if the European force cannot be augmented, the old difficulty recurs of having too many Native troops in proportion to the European.

And after all these sacrifices had been made for Affghanistan we should find the Affghans just as fierce and intractable as ever, and, in the end, have the satisfaction of seeing them join the Russian enterprise, in the hope of sharing in the plunder of India.

If we engage ourselves in Affghanistan, Russia will find us in the hour of trial impoverished and embarrassed. If we keep out of Affghanistan, Russia will find us in the hour of trial strong, rich, and prosperous in India. If she really wishes us ill she must naturally desire that we may be so infatuated as to pursue the former course. But it is for us to avoid the course which our enemies, if we have any, would desire us to follow. At present, Russia, in respect to India, is at one great disadvantage. She could only approach through a very difficult country; whereas we have a capital position, with every military and material advantage. Her troops would be worn and wasted; ours would be in the highest condition. But if we enter Affghanistan we leave our vantage ground, and place ourselves so far on an equality with our opponent.

In short, that we ought not to waste our Officers, our soldiers, our treasure in Affghanistan, that we ought not to entangle ourselves with such an incorrigible people as the Affghans, will be usually admitted as general propositions. Still, particular measures such as those just adverted to are proposed which do actually conduce to these very things.

I shall conclude by adverting to our policy on the trans-Indus frontier. I have been exactly acquainted with nearly all the transactions between the Local Government and the independent tribes on that frontier, and I affirm that, on the whole, the British dealings with those tribes have been con-

siderate, just and firm. It is most important to use kindness and conciliation with these people, and our policy has been marked by these qualities. On the other hand, after the failure of all other remedies, the application of force has occasionally been unavoidable. In every such instance, the adoption of force has been warranted by clear justification. The mixture of forbearance on the one hand, and firmness on the other, has now, after the lapse of some years, been followed by great improvement in the conduct of these people. There has never been any encroachment or aggression upon them on our part, and I hope that there never will be such. Their independence has been entirely respected, and it may be hoped the results of our frontier policy will stand us in good stead, if ever we come to a struggle with Russia in Asia.

The railway from Lahore to Peshawur has been ordered, and is to be commenced. It may not prove remunerative; its importance will be military and political. It will doubtless be finished in good time.

R. TEMPLE.

Enclosure 6 in No. 14.

MINUTE on the subject of the progress of RUSSIA in CENTRAL ASIA, and of the defence of our NORTH-WESTERN FRONTIER.

THE recent valuable paper of Sir Henry Rawlinson, on the advance of Russia in Central Asia, has led to the Viceroy once more to write a minute, setting forth the views of his Excellency on the important subject of our proper policy on or beyond our North-Western Frontier. His Excellency's minute is accompanied by papers by the present Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and by Colonel Reynell Taylor (who served for many years on our trans-Indus border) on the same topic, and I understand that it is the Viceroy's wish that the Members of Government should now, before the close of his Excellency's administration, express their views on the subject.

It is to be recollected, that this question was very fully gone into by the Viceroy and those who were in the Government about 14 months ago. I then, as Secretary to Government in the Military Department, had the honour to submit my opinion as to the course we should pursue, and I can see no reason now to alter the views then expressed.

It may be inferred from the tenor of certain parts of Sir H. Rawlinson's memorandum that he was unacquainted with the papers just alluded to. Had he seen them, it is probable that he would have noticed, or replied to, arguments used in those papers, which seem to have anticipated some of his present proposals.

It would perhaps have been well had those papers been communicated to him, and to others interested in, and who may be justly deemed authorities on, the subject. The writers in the public Press are mainly in favour of a line of action which is deemed to be impolitic and dangerous by many authorities whose experience and knowledge must be allowed to be worth something. The public, therefore, both in England and in India, is liable to be influenced by writers who are for the most part without official responsibility, and who in various ways betray an ignorance of the subject on which they treat; while that which is written in a contrary sense by officials who have given their earnest attention to the matter for many years, and some of whom have necessarily done so in pursuance of their official duties, remains unknown.

I do not suppose that it would be proper to publish all these writings, but I cannot but think it very expedient, that to some extent, the public should be aware of the policy that is advocated by those in authority in this country, and of the reasons they give for their view.

Various writers are now advocating measures of a more or less active character on our border, and we have, therefore, not only to consider how best to oppose Russian advances, but also to deal with the general question of our policy towards the tribes on our North-Western Frontier, which is attacked and declared faulty.

I propose to reply to these latter in this minute, and would observe that I am perhaps justified in holding a somewhat decided opinion as to our frontier policy from the circumstance of having served on the North-Western Frontier from our first occupation of Peshawur in March 1849 till 1855, and again in part of 1856, during nearly the whole of which period I was principal Staff Officer to the troops, and as such, present in many affairs with, and expeditions against the hill tribes.

As respects the best mode of dealing with Russian advance, I have really little to add to memorandum of the 5th October 1867, which has already gone to the Secretary of State.

I esteem the various plans propounded by different authorities (three of whom, Sir H. Rawlinson, Major-General H. Lumsden, and Colonel P. S. Lumsden, speak with a weight justly due to their knowledge and ability) whether for placing a force at Herat, or at Quetta, or at Jellalabad, or for having a British Envoy at Cabul with or without a contingent of Native troops, or for supplying the Persian army with British Officers, or for occupying Khoorrum, as unnecessary, and perhaps useless for the object aimed at, and as certain to involve us in difficulties and expense.

To occupy Herat involves occupying many other places, and also would render it necessary to keep other troops in readiness at all times to support those in advance. I believe such a measure would involve quite the expense stated in my memorandum of the 5th October 1867, as well as all the other difficulties therein detailed, and that it would weaken our defensive powers. Indeed, if we occupied Herat, Russia might force us to use nearly all our resources in supporting the troops at that place, and then, while we were thus occupied, prosecute with little hindrance her designs against us (if she has any) in quite a different quarter.

The occupation of Quetta or Jellalabad, or both, could exercise no more sensible influence on Russian advance than does the existing occupation of Peshawur or Jacobabad. If political necessity arises, both can be occupied with rapidity, but there is no political necessity whatever, and to carry out the measure without strong reasons seems to me most inexpedient.

We should have to place at least a very strong brigade of all arms, say 4,000 men, at each place, or at one, if only one was occupied. An equal force would have to be in reserve within our own frontier ready to move up. Both places have proved themselves very unhealthy for our troops at certain seasons. The distance and difficulty of the roads would render the measure costly, and there would be frequent interruption of communications through the passes, running as they do through mountains inhabited by robber tribes who own but scant allegiance to the Ruler of Cabul.

There would be the further difficulty of first obtaining the assent of the Affghans to the measure, and after that the still greater and lasting difficulty of keeping clear of misunderstandings.

And to what purpose is all this to be undertaken? I fail to discover a statement of one solid reason to show that such measures now adopted would check Russia; and for the mere purpose of rendering our present frontier more secure or quiet, independently of considerations connected with Russia, troops placed as proposed would be thrown away.

The next proposals are for having an Envoy at Cabul and a contingent of Native troops at the same place. His Excellency the Viceroy has spoken of both those proposals in paragraphs 21 to 24 of his present minute, and I most entirely concur in his Excellency's views. The presence of either would be likely to drag us into difficulties, and would in no way strengthen us or aid us in checking Russian advance.

What we really want just now is to be on friendly terms with the Affghans, to strengthen their Rulers hands, and to obtain correct intelligence of what goes on. By our native Agent and in other ways we obtain the latter satisfactorily and we can strengthen the hands of the Ruler for the time being, much better by not interfering with him, or giving cause for disagreement which the presence of a British Envoy would probably lead to, and which would almost certainly in the end be brought about if there was a contingent at a capital paid by us.

We can strengthen the Ameer in other ways, as we are now prepared to do, with arms and money, in a manner agreeable to him and to his subjects, and without incurring the risk of embroiling ourselves with the Affghan nation.

I also entirely agree with the Viceroy as to the inexpediency of placing British Officers with the Persian troops. If a struggle comes and Persia is inclined to our side, no doubt we may then use means to strengthen her hands, but the presence of British Officers might not be accepted now, or, if accepted, might lead to disagreements, while their employment cannot be supposed to be likely to influence Persia to side with us, and if disposed to go against us, she would dismiss these Officers at her pleasure.

The last proposal to be discussed is that of occupying Khoorrum.

Such a measure would be expensive; we cannot be at all certain that it would be assented to by the Ameer, while it would certainly extend the circle of our frontier difficulties, and it is easy to conceive, as one result of the measure, that we might possibly have troops locked up uselessly in this forward position of Khoorrum at a time when they would be invaluable for active service elsewhere. This argument, I may observe, applies equally to every pushing forward of troops unnecessarily to particular places, when we can in no way predicate in what direction Russia may press forward.

That Khoorrum is a few marches nearer to Cabul than any of our present garrisons, seems to me an argument of no force. Circumstances are not likely to require us to move to Cabul so suddenly that a difference of a few days will be of any moment; but if, contrary to all reasonable expectation, such circumstances did arise, the force we could ordinarily afford to keep at Khoorrum would not be strong enough to move up to Cabul for any useful purpose without reinforcements joining from Peshawur, while troops from Peshawur itself, replaced rapidly from Rawul Pindie and Jhelum, could in respectable strength reach Cabul direct, at least as soon as they could by joining the Khoorrum troops, and proceeding to Cabul by that route.

Whether it is better to have our troops at a place like Peshawur with obstacles and enemies in front only, and then only such as a fair force properly equipped would overcome, or to have that force placed as is described at page 7 of Colonel Taylor's memorandum, from which it would seem that we might have the rear of the Khoorrum force altogether cut off from us for a time, and not by any means without difficulties in its front, is a matter of opinion, but I for one have no hesitation in saying "leave Khoorrum alone."

To conclude this part of the subject, I would only say that I think we are following the proper policy at present. We remain within our own border; we are strengthening ourselves there by placing more troops within easy reach, by having a portion of those troops well equipped for mountain warfare, by improving our railway communications, and by fortifying Peshawur; we are endeavouring to be on friendly terms with and to strengthen the Affghan Government; we watch and are aware of all that goes on; and, as the Secretary of State says, in his Despatch of the 26th December 1867, Her Majesty's Government are prepared, if opportunity and necessity arise, to enter into friendly communication with Russia as to her advances in Central Asia, so as to avoid danger of misunderstanding.

If these fail, and Russia presses on as seriously to menace us, we shall be in a position to go to war with unwasted resources. I will say nothing of all that we might do against Russia elsewhere than in India, but here we could collect 70,000 or 80,000 good troops on our frontier, and, if necessary, advance into Affghanistan with a force likely to be superior in numbers, equipment, and condition to any Russian force we can contemplate as being brought there. Our reserves, too, would be close at hand, and placed in the midst of all our abundant resources.

I do not think there need be fear for the result.

Some think that the mere rumour of conflict between the Russians and ourselves would be the signal for great trouble within the limits of our own provinces. I do not think that we need be very apprehensive on this score. Many of us can recollect the invasion of the Sikhs in great force in 1845, and how for two months our troops, though fighting great battles, and suffering severely, had failed to drive them out of our territory. Surely there is no reason to suppose that the natives of our Provinces would sympathize more with the Russians than with Sikhs, and yet, though circumstances then compelled us to denude our garrisons of European troops, so that a white soldier was scarcely to be seen

between the Sutlej and Fort William; what happened beyond some excitement, and one plot nipped in the bud at Dinapore? I believe the people of India have no desire at all for the Russians, though, of course, whether with Russians or others, if we suffer a succession of disasters in India, we must expect our native friends to leave us; but this cannot be avoided, and certainly will not be averted by any of the expedients proposed. It is a reason, though, and a strong one, for not adopting measures of doubtful expediency, and which may end in disaster.

We have plenty to do in India, and political, military, and financial considerations alike point to the propriety of remaining within our present frontier; but if, at some future day, our successors have to advance and encounter Russia beyond India, I think we may, humanly speaking, feel as confident as we have done in former wars, that we can engage our enemies, and hold the country in our rear with honour and success.

I will now proceed to discuss our policy for the protection of the North-Western Frontier, and I would first say that I do not believe any one at all acquainted with that frontier would suppose that by placing brigades at Quetta or Jellalabad, or elsewhere in Affghanistan, we should render our border more secure from raids than it is at present. All the tribes or sections of tribes who annoy us would remain practically uninfluenced by such a measure. They are close to our frontier, and to our troops on that frontier, but would be far removed and separated by great ranges of mountains from our forces in Affghanistan. No one, I suppose, would suggest sending troops into Affghanistan solely to preserve peace along our present border; but I think it may be safely asserted that, if sent there for any other reason, troops so situated would absolutely in no degree beneficially influence the peace of our frontier, while the passage of convoys through the passes would tend to embroil us with our hill neighbours, as offering often very great temptations to their passionate desire for plunder.

I will dismiss this notion, therefore, of improving the peace of the border by a forward move into Affghanistan, and will now refer to a project put forward by a so-styled "Punjab official," to occupy the hilly country generally between Eusufzai and Scinde.

This might be a very efficacious measure *as respects the present border*, if we had money and men with which to carry it out; but as, on a moderate computation, a hundred thousand men would not suffice to remedy what is really a very insignificant evil, I think this idea too need not be seriously entertained, especially as it is quite impossible to see that our frontier system would be improved by pushing forward our troops a certain distance, where they would have enemies in front and all around them, in most difficult ground, and in a country which would supply them with nothing, instead of remaining, as at present, in a fertile plain, with their rear open, and no inconvenience ever arising from an enemy, save by an occasional raid, which in nine cases out of ten is promptly repelled with punishment to the raiders.

It is my belief, that we might uselessly expend ten thousand men a year in carrying out Dr. Bellew's most impracticable and unpractical proposal.

Our present system is easily explained. The frontier garrisons throw out a line of outposts, extending from Jacobabad in Scinde to the Eusufzai country, which is bordered to the east by the Indus. These outposts are ordinarily quite sufficient, but if the difficulties are apprehended they are reinforced or supported from the garrisons on which they are dependent.

The whole force thus posted belongs to eight cantonments, viz., Jacobabad, Rajanpore, Dera Ghazee Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Bunoo, Kohat, Peshawur, including Nowshera, and Murdan, and comprises 2 Batteries Royal Horse Artillery, 1 Horse Field Battery Royal Artillery, 1 Heavy Field Battery Royal Artillery, 3 Punjab Native Field Batteries of 4 guns each, a Native Mountain Battery of 4 guns, 4 mountain guns attached to Jacob's Rifles at Jacobabad, and a Native Garrison Battery, 2 Companies of Sappers and Miners, 11½ Regiments Native Cavalry, 3 Regiments British Infantry, and 17 Regiments Native Infantry,—not a very large force for a frontier extending over many hundred miles, and inhabited by very warlike tribes, who feel the comparative security of their own fastnesses.

It will be seen that the bulk of the force here posted is native, and this is wise, for Natives are better suited to constant out-post duty in this country than British troops, but the *supports* contain a far larger proportion of British troops. I have not included Hazara in the above account of the troops for frontier defence, for though bordered by wild tribes who recently gave us trouble, it is apart from the regular system of frontier defence, being Cis-Indus, and it has no line of outposts, the military station Abbottabad itself being in the hills. Before quitting the subject of Hazara, I may, once for all say that we have now held it for close upon 20 years, with an ordinary garrison of one or two Native regiments, while the Sikhs with difficulty held their own with a small army. Only twice in the whole of that period have we been forced to resort to hostilities: first, in 1852, when in consequence of the murder of Messrs. Carne and Tapp, who went beyond our border into a dangerous tract, where the people seem to have thought they were going to establish a Customs line, the Hussunzais of the Black Mountain were punished by a force of Native troops, directed by Colonels Mackeson and R. Napier (now Lord Napier of Magdala), and the other day, when circumstances, which are of such recent occurrence as to render it unnecessary to recount them, led to the assembly of a large force under Brigadier-General White, to punish various tribes who inhabited the fastnesses of the Black Mountain beyond our border.

In fact, few who knew the history of Hazara when we occupied it in 1849 would ever have imagined that, inhabited as it is by somewhat fanatical Mahomedan mountaineers, we should, during 20 years, have had only on two occasions to resort to arms, and never, I believe, have blood spilt save in these instances. Yet, to show how exaggerated accounts are published of all that goes on in this frontier, I may mention that a paper which is supposed to be a good authority declared the other day that we had been obliged to undertake three expeditions in 15 years in Hazara, or, as the writer said, on the "Muhabun" mountain, evidently believing that this celebrated mountain is in Hazara. Instead of three in 15, we had two expeditions in 20 years, having not 20 men killed, I believe, in both.

Any account of the tribes who inhabit the hill country beyond our frontier, from the Indus, where it leaves the mountain, to Scinde, would be out of place here. Suffice it to say that they are all more or less warlike, all more or less predatory; that they are all Mahomedans, and that they are poor.

All these circumstances are reasons why we should expect trouble, and at the very best, not infrequent plundering raids into our more fertile plain country; and when I say plain country, I must not be understood as saying that all our border country is a plain. Here and there it is intersected by hills, which run down and separate our valleys, and in some cases these hills are not inhabited by our subjects, but speaking generally, we hold the plains and leave the hills alone.

Our posts, which are usefully aided in places by small bodies of Border Militia, are charged with the protection of our people and their property, and, on various occasions, the parties stationed at them have distinguished themselves greatly in repelling raids. These raids, considering that we have villages possessing large herds of cattle within a mile or two of mountains occupied by robber tribes, have really been few, and have seldom in the end been unpunished.

The usual course when a tribe or section of a tribe has offended is to blockade it. As traffic with the plains is essential for them to obtain various necessities, and to dispose of other articles, this is an effectual punishment, and often has induced the offending tribe to make restitution. Failing this, the usual course is for an expedition to be organized to enter the hills and punish the offenders. Large numbers of the enemy are rarely killed on these occasions, for as they fight in mountains, in light skirmishing order, and never close unless on some detachment that may be in difficulty or for a night attack, they do not often fall, save under stray shots from our troops. The exceptions to this have been few, and then mainly when, emboldened by superior numbers, they have ventured to attack us, or to meet our attack in comparatively open ground.

But though the numbers killed may never seem to the outside world an adequate result for what is perhaps a much talked of expedition, with a fine force of troops, punishment has almost always been successfully given, and *felt* as punishment. Though the men may retire before us, and send their women and cattle away, their villages remain, which can be destroyed, their watch towers (useful in their internal quarrels) blown up, their stores of grain destroyed, and what, perhaps, has a stronger effect than all else, we have learned the way to those particular villages, and can go there again with far greater ease than on the first occasion, if necessity arises.

Such is the usual result, and though a writer ignorant of hill warfare may sneer at the smallness of the number of the enemy destroyed, the object has been effected, the offenders have been punished, and will behave well for a very long time to come.

This is, I may say, our invariable experience of hill expeditions, even when it seems to some that perhaps the enemy had not received, owing to uncontrollable circumstances, a sufficient punishment. I maintain that the system is a good one, and that it is successful beyond any expectation that could have been formed by those who knew the frontier when we first took charge of it.

A writer the other day said we had been engaged in 23 campaigns against the hill tribes on our north-western frontier. Now I have before me a list of every expedition since 1849. To call some of the little expeditions that lasted perhaps a week or less "campaigns" is surely an exaggeration.

Including General Wilde's recent expedition, there seem to have been 18 in 20 years,—say one a year; and this includes all our encounters (save slight affairs of outposts) with every tribe from the borders of Hazara and Cashmere to Scinde.

Some of these expeditions were of an easy description, and in only two do we appear to have had more than 20 men killed; in most much less; the exceptions being that of the Mahsood Wuzereee expedition, where a detached portion of the force had to endure and to repel a most serious night attack, and the Umbeyla expedition, where, I think entirely through a deviation from the plan sanctioned, our troops were brought into collision in a very unfavourable ground with one of the most powerful tribes in the hills, with whom we had no quarrel.

The tribes are learning, and, indeed, many have learned already, that punishment is *sure*. That offences may be pardoned now and then, and that sometimes we bide our time, waiting for a favourable season, or till we find it convenient to chastise them, is true, but come in the end chastisement does. If this plan is steadily pursued, we shall have little to complain of; for I, for one, cannot admit that the necessity of every now and then undertaking an expedition is any very great evil, while I know full well what benefit we have experienced from having Officers and troops trained in our border school, and used to such expeditions.

It is only when we enter and remain inactive or on the defensive in the hills, as we did at Umbeyla, that there is real danger, for then there is time for combination, and for our troops to get, as it were, mobbed.

Any action of the hill tribes against us in our own plains need hardly be thought of. For a brigade of our troops, with Cavalry and Horse Artillery in sufficient proportion, to defeat any force of hill men we are likely to see in the plains is hardly more arduous work than a good active field day.

My remarks have hitherto applied mainly to our Punjab Trans-Indus frontier, but we may glance for a minute at Scinde. There the outposts are mainly composed of Cavalry, and this is right, as the robber tribes have to cross a broad belt of desert country between the foot of the hills and our posts. It seems, indeed, that expeditions into the hills have been found quite needless in that quarter, the usual course of events being that, when a raid takes place, the marauders are encountered and pursued by Cavalry from the nearest post, and generally with most satisfactory results.

In a return of encounters on the Scinde border, extending over 20 years, I find that *ten* such encounters have taken place, and that some of these entailed *no* casualties to our troops engaged, who varied in strength from 17 to 133 sabres. In the whole of these encounters we have had 38 men killed and wounded.

Surely this is not a very great expenditure of blood for the protection of that portion of the frontier.

While I advocate expeditions when necessary, I am fully aware of the difficulties of hill warfare. No man who has seen warfare in mountains occupied by active enemies, knowing every crag, can underestimate these difficulties. These operations require an able, intelligent, and experienced Commander, they require good, active, forward troops, and they require perfect equipment. Expeditions should never be *lightly* undertaken; they are always attended with risk; for in no warfare does the safety of the

force and success of the campaign so much depend on the quick intelligence, and, if need be, judicious vigorous action of subordinate Officers, who are constantly placed with detachments in unexpected circumstances, with no possibility of referring for orders.

The difficulties of the ground which are usually unknown beforehand, the fact that everywhere and close around an active brave enemy may be lying concealed, ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity, or to kill stragglers or followers, the circumstance that, when a Commander would gladly dispense with baggage of any kind, he is compelled to carry with him every particle of food and other necessities, the impossibility of sometimes keeping open communications with the base, and many other hindrances sure to arise, render it no light matter to enter the Afghan hills. This is no reason, and should never be accepted as a reason, for not doing so when good policy requires it, but it is a good reason for not listening to clamour which presses on the Government a line of conduct unnecessary, and likely to cost blood and money without satisfactory result.

I trust the desire to enter the hills, save in fulfilment of a necessary and judicious policy, will always be checked by Her Majesty's Government, and I hope that the occupation of particular places in the mountains, on various specious pretexts that are put forward, will be steadily forbidden.

So much for our policy with the frontier tribes ; and with regard to the Russian advance in Central Asia, I have expressed my humble opinion as to our proper line of policy.

Calcutta, 8th December 1868.

W. H. NORMAN.

Enclosure 7 in No. 14.

MINUTE by Mr. G. N. TAYLOR, First Ordinary Member of Council.

A perusal of Sir H. Rawlinson's valuable memorandum, and of the papers which have been written by other authorities on the subject, has not altered the views on the Central Asia question, which I ventured to express very briefly when it was under discussion last year.

In the remarks now recorded by His Excellency the Governor-General in his minute of the 25th ultimo, so far as they relate to the policy to be pursued in reference to Afghanistan, I most fully and cordially concur. The measures which were in contemplation before the Government left Simla, and which his Excellency still recommends should be carried out when the proper time arrives, have for their object to strengthen the position of Shere Ali, and to place our relations with the reigning Amir on a firm and solid basis. Those measures will, I firmly believe, conduce to the result so obviously desirable and so forcibly advocated by Sir H. Rawlinson,—the consolidation of a strong and friendly Government in Afghanistan.

For the rest, we are doing what is necessary for the protection of our own border ; we are strengthening the frontier posts and fortifying the garrison of Peshawur ; while, at the same time, the efforts of Government are steadily directed to the improvement of our internal administration. We have undertaken the direct construction of the railway from Lahore towards Peshawur. Other important lines are progressing towards completion, and the Indus Valley line, the necessity for which is not so pressing, will doubtless follow in course of time.

So long as we remain within our own border, and continue our present policy of friendly conciliation and alliance with our immediate neighbours across the frontier, we have nothing whatever to fear from Russian aggression. Still it is impossible to regard her steady advance with complete indifference. She has already made rapid strides in Eastern Turkestan, and is still pushing forward ; and though her tenure may for the time be insecure, she is doing her utmost to establish her power and confirm the position she has acquired in those countries. The question is, what measures or precautions can we legitimately adopt in order not merely to check her onward march, but to neutralize or control her predominating influence and preserve the balance of power in Central Asia ?

I believe that we are doing all that is necessary to cement our friendship and alliance with Afghanistan and Kashmir ; and as regards our Persian diplomacy, though Sir H. Rawlinson's proposals and suggestions are entitled to great weight, I incline to agree with the Governor-General that, for the present at least, the transfer to the India Office of our relations with that Court is all that is required. With respect to our more northern frontier, we are exerting our influence in view to the extension of British commerce into the regions of Central Asia by facilitating the free course of traffic, by assisting in the opening out of the best existing route to the eastward of Kashmir, and by giving protection to traders to and from those parts. We have already established peaceful commercial relations with the ruler of Yarkand by deputing, at the invitation of the Kushbegi himself, a Native Consul to protect the interests of British traders at his capital. What is now wanted is a further move in the same direction. We have to meet Russia ; in short, in her own field ; to assist rather than oppose her action in the cause of civilization and progress, and to come to such terms with her as will facilitate commercial intercourse between both nations and with the regions of Central Asia.

To this end, I think the time has arrived for a more decided diplomatic action than has yet been employed. It is true, as Colonel Norman has remarked, that the attention of Her Majesty's Government has been directed to the subject ; but I think it is one of so much importance that it might with propriety be again urged on the early and serious consideration of the Secretary of State in view to the adoption of such a line of policy as would ensure the establishment of amicable commercial relations between the two powers. A mere diplomatic protest will not avail ; but I submit that negotiations conducted in a fair and friendly spirit will, in all probability, lead to a cordial understanding, and secure some permanent arrangement, whether in the shape of a convention or by an interchange of Consular agencies, which would put an end for ever to the visionary idea of Russia's hostile designs upon India which exists in so many minds.

Calcutta, 12th December 1868.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. N. TAYLOR.

Enclosure 8 in No. 14.

MINUTE by the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF in INDIA, suggested by Sir H. RAWLINSON'S MEMORANDUM on the Questions connected with Central Asia, dated 24th December 1868.

In the various papers submitted by me in the Foreign and Public Works Departments, on matters connected with the Central Asian question, Afghanistan, and the defence of India on the North-West Frontier, during the last two years, I have given my opinion on many of the questions suggested by Sir Henry Rawlinson in his Memorandum.

Thus, I think the argument is complete against a British occupation of Quetta, or an advance on Afghanistan, unless a real *casus belli* should arise in our relations with that country.

I hold, very strongly, that those relations should not be left to chance, or to be determined according to a distrustful or hostile attitude on our part, but that we should encourage diplomatic intercourse with the Court of Caubul, and, while testifying something like a genial sympathy towards the Government *de facto*, we should by political pressure and the practical testimony of our own good offices, bring about a reciprocity of good feeling towards ourselves.

I have thoroughly concurred with his Excellency the Viceroy in the policy pursued during the last four years.

Afghanistan being in a state of civil war, and it being really impossible to say from day to day what party might be in the ascendant, it has appeared to me to be clearly necessary to let the opposing parties fight their quarrel out; neutrality on our side being absolutely observed.

But I think it is obvious that such a policy of passiveness should be limited by the pressing necessity of actual civil war, and that so soon as we are able to assign something like firmness and stability to the *de facto* Government, we should not only speak to it with civility, but we should give it moral, and even material support.

This is required not only on the grounds of a large policy which we should direct as the great Indian power, a power resting on an European as well as an Asiatic basis, but also with regard to the considerations of trade with Caubul and the countries lying beyond.

Our relations with the Court of Caubul should then be put on a footing of liberality on such grounds, care being taken to exclude the notion that we are led to this by any fear or mistrust of Russian proceedings.

To make an alliance offensive and defensive with Caubul would indicate this fear of Russia, and therefore, on that ground alone, it is an inadmissible measure.

But it is certainly right so to influence the Ruler of Caubul, as to cause him to look to us as his best friend and support, and one to whom he may come for counsel and assistance, provided that, in important matters, he is disposed to adopt reasonable advice, and a policy in conformity with justice to his own subjects and respect to foreign obligations.

It will have been seen in my previous papers that I entirely decline to follow in the wake of those who are constantly striving to excite the military spirit in England and India against Russia.

But while I regret to see the efforts made in this sense, it does appear to me to be necessary to keep a vigilant watch over the proceedings of that country in Asia, just as we see a like precaution pursued by the Foreign Office with reference to the assumed ambition of Russia in her relations with the Danubian Provinces and the Porte.

Such diplomatic vigilance is required by general considerations. But it may be said with truth that the alarm testified with regard to Russia, as affecting British interests in India, is more unreasonable than it is possible to describe. As a military and vast political power, we have literally nothing to fear from Russia, whether she stop at her present limits, or spread her power even to our own borders. A great mischief is done by those who, from whatever cause, occupy themselves in preaching the falsehood of our weakness in India. We are simply invincible in that country against all the powers in the world, provided only we are true to ourselves. If we choose to commit ourselves to a policy of aggression, we can go and establish ourselves where we like. If, on the other hand, being guided by a true and sound policy, we restrict our ambition and fortify ourselves by a continuance of good Government and careful attention to the efficiency of our military establishments, without extravagance on the one hand, or unwise cheapness on the other, we not only do that which is best for the great empire committed to our charge, but we comply with the conditions requisite for security and freedom from political anxiety.

Reasoning from this point of view, I would repeat that we are bound to organize our Asiatic communications with Russia on a proper diplomatic and consular footing.

The absence of such arrangements between ourselves and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, on matters connected with Central Asian policy was, perhaps, not inconvenient before Russia had become the dominant power of Central Asia. But now that this has actually taken place, to forego diplomatic and consular intercommunication is opposed to a proper British policy, as shown by our proceedings in all other parts of the world, including those European countries where we habitually check Russian ambition. By such omission we cannot fail in the long run to precipitate the very dangers against which we are now warned by those who propagate alarm and suspicion of Russia's designs against India.

For it is but too true that we do not at present enjoy the advantage of correct information, and the policy of India beyond her frontiers has almost a Chinese character. That is to say, following an Asiatic idea, we seem to be jealous of the curtain between India and the outer world being penetrated, while we show no wish to exercise an influence beyond it.

I cannot think that this state of things is either statesmanlike, according to a notion of a broad British policy, or prudent even in the narrowest sense. For in this manner we are left to the mercy of mischief-makers in both countries, and of the unbounded suspicions and panic which are the children of ignorance.

This want of policy is certainly opposed to the traditions of our history, and it is also opposed to the modern notion that we have a mission before us of extension by means of civilising influences, although not of territory, and not by force of arms.

If this modern notion is to be abandoned, it will hardly be denied that the retrogression of Great Britain as one of the great empires in the world, it may be said, perhaps, with truth, the greatest, has commenced.

For to stand still, that is to say, to decline to exercise a civilising influence over nations with which we are brought in contact, and which are notoriously in a semi-barbarous state, is to declare in favour of a Chinese immobility, and to relinquish the hope of commercial extensions. This I take to be, in other words, retrogression from our place in the world, and the beginning of decline.

All that has been done of late years in India, the enormous commercial and pecuniary liability undertaken by England in this country, and the absolute confidence with which the Native powers look to us, notwithstanding the apparent alienation produced by difference of race and language, are certain proofs that we have not reached the point when such a policy of immobility can be embraced by any British Government, whether in England or in India.

I therefore take my stand upon this, that, so far as a broad Anglo-Asiatic policy is concerned, we must consent to use our influence, and at times, to enforce results, although it is my conviction that we have reached the proper limits of territorial development.

It appears to me that the value of the distinction here indicated is generally lost sight of, a mistake in the consideration of these matters which has already done much mischief in the inflammatory writings of those who are either jealous or afraid of Russian power in Asia, as well as in restricting the spread of legitimate British influence.

The restriction has been partly due to the fears of our own Government, and partly to the natural jealousy of what was once the policy of Great Britain in all parts of the world, but is so no longer.

With regard to the countries under Asiatic Governments intervening between the British border and the countries more or less influenced by Russia, it is not difficult to mark a popular error which to a certain extent blinds judgment in England.

Thus all the countries west of our north-west border are apt to be jumbled together as if they formed one united kingdom.

We, on the other hand, know that we have to deal with a belt of independent tribes spreading for many hundreds of miles, which are as free of the Court of Caubul as they are of ourselves. If there is a difference, however, it is to our advantage; for these tribes have a wholesome dread of our arms and power of arrangement, whereas they have little or none of the Afghan Government.

It seems to me that the Government of India has not as yet made such progress in assimilating these border tribes to its own purposes as it might have done, and yet a very great deal has been effected.

It is to be recollected that influence over these independent tribes depends, *first*, on invincible firmness in the repression of border disorder; *secondly*, by letting it appear, although we do not choose to annex their mountainous country, that whenever we do move we act as the suzerain, and will be obeyed, whatever the cost and trouble; and, *thirdly*, that in this sense we are willing to conciliate, the conciliation springing from the good will and strength of the suzerain, and not from the notion that we are unable to deal with them as we please.

An instance of the mode of conducting a war policy with the frontier tribes has been lately seen in the campaign of the Black Mountain, viz., to move in considerable force, and thus to overpower the very notion of opposition. When punishment has been inflicted for serious misconduct, conciliation may begin, but not before. For the prosecution of a peace policy with the same people, we need not look for an example further than Cashmere or any of the independent states in India itself.

It is sometimes said that our policy of forbearance is misconstrued on the frontier.

I find a difficulty in admitting the soundness of such an opinion. I believe that all experience shows that forbearance and conciliation have a lasting effect if the wild inhabitants of the mountains are duly impressed with a sense of the power of those who thus forbear.

But that sense of power must not be weakened by attempts to conciliate when punishment is due, and before the due punishment has been inflicted. For, whenever this takes place, there is not only loss of prestige, but of the loyalty of those who may come to think that misconduct is more remunerative than fidelity to engagements.

But I would go further still, and I would state my opinion that the true character of our policy should be so practically explained and enforced on our neighbours that there should be no possible mistake on their part. Thus I would make friendship with us a duty, the principle being broadly proclaimed and acted on that those border tribes which are not with us are against us, and to be dealt with accordingly by force of arms.

Thus I would not allow such an authority as the Akhoond of Swat to preserve a hostile attitude towards the British Government, which has been permitted during the last 20 years. I would simply tell him on the first opportunity that he must either be a friend or be treated as an enemy, and I would advance at once upon him, and so put an end to the discreditable state of things as regards that authority which I believe to exercise a very pernicious effect within our own territories and along a large extent of the border.

It is probable that a campaign and the deployment of 10,000 men for three months would be necessary on this account; in short, such a campaign as we have lately seen on the Black Mountain, although a sterner resistance would be encountered.

But it is very possible that recourse to arms may not be necessary if the Akhoond be invited to enter into proper relations with the Punjab Government, he being given to understand that ultimate recusancy on his part in the denial of all intercourse would be visited by us hereafter as hostility which could not be permitted.

It is probable that some such action is required also with the great Afreedie tribe, and possibly with others.

This brings me to a point in the existing mode of management of the Indus border and of the relations with the Court of Caubul.

At present all the questions connected with these matters come, in the first instance, to the Commissioner of Peshawur, who is, besides, the Administrative and Chief Judicial Officer of a large district.

It is, I think, clear that it is impossible for one man to be able to combine such very opposite duties, or to find time for their due exercise. I know that this is the opinion of those who have had to carry on the duties, and who are now engaged in their execution.

With regard to the affairs of the Government of Caubul, as well as difficulties with the frontier tribes involving peace and war, the decision rests with the Supreme Government, although the papers have passed intermediately from the Commissioner of Peshawur to the Punjab Government.

Consequently, as no affair reaches the Supreme Government at first hand, there cannot fail to be a circumlocutory mode of transacting business with concomitant weakness and a tendency to procrastination, which would be avoided if, as regards the trans-frontier matters, there were an officer specially charged with them, who should take his instructions from the Governor General in Council.

In short, I think there should be a Governor General's Agent, who might be entrusted with all matters connected with the policy of the border, and who should be the Correspondent of our Native Envoy at Caubul.

It is not usual to entrust diplomacy and decisions affecting war and peace to a minor Government. And as a matter of fact, when such matters pass through the hands of a minor Government, it comes in truth to be a sort of post office of transmission, and not the means of decision and action.

Yet, owing to the very circumstance of the Punjab Government being the authority to which the Commissioner of Peshawur reports, the ultimately deciding power, viz., the Government of India, ceases to take the direct interest necessary for due appreciation and guidance of a policy, and, as I have been credibly informed, does not now possess all that information which it otherwise would have. It may be that I am misinformed, but I am convinced that the present mode of transacting business is most likely to lead to the conditions of insufficient information and of weakness of purpose, which we cannot afford in the execution of relations with such a Government as that of Caubul, or of a policy of firmness with the border tribes.

It will not be understood that I am not attributing blame to any one, but am merely calling attention to what appears to me to be a vicious system.

I think it would be admitted by the Foreign Department of the Government of India, that when Sir R. Temple took office about this time last year, he found a great want of information, both practical and documentary, in the office as regards Caubul, the frontier tribes, and the Central Asian questions.

I have reason to believe that the Quartermaster-General was then much consulted by the Foreign Secretary, because no one in his office had any real knowledge of these most important matters, and because there existed no means of informing the Foreign Secretary.

Well, what is the cause of this? The answer is obvious, that these most vital considerations come before the Government of India at second hand through the Punjab Government, just as the affairs of Muscat and Zanzibar reach us through the Government of Bombay.

Hence delay, lukewarm interest, weakening of responsibility, first in the Punjab, and then in the Supreme Government, with consequent diplomatic debility, and all the concomitant results on border management, of which only those can judge who occasionally meet the Border Officers, and talk with them in familiar confidence.

It is almost incredible, but it is true, that according to this extraordinary system, Candahar news, which is very often most important as regards the dynasty in possession at Caubul, reaches the Government of India through the Commissioner of Sindh and the Government of Bombay.

With respect to the Court of Caubul, it is, I think, imperative that that condition should be observed which we know to have enormous weight in the minds of all Asiatic Chiefs, viz., that they should feel that they are dealing directly with the head of all, and not through a subordinate Government. On this ground alone the Governor General's Agent is required.

Should this proposition be admitted, it would not be very difficult, I imagine, to institute the Durbar system, according to which all the chief tribes in the frontier from Sindh to Cashmere should be represented by their Vakeels, according to what we know of the system pursued by the Governor General's Agents of Rajpootana and Central India. The arrangement already made for the due correspondence of our Native Envoy at Caubul would continue, but with this difference, that his correspondent would be the Governor General's Agent, instead of the Punjab Government.

Cashmere may be properly left in its present relations with the Punjab Government. The footing of that State is satisfactory; and there is probably no country in the East which is so well known to Englishmen as this province. The Consular appointment of Dr. Cayley at Leh has answered extremely well, and such is the growing trade with the Punjab, the same extending beyond Cashmere to Central Asia, that no object would be gained in effecting any change in that quarter, while, perhaps something might be lost. I would only say that we must resolutely decline to weaken the new Consular relations and arrangements as lately desired by the Durbar of the Maharajah.

To go back from them would be to sacrifice that amplification of civilizing influences which I take to be our modern notion of action as distinguished from the lust for territory, the characteristic of the British motives of foreign policy of a former age.

With regard to Persia, I am unable to see that any special advantage would flow from replacing the Mission at Teheran under the Government of India. I am impressed with the idea that the disputes of Persia with Turkey, and the general support of that country against Russian encroachment, the pressure required for the telegraphic system, and to soften or annul a barbarous policy, whether to her own subjects or towards independent tribes, can be better managed from Downing Street than Calcutta. Besides which, there can hardly be a doubt that the Shah would rather treat with the Representative of the Queen of England than with the Viceroy of India.

There is, indeed, a reason for adhering to existing diplomatic arrangements with regard to Persia similar to that I have indicated for the transfer of direct communication with the Court of Caubul from the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab to the Government of India.

The British Resident in the Gulf, being a servant of the Government of India, seems to me to answer every Indian purpose with regard to the peace of the Indian seas, the control of the Arab tribes, Muscat, &c., &c.

I can see no reason for repeating the experiment of sending British Officers to drill the troops of the Shah. This has been tried before, both in Persia and Turkey, without any really practical result, so far as I have ever been able to learn.

In short, I imagine such a measure in such countries to be without use or meaning, unless their Governments would consent to the Foreign Officers being the actual commanders and leaders of large divisions or *corps d'armées*, as we saw in the Punjab in the time of Runjeet Sing.

As such an arrangement is clearly out of the question in Persia, to commit ourselves *de novo* to the measure of sending English drill masters could hardly do anything but awaken extreme and reasonable jealousy in the Russian Government, and, perhaps, in other quarters also.

It appears thus, finally, to me that the whole of Indo-Asiatic policy requires revision, but in a sense opposite to that entertained by Sir Henry Rawlinson.

Thus I would put aside jealousy and antagonism towards other provinces, but would frame all our measures on a basis of international communication of peaceful character, of confidence instead of distrust, suspicion, and ignorance.

Thus, wherever and whenever it is possible, Consular agency should be reciprocated between countries hitherto supposed to be rival, Great Britain and Russia. If the latter should object at first we should not be discouraged, but persevere until we carry our point.

The same should follow in Eastern countries proper, of which an example has been set by the establishment of Dr. Caley at Leh, and of the Native Ughskul or Consul at Yarkund.

Thirdly, I would place our relations with Cabul under a Governor General's Agent, and so cause the communication with that country to be direct with the Government of India, instead of with the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, as is now the case.

Fourthly, the same functionary should guide all the relations with the independent tribes of the border, direct communication being not only encouraged, but, if necessary, enforced by downright pressure. Without this the frontier peace has been constantly endangered, and it must continue to be so.

Fifthly, I would leave the system as at present pursued in Persia without change. On the whole, we have reason to be satisfied with the results of the last few years, as shown in the construction of the telegraph wire, the navigation of the Euphrates, and the tone of the Shah's Government in its communications with Mr. Alison, and its general attention to British suggestions.

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

24th December 1868.

Enclosure 9 in No. 14.

MINUTE by Mr. R. H. DAVIES on Sir H. Rawlinson's Paper on RUSSIAN PROGRESS in CENTRAL ASIA, dated 27th December 1868.

A PERUSAL of Sir H. Rawlinson's paper leads me to the conclusion that he has failed to make out any sufficient case for the measures which he proposes. It is not, indeed, altogether consistent with itself, for while he professes to regard an invasion of India by Russia as a contingency not requiring to be guarded against, he nevertheless draws an alarming picture of the descent of 50,000 Persian Surbaz, supported by a Russian column, and hints that it might be successful, owing to the prevalent disaffection of the Mahomedan population of India.

His immediate object, however, is to bring some kind of increased diplomatic pressure to bear on the Rulers of Cabul and Persia.

One argument for interfering at Cabul is founded on the general advantages of keeping good order in a country adjoining our frontier; but a second plainly points to the creation by our agents of a confederacy of the Mahomedan States in antagonism to Russia. The various composition of such a league, and the utter bad faith of the parties to be consulted, would, I think, render such a scheme impracticable, as well as dangerous. The Russians would regard it as threatening their position in Bokhara, and as justifying any reprisals. Nothing but overt aggression on their part would, in any degree, recommend such a project.

The argument for interfering in Persia is that Russia may otherwise seize Herat. Various modes of intervention are suggested, all more or less involving expenditure on our part.

Now, does past experience warrant our augmenting our diplomatic interference in the affairs of those countries? Can we forget our former failure in Afghanistan, and its fatal consequences? Can we forget that, when Persia went to war in 1832 with Turkey, in 1826 with Russia, in 1832, 1836, and 1837 against Herat, she, in each instance, did so contrary to the remonstrances of the British Minister; and, in the case of Mahomed Shah, commenced hostilities immediately after we had aided his accession to the throne, with troops drilled by our Officers? Is there any hope of our efforts and expenditure now being more effectual? Shall we find less slippery materials to work with,—instruments more reliable,—than Dost Mahomed Khan, and the Kandahar brothers, or the vainglorious Shahs by-gone. Neither Oriental character nor the circumstances of these Mahomedan Governments have changed. Under the unplastic law of the Koran, every vacancy in the Musnud is liable to be contested with the sword. To side with one candidate is to make the other, and, perhaps, a strong party with him, an enemy; to side with neither is to pretermitt the purpose of the negotiator; and, while thus all the old elements of failure await him, is there any fresh cause of alarm? Does the position of Russia in Khokand, Bokhara, or Mongolia, in any way lessen the stupendous physical difficulties of the route to Cabul by Bamian, or to Kashmir by the Karakoram? Russia has been any time during the past thirty years as well able as she is now to aid Persia in the seizure of Herat. She has refrained from doing so. She refrained even at the time of the Sepoy mutiny. Is it to be imagined that she will attempt the precipitous and sterile passes of the Hindoo Khoosh and Karakoram, so long as she has the Kandahar route as an alternative? And yet her approach to these, our natural and impregnable

ramparts, is the pretext for advocating the transfer of our scanty surplus from public works and defensive preparations to the fallacious projects of an unavailing, if not mischievous diplomacy.

Much of the superstructure of Sir R. H. Rawlinson's conjurations rests on Sir R. Temple's Report of the disaffection of the Mahomedans in India. I do not deny that there is truth in it, more especially as regards the cities of Hyderabad and of Delhi before the mutiny, which were immediately referred to. It is also in a less degree applicable to the Pathans of Rohilkund, who still constitute a dominant colony, and are capable of combination. But it is much exaggerated if the general Mahomedan persuasion be in contemplation. The well-to-do majority are not likely to respond to the electric shock of Russian sympathy.

The space which the subject fills in the thoughts and aspirations of the population of India is also, in my humble opinion, greatly exaggerated. Much of what appears in the Native newspapers is the normal echo of the industrious knot of English alarmists. Much consists of the lucubrations of one or two well-known speculative Moonshees. For several years together the talk of the Punjab bazars was reported to me in Native news-letters, and though every wild political rumour found its place in the record, the spectre of Russian invasion was far from having the whole ground to itself. If any one will take the trouble to refer to the old Blue Books about Herat, or to such distant publications as "Shore's Notes on India," he will see that both the facilities for the invasion of India by the Kandahar route, and also the welcome ready for the Russians on the part of the population of India, were then duly announced, and have always formed key-notes in the cry of alarm.

It is not as if we had money to throw away. If our military preparations were complete, it would be another thing. But the Indus at Attock is actually neither bridged nor tunnelled. Kohat is *en l'air*, for want of a bridge at Khoshulgurh. The army at the Khybur, if worsted, has no *point d'appui* to fall back upon. The communication with Kurrachee must be reckoned as perilously defective until the railway is unbroken between that place and Peshawur. Surely any funds we have to spare might better be devoted to the tardy réparation of these deficiencies than engulfed in the profitless abyss of Afghan revolutions. Surely, if we really desire to prove to Russia, Persia, and India the stability of our power,—for this is the only way to check encroachment, and give confidence to our subjects,—we should perfect our armaments before subsidising powerless allies, in terror of a phantom enemy. Exactly in proportion as we are in a state of preparation, will the Russians hesitate to begin the adventurous march over the 1,100 ill-watered miles between the Caspian and the Indus. Exactly in proportion as we are ready to land a force on the shores of Persia, will that unenterprising Power avert its eyes from the coveted fortress. But it is to play the game of these secret confederates, to divert to chimerical objects the resources which might be made to prove to them the hopelessness of their combinations.

Averse to the grant of any annual subsidy to Shere Ali Khan, I see no objection to giving him arms, or to rewarding any services he may render, liberally or even lavishly. But I fear that troubles may arise from imposing on him any general responsibility for the conduct of the tribes, or for the surrender of criminals. The bond between Cabul and the tribes is slender and brittle. The Muhsood Wazeerees for instance, never acknowledged any kind of allegiance until, when blockaded by us, they applied in vain to Dost Mahomed Khan for assistance. Yet, if it were formally understood that the Ameer was bound to restrain them, his inability to do so might then appear an inadmissible excuse. Each case should, I think, be dealt with separately. There are, probably, reasons with which I am not acquainted, for the delay in coming to an understanding with Russia about the independence of Herat, for the advantages of this are obvious. In the absence of any such arrangement, however, I confess that I am not of the general opinion, that, at whatever cost to ourselves, any attempt on this fortress should necessarily become a *casus belli*. It is true that Herat is a strong position, near a fertile plain, and has a great name in Asia. But it is 400 miles from Kandahar, and a force invading India would, if we are true to ourselves, soon learn that the days of Nadir Shah and the Abdali have passed away. If the Afghans were constantly defeated by Ranjit Singh, what have we to fear from hordes of Persians or Turkomans, even if they ever do come, which I regard as in the last degree improbable.

Similarly, I am against in any way binding ourselves to preserve Balkh and Koondooz in the Amir's possession. These are comparatively open countries on this side the Oxus, and might easily be occupied by a force from beyond it. We could not prevent this.

To conclude, I regret that I cannot regard Sir H. Rawlinson's proposals otherwise than as an untimely revival of the policy of 1838, which nearly ruined the empire, and the effects of which we have still to get over. They would again plunge us into the ever-shifting sands of Central Asian intrigue, at a cost which we cannot afford; again prematurely withdraw our troops from their own ground to isolated positions, and again unite against us, as suspected invaders, all the wild passions of an irritated population which, unaroused against ourselves, may, at the proper time, be turned, as our best defence, against the common enemy. And though the result might not involve the same military disasters, it could not fail to embrace a similar retardation of all internal improvement, and a similar waste of the sinews of war.

27th December 1868.

(Signed) R. H. DAVIES.

Enclosure 10 in No. 14.

MINUTE by the Honourable Sir R. TEMPLE, dated 30th December 1868.

THERE is one passage in His Excellency Sir W. Mansfield's Minute, cited in the margin,* on which

* "I think it would be admitted by the Foreign Department of the Government of India, that when Sir R. Temple took office about this time last year, he found a great want of information, both practical and documentary, in the Office, as regards Cabul, the frontier tribes, and Central Asian questions.

"I have reason to believe that the Quartermaster-General was then much consulted by the Foreign Secretary, because no one in his office had any real knowledge of these most important matters, and because there existed no means of informing the Foreign Secretary."—Page 8.

I would say a few words. I am apprehensive that the passage, without explanation, might seem to others to imply avoidable deficiencies in the Foreign Office of the Government of India. Doubtless, it may have been far from his Excellency's intention to imply this.

Still I should wish to append my explanation.

It is very true, as mentioned by his Excellency, that I used to have long conversations with the Quartermaster-General, Colonel Peter Lumsden, on Central Asian subjects. That Officer and I were both old Punjabees, with many associations in common. He is an accomplished Officer, with special knowledge of Affghanistan, Thibet, and the countries beyond them. Moreover, in matters which were much connected with military communications, the Quartermaster-General was an authority with whom the Foreign Secretary would naturally confer. I acknowledge with pleasure the instruction I derived from my conversations with Colonel Lumsden.

On the other hand, there was as much information as could fairly be expected in the Foreign Office at Calcutta. As regards Affghanistan, the late Under Secretary, Mr. J. Wyllie, had earned a name even in England by his writings on the most recent history of the Affghans. The thread of the story was carefully taken up by Mr. Wynne, his successor. Moreover, I should say that Mr. Wynne had made the topography and recent politics of the Trans-Oxus Provinces his particular study. The newest books and maps were at hand, and were practically attended to. The reports by Pundit Munphool and his staff, after their travels in Badakshan, Thibet, and Yarkand, were carefully collated. A special agency was employed in England to obtain the most recent information about the Russians in Central Asia, and to furnish translations of all articles in the Russian Press that might bear on these matters. No doubt I somewhat expanded this system of examining the Russian newspapers, but I found it in full work before I joined. Again, the report on the tribes on our Trans-Indus border, which I prepared some years ago in the Punjab, had been carefully brought up to date by my successors, and was at hand in the Foreign Office. There was a mass of Caubul diaries regularly furnished by our Native Agent there. There was information of Southern Affghanistan regularly transmitted by the Sindh authorities. On joining the Office, almost the first thing I had to do was to examine the proofs of an elaborate history of the affairs of the Foreign Department during the past four years by Mr. Assistant Secretary Talboys Wheeler.

On the whole, I must testify that I received over the Foreign Office from my predecessors in excellent working order; though, of course, like every other Department, it may be improved more and more. Indeed, the collection of all the best publications, and the collation of the most recent and authentic information about the countries beyond the limits of India, are matters demanding incessant vigilance in the Foreign Office.

R. TEMPLE.

Enclosure 11 in No. 14.

SUPPLEMENTARY MINUTE by Sir J. LAWRENCE, dated 31st December 1868.

TIME will scarcely permit my analysing in detail all the points which are raised in the Minute of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 24th instant. I feel bound, however, to express my dissent from some of Sir W. Mansfield's suggestions. But, in the first place, I think it right to say that I cannot admit that the Foreign Office of the Government of India has, at any time since I have been Governor General, been defective in regard to information in respect to Caubul, the frontier tribes, and Central Asian affairs. Perhaps I may be admitted to have had special opportunity of forming a correct opinion in this matter, inasmuch as I have retained the Foreign Department under my personal control since I became Governor General. And during all this period it has been my distinct impression, that the information the Department has possessed has been considerable in itself, and quite as accurate as the relative circumstance between British India and those countries and their people would admit. During the last five years, we have maintained a Native Agent at the Court of Caubul, whose reports have proved remarkably accurate; and we have had special Agents travelling in different parts of Central Asia, through whom we have obtained valuable information. The knowledge which has in this way been acquired has been digested and collated with special care by Mr. John Wyllie and Mr. C. Girdlestone, successively Under Secretaries of the Foreign Department, and by Mr. J. Talboys Wheeler, the Assistant Secretary. No doubt, in progress of time, we may hope that our relations with these countries will still further improve; but I believe that they are at present as good as circumstances will admit. And, until a change of this kind takes place, it seems to me vain to hope that any great improvement in the information which is procurable will occur.

In view to make my remarks as brief as is possible, I have made notes on the different suggestions of Sir W. Mansfield in parallel columns to his Excellency's remarks, copies of which should be sent to the Secretary of State.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.

31st December 1868.

Enclosure 12 in No. 14.

MINUTE by Sir W. R. MANSFIELD, Commander-in-Chief, dated 1st January 1869.

I AM afraid, from the remarks of his Excellency the Viceroy, in his Minute of the 31st December, that either some words of mine are open to misconstruction, or that an impression has been conveyed which was certainly not my intention.

Thus in my Minute of the 24th December, in the course of a somewhat long *exposé* of my views on the foreign policy of India, the necessity occurred for showing what seems to me to be an inconvenient and unusual mode of transacting the most important diplomatic business which comes under the notice of the Government. It appears to me that the existing system tends to the weakening of responsibility where it should be most clearly defined, and that a division of duties should take place, which have hitherto been united in the same functionaries. But it was certainly very far from my wish to

assail the administration of the Foreign Office, either directly or indirectly, and I do not think that I have done so.

It is my conviction that the vast experience of his Excellency the Viceroy has during the years of his administration generally covered the want of a more perfect diplomatic system with respect to the region which has called forth my remarks, and I must have often given expression to this opinion in conversation. So thorough and sincere is my respect for that great experience and for the administrative ability with which it has been applied, my knowledge of these qualities having extended from a date long antecedent to the time when I was first associated with his Excellency's Government, that I have always felt extreme distrust of my own opinion if it differed in even slight particulars from that of the Viceroy in the matter of foreign policy of India.

I believe I have generally had the happiness to concur with him on all foreign affairs of real importance, this being shown in his Excellency's marginal remarks on my Minute of the 24th December, for, as respects the essence of the matter of these papers, there is no difference between us, although on certain points of detail of the execution of a policy there is difference of degree, but not, I think, in substance.

But I venture to submit, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, that the extraordinary experience, the immense knowledge of detail, and the administrative ability distinguishing his Excellency, on which, at the close of his administration, I may be permitted to dwell with a hearty feeling of real admiration, form together a happy and, perhaps, an unexampled accident. We can but seldom expect to see all these conditions united in the person of the Governor-General of India.

It is on this very account that the necessity has occurred to me, with a force I am unable to describe, that for the political security and peace of this country and its development in a peaceful sense, the supervision of frontier affairs should be organised after the manner I have attempted to sketch, and that the Court of Caubul should, through a frontier Governor-General's agent, be brought into direct communication with the Governor-General in Council, independently of the Punjab Government.

When the Punjab was first annexed, we had a body of frontier officers, who were at the same time distinguished soldiers and accomplished frontier diplomatists. That body of officers, which had been formed and inspired by the late Sir Henry Lawrence and by his Excellency himself, may be appropriately called the "Lawrence School" for the management of the border and general appreciation of Caubul and foreign Asiatic affairs.

It is not too much to say that that especial school, which sprang from the events preceding the annexation and from the annexation itself of the Punjab, has almost died out. The officers of the present day are well nigh overwhelmed with revenue and judicial duties, with attention to codes and the execution of the law on the one hand, and to the material development of their districts and people on the other. Many of them are young, as cannot be helped, and I apprehend that all, as being under the yoke of regular administration, are unequal to the political management of the frontier, which might fairly demand all the energy and thought of men set apart for it.

Therefore it is that I think we do want a separate political or diplomatic agency which shall in some measure serve to reproduce a school such as that I have referred to. It would, in truth, be a part of the Foreign Office, which appears to be absolutely incomplete without it, just as it would be incomplete without Governor-General's agencies in Rajpootana and Central India.

For I am compelled here to submit that his Excellency's analogy with reference to those agencies is incomplete. It would only be correct if the Governor-General's agents in Rajpootana and Central India reported, through the Government of the North-Western Provinces, to the Government of India, instead of being in direct communication with the latter, a condition believed by me to be as necessary for the North-West Frontier as it is for Rajpootana.

Perhaps before I close this paper I may advert to certain facts which bear on the question as now stated.

Thus, I believe it may be asserted that hardly one Peshawur Commissioner has executed his office since the annexation who has not found the mixed political and administrative duties almost beyond his powers.

More assistance has been constantly called for by the successive Commissioners. I have talked with many officers intimately acquainted with the subject, some belonging to the Punjab Government, and some unconnected with it, but all possessing experience and speaking from personal knowledge, and I have never heard but one opinion, viz., that the daily growing demands of the administrative and judicial work have rendered it almost impossible to do justice to that other portion of their labours which immediately after annexation engrossed almost the whole time of the Peshawur Commissioner and his assistants, viz., frontier management.

It must not, therefore, be thought that I am imputing blame to any man or to any set of functionaries. I have merely indicated that, as could not be helped, the nominal system of 20 years ago does not meet the demands of the present time, and that while we attend to the administrative wants of our districts, we should take care that special duties, on the execution of which the questions of peace and war depend, should receive the particular study and attention they deserve, and should therefore not be postponed to other cares in the routine administration.

I am confident that the necessity of the change I advocate will make itself henceforth constantly more and more felt, till it is carried into execution. I only trust that it will not be delayed till calamity or a wasting war have followed on the want of it.

After this explanation of my views, Sir Richard Temple will doubtless believe that I have intended no improper reflection on the Foreign Office. But I may refer to my conversations with him in the early part of the expired year as the justification for my introduction of his name with reference to my remarks on the wants of the department he lately presided over, wants inherent to a political system hitherto exceptionally pursued in the Punjab Frontier as distinguished from other parts of India, and not to be attributed to personal direction.

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

1st January 1869.

No. 14A.

No. 27 of 1869.

Government of India, Foreign Department.

Political.

To His Grace the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Fort William, the 19th January 1869.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a correspondence, from which it will be seen that we have granted further supplies of money and arms to His Highness the Ameer of Cabul.

2. We beg to draw the attention of your Grace to our letter dated the 9th instant, and to the khureeta of His Excellency the Viceroy to the Ameer of the same date, indicative of the policy which, after full deliberation, we have thought it desirable to define and pursue in consideration of the state of affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

MAYO.

W. R. MANSFIELD.

G. N. TAYLOR.

H. M. DURAND.

H. S. MAINE.

J. STRACHEY.

R. TEMPLE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14A.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st December, 1868.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR, Punjab.

The Viceroy wishes you at once to offer Shere Ali six lakhs of rupees, including the two already sanctioned.

The six lakhs should be a gift to help the Ameer in his need. Perhaps he will be able to draw on merchants at Cabul, who could be paid at Peshawur or Lahore.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14A.

TRANSLATION of a letter from AMEER SHERE ALI KHAN, of Cabul, to the Governor General, dated 12th Shaban, 1285 A.H.

MY grateful thanks are due to God (who has no equal), through whose favour the object of my heart has been attained, and the mind of your Excellency, as well as that of mine, have been made happy.

As the principles of friendship render it incumbent upon friends to communicate good accounts for the information of each other, I write this friendly letter, in which I beg to state that the British officers have much regard and friendship for this territory.

Such kindness on their part has laid me under great obligation, and has placed the affairs of this State on a firmer basis.

I hope that your Excellency, considering me as a sincere friend, will always gratify me with accounts of your good health. The act of pursuing such course will not be opposed to the rules of friendship.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14A.

TRANSLATION of a khureeta from His HIGHNESS AMEER SHERE ALI KHAN, of Cabul, to the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, dated 12th Shaban, 1285 A.H.

ALTHOUGH, from the friendly communications of His Excellency the Governor General of India and those of your Honour, as well as from the verbal representations of the British Envoy, I had learnt of the sincere desire (in a greater degree than before) of the British Government to see the foundations of my Government strengthened and the circumstances of my subjects (who had been the victims of lawless usurpers) improved, yet I deferred the settlement of all amicable relations and matters till such time as I should have a personal interview with His Excellency and your Honour; and I was preparing for the journey, when suddenly the hostile proceedings of Sardar Muhammad Azim Khan and Sardar Muhammad Abd-ul-Rahman Khan diverted my attention towards them, and rendered it necessary that I should chastise them. Wherefore my meeting with my friends was postponed.

I have now been informed that the British Government, acting in a most friendly spirit, and keeping in view certain important enterprizes which must be undertaken by my Government, have hastened the despatch of some money to me, and I am extremely obliged to the Government for this act of kindness. Whereas your Honour is well acquainted with the state of affairs of my country, and you are already aware that the agents of the usurpers forcibly realized the entire revenues, not only for the present year, but in some parts of the country those for the coming year also; and whereas the large number of my troops and dependants and followers is well known to you; should I now make further demands, such an act would be extremely oppressive on my subjects and calculated to ruin them; and, at the same time, if my troops and dependants are not paid, my Government would be weakened: therefore considering that the interests of the two Governments are identical, if the Government will, under these circumstances, with due regard to my requirements, help me with further remittances of money and arms, such assistance would not be opposed to the dictates of friendship, and would be attended with great advantage to my Government.

Enclosure 4 in No. 14A.

KHUREETA, dated 9th January 1869.

From the VICEROY and GOVERNOR GENERAL of INDIA to His HIGHNESS the AMEER
SHERE ALI KHAN of Cabul.

I HAVE received and carefully perused your Highness's letter, dated the 12th of Shaban 1285, and addressed to me.

I have also read your letter to His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab of the same date.

From an attentive perusal of these papers, as well as from a constant and careful observation of all the various events which have taken place in Affghanistan during the past few years, I am well acquainted with your Highness's present position and future prospects, and feel satisfied that your Highness desires that the friendship which has hitherto subsisted between you and the British Government should be maintained.

It is the earnest desire of the Government of India, as I have already intimated, to see your Highness's authority established on a basis of solidity and permanency, and to cement the bonds of friendship and alliance which ought to exist between the British power and your Highness as an independent Ruler.

You have been already apprized by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab that a sum of six lakhs of rupees has been placed at your unreserved disposal. For this, the British Government looks for no other return than abiding confidence, sincerity, and good-will.

I regret that obstacles of an insuperable nature should have prevented my meeting your Highness at some suitable place on the frontier of both kingdoms.

As a further proof of the desire of the British Government, which fears no aggression, and which wishes for no conquest, to see a strong, a just, and a merciful government established by your Highness at Cabul and throughout Affghanistan, I have to inform you that, in the course of the next three months, three sums of two lakhs of rupees each, or, in all, of six lakhs more, will be placed at your entire control, to be applied by

your Highness in the manner which you may think most conducive to the furtherance of your interests and to the consolidation of your authority.

For this, again, the Government of India will expect no return save one of the kind just indicated in the preceding part of this letter.

I am leaving the country almost immediately, and am handing over the high office of Viceroy and Governor General to my successor.

But the policy which I have advisedly pursued with regard to the affairs of Afghanistan is one which I have entered on with anxious deliberation, and which has commanded the assent and approval of Her Majesty the Queen of England; and as long as you continue, by your actions, to evince a real desire for the alliance of the British Government, you have nothing to apprehend in the way of a change of policy, or of our interference in the internal affairs and administration of your kingdom.

It will remain for the head of the administration to consider, in each succeeding year, what further proofs may be given of our desire to see your power consolidated, and what amount of practical assistance, in the shape of money or materials of war, may periodically be made over to your Highness as a testimony of our good will, and to the furtherance of your legitimate authority and influence.

But be assured that you will never err in shaping your course with a view to British alliance, and in considering Her Majesty the Queen of England and her Viceroy in India as your best and truest friends.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.

No. 15.

No. 78 of 1869.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Political.

To His Grace the DUKE of ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Fort William, 13th March 1869.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers relating to the meeting between His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General and the Ameer Shere Ali Khan of Cabul, which it is proposed shall take place at Umballa towards the end of this month.

We have, &c.

(Signed) MAYO.
H. M. DURAND.
H. S. MAINE.
J. STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

TELEGRAM, dated 10th February 1869.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR GENERAL of INDIA to LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR, Punjab.

PROPOSE to Shere Ali to meet me at Umballa about the 25th of March, or not later than 1st of April.

He will be received with all honour at all our stations, and every facility will be afforded by the officers of Government for his journey to Umballa and back.

Enclosure 2 in No. 15.

No. 127-51, dated 16th February 1869.

From T. H. THORNTON, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to Government, Punjab, to W. S. SETON-KARR, Esq., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

UNDER instructions conveyed demi-officially by His Excellency the Viceroy, our Agent at Cabul was desired to ascertain from the Ameer his wishes in regard to an interview with His Excellency.

2. I enclose a translation of the reply of the Agent dated 7th February.

3. His Honour presumes a final decision will be deferred until a reply has been received to the definite proposals contained in His Excellency's telegram of the 10th idem. It would appear from the present communication that the Ameer has contemplated a meeting at an earlier period than that proposed in His Excellency's telegram, and that, so far as he is concerned, he will be glad to have it held at as short a distance from the Affghan frontier as may be practicable.

Enclosure 3 in No. 15.

Dated 7th February 1869.

FROM ATA MUHAMMAD KHAN, British Vakeel at Cabul, to MAJOR F. R. POLLOCK, C.S.I.,
Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

I MENTIONED to the Ameer what you wrote on the subject of the proposed meeting between His Excellency the Governor General and the Ameer. His Highness replied that, although regarding all parts of the dominion of Her Majesty as his own house, he feels that he is honoured all the same wherever he may go to, far or near; but inasmuch as matters on the Turkistan border have to be settled, His Highness would have much rather wished that the meeting took place in the neighbourhood of Lahore or Delhi, so that he might return to Cabul quickly and attend to the settlement of his frontier affairs. But should His Excellency the Governor General be unable to come to Lahore or Delhi, His Highness is prepared to proceed even to Calcutta if necessary, for he considers the obtaining of a meeting with His Excellency to be more important than the settlement of his frontier affairs, the accomplishment of which latter object, too, depends on the friendly sympathy of the British Government.

It has been accordingly arranged that the advance tents shall be sent off on 26th Shawwal (9th February), and that the Ameer himself will start on the 10th. His Highness intends to be at Beet Khal, the first stage (D.V.), on the 11th, on his way from Cabul to Peshawur. I have stated the sentiments of the Ameer. It now rests with you to arrange for the meeting at such place and in such manner as you deem proper.

The Ameer, on perusing this petition, said that he would not be able to travel at night either by rail or carriage, but that he would travel only by day.

At present the Ameer intends to make 15 marches from Cabul to Peshawur. But the date on which His Highness shall reach Peshawur will be fixed on arrival at Jelalabad, and shall be duly communicated to you.

Enclosure 4 in No. 15.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from ATA MAHOMED KHAN, Khagwanee, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, dated 18th February 1869.

TO-DAY your Honour's letter dated 11th February 1869, regarding the interview between His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India and the Ameer Shere Ali Khan at Umballa, was received by undersigned at Gundamuk. It was in original submitted to the Ameer, who was extremely gratified and obliged by the consideration and kindness of the British Government. He intimated that he would arrive at Jellalabad the day after to-morrow, and, after two or three days' halt there, would set out for Peshawur by regular marches. He would fix the date of his arrival at Peshawur after reaching Jellalabad.

(Signed) ATA MAHOMED KHAN,
Khagwanee

Enclosure 5 in No. 15.

Telegram, dated 3rd March 1869.

From His Highness Ameer SHERE ALI KHAN, Peshawur, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Calcutta.

I HAVE this day arrived at Peshawur, and beg to make my acknowledgments for the honourable reception I have met with from the Commissioner and the General and other officers whom I had the pleasure of meeting.

Enclosure 6 in No. 15.

Telegram, dated 3rd March 1869.

From His Excellency the Viceroy, Calcutta, to His Highness Ameer SHERE ALI KHAN, Peshawur.

I CORDIALLY welcome your Highness to Her Majesty's territories, and wish you a prosperous and happy journey to our appointed place of meeting.

I am gratified that your Highness is pleased with your reception at Peshawur. You will receive from the British authorities, according to my desire, every honour and attention during your Highness's journey and stay in this country.

No. 16.

No. 98 of 1869.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Political.

To His Grace the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Fort William, 20th March 1869.

IN continuation of our letter, dated 13th instant, No. 78, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further papers relating to the visit of His Highness the Ameer of Cabul.

We have, &c.
(Signed) MAYO.
H. M. DURAND.
H. S. MAINE.
J. STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 16.

MEMORANDUM, dated 9th March 1869.

From T. H. THORNTON, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, to W. S. SETON-KARR, Esq., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

FORWARDS copy of Major Pollock's official Report of the Ameer of Cabul's entry into Peshawur.

DIARY (Extract).

The Ruler of Cabul, Ameer Shere Ali Khan, arrived at Peshawur on the 2nd instant, on his way down to Ambala, for an interview with His Excellency the Viceroy. His Highness was met at 7 a.m., within the mouth of the Khyber Pass, by Major Pollock,

C.S.I., Commissioner of Peshawur, and Brigadier-General D. M. Stewart, C.B., commanding Peshawur Brigade, and a large party of gentlemen, accompanied by a guard of honour of the XIX. Bengal Lancers.

After a hearty welcome to British territory,—a welcome which at once put His Highness at his ease,—he was escorted by the British officials to his camp at Burj Hurri Singh. On arrival at Jamrood a royal salute was fired as His Highness passed within the British border. Another salute was fired as His Highness dismounted at his camp, where he was received, with full military honours, by a guard composed of Her Majesty's Regiment and the XIX. Bengal Lancers.

The Commissioner, Major Pollock, C.S.I., and the Deputy Commissioner, Captain Waterfield, attended His Highness in camp during the day.

Enclosure 2 in No. 16.

From T. H. THORNTON, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab (demi-official) to W. S. SETON-KARR, Esq., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 12th March 1869.

I FORWARD herewith a copy of Major Pollock's Report of the proceedings of His Highness the Ameer on the 6th, 7th, and 8th instant, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy.

Ameer SHERE ALI KHAN at Peshawur.

On the 6th instant, the Commissioner, Major Pollock, C.S.I., paid a visit to the Ameer. His Highness, during the interview, mentioned having received His Excellency the Viceroy's reply to his telegram of the 3rd instant, and expressed his heartfelt gratification at the cordial welcome to Her Majesty's territories given him by His Excellency the Viceroy, and said he hoped the friendship between the two Governments would now be firm and lasting. In the evening His Highness drove out in an open carriage, attended by Colonel C. Chamberlain, C.B., 23rd Pioneers, and Dr. H. W. Bellew, civil surgeon, whose attendance His Highness specially requested. His Highness drove through cantonments along the mall, and visited Her Majesty's 36th Regiment in the barracks. Colonel McMahon, C.B., received His Highness, and conducted him through the barracks, sergeant's mess, reading-rooms, &c. His Highness minutely inspected the men's kits and arms, and spent some time in the reading-room and listening to the band. On re-entering his carriage the men of Her Majesty's 36th Regiment gave His Highness three good British cheers. His Highness expressed his high appreciation of the compliment, and thanked Colonel McMahon for his polite attentions. His Highness observed that he had now seen the British soldier visited unawares in his barrack. "Nothing," His Highness said, "could exceed the order, cleanliness, and comfort in which I have found them." His Highness was struck with the magnificence of the new barracks, and remarked—"They are far more magnificent and luxurious than any building in my kingdom, not excepting my own Palace."

On the 7th instant, Sunday, His Highness drove out in the evening, attended by Dr. Bellew, civil surgeon, in an open carriage. He passed through cantonments, along the mall, and returned to his residence at sunset. His Highness conversed a good deal on the affairs of his own kingdom, and lamented the ignorance and stubbornness of his own people, and attributed all their deficiencies to the absence of wealth from the country.

On the 8th instant, His Highness visited the photographic studio of Mr. Baker. He was attended by the Commissioner, Major Pollock, C.S.I., and the civil surgeon, Dr. Bellew. His Highness and his son, Sirdar Abdoolla Jan, were photographed singly, and then in a group with some of their attendant court officials. His Highness took a great interest in the process, and minutely examined all its details. He observed that our ingenuity had reached the highest point of perfection. "In fact," observed His Highness, "all people are advancing in the arts of peace and civilization. It is only we Affghans who remain the ignorant asses we have always been."

On being escorted back to his residence, His Highness was shown a portion of the Atlantic submarine cable. On its mechanism and uses being explained to him, he

expressed great astonishment, and could hardly credit the possibility of a message being sent from Peshawur to London within 24 hours. In the course of a general conversation, His Highness stated that coal was known to exist in the Sohgar valley, but the people were too ignorant and unsettled to make any use of it. In Toorkistan, he stated, the Russians worked mines of it. His Highness, on another occasion, referred to the thorough subservience of Persia to Russia, and observed that the British influence in that country was quite powerless against that of Russia. His Highness and all his suite being dressed in the costume of the people of Herat, and not in that of the Affghans, gave rise to comment on the part of the native residents of Peshawur. His Highness explained that he had adopted this costume ever since he succeeded to the throne of Cabul, as being one more suited to a military life than the cumbrous robes and head-dresses of the Affghans.

In the evening, attended by Colonel Chamberlain and Captain Upperton, His Highness drove out in an open carriage, and visited the Peshawur Museum.

(Signed) F. R. POLLOCK, Major,
Commander, and Superintendent.

No. 17.

No. A1.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Political.

To his Grace the DUKE of ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Dated, Camp, Umballa, 3rd April 1869.

WE have the honour to transmit papers relative to the meeting between His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council and His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan of Cabul, which has taken place, as proposed, in this station, and further to submit a brief narrative of the events of the past few days.

2. The Viceroy, accompanied by the members of his Government, and by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, arrived at Umballa on the morning of Saturday the 27th, and arrangements had been previously made for the reception of the Ameer in open Durbar on the evening of the same day.

3. For the proceedings which took place at the reception of the Ameer, and also for those of the visit paid by his Excellency in Council to the Ameer in return, we beg to refer your Grace to the Gazettes Extraordinary, published for both these occasions, copies of which we enclose.

4. On the afternoon of Monday, March the 29th, the return visit having taken place that morning, the Viceroy accorded a private interview to his Highness, who was attended by his most confidential and trusted adviser, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah. There were present also at this interview, his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, the Foreign Secretary, and Captain Grey, who acted as interpreter. After free and unreserved discussion between his Excellency the Viceroy and his Highness the Ameer on important matters relating to the affairs of Affghanistan and to the visit of his Highness; it was arranged that a letter should be addressed to his Highness expressive of the sentiments of the Government of India in respect to the matters under discussion. At a meeting of His Excellency's Council, which was held on the next day, Tuesday, March the 30th, the whole subject was very fully discussed in Council, and the form and contents of the letter, a copy of which is enclosed, was agreed to.

5. The letter was very carefully translated into the Persian language, and was presented to the Ameer by our Foreign Secretary, who was deputed to his Highness for that purpose.

6. A reply to the same has been received from the Ameer expressive of the satisfaction and thanks of his Highness at the kindness and friendship evinced by the British Government. A translation of this reply is also appended.

7. Two interviews have taken place between the confidential adviser of His Highness Syud Noor Mahomed Shah and our Foreign Secretary. At these interviews various matters of importance were fully discussed, and the means whereby trade with Affghanistan could be encouraged, and additional measures for securing the peace of the frontier could

be promoted, were carefully considered. An opportunity was also taken, at the same time, to inform the Minister, in the clearest and most explicit terms, that the British Government would always abstain from any direct interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and that under no circumstances could British troops or British officers be employed across the frontier in quelling civil contentions or domestic strife.

8. We have every reason to hope that the visit of his Highness and the communications which have taken place will be productive of the happiest results. It has assured his Highness that the policy which was adopted by his Lordship's predecessor, on the Ameer's regaining the throne of Cabul in August last, will be continued. It will show to the world that we have in the Ruler of Afghanistan a faithful ally, and that while the British Government has no desire of aggrandisement and extension of territory, it will still use all its influence to support neighbouring princes and rulers who are earnestly endeavouring to create by their own exertions a strong, independent, and friendly government.

We have, &c.
(Signed) MAYO.
W. R. MANSFIELD.
H. M. DURAND.
H. W. ELLIS.

Enclosure I in No. 17.

The GAZETTE of INDIA, Extraordinary, published by Authority.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Camp, Umballa, 31st March 1869.

At 5 p.m. on Saturday, March the 27th, 1869, his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General held a Public Durbar at Umballa, in honour of his Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan. The Durbar was attended by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the Honourable the Members of Council, his Excellency Lord Napier of Magdala, Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, the Maharaja of Puttiala, the Rajas of Jheend, Nabha, and Kuppooorthulla, the Nawab of Maleir Kotla, the Chief Sirdars and attendants of his Highness the Ameer, the General Commanding the Sirhind Division, the Officers attached to the Army Head Quarters, the Secretaries and Under-Secretaries to the Government of India, the Secretaries to the Government of the Punjab, and by a large number of other official and non-official gentlemen present at Umballa.

Raised seats were reserved for, and occupied by ladies, on both sides of the Durbar Tent. With the exception of the high officials entitled to salutes, the British officials and the Native chiefs were all seated by 4.30 p.m.

His Highness the Ameer, together with his son Abdoollah Jan, his chief Sirdars, and the British officers attached to the suite of his Highness, were escorted from his Highness's place of residence by a deputation consisting of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, the Secretary and Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department, the Agent to the Lieutenant-Governor for the Cis-Sutlej States, the General Commanding the Sirhind Division, and the Private Secretary and the Aides-de-Camp to his Excellency the Viceroy.

His Highness was received at the entrance of the Durbar Tent by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, attended by the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Members of Council, and he was conducted to the dais by his Excellency. Before taking their seats, his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General addressed his Highness the Ameer in the following terms:

"In the name of Her most Gracious Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and Sovereign of India, I bid you a hearty welcome, and express to you the sincere gratification that it gives me to receive your Highness as the guest of the Queen.

"I trust that this visit may be the commencement of many years of amity between Her Majesty and yourself, and of mutual confidence and goodwill between the nations which Her Majesty rules in India, and all the subjects of your Highness."

After a conversation of about fifteen minutes duration, fifty-one trays of presents were brought into the Durbar Tent for his Highness the Ameer; twenty-one trays for his Highness' son; and five trays for each of his Highness' six principal Sirdars. Six horses were also led to the entrance of the Tent for the acceptance of his Highness.

When all the presents had been duly laid before the throne, his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General placed a sword of honour in his Highness' hands, prefacing the gift with these words:

"I present you with this sword as a token of my desire that you may ever be victorious over your enemies, in defence of your just and lawful rights, and in all your efforts for the consolidation of your kingdom."

At the close of the Durbar his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General conducted his Highness the Ameer to the entrance of the Durbar Tent, and there took leave of him. His Highness and his suite were then escorted to his Highness' residence by the same deputation and with the same

formalities as were observed on the occasion of bringing his Highness to the Durbar. The body-guard of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General formed the escort to his Highness the Ameer in his progress to and from the Durbar Tent.

A Royal salute was fired as his Excellency the Viceroy entered the Durbar, and as he quitted it. The road from the house of his Highness to the barriers of the Viceregal camp was lined with cavalry. The main street of the Viceregal camp was lined with infantry, and a guard of honour was drawn up in front of the Durbar Tent. The troops saluted his Highness the Ameer as he passed. A Royal salute was fired both on the arrival and on the departure of his Highness.

The usual salutes were fired on the arrival and on the departure of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief; and the troops presented arms.

The chiefs present at the Durbar were honoured with the salutes due to their ranks.

The actual proceedings commenced at 5 o'clock and terminated at 5.45.

By order of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

W. S. SETON-KARR,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 2 in No. 17.

The GAZETTE of INDIA, Extraordinary, published by Authority.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Camp, Umballa, the 31st March 1869.

His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan held a Durbar at 8 a.m., on Monday, 29th March 1869, in his own camp, for the reception of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

All the officers of Government, both civil and military, who attended the Durbar of Saturday the 27th of March, were present on this occasion also, but owing to the limited accommodation available in his Highness' tents ladies and non-official gentlemen could not be invited.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General was escorted to the Durbar by Sirdar Abdoollah Jan, the son of the Ameer, and by his Highness' two principal Ministers, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, and Shahghassi Shere dil Khan. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Lord Napier of Magdala, the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and the personal staff of his Excellency likewise accompanied the Viceroy.

The Viceroy and Governor-General was met at the entrance of the Durbar Tent by the Ameer, and by the British officers attached to his Highness' suite, and was conducted by his Highness to the dais. His Excellency took his seat on the right hand of the Ameer, and on the left hand of his Highness was his son Abdoollah Jan. At the close of the interview his Highness, in complimentary language, presented his Excellency with his own sword.

When the conversation was over his Highness led his Excellency to the entrance of the tent, and there took leave of him. His Excellency was then escorted to his own camp with the same formalities, and by the same British officers who had accompanied him to the Durbar.

The same ceremonies were observed with regard to the array of troops the presenting of arms, and the firing of salutes to those entitled to these honours, as were observed in the Durbar of Saturday.

The proceedings closed at 8.30 a.m.

By order of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India,

W. S. SETON-KARR,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 3 in No. 17.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness Ameer
SHERE ALI KHAN, Wali of Cabul and its Dependencies.

Dated, Camp, Umballa, 31st March 1869.

As your Highness did me the honour to intimate that some further expression of the sentiments of the British Government in regard to your present visit and to the affairs of Afghanistan, would be acceptable, it is with much pleasure and satisfaction that I accede to your Highness' wishes in the following communication.

I am most desirous of expressing to you the sincere gratification which the visit of your Highness has afforded to me and to all the members of my Government.

I regard this visit as a mark of the confidence reposed by your Highness in the Government of the Queen, which will ever be remembered. I earnestly trust that on your Highness' return to your own country you may be enabled speedily to establish your legitimate rule over your entire kingdom; to consolidate your power; to create a firm and a merciful administration in every province of Afghanistan; to promote the interests of commerce; and to secure peace and tranquillity within all your borders.

Although, as already intimated to you, the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between that Government and your Highness have lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as Ruler of Cabul and rekindle civil war, and it will further endeavour, from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require

to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor.

It is my wish, therefore, that your Highness should communicate frequently and freely with the Government of India and its officers on all subjects of public interest, and I can assure your Highness that any representation which you may make will always be treated with consideration and respect.

By these means, and by the exercise of mutual confidence, I entertain well-grounded hopes that the most friendly relations between the British Government and that of your Highness may ever be maintained to the advantage of the subjects both of Her Majesty the Queen and of your Highness.

That your Highness may long enjoy health and strength sufficient to enable you to perform the arduous duties of your exalted station is the sincere wish of your friend.

(Signed) MAYO.

True Copy,

W. S. SETON-KARR,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 4 in No. 17.

From Ameer SHERE ALI KHAN of Cabool to his Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA.

AFTER expressing the earnest desire I have of seeing your Excellency, I beg to begin to write the subject of my letter. Your Excellency's friendly letter of the 31st March 1869, corresponding with the 17th Zelhej 1285, Hidjree, reached me at Umballa and strengthened the buildings of friendship of my Government (which has been given to me by God), and that of the powerful British Government. When our hearts are thus rendered clear as mirrors, and are reflecting light to all, how is it possible that the dust of ill-will may ever darken those mirrors (hearts) !

If it please God, as long as I am alive, or as long as my Government exists, the foundation of friendship and goodwill between this and the powerful British Government will not be weakened.

I strongly hope that the British Government will always do good and be kind to me, and keep me under its protection.

In conclusion, I beg to offer my friendly thanks to your Excellency.

I hope your Excellency will consider me a well wisher and a friend of yours, and gratify me with accounts of your health.

Allow me, &c.

Dated, Umballa, the 20th of Zelhej 1285 Hidjree,
corresponding with the 3rd April 1869.

(Signed) AMEER SHERE ALI.

No. 18.

Secret, No. 6.

To the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA.

MY LORD,

India Office, London, 14th May 1869.

1. I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Foreign (Political) despatch of the 3rd of April 1869 (No. A. 1.) with its enclosures, giving a full account of the conduct and the result of the meetings between your Excellency and the Ameer of Cabul on the 27th and 29th of March.

2. It gives Her Majesty's Government much satisfaction to be assured that your Excellency explained verbally but fully to the Ameer upon those occasions that "under no circumstances could British troops or British officers be employed across the frontier in quelling civil contentions or domestic strife."

3. It is not, however, without some concern that I observe the expressions used in certain paragraphs of your Excellency's letter to the Ameer, which, in so far as they stand alone and apart from the verbal explanations I have referred to, may some day be construed by the Ameer or by his successors, as meaning more than, with those explanations, they were intended to convey.

4. Under these circumstances I have to inform your Excellency of the views of Her Majesty's Government on the relations which it is desirable to establish with the Ruler of Afghanistan, and on the spirit in which any future communications with him ought to be conceived.

5. Her Majesty's Government agree with the late Viceroy of India, Lord Lawrence, that it is for the interest of our Indian Empire that there should be a strong and settled Government in Afghanistan, such as may promote commerce with us and protect the people of that country from the evils of civil war. For the purpose of promoting the

establishment of such a government it may be wise from time to time to assist with money or with arms any existing Ruler of Afghanistan whose character and position appear to afford the best hope of establishing a prosperous and peaceful rule. But Her Majesty's Government desire that the discretion of the Indian Government, under direction from the Government at home, should be kept absolutely free as to the occasions on which, and as to all the circumstances under which, such assistance should be given or withheld. It ought to depend not only upon the conduct of the Ruler of Afghanistan in his relations with the Government of India, but to some extent also upon his conduct in his relations with his own people. Her Majesty's Government indeed do not desire to exercise any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, nor can they pretend to pass judgment on the ordinary conduct of its affairs. But there are possible conditions under which it would not be for the credit of the British Government to support the Ameer either by money or by arms. If he succeeds in establishing a government, which is strong but notoriously cruel and oppressive, Her Majesty's Government ought to be free to withhold all assistance from him.

6. Although I do not construe the letter which your Excellency has addressed to the Ameer as depriving the Government of this free discretion, there are some expressions used which may occasion some embarrassment. The promise to view with extreme displeasure any attempts to rebel against the Ameer is not qualified by any reference to our right to form any opinion whether the Ameer may or may not have brought such rebellion justly upon himself. Again, the expression "rightful rule" may be construed to pledge the Government of India to an acknowledgment of his *de jure* sovereignty respecting which Her Majesty's Government would desire to be kept absolutely free.

7. It may be true as the Ameer argued that the avowal of a policy on our part having reference solely to *de facto* possession would not operate in itself as any discouragement of insurrection or of civil wars; but no such avowal is required or proposed. It is sufficient if the hands of the Government of India are left free to deal with future contingencies as they may arise. But for this purpose it is necessary to avoid the use of any language which is liable to be misunderstood.

8. For these reasons, Her Majesty's Government would desire that, as future occasions of communicating with the Ameer will certainly occur, your Excellency should make use of any opportunity which may arise of explaining more fully in writing the warnings which you have already verbally given against any expectation on his part of armed intervention; and also that your Excellency should make it clear to him that the money now or hereafter to be given is solely for the purpose of establishing a just and merciful as well as a strong government in Afghanistan, and that the continuance of our support must always depend upon the pleasure of the Government of India, and on its approval of the Ameer's conduct, not only towards us, but also in so far as we may have the means of judging towards his own people.

9. Your Excellency will understand that Her Majesty's Government do not desire that you should immediately follow up the letter already sent by another, since such a proceeding might appear like a change of policy and like a retraction of assurances already given. Her Majesty's Government only desire that, as natural opportunities may arise for further communications with the Ameer, your Excellency should govern the language you may address to him by the views of policy explained in this despatch.

I have &c.

(Signed) ARGYLL.

No. 19

No. 213.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Political.—Secret.

To His Grace the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Dated Simla, 1st July 1869.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Grace's secret despatch of the 14th May last, in reference to the meeting between the Viceroy and the Ameer of

Cabul which took place at Umballa in the month of March last, and containing some observations on certain expressions used in the letter which the Viceroy on that occasion addressed to His Highness.

2. We are glad to find that the general tenor of the policy which we pursued on that occasion has commanded Your Grace's approval, but we think it incumbent on us respectfully to offer some remarks on those portions of the despatch which express "apprehension" and "concern" in respect to some words used by the Viceroy in his letter to the Ameer.

3. We regret that Your Grace should have apprehended that a peculiar signification and meaning may be attached to the words "severe displeasure" and "rightful rule," used in the letter to the Ameer of Cabul, which, in our opinion they do not bear, which they certainly were never by us meant to bear, and which we are convinced that the Ameer quite understood that they did not bear.

4. We entirely agree with the principles laid down in Your Grace's despatch, *i.e.*, "that it is for the interest of our Indian Empire that there should be a strong and settled government in Affghanistan, such as may promote commerce with us and protect the people of the country from the evils of civil war; that the discretion of the Indian Government should be kept absolutely free as to the occasions on which such assistance should be given or withheld;" that further, we should abstain from exercising "any interference in the internal affairs of Affghanistan," and give no pledge which would lead the Ameer to believe that we should ever countenance or support a notoriously cruel and oppressive government.

5. All this we shall show was fully considered and agreed to by us, as soon as the meeting was determined on, was steadily kept in view, and strictly adhered to in every thing that took place at Umballa.

6. That it was laid down beforehand is shown by the demi-official communications addressed to Your Grace by the Viceroy early in March before he left Calcutta.

7. The Viceroy informed Your Grace that no one could be more impressed than he was with the necessity for abstinence, on the part of the Government of India, from interference in Asian politics; that whether it be in the central portions of the continent or elsewhere, our policy should be to keep on friendly terms with all our neighbours, to encourage them in any efforts they might make for the development and security of trade, but to let them know that if they chose to quarrel (which they are always ready to do) they must fight it out without any assistance from us, that the impolicy of having anything to do directly with these people was shown by the manner in which the existence of the lines of our telegraph along the coast of Beloochistan and Mekran had brought us into immediate connection with the disputes between Persia and the tribes in that district; that with regard to the approaching interview with the Ameer, the Viceroy's intention was to avoid any engagement of a permanent character opposed as he was to treaties and subsidies; that it was impossible to discuss the matter until we knew what the Ameer was going to say; that his Highness's visit would, he believed, do much good, showing him that we had no other wish than to see a strong government in Afghanistan; that we had no thought of interfering with him in any way; that we wanted no resident at Cabul, or political influence in his kingdom; while, at the same time, it would impress the people of India generally with the idea that we had a faithful ally in Affghanistan.

8. The object of the Viceroy, therefore, in agreeing to Shere Ali's request for a meeting was to show to him and to the world that we desired to establish with him a friendly and faithful alliance; to encourage him in his efforts to create a thoroughly independent kingdom and a just and merciful government; to acknowledge him as the rightful ruler of Cabul, not only as having inherited his throne by his father's will, made public in the lifetime of Dost Mahomed, but as the "de facto" sovereign of the country.

9. But the objects of the Ameer in coming to Umballa went far beyond this. It was evident from his communications with the Viceroy, the conversations of the Foreign Secretary with his minister, and the paragraphs which he suggested for insertion in the

letter to be addressed to him (as per margin) that he desired a treaty supplementary to that made with his father in 1857 (which he termed one-sided) and which would declare that we should be "the friend of his friends" and "the enemy of his enemies." He further desired that we should publicly declare that we

1st. Suggested paragraph.

"That, as now the Queen was the friend of the Ameer and his descendants and the enemy of his enemies and theirs, and would always be so, therefore, from time to time such measures as his welfare might require should be adopted for the objects conveyed in the Governor General's letter.

2nd. "That the bonds of friendship between the Ameer and his descendants and the British being now drawn much closer than heretofore, and as for the future the Government neither does nor will acknowledge any friend in the whole of Afghanistan save the Ameer and his descendants, therefore from time to time, &c."

should never acknowledge "any friend in the whole of Affghanistan save the Ameer and his descendants," and he evidently expected a promise of a fixed subsidy.

10. But this was not all.

11. He desired and asked that the British Government should not be the sole judge of when and how future assistance was to be given, but earnestly pressed that the words

* *Note*.—We subjoin the Persian words in the Roman character, and give their literal translation :

"Wa riez gah-ba gāhaz rui chuwān Tādābir Keh ba mukhtazai muslahat-i-wakt zarurat aftad, Koskish-o-masai barai hamin barni Kar Khwahad avard," i.e., "and also from time to time, by means of such expedients as fall in with the necessities of the counsels of the time it (the British Government) will make endeavours and efforts towards this direction," &c. &c.

in the Viceroy's letter "as circumstances may require,"* should be altered to "as his (the Ameer's) welfare might require."

12. Compliance with these desires was impossible, but it was necessary, by a straightforward and unmis-

takeable expression of opinion, to furnish the Ameer with some declaration (which without encouraging hopes that could not be fulfilled) would be of present use, truly describe our feelings and intentions towards him, and satisfy him that his journey and (to him) somewhat perilous absence from his kingdom, had not been made in vain.

13. This object was accomplished but not without difficulty.

14. A comparison of the principles laid down in Your Grace's letter of the 14th May with the action taken, and the opinions expressed at Umballa, will show how completely in accord those principles and those actions are. And although no instructions were received from the Home Government beyond a short general expression of desire contained in Your Grace's private letter to the Viceroy that he should "maintain that policy of reserve and of abstinence from interference which has been pursued by your predecessor," yet it can be shown not only that the communications made to the Ameer at the conference did not exceed former promises or extend in any way our liabilities, but that in effect they thoroughly defined and clearly explained the position we had determined to assume towards Affghanistan, and rather limited any engagement or liability it might be supposed that we had previously lain under as regards His Highness.

15. The first words which the Viceroy addressed to the Ameer at the conference of the 27th March were to express the firm desire of the British Government to see established at Cabul a *just*, strong, and independent Government; that we had no intention to deviate from the course which we had adopted since he had last regained his throne; that we wished to see him firmly established as ruler of Cabul, and that he should be able specially to establish tranquillity and good government in his territories.

16. The policy that we had endeavoured to establish may be termed an intermediate one, that is to say, that while we distinctly intimated to the Ameer that, under no circumstances, should a British soldier ever cross his frontier to assist him in coercing his rebellious subjects; that no European officers would be placed as residents in his cities; that no fixed subsidy or money allowance would be given for any named period; that no promise of assistance in other ways would be made; that no treaty would be entered into, obliging us under *every* circumstance to recognize him and his descendants rulers of Affghanistan, yet that we were prepared by the most open and absolute present recognition, and by every public evidence of friendly disposition, of respect for his character and interest in his fortunes, to give all the moral support in our power, and that in addition we were willing to assist him with money, arms, ammunition, native artificers, and in other ways, whenever we deemed it possible or desirable to do so.

17. In paragraph 8 of the official letter of the 3rd of April, we wrote as follows :—

"We have every reason to hope that the visit of his Highness, and the communications which have taken place will be productive of the happiest results. It has assured his Highness that the policy which was adopted by his Lordship's predecessor, on the Ameer's regaining the throne of Cabul in August last, will be continued. It will show to the world that we have, in the ruler of Affghanistan, a faithful ally, and that while the British Government has no desire of aggrandizement or extension of territory, it will still use all its influence to support neighbouring princes and rulers who are earnestly endeavouring to create by their own exertions a strong, independent, and friendly Government."

18. These references clearly show that not only was it our wish and policy, in the interest of our Indian empire "that there should be a strong and settled Government in Affghanistan," but that it should be such an one "as may promote commerce with us, and protect the people of the country from the evils of civil war."

19. They also show how completely free the Viceroy kept the hands of the Government of India "as to the occasions on which, and as to all the circumstances under

" which assistance (to the Ameer) should be given or withheld." For, besides what has been already said, the Viceroy informed your Grace that if at any future time we thought it to be our duty to assist his Highness, we should do it in any way which would neither entangle us in any engagements which might prove embarrassing nor weaken his independence.

20. The Ameer of Cabul fully understood that the British Government would assist him with money, now or hereafter, solely for the purpose of establishing a just and merciful, as well as a strong government in Affghanistan, and that the continuance of our support must always depend upon the pleasure of the Government of India, which principle is set forth, as far as it could be in a public document, in our letter to the Ameer, in which, as already quoted, we say :

" It (the British Government) will further endeavour from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require,* to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule," &c., &c.

* Or more literally, "as fall in with the necessities of the counsels of the time."

21. How thoroughly the Ameer understood this is shown in a Memorandum, marginally quoted, by Captain Grey, the Persian interpreter at the conferences, whose communications with the Ameer and his minister were of a most confidential character.

" I am quite satisfied that both the Ameer and his minister are deeply impressed with the importance to their Government of securing the favorable opinion of our Government and the British Public in respect of the justice and liberality of their administration by exerting themselves to the utmost for the material improvement of the country and increase of trade, and amelioration of the condition and conciliation of the people.

" As an abstract point the Ameer could fully understand, without demonstration, that in the present exhausted condition of the country and decline of trade, his interest lay in removing, as far as his necessities permitted, all burdens which would retard their recovery, and by a merciful and conciliating demeanour reconciling friend and foe to his administration and to compliance with such demands as the maintenance and consolidation of his administration rendered indispensable. Indeed the Ameer used the above as a strong argument in pointing out how much it was our interest by moderate assistance for a year or two. After which he could stand alone to enable him to allow the country breathing time and thus expedite its recovery of prosperity and attach all parties to his rule.

" These considerations, however, might not in themselves have sufficed to influence a man who, like most of his nation, is more likely to be governed by immediate expediency than to act on a far-sighted policy, but I am confident that his conviction of the necessity of securing our approbation and support by good and merciful government is so strong as to lead him to display generosity even towards political enemies, which is utterly opposed to Affghan ideas, and, as early as his financial difficulties will permit, to remove most restrictions and duties upon commerce, which is contrary to all traditions of Mussulman policy."

immediate wants, constant and friendly communication through our Commissioner at Peshawur, and our native agents in Affghanistan; he, on his part, undertaking to do all he can to maintain peace on our frontier, and to comply with all our wishes on matters connected with trade.

23. As regards the question of a grant of money to the Ameer it will be seen that the Viceroy was hardly prepared to go so far as Lord Lawrence in this particular respect.

24. In the letter of the 9th of January last from the Foreign Secretary to the Punjab Government, His Excellency in Council (Lord Lawrence) records his conviction "that the amount of money to be disbursed in the Ameer's favour should be a matter for periodical consideration year by year, and that in preference to regularly subsidising the Court of Cabul by a fixed sum, it will be expedient to make to it annual free grants of such sums of money as may be thought desirable by the Government of India, and may be justified by the necessities, the proved good intentions, and the whole circumstances in which the Ameer may in each year be placed."

25. We never at any time during the conferences contemplated giving the Ameer "annual grants" of money; nor of adding to the amount already given by the late Viceroy, unless an absolute necessity were found to exist, and unless it were quite clear that British interests would be thereby advanced.

26. In informing your Grace as to what assistance should be immediately given, the Viceroy said that as the Ameer had not yet received the second instalment of the 12 lacs promised by Sir John Lawrence, he did not think it desirable to give him any more money just at present.

27. On the night before he left Umballa, earnest entreaties were made to the Viceroy by many persons of authority, who had been in communication with the Ameer, that he

should promise at once a large addition to the subsidy. It was said, with great force and truth, "that Azim Khan had levied a year's revenue in advance; that the Ameer had therefore at once to raise another half year's taxes, which would cause much poverty and oppression; that the 60,000*l.* of Sir John Lawrence's allowance, not yet paid, was forestalled, and would have to be appropriated to the payment of his troops; that though the Ameer accepted the large present of arms and ammunition with gratitude, that he felt he was going back empty handed; that Yakoob and the Sirdars left behind at Cabul would laugh and say that he had gone on a fruitless errand; that immediate supplies were necessary for the commencement of the Turkistan campaign; and that the policy of support and countenance would not be believed in unless accompanied by a large gift of gold," &c.

In reply to these representations, the Viceroy said, viz., that he had made up his mind that he had his own reasons for the course he had adopted; and that he did not intend to add to the subsidy at present. These reasons were, that he wished to force the Ameer to spend the 60,000*l.* still due to him in paying his troops, and not on follies; that he wished to hear that he had done so before he considered the necessity of giving him any more money; that he was anxious to be sure that the policy adopted received your Grace's approval; and that he did not wish the world to think that the Ameer had gone back to Cabul a regular stipendiary of the British Government.

28. We now address ourselves to paragraph 6 of your Grace's letter of the 14th May, in which remarks are made on certain expressions used in our letter to the Ameer as those which "may occasion embarrassment," such being the promise "to view with severe displeasure" any attempts to rebel against the Ameer, without being qualified "by any reference to our right to form any opinion whether the Ameer may or may not have brought such rebellion justly upon himself."

29. Your Grace also appears to entertain the same opinion of the term "rightful rule," which you consider may be construed "to pledge the Government of India to an acknowledgment of his *de jure* sovereignty, respecting which Her Majesty's Government would desire to be kept absolutely free."

30. As regards the first point, we think it necessary to explain that the words "severe displeasure" (*etab-i-shadid*) or more literally in the Persian language, "strong or vehement displeasure," were most anxiously and most carefully considered by us in council, and were selected by three or four of our best Persian scholars, after much deliberation, as the only words that fully and adequately expressed our meaning and object, viz., that we should use every means in our power, short of those to which we have referred, to prevent Shere Ali's rivals from again entering the field against him, plunging the country into the horrors of civil war, and postponing the establishment of a strong and friendly rule. Our object was to comply, as far as possible, with the Ameer's request, and to furnish him with something to show that we took a warm and real interest in his attempts to subdue his rivals and establish his power.

31. There were no other words which occurred to us that were so suitable and so expressive of our feelings, and the Persian expression, * "haraina, een amūr moujib-
" i-etāb i shadid Sirkar Ingrazi
" Khwahad būd." as mentioned in the margin,* we have reason to believe, accurately and faithfully conveys their force.

32. They are strong, straight forward, and truthful. They convey a real and practical meaning; for we apprehend that we should not act as British honour and true policy demand, both as regards the Ameer and in the interests of humanity and justice, if in the event of any person, people, or power, endeavouring wantonly either by force or fraud to dethrone His Highness, to conquer his kingdom, or to re-kindle civil war in Afghanistan, we did not, as opportunities occurred, express "severe displeasure," if we thought that by such expression we could prevent internecine contention, and could avert from our ally and his subjects disaster, misery, and disgrace.

33. It would have been both ungenerous and imprudent on our part, on such an occasion, to have addressed His Highness in "uncertain sounds." The use of a less forcible expression would have misrepresented our intentions and feelings, and would probably have defeated all the objects of the conference.

34. And we know that, happily, British influence in the East is so paramount and so overwhelming that we do possess the power of securing (by various means short of armed intervention) to a faithful ally safety and peace.

35. With reference to the expression "rightful rule," we consider that under the circumstances no other term could have been so appropriately employed.

36. In the Persian translation the words used are “wa hukūmat-i-ra, keh istikāk ‘an ast, ba ādul o insāf jari darand,” which, literally translated, are “that you may exercise, with equity and justice, rule, *that right rule is.*”

37. Before the Dost's death, i.e., in September 1858, Lord Canning's Government recognised Shere Ali as heir apparent on the death of his elder brother, and by the advice of Lord Lawrence, then Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, it acknowledged the notification from the Dost with an expression of hope “that the new heir apparent would, under the tuition of his father, learn to conduct the Government with the same wisdom and success.” These papers were forwarded to your Grace's predecessor, and are to be found in the proceedings of the Foreign Office, Nos. 253-256, dated 1st October 1858.

38. On the death of the Dost, Shere Ali, as a matter of course, succeeded to the throne. There was some little delay, which was in part due to the illness and death of Lord Elgin, in formally recognising him as Ameer of Cabul; but at length, in December 1863, Sir William Denison, then acting as Viceroy, did notify the formal acknowledgment of the new ruler on the part of the Government of India.

39. Subsequently, in 1864, Shere Ali sent a Vakeel to Peshawur with several requests, one of which was “an expression of hope that the friendly alliance and moral support extended by the British Government to his late father, might be unreservedly continued to himself;” another, that his eldest son, Mahomed Ali, might be “henceforth styled in correspondence heir apparent (Wullee Ahud).”

40. Major James, the Commissioner, informed the Vakeel that, as regards the first point the Ameer would already have received that assurance from the Governor-General, instancing as facts the letters addressed to the Ameer by Sir W. Denison and by Lord, then Sir John, Lawrence, as well as the resistance to all attempts on the part of rival and ill-disposed Sirdars to enter into correspondence and be countenanced by our officers, &c., &c.

41. In a letter dated the 4th of May 1864, the Viceroy, Lord Lawrence, entirely approved of Major James' proceedings, and was pleased to accede to the Ameer's request that his eldest son should be styled “Wullee Ahud,” or heir apparent, in all future correspondence.

42. Again in March 1865, Lord Lawrence issued instructions to the Bombay Government with reference to some envoys, who had come down through the Bolan Pass from Ameer Khan of Candahar, a rival of Shere Ali, with letters and presents for the British authorities, that they were not to be received; that “our treaty engagements were with the Ameer, and the British Government could not consent to recognise in any way the independence of any of his relations, or to give any countenance to proceedings, having for their object the assertion and establishment of such independence;” the substance of which, the Under Secretary of the Foreign Department, in a Memorandum, dated 11th June 1866, states, was communicated to His Highness, in order that he might not have the slightest grounds for supposing that the British Government gave any encouragement to his enemies.

43. In 1868, when Shere Ali regained his throne, after nearly three years of civil war, Lord Lawrence wrote in a Minute, dated 25th November 1868:

“Latterly, when the Ameer Shere Ali had recovered his throne, and had apparently got the better of all his enemies, and was even welcomed back to Cabul by the very soldiers and people who had deserted him, the time seemed at length to have arrived when we might, with some show of reason, help him to render firm his recovered position, and to consolidate his power.”

44. Fortified by these proofs, we venture to think that in the words “rightful rule” we not only used a term which accurately described Shere Ali's present position as the inheritor of his throne in virtue of the provisions of his father's will, and as the present Ruler of Affghanistan, but that we acted in conformity with former proceedings of this Government in respect to His Highness.

45. One of the most urgent and prominent demands made by the Ameer at Umballa was that we should recognise and acknowledge not only himself but his lineal descendants against all comers and under all circumstances.

46. On every occasion that he brought the subject forward, the Viceroy declined to entertain it.

47. At the further conference that took place between his Excellency and the Ameer he (the Ameer) declared that it was his earnest wish that the Government of India should recognise and acknowledge not only himself but his lineal descendants, or successors in blood; and this phrase he repeated several times with great earnestness and emphasis. He explained again, and at some length, that merely to acknowledge the Ruler *pro tem.* and *de facto* was to invite competition for a throne, and excite the hopes of all sorts of candidates; that if the British Government would recognise him and his dynasty, there was nothing he would not do in order to evince his gratitude, and to comply with the wishes of the Indian Government in any particular, and support them with his means and his life, it being understood that the slightest failure on his part or his descendants should vitiate all engagements on ours.

48. The Viceroy, in reply, remarked that it was impossible to prophecy or to anticipate events; that we must deal with the present, and that His Highness could not expect him to enter into engagements as to a state of circumstances which might never occur.

49. It would have been impossible to have alluded to many of the foregoing topics in a public document without giving needless offence.

50. Had the Viceroy referred, in the letter addressed to His Highness, to the subject of armed intervention in Affghanistan, His Highness' subjects would have immediately concluded that this question had been discussed at Umballa.

51. Had he endeavoured to lay down in that letter an abstract principle with regard to "de facto" rule, it would have been taken as little short of an insult.

52. Had he intimated that our future support depended upon the Ameer's administering the affairs of his kingdom in a just and merciful manner, it would have been thought that we entertained suspicions that his rule was likely to be cruel and oppressive.

53. Had he referred in any way to a subsidy, it would have given colour to the prevalent opinion amongst Europeans and Orientals that we intended to make it permanent.

54. In addition to this, we considered that it was undesirable to engage in voluminous written communications with the Ameer. The visit was one of a personal character, conceived in the spirit of amity and good faith. We had previously determined that no formal treaty was to be entered into; and having made His Highness aware of our opinion in this respect, we could not with propriety have ventured on written suggestions to him on the foregoing points.

55. Such a course would have inevitably led to many difficulties, and as everything that we wished to communicate to His Highness was conveyed to him in a more suitable manner, it could have been attended with no useful result.

56. We now turn to another portion of Your Grace's despatch (paragraph 8.), and must express our opinion that there may be considerable difficulty in complying with the suggestions contained therein, and to submit for Your Grace's consideration that an immediate communication is not necessary, and could hardly be made without much risk.

57. A favourable occasion may not presently occur for making an important official communication to the Ameer.

58. Two recommendations are made by Your Grace; 1stly, that we should explain more fully in writing the warnings which we have already given; 2ndly, that now and hereafter the payments should be made solely for the purpose of establishing a just and merciful, as well as a strong Government in Affghanistan.

59. With regard to the first, the Ameer has been made fully aware that no armed

Note.—Our Foreign Secretary informed the Viceroy on the 3rd of April that "at the close of the interview he took the minister apart and clearly explained to him His Excellency's instructions that under no circumstances was the Ameer to expect that British troops would cross the border to put down civil war or domestic contention."

This intimation was repeated to the minister by the Foreign Secretary at a subsequent interview, and the minister's reply on both occasions was clear and satisfactory as to the Ameer's full understanding on this point.

intervention on our part for the purpose of suppressing rebellion ever was intended by us, or can be expected by him and his ministers.

60. Although this intimation was conveyed to His Highness in the clearest manner it was hardly necessary, for we were given to understand that he would decidedly object to any armed interference on our part. We also know that such is the present state of feeling in Affghanistan, that if it was supposed that the Ameer had asked for or acquiesced in the advance of a British force into his territory it would probably cost him his throne.

61. With regard to the second suggestion, we have to observe that such an intimation as is proposed might hold out a hope that we intend to continue the money grant as an annual one and to make it permanent. When the Ameer was at Umballa it was supposed that he would be obliged to enter upon an expensive and uncertain campaign in order to regain his province of Turkistan then in open revolt. This would have involved a large expenditure of money, and it was thought that it would possibly be desirable to add to the grant that he has already received. Happily, to all appearance, for the present at least, that danger had passed away, and the unhesitating submission of the chiefs of Turkistan, and the neighbouring districts of Badakshan and Koonduz render it probable that a great military movement to the north of the Hindoo Koosh will not now be undertaken by the Ameer.

62. It is expected, therefore, that the consideration of an additional grant of money may be postponed for the present, and we are not without hope that His Highness may be able to maintain his position and carry on his Government without any further assistance in money from us. This is, however, still exceedingly uncertain.

63. Every step that has been taken in this most important matter has been the subject of constant and anxious deliberation on our part, and on every point the most complete unanimity has prevailed in our counsels. From the 16th of March, when the Viceroy first wrote demi-officially to Your Grace, till now, the policy on which we had agreed has been rigidly adhered to, and, on a very critical occasion, fully and clearly explained to the Ameer.

64. On the whole, the Umballa conference, while it had the effect of impressing upon Shere Ali the friendly feelings we hold towards him, and the warm interest we take in his welfare, while it gave him, for the first time, a true view of our political greatness, our administrative strength, and our military power, it afforded us an opportunity of explaining, limiting, and defining, any intention, engagement, or liability, which may have been supposed to have existed on our part towards him.

65. The result is that while we, to all present appearances, have secured a powerful ally, our position with regard to the ruler of Afghanistan is now clearly laid down, and our engagements towards him have been limited and defined.

66. No one can foretell what the course of events in Central Asia may be. War in those regions is the normal state of the people. A single rash act on the part of the Ameer may again imperil his throne, and foreign intrigue, or some bold deed of arms on their own part, may render Azim Khan and his nephew or even other rivals again formidable.

67. But for the present civil war has ceased, and the man whose nominal rule extends from the Oxus to the Helmund, from Herat to the gates of Peshawur, has, while seated on the throne of his father, professed himself our true and faithful ally.

68. The effect of the meeting may be already traced. As Your Grace has been from time to time informed, Mahomed Ishak Khan, son of Azim Khan, has fled from Toorkistan and his army has dispersed. The news was sent to the Ameer, Shere Ali, signed and sealed by twenty-six of the leading Khans of Turkistan in token of their submission. The Meer of Badakshan, the connection and close ally of Azim Khan, has given in his adhesion without a blow, and has stated his wish to be considered the friend and dependant of the Ameer.

69. In fact the whole of Affghan Turkistan, the focus of discontent and rebellion, has been tranquillised without a struggle, and a perilous and bloody campaign has, we trust, been avoided.

70. The Ameer himself, from the moment of his return to his own country, has evinced the most fervent desire to comply with the wishes of the British Government as to the administration of his kingdom, so repeatedly conveyed to him at Umballa; he is endeavouring to establish a just, strong, and merciful rule. He has, against all Affghan precedent and doctrine, reconciled himself to many of his opponents, amongst others to Shah Nawaz Khan, son of Sooltan Ahmed Khan, who, it was reported at one time, was threatening Herat with a large force under Persian influence.

71. He has evinced a desire to carry out useful administrative and financial reforms in many parts of his kingdom, the accomplishment of which, should he not force them too quickly on his people, on which point we have repeatedly cautioned him, will go far to establish what we so much desire, a strong, just, and merciful Government in Afghanistan.

72. The effect of the Umballa meeting on the frontier tribes, combined with well planned and decided measures taken at the same time for the punishment of crime, has been equally favourable.

73. We cannot describe this with greater force than in the words of Lieutenant-Colonel Pollock, the able and experienced Commissioner of Peshawur, in an official letter dated 1st May 1869.

“ We have already seen, I venture to think, some excellent results from the Umballa meeting and the kingly reception of the Cabul Ruler. His Highness’ recovery without a struggle of Turkistan (Balkh), the flight across the Oxus of the Ex-Ameer Mahomed Azim’s son, Sirdar Mahomed Ishak Khan, and the submission of the Meer of Badakshan, have mainly if not entirely to be attributed to the news of the British alliance, and the manner of the reception of the Ameer reaching Cabul and Central Asia, while the orders issued by the Ameer to his officials in Koorrum and Khost in the matter under report, although not necessary to us in the accomplishment of our object, were clearly serviceable, both at the time, and as showing the neighbouring tribes that the two Governments would in future act in concert. Had our troops moved in the spring of 1868 instead of 1869, the then Ameer would have publicly addressed unmeaning replies to our letters, and privately have done all in his power to thwart us.”

74. In conclusion, we beg to assure Your Grace that on every point of present policy with regard to Affghanistan, we entirely agree with the opinion and principles laid down in your despatch of the 14th of May, and that we are prepared most heartily to carry into effect the instructions of Her Majesty’s Government as conveyed to us therein.

75. We venture to hope that, on reading the foregoing history of the course which the Government of India have taken in this matter from the moment of its recognition of Shere Ali in September last to the present time, you will come to the conclusion that its policy and its action have been prudent and consistent, and that its present effect has been to strengthen British power, to lay the foundation of a Government of justice and mercy in Affghanistan, and to promote the chances of peace throughout the States of Asia.

We have, &c.
(Signed) MAYO.
W. R. MANSFIELD.
H. M. DURAND.
H. S. MAINE.
J. STRACHEY.
B. H. ELLIS.

No. 20.

Secret, No. 8.

To the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA.

MY LORD,

India Office, London,
27th August 1869.

I HAVE read with much satisfaction your letter of the 1st July last, No. 213, explaining more fully the sense in which you have acted, spoken, and written in the affairs of Affghanistan.

2. These explanations are in all respects satisfactory to Her Majesty’s Government, inasmuch as they afford evidence that your policy cannot have been misunderstood by the Ameer, and that this policy is in accordance with “the opinions and principles laid down in my Despatch of the 14th May.”

3. In these circumstances, and in view of the satisfactory course which events appear to have taken in Affghanistan since the interview between Your Excellency and Shere Ali at Umballa, I do not desire that you should make any further communication to him on the subject of that interview, unless at any future time it should seem expedient to your Government to do so.

(Signed) ARGYLL.

No. 20A.

No. 33 of 1873.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To His Grace the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Fort William, 28th March 1873.

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Grace's secret despatch, No. 13, dated 7th February, communicating a copy of Prince Gortchakoff's despatch dated 19th–31st January 1873, in which the Russian Government intimate their acceptance of the Afghan boundary, as defined in Lord Granville's despatch to Lord Loftus, dated October 17th, 1872.

2. Enclosed is a copy of a letter* which we have caused to be addressed to the Punjab Government on the subject. Your Grace will perceive that we have not failed to counsel His Highness Ameer Shere Ali to persevere in the peaceful policy which, in accordance with the advice formerly given him by Lord Mayo, he has adopted and has enjoined the Governor of his Turkestan frontier to observe. So far as our advice and influence will avail we shall be ever ready to exert them for this end. We understand that the result of the late correspondence is that the Russian Government have agreed to co-operate with us in our endeavours to establish and maintain peace in Central Asia by impressing a similar policy on those States and tribes beyond the limits of Afghanistan which come within the sphere of Russian influence and control. Relying, therefore, on the friendly assurances again given by Prince Gortchakoff in his despatch of 19th–31st January 1873, that peace and tranquillity in Central Asia are the objects which Russia in common with England continues to pursue, we look with confidence to the fulfilment of the promises given by the Russian Government in 1869, to which we have so often referred in former despatches. We confidently expect that while on the one hand our good offices are exerted to dissuade the Ameer from aggression, Russia on the other hand will similarly use her good offices to restrain the States of Central Asia within her influence from transgressing their proper limits.

3. Prince Gortchakoff, as Your Grace is aware, assured Her Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty the Emperor considers extension of territory to be extension of weakness; and His Majesty has himself stated that there is no intention of extending the Russian dominions.

4. It is with much satisfaction then that we learn from the enclosures of your despatch No. 7, dated 17th January 1873, that in his recent mission to London, Count Schovaloff gave Her Majesty's Government the "most decided and positive assurances that not only " was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive " orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed " should be such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva." In our despatch No. 28, dated 26th May 1871, we addressed Your Grace on this subject, and we accept the renewed assurances given by Count Schovaloff as evidence that the policy of the Russian Government on this question has undergone no change, and that the Government of His Imperial Majesty will approve of no course of action calculated to revive the uneasiness in regard to Central Asian affairs which the frank and amicable discussions of the last three years have done so much to allay.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

NORTHBROOK.
 NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
 R. TEMPLE.
 B. W. ELLIS.
 ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
 E. C. BAYLEY.

Enclosure 3 in No. 20A.

No. 562 P, dated Fort William, 22nd March 1873.

FROM SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, Foreign Department, to SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of the PUNJAB.

UNDER the instructions of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, I have addressed you in a separate letter of yesterday's date, No. 534 P, on the subject of the settlement of the Seistan boundary.

2. His Excellency in Council is desirous to take advantage of the interview between the Ameer and Mr. Macnabb to make His Highness fully acquainted with the progress and conclusion of the communications which have taken place between the British Government and the Government of Russia on the subject of the extent of His Highness' dominions. His Highness has already received several letters from the Viceroy, in which his Excellency conveyed to him the assurances given by the Russian Government that they recognised as belonging to Afghanistan all the territories then in His Highness' possession. Assurances of the peaceful intentions of the Russian Government towards His Highness have been given to the Ameer by the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend. His Highness is also aware that ever since his meeting with the Viceroy at Umballa and the deputation of Mr. Forsyth to St. Petersburg the question how these assurances could best be given effect to has formed the subject of correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Russia.

3. His Excellency in Council has now to announce to His Highness that the Government of Russia has accepted the views of the British Government and engaged to recognise the Ameer's territories as they are described in Lord Granville's letter of 17th October 1872. I enclose, for communication to the Ameer, copies with Persian translations of the latest and most important portions of the correspondence on the subject. Having now received the official pledges of the Russian Government to recognise the Ameer's possessions, His Excellency in Council trusts that His Highness will be enabled to devote his undisturbed attention to the consolidation and improvement of his internal Government.

4. In accordance with the advice given to him by Lord Mayo, the Ameer has more than once expressed his determination to abstain from interference in the affairs of States and tribes beyond the borders of Afghanistan, and has issued stringent instructions to his frontier officers to commit no aggressions on neighbouring powers. Her Majesty's Government have therefore felt no hesitation in undertaking to use their influence to impress upon His Highness the importance of maintaining this peaceful attitude, and of allowing no considerations to tempt him to entertain any designs of conquest or aggression beyond the country described in Lord Granville's letter of 17th October 1872. The Russian Government have, as His Highness was informed in Lord Mayo's letter of 24th June 1870, undertaken on their part to use their best endeavours to restrain the States over which they have any influence from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory.

5. A translation of this letter is enclosed for delivery to the Ameer at the interview referred to in my separate letter regarding Seistan.

No. 21.

TELEGRAM No. 1,414 P., dated 27th June 1873.

FROM VICEROY, Simla, to SECRETARY OF STATE, London.

DESPATCH goes by next mail summing up Central Asian correspondence with Russia in conciliatory spirit, in accord with Gladstone's speech on Eastwick's motion.

We think it for interests of peace that Russia should know our relations with Afghanistan, and we say in paragraph 18: "Although we have abstained from entering into any treaty engagement to support the Ameer by British troops in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of

“ India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference. So long as the Ameer continues as he has hitherto done in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us ; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty’s Government to render him such assistance.”

I propose to inform Cabul envoy of sense of this paragraph.

No. 22.

No. 60 of 1873.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To His Grace the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Simla, 30th June 1873.

IN our despatch No. 33, dated 28th March last, we communicated shortly to Your Grace our views with respect to the understanding that has been effected with the Russian Government on the subject of the Afghan boundary. As, however, the immediate duty of giving practical effect to that understanding on the part of Her Majesty’s Government will devolve upon the Government of India, we consider it to be desirable to enter somewhat more at length into the nature of the obligations which appear to us to have been undertaken by the British and Russian Governments respectively, and to state our view of the general policy which has been agreed upon between the two Governments in regard to their dealings with the countries which lie between their respective possessions in the East. A clear appreciation of that policy and of those obligations appears to us to be essential in order to avoid the risk of misunderstandings arising which might be detrimental to the friendly and cordial relations which now happily exist between the two countries.

2. To advert shortly to the general policy which has been pursued of late years by the Russian Government in Central Asia, our opinion is still that which we expressed in 1869 in the following language :—

“ We by no means share in the exaggerated apprehensions expressed in many quarters as to the danger to British rule in India which may arise from an extension of Russian influence in those countries lying to the South and East of her enormous possessions in Asia.

“ We believe that the influence of a civilized European power over wild and savage tribes cannot be otherwise than beneficial.

“ We would therefore heartily assist in establishing a frank and clear understanding with Russia as to the relative position of British and Russian interests in Asia.”

In accordance with these principles, therefore, we suggested that, as it was for the interests of both countries that a wide border of independent States should exist between the British and Russian frontiers, it would be desirable that Russia should be invited to adopt the same policy with regard to the independent States which come under her legitimate influence as we have pursued with regard to Afghanistan and the independent States within our influence. The friendly interchange of communications between Her Majesty’s Government and the Russian Government which we propose to review in this despatch appears to us to have established results entirely in accordance with the sentiments we have heretofore expressed.

3. It is unnecessary for us to advert to any occurrences previous to the communications which are contained in the papers recently laid before Parliament, commencing with the letter addressed by the Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan on the 27th of March 1869.

Lord Clarendon, shortly before the date of that letter, in several conversations with Baron Brunnow, recommended “ the recognition of some territory as neutral between the possessions of England and Russia, which should be the limit of those possessions, and which should be scrupulously respected by both Powers.”

Prince Gortchakow, to whom Baron Brunnow had communicated Lord Clarendon's suggestions, replied that the idea of maintaining between the possessions of the two Empires in Asia "a zone to preserve them from any contact" had always been shared by the Emperor, and authorised Baron Brunnow to "repeat to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State the positive assurance that His Imperial Majesty looks upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence. No intervention or interference whatever, opposed to the independence of that State, enters into his intentions."

4. Lord Clarendon answered, after expressing the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the friendly feelings which had prompted Prince Gortchakow's communication, that the Secretary of State for India, having consulted those Members of his Council who were well acquainted with the countries in question, had arrived at a decided opinion that Afghanistan would not fulfil those conditions of a neutral territory that it was the object of the two Governments to establish, and that it was, therefore, thought advisable to propose that the Upper Oxus should be the boundary line which neither Power should permit its forces to cross.

5. In the autumn of 1869 an interview took place at Heidelberg between Prince Gortchakow and Lord Clarendon, at which the subject was further discussed. On the one hand, the Prince declared that "the Emperor considered, and he entirely shared His Majesty's opinion, that extension of territory was extension of weakness, and that Russia had no intention of going further south," and that it was the desire of the Emperor not to retain Samarkand. On the other, Lord Clarendon explained that the relations between the Government of India and the Ameer of Afghanistan had been entered into solely with the object of enabling him to maintain that order in Afghanistan which was of importance to the neighbouring possessions of Great Britain,—had no reference to the advances of Russia in Central Asia,—and evinced no hostile disposition towards Russia.

6. In the latter part of the year 1869 the presence of Mr. Douglas Forsyth at St. Petersburg, afforded an opportunity for a more full discussion of the proposals which were under the consideration of the two Governments.

The subject of the influence which should be exercised by Russia and Great Britain respectively, over the States on their frontiers was frankly entered into, and it was agreed that beyond the limit of the provinces which the Ameer of Afghanistan then held he should not attempt to exercise any interference or influence, that the good offices of England should be exerted to restrain him from all thought of aggression, and that, similarly, Russia should exercise all her influence to restrain Bokhara from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory.

7. Prince Gortchakow expressed his opinion that there might be some difficulty in restoring Samarkand to Bokhara, notwithstanding the desire of the Emperor to do so. He considered that the influence possessed by the Government of India over the Ameer of Afghanistan was greater than that of Russia over Bokhara, but admitting "that to be a mere question of appreciation," he did not anticipate much difficulty in inducing the Ruler of Bokhara to abstain from aggressive acts against Afghanistan. He felt assured that the advice of Russia to the Khan of Khokand to live in peace with his neighbours would be followed. He stated that he saw no objection to English officers visiting Cabul, though he agreed with the Earl of Mayo that Russian agents should not do so.

With regard to Kashgaria or Yarkand, in which country the Atalik Ghazee had recently established a Government, Prince Gortchakow observed to Sir A. Buchanan that the Atalik Ghazee had nothing to fear from Russia, but as the Russian Government had no relations with him, and the Government of India appeared to have had dealings with him, "you can assure him, on my authority, that Russia has no hostile intention towards him, or any desire to make conquests in his territories."

Prince Gortchakow, on the conclusion of these communications, requested Sir A. Buchanan to tell Lord Clarendon that "as both Governments are free from all *arrière-pensées*, ambitious views, or unfriendly feelings towards each other, the more fully

“ and frankly all questions connected with Central Asia are discussed between them the more effectually will the ‘mists’ be blown away which, through the misrepresentations of over-zealous subordinate agents may, at any time, hang over them.”

Lord Clarendon, in reply, requested Sir A. Buchanan to state to Prince Gortchakow “ that Her Majesty’s Government entirely reciprocate these opinions, and will act upon them without reserve and in a spirit of confidence, being assured that such a course is best calculated to promote the entirely good understanding with Russia which we are so anxious to maintain upon the only matters upon which an apparent, though not necessary, divergence of interest might lead to differences.”

8. The general policy to be pursued by the two Governments was thus satisfactorily agreed upon. The result of the communications that had passed was summarised as follows by Prince Gortchakow in his despatch to Count Brunnow of the 1st of November 1871 :—

“ (a.)—That the territory in the actual possession at the present moment of Shere Ali Khan should be considered to constitute the limits of Afghanistan.”

“ (b.)—That beyond these limits the Ameer should make no attempt to exercise any influence or interference, and that the English Government should do all in their power to restrain him from any attempts at aggression.

“ (c.)—That for their part the Imperial Government should use all their influence to prevent any attack by the Ameer of Bokhara upon Afghan territory.

“ These principles had been unreservedly accepted both by the Cabinet of London and the Governor-General of India.”

9. There remained the settlement of the boundary of Afghanistan so as to embrace the provinces then held by the Ameer.

Some delay not unnaturally occurred in the settlement of the north-eastern and western portions of this boundary, for it required an investigation into the condition of countries little known either to the British or to the Russian authorities. Ultimately there was a difference of opinion between the two Governments upon the question whether Badakshan and Wakhan did or did not form part of the provinces held by the Ameer. It is only necessary for us again to express the satisfaction with which we have learnt from Prince Gortchakow’s letter to Count Brunnow of the ^{19th}/_{31st} January last, that the Russian Government finally agreed to accept the views of Her Majesty’s Government upon the question, and we regard this as a proof of the desire of the Russian Government to avoid, as far as possible, any future elements of discord.

10. Notwithstanding, however, that the precise boundary of Afghanistan had remained unsettled from the end of the year 1869 until January last, the Government of India have been guided in their transactions with their Asiatic neighbours by the principles of policy which were agreed upon in 1869 between the two Governments. At the Umballa Durbar and on several other occasions the Ameer of Afghanistan was earnestly advised to commit no aggression on his neighbours. This advice was repeated with special reference to the differences then existing between the Ameer of Bokhara and his rebellious son, and to the wish of Shere Ali Khan to annex Kirkee and Charjui. Our influence was on these occasions exercised with success, and we had the satisfaction of being informed by your Grace that our proceedings were considered by the Emperor of Russia as a gratifying proof of the good effects of the communications between Prince Gortchakow and Lord Clarendon at Heidelberg, and of the determination of the two Governments to do everything in their power to promote peace in Central Asia.

We have also advised the Atalik Ghazee to abstain from interference in the political affairs and quarrels of neighbouring States. Our communications with him have been confined to the establishment of friendly relations, and in pursuance of negotiations which commenced some years ago we are now engaged in the conclusion of a Treaty of Trade and commerce with Yarkand. It is apparent from the language used by Prince Gortchakow to Sir Andrew Buchanan in 1869, which is quoted in the 7th paragraph of this despatch, that Yarkand was not included by the Russian Government among the countries within the immediate sphere of Russian influence, and we do not consider that the recent conclusion of a commercial treaty by Russia with Yarkand has substantially altered the position of that country as regards Russia.

We have declined to exercise any interference in the affairs of Bokhara and Khiva when appealed to more than once by envoys from those countries.

11. On the other hand, the action of the Russian Government upon several occasions has been in accordance with the same policy.

In the beginning of 1870 apprehensions were entertained of a hostile movement on the part of the Ameer of Bokhara upon Afghanistan, and a rumour had reached India of a contemplated attack on the territories of the Atalik Ghazee by the Khan of Khokand. Communications were addressed to the Russian Government, and Prince Gortchakow repudiated the idea of the Ameer having the slightest ground for apprehension. Sir Andrew Buchanan then said:

Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan, January 29th, 1870.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon, February 8th 1870.

"That if it can be shown that the Emperor of Russia is following a similar policy with the Government of India, and that the object of His Majesty's policy is to create on his frontiers a series of influenced but not tributary or neutralized States, to secure to them national independence, and to put an end for ever to that state of conflict and internal disturbance which has for ages prevailed in those regions, the interests of civilization will be strengthened and possibly permanently consolidated; that the Viceroy had done all in his power to maintain peace on the frontier of Afghanistan, and that it therefore rests with the Government of the Emperor, by adopting the same course with regard to those countries which bound the Russian possessions in Central Asia as the Viceroy has taken towards Afghanistan, permanently to secure peace throughout their wide districts, which are influenced respectively by the Government of the Queen and that of His Imperial Majesty."

M. Stremoukoff replied:

"What you have read is our programme, and describes exactly what we desire, and are endeavouring to establish."

Subsequently Prince Gortchakow requested Sir A. Buchanan to assure Lord Clarendon in the most positive manner that "the Russian Government lost no opportunity of impressing on the Khan of Bokhara their desire that he should abstain from all aggression on the territories of the Ameer of Cabul." At the same time, the Emperor, in an interview which he accorded to Sir Andrew Buchanan, entirely confirmed this assurance.

Sir A. Buchanan to Lord Clarendon, March 21st and 22nd, 1870.

12. General Kaufmann, during the same period, assured the Ameer of Afghanistan that he had given no encouragement to Abdool Rahman Khan, the nephew of the Ameer, who was residing as a refugee in Russian territory and was supposed to entertained designs upon the tranquillity of Afghanistan:

General Kaufmann's language to the Ameer was as follows:

"The Czar's possessions in Turkestan do not border on the countries at present under your rule: we are separated by the Khanate of Bokhara, whose Ameer, Seid Mouzuffar, has concluded a peace with Russia, and is at present friendly towards and under the protection of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians. No collision or misunderstanding can therefore take place between us, though we are distant neighbours, and we can and ought to live in peace and concord. I have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, because, on the one hand, you are under the protection of the English Government, who, as you are probably aware, are friendly towards that of the Czar; and because, on the other hand, I do not perceive any interference on your part in the affairs of Bokhara."

13. The settlement of the boundaries of Afghanistan will render it more easy for the authorities of both nations to carry into practical effect the policy which has been agreed upon between the two Governments, and the public announcement of the agreement will, in our opinion, conduce to the preservation of peace in the countries concerned. At the same time, much will depend on the firm adherence to the policy of non-annexation both by England and Russia; for we have good reason to believe that an advance of the Russian frontier towards that of Afghanistan would undoubtedly revive in that country the uneasiness which the frank avowal of the good understanding between Great Britain and Russia on the general question of Central Asian policy has done much to allay.

14. It is obvious, from the whole tenor of the communications between the two Governments, that although the term "neutral territory" was originally used by the Earl of Clarendon, the idea has not been pursued in the subsequent negotiations, mainly owing, as it appears to us, to Prince Gortchakow's objections to the adoption of the Upper Oxus as the line of demarcation for a neutral ground. The expression originally

used by Prince Gortchakow, indeed,—“*zone destinée à préserver les possessions des deux Empires en Asie de tout contact*,”—appears to us more accurately to express the condition in which both Governments desire to maintain the countries which intervene between their respective possessions in Asia.

15. Our opinion upon this subject was given to Her Majesty's Government in the year 1869; and we still think that the existence of a treaty which would limit and control the conduct of either of the two great Powers with regard to their immediate neighbours might prove a fertile source of dispute between the two Governments. It would be impossible to expect Russia to agree to any such stipulations in regard to Khiva or Bokhara, and our relations with Afghanistan are of a kind quite inconsistent with “neutrality” in its strict sense.

16. As it is possible that the Russian Government are not in possession of full information with respect to the nature and scope of those relations, it may be advisable shortly to recapitulate them.

The Earl of Mayo informed the Ameer of Afghanistan at Umballa, in the spring of 1869, that although the British Government did not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between the Government of India and His Highness had lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, we should endeavour, from time to time, by such means as circumstances might require to strengthen the Government His Highness; and that we were willing to assist him with money, arms, ammunition, and in other ways, whenever we deemed it desirable to do so. The hands of the Government of India were left absolutely free as to the occasions on which and the circumstances under which such assistance was to be given to or withheld from the Ameer. He was given clearly to understand that the assistance then or hereafter to be given him was solely for the purpose of establishing a just and merciful as well as a strong Government in Afghanistan, and that the continuance of our support must always depend upon the pleasure of the Government of India. These explanations were accepted and approved by Your Grace as in all respects satisfactory and in accordance with the opinions and principles laid down by Her Majesty's Government. It was distinctly explained to the Ameer that he was to receive no fixed subsidy from us, and as a matter of fact the only occasion on which, since the Umballa Durbar, His Highness has received assistance in money from us was in the spring of 1872 when we made him a present of two lakhs of rupees to assist him in carrying out certain reforms in his internal administration. It is probable that a further sum of money will now be supplied to him for the purpose of facilitating the peaceful settlement of the disputed boundary between Afghanistan and Persia in Seistan.

17. This statement will suffice to show the nature of our relations with Afghanistan. Our influence has been exercised with the Ameer to encourage him in the peaceful policy which he has hitherto pursued towards his neighbours and we believe that it will in future be sufficient to secure that most desirable object. Indeed, we are confident that the Ameer himself will appreciate his obligation, in consideration of the recognition by Russia of the boundaries of his territory, to refrain from any aggression; but we have never desired to interfere with the independence of Afghanistan, and, therefore, we can undertake no further responsibility with regard to the action of the Ameer than to press upon him in case of need in the strongest manner our friendly advice, and to govern our relations towards him in accordance with the action he may take, in the same way as the Russian Government have engaged to act with regard to Bokhara.

18. Although we have abstained from entering into any treaty engagement to support the Ameer by British troops, in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference. So long as the Ameer continues, as he has hitherto done, to act in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty's Government to render him such assistance.

19. The assurances given by the Russian Government of their determination not to interfere with Afghanistan have been clear and positive throughout the whole course of these negotiations. We unreservedly accept those assurances, and we are satisfied that this frank explanation of the position of the Government of India as regards Afghanistan will not be misinterpreted.

20. Both powers have now publicly avowed their adherence to the policy of not further extending their territorial possessions in the Southern portion of Central Asia.

They have pledged themselves reciprocally that so far as their influence extends over the States lying between their respective frontiers, that influence will be exerted in the interests of the general peace to restrain those States from aggression upon each other. As regards Afghanistan, the boundary recently settled is to be the limit of the Ameer's dominions; while, on the one hand, the Government of India are to use all the influence they possess with the Ameer to prevent him from transgressing that boundary, Russia will on her part use all her influence over Bokhara and the other States to which her influence extends to restrain them from aggressions on Afghanistan. Therefore, so long as the Ameer confines himself to the boundary now defined, he need fear no molestation from Russia or the countries under her influence.

Should our general view of the recent negotiations and of the obligations which will consequently devolve upon us receive the approval of Her Majesty's Government, we would suggest that a copy of this dispatch might be communicated to the Russian Government, in order that we may act with freedom and confidence in our future communications with the different countries whose interests are concerned.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
R. TEMPLE.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

No. 23.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st July 1873.

From SECRETARY of STATE, London, to VICEROY, Simla.

YOUR telegram of the 27th June. I do not object to the general sense of the paragraph, which you quote as a communication to Russia from the Foreign Office, but great caution is necessary in assuring Ameer of material assistance which may raise undue and unfounded expectation. He already shows symptoms of claiming more than we may wish to give.

No. 24.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY to SECRETARY of STATE.

Simla, dated July 24, 1873.

AMEER of Cabool alarmed at Russian progress, dissatisfied with general assurance, and anxious to know definitely how far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose assuring him that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations we will help him with money, arms, and troops, if necessary, to expel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity. Answer by telegraph quickly.

No. 25.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY of STATE to the VICEROY.

India Office, dated 26th July 1873.

CABINET thinks you should inform Amir that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it: but you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs.

No. 26.

No. 75 of 1873.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To His Grace the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Simla, 15th September 1873.

IN continuation of our Secret Despatch, No. 60, dated 30th June last, and with reference to the telegraphic correspondence marginally noted, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers connected with the communications that have recently taken place with the envoy of His Highness the Ameer of Cabul, regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan and the general policy of the British Government towards that country.

2. There was little difficulty in explaining to the envoy the result of the recent correspondence with Russia regarding the northern boundaries of Afghanistan. He appeared to appreciate correctly the nature of the arrangement concluded with Russia, but sought for an explanation on certain minor points which have been satisfactorily cleared up in the final letter from the Viceroy to the Ameer.

3. From conversations with the envoy we were led to believe that the Cabul Durbar had interpreted the friendly assurances of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo to mean that the British Government had bound themselves to comply with any request preferred by the Ameer. It was necessary, therefore, in the first place to remove any incorrect impressions on this score, and in repeating to the Ameer the assurances given to him at the Umballa Durbar, we have given the envoy distinctly to understand that, while the policy adopted towards Afghanistan by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo will be maintained, the British Government reserve to themselves the right of judging as to the propriety of any request preferred by the Ameer.

4. In the course of the discussions the envoy stated that he had been instructed to apply to the British Government for assistance, both present and prospective; the former for the purpose of strengthening the Government of Afghanistan, and the latter with the view of meeting the contingency of actual aggression by a Foreign Power. Though believing, as the envoy was distinctly informed, that the result of the recent arrangement with Russia has been to remove further than before the possibility of foreign aggression on Afghanistan, we were of opinion that the time had arrived for affording the Ameer present assistance in accordance with our settled policy. As your Grace was informed, we had promised the Ameer five lakhs of rupees to assist him in adjusting the claims of his subjects who had suffered from raids in Seistan, and we have now decided on presenting His Highness with an additional sum of five lakhs of rupees and with 10,000 Enfield and 5,000 Snider rifles for which he had applied previous to the envoy's arrival.

5. The question of the policy to be pursued in case of actual or threatened aggression on Afghanistan, was the subject of considerable discussion with the envoy. After receipt of your Grace's telegram of the 1st July, the envoy was informed at the interview of the 12th idem, that if, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would afford the Ameer material assistance in repelling an invader, but that such assistance would be conditional on the Ameer following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression. Further and more definite explanations were given on this subject in the conversation with the envoy of 30th July, to which we beg to refer your Grace.

6. A copy and translation of these conversations were annexed to the letter which the Viceroy has addressed to the Ameer. But as the subject is one of great importance, and the envoy appeared to doubt how far his instructions justified him in committing himself to any definite arrangement, we considered it advisable to postpone the settlement of it to a more favourable opportunity, when we trust the matter may be discussed with the Ameer in person.

7. From the separate memorandum of the several points which the envoy is to lay before the Ameer, your Grace will observe that we have suggested the expediency of

deputing a British officer to examine the western and northern boundaries of Afghanistan. Though we think that the presence of accredited British officers at Cabul, Herat, and possibly also Candahar, would for many reasons be desirable, we are fully alive to the difficulties in the way of such a measure until the objects and policy of the British Government are more clearly understood and appreciated in Afghanistan. It is with the view of removing some of these difficulties that we have proposed the deputation of an officer to examine the boundaries. Independently of the valuable information, both geographical and political, that might be collected, a judicious officer would have it in his power to do much towards allaying any feelings of mistrust that may still linger in the minds of some classes of the people in Afghanistan, and towards preparing the way for the eventual location of permanent British representatives in that country, if such a measure should at any time be considered desirable or necessary.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
R. TEMPLE.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

Enclosure 1 in 26.

TRANSLATION of Letter, dated 14th April 1873, from the AGENT at Cabul to COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

AFTER reading your letter to me, dated 4th April 1873, which was received by me on 9th idem, on the subject of rifles, the Ameer observed as follows:—

“ No doubt the kingdom which God has given me should be thankful to the British Government for their sympathy and cordiality, but it is as clear as daylight that both the nobles and common people of Afghanistan are armed with guns, and always accustomed to the use of rifles. A factory for the manufacture of Snider guns has been started in this country, but as the workmen have not sufficient skill, the Snider and other guns cannot be prepared so speedily as to be available for the whole of the Afghan troops in a short period. His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India has expressed his wish to send 5,000 Enfield rifles; this offer, though it is a proof of the kindness and favourable consideration of the British Government, will not meet the requirements of the army of this kingdom. Consequently, as intimated before, it is necessary that small arms to the number of 15,000 three-grooved rifles and 5,000 Snider guns should be procured at any price at which it may be possible to procure them.” This letter is forwarded after perusal by His Highness the Ameer.

Enclosure 2 in 26.

TRANSLATION of Letter, dated 5th May 1873, from the AGENT at Cabul to COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

INFORMATION regarding the observations made by the Cabul authorities before was submitted with my letter of 14th April 1873 to you. For the last few days discussions are going in between the Ameer and his principal durbar officials, and on some occasions His Highness in a friendly manner makes some remarks to me. These observations which His Highness makes are as follows:—

“ After giving all the details of the state of affairs in Afghanistan at the Umballa conference, I exonerated myself from the responsibility of making arrangements for the security of the Afghan border. Should an opportunity occur for a special meeting between me and a representative of the British Government, I will recapitulate the circumstances which I mentioned before in the above-mentioned conference. It is manifest that his Excellency the Viceroy and the Governor-General of India has clearly written in his murrasilla that Mr. Forsyth, Commissioner, has decided the question about the boundary of Afghanistan with the Russian authorities at St. Petersburg. The Russian Governor-General also wrote to me in his murrasilla in clear terms that they, Russian Government, will not interfere with the dominions which are at present in my possession. I am at a loss to surmise what great difficulty has given rise to the deliberations which have taken place the second time between the British and the Russian Governments about the northern boundary of Afghanistan. It cannot be concealed that it is impossible for the Russians to remain always firm in their negotiations. For instance, they could not remain firm in their engagements about the Crimea even for a short period. My anxiety which I feel on account of the Russians will never be removed unless the British Government adorns the Afghan Government with great assistance in money and ammunitions of war for the troops, and unless great aid is given for the construction of strong forts throughout the northern Afghan border. And, further, if an emergency arises for the Afghan Government to

“oppose the Russians, such opposition cannot take place without the co-operation of the disciplined troops of the British Government. Should the British Government desire that I should at once organise the Afghan troops, and make arrangements for the security of the border against the Russians on a favourable occasion, I think it is impossible to do so. No person has attained his object in this world immediately. It is plainly obligatory on the British Government to show their cordiality in this matter before anything happens. It is rather advisable that the British Government for its own and my satisfaction should set apart some property, either in India or in Europe, for my support, in order that if, which God forbid, a serious difficulty constrains me to quit Afghanistan, I may retire there with my family and children, and find both accommodation and maintenance there; and after this re-assurance I will work with zeal and high spirit day and night for the security of the border of Afghanistan, which is in truth the border of India. Time has approached very near when the Russians, after taking possession of Urganj and Merve Shahjehan, will make communications for exercising some influence in my kingdom. It is as clear as daylight that as soon as the Russians will take possession of Merve Shahjehan, the Turkomans will necessarily take refuge in Badghees in Herat, and if they do not desist from their misbehaviour, viz., from causing injury to the Russians from time to time, the Russians will undoubtedly send messages to the Afghan Government that either the Turkomans should be prevented from aggression, or permission should be given to them (the Russians) to punish these hostile tribes. Under these circumstances, such difficulty will present itself to me that even the British Government with regard to the interests of the Afghan and English Governments being identical, will have to adopt very serious measures for its removal. Koshad Khan, Chief of Merve Shahjehan, has sent his son to me undoubtedly for this reason, that should the people of that territory be unable to oppose the Russians, the Afghan Government may not prevent them from seeking shelter in Badghees. It is well known that if in the event of the Turkomans being overcome by the Russians, they wish to come to Badghees, the Russians will not withhold themselves from going in pursuit of them. The Russians can be opposed merely by the means above noted. Besides this, as the British Government has approved of the cession of the fertile territory of Seistan proper to the Persian Government, this decision will one day cause so much injury to Afghanistan that it will not be surprising if its effects will at the end spread as far as India, as there is a straight road from Merve Shahjehan to India via Seistan. There will, therefore, be no person throughout this road to oppose the Russians as far as the border of India. The injury which will be caused to Afghanistan by the recent decision of the Seistan question is more clear than the light of the sun, and I cannot, therefore, in my opinion, accomplish the provisions of this decision. The British Government should take my views and reflections into most careful consideration, and be kind enough to sympathise with Afghanistan, otherwise I have not at all received any peace of mind whereon I can place perfect reliance and remain quiet or free from anxiety. Should the British Government intentionally overlook this matter with a view to temporising for a few days, it is their own affair, but I will represent my circumstances in a clear form in detail without time-serving hesitation.”

As I have no authority to give any answer to the Ameer in such most important matters, I could not but remain silent. His Highness, in concurrence with the opinion of the Cabul authorities, desires that the British Government should commence forthwith to organise the Afghan troops, to send from time to time large amounts of money with great number of guns and magazine stores in order that His Highness may steadily be able in a few years to satisfactorily strengthen the Afghan kingdom.

Enclosure 3 in 26.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from His Highness the AMEER of CABUL to His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL, dated Thursday, the 4th Rube-ul-awul 1290 A. H., corresponding with 22nd May 1873.

As it has been determined that Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, my special Motamid, should wait upon your Excellency for the purpose of drawing closer the bonds of friendship of this state with the British Government, I therefore beg to address this friendly letter, and to say that the said Syed Noor Mahomed Shah will present himself before your Excellency, will hear any communications that may be made in regard to the affairs of State, &c., and will submit all that I have to make known concerning the welfare of both the states. He will return after attaining his object.

Enclosure 4 in 26.

MEMORANDUM of a CONVERSATION between His Excellency the VICEROY and SYED NOOR MAHOMED SHAH, the Cabul Envoy, held at Government House, Simla, on Saturday, the 12th July 1873.

Present:

His Excellency the Viceroy.
The Cabul Envoy.
The Foreign Secretary, Mr. Aitchison.
The Private Secretary, Captain Baring.

Interpreter.

Captain Henderson, Under-Secretary, Foreign Department.

His Excellency the Viceroy commenced the conversation by observing to the Envoy that the result of the recent correspondence that had taken place between the British and Russian Governments

regarding the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, was considered by the British Government to be highly advantageous to His Highness the Ameer.

Here the Envoy remarked that he had only received on the previous day a translation in Persian of the papers connected with that correspondence; there had not therefore been sufficient time for him to consider the subject fully, and he proposed to reserve an expression of his sentiments on the subject of that correspondence until he had attentively considered the matter and discussed with the Foreign Secretary certain points which were not clear to him.

His Excellency the Viceroy approved of this course, and, observing that it was not intended in the present conversation to touch on the details of the communications with Russia, continued that the British Government considered the result of those communications to be advantageous to the Ameer for the following reasons:—

The Russian Government had given positive and repeated assurances to the effect that they considered Afghanistan “completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence,” and had stated that “no intervention or interference whatever, opposed to the independence of that State, enters into its intentions.” These assurances, however, left the boundaries of the Ameer’s possessions undefined, and so long as they remained so there was the possibility of differences as to the precise territories to which the assurances applied. Russia had now accepted the definition of the northern and western boundaries proposed by the British Government, who became thus a party to the settlement and interested in maintaining the integrity of the frontier. The British Government would be prepared to use their best endeavours to maintain the frontier intact so long as the Ameer or the Ruler of Afghanistan follows their advice as regards his external relations, and abstains from encroachments and aggression on his neighbours. If, for example, troubles should arise and the boundary in question were violated by neighbouring countries, or by any tribes under Russian influence, the natural course would be for the Ameer to refer to the British Government, and every effort would be made by that Government to bring about a satisfactory settlement.

His Excellency wished it be clearly understood by the Envoy that the influence proposed to be exercised by the British Government referred to the external relations of Afghanistan alone, and that no interference was contemplated in the internal affairs of that kingdom. The Ameer, continued His Excellency, must be well aware that, occupying as Afghanistan does an intervening position between the British and Russian dominions, it was important for the interests of India that she should be both a strong and an independent State.

His Excellency the Viceroy observed that if, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. Such assistance would of course be conditional on the Ameer following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression.

When His Excellency had concluded the above remarks, the Envoy observed that the Ameer, as well as the people of Afghanistan, were fully aware that the influence of the British Government would be exercised solely in the interests of Afghanistan, and that no interference in the internal affairs of that kingdom was to be anticipated.

The rapid advances made by the Russians in Central Asia had, he said, aroused the gravest apprehensions in the minds of the people of Afghanistan. Whatever specific assurances the Russians might give, and however often these might be repeated, the people of Afghanistan could place no confidence in them, and would never rest satisfied unless they were assured of the aid of the British Government. The Envoy continued that he fully appreciated the nature of the communications that had been made to him at the present conference, but he wished to reserve any further discussion of the subject for a future occasion.

His Excellency expressed his approval of this course, and the interview then terminated.

C. U. AITCHISON.

MEMORANDUM.

This conversation is referred to in paragraph 5 of the letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to the Ameer, dated 6th September 1873, and a copy of it, with translation, was attached to that letter. A further copy was given to the Envoy under cover of letter No. 1857P., dated 18th August 1873.

C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 5 in 26.

MEMORANDUM of Interview between his Excellency the VICEROY and the CABUL ENVOY, held at Government House Simla, on Wednesday, the 30th July 1873.

Present:

His Excellency the Viceroy.

The Cabul Envoy.

C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary.

Captain Henderson, Under Secretary, Foreign Department, Interpreter.

His Excellency the Viceroy observed that at the previous interview held on the 12th July, when the result of the recent correspondence between the British and Russian Governments regarding the northern frontier of Afghanistan, had been explained to the Envoy, he had expressed a wish to reserve any remarks until he had fully considered the subject and discussed certain points with the Foreign

Secretary. His Excellency the Viceroy observed that he had been made acquainted with the communications that had passed with the Foreign Secretary, and now invited the Envoy to state briefly the points for consideration.

The Envoy said that on perusal of the correspondence between the Russian and English Governments, translations of which had been furnished to him, he had noted two points which might give rise to question in Afghanistan, and which it would be advisable to explain in the paper containing the result of the present communications of which he would be the bearer to the Ameer. These points were as follows:—

(a.) From the passage marginally quoted*, occurring in Earl Granville's despatch of the 17th October 1872, it appeared that the object of the correspondence between the English and Russian Governments was to secure peace and tranquillity in Central Asia. If at any time fault should be found with the internal condition of Afghanistan by a Foreign Power, and if it should be asserted that these terms of peace and tranquillity are not appropriate to it, there was room for apprehension that this might be held to constitute a condition of affairs that would invalidate the arrangement entered into between Russia and England. The Envoy, therefore, wished it to be clearly explained that the Afghan Government should be allowed to follow its own laws and customs in its own territories; that the internal administration of the States on both sides of the frontier shall be free from interference; and that the expression alluded to had no reference to the internal condition of these countries.

His Excellency the Viceroy replied that there could be no doubt whatever that the words "peace and tranquillity" referred to the external relations of the countries concerned, and that the absence of these conditions in the internal economy of those countries could not in any way invalidate the arrangement. His Excellency had no doubt that in the letter to the Ameer, of which the Envoy would be the bearer, this point would be satisfactorily disposed of. At the same time His Excellency observed that if any Russian subjects or other foreigners entering Afghanistan were subjected to molestation and denied protection through any fault of the Government of Afghanistan, it would be the duty of the Ameer to give redress and compensation in accordance with the usage of nations. His Excellency could say nothing which could give countenance to any neglect on the part of Afghanistan of the ordinary duties of every Government in respect to matters of this kind.

The Envoy thereupon remarked that as there were so many objections to the merchants of such great Powers entering Afghanistan, and Afghanistan was unable to control their movement, the above conditions could apply only to such merchants as may enter Afghanistan with the Ameer's permission given after due consideration. These would receive the same protection as other merchants have received up to the present day. His Excellency replied that his remarks had reference to merchants entering with the permission of the Ameer.

(b.) The second point to which the Envoy alluded was the confirmation by Bokhara of the claims of Afghanistan, mention of which is made in the same despatch from Lord Granville.* The Envoy was

* "Her Majesty's Government believe that it is now in the power of the Russian Government, by an explicit recognition of the right of the Ameer of Cabul to the territories which he now claims, and which Bokhara herself admits to be his, &c."

apprehensive that at some future time Bokhara might under pressure be induced to deny this confirmation, and thus afford a ground for re-opening the question. The remedy against such a contingency would be a declaration that the arrangement arrived at is final, and that no further negotiation on the subject would take place.

His Excellency the Viceroy replied that no subsequent denial by Bokhara could in any way affect the arrangement between the English and Russian Government, and that this would be declared in the letter to be given to the Envoy.

The Envoy next alluded to the absence of any distinct assurances on the part of Russia in the recent correspondence that no aggression would be made on Afghanistan.

To this the Viceroy replied that the latter part of the correspondence between England and Russia was confined to the specific subject of the actual northern boundary of Afghanistan, and that such assurances would, therefore, have been out of place. At they had, however, been repeatedly given by Russia before, and also in the commencement of the correspondence, they would be embodied in the final letter to the Ameer.

Next the Envoy proceeded to state that whatever assurances were given by Russia, the Ameer and people of Afghanistan would rely on definite promises of assistance given by the British Government. He had explained in detail to the Secretary the precise grounds for the apprehensions entertained by Afghanistan, and it was, therefore, unnecessary to enlarge on the subject. Assistance was solicited by Afghanistan for two reasons: First, it was the expectation of the Ameer that the British Government would aid him with money and arms so that he might be enabled to strengthen his frontier against any possible future aggression. This request, said the Envoy, was based partly on the promises made by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, on the strength of which the Ameer had been induced to raise a large body of troops for the defence of his territories.

With respect to these promises the Envoy appeared to be under the impression that the British Government are pledged to comply with any request for assistance preferred by the Ameer. He professed unwillingness to press this point, but his Excellency the Viceroy deemed it desirable to refer to the correspondence in order to remove any incorrect impressions that he might entertain with regard to the promises of the British Government. After hearing the passages in the correspondence bearing on the subject, the Viceroy inquired of the Envoy whether he still held that the British Government are bound to comply with every request preferred by the Ameer. The Envoy replied to the extent that may be proper. Such being the case, his Excellency observed, that it was desirable that no doubt should exist on the subject, and that it must be distinctly understood that the British Government are to be the judges of the propriety of any request preferred by the Ameer. His Excellency proceeded to say that Lord Mayo had assured the Ameer that any representation he might make would "always be treated with consideration and respect;" and his Excellency was quite prepared to maintain the policy of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and to entertain in a similar spirit the request now preferred. His Excellency said that the British Government were far from sharing the apprehensions entertained

by the Ameer of dangers from without, for they considered that the result of the recent correspondence between England and Russia was to strengthen very materially the position of Afghanistan; but that, apart from these considerations, it was the policy of the British Government to see Afghanistan powerful. The request for present assistance would, therefore, be complied with to the extent which the British Government might consider appropriate to the present necessities of Afghanistan, and His Excellency invited the Envoy to see the Foreign Secretary again on the subject.

Proceeding in the next place to the question of the assistance to be given to Afghanistan in case of actual aggression from without, the Envoy observed that at the previous interview his Excellency had said that if, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. His Excellency had also said that such assistance would of course be conditional on the Ameer following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression. Now the Ameer, in expectation of the assistance of the British Government, had up to the present time followed the advice of the Viceroy as regards abstinence from aggression, and in the event of assistance being given would continue to follow that policy. The Envoy continued that he had at an interview with the Secretary brought forward many arguments with regard to the proffered assistance, showing how it would fail to convey sufficient re-assurance. In the event of assistance being given to Afghanistan by the British Government, it should be in the form of a promise to assist that country with money and arms according to the circumstances of the case in the event of invasion, and if the Ameer should be unable to cope single-handed with an invader, and should prefer a request for troops, the British Government should promise to despatch troops to his aid and withdraw them when the necessity for their employment is over.

His Excellency the Viceroy replied that the British Government did not share the Ameer's apprehensions, but that as already mentioned in the previous conversation, it would be the duty of the Ameer, in case of any actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to the British Government, who would endeavour by negotiation and by every means in their power to settle the matter and avert hostilities. It was not intended, by insisting on such previous reference to the British Government, to restrict or interfere with the power of the Ameer as an independent Ruler to take such steps as might be necessary to repel any aggression on his territories; but such reference was a preliminary and essential condition of the British Government assisting him. In such event should these endeavours of the British Government to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British Government are prepared to assure the Ameer that they will afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and will also in case of necessity aid him with troops. The British Government holds itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent: moreover, the assistance will be conditional upon the Ameer himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations. The Envoy said that both in conversation with the Foreign Secretary and at the present interview he had explained his views on the subject, and his objections on certain points, and the matter would now be laid before the Ameer for his consideration.

Two points in connection with the promised assurance were then brought forward by the Envoy. He requested in the first place that, in the event of any aggression on the Ameer's territories, the British Government would distinctly state that they would consider such aggressor as an enemy.

His Excellency said that in diplomatic correspondence such expressions were always avoided as causing needless irritation. In His Excellency's opinion the assurance above given should be sufficient to satisfy the Ameer as to the light in which any aggression would be considered by the British Government.

Next the Envoy pressed that the contingency of aggression by Russia should be specifically mentioned in the written assurance to be given to the Ameer.

To this His Excellency replied that, setting aside the inexpediency of causing needless irritation to a friendly Power by such specific mention, the suggestion was one that could not be adopted, inasmuch as it implied an admission of the probability of such a contingency arising, which the British Government are not prepared to admit in the face of the repeated assurances given by Russia.

The Envoy then asked what reply should be given by the Ameer to the request which the Turkomans had preferred for advice as to the attitude they should assume to the Russians, who had demanded a passage for their troops through the Turkoman territory.

His Excellency replied that the advice given by the Foreign Secretary was correct. The Turkomans were robbers and kidnappers and the cause of a large portion of the mischief in Central Asia. The Ameer would do a most unwise thing to make himself responsible for such people in any way whatever. Of course friendly answers should be returned to friendly letters from them, but the Ameer should in no way make himself responsible for them or countenance their lawless proceedings or any opposition on their part to the march of Russian troops.

The Envoy concurring in the wisdom of this course, said he would let the Foreign Secretary see the letter he proposed to send to the Ameer.

The Envoy having intimated that there were no further points connected with the northern boundaries of Afghanistan, which he wished to discuss, the conversation turned on Seistan matters. Particulars will be found recorded in a separate memorandum.

C. U. AITCHISON.

MEMORANDUM.

This conversation is referred to in paragraph 5 of the letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to His Highness the Ameer, dated 6th September 1873, and a copy of it, with translation, was attached to that letter. A further copy was given to the Envoy under cover of letter No. 1857P., dated 18th August 1873.

C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 6 in No. 26.

MEMORANDUM OF CERTAIN POINTS which will be laid before the AMEER by the ENVOY.

THE Envoy has explained the views entertained in Afghanistan regarding the advance of the Russians towards the frontier of that country, and the probable establishment by them of cantonments in Kirkee, Charjoe, and other places near the frontier: also regarding the probable entry of the Turkomans into the Badgneis District, and he expressed a fear lest the Cabul Government should be called upon by Russia for political objects to enter into arrangements for the establishment of a Russian Mission and Agents in various parts, or to comply with other demands. He represented that the establishment in Afghanistan of a Mission on the part of so great a Power presents many difficulties and is indeed impossible. As regards other matters also many difficulties might arise, and he inquired in the unprovided condition of Afghanistan what answer could then be given to such demands.

With regard to the location of Russian Agents in Afghanistan, the Envoy was informed that Prince Gortchakoff has officially intimated that while he saw no objection to English officers going to Cabul, he agreed with Lord Mayo that Russian agents should not do so. In the event of any such request being made, the advice of the British Government should be at once sought. If in this or any other matter, the Ameer should seek the advice of the British Government, such advice would be given him as the circumstances of the case might require.

As before explained the British Government are far from entertaining apprehensions of a Russian invasion of Afghanistan. It is, on the contrary, their decided belief that the effect of the recent arrangements has been to render the occurrence of such a contingency more remote than ever. Under these circumstances, therefore, they could not encourage the Ameer to launch out into any large expenditure for the purpose of guarding against this contingency.

At the same time they are desirous to see the Ameer strong and his rule firmly established, and to maintain their policy in regard to strengthening His Highness. For this object they are prepared to give him any reasonable assistance. A request has been preferred by the Ameer for 20,000 stand of arms, *viz.*, 5,000 Sniders and the remainder Enfields, with proportionate Snider ammunition and accoutrements. There is not at present in India a sufficient reserve supply of Sniders for the use of the British troops, and it is further impossible to spare at present more than 5,000 Enfields. This number will be at once placed at the disposal of the Ameer for removal whenever desired. The remainder have been ordered from England, and will be forwarded as soon as received.

The British Government have considered in a spirit of the utmost friendliness the representations made by the Envoy regarding the condition of Afghanistan. At an interview with His Excellency the Viceroy the Envoy was requested to see the Foreign Secretary on the subject, and accordingly the Foreign Secretary intimated that His Excellency had directed him to offer the Ameer a gift of ten lakhs of Rupees, inclusive of the value of the arms, in addition to the five lakhs promised last year as a contribution towards the amount to be paid as compensation to His Highness' subjects who have suffered by raids from Seistan, making fifteen lakhs in all. Accordingly ten lakhs in cash, *viz.*, the five lakhs promised for compensation to the sufferers and five lakhs more will now be placed at the disposal of the Ameer, and the remaining five lakhs will be reserved for the arms. Immediate instructions will be issued to have the ten lakhs in readiness at Peshawur for removal whenever desired, and after the price of the arms has been ascertained the balance of the remaining 5 lakhs, if any balance should remain, will be forwarded to Cabul with the arms.

Looking to the responsibilities that have been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government on behalf of Afghanistan, and looking also to the imperfect information which they possess regarding the border in respect to which these responsibilities have been incurred, it is considered highly desirable that a British Officer of rank, accompanied by a competent Staff, should proceed to examine thoroughly the northern and north-western boundary as far as its eastern extremity; it would be advisable that this officer should also visit the Seistan boundary, proceeding thither *via* Candahar and eventually returning by way of Cabul, when he would have an opportunity of conferring with the Ameer regarding the condition of the border and could lay before His Highness any views he may have formed regarding the measures necessary for the security of the entire frontier. His Highness would thus be enabled, in communication with the British Government, to devise such measures as, after consultation with this officer, might be deemed best fitted for the defence of Afghanistan. As already intimated, the British Government do not anticipate any danger to Afghanistan from without. Still cases might arise in which from imperfect information the interests of Afghanistan might suffer. The very great importance, therefore, of the British Government both in India and England being in possession of such accurate information as will enable them to reply promptly and authoritatively to any reference or question that may be raised on the subject is so obvious that it is unnecessary to dwell further on this point. On receipt of a reply on this subject, early arrangements will be made for the deputation of an officer, and details will be arranged in communication with His Highness' Government.

It is also desirable that if possible the Ameer should arrange for a regular *dāk* *via* Budukshan to communicate with Mr. Forsyth's mission while in Yarkund.

C. U. AITCHISON.

MEMORANDUM.

This memorandum is referred to in paragraph 7 of the letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to His Highness the Ameer, dated 6th September 1873, and a copy of it with translation was attached to that letter.

C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 7 in No. 26.

KHUREETA, dated Simla, 6th September 1873.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness Ameer SHERE ALI KHAN, Wali of Cabul and its Dependencies.

The object which I had in view in recently proposing to depute a British officer to Cabul was to explain to your Highness the result of certain correspondence that had taken place between the British and Russian Governments with regard to the frontiers of Afghanistan, and also the details of the settlement of the Seistan boundary. I have now discussed both subjects at length with Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, the Envoy and Plenipotentiary deputed to me by your Highness, who has fulfilled his duties with zeal and intelligence.

In the letters marginally noted, the assurances of the Russian Government were conveyed to your Highness that they had no intention of extending the Russian boundary further south, and that they recognised as belonging to Afghanistan all the territories then in your Highness' possession. Prince Gortchakoff has further intimated to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, that the Emperor of Russia "looks upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence," and that "no intervention or interference whatsoever opposed to the independence of Afghanistan enters into his intention." These assurances, however, left the territories then in your Highness' possession undetermined, and so long as the boundaries of Afghanistan remained undefined, there existed the possibility of difference as to the precise extent of territory to which the assurances applied. The object of the latter part of the correspondence between the British and Russian Governments was to remove the possibility of doubt or misunderstanding by declaring definitely what territories are recognised as belonging to Afghanistan, and it is now my pleasing task to inform your Highness that the Government of Russia has finally accepted the views of the British Government, and has engaged to recognise the limits of your Highness' territories as they are described in Lord Granville's letter of the 17th October 1872, a translation of which, as well as a translated extract from the Russian reply, is herewith enclosed for your Highness' information.

It has been a source of much satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government that your Highness has more than once expressed your determination, in accordance with the advice given by the late Earl of Mayo, to abstain from all interference in the affairs of states and tribes beyond the borders of Afghanistan. Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, felt no hesitation in undertaking to use their influence to impress upon your Highness the importance of maintaining this peaceful attitude, and of allowing no considerations whatever to lead to any designs of conquest or aggression beyond the limits described in Lord Granville's letter of the 17th October 1872. On the other hand the Russian Government have undertaken on their part to use their best endeavours to restrain the States over which they have any influence from transgressing the limits of Afghanistan as above described.

Your Highness will see that the correspondence on the subject of the boundaries relates only to the external relations of Afghanistan; and I entertain a confident hope that, by the conclusion arrived at, the important object referred to in Lord Granville's letter of 17th October, viz., the maintenance of peace and tranquillity between the States of Central Asia in their external relations will be attained, and that in future no aggressions will be made from either side of the boundary now fixed.

The result of the communications between the British and the Russian Governments has been, in my opinion, materially to strengthen the position of Afghanistan, and to remove apprehension of dangers from without. The boundaries of your Highness' dominions to which the letters refer have now been definitely settled in a manner which precludes any re-opening of the matter by Bokhara or any other power, or any further question or discussion on the subject between your Highness and your neighbours in those quarters. To this settlement the British Government are a party, and they are consequently even more interested than before in the maintenance of the integrity of your Highness' frontier. I have had some conversation with your Envoy on the subject of the policy which the British Government would pursue in the event of an attack upon your Highness' territories. A copy of the record of these conversations is attached to this letter. But the question is in my opinion one of such importance that the discussion of it should be postponed to a more suitable opportunity.

I do not entertain any apprehensions of danger to your Highness' territories from without, and I therefore do not consider that it is necessary that your Highness should at present incur any large expenditure with a view to such a contingency. My hope is that having received the foregoing assurances, your Highness will now be enabled to devote your undisturbed attention to the consolidation and improvement of your internal government. The British Government desires to see your Highness' country powerful and independent. It is my determination to maintain the policy which has been adopted towards your Highness by my predecessors, Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and I repeat to your Highness the assurance given you at the Umballa Durbar, that the British Government will endeavour from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor.

There are some details connected with the recent negotiations and other matters on which explanation has been given to your Highness' Envoy, Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, in a separate memorandum.

On the subject of the Seistan boundary, I have addressed your Highness in a separate letter.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself your Highness' sincere friend.

No. 27.

No. 4 of 1874.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To His Grace The DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Fort William, the 23rd January 1874.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the enclosed correspondence between the Viceroy and the Ameer of Cabul, relative to the nomination of Sirdar Abdoola Jan to be heir-apparent to the throne of Afghanistan.

2. From the Cabul diaries and the letters of our Cabul Agent, which have been separately forwarded, Your Grace will have learned that the installation of the Sirdar as heir-apparent was carried out with great ceremony and rejoicing, and that most of the principal Governors and Sirdars of the country have offered their congratulations to the Ameer on this event either in person or by deputy.

3. How far this may be taken as an indication of the real state of feeling in Afghanistan, and of acquiescence in the supercession of Yakoob Khan, to whom the Ameer is mainly indebted for the recovery of his throne, remains to be seen. It would be rash at present to hazard a conjecture. Meanwhile Yakoob Khan himself has sent no congratulations, and, if reports be true, he has placed the adherents of the Ameer and Sirdar Abdoola Jan at Herat under restraint, and is strengthening the defences of the town and fort. Several influential Sirdars, and among them Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, the Governor of Cabul, are reported to be dissatisfied with the nomination of Abdoola Jan. The Ameer himself and the officers of his Court are evidently anxious as to the attitude which Sirdar Yakoob Khan may assume, and various proposals for his removal from the Government of Herat, and for attacking him from Furrak, &c., have been discussed in the State Council. At one time it was proposed that the Ameer himself should go to Candahar for the winter, with a view to check him should he attempt a movement; but this project was over-ruled.

4. It seems to us very doubtful whether Sirdar Yakoob Khan will quietly acquiesce in the nomination of his younger brother. But he is reported to have no funds, and it seems improbable that he will attempt any movement at present until circumstances be more favourable for the assertion of his rights.

5. The Ameer has taken this important step, which is very likely to have a marked effect on the course of events in Afghanistan, without reference to the British Government, a circumstance which we consider fortunate. We could not have approved of the measure had we been previously consulted, nor could we have hoped to influence the Ameer's choice in the matter. In the reply to the Ameer no opinion as to the wisdom of the step which has been taken by the Ameer has been expressed, and the letter has been designedly couched, as nearly as circumstances admit, in the same language as that in which, in 1858, the Punjab Government were instructed to reply to the letter from Dost Mahomed Khan, intimating the selection of Shere Ali as heir-apparent in supercession of his elder brother, Mahomed Afzul Khan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
R. TEMPLE.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from his Highness the AMEER of CABUL to his Excellency the VICEROY, dated 9th Shawul A.H. 1290, corresponding with the 30th November 1873.

BE it known that the recent sudden illness with which we were seized caused general consternation and anxiety, so much so that certain of the chief personages of the State and officers of the Government assembled together and after mutual consultation made a unanimous representation to the effect that, in accordance with the approved custom of ancient kings, and for the purpose of securing the welfare of the subjects of this kingdom, it was absolutely essential to appoint an heir and successor to the throne.

On hearing these representations from the said officers of the State, we ordered the matter to be referred for consultation and deliberation, and a few days before the auspicious occurrence of the Eedool Fitr all the nobles of exalted rank, the chief and leading men of Afghanistan, after careful deliberation cast the dice of this auspicious fate in the name of Sirdar Abdoolla Jan, whose stature of ability they judged would best befit the regal robes of sovereignty after our removal from this world.

Accordingly, on Sunday, the 1st Shawul, being the opening day of the festival, we honoured and exalted Sirdar Abdoolla Jan with the title of heir-apparent agreeably to the sincere desire of all classes of our subjects, and all the followers of Islam opened their lips in prayer for our son, and stretching forth their hands in acknowledgment of his selection recognized him as their absolute sovereign, ruler over all the territories of Afghanistan, &c., and master of the entire country and army of this Government. They submitted, moreover, a formal document recognizing the Sirdar as heir-apparent and sovereign.

Since there has always existed a firm and constant friendship between this State and the British Government, it has been deemed fitting to afford information of this matter, which has been approved by all classes in the State, and accordingly the present letter has been written.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

KHUREETA, dated 21st January 1874.

From VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness Ameer SHERE ALI KHAN, Wali of Cabul and its Dependencies.

I HAVE received your Highness' friendly letter of 9th Shawul A. H. 1290, corresponding with 30th November 1873, and trust that your Highness has completely recovered from the illness which afflicted you. I pray that your Highness may still enjoy many years of life and good health during which the cords of friendship may be drawn yet closer, and that Sirdar Abdoolla Jan, whom, with a view to the welfare of your kingdom, you have appointed to be heir-apparent, may, under your Highness' tuition, learn to conduct the Government with the same wisdom and success.

Consider me always as your Highness' friend, and sincerely desirous of the prosperity of your kingdom.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself your Highness' sincere friend.

No. 28.

No. 7 of 1874.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To His Grace the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Fort William, 23rd January 1874.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 75, dated 15th September 1873, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the enclosed correspondence between the Viceroy and the Ameer of Afghanistan.*

* From His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan, dated 13th November 1873.

To His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan, dated 23rd January 1874.

2. We propose shortly, in a separate Despatch, to lay before your Grace some general considerations regarding Afghanistan, and we shall reserve till then our remarks on this correspondence.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

NORTHBROOK.

B. H. ELLIS.

H. W. NORMAN.

ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.

E. C. BAYLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 28.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMEER of CABUL to His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA, dated Cabul, 21st Rumzan 1290 A.H., corresponding with 13th November 1873.

BE it known to your Excellency that at this happy time, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah arrived here and delivered to me your welcome letters. As these letters contained intelligence of your Excellency's good health, the perusal of their contents afforded me much pleasure. I am deeply thankful for the honour, respect, and kind attention with which your Excellency and the officers of the British Government, out of regard to the relations of amity subsisting between the two Governments, treated my Envoy. God be praised that the bud of welfare of both the States continues expanded. I entertain a hope that the relations of friendship and amity between the two great Governments may become stronger day by day.

All that has been written regarding the northern boundary I have fully understood, and I offer up my grateful thanks to the Almighty that peace and tranquillity have, praise be to God, been established in all States in perpetuity, and that doubts and disputes have on every side been removed; and that such security has been established in all countries that no aggressions will take place, nor will any power raise discussions or disputes with another within the dominions of that power; and that the use of inimical expressions has been discontinued in diplomatic correspondence, and that peace and tranquillity have been secured to the whole world.

In respect to the brief mention that your Excellency has made of the Seistan question, your Excellency has observed that, "to this I have no objections on the understanding that the exercise of that right is not to be made a pretext for the annexation to Afghanistan of any portion of the Persian dominions, and that any military force which may cross the frontier for the above purpose shall retire to its own territory as soon as its object is accomplished. This condition is made on account of the existence of a similar stipulation in the Treaty of Paris between England and Persia regarding the violation of the Persian frontier by Afghanistan."

Your Excellency! if the Seistan matter had been decided in accordance with the 6th Article of the Treaty concluded at Paris there would have been nothing further to be said. Your Excellency has observed that it is advisable that I should issue stringent orders to my boundary officers to refrain from interference on the Persian border. From the commencement to this day I have, out of regard for the British Government, issued stringent instructions to these officers on the subject. Now again I issue strict orders to my officers on the frontier, warning them to abstain as before from interference on the Persian border.

The friendly declaration of your Excellency to the effect that you will maintain towards myself the same policy which was followed by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo has been the cause of much gratification to me. My friend! under this circumstance of the case it was not necessary to hold all those conversations with Syud Noor Mahomed Shah at Simla. The understanding arrived at in Umballa is quite sufficient. As long as the beneficent Government of Her Majesty the Queen of England continues firm and constant in its friendship I shall also, please God, remain firm in my sincere friendship, as on the occasion of my meeting at Umballa with Lord Mayo, whose writing I hold in my possession, as also a document from Lord Lawrence. Of this friendship your Excellency may rest assured.

Mr. Macnabb, the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawur Division, wrote through the British Agent at Cabul to the effect that Colonel Baker wishes permission to come to Hindoostan from

Teheran through Cabul. Your Excellency! my Envoy at interviews and conversations with your Excellency explained the many objections that exist to men like Colonel Baker and others travelling in Afghanistan. I therefore do not think it necessary to allude to the subject further.

I hope your Excellency will consider me as your sincere friend, and will continue to gratify me with friendly letters containing accounts of your good health.

Enclosure 2 in No. 28.

Khureeta, dated Fort William, 23rd January 1874.

From VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness the AMEER SHERE ALI KHAN, Walee of Cabul and its Dependencies.

YOUR Highness' letter of 21st Rumzan 1290 A.H., corresponding with 13th November 1873, has been received and considered by me with the attention due to the importance of its contents. I fully reciprocate the hope expressed by your Highness, that the relations of friendship between the two Governments may become stronger day by day.

The intimation made to me that your Highness has fully understood all that has been written regarding the northern boundary, and that as regards Seistan you have again issued strict orders to your officers on the frontier, warning them to abstain as before from interference on the Persian border, is a cause of satisfaction to me.

There are, however, some matters referred to in my letter of 6th September 1873, and the papers attached thereto, on which I have not been favoured with an expression of your Highness' views. There are others in regard to which I judge from your Highness' reply that the views of the British Government have perhaps not been fully understood. My friend! considering it due to our established friendship that I should withhold no manifestation of the friendly interest which the British Government takes in your Highness and the prosperity of Afghanistan, or of my personal desire to see your Highness' Government strengthened and your dominions transmitted to your descendants in their integrity, I was perfectly unreserved and explicit in my communications with your Highness' Envoy, and I cannot expect to make matters plainer by explanations beyond the terms of my previous letters to your Highness, which were designedly framed by me with the view of drawing the cords of friendship still closer and of giving your Highness assurances of support even more explicit than those contained in the auspicious writings of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo to which your Highness has referred.

It is not always easy for friends who are far removed from each other to adjust the details of important questions affecting their common welfare by means of letters. Your Highness will therefore probably agree with me that it will be preferable to postpone the further discussion of the matters now under consideration till some more convenient opportunity.

My friend! with regard to the request made by Colonel Baker through the Commissioner of Peshawur, that officer returned to England some time ago and abandoned his intention of travelling to India through Afghanistan. I am aware of the difficulty in which your Highness is placed with regard to the reception of guests in Afghanistan. It is usual, however, to express regret when the request of the servant of a friendly power, preferred through the constituted authorities, cannot be complied with, and I feel sure that your Highness regrets your inability to welcome the servants of Her Majesty the Queen in the same manner as I receive your Highness' servants and subjects in India.

I beg again to assure your Highness that I fully understand and appreciate the difficulties of Afghanistan with reference to political events, and that I sincerely sympathise with your Highness in the anxieties which you have more than once expressed. I trust that your Highness' reign may be prolonged, and that the peace which so happily prevails throughout your dominions may remain long unbroken by enemies from without or by rebels from within.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness and to subscribe myself your Highness' sincere friend.

No. 28A.

No. 17 of 1874.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret (extract).

To the Most Honourable the MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, 6th March 1874.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government,

copy of a letter* from the Commissioner of Peshawur, giving over to a communication from the British Agent at Cabul, who reports the arrival at that place of Ibrahim Khan, an Inspector of Police in the Punjab, who is attached to the Yarkund Mission. Ibrahim Khan was sent by Mr. Forsyth from Kashgar on the 1st January with instructions to proceed to Cabul by

* No. 88,470, dated 26th February 1874.

the Pamir and Budukshan route, and deliver to the Ameer a letter expressing a wish that the Yarkund Mission may be permitted to return to India through Afghanistan. It will be seen that the Ameer has as yet given no definite reply to this request.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 28A.

No. 88-470, dated 26th February 1874.

From COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division, to SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, Foreign Department.

SUBMITS, for the information of the Supreme Government, translation of a letter from Ata Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Cabul, dated 19th current, to the address of Commissioner, Peshawur Division, together with enclosure.

Enclosure 2 in No. 28A.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER, dated 19th February 1874, from ATA MAHOMED KHAN, Cabul Agent, to the COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

YESTERDAY (18th instant) Inspector Ibrahim Khan arrived here and came to stay in my house. I immediately obtained the honour of presenting myself to the Ameer and informed him of his arrival. The Ameer expressed a wish to see him at once, so the Inspector proceeded to the Durbar, and had the honour of being presented to His Highness. He delivered two letters addressed to His Highness, one from Mr. Forsyth and the other from Dr. Bellew. The Ameer, with expressions of gratification, read the letters. The tenor of the letter was to express a wish to return *via* Budukshan and Turkistan.

His Highness, after making some enquiries from Ibrahim Khan about the state of affairs in the countries he had come through, observed in course of conversation, "Yarkund lies at a vast distance from the territories of the British Government and is close to the confines of the Russian possessions. I cannot understand what advantage is looked for by the establishment of this intercourse, but I suppose the officers of the British Government see some prospect in view of results favourable to the interests of their Government." After a short interval the Ameer gave the Inspector leave to retire. Ibrahim Khan brought a letter for me from Mr. Forsyth, a copy of which I annex. I shall not fail to report whatever is done in this matter in Durbar, and so far as I am able will endeavour to give assistance in promoting the object in view.

Naib Mahomed Alum Khan treated Ibrahim Khan with honour and hospitality, and sent his own peshkhidmut with him to Cabul. He has brought letters for Syud Noor Mahomed Shah also, and I will take the first favourable opportunity of presenting him to the Syud.

Enclosure 3 in No. 28A.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER, dated Kashgar, the 1st January 1874, from D. T. FORSYTH, C.B., Esq., to ATA MAHOMED KHAN, BRITISH AGENT at CABUL.

You have no doubt heard of a mission having been sent by the British Government to Yarkund and Kashgar. Our present intention is that I and the other officers who accompany me, after concluding such arrangements as we were desirous of making in these parts, which by the grace of God have been accomplished according to our wishes, should return to Hindostan by way of Budukshan and Turkistan, and have the honour of an interview with His Highness the Ameer. I explained all this to Syud Noor Mahomed Shah at Simla, and doubtless he has ere this brought it to the notice of the Ameer. At present his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India has sanctioned my

returning to Hindostan *via* Budukshan and Turkistan, provided that His Highness the Ameer has no objection to offer to the arrangement. I have therefore sent the bearer of this letter, who is attached to this mission, with a letter to His Highness the Ameer, which I shall be obliged by your presenting to His Highness on the first favourable opportunity after its reaching you. Have the goodness also to explain to Syud Noor Mahomed Shah that I confidently believed that the authority of the Ameer is all powerful in the countries through which the mission would have to travel, that is to say from Sirikol to Wakhan and Killa Panja; there is only the Pamir desert which is under the authority of the Meer of Wakhan, a tributary of Budukshan. It is an uninhabited plain, but caravans of merchants and traders are constantly passing over it. All the rest of the way from Faizabad to Kundooz and Khulm and on to Cabul there are frequented roads through a populous country, and it is possible to make arrangements for carriage, &c. from place to place with the assistance of the local Governors. The best arrangement would be that His Highness should send a trustworthy and responsible person with intelligent attendants to me to Kashgar, that I might make all arrangements with him about the journey, stages, supplies, &c., and that His Highness the Ameer might issue such orders as he may think necessary at suitable times. I hope that you will give such assistance as you can in this matter.

No. 29.

No. 28 of 1874.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Most Honourable the MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, 1st May 1874.

WITH reference to our Despatch, No. 7, dated 23rd January last, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, translation of a letter from the Ameer of Cabul, dated 10th ultimo, which is a reply to the communication sent by the Viceroy to His Highness on the 23rd January.

2. From the further paper herewith forwarded, which gives cover to the Cabul Agent's letter of the 11th instant, it will be seen that the return of Mr. Forsyth's Mission from Kashgar by way of Budukshan is considered by the Ameer Shere Ali inadvisable with reference to the present posture of affairs in Afghanistan in consequence of the designs of Sirdar Yakooob Khan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
JOHN INGLIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 29.

TRANSLATION of a KHUREETA from the AMEER of CABUL, dated 22nd Sufur 1291 A.H., corresponding with the 10th April 1874.

BE it known that I received on the 28th Zilhij your Excellency's friendly letter dated 23rd January 1874, which was written in reply to my communication of the 21st Ramzan 1290 A.H., and was gratified to receive accounts of your health and welfare.

With regard to the statement in the letter under reply to the effect that I had omitted to indicate my sentiments on the subject of your letter, My Lord! my opinion is identical with that which my Envoy represented and explained both verbally and in writing at Simla, on which occasion he neither

* This appears to mean "Notwithstanding that my Envoy's representations were sufficient I here again repeat that my sentiments, &c."

kept back nor concealed anything. Notwithstanding that* my sentiments are identical with those which were fully set forth in my letter of the 21st Ramzan, viz., that the arrangements made by Lord Lawrence and by Lord Mayo at the Umballa conference are sufficient, and that there is no need to repeat all this discussion.

What your Excellency has been pleased to indite with friendly pen to the effect that looking to the established friendship, the prosperity, welfare, and consolidation of my State is an object of consideration, and that in verbal and written communications with my Envoy at Simla there had been no concealment and no matter kept back.

It is full certain that the members of the exalted British Government, looking to the union of the two great States, will ever, and do ever, consider and regard the prosperity, welfare, and consolidation

† The construction here is obscure, and the connexion between this sentence and the following paragraph not at all clear.

of my kingdom because the exalted greatness of the kingdom of Her Majesty the Queen is more apparent than the sun and more plain than yesterday.† Looking to the requirements of friendship and amity, my Envoy, with a truthful and pure heart, made all those verbal and written representations at Simla, and explained fully what was in his mind without any reserve.

As to the sentiments of regret expressed by your Excellency, the fact is this, that I also experience regret and uneasiness, for this reason, that the people of Afghanistan are rude mountaineers, unendowed with knowledge and wisdom. Accordingly it is my endeavour day and night to teach these people wisdom, knowledge, and excellence, and I fervently hope that by degrees that even Afghanistan will share in the acquirement of knowledge and wisdom.

Your Excellency! Since Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, especially the former, possessed an intimate knowledge of Afghanistan and its frontiers, and your Excellency also must certainly have acquired the same knowledge, I, therefore, am desirous that your Excellency, after full and careful consideration of the approval expressed by Her Majesty the Queen, the "Sunnud" of Lord Lawrence and the decision of Lord Mayo, will remain firm and constant in order that Afghanistan and its territories may be maintained inviolate and secure.

A letter has recently been received by the hands of Ibrahim Khan, attached to the Yarkund Mission, from Mr. T. D. Forsyth, C.B. An exact copy of that letter and the reply is herewith forwarded. It is certain that Mr. Forsyth has not been informed of the objections of Afghanistan and the conversation which took place between your Excellency and my Envoy. Your Excellency will certainly (now) inform Mr. Forsyth.

Enclosure 2 in No. 29.

SUBSTANCE OF MR. FORSYTH'S LETTER to the AMEER,

AFTER reminding the Ameer of the previous occasions on which he had seen His Highness, and expressing regret at an opportunity having been afforded him of a further meeting, Mr. Forsyth says that His Highness was doubtless aware that when Syud Noor Mahomed was at Simla in the middle of last year he (Mr. Forsyth) had been deputed to conduct a Mission to Yarkund. He had then mentioned to the Syud that in order to gratify his desire for a meeting with the Ameer he had resolved to return to India *via* Budukshan.

Mr. Forsyth then informs the Ameer that the Mission has arrived, and of his intention, after its business was concluded, to proceed *via* Sir-i-kul and Budukshan and present himself to the Ameer.

As his Excellency the Viceroy had ordered that the return of the Mission by Budukshan was to be dependant on the will and pleasure of the Ameer, therefore Mr. Forsyth expressed a hope that arrangements might be made, and he proceeds to explain the nature of these arrangements.

The Ameer's reply to Mr. Forsyth is that the latter cannot be aware of the nature of the communications between his Excellency and Syud Noor Mahomed, but doubtless he would be informed of the same.

Enclosure 3 in No. 29.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER, dated 11th April 1874, from the AGENT at CABUL to COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

AFTER two days private discussion replies to the murrasilas received from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and Mr. Forsyth were written in the Cabul Durbar. The murrasila to the address of the Viceroy was sent to the Agency Office, and the other to Mr. Forsyth having been made over to Ibrahim Khan of the Yarkund Mission, a "Rukksatana" of four hundred rupees of Cabul currency cash, one Cashmeree shawl, and an embroidered broad cloth chogha were assigned to him. Unless any impediment presents itself, he (Ibrahim Khan) will return to Mr. Forsyth *via* Balkh and Budukshan, in company with Mirza Abdool Hadi Khan, Agent of Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, Governor of Balkh, to-morrow or the day after to-morrow. The views of the Cabul Government will become known to you by the contents of the murrasila to the address of his Excellency the Viceroy and the enclosed copy of the second murrasila.*

* Not received; will be asked for.

The Sadr-i-Azem observed to me privately as follows:—

"As regards Herat matters, if, through misfortune ('Na-Saadat Mandi'), Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan fails to arrive at a right conclusion (literally straight road, 'rah-i-rast') the Cabul Government will be constrained to send troops against Herat. In such case the Cabul authorities do not consider it advisable that Mr. Forsyth should return to India *via* Cabul, especially because when Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan took flight from Cabul he put off his uniform outside the city, and with a view to collecting short-sighted people ('Kotah-Andesh') he gave out that the Ameer on his return from India after the Umballa conference had abandoned the Mahomedan religion, and that he (the Sirdar) intended to wage religious war against His Highness with the aid of the Mussulmans of the country. If, therefore, Mr. Forsyth should come to this kingdom at a time when it is proposed that

troops should proceed to Herat the Sirdar will undoubtedly make ignorant people believe his former statement, and will thus find an opportunity to support his designs for raising disturbances, and the Cabul authorities will feel great anxiety lest any injury shall befall Mr. Forsyth."

The Ameer then desired me to insert his observations in Persian in this letter as follows:—

"While replies were being written to the murrasilas received from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and Mr. Forsyth, the members of the Durbar observed that it would be proper if it were written (to British Government) that the statements made by Meerakhor Ahmed Khan, Moolla Yahaya, and Khalifa Abdool Rahman, who have lately arrived from Herat, confirm the representations of the Cabul Envoy made before his Excellency the Viceroy at Simla about the obstacles (in the way of a safe journey) of Afghanistan, but that it is not advisable to make mention either colloquially or in writing of such matters from which no advantage can be derived."

The Ameer has written a friendly murrasila to Dr. Bellew and the Sadr-i-Azem one to Mr. Forsyth, to the effect that the views of the Cabul Durbar will become known to him from the Ameer's murrasila.

I have submitted a letter to Mr. Forsyth to the following effect:—

"Ibrahim Khan, Inspector, has been permitted to-day by the Ameer to return to you *viâ* Balkh and Budukshan. The views of the Cabul Government will be known to you from the Ameer's murrasila, which he bears, and he will give accounts of the state of affairs in this country. I am extremely sorry that I have not been able to fulfil my wish of having an interview with you at Cabul on account of the unsatisfactory state of the affairs of this kingdom. May God make you successful in your mission."

No. 30.

No. 70.—Government of India.

Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Most Honourable the MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, 20th November 1874.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the enclosed documents relative to the visit of Sirdar Mahomed Yakooob Khan to Cabool, and the arrest of the Sirdar by His Highness the Ameer.

2. The conditions on which Sirdar Yakooob Khan is understood to have visited his father are reported in the telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawur dated the 12th instant, and in the Cabool Diary of 3rd to 5th November. As our Agent at Cabool had reported that the Ameer was much gratified at the visit of his son, and had received him with kindness, we were unprepared for the intelligence we received on the 16th, that Yakooob Khan had been placed by the Ameer in custody a few days after his arrival.

3. We have not as yet been informed of the reason for the arrest. But considering our relations with the Ameer, our declared desire to see "a firm and merciful administration established in every province of Afghanistan," and "peace and tranquillity secured within the Ameer's borders," considering the assistance we have given to His Highness in money and arms to enable him to strengthen his position, considering also the previous fortunes of Yakooob Khan, and the fact that a temporary reconciliation between him and his father was effected through the influence of the Government of India in 1871, and bearing in mind the position of the Sirdar, we have deemed it right, although it is neither our desire nor our intention to interfere actively in the internal dissensions of Afghanistan, to address a message to the Ameer through our Agent, which we trust will prevent him from committing himself to any course calculated to disturb the peace of his kingdom, and to produce complications in his relations with the British Government.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

NORTHBROOK.

B. H. ELLIS.

H. W. NORMAN.

ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.

E. C. BAYLEY.

JOHN INGLIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 30.

Cabul Diary from the 27th to the 29th October 1874, inclusive.

URSULLA KHAN and Ismutoolla Khan, Ghilzai Chiefs, wrote to the Ameer that Sirdar Mahomed Yakooob Khan would arrive at Cabul on 1st November 1874, and His Highness assigned the Bagh-i-Shahi in the Bala Hissar for the residence of the Sirdar, and the stable of Sirdar Wullee Mahomed Khan for his horses. To-day Councils are being held in a private apartment as to the policy which should be assumed on and after the arrival of the Sirdar at Cabul, and His Highness has therefore been unable to hold an open Durbar. The adherents of the Sirdar, who had been entertaining great designs, feel now very anxious as to the steps which will be taken on their behalf and for the Sirdar. In reply to his application mentioned in the last diary, Naib Mahomed Allum Khan has been ordered to await instructions at Ghorian. It was first proposed that on his arrival at Ghorian he should be directed to come to Cabul to give Councils as to the measures to be adopted for Budukshan, or that written instructions might be sent to him.

One day in presence of the Agent the Ameer observed that, after the removal of his anxiety on account of Herat matters, he intended to go to Turkistan and Budukshan, returning to Cabul from Ghorian *via* the Hindoo Koosh, or to extend his journey by returning to Cabul from Turkistan *via* Maimena, Herat, and Candahar.

As Bahoo Khan, late Government farmer of Kunar, has not yet paid the arrears of his revenue, the Ameer lately became much annoyed with Mustowfee Hubeoollah Khan, and said that if the money was not recoverable he should pay it. The latter represented that the farm was not given without His Highness' consent, and this enraged the Ameer.

The people of the Cabul city went for three days to Jubba with alms to perform special prayers for the discontinuance of the earthquakes. Slight shocks are felt from time to time.

Enclosure 2 in No. 30.

Cabul Diary from the 30th October to the 2nd November 1874, inclusive.

THE Council mentioned in the last Diary resolved that according to the custom of the country every token of kindness should be shown to Sirdar Mahomed Yakooob Khan, and consequently trays of sweetmeats were sent on the road for him on the part of the Ameer, the heir-apparent, Sirdar Mahomed Ibrahim Khan, &c., and with the exception of the Mustowfee and the Sadr-i-Azem all the members of the Durbar and Chiefs and Sirdars were sent yesterday to receive him at Deh Bori. The Sirdar arrived at Cabul at 11 a.m., and according to the custom of the country (waited on the Ameer and) kissed His Highness' feet. The Ameer received him with kindness, and the Sirdar having presented 36 horses of superior breed and some choice cloth manufactures of Herat, such as "kurk," "kakuma," carpets, woollen "daris," &c., returned after half an hour under permission to the Bagh-i-Shahi. At present he gets cooked food from the Ameer's own kitchen; a cash ziafat will be assigned hereafter. At the time of his expressing his intention to return from Herat to Cabul, he proposed, as was reported before, to bring with him his younger brother, Sirdar Mahomed Ayoob Khan, five hundred cavalry, and all the Chiefs and Moollas of Herat, but he has brought only his Chief Agent, Abdool Zahir Khan, two or three Chiefs, and one hundred cavalry. Meer Murtza Shah, the Mutwali of the shrine of Hazrat Abdoollah, has gone by his permission from Candahar to Mecca. Further accounts will follow after enquiry.

General Sufdur Ali Khan writes from Candahar to the Ameer that the Khan of Khelat has guaranteed the security of the Moolla Pass, and that the merchants intend to export their goods by that route; also that Said Mahomed Fazul Shah, the British correspondent (Candahar), died after three or four days' illness.

The earthquakes have now ceased for the last two days. Nazir Wali Mahomed Khan, the Governor of the Kohistan, reports the death of 7,052 persons in his country in consequence of these shocks, and though reports from Nijrab and Tagabs have not yet been received, it is probable that the number of persons killed there will exceed the above.

To-day the Ameer graciously sent for Ahmad Khan, the Agent's son, one of the horses presented to His Highness by Sirdar Mahomed Yakooob Khan, and the Agent gave a Peshawuree embroidered *lungi* and Rupees 20 cash to the servants who brought it.

Enclosure 3 in No. 30.

Telegram, dated 12th November 1874.

From COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

YAKOOB'S visit attributed to poverty; stipulated that he should not be detained more than ten days; should retain Herat Government; be excused waiting on or seeing heir-apparent, and be allowed to take back his adherents with him. All these points were conceded by Ameer's Agents, Ismutoolla and Ursulla Ghilzai.

Enclosure 4 in No. 30.

Telegram, dated 16th November 1874.

From DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

REPORTS, by desire of Commissioner, Ameer placed his son, Yakooob Khan, in custody on 8th instant.

Enclosure 5 in No. 30.

Telegram, No. 2470 P., dated 17th November 1874.

FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, Peshawur.

INSTRUCT Agent at Cabul to deliver following message to Ameer: Message begins:—

The Viceroy has been informed that Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan came to Cabul under a safe conduct from the Ameer, and that notwithstanding the safe conduct he has been placed in custody by His Highness. The Viceroy, as a friend and well-wisher to the Ameer, hopes this report is untrue, and desires strongly to urge His Highness to observe the conditions under which the Sirdar has come to Cabul. By so doing the Ameer will maintain his good name and the friendship of the British Government. The Viceroy would be glad to receive early assurances to this effect, and to be correctly informed of what has taken place. Message ends.

Translate carefully message which Agent should read, having no discretion to vary terms thereof.

If before despatch of message from Peshawur further information should arrive, telegraph it at once and detain message pending instructions.

Enclosure 6 in No. 30.

Cabul Diary from the 3rd to the 5th November 1874, inclusive.

YESTERDAY (4th) a letter from Khan Bahadoor Ibrahim Khan to my address reached me, written

There was a letter also for Sir D. Forsyth and myself; the former is being forwarded to its addressee to-day, the latter was only a covering letter.

(Sd.) F. R. POLLOCK,
Commissioner.

on 19th October, from Wakhan, to effect that he had safely arrived on previous day at Killa Punja, and nothing preventing would on following day (20th October) start on his return journey. If Mirza Abdool Hadi Khan (Agent of Naib Mahomed Allum Khan sent with Ibrahim Khan from Cabul) decided on taking the Hindoo Koosh route, they would quickly reach

Cabul. If the Tashkurghan road should be taken, then some little delay would be caused.

When Ismutoola Khan and Ursulla Khan reached Herat, Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan told them that if they would take oath with him on four points he would feel reassured and would accompany them to Cabul, otherwise owing to want of confidence he must decline to accompany them—

- 1st. Herat to remain as now in his hands.
- 2nd. Ameer not to detain him more than ten days in Cabul.
- 3rd. That he should be excused from visiting the heir-apparent, and from holding interview or shaking hands with him.
- 4th. That he should be allowed to bring back with him to Herat without hindrance any of his adherents.

On this Ismutoola Khan and Ursulla Khan feeling helpless in the matter agreed to all four points, writing them in a Koran, and taking oath regarding them. It is also reported that the Sirdar has been obliged to return to Cabul, because, under the idea that he would be able to complete his designs, he entertained a large number of troops, but in consequence of his pecuniary embarrassment and the small revenue of Herat, he found himself unable to pay their salaries. Some of the troops received four months' pay and others six months' pay (in the year), and consequently all these troops were dissatisfied with him and anxious for the arrival of the Ameer. First the Sirdar prepared a list of some of the Chiefs of Herat with a view to bringing them to Cabul, but afterwards he abandoned this idea, fearing lest they should report to the Ameer that they had got no allowances, and thus reveal all the circumstances of Herat to His Highness. He has therefore brought only a few Cabulees with him. The Sirdar attends the Durbar in the morning and evening every day, and the Ameer receives him ostensibly with kindness. Councils are being held by the members of the Durbar as to the policy which should be adopted towards him. They say that should he be allowed to return to Herat, the same anxiety and vexation will be felt on account of him which have been hitherto felt, and that should he be kept at Cabul it would tend to difficulties. It appears from the tenor of their observations that they are of opinion that he should be sent back of necessity to Herat. These Councils have not been yet brought to conclusion.

Naib Mahomed Allum Khan writes to the Ameer that, as the climate of Ghorian did not agree with him, he got fever and arrived at Mazar-i-Sharif, and that although on the road he received His Highness' orders for remaining at Ghorian, he did not go back in consequence, and that he was ready to present himself wherever His Highness might order him.

On the authority of General Sufdur Ali Khan's letter mentioned in the last Diary, the Sadr-i-Azem has written to Futteh Khan, Governor of Candahar, to enquire by a murrasila from the Khan of Khelat whether he has really made arrangements with traders to open the Moola Pass for them.

General Sufdur Ali Khan has sent to the Ameer two lakhs of rupees (Candahar currency) on account of Government revenue, 180 camels, and 60 loads of horse coverings of "Namda," prepared in Candahar.

Slight shocks of earthquakes have recommenced for the last two days in Cabul.

To-day, by order of the Ameer, the Commander-in-Chief brought out nine infantry and two cavalry regiments to the grass plain near the chief private serai to salute His Highness.

No. 30 A.

Government of India—Foreign Department.

Secret. (No. 1.)

To the Most Honourable the MARQUIS of SALISBURY, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, 1st January 1875.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers specified in the accompanying Abstract of Contents, relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
W. MUIR.

Enclosure 1 in No. 30 A.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AGENT at CABUL to the COMMISSIONER and
SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division, dated 14th December 1874.

AFTER reading your letter of 18th November 1874 to me, in the matter of Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan, the chief members of the Darbar observed privately as follows in surprise :—

“We do not understand as to what judgment is given in all religions against a son who having rebelled against his father resolves to ruin him. We need not describe the misbehaviour of Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan, such as the writing of an (insolent) epistle to the Ameer at the time of his departure from Herat; causing ruination to people from Cabul to Herat; killing Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan, his son, and some other Chiefs; plundering the city of Herat, murdering the Commander-in-Chief (Feramorz Khan); making the Chiefs and people at large in the neighbourhood of Herat uneasy, and disobeying the orders of the Ameer. All these faults are as evident as daylight. When the Sirdar was unable to deal with the people of Herat, and he returned to Cabul, it was not advisable to send him back as Governor of Herat, but the Ameer, through paternal affection, notwithstanding the above serious faults, sent him to that territory, under the impression that probably he would keep in view His Highness' fresh kindness, and in repentance of previous misbehaviour would in future not deviate from submission to His Highness. However, the Sirdar, owing to his evil disposition and by reason of associating with mean people, did not desist from his rebellious designs, and, contrary to the interests of the Government, entered into negotiations with the Persian Envoy without the permission of the Ameer, and though His Highness made enquiry he did not inform him of the real object of the deputation of the Envoy. Now the Ameer has kept him under surveillance in his chief apartment (lit. has given him a place). The real object is to bring the Sirdar to a right conclusion, to show kindness to him again, and to relieve the people of Afghanistan from apprehension as to the security of the border. Taking into consideration the conduct of the Sirdar the Cabul Government recently felt anxiety lest he should be made an officer of a foreign State (Persia), take action against the interests of this Government and throw all the people of Afghanistan into serious danger; otherwise, it is evident that a father never becomes an ill-wisher of his son. Fathers always wish that his children may turn out best of all in the world, in all virtues, and gain a name for their family. Should by any accident private disputes occur between father and son it is advisable that other people should put a veil on them (“chashmposhi”). It is not heard that there is any room (for claim) for the fulfilment of conditions and stipulations between son and father. The British Government has sent a communication in this private affair between the son and the father, and we do not understand as to what is their real object as regards the interests of Afghanistan. The Ameer will have to endure a heavy injury to State and private matters in the release of Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan.”

In short, the Ameer has given a Persian reply in this matter, every word of which is herewith submitted.

Enclosure 2 in No. 30A.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AGENT at CABUL to the COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division, dated 14th December 1874.

TO-DAY, in reply to your letter of 18th November 1874, to me, in the matter of Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan, the Ameer observed as follows:—

“In reality the recommendation of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India is based on friendship and well-wishing. There is no necessity for describing the misbehaviour and misconduct which has frequently come to light on the part of Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan. There can be no doubt that they (acts) are not hidden from his Excellency. I feel shame in repeating them. Mention before a father of the evil actions of his son undoubtedly tends to increase the father's shame. Sincere, intelligent friends, owing to their sound judgment and farsightedness, do not like under any circumstances to put their faithful friends to such shame. Should Government's guidance be serviceable to him (the son) what difficulty is there in enabling him to regain good fortune (“saadat”)? As regards the friendship existing between the two Governments (viz., the English and Afghan Governments), by the help and grace of God, it is being confirmed and consolidated every day and every minute. Neither on the part of the British Government nor on the part of the Afghan Government does any unsuitable action occur against (or opposed to) the purport of former written or verbal communications which might tend to any sort of displeasure or annoyance to his Excellency. By the grace of God, in future also the friendship existing between the two Governments will continue to increase.”

No. 31.

Secret, No. 2.

To the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

MY LORD,

22nd January 1875.

HER MAJESTY'S Government have followed with anxious attention the progress of events in Central Asia, and on the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan. Though no immediate danger appears to threaten the interests of Her Majesty in those regions, the aspect of affairs is sufficiently grave to inspire solicitude, and to suggest the necessity of timely precaution.

2. In considering the questions of policy which arise from time to time, Her Majesty's advisers cannot but be struck with the comparative scantiness of the information which it is in your Excellency's power to supply. For knowledge of what passes in Afghanistan and upon its frontiers they are compelled to rely mainly upon the indirect intelligence which reaches them through the Foreign Office.

3. Your Excellency maintains a Native Agent at Cabul. I am informed that he is a man of intelligence and respectability. But it appears to be very doubtful whether he is in a condition to furnish you with any facts which it is not the Ameer's wish that you should receive. Even if you could rely upon the perfect frankness of his communications, it is not likely that any Native Agent would possess a sufficient insight into the policy of western nations to collect the information you require. One of the principal qualifications for this function is the neutrality of feeling in respect to religious and national controversies which only a European can possess. Of the value of the Cabul diaries different opinions are expressed. It is obvious that they are very meagre, and doubts have been thrown upon their fidelity.

4. Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that more exact and constant information is necessary to the conduct of a circumspect policy at the present juncture. The disposition of the people in various parts of Afghanistan, the designs and intrigues of its Chiefs, the movement of nomad tribes upon its frontier, the influence which foreign powers may possibly be exerting within and without its borders, are matters of which a proper account can only be rendered to you by an English Agent residing in the country. There are many details, moreover, a knowledge of which it is material that the military authorities should possess, and with respect to which it is not to be expected that a Native Agent would be either able or willing to collect for your Government trustworthy information.

5. I have therefore to instruct you to take measures, with as much expedition as the circumstances of the case permit, for procuring the assent of the Ameer to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat. When this is accomplished it may be desirable to take a similar step with regard to Kandahar. I do not suggest any similar step with respect to Cabul, as I am sensible of the difficulties which are interposed by the fanatic violence of the people.

6. The Ameer has more than once in former years expressed his readiness to permit the presence of an Agent at Herat, and it is therefore not possible that, if his intentions are still loyal, he will make any serious difficulty now. But if he should do so, your Excellency will doubtless point out to him that the interest which Her Majesty feels in the integrity of Afghanistan makes it essential that she should be able to receive, from the observations of her own officers, warnings of danger that may threaten it.

7. I have dwelt upon the importance of an English Agency at Herat exclusively for the sake of the information an English officer might collect. But it will have other material, though more indirect, results. It will be an indication of English solicitude for the safety of our allies, and may so tend to discourage counsels dangerous to the peace of Asia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 32.

No. 19 of 1875.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Most Honourable the MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 7th June 1875.

We have the honour to reply to your Lordship's Secret Despatch, No. 2, dated the 22nd January 1875, on the subject of the deputation of British Agents to Herat and Candahar.

2. In the Despatch under acknowledgment it was stated,—1st, that though no immediate danger appears to threaten the interests of Her Majesty, the aspect of affairs on the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan is sufficiently grave to inspire solicitude, and to suggest the necessity of timely precaution; 2nd, that Her Majesty's Government are compelled mainly to rely upon the indirect intelligence received through the English Foreign Office for a knowledge of what passes in Afghanistan and upon its frontiers, as the Native Agent of the Government of India at Cabul does not, and cannot be expected to, furnish the full and trustworthy information which is required; 3rd, that the Ameer of Cabul, having more than once in former years expressed his readiness to permit the presence of a British Agent at Herat, would probably raise no serious objection to the proposed arrangement if his intentions are still loyal.

3. We were accordingly instructed to take measures, with as much expedition as the circumstances of the case permit, for procuring the assent of the Ameer to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat. The adoption of a similar arrangement at Candahar was indicated as a desirable measure to be taken hereafter, but having regard to the fanatical violence of the people the establishment of a British Agency at Cabul was not suggested.

4. By telegram from the Viceroy despatched on the 18th February 1875 your Lordship was informed that in our judgment the time and circumstances appeared unsuitable for taking the initiative in this matter; that nothing was traceable among the records of the Government of India showing that the Ameer had ever expressed his readiness to agree to the presence of a British Agent at Herat; that His Highness might have objections to such an arrangement, and yet that those objections might not indicate disloyal intentions on his part towards the British Government. We therefore inquired whether the instructions of Her Majesty's Government were to be carried out at once, or whether a discretion was left to the Government of India with respect to time and opportunity.

5. In answer to the above inquiry we received your Lordship's telegram despatched on the 23rd February 1875, by which we were informed that a delay of three or four months would be within the discretion contemplated by the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, but that for any further delay our reasons should be stated. We were also referred to certain papers in support of the statement that the Ameer had expressed his readiness to accept a British Agent at Herat, and we were directed to ascertain the fact from Sir Richard Pollock, Commissioner of Peshawur, Mr. Thornton, Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, and Mr. Girdlestone, Resident in Nepal.

6. The Viceroy had arranged to be at Delhi towards the end of March, and it was therefore deemed desirable that further consideration of the subject should be postponed until his Excellency should have had the opportunity of conferring personally with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and with some of the officers whose names have been mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The conference took place on the 23rd March 1875, and on the 24th your Lordship was informed by telegraph that the opinions of the officers of the Punjab were adverse to the proposal that the Ameer should be pressed to accept a British officer as Agent at Herat. We added that the views of those officers who had been consulted would be considered at Simla, and the opinion of the Government of India would then be communicated to Her Majesty's Government.

7. We at once addressed the Government of the Punjab for the purpose of obtaining the recorded opinions of the Lieutenant-Governor and such experienced officers of the Punjab as his Honour might consider competent to advise on the subject. The following points were indicated as those to which attention should be directed:—

First.—Whether the Ameer of Afghanistan would willingly consent to the appointment of British officers as Residents at Herat and Candahar, or at either place.

Second.—Whether the presence of such Residents at either place would be advantageous to the British Government.

Third.—Whether the Lieutenant-Governor was satisfied with the sufficiency and accuracy of the intelligence received from the British Agent at Cabul, and if not, whether his Honour could suggest any way of procuring fuller and more accurate intelligence.

8. Mr. Girdlestone, Resident in Nepal, was also asked whether he could call to mind the authority from which the information recorded in his note of the 26th March 1869 was derived, that the Ameer was prepared, if requested, to allow European Agents at Candahar, Herat, and Balkh.

9. The replies to our inquiries have been received. They are enumerated in the accompanying Abstract of Contents, and they form the basis of the opinions which we now submit for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

10. Before entering upon the question whether, at the present time and under existing circumstances, it would be politic to request the assent of the Ameer of Cabul to the residence of British officers within his dominions, we desire to notice the two other points mentioned in the Despatch of 22nd January 1875, namely, first, the value of the intelligence at present received through our Native Agent at Cabul, and, second, the statement that the Ameer has more than once in former years expressed his readiness to allow the presence of an European Agent at Herat.

11. As regards the first of these two points, we are of opinion that the value of the reports which we receive from our Agent at Cabul has been under-estimated, and we have no recollection of important intelligence relating to Afghan affairs having been communicated to us from Teheran, or from England, through the Foreign Office. Information respecting the condition of the Turkestan frontier of Afghanistan will probably be obtained with greater promptness and accuracy through Persia than through Afghanistan.

12. It is no doubt true that the position of the Native Agent at Cabul compels him to be cautious in communicating news to the British Government. As observed by Sir Richard Pollock, "Any native who took a perfectly independent tone at Cabul and made no secret of reporting regularly to his Government without reference to the wishes of the Ameer all information that he believed to be correct would very shortly find his position at Cabul unbearable." We think, moreover, that in endeavouring to keep on friendly terms with the Ameer, the Agent does no more than common prudence would dictate, and that he shows a right judgment in omitting to report every idle rumour that may come to his hearing.

13. We have no reason, however, to believe that information of importance has been withheld, or that the intelligence reported in the Cabul Diaries has been subjected to the approval of the Ameer, and we would refer as illustrations of our meaning to the two

Diaries numbered 12 and 13 in the Abstract of Contents. In both these Diaries there are allusions to the conduct of the Governor of Afghan Turkestan, and in the Diary for the period from the 4th to 6th May 1875 it is mentioned that two adherents of Sirdar Mahomed Yakooob Khan had been blown from guns. We think that these and other particulars contained in the Diaries are not pieces of intelligence which the Ameer of Cabul would be desirous of bringing to the knowledge of the British Government.

14. On the whole, we are of opinion that, making due allowances for the position of our Agent at Cabul, the information which he supplies is fairly full and accurate. In this conclusion we are supported generally by the views of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and his most experienced officers. There are doubts indeed as to the sufficiency of the intelligence given, but we think that a retrospect of the series of Diaries relating to recent events at Herat will prove that the value of the information is not destroyed by such defects. The correctness of our Agent's reports has been corroborated by confidential information which we obtain from time to time from Afghanistan.

15. On the second point mentioned in the 10th paragraph of this Despatch, namely, that the Ameer had more than once in former years expressed his readiness to permit the presence of a British Agent at Herat, we invite special attention to the Memorandum of Secret Records in the Punjab Office which is appended to Mr. Thornton's note of the 21st April 1875. It will be observed that the person on whose authority the statement respecting the intentions of the Ameer in some measure depended has since affirmed that, so far as he could ascertain at Umballa in 1869, it was the belief of the Afghan councillors that the Ameer had never agreed to the location of British officers in Afghanistan.

16. Sir Richard Pollock and Mr. Thornton, from whom the information recorded in Mr. Girdlestone's note of the 26th March 1869 was supposed to have been derived, are not under the impression that the disposition of the Ameer was such as was described in Mr. Girdlestone's note. Mr. Girdlestone's information was not obtained from the Ameer himself. No admission on the part of the Ameer of his readiness to receive (European) British Agents in Afghanistan is to be found in any document that passed between the Government of India and the Ameer. The subject was not mentioned at the official interviews between Noor Mahomed Shah and the Foreign Secretary on the 1st and 3rd of April 1869 when the question of the mission of Native Agents alone was discussed. It was not alluded to by Lord Mayo in his conferences with the Ameer; nor was the future establishment of British Agents in Afghanistan reported to the Secretary of State as one of the results of the Umballa conferences.

17. On the contrary, we find that in the Despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, No. 213, dated 1st July 1869—a Despatch written for the purpose of explaining some doubts which had been expressed by the Duke of Argyll

as to the policy of the negotiations with the Ameer—it was said:
Paragraph 16. “We distinctly intimated to the Ameer...that no European officers

Paragraph 20. “would be placed as Residents in his cities,” and “the position at

the close of the conferences may, in the Viceroy's words confidentially addressed to your Grace, be summed up as follows:—

“1st.—What the Ameer is not to have: No treaty, no fixed subsidy, no European troops, officers, or Residents.”

18. On the other hand, Captain Grey, who was in confidential communication with the Ameer and his Minister, Noor Mahomed Shah, at Umballa has stated in his letter dated 29th March 1875 that “the Ameer *did* freely consent to the appointment of “European British Officers in Balkh, Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul.” But it will be observed that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab has expressed strong doubts as to whether the meaning of the Ameer may not have been misapprehended. Sir Robert Davies believes that, while the Ameer may have been ready to acquiesce in the appointment of mere news-writers, his Highness was never prepared to accede to the appointment of Political Agents within his dominions.

19. On the whole, however, we think that either the Ameer himself or his Minister, Noor Mahomed Shah, did in confidential communications with Captain Grey express a readiness to accept at some future time not far distant the presence of British Agents at places in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself. But our impression is that the intimation was intended to be contingent either upon the receipt of far more substantial assistance than was promised the Ameer at the Umballa conferences, or upon the conclusion of a Dynastic Treaty, that is, upon obtaining the recognition, in a treaty with the British

Government, of his son Abdoola Jan as his successor. Such a formal recognition His Highness was anxious to secure, but Lord Mayo, for obvious reasons, declined to entertain the proposal.

20. Looking to all the circumstances of the case, the absence of any formal record of the alleged admission, its entirely private and confidential nature, and the uncertainty as to its scope and intention, we consider that we should not be justified in founding any representation to the Ameer regarding the mission of a British Agent to Herat upon the assumption that he had, when at Umballa, expressed his willingness to agree to such an arrangement; nor do we think that, in forming an opinion upon the Ameer's reception of any such proposal at the present time, we could fairly attach any importance to the communications which were made to Captain Grey at Umballa in 1869. Of any previous or subsequent acceptance of such a proposal by the Ameer we can find no trace.

21. We now proceed to consider the question whether, putting aside the supposition that the Ameer has on previous occasions assented to the proposal, it would be wise and politic to urge upon him the establishment of a British Agency at Herat or Candahar. And here we invite attention to the opinions of the able and experienced officers whose letters accompany this Despatch.

22. If the concurrence of all those who may be supposed to have the means of forming a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Ameer is of any value, we must be prepared to find him most unwilling to receive a British Agent at Herat. On this the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Richard Pollock, Major-General Reynell Taylor, Colonel Munro, and Captain Cavagnari are all agreed, and their views are confirmed—

First.—By those of Nawab Foujdar Khan and Nawab Gholam Hassan Khan, who have successively served as British Agent at Cabul, and who have means of knowing the present sentiments of the Ameer.

Second.—By the opinion of Noor Mahomed Shah, the Cabul Envoy, who, when at Simla in 1873, advised the Foreign Secretary that a specific request should not be preferred to the Ameer for British officers to be stationed within the Afghan dominions.

Third.—By the recent acts of the Ameer in objecting to permit Sir D. T. Forsyth to traverse Balkh on his return journey from Yarkund and in discouraging* Colonel Baker from returning to India from Teheran *via* Cabul.

* *Vide* enclosures of our Despatch, No. 7, dated 23rd January 1874.

23. Assuming that the Ameer would object to the location of a British Agent at Herat, we are not of opinion that his objection would imply that his intentions have ceased to be loyal towards the British Government. It is true that such an objection, if raised by an European Power, or even by some Asiatic rulers, although it might be justifiable by the principles of international law, would evince a disposition but little removed from actual hostility; but the motives of the Ameer cannot, in our opinion, fairly be judged by this standard.

24. There can be no reasonable doubt that there still exists a strong party among the Sirdars of Afghanistan opposed to the measure. Although the time which has elapsed since the Afghan war appears to us to be long on account of the succession of Governors-General of India, and the importance of the events that have intervened, there are many persons living in Afghanistan who were engaged in that war, and whose memory of what took place is probably the more lively from the narrow limits of their thoughts and actions. Those who have had the most intimate acquaintance with Afghanistan have always expressed their opinion that the establishment of complete confidence between the Afghans and the British must be a work of time, and this opinion will be found repeated in the enclosures of this Despatch.

25. We consider that the reluctance of the Ameer to consent to the presence of British officers in Afghanistan is attributable mainly to the adverse feeling entertained by an influential party in that country to the measure, and to the consequent unpopularity he would incur by consenting to it. His position in Afghanistan is not so secure that he can afford to neglect any strong feeling among an important section of his subjects. He may also be influenced by the possibility of the safety of the officers employed being

† *Vide* enclosure of our Despatch, No. 28, dated 1st May 1874.

endangered by the acts of fanatics. This danger was hinted† at by both the Sadr-i-Azem and the Ameer at the time when Sir T. D. Forsyth's return through Afghanistan was discussed in the Cabul Durbar. It was for these reasons that we thought the Ameer's refusal to allow Sir T. D. Forsyth to return through Afghanistan might reasonably be explained without assuming that it was prompted by an unfriendly feeling

towards the British Government, and we accordingly abstained from pressing him upon the subject.

26. Besides the above reasons, there is probably also the apprehension that the permanent location of British officers in Afghanistan would bring to light proceedings which would be condemned by our standard of right and wrong, and might find their way into the public press, of which the Ameer feels a great dread. We may again refer to the Diaries accompanying this Despatch as containing illustrations in point. That such apprehensions are not confined to the Ameer of Cabul is evident from the strong feeling which has been expressed by the Maharaja of Cashmere against the appointment of a permanent Resident at His Highness' Court.

27. We have thought it to be our duty to state in what particulars our information as to the condition of Afghanistan and the sentiments of the Ameer towards the British Government leads us to differ from some of the opinions entertained by Her Majesty's Government. At the same time we agree with Her Majesty's Government that, having regard to the present aspect of affairs in Turkistan, it would be desirable that a British officer should be stationed at Herat. The appointment, it is true, would be attended with some risks, and the usefulness of the measure would depend on the discretion of the Agent who might be selected. But if an officer of experience and sound judgment were chosen who possessed the full confidence of the Ameer and the Afghan officials, we should anticipate great advantage from the arrangement. Under such circumstances, the Agent would be in a position not only to procure valuable information, but probably also to exert his influence with some hope of success in the interests of peace by preventing collisions between the subjects of powers beyond the frontier and the subjects of Afghanistan. His presence at Herat would also, to some extent, be a check on any movements threatening to Afghanistan.

28. But for the attainment of these ends, it is in our opinion essential that the proposed arrangements should have the cordial consent of the Ameer. For the reasons given above, we are of opinion that, if we were to press the question on the Ameer at present, our proposals would in all probability either be refused or accepted with great reluctance.

29. If the Ameer should give an unwilling consent, the officers whom we have consulted are agreed that no advantage would be derived from the presence of a British Agent at Herat. The case is forcibly stated in the 33rd paragraph of Major-General Taylor's letter, dated 17th April 1875, and the obstacles which would render the acquisition of valuable information impossible under such circumstances are described in paragraph 3 of Sir Richard Pollock's letter of 30th March. Moreover, if the Ameer should represent the risk to which our Agent might be exposed from the acts of fanatics or persons opposed to the presence of our officers in Afghanistan and an outrage on the person of the Agent were attempted, we should be subjected to a humiliation for which under the circumstances we might not be justified in holding the Afghan Government responsible, and for which therefore it would be extremely difficult to obtain satisfaction.

30. If the Ameer should refuse, his refusal would impair the influence of the Government of India in Afghanistan. It must either be accepted without any change being made in our present policy towards Afghanistan, in which case the Ameer would be encouraged to act upon other occasions without regard to the wishes of the British Government; or we must treat it as a proof of unfriendly feeling on his part, modify our present policy, retire from our attitude of sympathy, and withdraw our assurances of support. If we are correct in believing that the refusal would not show the intentions of the Ameer to be disloyal, it would afford no sufficient justification for a change of policy which might throw Afghanistan into the arms of Russia upon the first favourable opportunity. We may also observe that the refusal would weaken the hands of Her Majesty's Government in any future negotiations with Russia when questions might be raised as to the real value of British influence in Afghanistan.

31. After a careful consideration of the information which we have collected as to the disposition of the Ameer and of the probable result of pressing him to accept a British Agent at Herat, we remain of the opinion which we expressed to your Lordship by telegraph on the 18th of February last, that the present time and circumstances are unsuitable for taking the initiative in this matter. We recommend that no immediate pressure be put upon the Ameer, or particular anxiety be shown by us upon the subject, but that advantage be taken of the first favourable opportunity that his own action or other circumstances may present for the purpose of sounding his disposition and of representing to him the benefits which would be derived by Afghanistan from the pro-

posed arrangement. The object in view is, in our judgment, more likely to be attained by taking this course than by assuming the initiative now. In the meantime we shall neglect no opportunity of obtaining full information respecting events in Afghanistan by such means as may from time to time present themselves.

32. It may not be out of place to add some observations upon our present relations with Afghanistan.

33. It is difficult to appreciate the feelings which influence the conduct of the Ameer Shere Ali, subject as he is to the risk of a revolution at home and apprehensive of attack from abroad. He cannot be expected to comprehend the language of European diplomacy, and his Ministers are imperfectly educated, of limited experience, and doubtful integrity. We believe, however, that he understands that the British Government have no designs of encroaching upon Afghanistan, that he feels that the interests of British India and his own are identical, that he is seriously alarmed at the progress of Russia, and that his main reliance is placed upon British support. His language after the return of his Envoy, Noor Mahomed Shah, from Simla in 1873 was certainly far from satisfactory; but we are disposed to attribute it either to his impression that we were so anxious for his support that by assuming an attitude of dissatisfaction he might obtain further assistance from us; or to his disappointment that we did not give him the distinct pledge he asked that the British Government would protect him under all circumstances against external attack, coupled perhaps with his discontent at the result of the Seistan arbitration.

34. Sir Richard Pollock, whose intimate acquaintance with Noor Mahomed Shah gives him the best means of forming a correct judgment of the Simla negotiations, and who on his return to Peshawur in the beginning of 1874 obtained confidential information as to the sentiments of the Ameer, stated his "conviction that no unfavourable change whatever had occurred in the disposition of His Highness, that he leaned as much as ever on the British Government, and that he (Sir Richard Pollock) could find no symptoms whatever of an inclination on the part of the Ameer, or on the part of those about him, to seek assistance from any other quarter. On the contrary," (Sir Richard Pollock adds) "it would appear that he looks with increasing distrust and suspicion on his northern neighbours, while Persia, his only other neighbour worth writing of, is his natural enemy." Similar information has been received by us from other sources. We attach but little value to the vague rumours which have reached us from time to time that communications unknown to the British Government have passed between the Ameer and Russian Officers, or that Russian Agents have penetrated Afghanistan. It must not be forgotten that such rumours are frequent in regard to those countries. Similar rumours prevailed with respect to our own communications with Bokhara, and are current even now as to our dealings with the Turkoman tribes, without any foundation in fact.

35. Since the Umballa conferences the Ameer has never shown any disposition to neglect our advice as to the external relations of Afghanistan. He accepted fully, although with great reluctance, the decision of the British Government in the Seistan arbitration, and we have no reason to doubt that he intends loyally to abide by it.

36. This being so, and if we have formed a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Ameer towards the British Government, the main objects of the policy which was advocated by Lord Canning in the time of Dost Mahomed,—which was renewed by Lord Lawrence on the first favourable opportunity that occurred after the death of Dost Mahomed—which was ratified by Lord Mayo at the Umballa conferences—and which we have since steadily pursued,—are secured. We have established friendly relations with Afghanistan: that country is stronger than it has ever been since the days of Dost Mahomed, and our influence is sufficient to prevent the Ameer from aggression upon his neighbours. It is to be regretted that old animosities and other causes have hitherto prevented the establishment of free intercourse between European British subjects and Afghanistan, and the location of British Agents in that country. But we believe that these things will naturally follow in course of time when our motives are better understood. Their attainment would be hastened by a further advance of Russia in Turkistan, or by any other danger that may threaten the integrity of Afghanistan.

37. Much discussion has recently taken place as to the effect that would be produced by a Russian advance to Merv. We have before stated to Her Majesty's Government our apprehension that the assumption by Russia of authority over the whole Turkoman country would create alarm in Afghanistan, and we think it desirable to express our opinion of the course which should be adopted if it should take place. It would then

become necessary to give additional and more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without. It would probably be desirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him; and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian frontier.

38. We think that these would be the measures best calculated to avert any dangers that may ensue from a Russian advance to Merv, and that they should be adopted when the necessity for them arises. The observations addressed on this subject by the Earl of Derby to Count Schouvaloff appear to us to indicate the policy which should be pursued by the Government of India, and we have before stated our opinion that the more clearly Russia is given to understand the position which we have assumed towards Afghanistan the greater will be the probability of the maintenance of peace. To anticipate the Russian occupation of Merv by any active measures or specific Treaty engagements would, in our opinion, be more likely to prejudice than to advance the interests of Her Majesty's Indian Empire.

39. We attach great importance to the moral and material advantages which are derived from maintaining friendly relations with Afghanistan; and we would impress upon Her Majesty's Government our conviction that such relations will best be secured by a steady adherence to the patient and conciliatory policy which has been pursued by the Government of India for many years towards Afghanistan; and by making every reasonable allowance for the difficulties of the Ameer, even if he should be reluctant to accede to the views which we may entertain as to the measures which may be advisable equally for his own interests and for those of British India.

40. In making these observations we by no means desire to imply that we are willing to concede any caprice of the Ruler of Afghanistan, and to grant everything that may be asked of us without requiring any return. Neither in the Umballa conferences, nor in the Simla negotiations of 1873, were nearly all the demands of the Ameer complied with; and recently, when we had reason to suppose that he intended to demur to our reasonable request that Ibrahim Khan should pass through Afghanistan with a communication from us to the Meer of Wakhan, we insisted upon a compliance with our wishes. We should adopt the same course again under similar circumstances.

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
W. MUIR.
A. EDEN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 32.

No. 48 C.P., dated 25th March 1875 (strictly confidential).

From C. U. AITCHISON, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to
T. H. THORNTON, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

THE Viceroy and Governor-General in Council directs me to request that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will be so good as to submit his opinion on the following points at as early a date as possible:—

1st.—Whether the Ameer of Afghanistan would willingly consent to the appointment of European British officers as Residents at Herat and Candahar, or at either place.

2nd.—Whether the presence of such Residents at either place would be advantageous to the British Government.

3rd.—Whether the Lieutenant-Governor is satisfied with the sufficiency and accuracy of the intelligence now received from the British Agent at Cabul, and if not, whether he can suggest any way of procuring fuller and more accurate intelligence.

2. His Excellency in Council would wish the Lieutenant-Governor confidentially to consult such officers in the Punjab as from previous or recent experience of the country he may consider competent to advise on these questions, and submit their opinions with his own.

Enclosure 2 in No. 32.

No. 59 C.P., dated 27th March 1875 (strictly confidential).

From C. U. AITCHISON, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
to C. E. R. GIRDLESTONE, Esq., Resident in Nepal.

On 26th March 1869 you submitted a note of certain information regarding Cabul affairs obtained in conversation with Punjab officials, and observed that your chief informants were Major Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawur, and Mr. Thornton, the Secretary to the Punjab Government. Among other things it is stated in the note that "the Ameer is prepared, if asked, to allow European Agents " at Candahar, Herat, and Balkh, but he would raise difficulties, though not probably insuperable ones, " about such an officer at Cabul."

2. The Governor-General in Council desires me to enquire whether you can call to mind if you received this information from Sir R. Pollock, or Mr. Thornton, or any other officer of the Punjab, or whether it was derived from the Ameer himself, or from a report by X. Y. of certain consultations which according to his account were held at Lahore on 17th March 1869.

3. Sir R. Pollock and Mr. Thornton do not entertain the impression that they had then any reason to believe that the disposition of the Ameer was such as was described in your note, and you therefore probably depended upon some other information.

4. An early reply is particularly requested.

Enclosure 3 in No. 32.

Dated Katmandoo, 7th April 1875.

From C. GIRDLESTONE, Esq., Resident in Nepal, to C. U. AITCHISON, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary
to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In acknowledging your letter, No. 59 C.P., dated the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to say that my memory fails to recall with certainty the authority for the passage quoted, but I am under the impression that the information was given to me either by Major Pollock or Mr. Thornton on the strength of previous communications with the Ameer and his suite. It was my usual practice in the Foreign Office to give my authority for any statement of importance, and from the fact of my having mentioned the names of these gentlemen as the "chief informants," for the note under reference I attribute to one or both of them this special statement, rather than to any other member of the Punjab Commission whom I met at Umballa in those days. The only other Punjab official with whom I remember to have talked about Afghan affairs was Colonel Reynell Taylor, then Commissioner of Umballa. The information was not obtained from the Ameer, to whom on the indicated date of the note (March 26th), as I learn from a private diary, I paid my first visit, which was purely of a ceremonial character, nor from X. Y., with whom I was not acquainted.

Enclosure 4 in No. 32.

No. X., dated Lahore, 21st April 1875 (confidential).

From T. H. THORNTON, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to
C. U. AITCHISON, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 48 C.P., dated the 25th March, in which you convey the request of the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council for an expression of the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, and of such officers in the Punjab as may be considered competent to advise on the question in regard to the deputation of European British officers as Residents at Herat and Candahar, or at either place.

2. In reply, I have the honour to submit copy of a Minute by Sir Henry Davies, together with letters from the officers noted on the margin, containing an expression of their views in regard to the three points noted in your Despatch, also a note by the undersigned, and a letter (dated 29th March 1875) from Captain Grey, Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Ferozepoor, who acted as the Viceroy's interpreter at the Umballa Conference, and was asked to record exactly what passed on that occasion in reference to the subject now under inquiry.

COPY of a MINUTE by His Honour the LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR of the PUNJAB on the Inquiries contained in the Letter from the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA in the Foreign Department, No. 48 C.P., dated the 25th March 1875.

Question 1.

I have always had the impression that in the present state of affairs the Ameer would not willingly consent to the appointment of European British officers as Residents at Herat and Candahar, or at either place, and from a perusal of the Secret papers in this office and of Captain Grey's statement, it seems to me extremely doubtful whether His Highness ever intended to be understood as expressing such consent. My belief is that while he may have been ready to acquiesce in the appointment of mere news-writers, such as were Mr. Masson or Shahamat Ali before the occupation of Afghanistan, he never was ready to acquiesce in the appointment of Political Agents.

Question 2.

I do not think the presence of Residents at either of the places named would be advantageous to the British Government. On the contrary, I think their presence against the Ameer's wish would irritate him personally, and would disincline him to communicate information to them himself, or to allow them to acquire it. On the other hand, the Residents might be courted by His Highness' opponents, which would add to his vexation; or they might be insulted with the direct object of embroiling him with our Government. Distrust and alienation on his part would not be unlikely to lead to complaint on ours; interference might follow on complaint, and interference would certainly be met with open or secret resistance. Nor can I see how a Resident at Candahar or Herat is better placed for acquiring early information of Russian movements than one at Meshed. At the same time, as the Ameer has professed his willingness himself to procure information, there could be no harm in requiring him to do so promptly and regularly, though I am much mistaken if he would require much pressing on this head, if he were under any apprehension of impending encroachment on his territories.

Question 3.

The information contained in the bi-weekly diaries of the Native Agent at Cabul is for the most part correct. He has always appeared to me to be extremely cautious in what he writes, and to eschew superfluous details. It is probable that his influence with the Ameer depends in a considerable measure on his abstinence from criticism on the internal state of Afghanistan and on the persons trusted by the Ameer. On the whole, I consider this reticence favourable to British interests, and calculated to give weight to advice which the Agent on serious occasions may be authorised to put forward. I do not think that any innovations on the existing system would, at the present time, be of any advantage, and I consider that the Ameer having now got Herat into his own hands will probably be himself sensitive of any menace to it, and will not be slow to apprise the British Government thereof.

(Signed) R. H. DAVIES.

Enclosure 5 in No. 32.

Dated Peshawur, 30th March 1875.

From Colonel Sir R. POLLOCK, K.C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division,
to T. H. THORNTON, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt this morning of your No. A., dated Camp Delhi, 26th instant, and enclosure (extract copy of letter of Supreme Government; dated 25th idem, No. 48 C.P., and I proceed at once to reply to the questions put therein.

Question 1.

2. I am quite convinced that His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan would not willingly consent to the appointment of European British officers as Residents at Herat and Candahar, or at either place, and that his dislike to such an arrangement would only be short of what he would feel if asked to consent to the location of such an officer at his capital. As regards the past, it is well known to Government that the strongest objection has hitherto existed to such nominations. Major Lumsden's deputation to Candahar was only agreed to ungraciously when the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan found that only on this condition could he obtain the valuable subsidy promised by our Government.

In my judgment nothing has occurred since that time to lessen the dislike of the Afghan Government to allow European officers to take up a permanent position in their country, while one additional reason for their not unnatural dislike to such a measure has arisen. The recent action of Russia, and specially her military operations in the Khanate of Khiva, would lead the Ameer and his Councillors to believe that any permission granted to the British Government to send Agents to Herat or Candahar, or to both places, would be certainly followed by a similar demand from the Russian side.

Question 2.

Para. 3. I am equally convinced that the result of sending such officers would not be advantageous, assuming my previous statement to be correct, viz., that the Agents would be there contrary to the wish of the Ameer and his Councillors.

We know what occurred in Major Lumsden's case, and how impossible he found it to bring any influence to bear usefully, or to obtain valuable information for his Government, and although it may certainly be urged that the circumstances were peculiar, and that the breaking out of the mutiny or insurrection of 1857 lowered our prestige for a time, and led to the serious discussion of plans for the invasion of British India, I feel quite sure myself that more favourable circumstances would not have produced good results, and that from the Ameer's point of view excellent reasons can be brought forward in justification of the dislike to all interference which I believe to exist.

Question 3.

Para. 4. There is not much to be said against the accuracy of the news from week to week submitted by the Cabul Agent, though the sufficiency of it may doubtless be questioned. Any Native Agent who took a perfectly independent tone at Cabul, and made no secret of reporting regularly to his Government, without reference to the wishes of the Ameer, all information that he believed to be correct, would very shortly find his position at Cabul unbearable.

Obvious objections exist to the employment regularly of paid secret correspondents, and I am myself inclined to recommend that we should continue to content ourselves with receiving the official diaries, supplementing and checking them by the occasional employment of Agents, such as the person whose narrative was lithographed in the Jail Press here, and whose second narrative is now in course of being

printed, or the person whose reports received recently through Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, were so full of interest and in many particulars correct. Secret agents regularly entertained and salaried are, whether resident or peripatetic, a mistake, so far as my experience goes; for, thinking it necessary to earn their bread by writing something periodically, correct or incorrect, they seriously mislead their employers, besides which their employment becomes gradually a matter of notoriety, and this is clearly undesirable.

Enclosure 6 in No. 32.

No. 785, dated Umritsur the 17th April 1875.

From Major-General R. TAYLOR, C.B., C.S.I., to T. H. THORNTON, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab.

With reference to your letter No. C. of Camp Delhi, dated March 26th, 1875, I have the honour to forward my opinions on the points noted by the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

1. Whether the Ameer of Afghanistan would willingly consent to the appointment of European British officers as Residents at Herat and Candahar.

2. Before attempting to answer this question, I must note that I have not, for a considerable period, had any opportunity of watching the Ameer's tone and conduct nor that of his advisers. The newspaper accounts do not command confidence, as frequently what is asserted in one issue is contradicted in the next, and thus the inclination to reason on the reports given is greatly weakened.

3. It is very possible, therefore, that my opinions, based, I must allow, on a generally low opinion of Afghan political morality, may appear to bear harshly on the Ameer, if he has indeed made more genuine efforts to act up to the spirit of treaties than I on my rather desultory sources of information give him credit for.

4. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor is, I know, aware that my opinions regarding affairs in Afghanistan are much derived from the views entertained by Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan Allyzye; in fact, as I am at present situated, he and Nawab Foudar Khan and other occasional visitors from the frontier are, apart from the newspapers, my only means of gaining information.

5. Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan lately wrote a paper on this subject, based on certain rumours he had seen in the Native newspapers regarding a proposed mission to the Ameer. This paper has been, I am aware, perused by his Excellency the Viceroy. It contained opinions bearing on the questions now put by the Foreign Secretary. I shall therefore freely quote Gholam Hussan Khan's opinions. The Lieutenant-Governor is aware that I have the highest appreciation of his loyalty and integrity, though I cannot always agree in his political views.

6. To the point then, with regard to the Foreign Secretary's first question, I feel certain that I have good grounds for saying that the Ameer would not willingly consent to the appointment of British officers as Residents or Political Agents of our Government to be located at Herat and Candahar, or at either place. I was, on my own knowledge, pretty well convinced that the Ameer and his advisers would dislike the presence of an English Envoy at Candahar as much as they would be averse to one being located at Cabul itself; but I did think it possible that, from the peculiar antecedents of Herat, and from the fact that his (the Ameer's) material hold upon it is not as yet a very firm one, he might not be so disinclined to accept of our assistance and countenance in holding Herat; but I see that Gholam Hussan Khan is distinctly of opinion that the Afghan feeling would be one and the same regarding any arrangement which located a British officer in any part of their territory.

7. This distrust, which really proceeds from a variety of causes, some of which I shall subsequently allude to, is partially entertained by the Ameer himself; but the feeling in his mind is constantly intensified by the action and language of the Afghan Sirdars around him, the majority of whom appear to be senselessly rabid on this point, losing no opportunity of exacerbating this prejudice in the Ameer's mind against the admission of British officers to the country in any form. The result is that he (the Ameer) yields to the influence of the common cry about him, and is thus induced by his advisers to act in what we naturally regard as a senselessly churlish manner on this point.

8. A portion of this hostile feeling on the part of the Sirdars may be attributable to actual dislike, but a large share of it is, in fact, complimentary to our energy and power. Thus they believed that, if they were to allow the small end of the wedge to be put in we should very soon split up their country and take the rule and lead in all matters connected with the management of it into our own hands, and they have spirit enough to prefer managing matters for themselves. The matter is simply expressed by Gholam Hussan Khan by saying that the British officers would be writing for this thing and that, and the Ameer would have to comply with these requisitions, and thus in a very short time he would virtually surrender his independence, and be at the beck and call of the British Resident. The advice of the Sirdars, therefore, to him is strongly against the adoption of any measure which should result in the deputation of British Agents to the chief political or strategical points of Afghanistan.

9. I think it but fair to urge that under these circumstances it would not be just to be too hard on the Ameer for what must and does appear to us a churlish refusal, reiterated from time to time, to allow officers belonging to a friendly nation, and one which has striven with no niggard hand to gain his good-will and that of his Sirdars and people to travel even through his country. It may be a fact that the Ameer is somewhat himself afraid of the mischiefs and annoyances, if not real dangers as he considers them, that would follow from the presence of British officers, but he is still more afraid of Afghan opinion and averse to running counter to the strong national feeling against permitting our interference in any shape with their affairs, which is still, I fear, the predominant feeling in the breasts of Afghan Sirdars with regard to us.

10. It is perhaps strange that this feeling should be nationally as strong as it is, for it is a fact that personally British Officers and Afghan Sirdars can be on very friendly terms, entertaining respect for one another, coupled with true kindly feeling, but nationally there exists on both sides a recollection

of wrong suffered and wrong done, which makes a hitherto unbridged chasm between us, and which I believe, probably to the end of the chapter, will render our reappearance in Afghanistan distasteful to its people.

11. There is another cause for the apparently reckless conduct of the Afghans which may not be understood by those only partially acquainted with this peculiar people, and that is, that, strange as it may seem to us, I believe that the Afghans do not habitually feel that they greatly need our assistance; they have an overweening confidence in the efficacy of their Kuzzak style of warfare, and believe that they will be able to preserve their Puthnukkee grasp of the country against all comers, either by fighting at their own chosen spots or by getting out of the way till fortune grants them the opportunity to fall upon their enemies at their disadvantage. No doubt the Ameer and some of his more astute advisers are better informed and are well aware that they could make but little head against Russian invasion, and consequently they would like to retain a lien on the assistance of a strong Government like ours, as a *pis aller*, when the dire extremity came, but until that final pressure is at the door, these wiser heads, as well as the rest, would wish to have as little to do with us as possible, always excepting of course the matter of receiving arms and money in which, Afghan-like, they are not unnaturally ready to play their part.

12. One feeling I can imagine weighing strongly with the Ameer against the acceptance of British Officers is that he is conscious that his mode of dealing with rivals in order to clear away his difficulties would cause much scandal and annoyance to any British Officers who might be witnesses of these proceedings on the spot, the result possibly being accurate and reliable reports on these occasions to their own Government, followed by remonstrances from that Government, which the Ameer must either comply with and thereby incur the scorn and indignation of his Sirdars, who would taunt him with being under English influence, or he must disregard these well-meant strictures on his conduct, and this no doubt would be done at some pain to himself.

13. In this way the Ameer's case is somewhat like that of a border Baron or Chieftain under the feudal system, patronised by the neighbouring settled Government on account of the political or strategical importance of the position he occupied, the Chief himself being conscious of the advantage of being recognised and supported by the countenance of the stronger power, but from intrinsic weakness, internal feuds, &c. being obliged to maintain his authority by irregular and unjustifiable action. In such a case, though anxious to fulfil the expectations of his powerful neighbour to the best of his ability, the last thing which the rough-dealing, semi-outlawed Chief would probably choose would be to have members of the regular Government billeted on him, to be, as he would fear, censorious scrutinisers of his rather questionable methods of maintaining his power.

14. Lastly, but not least in importance, is the fact that the Ameer probably feels that he cannot depend upon his own people, and that, either in opposition to his wishes, or perhaps in order to embroil him with the British Government, or from a burning, perhaps fanatical, zeal in the cause of "Afghanistan for the Afghans," British Officers located in or travelling through the country might come by evil mishaps, which he would be utterly unable to control or remedy. This is perhaps the true key to that mode of expression which has, I believe, been used more than once by the Ameer and his advisers, namely, "Do anything but force British Officers on us."

15. On the above grounds, I feel quite clear on the point that the Ameer and his Sirdars would not, at any rate at present, willingly agree to the location of British Officers at Candahar or Herat.

16. The second point is whether the presence of such Residents at both these places, or at either, would be advantageous to the British Government.

What am I to say,—it would be very charming to have Herat and Candahar news put on our tables twice a week. Glancing at the map, many among us would feel great satisfaction at having thrust out a western horn to correspond to the eastern one at Yarkund and Kashgar. Politicians at home and abroad, who are inclined to be chiefly influenced by the appearance of things upon the map, and who wash their hands of local difficulties, would allow that we had fully occupied the ground diplomatically in front of the Russian onward wave. There would further be no fear of the Afghans keeping us in the dark regarding events in their front, or of their deceiving us regarding their own action with reference to the approach of the Russians.

17. We have established relations with the Ruler of Yarkund, and have located a British European Agent in his territory. It would be a natural further move to occupy the left of the advanced line in the same way.

18. Lastly, it might be a step towards an amelioration of manners and bearing on the part of the Afghans contact with us; and a gradual rising to our ways, coupled with a progressive perception of, and belief in, the general honesty and simplicity of our intentions, are perhaps the only things which hold out a hope of this amelioration.

19. The above are the advantages which probably would attend the location of British Officers at important points like Candahar and Herat.

20. But the arguments against the plan are very strong too. I have given it as my opinion that we should not be able to obtain the willing consent of the Ameer and his councillors to the appointment of British Residents in their country. It must then be accomplished by the exertion of pressure, but the Afghans in their pride, based on the rough and impregnable character of the more difficult portions of their country, and on the warlike prestige of the men who inhabit and are ready to defend them, are but little inclined to yield readily to pressure from us, as they know how averse we are to the exertion necessary to make our displeasure felt. Unless, therefore, we are able and willing to put the screw, as the expression is, on them in some material fashion, they will not improbably disregard our attempts to force them into doing what is so disagreeable to themselves.

They are such careless, happy-go-lucky fellows, too, that I do not think that the threat to withhold the subsidy, release State prisoners, &c., would induce them to accept a condition regarding which they feel so strongly.

21. It is, therefore, the very peculiar character of the Afghans as a people, coupled with certain perplexing and peculiar points in our relations with them; the fruit possibly in some measure of former

mistakes of our own, added to the material obstacles presented by the rugged Passes and their warlike defenders that divide us from their country, which make the difficulty of the case. Were the temper of the people different, and our relations with them cordially friendly, it would be no matter of difficulty for us to scan the whole country and arrange for its being so strengthened as to make it no easy matter for the Russians, with their enormously extended line of advance, to think of absorbing Afghanistan by force.

22. Also, if the Afghans were either weaker or stronger, they would very likely welcome our assistance. As it is, they are weak enough to be distrustful of us, and yet strong enough to hope to be able to play the game without calling us in; and thus though they know that they may deeply need our aid, they are afraid to welcome us frankly as allies, lest the result should be the loss of their independence.

23. I proceed at this point to notice more particularly Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan's writing and opinions. Having seen in the Native newspapers a rumour of an intention to send a mission to Cabul accompanied by English officers, &c., he states that he is greatly averse to the measure in the first instance, as he believes that if this plan were adopted without the way being in some measure prepared for the event, the Afghans would be so agitated by the approach of the mission, that they would possibly decline to receive it; and if not this, that they would be so disturbed, and the whole thing be so distasteful to them, that there would be no hope of the benefit being gained, which he (Gholam Hussan Khan) believes might be obtained in another way.

24. Gholam Hussan Khan recommends, in place of the above plan, that an emissary chosen from the Ameer's own class—one with whom he could discuss matters freely—should be employed in the first instance on this duty, and that the Native gentleman thus employed should be commissioned to explain the whole case to the Ameer, and should endeavour to bring him to a point in regard to the chief requirements it presents. Gholam Hussan Khan's belief and hope is that in this way the Ameer might have his eyes opened to the suicidal character of the policy which his Sirdars and advisers are inducing him to pursue, and that he might thus be brought to relax the stringency of his opposition to the visits of British officers, and the like, which could do him and the people no harm, and might greatly strengthen his hands.

25. I am aware that the above proposition of Gholam Hussan Khan's might be supposed by those who do not know the man to emanate entirely from an interested wish on the part of the writer to suggest a duty which he of all others would be the man best fitted to perform. Some little margin must be allowed for human nature in such cases; but I have that confidence in the man's honest zeal for the welfare of the British Government, which assures me that he would not make the recommendation unless he truly believed it to be the best course that could be adopted.

26. Gholam Hussan Khan is of opinion that if it proved that the Ameer, notwithstanding a calm discussion of the matter in all its bearings, would do nothing in accordance with the advice given, and would in nowise relax his policy of exclusion, in that case it would be of course open to the British Government to withdraw from the position which has grown up, reverting to one of general friendship and good-will, keeping up appearances, but not lavishing too much on an ally who makes no suitable return for the favours bestowed upon him and his people. This change of policy would have to be formally announced to the Ameer and Afghans by a second mission, or in some other formal manner to avoid a subsequent assertion of its not having been understood.

27. As I understand Gholam Hussan Khan's meaning, it is that the attitude of the British Government to be reverted to would be that sketched by Lord Lawrence in the 38th to 41st paragraphs of his Minute of the 25th of November 1868, commenting on Sir Henry Rawlinson's papers on Central Asian affairs.

28. Gholam Hussan Khan, however, is very averse to anything like an open breaking with the Ameer at this juncture, as it would have a bad effect in the country he thinks, weaken our position at Yarkund, and leave the field open to the Russians all along the line. He is of opinion, then, that the Ameer should be gently forced into a more genial reciprocation of our solidly expressed good-will towards himself and his countrymen. He notes that the late proceedings and successes of the Russians have established their influence over all Turkoman tribes, viz., the Tekke, Yemoot, Merve, Sarukhs, &c., in fact close up to Herat, while in the East they are close up to the Yarkund and Kashgar territory. They, the Russians, are further projecting to connect the Amoo and Syr rivers by a navigable canal which would consolidate their position close up to the Turkestan provinces of Afghanistan. I may note that I saw mention of this project in the Geographical Magazine, but I do not think that the points on both rivers to be united were mentioned, but I think Charjoee on the Oxus (Amoo) was mentioned as one.

29. Under these circumstances Gholam Hussan Khan's feeling evidently is that it is unreasonable that we should not have the power of sending officers to study the lay of the country, and thus to understand the full bearings of the game we are supposed to be playing, and so I must confess, judged by ordinary rules, it is. It is only the extraordinary difficulties of the case which render it not so unnatural a result after all as it appears at first sight.

30. On the above ground, namely, on the difficulties which now surround the external relations of the Cabul territory, Gholam Hussan Khan is of opinion that it would be natural and appropriate that we should at this time insist on our influence being materially extended in Afghanistan.

Secondly, on account of the internal state of Afghanistan, he considers that our interferences would be equally beneficial at this time. He enumerates the remarkable instances in which the Ameer has disregarded the advice successively given him by Sir John Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and his Excellency the present Viceroy, and always with disastrous consequences to himself, the result in the last instance being that he, the Ameer, has deeply offended and possibly estranged the two powerful Ghilzai Chiefs, and he thinks that the influence of the British Government might be beneficially employed in saving the Ameer from such mistakes in future.

31. This of course would involve an amount of interference in the internal affairs of the Ameer's country which I feel certain we are not likely to embark in.

32. My own opinion hinges, as I have before said, on the character of the Afghans and of the country to be dealt with.

If the Afghans were truly friendly to us, and inclined to welcome our assistance, or were their country such that it would enable us, without desperate exertion, to avenge, if necessary, insult or injury done to our officers employed in the country, if they came by mishap, then I should probably favour the idea of our sending forward political representatives to look after our interests in that quarter.

33. But as it is clear that the Ameer and his advisers will not willingly receive our European Residents, I am quite certain that it would be a deeply unwise act to force them upon them, and further as the necessity if it occurred of avenging injury done to our representatives would be a grievous misfortune to us, I am strongly of opinion that it is most expedient to avoid putting our officers in positions which might endanger such a result.

34. I need not say how unfortunate the scandal would be to us if we had to go to war with our reputed allies to punish them for dealing treacherously with the officers whom we had put forward to assist in what was supposed to be our common interests.

35. I forward with this paper a transcript of a memorandum which I wrote in 1867 for Sir John Lawrence. There are some points in it which I think it fair to point to, as showing that my views have been consistent with regard to what was to be hoped from the Afghan character, but I would deprecate the idea that I dislike the men: they have some fine qualities, and as men are, at any rate, remarkable, being one of the finest races in the world; but their political morality is certainly of the lowest order, and I pray my Government to beware of them in all matters that demand stability of action and good faith.

Enclosure 7 in No. 32.

No. 124 C, dated Dera Ismail Khan the 14th April 1875.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. MUNRO, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to T. H. THORNTON, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab.

In acknowledgment of your No. B., of 26th ultimo, and its annexure, I have the honour to state that, in so far as my information enables me to judge, I believe the appointment of British Officers as Residents at Candahar and Herat, or at either of those places, would be distasteful to His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan.

2. As a Barukzai, the Ameer can hardly be expected willingly to consent to such a measure. If His Highness were even prepared to waive his own personal objections from a desire to maintain the alliance and secure the continued support of the British Government, it is probable that the opposition of the great majority of those Sirdars who are friendly to him could not be got over. The memory of former British occupation of the country is still fresh amongst the older Sirdars, whose prejudices and opposition the Ameer might not be in a position to overrule successfully.

3. The general impression abroad regarding the intelligence received through the British Agent at Cabul is, that it is as authentic as any information obtained from exclusively Native services can be expected to be.

Enclosure 8 in No. 32.

Dated Dera Ismail Khan the 14th April 1875.

Demi-official, from Lieutenant-Colonel A. MUNRO, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to T. H. THORNTON, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab.

I YESTERDAY returned to Dera Ismail Khan after my tour in the southern part of the Division, and I have since had an opportunity of questioning Nawab Foujdar Khan on the subject of your confidential note of the 27th ultimo.

In course of a visit which he paid me this morning to discuss other matters, I managed to get his opinion on the subject of your confidential official letter, No. B., of 26th ultimo, without appearing in the least to desiderate the information by direction of the authorities. The Nawab says he thinks the Ameer of Cabul would have strong objections to the permanent location of British Officers for political purposes either at Herat or Candahar. His acquaintance with the Ameer personally and knowledge of his views and objects lead the Nawab to believe that the Ameer would dislike the appointment of British Officers as Residents at either place. The recollection of some former Missions is still fresh in Cabul, Candahar, and Herat; even if the Ameer were prevailed upon to forego his own predilections in order to secure the alliance and confidence of the British Government, the strong feeling which exists amongst the Afghan Sirdars generally against a re-introduction of British Officers could hardly be resisted, and the unpopularity of his Government, specially with those who are already secretly the Ameer's enemies, would be largely increased by his consenting to such a measure. The Nawab is of opinion that the objection to the location of Native Agents of the British Government would not be so strong, and that if such a measure were deemed advisable, the Ameer's consent might be obtained more easily, though a certain amount of suspicion and distrust might be aroused by its being carried out.

The Nawab says the information furnished through the British Agent at Cabul is generally to be relied upon, much of it being obtained from independent sources.

Enclosure 9 in No. 32.

REPLIES to QUESTIONS received under Cover of SECRETARY GOVERNMENT PUNJAB'S LETTER No. D., dated 27th March 1875, to address of Captain CAVAGNARI, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Peshawur.

I do not believe that Ameer Sher Ali Khan would willingly assent to such appointments in any part of Afghanistan. He would probably declare that the unsettled state of his kingdom prevented his being able to guarantee the safety of the officers appointed. The Ameer has always evinced extreme jealousy at any step towards interference on the part of our Government, and more especially at any measure which would enable our officers to deal direct with any of the Afghan Provincial Governors or officials. This is especially noticeable on the Kuram border of the Kohat District. I have never yet been up to Thal (on the Kuram) either with or without troops, that an Agent has not been deputed from Cabul to watch my movements, and particularly to see that nothing approaching to cordiality takes place between myself and the Kuram Governor (Sirdar Wali M. Khan).

Could the Ameer be brought to see and acknowledge the advantages that would result to his Government by the appointment of such Residents, the measure would undoubtedly be very beneficial to both Governments :—

2nd.—Whether the presence of such Residents at either place would be advantageous to the British Government.

1st.—It would tend to check all opposition against the Ameer, for those inclined to resist his Government would assuredly consider that the presence of an European British Officer was a sign that the British Government was prepared to aid the Ameer in every possible way, not only by money and arms as heretofore, but by force if necessary.

2nd.—The presence and advice of British Officers might inaugurate a better state of Government, and thus tend to allay much of the present discontent against the Ameer, which is in a great measure caused by the oppression of his Governors.

3rd.—The British Government would be in a better position to obtain reliable intelligence and to watch passing events than can possibly be the case by trusting, as at present, to the Native Agent at Cabul or to casual sources of information. But should the Ameer refuse, or unwillingly assent to the measure, it would possibly be productive of very evil results. Everything would be done to thwart the action of the Resident, and not unlikely some sort of insult would be offered, which would either result in his having to be withdrawn, or supported in his position by force of arms.

I do not believe that the people generally of Afghanistan would seriously object to the appointment of such Residents, not only at Herat and Candahar, but at Cabul itself and Balkh. What could be worse for them than the condition of the last-mentioned Province, the people of which are goaded to the utmost exasperation by the tyranny and oppression of a low-born ruler (Naib M. Alum Khan, the only point in whose favour is that he is a Mahomedan!) The slightest show of resistance at Herat by Ayoob's party would to a certainty have been followed by a general revolt in Balkh. The Sirdars, who probably hope to become Governors in the different Afghan Provinces, would, like the Ameer, be adverse to the appointment of European British Officers. They probably fear that the appointment of such Residents would be merely a preliminary step to annexation!

It is notorious that only such information as the Ameer approves of is furnished by the British Native Agent at Cabul. Such can only be expected, as the Agent knows that he must either act up to the wishes of the Ameer, or else he would be treated as a nonentity and very possibly be brought to disgrace in some way or another. During the first days after his appointment, Ata Muhammad Khan did attempt to act independently, but he soon discovered that his

3rd.—Whether the Lieutenant-Governor is satisfied with the sufficiency and accuracy of the intelligence now received from the British Agent at Cabul, and if not, whether he can suggest any way of procuring further and more accurate intelligence.

munshi Bakhtyar Khan, who acted up to the Ameer's wishes, received far more distinction and honour than he, the British Agent, did. The position is now quite reversed, and Ata M. Khan is spoken of as one of the Ameer's confidential advisers.

I think it possible to establish a system of communication through Kuram by means of reliable agents who would furnish regular and authentic information on important Central-Asian matters. Doing so from the Kohat side would probably attract less notice than could be hoped for if agents were employed from Peshawur, for I am informed that any man coming from Peshawur, of the class likely to be used as a means of furnishing information rarely escapes scrutiny, and if at all suspected of being on such an errand he would be so closely watched that his usefulness would be very much impaired.

The difficulty, however, is not so much in finding agents to furnish news as to get men who will send really true and unvarnished information. Newsagents are very apt to imagine that the very fact of their being employed is a sign that we wish to discover something going on in Afghanistan inimical to British interests, and that news of that kind is expected from them. They therefore are inclined either to trump up something which will meet the object in view, or else they twist and turn about with the same intent facts that have really occurred, so that a minimum amount of value can be attached to what is reported.

Personally I am more inclined to credit information received from special agents deputed occasionally into Afghanistan to observe and report what is going on than that furnished by a regularly appointed agency; for the latter, after the first freshness is worn off, sooner or later degenerates into newswriting more or less of a stereotyped form.

Peshawur, 1st April 1875.

(Signed) N. CAVAGNARI, Captain,
Officiating Deputy Commissioner.

Enclosure 10 in No. 32.

Note.

I HAVE been desired by the Lieutenant-Governor to record my opinion upon the three points noted in Foreign Department's Letter No. 48 C. P., dated 25th March, and give it for what it is worth.

In regard to the first point, I concur in the opinion expressed by Sir R. Pollock, Major-General Taylor, Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, and Captain Cavagnari that the location of English Officers at Herat and Kandahar, or at either place, would be very distasteful to the Cabul Government. I was not present at any of the conferences between Lord Mayo and the Ameer at Umballa in 1869, and cannot consequently speak from personal knowledge of what passed on those occasions; but from the

* Vide Appendix to this Note.

evidence contained in the secret records of the office, of which I append an abstract,* it would appear that, though the Ameer was at first personally inclined to meet the supposed wishes of the British Government in the matter of having English Agents in certain parts of his territory, his Council, and especially the present Prime Minister, Sayad Nur Mahomed Shah, were decidedly opposed to the measure.

Captain Grey states in his letter of the 29th March 1875 that the Ameer "freely consented to the appointment of European British Officers in Balkh or Herat or anywhere but actually in Cabul;" but I cannot find in Captain Grey's letter that any definite understanding was come to on the subject; all that the Ameer appears to have been ultimately prepared to accede to was the deputation of Native Agents wherever we pleased and the deputation of an English Envoy at some future time when things had settled down.

But if this is all that could be obtained from the Ameer at a time when "his whole attitude was that of one eager to please—" what is likely to be the policy of the Ameer and his councillors now that he is no longer "eager to please," but still suffering from bitter disappointment at the result of the Seistan arbitration? We have some indication of what their policy and feelings are in the Cabul Agent's letter of the 14th April 1873, in which an account is given of the manner in which the proposal to send Mr. Macnabb to Cabul to explain the details of the Seistan arbitration was received in Durbar; from that account it is clear there was then a decided objection to an English Officer proceeding to Cabul for even a temporary purpose; the same policy was exhibited in reference to the proposed return of Sir D. Forsyth's Mission through Afghanistan, and I have no reason to believe that matters have in any way improved. It is possible, indeed, that the Ameer's strange unwillingness to take the subsidy, which long lay ready for him on the frontier, was dictated by a fear of its leading to a proposal to depute a British Officer to see how it was spent.

But, though I believe the location of British Agents (Europeans) in Afghanistan would, under present circumstances, be most distasteful to the Cabul Government, I am not without a hope that a change for the better may hereafter take place. X.Y., himself an Afghan and in frequent communication with his countrymen, is of opinion that the people of Afghanistan and many of the Sirdars are getting weary of the present state of things, and are becoming inclined to look upon the presence of English Officers in their country as likely to bring about an amelioration of their condition.

In regard to the second point, it would not, in my humble opinion, be to the advantage of the British Government to send European Officers into Afghanistan, if their deputation is, as I believe it to be, highly distasteful to the Ameer or his Councillors; on the contrary, such a measure would probably lead to grave embarrassment. With reference to the third point, I have no reason for doubting the accuracy of Atta Mahomed Khan's intelligence; but it is undoubtedly meagre,—and, if we get the truth, we do not get the whole truth; e.g., at this present moment we are not by any means fully informed of the circumstances under which the hostile movement against Nouroz Khan has been undertaken, though of course we can very well guess the cause; still I cannot suggest any other practicable means of supplementing our intelligence save those indicated by Sir R. Pollock.

21st April.

T. H. THORNTON.

Enclosure 11 in No. 32.

Appendix to Note.

From a reference to the secret records of the Persian Office, it appears that on the 17th March 1869 (while the Ameer was at Lahore) X. Y. reported the substance of a discussion which took place at Cabul on the receipt of the Viceroy's letter of the 9th January 1869. In this discussion the Amir, Noor Muhammad Shah, and others took part, and the conclusion arrived at was that the British Government had no intention of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. This discussion was followed next day by a private discussion between the Ameer and Noor Mahomed Shah, at which no third person was present. It turned upon the following passage in the Viceroy's letter: "It will be left to the Head of the Government of India year after year to determine what shall be done by the British Government in proof of its desire to strengthen your Highness' power, and what assistance in the shape of money and arms shall be given year after year for the consolidation of your Highness' Government and in evincing the good-will of the British Government." Syud Noor Mahomed Shah observed that "it does not appear from the wording of the passage what are the wishes of the British Government. If the Government desires to ask for any place in Afghanistan wherein to establish a cantonment, it is impossible to comply with its wishes, considering the usage of Afghanistan. If the Government should desire to send its troops to this country under the name of an auxiliary force, this will alienate the tribes from us and unsettle men's minds. What is practicable is this, that the money and arms be given by the British Government; the men composing the troops should be provided by us, and the power and management should rest with ourselves. It shall be our duty to show due submission and good-will towards the British Government."

Hearing this interpretation the Ameer said :—

"May God will that at the time of treaty the wishes and requisitions of the British Government be such that there may seem nothing to prevent our complying with them. I would agree even to this, that the troops be our own and the military officers and drill instructors be furnished by the British Government, and that a confidential Agent of the Government be stationed in Balkh and Herat!"

Syud Noor Mahomed Shah said :—

"Be that as it may, at the present time the British Government has also its own objects in view. You are the same Ameer Shere Ali Khan who after the defeat at Candahar repeatedly asked for assistance. Why did not the English agree then? Now both the parties have their own objects. May God vouchsafe all is that good!"

The Ameer then said: "May God send us good! And may the requests of the British Government be such that our people may be able to agree to them! If the British Government put upon my neck a heavier load than my country and religion would be able to bear, there will be difficulty."

On the 18th March X. Y. repeated a discussion that took place in the Saniman Boorj in the Lahore Fort on the 17th March, at which the Ameer observed that personally he would have no objection to an English Envoy being stationed at Cabul, but that owing to the turbulent character of the people it would not be safe. The same objection, however, did not apply to Balkh, Candahar, or Herat, and the arrangement by which an English Officer should be stationed at these places would be beneficial to both Governments. A translation of this report was sent to the Foreign Office, and printed *in extenso*.

On the 26th March X. Y. reported a discussion which took place at 7 A.M. on 25th March between the Ameer, Noor Mahomed Shah, and others on certain questions which had been put to the Ameer by Sir Donald McLeod. One of these questions was :—

"What can the Ameer do to procure intelligence from the frontier of Afghanistan, and what assistance can the British Government give in this matter?"

The Ameer and his councillors are reported to have said :—

"The object of the British Government appears to be to place their own men on the frontier. On every account the best plan would be that the Ameer arrange himself to procure intelligence and send it to the British Government. His Highness would be prepared to expend two lakhs of rupees annually for this purpose from his own treasury.* On the 2nd April 1869 X. Y. reported that the previous night Syud Noor Mahomed Shah had represented to the Ameer that it would be advisable that the British Government depute Mahomedans to the borders of Afghanistan, Candahar, and Herat, and after the conquest of Balkh to Balkh, for the purpose of procuring information. No more than one European or Native news-caterer should be stationed at one place. The Ameer approved of this advice."

X. Y. now states that, so far as he could ascertain at Umballa in 1869, it was the belief of the Ameer's councillors that he never agreed to the location of British Agents in Afghanistan.

T. H. THORNTON.

Enclosure 12 in No. 32.

Dated Ferozepore, 29th March 1875.

From Captain H. GREY, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Ferozepore, to T. H. THORNTON, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to Government of Punjab.

In reply to your letter No. E., of the 27th instant, I have the honour to state that the Ameer *did* freely consent to the appointment of European British Officers in Balkh, Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul.

My authority is a copy, certified by the Foreign Secretary, of a note submitted by me to Lord Mayo on conversations held with the Minister Noor Mahomed. In that copy I find the following passage :—

"He is open to any proposition for securing his northern border; while doubtful of any Russian power for aggression for some years to come, he still thinks precautions should be taken; would construct forts on his own part or under our superintendence, and admit European garrisons if ever desired; would gladly see an Agent or Engineer Superintendent there (in Balkh), Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul, which might lead to the supposition of his being a puppet. There would be no danger for such, did they respect the Afghans and themselves."

Mr. Seton-Karr heads the paper from which the above is taken "Memorandum on conversations held with the confidential Minister," and dates it the 31st March. I observe, however, that my summary of proceedings, dated 4th April 1869, gives its date as being the day of the first private interview, *i.e.*, 29th March 1869, and distinctly states that the Ameer was party to the conversation, and such I remember to have been the case.

A further authority, upon which I go, is a passage in my private memoranda to the following effect :—

"4. In accordance with my representations, therefore, a new letter (No. I.) was addressed to the Ameer, to which I was directed (No. VII.) to obtain, if possible, an answer of complete satisfaction; and also to arrive at a definite understanding with him on various other points noted below, after which

* The written reply actually given to the question was as follows :—

"Since His Highness and Her Majesty's Government are partners in each other's benefits and losses, how can His Highness act lightly in collecting information and watching the course of events in Central Asia. On the contrary, he will, to the utmost of his power, endeavour to collect correct information of passing events. There is no such necessity for assistance in the collection of information on the affairs of Central Asia from the Government of Her Majesty, for the two Governments are as one, and if any expense be incurred it is of no consequence."

This written reply bears the seal of Noor Mahomed Shah, and is, it will be perceived quite in accordance with the views set forth in the reported discussion, and is so far a proof of the correctness of X. Y.'s information.

should be held the second private interview, which would, in a manner, sanction and confirm the result of the negotiations. The points (recorded in pencil notes in my possession) were :—

“(1).—That the Ameer should accede to our deputation of Native Agents wherever we pleased. To this the Ameer agreed, and promised to assist them in every way.

“(2).—To ascertain whether the Ameer was agreeable to the deputation of an Envoy at some future date. On this point the Ameer expressed his willingness to receive an Envoy as soon as things had somewhat settled down, anywhere save at Cabul, where he thought it would affect his power with the people. * * *

I may note that the Ameer was at that time eager to meet what he supposed to be our views, and his whole attitude was that of one eager to please.

Enclosure 13 in No. 32.

OPINIONS of Nawab GOOLAM HOSSEIN KHAN BAHADOOR, C.S.I., Native Commandant, 15th Regiment Bengal Cavalry, on the present state of affairs in Cabul, submitted to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

ALWAYS actuated by a sense of devotion and loyalty towards the British Government, I have been in the habit of occasionally venturing to give any information, with my views, on the subject of Afghan politics, whenever I considered such conducive to the interests of Government. Seeing, therefore, that the British Government at the present day takes more than ordinary interest in the affairs of Afghanistan, and that events of some importance have recently transpired in that country, which have been noticed by the Native Press in India, adding that the British Government had resolved on sending a special mission to Afghanistan; and having in former years served as British Agent at the Court of Cabul, and being more or less acquainted with the internal and external affairs of that country, and to this day in correspondence with trustworthy friends there, I am to a certain extent kept acquainted with the course of events and the opinions entertained thereon, and consider it my duty towards the Government I have the honour of serving to express my opinions, based as they are upon former experience. And although it may be considered presumptuous in so humble an individual to express any opinion in such important and delicate questions, still trusting to the indulgence granted to all faithful servants of Her Majesty, I presume to offer the following :—

For some time the British Government has been anxious that order and tranquillity should be established in Afghanistan, but the Ruler of that country, through error of judgment and want of foresight and proper discernment, has not acted on the wholesome advice given him, but to all appearance considered such advice as being injurious to the interests of his own country and, if followed, greatly to the advantage of the British Government only; and in support of this view gave some weak reasons. But the expression of this hostile opinion does not emanate from the Ameer himself, but rather from a number of influential Sirdars who are constantly about him, and who have recently risen to high office in the State. These men are not only ignorant and wanting in judgment, but are also avaricious, and under the cloak of patriotism have become the confidential favourites of the Ameer, and, taking advantage of their influence to benefit and enrich themselves, represent the friendly advice, tendered by the British Government, as injurious to the country, and use all manner of artifice to impress this upon the Ameer, who is quite unable to judge for himself of the true merits of the case. Moreover, it is well known that when the principal officers of a State, for motives of their own, forsake the true interests of their master, however intelligent the master himself may be, it is extremely difficult for him to arrive at the truth. It is therefore of the last importance to make known to the Ameer by sound advice and good counsel what his true interests are, put him on his guard, and show him the machinations of the honey-mouthed but designing men who are about him.

It remains to be considered in what way this can be brought about; and in my humble opinion it would be desirable for Government to name a person of the same creed and country as the Ameer, an individual well disposed towards both Governments, who could win his confidence, and take the opportunity of communicating to him the views and friendly advice of the British Government, explain to him the present and future benefits to be derived from following such friendly advice, &c. This person to act in concert with the British Agent at present in Cabul. Should, however, the advice given not be followed by the Ameer, owing to the intrigues of selfish and interested courtiers, still no change should be allowed to take place in the relations at present subsisting between the two Governments, and then, if considered necessary, a mission might be sent to express openly and candidly to the Ameer the convictions of the British Government, and what would probably follow if the advice given was not listened to. But I consider that to send a mission composed of European officers, in the first instance, would be a mistake, and this for two reasons: in the first place, the members of the Afghan Durbar on hearing even that a mission might be expected at Cabul would become greatly excited and annoyed, and in that case the friendly advice of the Government would be represented as given from purely interested motives and not for the sole benefit of the Ameer and his country; in the second place, should the Afghan Durbar either from fanaticism, ignorance, or other motives oppose the despatch of a mission into Afghan territory, and the British Government calmly accept the refusal, its dignity and prestige would be compromised to a serious extent, and cause anxiety as to what further step to take under the rebuff. I repeat then my conviction that, under the present circumstances, it would not be advisable to send a mission composed of European officers, but a native of distinction as already stated, if the object in view is to be attained.

Again it is a matter for serious consideration whether, in the present state of affairs, it has become necessary for the British Government to tender advice to the Ruler of Afghanistan. In my humble opinion there are two good reasons why such advice, if possible, should be given. The first concerns the external relations of Afghanistan with its neighbours, such as Yarkund, Turkomania, Tek, Yamoot, Merve, and the country in the vicinity of Herat, which have been encroached upon by Russia, whose

conquest and influence are daily on the increase ; and although there are still tribes of Turkomans and desert tracts intact, still these even may be considered as if already in the hands of that power ; and Government is aware of the efforts Russia is making to navigate the rivers of Turkistan, and to connect the Syr Darya and Amu rivers with a view to intercommunicate by means of steam vessels ; that already their trading vessels are on the Amu Darya and have penetrated to Balk and Badakshan, while no British officer can penetrate to Balkh, Herat, or Badakshan ; nay not even a traveller has access to these countries—a proof that British interest has rather decreased than increased of late in those parts, which makes it more necessary that some attempt to establish intercourse should be made ; and, in my humble opinion, taking into consideration the inroads of Russia into Turkistan, it would be wise to act with forethought in the affairs of Afghanistan.

As regards the internal state of that country, it would be impossible to describe in this brief paper the discord that reigns, but some notice may be taken of matters which immediately concern the British Government. For the last two or three years Government seems anxious that Europeans should have access to Cabul. Sir F. Pollock was at one time named as likely to be sent ; then Mr. MacNabb was spoken of ; after him a Colonel, who had travelled from Herat to Meshed ; again it was intended that the mission sent to Yarkund should return *via* Cabul, but the Court of Cabul opposed this last.

When Syud Noor Mahomed Shah was at Simla as Envoy to discuss the relations between the British Government and the Court of Cabul, he accepted in the name of his Government the condition that Europeans should be allowed to visit Cabul, also that European Political Officers should be allowed to reside in different parts of Afghanistan, but on his return to Cabul his Government disavowed this condition, stating that such a demand could not be complied with.

When the Ameer took the field against his brother, Sirdar Mahomed Ameen Khan, then Ruler of Candahar, the British Government in a friendly manner advised him in vain not to proceed to violence ; finally, Mahomed Ameen Khan and the Ameer's elect son, Sirdar Mahomed Ali Khan, then heir-apparent, lost their lives in the conflict which ensued, thus giving the family of Mahomed Afzul Khan the opportunity of intriguing and seizing upon Cabul, Turkistan, and Candahar after defeating the Ameer.

The late lamented Lord Mayo, after the flight of Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan from Cabul, frequently wrote to the Ameer in a friendly way not to drive his promising son into exile, but rather to conciliate and call him back ; but the Chief of Cabul would not take his advice, and finally the above-named Sirdar attacked and took Herat. Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan, then Ruler of Herat, and his son with other Chiefs were killed in the defence. Such were the results of the bad counsel given by the Ameer's advisers ; and it is these very men who have instigated the recent act of treachery on the part of the Ameer towards his son, which has brought the Ameer into such bad repute in the country, and more especially among the Ghilzee Sirdars who were security for the safety of Yakoob Khan, and it is more than probable that serious disturbances will break out before very long.

The remonstrances of the British Government for this act of treachery have been disregarded by the Ameer, and in this state of things it has become almost a necessity for the British Government to interfere by calling upon the Ameer to settle the administration of his country.

Considering then the external and internal state of Afghanistan, I am firmly convinced that now is the time for the interference of the British Government with a view to the peace of that country and the tranquillity of Hindoostan.

The following are a few of the reasons why the Government of India should interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan :—

1st.—For a long time the British Government has been anxious to establish amicable relations with the Ruler of Cabul, but without success.

2nd.—The interference of Government in former days, and the expenditure of large sums, notwithstanding that the powerful and independent kingdom of the Punjab intervened.

3rd.—That notwithstanding the aid treacherously given to the Sikhs by Dost Mahomed Khan, the British Government considered it advisable at the time to keep on friendly terms.

4th.—Sending a costly expedition to Persia with a view to annex Herat to the Afghan kingdom.

5th.—The grant of large sums of money to the Ameer, together with arms, &c.

6th.—Making a clause in the new Treaty that an external enemy (having designs on Afghanistan) should be considered an enemy to the British Government.

7th.—The protection given to the Sirdars made prisoners by the Ameer, and their support by the British Government.

8th.—The bad results to British trade from the navigation of the Amu Darya by Russia.

9th.—The possible inclination of the Ameer towards another party (Russia?) owing to the silence and apparent apathy of the British Government.

10th.—The constant anxiety felt on the frontier under British rule owing to the unsettled state of affairs in Afghanistan.

11th.—Suggesting to the Native Princes of India thoughts (conjectures) as to why the British Government had relinquished its hold on that country.

12th.—The establishment of friendly relations with Yarkund will lose its advantages.

Advantages to be derived from interference in the affairs of Afghanistan—

1. To perpetuate the old friendship which subsisted between the two Governments.

2. To derive some benefit after expending large sums of money on that country.

3. To secure the prestige of the British Government.

4. The sense of security to Afghanistan itself which would result from a good understanding between the two Governments.

5. The sense of security and peace in India and the Punjab, &c.

6. The possibility of strengthening friendly relations with the Ruler of Yarkund.

7. Advantages to be derived from commercial intercourse.

Camp, Umballa, 15th January 1875.

No. 33.

Secret, No. 34.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA
IN COUNCIL (Extract).

India Office,

London, 19th November 1875.

MY LORD,

1. I HAVE carefully considered your letter of 7th June, and the papers accompanying it, with respect to the establishment of a British Mission in Affghanistan.

2. I do not gather that in your Excellency's mind, or in that of the able Officers whose communications are appended to the Despatch, any doubt exists as to the insufficiency of the information which you now receive from that country. The baldness and extreme scantiness of the Diaries hardly require to be established by testimony, and it appears, from the statements of Captain Cavagnari and Sir R. Pollock, that only such information as the Amir approves of is contained in them. It would seem further that, in the opinion of Sir R. Pollock, intelligence from Affghanistan was never so hard to obtain as it is now. Still less are the present arrangements efficient for the purpose of obtaining intelligent reports upon Central Asian affairs generally, or any trustworthy estimate of the course they may be expected to take; or for exercising any influence, in case of emergency, on the minds of the Amir or his nobles.

3. Your Excellency does not doubt that, having regard to the present aspect of affairs in Central Asia, it would be desirable that a British Officer should be stationed at Herat, and you anticipate great advantage from the arrangement, if the Officer should be a man of sound judgment and possessing the full confidence of the Amir. The only point which you raise for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government is whether the advantages are such as to justify efforts being made for obtaining the concurrence of the Amir, which would be attended with difficulty, and would not be certain of success.

4. The question has been clothed with an importance it never possessed before by the recent advances of Russia, which have placed her outermost posts in some places almost on the frontier of Affghanistan, in others upon roads which lead to it by easy and well supplied marches.

5. As the proximity of Russia to Affghanistan becomes closer and more established, the danger which is to be feared, whatever its extent may be, will probably take one of three forms. Russia may, by terror or corruption, obtain a mastery over the Amir, which will detach him from English interests, and leave to her choice the moment for penetrating to any portion of the country. Or, secondly, if she fails to shake his loyalty, his hold on power may be destroyed by internal disorder, and Russia, by establishing her influence over the Chiefs who may become dominant, may secure the same advantages as would have resulted from the adhesion of the Amir himself. Or, thirdly, if both the Amir and his Sirdars remain insensible to the suggestions of the Russian Agents, they may by some imprudence come into collision with the frontier forces of that empire, and afford a pretext for the exaction of some territorial penalty.

6. The general tendency of the information you have furnished to me is to the effect that no apprehension of the first alternative need be felt. Your Excellency and your most experienced officers appear to be convinced that the Amir's dislike of the presence of any British representative in his dominions does not furnish ground for inferences unfavourable to his loyalty. But, whatever confidence present circumstances may justify you in entertaining, the well-known peculiarities of the Affghan character forbid the omission of such a contingency from any computation of the probable result of a close neighbourhood between Russia and Affghanistan.

7. The second and third alternatives appear, unfortunately, from the papers you have forwarded, to be still less beyond the range of probability. The fiscal corruption to which the Cabul Diaries bear testimony, seems, according to the Candahar Diaries, to have produced the natural result of excessive taxation, and consequent discontent. Captain Cavagnari speaks to an amount of oppression in the Province of Balkh, which may probably lead to a revolt on the first favourable opportunity; and Goolam Hossein anticipates the breaking out of serious disturbances before long, in consequence of the irritation of the Ghilzee Sirdars. Even, therefore, if the Amir's loyalty could be counted on for an indefinite period, a field would still be left for foreign intrigue, dangerous alike to the Amir's power and to the interests of Great Britain.

8. The military operations lately undertaken by the Amir, which appear to have been resolved upon before any information was communicated to your Government, suggest that the contingency of collision between his forces and those of Russia, or of the allies of Russia, must not be left out of account. Territorial boundaries in those countries are vague and ill-recorded, and the Amir has never shown any disposition to seek peace by abating a doubtful claim. He may think himself bound to assert supposed rights which may trench on the claims of Russia or of her allies; and steps may be taken which, in the judgment of the frontier commanders, may render a movement in advance necessary to the honour of Russia before your Government has had the opportunity of interposing either remonstrance or restraint.

9. The chance that any of these opportunities would be offered for the establishment of a dominant Russian influence in Affghanistan would be materially diminished, if not wholly neutralized, by the presence of a British Officer in that country. The evils to which I have referred would lose their formidable character if warnings could be given to your Government, or advice tendered to the Amir, in good time. They could only grow to dangerous proportions if their first commencement were hidden from your knowledge.

10. I do not desire, by the observations which I have made, to convey to your Excellency the impression that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Russian Government have any intention of violating the frontier of Affghanistan. The restraining force exercised from St. Petersburg may not have been altogether effectual in its results; and it may depend in the future upon fortunate circumstances, which an accident may terminate. Still, it is undoubtedly true that the recent advances in Central Asia have been rather forced upon the Government of St. Petersburg than originated by them, and that their efforts, at present, are sincerely directed to the prevention of any movement which may give just umbrage to the British Government. But the very fact that the measures of the frontier authorities do not always faithfully represent the ideas of the distant Government on whose behalf they act makes me more anxious that your Excellency should possess some channel of speedy and accurate information from the regions in which this dangerous policy is pursued. The case is quite conceivable, in which Her Majesty's Government may be able, by early diplomatic action, to arrest proceedings on the frontier which a few weeks, or even days, later will have passed beyond the power even of the Government of St. Petersburg to control.

11. On all these grounds, Her Majesty's Government continue to attach very serious importance to the presence of a British Agent in Affghanistan. I do not gather that your Excellency is inclined to differ from this judgment. But, in your opinion, the moment for giving effect to it will not arrive until the advance of Russia is further developed, and its forces have occupied Merv. In this opinion it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to concur. If ever the Russians should accomplish the permanent occupation of Merv, the time would possibly have passed by when representations to the Amir could be made with any useful result; for the influence of your Government at Cabul, already enfeebled, would, for such a purpose, have in a great measure disappeared. The Amir has watched the steady progress of the Russian arms, scarcely impeded by such resistance as the Governments of his own race and creed have been able to offer. He has warned the British Government that one advance would follow another, and his prediction, disregarded when made, has been shown by the issue to be true. If, in spite of all promises given, and confidence expressed to the contrary, the Russians should advance to Merv, the Amir will conclude, until at least the contrary has been established, that no power exists which is able to stay their progress. He will then be hardly induced to consent to an arrangement which may cause him to lose favour in the eyes of the neighbour whom he esteems to be the strongest.

12. I gather from your letter under reply, that the principal objection felt by you to an immediate effort to obtain the consent of the Amir to a British Agency in Affghanistan is the fear that the effort would be vain. You apprehend that a refusal might lower the estimation of British power among the Affghans, and that England might be placed in an embarrassing position whenever it might hereafter be desirable to persuade the Russian Government of the existence of a real British influence at Cabul.

13. That a refusal would illustrate the feebleness of our influence with the Amir cannot be doubted; but I apprehend little evil from this disclosure. It is not likely that either the Affghan Sirdars or the Russian Ministry are misinformed as to the true state of the case, or that any useful purpose would be served by keeping up, even if it were possible, an appearance of influence which does not correspond with the reality.

14. But I am not convinced that the Amir's present disinclination indicates that his concurrence will be ultimately refused. He has had no opportunity of forming a more enlightened judgment. He has no assistance from any European mind in interpreting the events which have recently taken place in Central Asia. In judging of the probable course and the relative importance of the two European powers upon whom the destiny of his country depends, he can only reason by his Asiatic experience and the counsels of a singularly prejudiced durbar; and he is little able either to measure the gravity of the danger which threatens him, or to discern his best chance of safety. It is premature to abandon all hope of leading him to form a juster estimate of his position. Indian diplomatists, by superior intellect and force of character, have, in their intercourse with Native Princes, often triumphed over more stubborn prejudices. The serious peril to which his independence is exposed, the inability of the British Government to secure the integrity of his dominions unless it can watch through the eyes of its own officers the course of events upon his frontiers, will, if these topics are enforced in personal intercourse by an Agent of competent ability, probably outweigh in the Amir's mind any rancour surviving from the events of 35 years ago, or any dissatisfaction with the issue of the Seistan arbitration.

15. The first step, therefore, in establishing our relations with the Ameer upon a more satisfactory footing, will be to induce him to receive a temporary embassy in his capital. It need not be publicly connected with the establishment of a permanent mission within his dominions. There would be many advantages in ostensibly directing it to some object of smaller political interest, which it will not be difficult for your Excellency to find, or, if need be, to create. I have therefore to instruct you, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, without any delay that you can reasonably avoid, to find some occasion for sending a mission to Cabul; and to press the reception of this mission very earnestly upon the Amir. The character you will give to it, and the amount of escort, if any, that it will require, I must leave entirely to your judgment. The Envoy whom you may select will be instructed to confer with the Amir personally upon the recent events in Central Asia; to assure him of the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that his territories should remain safe from external attack; and, at the same time, to point out to him the extreme difficulty which will attend any effort on your part to ensure this end, unless you are permitted to place your own officers upon the frontier to watch the course of events. In these communications he will not depart from the amicable tone in which your intercourse with the Amir up to this time has been conducted. On the contrary, he will not forget that one of the chief objects of his mission is to leave in the Amir's mind an undoubting impression of the friendly feeling of Her Majesty's Government. But, maintaining this tone, it will be the Envoy's duty earnestly to press upon the Amir the risk he would run if he should impede the course of action which the British Government think necessary for securing his independence.

16. I request that you will furnish me with an early report of the measures you have taken to carry out the instructions of this Despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 34.

No. 10 of 1876.

Government of India.—Foreign Department:

Secret.

To the Most Honourable the MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, 28th January 1876.

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Secret Despatch, No. 34, dated the 19th of November 1875, in which, after reviewing our Despatch, No. 19, of the 7th of June last, and conveying to us the views of Her Majesty's Government on the important questions of policy discussed in that Despatch and in previous correspondence, you instruct us, without any delay that we can reasonably avoid, to find some occasion for sending a mission to Cabul, and to press the reception of the mission very earnestly upon the Ameer; the object of the mission being to urge upon His Highness the desirability of stationing British officers upon the frontier of Afghanistan.

2. Before explaining the reasons which make it necessary for us to ask for further instructions on the subject of the proposed mission, we desire to observe, with reference to the remarks contained in the earlier paragraphs of the Despatch, that the views and opinions set forth in our Despatch of the 7th of June appear to have been misapprehended in several important particulars.

3. In paragraph 2 it is stated that we appear to entertain no doubt as to the insufficiency of the information at present received from Afghanistan; that the diaries of our Agent in Cabul are bald and extremely scanty; and that it appears from the statements of Captain Cavagnari and Sir R. Pollock that only such information as the Ameer approves of is contained in them. With reference to these remarks we would explain that in paragraphs 11 to 14 of our Despatch of the 7th of June we stated our opinion that though there might be doubts as to the sufficiency of the intelligence given by our Agent at Cabul the value of the information was not destroyed by such defects; that while the position of the Agent compelled him to be cautious in communicating news to the British Government we had no reason to believe that information of importance was withheld; that, on the contrary, the information supplied was fairly full and accurate, and that the diaries contained internal evidence that the intelligence reported in them was not submitted to the Ameer for his approval. The opinion which we then expressed was based upon our own experience, confirmed by the views entertained by Sir Henry Davies, Sir R. Pollock, Colonel Munro, and Nawab Foujdar Khan.

4. The information we have since obtained confirms us in these opinions. It is true that Sir R. Pollock, writing in July 1874, stated that he had at no time experienced greater difficulty in procuring reliable intelligence regarding Afghan affairs, but he now informs us that he has every reason to be satisfied with the fullness and accuracy of the intelligence at present furnished by our Agent; and a perusal of the recent diaries is sufficient in our opinion to establish the improbability of the statement (for which indeed we have never seen any evidence advanced) that the Agent withholds information in deference to the wishes of the Ameer. As a matter of fact, we are not aware that any event of importance which it would have been the Agent's duty to report has not been promptly communicated to us. The diaries received since our Despatch of the 7th of June was written abound in matter which it is impossible to believe the Ameer ever saw, or would wish to be reported to the British Government.

5. It would also appear from paragraphs 3 and 12 of your Lordship's Despatch, that our opinions with respect to the negotiations proposed by your Lordship with a view to the establishment of a British officer at Herat, as expressed in our Despatch of the 7th of June, have been imperfectly apprehended. Our object was to inform your Lordship that there was an entire concurrence of opinion among all those who could be supposed to have the means of forming a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Ameer that he is most unwilling to receive British officers as residents in Afghanistan; that his reluctance is consistent with his loyal adherence to the interests of the British Government; and that such being the case we considered it would be a grave error to urge upon him the establishment of a British Agency at Herat or Candahar at the present time, because it would be a deviation from the patient and conciliatory policy which had hitherto guided our relations with Afghanistan. We expressed an opinion, indeed, that "having regard to the present aspect of affairs in Turkistan it would be desirable that a British officer should be stationed at Herat," and that "if an officer of experience and sound judgment were chosen who possessed the full confidence of the Ameer and the Afghan officials we should anticipate great advantage from the arrangement." But we considered that these advantages were contingent upon a condition of things which did not exist. We did not discuss the question whether the advantages to be expected from the proposed measure were "such as to justify efforts being made for obtaining the concurrence of the Ameer;" because in our judgment the advantages to be gained from the presence of British officers on the Afghan frontier depended entirely upon the cordial concurrence of the Ameer, and would not be secured by his reluctant assent after pressure put upon him by us. We gave at considerable length our reasons for thinking that the Ameer's cordial consent could not be obtained, and we said that "if we were to press the question on the Ameer at present, our proposals would in all probability either be refused or accepted with great reluctance." In either case we pointed out the serious objections to the scheme, and we added:—
 "After a careful consideration of the information which we have collected as to the position of the Ameer, and of the probable result of pressing him to accept a British Agent at Herat, we remain of the opinion which we expressed to your Lordship by telegraph on the 18th of February last, that the present time and circumstances are

“ unsuitable for taking the initiative in this matter. We recommend that no immediate pressure be put upon the Ameer or particular anxiety be shown by us upon the subject, but that advantage be taken of the first favourable opportunity that his own action or other circumstances may present for the purpose of sounding his disposition, and of representing to him the benefits which would be derived by Afghanistan from the proposed arrangement. The object in view is, in our judgment, more likely to be attained by taking this course than by assuming the initiative now.”

6. We have deemed it necessary to enter at some length on these explanations because, from the tenor of the Despatch under reply, we gather that Her Majesty's Government have concluded that the measure we are now instructed to carry out would present itself to us in a more favourable light than that in which we really regard it.

7. Having made these preliminary observations, we proceed to explain the steps we have taken in order to comply with the instructions contained in your Lordship's Despatch. Immediately after we received it we summoned Sir R. Pollock, Commissioner of Peshawur, to Calcutta to confer personally with us on the subject. The Viceroy also placed himself in private and confidential communication with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The result of our deliberations is that we are convinced that, if a mission is to be sent to Cabul, the most advisable course would be to state frankly and fully to the Ameer the real purpose of the mission, and to invite him to enter cordially into those closer relations with the British Government which the mission is to endeavour to establish. The Ameer and his advisers are shrewd enough to understand that only matters of grave political importance could induce us to send a special mission to His Highness' Court. If the mission were ostensibly directed to objects of minor political importance, the Ameer and his officials would be incredulous. He might then decline to discuss the weightier questions brought forward by our Envoy, and in all probability his confidence in us would be shaken, especially as the proposal to establish British Agents in Afghanistan is, as we pointed out in our Despatch of the 7th of June, a departure from the understanding arrived at between Lord Mayo and the Ameer at the Umballa conferences of 1869. A reference to the correspondence forwarded with our Despatch, No. 46, dated 22nd May 1873, will show that the Ameer is not likely to welcome any mission we may send unless its objects are fully and clearly explained to him beforehand.

8. If notwithstanding the views expressed in this Despatch Her Majesty's Government determine that a mission shall be sent, the Ameer should in our opinion be informed in a letter from the Viceroy that the present condition of affairs in Central Asia makes it expedient that the relations between the British Government and Afghanistan should be placed on a more definite footing than at present; that, while we have no proposals to make deviating in any way from the policy, which has hitherto guided and will continue to guide us, of complete abstention from interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, we are desirous of arriving at a clearer understanding as to the arrangements necessary for obtaining full information of events on and beyond the frontiers of Afghanistan so that the British Government may be able to avert by a timely exercise of friendly influence any danger which may threaten the integrity of Afghanistan; and that for this purpose direct personal conference with His Highness is necessary. We would then suggest to the Ameer either that he should come to Peshawur to meet the new Viceroy in person at some early and convenient time to be hereafter arranged, or, if His Highness preferred it, that we should send a mission to such place as he might consider most convenient, to explain our views. It might be advisable to give the Ameer these alternatives, which were suggested by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, because it would be more difficult for him to refuse both proposals, and if he were not disposed for the personal interview he might more readily accept the mission.

9. On the whole, however, we doubt whether the Ameer would exhibit less reluctance now to receive a special Envoy than he did in 1873, when we proposed to send the Commissioner of Peshawur to Cabul to explain the result of the Seistan arbitration and the assurances given by Russia in respect to the boundaries of Afghanistan and the integrity of the Ameer's territories.

10. As the steps which we believe to be the best for commencing negotiations with the Ameer differ from the suggestions contained in your Lordship's Despatch in the important particular that the nature of the business would be indicated in the first instance instead of the mission being ostensibly directed to some object of minor importance, we should have thought it necessary, upon this point alone, to ask for instructions before making any communication to the Ameer. But, apart from the

procedure to be adopted, we shall have to instruct the Envoy who will be charged with the negotiations upon several subjects regarding which it seems to us to be necessary that we should receive some further explanation of the views entertained by Her Majesty's Government.

11. The correspondence which has taken place with the Ameer of late, and the experience derived from the communications held with Syud Noor Mahomed at Simla in 1873, satisfy us, and our opinion is entirely shared by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and Sir Richard Pollock, that at least two important questions will be raised by the Ameer if he entertains the proposal that British Residents should be placed at Herat and Candahar.

Those questions are—

1st. Whether Her Majesty's Government are prepared to give unconditional assurances of their determination to protect the territories of Afghanistan against any external attack.

2nd. If the Ameer should apply for assistance for the purpose of fortifying Herat and improving his army, to what extent his demands should be complied with.

12. Both these questions are of great importance. Your Lordship will doubtless have read the observations made by the Ameer in May 1873 and the communications which took place with Syud Noor Mahomed later in the same year on the subject of the protection of Afghanistan. It then appeared that nothing short of a full and unconditional promise of protection against foreign attack would have been satisfactory to the Ameer; consequently, in the Viceroy's letter to His Highness of the 6th of September 1873, the question was deliberately reserved for future consideration. We had no authority then, nor have we received authority since, from Her Majesty's Government to give to the Ameer any such unconditional guarantee, and we are of opinion that there are grave objections against binding the British Government by such an obligation. We are precluded by law from entering into a treaty of this nature without the express command of Her Majesty's Government, and unless such a treaty is accompanied by reciprocal engagements on the part of the Ameer which seem to us to be inapplicable to the present condition of affairs.

33 Geo. 3. c. 52.

13. The Ameer will in our opinion, judging from the whole tenor of his communications and from the language used by Syud Noor Mahomed in 1873, expect some large pecuniary assistance in aid of the protection of Afghanistan, if the contemplated negotiations are opened. The Syud studiously avoided making any definite official demand, but the sum of 100,000*l.* which, bearing in mind the dissatisfaction felt by the Ameer at the result of the Seistan arbitration, we then offered to put at his disposal, was evidently considerably below his expectations. Your Lordship is aware that up to the present time the Ameer has not taken advantage of the offer. The reason may be either that he was disappointed at its amount, or that, having objected to the return through Afghanistan of Sir Douglas Forsyth's mission to Kashgar, he was reluctant to accept the gift. However this may be, his conduct affords no encouragement to the successful accomplishment of the objects of the proposed mission. His objections to the presence of British officers in Afghanistan are clearly very strong, and his expectations of pecuniary aid are very high.

14. In our opinion it would be impolitic to expend large sums of money for the purpose of strengthening the position of Afghanistan. Considering the insecure basis upon which the Government of a country like Afghanistan rests, it is impossible to foresee the use to which the fortifications far from our own base of operations which would be improved and the troops who would be raised and equipped at our expense might at some future time be applied. We concur in the objections expressed by Lord Lawrence* in the Despatch of the 4th of January 1869 to the imposition of heavy charges upon the revenues of India for such purposes.

* "We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is, to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control.

"Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or, what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Cabul, Candahar, or any similar outpost; in full reliance on a compact, highly-equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories, or on our own border; in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses; in the sense of security of title and possession, with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of

15. Sufficient has been said to show the difficulty of the two questions which we have discussed and the necessity we are under of asking for further instructions with regard to them. But besides these questions it is our duty to urge upon your Lordship the difficulty we feel in framing directions to the Envoy as to the arguments which he is to use when pressing upon the Ameer the advisability of accepting British Residents in Afghanistan.

16. In your Lordship's Despatch under reply, an opinion is expressed to the effect that the Ameer's independence is exposed to "serious peril," and the possibility of diminishing or neutralizing that peril by the personal influence of a British Agent in Afghanistan and by timely information of the course of events on the Afghan frontier is the consideration which Her Majesty's Government desire to press upon the Ameer.

17. The dangers to the independence of Afghanistan may be considered as possible from two different causes—from the future action of the Russian Government or of Russian officers on the one hand, and from the action of the Ameer and the Sirdars or people of Afghanistan on the other.

18. We are in possession of no information which indicates an intention or desire on the part of the Russian Government to interfere with the independence of Afghanistan. In the correspondence forwarded to us with your Lordship's Secret Despatch, No. 32, dated 19th November last, there has been a frank interchange of views between Her Majesty's Government and the Russian Government on the subject of their policy in Central Asia, and Her Majesty's Government have intimated that "they have now received with the most sincere satisfaction the assurances conveyed in Prince Gortchakoff's Despatch as to the enlightened conviction of His Imperial Majesty that such extension,† either on the side of Bokhara, of Krasnovodsk, or of the Attrek, is contrary to Russian interests, and that formal orders have been given that all future action in those regions is to be strictly confined to the defence of existing limits and the protection of property and commerce from pillage and brigandage."

† i.e., "the further extension of Russian territory towards the Afghan borders."

19. In this satisfaction we fully share. As Her Majesty's Government are aware, we have always held that the wisest course to pursue is to explain fully to Russia the importance to British interests of the complete independence of Afghanistan, and to make it clearly understood that Great Britain could not look with indifference on any measures tending to impair or interfere with that independence. We therefore view with peculiar gratification the clear exposition of the policy of Her Majesty's Government as set forth in the Foreign Office Memorandum of the 11th of May 1875. At the same time we fully appreciate the force of the considerations referred to in the 10th paragraph of your Lordship's Despatch, which render it conceivable that circumstances may occur, as they have occurred before, to draw the Russian Government into a line of action contrary to their real intentions and wishes.

20. At present, however, we are in possession of no information which leads us to look upon Russian interference in Afghanistan as a probable or near contingency, or to anticipate that the Russian Government will deviate from the policy of non-extension so recently declared. The Ameer has always watched the progress of the Russian power with alarm, and has at times been greatly agitated by the possibility of the Russian occupation of Merve and the immediate contact of the Russian and Afghan dominions. But we have been informed that Her Majesty's Government did not at all share his alarm and considered that there was no cause for it. The Ameer was accordingly told that the result of the communications between the British and the Russian Governments regarding the boundaries of his dominions has been materially to strengthen the position of Afghanistan and to remove apprehension of danger from without, and he was counselled to devote his undisturbed attention to the consolidation and improvement of his internal government. Apparently these communications have tended to remove the feelings of alarm which were undoubtedly felt by the Ameer when he first heard the rumour of a Russian expedition to Merve. In October 1873 he is reported to have written to his Agent at Bokhara as follows: "It is evident that the British Government

the principal Chiefs and the Native aristocracy; in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political and military strength; in husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying our resources; in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard; and in the trust in a rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt."

“ has defined the Afghan boundary with the Russian and Persian Governments, and that
 “ even if the Russians take possession of Sarakhs and Merve Shahjehan it is not to be
 “ apprehended, with regard to the communications made between the Russian and the
 “ British Governments on the subject of the definition of the Afghan boundary, that they
 “ will attempt any advance into the Afghan border.” If representations of an opposite
 tenor are now to be made, the Ameer will expect to be fully informed of the grounds
 for them.

21. Moreover, the assurances given to the Ameer, that a good understanding exists between England and Russia on Central Asian affairs and that his dominions are secure from Russian attack, have in our opinion had a salutary effect in inducing him to adhere to the policy of peace which he has hitherto pursued towards his neighbours. It is manifestly important to avoid anything which might lead him to doubt the correctness of the assurances repeatedly and advisedly given him, or might have the effect of unsettling his mind and of weakening the influence which we have for many years successfully exercised at Cabul in the interests of peace; collision between the Ameer and the frontier tribes or with the allies of Russia, which we consider under present circumstances to be unlikely, would become probable; and the understanding arrived at with Russia regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan and the independence of the Ameer's territories would be imperilled. Language which indicates a change of policy fraught with consequences so grave to Afghanistan and to British interests in Central Asia ought not in our opinion to be used unless there be a material change in existing circumstances, and we are not aware that any such change has occurred.

22. We do not share to the full extent the apprehensions expressed in paragraphs 6 to 8 of your Lordship's Despatch. Of course it is impossible to predict with confidence what turbulent affairs may take among a people like the Afghans. But, so far as circumstances enable us to form a forecast, we have no reason at present to anticipate the occurrence of a collision between Russia and Afghanistan from any of the causes mentioned. Those officers of our Government who are best acquainted with the affairs of Afghanistan and the character of the Ameer and his people consider that the hypothesis that the Ameer may be intimidated or corrupted by Russia (even supposing there was any probability of such an attempt being made) is opposed to his personal character and to the feelings and traditions of his race, and that any attempt to intrigue with factions in Afghanistan opposed to the Ameer would defeat itself and afford the Ameer the strongest motive for at once disclosing to us such proceedings. Whatever may be the discontent created in Afghanistan by taxation, conscription, and other unpopular measures, there can be no question that the power of Ameer Shere Ali Khan has been consolidated throughout Afghanistan in a manner unknown since the days of Dost Mahomed, and that the officers entrusted with the administration have shown extraordinary loyalty and devotion to the Ameer's cause. It was probably the knowledge of the Ameer's strength that kept the people aloof from Yakoub Khan in spite of his popularity. At all events, Herat fell to the Ameer without a blow. The rebellion in Lalpoora in the extreme east was soon extinguished. The disturbances in Budukshan in the north were speedily suppressed. Nowhere has intrigue or rebellion been able to make head in the Ameer's dominions. Even the Char Eimak and the Hazara tribes are learning to appreciate the advantages of a firm rule.

23. We by no means overlook the contingency referred to in paragraph 8 of the Despatch under reply, but we think that Her Majesty's Government scarcely do justice to the Ameer and his unqualified acceptance hitherto of our advice in his dealings with his neighbours. The military operations referred to are probably the expedition to Maimena, a place which forms an integral part of the Afghan dominions. The reduction of the Chief of Maimena to obedience is therefore a domestic affair with which it is contrary to our policy to interfere, and on which we should not ordinarily expect the Ameer to communicate with us. As a matter of fact, however, the operations were not resolved upon before information was communicated to us. We were kept acquainted with the whole course of the discussions in the Durbar previous to the despatch of the troops, and have been since regularly informed of the progress of the expedition.

24. But what we wish specially to repeat is that from the date of the Umballa Durbar to the present time, the Ameer has unreservedly accepted and acted upon our advice to maintain a peaceful attitude towards his neighbours. We have no reason to believe that his views are changed. On the contrary, so late as September last, when the Ameer received news of the disturbances in Kokand, and heard news of a general

rising against the Russians, he wrote to Naib Mahomed Alum Khan "that he must " make endeavours to obtain as much information as possible in this matter, but that he " should be careful lest any person in his territory should act against the Russians, and " that he should exercise such restraint over his people that no act contrary to the " friendship existing between Afghanistan and Russia may take place."

25. The observations which we have hitherto made apply to the manner in which the instructions contained in your Lordship's Despatch could in our opinion best be carried into effect, and to the further instructions which appear to us to be necessary before the proposed negotiations can be commenced. But the matter is, in our own judgment, and in that of all those whom we have been able to consult, of such grave importance that we feel it to be our duty to add some further remarks for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government in the hope that the whole question may still be reconsidered.

26. It is in the highest degree improbable that the Ameer will yield a hearty consent to the location of British Officers in Afghanistan which the Mission is intended to accomplish; and to place our Officers on the Ameer's frontier without his hearty consent would, in our opinion, be a most impolitic and dangerous movement. Setting aside the consideration of the personal risk to which under such circumstances the Agents would be exposed and the serious political consequences that would ensue from their being insulted or attacked, their position would be entirely useless. They would be dependent for their information on untrustworthy sources. They would be surrounded by spies under the pretext of guarding them or administering to their wants. Persons approaching or visiting them would be watched and removed; and though nothing might be done ostensibly which could be complained of as an actual breach of friendship, the Agents would be checked on every hand, and would soon find their position both humiliating and useless. Such was the experience of Major Todd at Herat in 1839 when his supplies of money failed. Such was the experience of Colonel Lunnsden when he went to Candahar in 1857 as the dispenser of a magnificent subsidy.

27. A condition of things like this could not exist for any length of time without leading to altered relations and possibly even in the long run to a rupture with Afghanistan, and thereby defeating the object which Her Majesty's Government have in view. We already see the fruits of the conciliatory policy which has been pursued since 1869 in the consolidation of the Ameer's power and the establishment of a strong Government on our frontier. The Ameer's not unnatural dread of our interference in

* Paragraphs 24 to 26 and 33 to 36.

his internal affairs, and the difficulties of his position as described in our Despatch* of the 7th of June last, combined, perhaps, with the conviction that if ever a struggle for the independence of Afghanistan should come we must in our own interest help him, may have induced him to assume a colder attitude towards us than we should desire. But we have no reason to believe that he has any desire to prefer the friendship of other powers. We are convinced that a patient adherence to the policy adopted towards Afghanistan by Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo, which it has been our earnest endeavour to maintain, presents the greatest promise of the eventual establishment of our relations with the Ameer on a satisfactory footing; and we deprecate, as involving serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan and to the interests of the British Empire in India, the execution, under present circumstances, of the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's Despatch.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
W. MUIR.
E. C. BAYLEY.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.

No. 35.

Secret, No. 3A.

To the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

MY LORD,

28th February 1876.

I ENCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's information and guidance, the instructions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the affairs of Afghanistan and Khelat.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

Enclosure in No. 35 (Extract).

MY LORD,

India Office, 28th February 1876.

THE tranquillity of the British power in India is so far dependent on its relations with the Trans-frontier States, that Her Majesty's Government cannot view without anxiety the present unsatisfactory condition of those relations. The increasing weakness and uncertainty of British influence in Afghanistan constitutes a prospective peril to British interests; the deplorable interruption of it in Khelat inflicts upon them an immediate inconvenience by involving the cessation of all effective control over the turbulent and predatory habits of the Trans-Indus tribes.

2. In view of these considerations, Her Majesty's Government have commended to the consideration of the Governor General of India in Council arrangements for promoting unity of purpose and consistency of conduct in the administration of the Sindh frontier. They have also instructed the Viceroy to find an early occasion for sending to Caubul a temporary mission, furnished with such instructions as may, perhaps, enable it to overcome the Amir's apparent reluctance to the establishment of permanent British Agencies in Afghanistan, by convincing His Highness that the Government of India is not coldly indifferent to the fears he has so frequently urged upon its attention; that it is willing to afford him material support in the defence of his territories from any actual and unprovoked external aggression, but that it cannot practically avert or provide for such a contingency without timely and unrestricted permission to place its own Agents in those parts of his dominions whence they may best watch the course of events.

3. It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the present moment is favourable for the execution of this last-mentioned instruction. The Queen's assumption of the Imperial title in relation to Her Majesty's Indian subjects, feudatories, and allies will now for the first time conspicuously transfer to Her Indian dominion, in form as well as in fact, the supreme authority of the Indian Empire. It will, therefore, be one of your earliest duties to notify to the Amir of Afghanistan and the Khan of Khelat your assumption of the Viceregal office, under these new conditions.

4. A special mission, having for this purpose a twofold destination, might perhaps be advantageously despatched from Jacobabad, up the Bolan Pass, to Quetta, where the Khan could be invited to meet and receive it. After delivering your letter to the Khan, the mission might proceed to Kandahar, and thence, under an escort furnished by the Amir, continue its journey to Cabul. From Cabul it would return to India, either through the Koorum Valley or the Khyber Pass, according to circumstances.

5. Her Majesty's Government, however, only suggest this plan to your consideration, with due reference to the circumstances of the moment as they arise. You may possibly find it advisable, on your arrival at Calcutta, to communicate indirectly with the Amir through your Commissioner at Peshawur. This officer might privately inform Shere Ali of your intention to send a complimentary letter to him, as well as to the Khan of Khelat, and ascertain the route by which it would be most agreeable to His Highness that the mission charged with the delivery of that letter should approach his capital. If the Amir expresses any preference for the northern route, the mission could proceed directly to Cabul by the Khyber Pass, returning to India through Kandahar and Khelat.

6. To invite the confidence of the Amir will be the primary purpose of your Agent. To secure that confidence must be the ultimate object of your Government. But to invite confidence is to authorise the frank utterance of hopes which it may be impossible to satisfy, and fears which it may be dangerous to confirm. Whether these hopes and fears be reasonable or the reverse, their open avowal is, in [the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, preferable to their concealment.

7. The maintenance in Afghanistan of a strong and friendly power has at all times been the object of British policy. The attainment of this object is now to be considered with due reference to the situation created by the recent and rapid advance of the Russian arms in Central Asia towards the northern frontiers of British India. Her Majesty's Government cannot view with complete indifference the probable influence of that situation upon the uncertain character of an Oriental Chief whose ill-defined dominions are thus brought, within a steadily narrowing circle, between the conflicting pressures of two great military empires, one of which expostulates and remains passive, whilst the other apologises and continues to move forward.

8. It is well known that not only the English newspapers, but also all works published in England upon Indian questions, are rapidly translated for the information of the Amir, and carefully studied by His Highness. Sentiments of irritation and alarm at the advancing power of Russia in Central Asia find frequent expression through the English press, in language which, if taken by Shere Ali for a revelation of the mind of the English Government, must have long been accumulating in his mind impressions unfavourable to its confidence in British power. Whether the passivity of that power, in presence of a situation thus unofficially discussed with disquietude, be attributed by the Amir to connivance with the political designs, or fear of the military force, of his Russian neighbours,—the inference, although erroneous, is in either case prejudicial to our influence in Afghanistan.

9. The Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James has been officially informed by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the objects of British policy as regards Afghanistan are—

1st. "To secure that State against aggression."

2nd. "To promote tranquillity on the borders of that country, by giving such moral and material support to the Amir, without interfering in the internal affairs of his country, as may enable Her Majesty's Government to prevent a recurrence of the disturbances and conflicts between rival candidates for power among his own family, or the Meers of the different Provinces."

10. Her Majesty's Government would not, therefore, view with indifference any attempt on the part of Russia to compete with British influence in Afghanistan; nor could the Amir's reception of a British Agent (whatever be the official rank or function of that Agent) in any part of the dominions belonging to His Highness afford for his subsequent reception of a Russian Agent similarly accredited any pretext to which the Government of Her Majesty would not be entitled to except as incompatible with the assurances spontaneously offered to it by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. You will bear in mind these facts when framing instructions for your mission to Cabul. To demands which you have no intention of conceding your Agent will oppose a frank and firm refusal. You will instruct him to prevent such demands from becoming subjects of discussion. Others which, under certain conditions, you may be willing to entertain, he will undertake to refer to your Government, with such favourable assurances as may induce the Amir to recognize the advantage of facilitating, by compliance with your wishes, the fulfilment of his own.

11. If the language and demeanour of the Amir be such as to promise no satisfactory result of the negotiations thus opened, His Highness should be distinctly reminded that he is isolating himself, at his own peril, from the friendship and protection it is his interest to seek and deserve.

12. The requests which may be made by Shere Ali in connexion with his reception of permanent British Agents in Afghanistan will probably raise the question of granting to His Highness—

1st. A fixed and augmented subsidy.

2nd. A more decided recognition than has yet been accorded by the Government of India, to the order of succession established by him in favour of his younger son, Adbullah Jan.

3rd. An explicit pledge, by Treaty or otherwise, of material support in case of foreign aggression.

13. The first of these questions is of secondary magnitude. You will probably deem it inexpedient to commit your Government to any permanent pecuniary obligation on behalf of a neighbour whose conduct and character have hitherto proved uncertain. On the other hand, you may possibly find it worth while to increase from time to time the amount of pecuniary assistance which up to the present moment the Amir has been receiving. But your decision on this point can only be determined by circumstances which have not arisen, and considerations which must be left to your appreciation of such circumstances.

14. With regard to the recognition of Abdulla Jan, whose selection as legitimate successor to the throne of his father has been made with much solemnity by Shere Ali, and ostensibly acquiesced in by the most influential of the Afghan Chiefs, Her Majesty's Government in considering this question have before them the solemn and deliberate declaration made in 1869 by Lord Northbrook's predecessor to the present Amir, viz., that "the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet considering that the bonds of friendship between that Government and your Highness have been lately more closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as Ruler of Cabul, and rekindle civil war; and it will further endeavour from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor."

15. The Government of India having in 1869 made that declaration, which was approved by Her Majesty's advisers, have not based upon it any positive measures; while to the Amir, who had received that declaration under circumstances of some solemnity and parade, it appears to have conveyed a pledge of definite action in his favour. It is not surprising that these conflicting interpretations of an ambiguous formula should have occasioned mutual disappointment to His Highness and the Government of India.

16. Her Majesty's Government do not desire to renounce their traditional policy of abstention from all unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. But the frank recognition of a *de facto* order in the succession established by a *de facto* Government to the throne of a foreign State does not, in their opinion, imply or necessitate any intervention in the internal affairs of that State.

17. You may also find it in your power to bring about a reconciliation between the Amir and his nephew, Abdul Rahman Khan, who is now a refugee at Samarcand, under Russian protection. The order of succession established by Shere Ali would derive increased solidity from the support of this powerful malcontent, whose adhesion to it might, perhaps, be secured through the friendly assistance of your Government.

18. Any of these arrangements might strengthen the position of the Government of India in Afghanistan, by securing its influence over the present Ruler of that country, and exhausting some of the sources of the political and social confusion which his death is now likely to occasion. But you will fully understand that, in adverting to them, I am only suggesting points to which your consideration should be directed, and am in no way limiting your discretion with respect to them.

19. It remains to consider the question of giving to the Amir a definite assurance of material support in case of external aggression upon those territories over which Her Majesty's Government has publicly recognized and officially maintained his right of sovereignty.

20. With or without any such assurance, England would be impelled by her own interests to assist His Highness in repelling the invasion of his territory by a foreign power. It is, therefore, on all accounts desirable that the Government of India should have at its disposal adequate means for the prevention of a catastrophe which may yet be averted by prudence, and the fulfilment of an obligation which, should it ever arise, could not be evaded with honour. The want of such means constitutes the weakness of the present situation.

21. In the year 1873, Lord Northbrook gave to the Envoy of the Amir the personal assurance that, in the event of any aggression upon the territories of His Highness which the British Government had failed to avert by negotiation, that Government would be prepared "to assure the Amir that they will afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and will also, in case of necessity, assist him with troops."

22. The terms of this declaration, however, although sufficient to justify reproaches on the part of Shere Ali if, in the contingency to which it referred, he should be left

unsupported by the British Government, were unfortunately too ambiguous to secure confidence or inspire gratitude on the part of His Highness. The Amir, in fact, appears to have remained under a resentful impression that his Envoy had been trifled with, and his attitude towards the Government of India has ever since been characterized by ambiguity and reserve.

23. If, therefore, Shere Ali be frank with your Envoy, he will probably renew to him the demand addressed in 1873, through his own Envoy, to Lord Northbrook, "that in the event of any aggression of the Amir's territories, the British Government should distinctly state that it regards the aggressor as its enemy; and, secondly, that the contingency of an aggression by Russia should be specifically mentioned in the written assurance to be given to the Amir."

To answer this renewed demand in terms identical with those of the answer formerly given to it would prejudice, instead of improve, your relations with the Amir, by the evasion of an invited confidence.

24. Her Majesty's Government are, therefore, prepared to sanction and support any more definite declaration which may, in your judgment, secure to their unaltered policy the advantages of which it has been hitherto deprived by an apparent doubt of its sincerity. But they must reserve to themselves entire freedom of judgment as to the character of circumstances involving the obligation of material support to the Amir, and it must be distinctly understood that only in some clear case of unprovoked aggression would such an obligation arise.

25. In the next place, they cannot secure the integrity of the Amir's dominions, unless His Highness be willing to afford them every reasonable facility for such precautionary measures as they may deem requisite. These precautionary measures by no means involve the establishment of British garrisons in any part of Afghanistan, nor do Her Majesty's Government entertain the slightest desire to quarter British soldiers upon Afghan soil; but they must have, for their own Agents, undisputed access to its frontier positions. They must also have adequate means of confidentially conferring with the Amir upon all matters as to which the proposed declaration would recognize a community of interests. They must be entitled to expect becoming attention to their friendly counsels; and the Amir must be made to understand that, subject to all fair allowance for the condition of the country, and the character of the population, territories ultimately dependent upon British power for their defence must not be closed to those of the Queen's officers or subjects who may be duly authorized to enter them.

26. Her Majesty's Government are also of opinion that the establishment, if possible, of a telegraph from some point on the Indian frontier to Cabul, *via* the Koorum Valley, is an object deserving of your consideration, and the permanent presence at the Viceregal Court of a properly accredited Afghan Envoy is much to be desired, as a guarantee for the due fulfilment of counter obligations on the part of the Amir, and the uninterrupted facility of your confidential relations with His Highness. Subject to these general conditions, Her Majesty's Government can see no objection to your compliance with any reasonable demand on the part of Shere Ali for more assured support and protection, such as pecuniary assistance, the advice of British officers in the improvement of his military organization, or a promise, not vague, but strictly guarded and clearly circumscribed, of adequate aid against actual and unprovoked attack by any foreign power. Such a promise personally given to the Amir will probably satisfy His Highness, if the terms of it be unequivocal. But Her Majesty's Government do not wish to fetter your discretion in considering the advantages of a treaty on the basis above indicated.

27. The conduct of Shere Ali has more than once been characterised by so significant a disregard of the wishes and interests of the Government of India, that the irretrievable alienation of his confidence in the sincerity and power of that Government is a contingency which cannot be dismissed as impossible. Should such a fear be confirmed by the result of the proposed negotiation, no time must be lost in reconsidering, from a new point of view, the policy to be pursued in reference to Afghanistan.

28. On the other hand, the success of those efforts (which, if they be made at all, cannot be safely delayed) will be pregnant with results so advantageous to the British power in India that Her Majesty's Government willingly leave to the exercise of your judgment every reasonable freedom in carrying out the present instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 36.

No. 13 of 1877.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Most Honourable the MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, P.C., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 10th May 1877.

WE have already notified to your Lordship by telegraph the close of the recent conference at Peshawur between the Envoys of the British and Afghan Governments; and we now take the earliest opportunity in our power of submitting a full report of our proceedings in connection therewith. Those proceedings have been governed by the general principles laid down for our guidance in your Lordship's Despatches of the 23rd January and 19th November 1875. and your further separate instructions of the 28th February 1876. We were informed by the above-mentioned communications that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the time had arrived when it was desirable to place our relations with Afghanistan on a more definite and satisfactory footing; and that for the attainment of this object the first favourable opportunity should be taken to open amicable negotiations with the Ameer of Cabul.

2. For the complete explanation of the steps taken by us in accordance with the views thus held by Her Majesty's Government, we must preface our report of them by a brief recapitulation of our past relations with that Prince, so far as they affect the questions dealt with in this letter.

3. The only formal obligation still extant between the British Government and the Barackzai Rulers of Afghanistan is the Treaty of the 30th of March 1855. This Treaty comprises three short articles. The first article established perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government and Dost Mahomed Khan and his heirs; the second pledged the British Government to respect the territories then in His Highness' possession, and never to interfere therein; the third pledged the Dost, his heirs and successors, similarly to respect the territories of the British Government, and to be the friend of its friends and enemy of its enemies, without any such corresponding obligation on our part. It did not take long to prove the somewhat imperfect character of the Treaty thus contracted. Two years afterwards, on the first occurrence of a crisis affecting British interests in Afghanistan, a much more complete engagement stipulating for British Agencies in Cabul, Candahar, and Balkh, and granting aid to the Ameer in money and arms, was entered into by Sir John Lawrence and Dost Mahomed. That engagement, though limited to the duration of the war then being waged between the British Government and the Shah of Persia, was declared by Lord Canning to be sound in principle, liberal, and simple; tending to "redress the somewhat one-sided character of the Treaty of 1855, in which we appeared to take more than we gave;" and his Excellency expressed an earnest hope that, independently of the war in which we were then engaged, the relations of the British Power with Afghanistan might remain upon a permanent footing, similar to that upon which the above-mentioned engagement had placed them.

4. Dost Mahomed Khan was informed, during the course of the negotiations of 1857, that the British Government's support and assistance of him would be conditional on its officers being received in Afghanistan with the countenance and protection of His Highness. They were not, however, to exercise authority, or command, on Afghan territory; their duty (in the performance of which the Ameer was expected to afford them every facility) being simply to give advice when required, and to obtain all the information needed by our Government. The readiness with which the Ameer and his Sirdars perceived the propriety of this condition was, it is said, remarkable; and the measure, although not unattended by risk, met with reasonable success. This, at any rate, may be assumed from a careful review of past records, and from the views entertained by the experienced Head of the Mission, then stationed at Candahar, in favour of a renewal, at the present moment, of the policy then adopted.

5. It must, however, be observed that, although the residence of a British Mission at Cabul formed part of the stipulations agreed to in 1857, this step was not enforced by the British Government. The Dost urged that the Afghan people would view it with dislike; but Sir John Lawrence deemed it more probable that the real motive of

this representation was the disinclination of His Highness to let British officers discover the weakness of his rule, or come in contact with disaffected Chiefs at his capital. Provision was thereupon made in the Treaty that, whenever the subsidy should cease, and the British officers have been withdrawn from the Ameer's country, a Vakeel; not an European officer, should remain at Cabul on the part of the British Government, and one at Peshawur on the part of the Government of Cabul. The stipulation thus agreed upon has, so far as the British Government is concerned, been tacitly observed, for convenience sake, from that day to this; but it is worthy of remark that the Government of Cabul withdrew its Vakeel from Peshawur in 1858, and has never replaced him by another. With the exception of this last-mentioned provision, the obligations of the Treaty of 1857 were contracted for a special and limited purpose which has long since lapsed with the lapse of time; it fixed the relations of the British Government with the Ruler of Cabul, and their reciprocal obligations, for the duration of the war with Persia; and our only object in referring to it now is to bring to recollection the good feeling of the Afghan Ruler and people, some twenty years ago, in regard to the stationing of British missions in their territory, elsewhere than at Cabul.

6. No further change occurred for some years in the relations between the two Governments. They remained in a condition of friendly reserve. After the death of Dost Mahomed, in 1863, Afghanistan became involved in civil war, which lasted four years; it did not necessitate, in the opinion of Lord Lawrence's Government, any active interference on our part. The present Ameer, alone and unaided, after varying fortunes, and many severe reverses, regained the throne bequeathed to him by his father, the Dost. But no sooner was he firmly established thereon than he expressed a great desire,—not without some feeling of resentment for the neutral attitude which had been observed towards him in his hour of need,—to bring himself into friendly relations with the British Government. Lord Lawrence responded to his wishes; he presented His Highness in 1868 with a free gift of money and arms, and would have effected a friendly meeting with him at Peshawur had not the expiry of his tenure of office obliged his Excellency to return to England.

7. That meeting was, however, carried out at Umballa, in March 1869, by Lord Lawrence's successor in a manner which laid the foundation of closer relations between the two neighbouring Powers, and enabled Shere Ali to consolidate his authority on his return to Cabul. The Ameer, in his conferences with the Viceroy, bitterly complained of the one-sided character of the existing Treaty relations—those of 1855—between the two Governments, and earnestly solicited an amendment of them. Lord Mayo, however, was precluded, not only by the orders of Her Majesty's Government, but by his own convictions, from acceding to the wishes of His Highness. The policy of the Viceroy was, in his own words, an "intermediate" one, susceptible of development in proportion to the subsequent consolidation of the Ameer's authority, and the continued good conduct of His Highness, in his dealings with the British Government. In order, however, to meet, in some measure, the wishes of the Ameer, and to give him a tangible proof of the friendship of the British Government, Lord Mayo added a large gift of arms to that of the money already presented to His Highness; he, moreover, handed the Ameer a written assurance that the British Government would assist His Highness in strengthening his Government as circumstances might require, and would view with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of His Highness' rivals to disturb his position as Ruler of Cabul. This document was in no way intended to have the force of a Treaty; it was given to the Ameer in compliance with the earnest representations of His Highness that, without such an assurance, he would be unable to return to Cabul; and it is needless to observe that it did not commit the British Government to any unconditional protection of the Ameer, or to any liabilities which were not dependent on his future conduct towards us.

8. We may here mention that there are undoubted grounds for the conviction expressed to your Lordship in our Despatch, No. 19, of the 7th of June 1875—a conviction since strengthened by reference to persons in Lord Mayo's confidence, who conversed frequently at Umballa with Shere Ali and his confidential Minister—that a readiness was then manifested on behalf of His Highness to agree to the presence of British Agents at any places in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself, on condition of more substantial assistance, and open support, than the British Government was willing to afford him in 1869.

9. Owing to the strong personal influence established by Lord Mayo over Shere Ali, our relations with Cabul, although still somewhat distant and indefinite, remained for a

few years upon a satisfactory and friendly footing. During this period the British Government completed, on behalf of the Ameer, successful negotiations with the Government of the Czar for the definition, in a manner most favourable to His Highness, of the exact limits of the northern boundaries of Afghanistan, within which the Russian Government engaged to refrain from all interference.

10. The result of those negotiations, which had extended over more than three years, was communicated to Shere Ali early in 1873, when Lord Northbrook's Government, in its review of our position towards Cabul up to that period, expressed the opinion that—

“Although we have abstained from entering into any Treaty engagement to support the Ameer by British troops in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference. So long as the Ameer continues, as he has hitherto done, to act in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty's Government to render him such assistance.”

11. The Ameer, apparently actuated, at this period, by a deep-rooted fear of the Russians, professed himself at a loss to understand the great delay and difficulty which had arisen in the deliberations between the British and Russian Governments; he informed the British Agent that it was “impossible for the Russians to remain always firm in their negotiations;” and that his anxiety would never “be removed unless the “British Government adorns the Afghan Government with great assistance in money, “and ammunition of war for the troops, and unless great aid is given for the construction of strong forts through the northern Afghan border. If an emergency “arises,” he said, “for the Afghan Government to oppose the Russians, such opposition “cannot take place without the co-operation of the disciplined troops of the British “Government. It is plainly obligatory on the British Government to show their “cordiality in this matter before anything happens.”

12. With these thoughts in his mind, His Highness deputed Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, in the summer of 1873, to wait upon Lord Northbrook, and submit this and other matters to the consideration of the Viceroy. The Envoy's object appeared to be the establishment of an assumption on the part of the Ameer that both Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo had given His Highness unconditional promises of aid in money and arms,—an assumption which Lord Northbrook at once refuted, reminding the Envoy that the British Government alone was to be the judge of the propriety of any request for assistance preferred by his master. The Viceroy, finding that the Envoy was instructed by Shere Ali to apply to the British Government for assistance, both present and prospective—the former for the purpose of strengthening the Government of Afghanistan, the latter with the view of meeting the contingency of actual aggression by a foreign power—and learning, moreover, that he was not satisfied with general assurances, telegraphed to Her Majesty's Government for further instructions. On receipt of these, he informed Syud Noor Mahomed that it would be the duty of the Ameer, in case of actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to the British Government, which would endeavour, by negotiation and by every means in its power, to settle the matter and avert hostilities; but that, should these endeavours prove fruitless, the British Government was prepared to assure the Ameer that it would afford him assistance in the shape of money and arms, and, in case of necessity, aid him with troops. Lord Northbrook, however, deemed it advisable to avoid giving Syud Noor Mahomed any more definite pledge than this, or to comply with the request preferred by him for a distinct statement by the British Government that, in the event of any aggression on the Ameer's territories, it would consider the aggressor as an enemy to itself.

13. During the presence at Simla of the Afghan Envoy the subject of the location of British Agents in Afghanistan became, as in 1869, a topic of discussion. Our Foreign Secretary suggested the deputation of a British officer, of high standing and in the full confidence of the British Government, to the Court of the Ameer as the best preventive of the danger apprehended by His Highness: this officer could advise Shere Ali as to the circumstances of each case, and the action which, in cases of emergency, it might be necessary to take till the Government of India could be communicated with; whilst such a measure need not be followed by the location of Russian Agents in Afghanistan, which

would be incompatible with the pledges given by Prince Gortchakoff to Her Majesty's Government. The object of the location of British Agents in Afghanistan would, Mr. Aitchison said, be primarily to obtain accurate information on all matters affecting the external relations of Afghanistan, whilst in no way exercising interference in its internal affairs. The Envoy expressed his general concurrence in the principle of some such arrangement, but declined to recommend to the Ameer any specific proposal for giving effect to it, on the ground that it might occasion mistrust and misapprehension. He suggested, as an alternative, the deputation of a British officer to inspect the western and northern boundaries of Afghanistan, who could enter by Candahar and return by Cabul, and be again deputed to the capital, if necessary, at a later period. Such a course would, he said, familiarize the Ameer and the people of Afghanistan with the idea of receiving a permanent British representative, and eventually effect the desired object.

14. A Memorandum embodying the Envoy's alternative proposal was consequently communicated to the Ameer by the Government of India. The proposed arrangement was, in this Memorandum, strongly urged, as highly desirable, on account of "the responsibilities that have been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government on behalf of Afghanistan," and "the imperfect information which they possess regarding the border in respect to which these responsibilities have been incurred." The Government of India, when reporting its proceedings in the matter, expressed to your Lordship's predecessor the following opinions:—

"Though we think that the presence of accredited British officers at Cabul, Herat, and possibly also Candahar, would, for many reasons, be desirable, we are fully alive to the difficulties in the way of such a measure until the objects and policy of the British Government are more clearly understood and appreciated in Afghanistan. It is with the view of removing some of these difficulties that we have proposed the deputation of an officer to examine the boundaries. Independently of the valuable information, both geographical and political, that might be collected, a judicious officer would have it in his power to do much towards allaying any feelings of mistrust that may still linger in the minds of some classes of the people in Afghanistan, and towards preparing the way for the eventual location of permanent British representatives in that country, if such a measure should at any time be considered desirable or necessary."

15. The Envoy left Simla without having obtained the avowed object of his mission. On bidding farewell to those members and officers of the Government of India with whom he had been associated during the course of it, the Syud was profuse in his expressions of personal gratitude for the hospitality of his entertainment, and the courtesy with which he had been treated. But no sooner had he returned to Cabul than it became apparent that his feelings towards the British Government were most unfriendly; and from that time forward his influence in the Cabul Durbar, which we believe to have been considerable, was exerted on every occasion to the prejudice of our relations with the Ameer.

16. At the conclusion of the Simla conferences the Viceroy presented the Ameer with 100,000 r. and 20,000 rifles. But, notwithstanding his Excellency's gifts and assurances, the attitude of the Ameer became increasingly frigid, sullen, and discourteous. His Highness evinced deep disappointment at the result of his Envoy's interviews with the Viceroy. To all appearance, whilst mistrusting our repeated assurances that he had nothing to fear from the rapid and unchecked advance of Russia towards his Asiatic frontier, he had nevertheless persuaded himself that, in any emergency, the British Government would be compelled, by its own interests, to afford him unconditional assistance. Under this impression he seemed to believe that, in the meanwhile, he might with impunity disregard its advice, and reject its offers of conditional protection.

17. The fallacy of these views lay in their erroneous estimate of the political necessities of this Government, which are as adverse to the wholly uncontrolled personal action of any Afghan ruler, as they are favourable to the territorial independence of Afghanistan. It may, however, be admitted that the Ameer was at this time led, not altogether without cause, to hope and seek from the British Government evidence, more conclusive than he had yet received, of its professed regard for his interests. The arms and money denied to His Highness at a time when they might, perhaps, have saved his country and himself from prolonged civil war, were subsequently given to him when his need of them was infinitely less, and his cause for gratitude proportionally small. But the particular form

of support which, as the established legitimate Ruler of Afghanistan, he then most needed, was again refused him, at the time when, if given, it would have been best appreciated. On the part of the British Government he had seen nothing but extreme caution in committing itself to his support, whilst it lost no opportunity of assuring His Highness of its friendship with Russia and its reliance on her promises. On the part of Russia he saw nothing but a system of aggression on territories neighbouring his border, and a series of pledges unfulfilled. He had been officially informed in 1869 by Lord Mayo that the Government of the Czar would not interfere in Afghanistan, and would recognize as his all the territories then in his possession; and yet he was shortly afterwards beset with communications from General Kauffman which seemed to him inconsistent with this assurance; nor was it till nearly three years afterwards that Russia finally withdrew her strong opposition to the recognition of his authority over a most important portion of his territories. Again the promised restoration of Samarcand by Russia to the Ameer of Bokhara had been formerly announced to him by us, and yet evaded; whilst he found the pledge of the Russian Government not to annex Khiva virtually disregarded, and the Russian forces firmly established on the Oxus close to his own frontier.

18. In such circumstances it is, perhaps, hardly to be wondered at that the assurances given to His Highness by Lord Northbrook in 1873 failed to satisfy the Ameer, or to restore that confidence and good feeling which, for some time previously, had been upon the wane. His reply to Lord Northbrook's letter, submitted to him through his Envoy, was ungracious and evasive. He accorded no further notice to the Viceroy's proposals for sending an officer to inspect his boundaries than the curt statement that he had read and understood them; he hesitated for some time to receive the arms that were sent for his acceptance; and the subsidy of ten lakhs of rupees, lodged to his credit at the Kohat Treasury, he contemptuously rejected. Moreover, in terms positively offensive, he refused to permit any English officer to enter his territories; and peremptorily prohibited Sir D. Forsyth from passing through Cabul on the return of that officer, in the capacity of British Envoy, from Kashgar to India. In his recent interesting narrative of the journey of Syud Yakoob Khan to Russia, Captain Molley reports, and comments on, the prejudicial effect of this unfriendly act upon our position in Kashgar, and our prestige throughout Central Asia. Of such conduct, on the part of the Ameer, the reports received from our Native Agent at Cabul afforded no intelligible explanation. Of the actual condition of affairs in Afghanistan, of the projects and proceedings of its Ruler, the strength of his military force, the sentiments of his advisers, and the circumstances of his subjects, the Government of India was then without any trustworthy information, or any means of obtaining it. The evidences of a strong irritation in the mind of the Ameer against the British Government were obvious enough; but the true causes of this irritation our Native Agent seemed unable to remove, or even to indicate. It was also sufficiently apparent that, whilst the British Vakeel exercised no influence over the Ameer, the Ameer was exercising considerable influence over the British Vakeel; the tenor of whose correspondence with the Commissioner at Peshawur suggested an impression (which subsequent information proves to have been accurate) that his letters, if not always submitted to the Ameer for approval, were generally written in the sense believed by the writer of them to be in complete accordance with the wishes of His Highness; and that they never contained any intelligence, or the expression of any personal opinion, which could expose him to the Ameer's resentment, if those letters were to fall into the hands of the Cabul Durbar.

19. Such was the condition of our relations with Afghanistan when we received your Lordship's Despatch,* conveying to us the instructions of Her Majesty's Government to take an early opportunity for improving them, if possible, by endeavouring to secure the Ameer's assent to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat. We informed your Lordship that, whilst fully appreciating all the advantages to be anticipated from such an arrangement, we could not disguise from ourselves the practical difficulties of carrying it out; and that, for any immediate attempt to overcome them, the time and circumstances appeared to us inopportune. In fact, the late Viceroy was of opinion that precautionary measures in regard to Afghanistan might be advantageously deferred till the Russian frontier had been pushed on to Merv. It would then, in the opinion of his Excellency, be necessary to give more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan, and be probably desirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him, followed by the natural consequence of the establishment of British Agencies upon his frontier.

* No. 3, 23rd January 1875.

20. Your Lordship informed us in reply† that it was impossible for Her Majesty's Government to concur in this opinion. If the

† No. 34, 19th November 1875. Russians advanced their frontier to Merv the time would probably have passed when representations to the Ameer could be made with any useful result. The Ameer's reported and very probable disinclination to the establishment of a British Agency in his country might possibly be overcome if His Highness could be convinced of the inability of the British Government to secure the integrity of his dominions without this precautionary condition. At any rate, the attempt was, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, well worth making without further delay, since such delay was unjustified by any prospect of spontaneous change for the better in the ascertained tendency of Central Asian affairs, or any initiative on the part of the Ameer for the improvement of his relations with the British Government. Your Lordship, therefore, renewed the injunction, previously made on the subject of a special mission to Cabul, for the above-mentioned purpose.

21. On receipt of the Despatch conveying to us this expression of the views of Her Majesty's Government, we asked‡ your Lordship for further instructions, pointing out that any overtures to Shere Ali, of the kind commended to our adoption, would probably provoke from His Highness counter demands which could not be satisfied without the previous sanction of Her Majesty's Government. All the recent conduct and language of this Prince had pointed to the conclusion that he cared little, or nothing, for such eventual protection of his country as our own political necessities might oblige us, in any case, to afford it against foreign aggression; and that what he really did care to obtain from us was some unconditional pledge of personal and dynastic support to himself and

§ No. 3A, of 28th February 1876. family. On this point we desired to learn the views of Her Majesty's Government before proceeding further. Those views§ were received by us at the hands of the present Viceroy, and immediately commanded our careful consideration. In the main they removed the chief ground of our objection to any step which might have the effect of bringing to a crisis the relations of this Government with the present Ruler of Afghanistan, by informing us that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to enter into a more definite, equilateral, and practical alliance with His Highness. Our consideration of your Lordship's above-mentioned instructions was also influenced to some extent by the information which the present Viceroy was enabled to place before us, after personal conference, not only with Her Majesty's Government, but also with the Russian Ambassador in England, on the general circumstances of the situation we were now called upon to deal with. Whilst still alive to the difficulties and risks inseparable from any attempt to enter into closer and more responsible intercourse with a barbarous neighbour, so suspicious, discontented, and untrustworthy as Shere Ali, we certainly could not regard with unconcern the increasing inconvenience, and possible peril, of the extremely ambiguous and uncertain character of our existing relations with him. It was impossible to deny that the practical results of the Afghan policy, patiently pursued by us for several years, were far from satisfactory.

22. In 1869 overtures for closer relations between the two Governments, and freer intercourse between their respective subjects, had been initiated by Shere Ali. In 1876 there was every reason to anticipate that similar overtures, if initiated by us, would be rejected by His Highness. The Ameer left Umballa apparently much impressed by the power, and most solicitous of the friendship, of the British Government. Since then his respect for the one, and his desire for the other, had, to all appearance, been steadily decreasing. In the meanwhile His Highness had received from the British Government 12 guns, 21,400 rifles, 11,000 muskets, 1,200 carbines, 1,000 pistols, and a quarter of a million sterling of money. It was certainly not in our power to point to any reciprocal benefits which, during the same period, the British Government had received from the Ameer. The turbulent tribes which occupy the mountain passes between Cabul and Peshawur constitute a social barrier between Afghanistan and India, which the Ameer would doubtless endeavour to strengthen if he mistrusted our friendship. On the other hand, if he were sincerely desirous of improved intercourse between the two countries, and more practical relations with the Government on whose military support the protection of his Asiatic frontier has been assumed to be dependent, then he would naturally do all in his power to assist us in removing such a barrier by bringing these turbulent tribes under orderly control, and keeping open the passes which it is in their

power (if uncontrolled) to close between Cabul and Peshawur. This, indeed, His Highness engaged to do when he took leave of the Viceroy at Umballa; and, for a short while after his return to Cabul, he adhered to his engagement. But for the last three years he has withdrawn, the allowances, previously given by him in conformity with that engagement, to the Afreedis for keeping open the Khyber Pass; which has consequently remained practically closed against us. In the meanwhile the negotiations which had taken place between the Cabinets of St. James and St. Petersburg had placed us in the apparent position of the avowed protectors and controllers of the Ameer of Cabul. Prince Gortchakoff had not been slow to fix upon us all the responsibilities of such a position. Were Shere Ali, by his dealings with the Tekki Turkomans, to provoke the hostility of the Russian Power in Central Asia, it is the British Government which the Government of Russia would endeavour to hold responsible for the conduct of the Ameer; and, in fact, complaints on the supposed intentions, or rumoured action, of Shere Ali have already on more than one occasion been addressed in this sense by the Russian to the British Government. Yet the imperfect character of our relations with His Highness virtually rendered us unable to control his action, or even to obtain timely knowledge of his intentions. At the same time, were the Ameer's conduct such as to subject Afghanistan to a sudden attack from the Russian forces, the interests of our own Empire, complicated by the assurances we had repeatedly given to His Highness, would probably compel us to resist the attack *vi et armis*. In short, the policy hitherto pursued by the Government of India, in its relations with the Ruler of Cabul, had bequeathed to it certain imputed liabilities towards Russia on the one hand, and Afghanistan on the other, which the practical results of that policy did not enable it to fulfil except under conditions heavily disadvantageous to its own interests. For all these reasons we considered that, although the prospect of any attempt to improve our relations with the present Ameer of Cabul was extremely unpromising, still the necessity of bringing those relations to a definite issue, and promptly defining the position in which they could safely be left by us, was no longer open to reasonable question.

23. We, therefore, lost no time in acting on the last instructions of Her Majesty's Government. The Viceroy was of opinion that the opportunity and pretext hitherto wanting for the despatch of a complimentary special mission to Cabul were furnished by his Excellency's recent accession to office, and the addition which the Queen had been pleased to make to Her Sovereign titles with special regard to India. Concurring in that opinion, we made immediate preparations for announcing these events to Shere Ali by a special Envoy, secretly authorised to use his best endeavours to bring about a favourable opening for the renewal of the discussions commenced in 1869 with the Ameer, and continued in 1873 with the Minister of His Highness, on matters of common interest to the two Governments. But, in order to ensure, if possible, the friendly reception of it, we decided to depute, in the first instance, a trusted Native Officer charged to deliver to the Ameer a letter from the Commissioner of Peshawur, announcing to His Highness the ostensible objects of the proposed Mission. With this letter Ressaldar-Major Khanan Khan reached Cabul on the 17th of May 1876. His arrival there was announced to us by our Cabul Agent in a letter stating that the Ameer would "decline the interview as on former occasions." This information was shortly afterwards confirmed by a communication from the Ameer himself, declining the proposed Mission, on the ground that he desired no change in his relations with the British Government, which appeared to have been defined by that Government to its own satisfaction at the Simla Conference. If the British Government had now anything new to say about them, he would prefer to send his own Agent to the Viceroy, in order that the subjects of discussion, "weighed by a minute and exact investigation, might be committed to writing." An explanatory letter, simultaneously received from the British Vakeel at Cabul, stated that the additional reasons professed to him by the Ameer for declining the proposed Mission were—1st, that he could not guarantee the personal safety of "the Sahebs;" and, 2ndly, that, if he admitted a British Mission, he could not refuse to receive a Russian one, for the similar purpose of better defining his relations with the Russian Government.

24. After full consideration of these communications, we came to the following conclusions:—1st, that the result of the Simla Conferences having been eminently unsatisfactory to ourselves; and apparently no less unsatisfactory to the Ameer, it was not desirable to renew that experiment; 2ndly, that the Ameer's objection to a British Mission, on the ground that it would oblige him to receive a Russian one, involved a conscious and significant disregard of the understanding arrived at on his behalf between

the British and Russian Governments, and communicated by us to His Highness ; 3rdly, that in the Ameer's interests, as well as our own, it was undesirable to regard as absolutely final an answer which appeared to have been written without due deliberation, and might possibly have been inspired by a very erroneous estimate of the position in which His Highness would find himself placed if we at once proceeded to act upon it. We, therefore, exhorted His Highness once more to consider seriously before he rejected our proposals, the consequences to himself of obliging the British Government to look upon him henceforth as a prince who had voluntarily isolated his personal interests from its proffered alliance and support. We felt that the studied ambiguity of his response to our preceding communication made it more than ever incumbent on us to ascertain promptly the precise nature of his real disposition towards us, and the extent to which we might rely, in case of need, upon his recognition of the favours he had received from us, up to this time, without any corresponding obligations on his part. The terms of our answer to his letter were governed by these considerations. But, in order not to leave untried every legitimate means of convincing His Highness that our promises, as well as our warnings, were sincere, we authorised Dr. Bellew, and other personal friends of theirs in the service of our Government, to address at the same time to the Ameer and his Ministers letters, unofficially explaining our sentiments, and the importance of the opportunity then offered to the Afghan Government for materially strengthening its position at home and abroad.

25. The Ameer replied to our above-mentioned communications after a significant delay of two months. In the meanwhile, we had received from our Vakeel at Cabul reports of the reception by His Highness of frequent confidential emissaries from General Kauffman. Of what had passed between the Ameer and these Russian Agents, our knowledge was entirely confined to the contents of a letter delivered by one of them to His Highness from the Russian Governor. A copy of that document, communicated by the Cabul Durbar to the Government of India, and forwarded by us to your Lordship, has already been the subject of a correspondence between the Government of Her Majesty and that of the Czar. The answer finally received from the Ameer submitted to us two alternative proposals—First, that an Afghan Envoy should be deputed to meet one from the Viceroy at Peshawur; and, second, that the British Vakeel at Cabul should proceed to Simla charged with a confidential explanation to the Viceroy of the personal views and sentiments of the Ameer on the subject of his relations with the British Government. As regards the first of these proposals, we were of opinion that it was clearly inexpedient that representatives of the two Governments should be authorised to commence negotiations which could not fail to attract the attention, and excite the curiosity of the public, before the basis of such negotiations had been duly considered and distinctly accepted by each party to them. The second proposal appeared to us, not only free from objection, but altogether advantageous to the realization of our chief object, which was to ascertain the real sentiments of the Ameer. We, therefore, authorised our Vakeel to set out for Simla immediately, after placing himself in communication with the Ameer on the subject of his instructions.

26. This Vakeel, the Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, reached Simla on the 6th of October last. At first, though pressed to be explicit, he threw little light on the views and feelings of the Ameer. His Highness was, he said, resentful to the rebuffs met with by his previous representations to the Government of India, and resolved not to incur any repetition of a result which he deemed offensive to his dignity. Further pressure, however, elicited from the Vakeel four special causes of grievances as alleged by the Ameer against the Government of India. The first was a communication from Lord Northbrook in 1874, on behalf of his rebellious son, Yakoob Khan, whom he had imprisoned. This he resented as an unwarrantable interference in his most domestic concerns, as well as a support given to his personal enemies. The second cause of complaint was our decision on the question of the Seistan boundary, which he regarded as an unfriendly act, depriving him of his legitimate possessions. In the third place, he resented, as an interference with his authority, and an offence to his dignity, the gifts sent by the late Viceroy direct to the Chief of Wakhan, who is a tributary to His Highness. Finally, the Ameer was profoundly mortified by the repeated rejection of his previous requests for a defensive alliance, coupled with our formal recognition of the order of succession as established by him in the person of his youngest son, Abdulla Jan. It was also elicited from the Vakeel that the Ameer was much in want of money, and his people much disaffected by his expedients for obtaining it; that the undoubted reluctance

of His Highness to receive British officers was occasioned, not by fears for their personal safety, but by a dread of their probable popularity and possible intervention on behalf of oppressed or discontented subjects; that the Ameer, confident in the strength of the army our gifts had enabled him to equip, no longer felt his old dread of the power of Russia; that, in accordance with our own exhortations, he had lost no opportunity of improving his relations with the Russian authorities in Central Asia; and that between General Kauffman and His Highness permanent diplomatic intercourse was now virtually established by means of a constant succession of special Agents, who held frequent conferences with the Ameer, the subject and result of which were successfully kept secret. In short, the information gradually extracted from our Cabul Agent convinced us that the system on which we had hitherto conducted our relations with Shere Ali had practically resulted, not only in the alienation of His Highness from the Power which had unconditionally subsidised and openly protected him; but also in the increased closeness and confidential character of his relations with the only other Power that can ever cause serious danger to our Empire in India. The Vakeel, however, represented to the Viceroy that the Ameer, though strongly disinclined to admit British officers into any part of Afghanistan, would probably, if the point were pressed, accept such a condition rather than forfeit the advantage of a long-desired alliance with the British Government upon terms certain to strengthen his personal position at home, about which His Highness was chiefly anxious.

27. These statements gave us, for the first time, a clue to the Ameer's feelings, and the motives of his previous attitude towards us. After prolonged consideration of them in connection with the last instructions received from your Lordship, the Viceroy came to the conclusion that the Treaty of Alliance and the formal recognition of the Ameer's selected heir, which His Highness was supposed to desire of us, might be safely and advantageously accorded to him; provided that his willingness and ability to fulfil with loyalty his own part in the reciprocal obligations of such a Treaty were first manifested to us in a satisfactory manner. These concessions, sanctioned by your Lordship's last instructions, would not practically commit the British Government to anything more than a formal re-affirmation of the assurances already given by it, through Lord Mayo, to the Ameer in 1869, and a public recognition of its inevitable obligations to the vital interests of its own Empire. There was great reason to believe, for the ultimate stability of his previously contested authority, the father of the present Ameer was mainly indebted to the supposed protection of the British Government. It might, therefore, be presumed (and such a presumption was strongly confirmed by all our most verified knowledge of the social condition of Afghanistan) that, notwithstanding the apparently precarious tenure of Shere Ali's power, and the youth of his appointed heir, the timely and positive proclamation of such protection would effectually prevent those civil conflicts, otherwise certain to recur upon the death of the present Ameer. On the other hand, the conditions on which the concessions thus contemplated would be made dependent were such as any neighbouring Prince, sincerely desirous of our active friendship, might accept with personal cordiality and national benefit. They involved no interference with the Ameer's independent authority, no occupation of any portion of his territory, no foreign control over his civil or military administration. They were strictly confined to the location of at most two or three British officers (accredited to His Highness, placed under his protection, and precluded from all interference in the internal affairs of his Government) upon those points of his frontier whence we were unable to obtain intelligence by other means, and which were most exposed to the attacks against which we were asked to defend it. The Viceroy was nevertheless of opinion that it would be wholly inconsistent with the dignity, and contrary to the interests, of this Government to urge any proposals on the unwilling acceptance of the Ameer, or afford His Highness the opportunity of rejecting its positive demands. The Ameer's apparent object was to place the British Government in the position of a petitioner; and that position it behoved the British Government to reverse. Such were the opinions of the Viceroy, in which we generally concurred.

28. The Vakeel was consequently instructed to return to Cabul, and there explain to the Ameer, with the utmost possible precision, the moderate and necessary condition on which the British Government was prepared to sign with His Highness a Treaty of Alliance, and to accord its formal recognition to his heir-apparent. The Vakeel was charged to explain to the Ameer very clearly that our assent to the conference, suggested by His Highness in reply to our previous communications, would be entirely dependent on his agreement to this preliminary condition as a basis of negotiation. In order to

prevent the possibility of misunderstanding on that point, Atta Mahomed received from the Viceroy an Aide Memoire, which he was authorised to communicate to the Ameer. The Viceroy also addressed to His Highness a friendly letter, inviting him to Delhi as the guest of the British Government at the Imperial Assemblage, and proposing on that occasion to sign with him the Treaty of Alliance, which, subject to the above-mentioned condition, Sir Lewis Pelly would be authorised to negotiate at Peshawur with the Envoy of His Highness.

29. On this errand, in the satisfactory result of which he professed great confidence, Atta Mahomed returned to Cabul at the end of October last; and at the same time the Viceroy left Simla on a tour of inspection round the frontier. About this time, events occurred in Europe the effect of which was immediately apparent on our negotiations with Shere Ali. Throughout India and Asia there was a prevalent expectation that war between the Sultan and the Czar was imminent; and that it must lead, ere long, to war between England and Russia. Had this expectation been realized, the policy which had hitherto governed our relations with Afghanistan would have been promptly brought to a very practical test. It was immediately evident that the Ameer had no intention of committing himself to an English alliance on the supposed eve of a war between England and Russia. His apparent policy was to stand aloof from us till the latest possible moment; and then, if he found himself unable to maintain a strict neutrality between the two belligerents, to sell his alliance to the highest bidder, Russian or English, on the dearest terms. For this purpose, it was essential to His Highness to gain time. Accordingly, on his return to Cabul, the British Vakeel was informed that the Ameer was too unwell to receive him. This transparent pretext was prolonged till the Vakeel, instructed by the Viceroy to insist on its abandonment, was at last admitted to the presence of His Highness. The Ameer then informed him that he was still much too ill to discuss business, or even to receive the Viceroy's messages: and the Vakeel, either from stupidity or disloyalty, accepted the excuse. So matters went on for more than a month. During this period the Ameer, though too unwell to discuss business with the British Vakeel, was able to review troops and issue military orders. An Agent from General Kauffman remained at his Court, and was supposed to be in secret communication with His Highness. But of all that was passing at Cabul we knew less than ever; for the reports of our own Agent there had become studiously infrequent, vague, and unintelligible. Thus, after many years of a waiting policy, patiently pursued and confidently trusted, our attainment of the object, for which we had so long been waiting, proved to be perilously uncertain, at the very moment when certainty in such a matter was most essential to our interests; nor could we tell whether the lakhs of rupees and rifles, unconditionally lavished on Shere Ali by the British Government, might not at any moment be used against it by His Highness. At length the Ameer, finding himself unable to evade any longer the issue put to him, without bringing his relations with us to an open rupture (a result no more compatible with his purpose than placing them on a definitely cordial footing), despatched his Minister, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, to meet Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur, and wrote to the Commissioner there, briefly informing him of the Minister's departure with instructions to open negotiations; but without noticing the Viceroy's letter, or answering the invitation it contained.

30. The Ameer's Minister, who was in ill health, and could only travel by easy stages, reached Peshawur on the 27th of January. Thither Sir Lewis Pelly also proceeded, with detailed instructions for his guidance. At the first meeting between the two Envoys it appeared that the Afghan Envoy had no authority from his Government to accept the basis we had laid down as a *sine qua non* condition of our assent to the negotiations he had come to open. He, however, requested permission to defer his final answer on this point until he had made a full and detailed statement of the Ameer's views respecting his relations with us, and of certain episodes in the history of those relations which His Highness considered himself entitled to complain of. As we had all along been anxious to obtain authentic information of the Ameer's real sentiments on this subject, the Envoy's request was at once agreed to; on the condition, which he understood and accepted, that his statement should not be received by us, or be treated by him, as a basis of discussion.

31. This statement by the Afghan Envoy, which is herewith enclosed, is an interesting, instructive, and important document. It repeats and confirms the information previously given by Atta Mahomed to the Viceroy in regard to the Ameer's professed grievances against the British Government. It assumes, as a matter of course, that the British Govern-

ment is already bound, in honour and by written contract, to afford to the Ameer and his dynasty unconditional military support, both at home and abroad, whenever called upon to do so by His Highness. On this assumption, it naturally questions the advantages to the Ameer of any treaty of alliance which, on our part, would merely re-affirm liabilities already contracted by us towards His Highness; whilst, on his part, it would involve the definition and acceptance of liabilities altogether novel towards ourselves. Furthermore, it refers indirectly to the Ameer's relations with Russia in terms which seem to imply an impression on the part of His Highness that the claim of the Russian Government upon his consideration is practically much the same as that of the British.

32. Owing to the Envoy's increasing ill health, several weeks were occupied in the delivery of this long statement. During that time intelligence reached us from Cabul that the Ameer was straining every effort to increase his military force; that he was massing troops on various points of his British frontier; that he was publicly exhorting all his subjects and neighbours to make immediate preparation for a religious war, apparently directed against his English, rather than his Russian neighbours; both of whom he denounced, however, as the traditional enemies of Islam; that, on behalf of this jihad, he was urgently soliciting the authoritative support of the Akhoond of Swat, and the armed co-operation of the Chiefs of Dhir, Bajour, and other neighbouring Khanates; that, in violation of his engagements with the British Government, he was, by means of bribes, promises, and menaces, endeavouring to bring those Chiefs and territories under personal allegiance to himself; that he was tampering with the tribes immediately on our frontier, and inciting them to acts of hostility against us; and that, for the prosecution of these objects, he was in correspondence with Mahomedan Border Chiefs openly subsidised by ourselves.

33. In acknowledging the receipt of the Afghan Envoy's statement, the Viceroy instructed Sir Lewis Pelly to point out to the Envoy that the alleged grievances, over which the Ameer appeared to have been resentfully brooding for some years in unbroken silence, were mostly the result of mutual misunderstandings which could not possibly have occurred had the two Governments possessed the ordinary means of diplomatic intercourse with each other. With this remark, Sir Lewis Pelly proceeded to correct the Ameer's interpretation of our existing engagements with His Highness, and explain the thoroughly conditional character of them. He demanded from the Envoy an explanation of the reported hostility of the Ameer's language and conduct, at a time when the representative of His Highness was still engaged in friendly and pacific negotiation with the British Government; and, finally, he required from his Excellency an immediate and decisive answer on the Agency condition, which we had declared to be our only recognized basis of negotiation.

34. The Envoy replied that the reports which had reached us of the Ameer's utterances and proceedings were, he trusted, much exaggerated; he feared, nevertheless, that since his own absence from the Cabul Durbar His Highness had fallen under mischievous influences which he himself deplored and condemned; he would lose no time in addressing to the Ameer strong remonstrances on this subject. With regard to the Agency condition, he regretted to say that he was still without instructions, for which, however, he would again make special reference to Cabul. He was reminded, in reply, that the condition of our assent to negotiation with the Ameer had been distinctly explained to His Highness many months before he had decided, after deliberately considering it, to open the conference at Peshawur. If the Ameer had subsequently changed his mind, and now wished to revoke his acquiescence in this condition, we were in no disposition to urge it on his acceptance. It was merely part of a general arrangement to which, if seriously desired by His Highness, we were willing to assent. If the Ameer considered the arrangement disadvantageous to himself, he had only to say so, and the discussion of it would cease *ipso facto*. But we must, in either case, insist on a prompt and plain answer.

35. The Afghan Envoy, who had long been suffering from a mortal disease, expired shortly after his receipt of this communication. His surviving colleague, the Mir Akhor, declared that he had no authority to answer any question from the British Government; and Sir Lewis Pelly was consequently instructed to close the conference on the ground that there was no basis for negotiation.

36. Apparently the Ameer, whose object was still to gain time, was much surprised and embarrassed by this step. At the moment when Sir Lewis Pelly was closing the conference, His Highness was sending to the Mir Akhor instructions to prolong it by

every means in his power; a fresh Envoy was already on the way from Cabul to Peshawur; and it was reported that this Envoy had authority to accept eventually all the conditions of the British Government. The Viceroy was aware of these facts when he instructed our Envoy to close the conference. But it appeared to his Excellency that liabilities which the British Government might properly have contracted on behalf of the present Ameer of Cabul, if that Prince had shown any eagerness to deserve and reciprocate its friendship, could not be advantageously, or even safely, accepted in face of the situation revealed by Sir Lewis Pelly's energetic investigations. Under these circumstances, the prolongation of the Peshawur conference could only lead to embarrassments and entanglements best avoided by the timely termination of it.

37. To the letter addressed by Sir Lewis Pelly to the late Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, on closing the conference at Peshawur, no reply has yet been received from the Ameer. Some time previously we received, from secret Agents of our own, information that the Ameer had despatched a confidential Envoy to Tashkend; and this information has lately been confirmed by a telegram from Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran. Such a proceeding was to be expected on the part of His Highness, whose policy is to play off against each other his two powerful neighbours. Seeing no immediate prospect of further support from the British Government, and fearing, perhaps, the consequences of its surmised resentment, he would naturally become more urgent in his advances towards Russia. But the war now raging between that power and the great Mahomedan Empire of the West will render it extremely difficult for His Highness to receive open support from the Russian Government, or enter into closer relations with the Russian authorities, in face of the religious fanaticism which the Ameer himself has done his utmost to inflame throughout Afghanistan. Meanwhile, his endeavours to organize a general jihad against the British Government appear to have completely failed.

38. The motive of this abortive attempt was not, in our opinion, a religious, but a purely political one, easily explained by the history of the Ameer's relations with the British Government during the last four years. So long as Shere Ali cherished the hope of obtaining eventually from us a personal and dynastic support, he was willing to associate his interests with our own, and even anxious for the protection of the British Government. When, however, the discouraged hope of such support, with each succeeding year, grew feebler, he appears to have turned his attention to such sources of strength as might, in case of need, be derived from the fanaticism of the Mahomedan populations occupying the wild tract still left between the British and the Russian outposts. For some years his influence, so far as we can judge, has been passively opposed to our own over the border tribes, and, at last, the apparent determination of the British Government to bring its ambiguous relations with His Highness to a definite issue, coinciding with the critical and sinister situation of the whole Eastern question, doubtless induced the Ameer to believe that the decisive moment, to which he had long been looking forward as ultimately inevitable, was then imminent. Under this impression, he attempted to place himself at once at the head of an armed movement, fanatical on the part of his dupes, but purely political so far as he himself was concerned in it. The attempt, however, failed. The Akhoond of Swat mistrusted the designs of the Ameer even more than he disliked the neighbourhood of the British. Old, wary, and with nothing to gain by the sword, this spiritual potentate temporised with the secular ruler who had raised an inconvenient religious cry; but, when it came to the point, he refused to identify himself with it. The Ameer's subjects responded coldly to his call, and the neighbouring Chiefs, to whom he had appealed, availed themselves only of the favourable opportunity to extract money from him. So completely had the whole movement collapsed before we closed the conference at Peshawur, that the first step taken by the Ameer, immediately after that event, was to send messages to the authorities and population of Candahar, informing them that the jihad project was abandoned, requesting them to do all in their power to allay the religious excitement he had till then been endeavouring to arouse, and adding that his relations with the British Government were eminently satisfactory.

39. If those relations are not as satisfactory as Shere Ali would have them supposed, we have at least every reason to believe that they involve no feelings of irritation against us which are not entirely confined to His Highness. Our relations with the people of Afghanistan are as friendly as they have ever been. At Candahar, where recent events in Beloochistan have brought us into contact with Afghanistan from a new side, we have every evidence of the amicable feeling of the population, and their disposition to look to us as protectors rather than as enemies. From Sibi the Chiefs and headmen, subjects

of the Ameer, recently waited on the British Agent in Khelat for the purpose of inviting his mediation in their domestic and inter-tribal quarrels, and his protection from their neighbours, the Murrees. Elsewhere, the British officers lately at Thull, on a mission of inspection, were received by the Ameer's people beyond the border, and invited inside their frontier posts with every demonstration of cordiality and confidence. On the other hand, all our reports from Afghanistan concur in representing the Ameer's subjects as generally disaffected on account of the heavy military burdens recently imposed on them; his army in arrears of pay, and portions of it mutinous; his treasury nearly exhausted, and his personal position precarious.

40. The further course of Cabul politics we cannot foresee, and do not attempt to predict. But we await its natural development with increased confidence in the complete freedom and paramount strength of our own position. In the meanwhile we see no reason to anticipate any act of aggression on the part of the present Ameer, or on our own part any cause for interference with His Highness. Our relations with him are still such as we commonly maintain with the Chiefs of neighbouring and friendly countries. But whilst, on the one hand, they are now relieved from all liabilities, real or imputed, on behalf of his personal fortunes or those of his dynasty, on the other hand, they have been placed by our recent arrangements with Khelat (and others which will be separately reported to your Lordship) in a position much less dependent than heretofore upon the personal disposition, or uncontrolled conduct, of so uncertain a neighbour.

41. In closing this unavoidably long report upon the cause, the course, and the result of the Peshawur conference, we desire to express our entire satisfaction with the manner in which that conference was conducted by Sir Lewis Pelly. We are of opinion that, in the skilful discharge of a very delicate task, Sir Lewis has upheld with marked ability the dignity of our Government and the interests of this Empire. That opinion will, we trust, be fully shared by your Lordship, after perusal of the papers annexed to our present Despatch.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
E. C. BAYLEY.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.

Enclosure 1 in No. 36.

EXTRACT from a REPORT purporting to contain an account of a Secret Council held by the Ameer in the Fort of Lahore on the 17th March, in the presence of Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, and others.

"THE Ameer then said, 'should the British authorities propose that an European Agent be stationed at Cabul itself, although I am myself agreeable to such arrangement, but the people of Cabul are turbulent and mischievous, should such European Agent be injured in any way, which God forbid, I would be disgraced. The late Ameer, my father, on these very considerations refused to have an European Agent at his capital. But if an Agent be located in the interior, at places like Candahar or Balkh or Herat, there would be no objection. Such an arrangement would be advantageous to both the Governments; for instance, at the present time the people of Lower Seistan have commenced encroachments on the Candahar boundaries. Lower Seistan was formerly always attached to Afghanistan, and has been occupied by Persia only since a short time. We are not aware what agreement exists between the British and Persian Governments regarding Lower Seistan. If there should be an European Agent on the border, he would be possessed of the necessary information, and would be at hand to consult regarding affairs relating to territories beyond the borders.'"

Enclosure 2 in No. 36.

EXTRACT from a NOTE by Under-Secretary to Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 26th March 1869.

"THE Viceroy may possibly desire to have without delay the following details which I have learnt from Punjab officials in the course of conversation yesterday and to-day. The chief informants

have been Major Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawur, and Mr. Thornton, the Secretary to the Punjab Government."

"The Ameer is prepared, if asked, to allow European Agent at Candahar, Herat, and Balkh ; but he would raise difficulties, though probably not insuperable ones, about such an officer at Cabul."

Enclosure 3 in No. 36.

EXTRACT from MEMORANDUM of CONVERSATIONS between Captain Grey and Noor Mahomed Shah, dated 31st March 1869.

"THE Ameer is prepared to act on what he may see is the nature of the friendship the British propose to afford him. If, as hitherto, merely acknowledging the Ruler of Cabul *de facto*, well and good ; but if prepared to acknowledge and support him and the heir he may point out (the contrary having produced the present troubles), there is nothing he will not accede to."

"He is open to any proposition for securing his northern border, while doubtful of any Russian power for aggression for some years to come, still thinks precautions should be taken ; would construct forts on his own part or under our superintendence and admit European garrisons if ever desired ; would gladly see an Agent or Engineer superintendent there (in Balkh), Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul, which might lead to the supposition of his being a puppet."

Enclosure 4 in No. 36.

EXTRACT from NOTES of a CONVERSATION between the Foreign Secretary, Captain Grey, and Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, held at Umballa on 1st April 1869.

"WE know the Russians to be great tyrants, and not so trustworthy as you. In old days, in Afghanistan, you showed a want of consideration to those who were most entitled to it. From the public reception at which the Ameer was present, the other night, he saw that this policy had been put aside, and that little Native Princes of the Punjab, such as he had met, were fairly and honourably treated. You do not want our country, and were you to get it, there would be no profit to you."

"The Secretary asked him if the Ameer would sanction Native Agents* in Afghanistan either as

* Captain Grey's version of this is as follows :—He says that before the second private interview at Umballa he was directed to arrive at a definite understanding with the Ameer on various points, which were—

"(1.) That the Ameer should accede to our deputation of Native Agents wherever we pleased. To this the Ameer agreed, and promised to assist them in every way."

"(2.) To ascertain whether the Ameer was agreeable to the deputation of an envoy at some future date. On this point, the Ameer expressed his willingness to receive an envoy, as soon as things had somewhat settled down, anywhere, save at Cabul, where he thought it would affect his power with the people."

visitors or as permanent residents, supposing the British Government wished it; the Minister replied that he did not wish to commit himself and asked, rather anxiously, whether European Agents were intended, observing at the same time that it was of no use to send any but Mahomedans, Hindoos were of no good at all ; . . . he added, he was looking far forward, and the day might come when the 'Russ' would arrive, and the Ameer would be glad not only of British Officers as Agents, but of arms and troops to back them."

Enclosure 5 in No. 36.

EXTRACT from MEMORANDUM of a CONVERSATION held at Umballa on 3rd April 1869 between the Foreign Secretary and Syud Noor Mahomed Shah.

"REFERRING to the points which were reserved in the conversation of 1st April 1869, the Minister said there was no occasion to include Ghuznee as a place of residence for a British Agent, as Ghuznee was included in Cabul ; the Ameer was ready to have a writer to accompany him whenever he moved, and to allow of men in Turkistan and Balkh, when the country was more settled. The Minister himself considered Unwar, the present news-writer at Candahar, to be 'a thorough rascal.' Any agents so sent were to be merely for the sake of sending intelligence. The great danger of these agents was, unless they were treated as they wished, they vilified the Government in their reports. As an instance, he quoted that, when the Ameer was defeated at Candahar, Azeem Khan sent to Unwar khilluts, money, &c., and in return Unwar wrote false accounts of Shere Ali's proceedings and flaming reports of Azeem Khan's power and success. 'If you don't believe me,' he urged, 'send for the diaries of that period from Jacobabad.' As long as the Ameer gave the news-writer *dilasa* (smoothed him down), it was all very well. With these reservations the British Government has full power to send news-writers. If any news-writer was personally offensive to the Ameer, the Secretary explained, of course the Government would not continue him in his post or insist on his retention."

The Officers most intimately acquainted with the Ameer and with the mind of the Viceroy of Umballa in 1869, say as follows :—

† Letter, 29th March 1875, to Secretary to Punjab Government.

Dr. Bellew says*, "The impression left on my mind was that he (the Ameer) wanted no troops, but

* Letter to Colonel Burne, 2nd July 1875.

"might apply for the services of some European Officers to organise his army, and that he would gladly see Agents at Herat and Candahar ; he was at that time in a very good humour with his reception, and doubtless some similar treatment on our side might bring him back to a like frame of mind."

Colonel Burne says,† “ I cannot understand why Lord Northbrook’s Government have thrown doubt
 “ on facts which were patent in 1869. I can fully corroborate all that
 † Memorandum, dated 24th April 1877. “ Captain Grey and Dr. Bellew say as to the willingness of the Ameer at
 “ Umballa to consider the subject of British Agencies in Afghanistan had
 “ he received encouragement to enter officially into the subject, and had his expectations of being
 “ granted a new treaty been responded to. The same evidence which certified to Shere Ali’s desire
 “ for a treaty certified to his willingness to receive British Agents. If the one was imaginary, so was
 “ the other. Being at that time in Lord Mayo’s full confidence, I can testify to the fact that both he
 “ himself and those associated with him accepted the evidence of the Ameer’s wishes in both cases as
 “ genuine. The time had, however, not arrived for the consideration of either question; and the
 “ orders of Her Majesty’s Government, added to Lord Mayo’s own personal views as to the requirement
 “ of the moment, and the danger of suddenly deviating from the policy of the Viceroy, who had just
 “ left India, induced him to discourage the official mention of either matter at the conferences. More-
 “ over, His Highness made no formal proposition on the subject, hoping, as we were led to believe, that
 “ it might come first from the Viceroy, and thereby ensure him better terms.”

The Government of India say, in their Despatch of 7th June 1875,—
 “ 19. On the whole, however, we think that either the Ameer himself or his Minister, Noor
 Mahomed Shah, did, in confidential communication with Captain Grey, express a readiness to accept
 at some future time, not far distant, the presence of British Agents in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul
 itself.”

Enclosure 6 in No. 36.

Draft sent 5th May 1876.

FROM COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR TO AMEER OF CABUL.

I AVAIL myself of this propitious moment to acquaint you that his Excellency Lord Lytton has
 assumed the Viceroyalty of India, in succession to Lord Northbrook, who left Calcutta for England on
 15th of April last.

Informed of his Excellency’s arrival in India, I lost no time in waiting on him; and in the course of
 a lengthened interview with which I was honoured by his Excellency, the present Viceroy enquired
 very cordially after your Highness’s health and welfare, and those of His Highness Abdullah Jan;
 intimating his intention of deputing to your Highness, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be
 made, his friend Sir Lewis Pelly, who has accompanied his Excellency from England, and who will
 return so soon as his interviews with your Highness are completed. Sir Lewis Pelly will be accom-
 panied by Dr. Bellew and Major St. John for the purpose of delivering to your Highness in person a
 khureeta, informing your Highness of his Excellency’s accession to office, and formally announcing to
 your Highness the addition which Her Majesty the Queen has been pleased to make to Her Sovereign
 titles in respect to Her Empire of India.

I feel sure that your Highness will fully reciprocate the friendly feelings by which the Viceroy’s
 intention is prompted; and I beg the favour of an intimation of the place at which it would be most
 convenient to your Highness to receive his Excellency’s envoy.

Sir L. Pelly, who is honoured by the new Viceroy with his Excellency’s fullest confidence, will be
 able to discuss with your Highness matters of common interest to the two Governments.

Enclosure 7 in No. 36.

Dated 22nd May 1876.

FROM AMEER OF CABUL TO COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR.

(Literal Text.)

THE friend, emblem of sincerity and friendship, the friend, foundation of affection and candour, the
 kindest of friends, Colonel Sir Richard Pollock, Commissioner and Superintendent of Peshawur
 Division, may his favours increase, and the desire of an agreeable meeting increase!

After writing the customary *expressions* of affection, and calling to mind the requisite *expressions* of
 unity, makes known to the heart full of sincerity (friendship) *that* the letter full of kindness, dated
 5th May in the year 1876 of Jesus, was brought to the clear (brilliant) consideration of the suppliant at
 the Sublime Throne (*of God*). It is hoped that what you wrote of your interview full of pleasure with
 his noble Excellency of exalted titles the Viceroy and Governor General Lord Lytton, and the succession
 to the illustrious office of Viceroy and Governor General of the Empire of Hind, and the requisites of
 the road and the intention of the visit of Sir Lewis Pelly and Dr. Bellew and Major St. John at some
 place, and the intimation of the glad tidings of Her Majesty the Great Queen, who has become entitled
 with the title of Shahinshahi Sultanat-i-Hind, has become fixed in the heart of this friend.

Kind friend, by hearing the good news of the Shahinshahi (office of Shahinshah) of Her Majesty the
 Great Queen, in view of the friendship and union of the two Exalted Governments, much joy and
 pleasure and happiness were produced in the penetrating heart. Consequently the firm hope is this,
 that from the most excellent title of Shahinshah of Her Majesty the Great Queen repose and security
 in all that belongs to the affairs of the servants of God, for they are the created subjects of the Creator

more than in former times, will be experienced in reality (as a matter of fact). And also the arrival of his noble Excellence of exalted titles Lord Lytton, Governor General of the Empire of Hind, has produced complete satisfaction, and it is expected that the friendship and union of the two exalted Governments, more than in past times, will be fixed and secured.

And in the particular of the coming of the Sahibs for the purpose of certain (some) matters of the two Governments is this—that the Agent of this friend formerly personally held political parleys at the Station of Simla; those subjects, full of advisability for the exaltation and permanence of friendly and political relations, having been considered sufficient, and efficient, were entered in two letters, dated Thursday, the 21st of the month of Ramzan the Sacred in the year 1290 of the Flight of the Prophet, and dated Friday, the 22nd of the month of Safar the Victorious in the year 1291 of the Flight of the Prophet, and need not be repeated now.

Please God the Most High, the friendship and the union of the God-given State of Afghanistan in relation to the State of high courage (lofty authority), the Majestic Government of England, will remain strong and firm as usual. At this time, if there be any new parleys for the purpose of refreshing and benefiting the God-given State of Afghanistan entertained in the thoughts, then let it be hinted, so that a confidential Agent of this friend, arriving in that place and being presented with the things concealed in the generous heart of the English Government, should reveal them to the suppliant at the Divine Throne, in order that the *matters* weighed by a minute and exact investigation may be committed to the pen of affectionate writing.

It is hoped that in the future you will occasionally gladden the friend by *news* of the health of your constitution, tempered with affection. Dated Monday, 27th Rabi Sani in the year 1293 of the Flight of the Prophet, the blessing of God upon him and his family and peace.

Enclosure 8 in No. 36.

Dated 22nd May 1876.

From the BRITISH AGENT, Cabul, to the COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR.

SALUTATION to my cherisher. May his prestige endure. Submits that in the matter of the answer to your bountiful honour's letter, written 5th May 1876, there has been a consultation for three or four days continuously in the private assembly of His Highness the Ameer. The members of the assembly, in this consultation, said that, although the coming of a European Agent of the English Government would be altogether an access of freshness and advantage to the State of Afghanistan, still, by reason of regard to the barbarity and ignorance of the diverse tribes of Afghanistan, there is profound cause of fear.

In the first place is this—that to maintain the safety of the gentlemen (Sahibs) is difficult, because some people are such that, by reason of their own ignorance, putting forward the name of "religious enmity" (ghaza), they will become perpetrators of injury; and other people are such that, simply with the idea of an ultimate injury to the special family of His Highness the Ameer, they will purposely consider the infliction of injury upon the Sahibs as of the first importance.

Under these circumstances, should by any means injury occur to them in this country of Afghanistan, then there would, without fail, occur a difference in the friendship of the English Government and of the Government of Afghanistan; and the occurrence of that difference (or opposition) in the friendship of the two Governments would be, under every condition, injurious to all the people of Afghanistan. As, in illustration of this, is apparent, the affair (case) of the murder of Major Macdonald (Makdala) at Michni, and the hard treatment in respect of it of Nouroz Khan, in which, notwithstanding the innocence of Nouroz Khan, merely out of deference to the English Government, Nouroz Khan was for a while suspended from the Khani (or local rule), with the punishment of a heavy fine, and several persons were severely punished.

In the second place is this—that, if the Envoy of the English Government should put forward any such weighty matter of State that its entertainment by His Highness the Ameer, in view of the demands of the time, should prove difficult, and he should verbally reject it, then, too, will (would) occur a breach in the friendship of the two Governments. And then, for the sake of removing that breach (injury), it will be necessary for both Governments to endure troubles. It was by reason of these very objects (considerations) at the time of making the first treaty between the English Government and the State of Cabul, His Highness the late Ameer objected to the coming of an English Envoy of European race. Moreover, from that time to this, whatever occasions have presented themselves for the coming of Sahibs, the Cabul Government has always objected to them from far-sightedness. Now, too, the coming of Sahibs, in view of the state of affairs, is not advisable.

To us especially the point of chief regard is this—that, if simply, for the sake of seeking the goodwill of the English Government, we consent to the coming of an European Agent, and for this safety, let's suppose, perfect arrangements are made, then this great difficulty arises, that the coming and going of the Sahibs cannot be kept concealed anyhow from the Russian Government, which on my northern border (frontier) is conterminous (joined) with the frontier of the English Government.

The people of the Russian Government are extremely fearless. If any man of theirs, by way of Envoy, or in the name of speaking about some other matter of State, should suddenly enter the territory of Afghanistan, then it would be impossible by any means to stop him. In other words, their way too, would be opened; and in the opening of the road there is good neither to the State of Cabul nor of the English Government. Consequently in this matter it is better that the coming and going of the Sahibs should, according to the former (old) custom, remain closed (prohibited); and, first, that some confidential Agent of ours going to the English Government, and there becoming acquainted with the State requirements (objects sought), should inform us of what is in the mind of the English Government; and the Cabul Government, considering the subject in its own place, give answer to the English Government regarding these objects, whether written or verbal.

And if our man, in conversation there, agree to, or refuse, any point, then by all pretexts His Highness the Ameer can arrange for its settlement. But if in his presence it devolves on His Highness the Ameer to summarily accept or reject some State demand, this becomes a very hard matter, and its ultimate issue will not turn out well.

In short, the letter regarding the impropriety of the coming of the Sahibs having been written in your bountiful honor's name and closed, was this day given to Alijah Khanan Khan by the Cabul Durbar at the time of his dismissal. And 800 rupees in cash with one chogha and one Cashmere shawl were given to the above-named Alijah by the Cabul Government by way of dismissal gift.

Mulla Muhammad Nasim Khan, Cabuchi, has been appointed to accompany the above-named Alijah from Cabul by Jellalabad to the Cabul frontier. The Alijah will start from Cabul to-morrow for Peshawur.

Enclosure 9 in No. 36.

Dated 8th July 1876.

From the COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR to the AMEER OF CABUL.

(Compliments.)

I HAVE received your Highness's letter of the 22nd May, and informed his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of its contents.

In intimating to your Highness his intention of deputing his confidential Envoy, Sir Lewis Pelly, to wait upon your Highness, at such place as your Highness should appoint, for the purpose of announcing his accession to office, and the addition which the Great Queen of England has made to Her Sovereign titles, the Viceroy was actuated by the most true friendship for your Highness. His Excellency considered that the proposed complimentary and friendly mission would not only be acceptable to your Highness, as following the course adopted between all civilized Courts, but that it would also afford a desirable opportunity of improving the existing relations between the two Governments by means of frank communication on matters of common interest.

The reluctance evinced by your Highness to the reception of this friendly mission is, therefore, much to be regretted.

But by a letter which I have received from the British Agent at your Highness's Court, I am induced to believe that your Highness's advisers, in counselling you not to receive the Viceroy's Envoy, may have been influenced by a misconception of the objects of his Excellency, or may not have fully considered the light in which such a refusal might be regarded by the British Government. I have, therefore, in accordance with the Viceroy's instructions, explained at length to the British Agent the views of his Excellency on the relations between the two Governments, and on the causes to which he attributes the reluctance of your Highness to receive the mission. These views the Agent has been instructed to communicate to your Highness.

Your Highness has indeed suggested that it would answer all purposes were you to depute a confidential Agent to learn from the Viceroy the views of the British Government. My friend! The Viceroy cannot receive an Agent from your Highness when you have declined to receive his Excellency's trusted friend and Envoy. The British Agent at the Court of your Highness will explain to you the reasons which make it impossible for the Viceroy to accept such a proposal.

It is the Viceroy's sincere desire not merely to maintain, but also materially to strengthen, the bonds of friendship and confidence between the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan; so that the interests of your Highness, as the Sovereign of a friendly and independent frontier State, may be effectually guaranteed against all cause for future anxiety. But the support of the British Government cannot be effectual unless it is based on reciprocal confidence and a clear recognition of the means requisite for the protection of mutual interests.

I am to repeat that, in proposing to send a friendly mission to your Highness, the Viceroy has been actuated by a cordial desire, which it rests with your Highness to reciprocate, for the continuance, on closer terms than heretofore, of amicable relations between the two Governments in view of common interests, more particularly affecting Afghanistan and the personal welfare of your Highness and your dynasty. It will, for this reason, cause the Viceroy sincere regret if your Highness, by hastily rejecting the hand of friendship now frankly held out to you, should render nugatory the friendly intentions of his Excellency, and oblige him to regard Afghanistan as a State which has voluntarily isolated itself from the alliance and support of the British Government.

Enclosure 10 in No. 36.

Dated 8th July 1876.

From the COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR to the BRITISH AGENT, Cabul.

Your letter of the 22nd May has duly come to hand, and I have submitted it to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General.

The unsatisfactory and inadequate reasons which, according to your above-mentioned letter, would appear to have induced the advisers of the Ameer to persuade His Highness not to receive a friendly and complimentary mission from the Viceroy and Governor General of India, have caused his Excellency profound surprise.

Your letter states, in the first place, that "to assure the safety of the Sahibs is difficult" on account of religious and political enmities which the Ameer is powerless to control.

The Viceroy and Governor General cannot suppose this objection to be serious, more especially as, in my former communication, it was intimated to the Ameer that his Excellency was prepared to

send his Envoy to any place of meeting where it would be most convenient to His Highness to receive him.

In the second place, your letter specifies, as one of the reasons for declining to receive the Viceroy's confidential Envoy, that His Highness's advisers are not without a fear lest the Envoy should address to the Ameer demands incompatible with the interests of His Highness, which demands it might be impossible to comply with, and embarrassing to reject.

You are to inform the Ameer that this fear is quite groundless. It can only have been derived from idle reports, or mischievous misrepresentations, by which His Highness will always be liable to be led into grievous error as to the intentions of the British Government so long as he declines to avail himself of the opportunities afforded him for entering into frank and open communication with it.

The Ameer has, on previous occasions, expressed to the British Government the anxiety caused him by circumstances which did not, on those occasions, appear to the British Government so serious as to require any immediate measures on its part for the protection of His Highness. But some time has now elapsed since any interchange of opinions has taken place on this subject between the two Governments. The Viceroy would, therefore, have been glad to afford the Ameer a timely opportunity of making known his views in regard to the interests of Afghanistan under existing circumstances: and His Highness will incur a grave responsibility if he deliberately rejects the opportunity thus offered him.

The Ameer has already received from this Government substantial proofs of friendly interest in his welfare which I need not now enumerate; and His Highness must be aware that the British Government cannot be indifferent to any circumstance, or contingency, likely to affect the condition of a State so close upon the frontier of British India as the State of Afghanistan. The Viceroy will, therefore, regard the interests of Afghanistan as identical with those of the British Government so long as the Ameer proves himself to be its loyal friend and ally. In that case, the Ameer need certainly have no fear of any desire on the part of his Excellency to interfere with the political independence, or commercial freedom, of Afghanistan; whilst he may as confidently reckon upon the Viceroy's willingness to consider in the most frank and friendly spirit the best means of giving practical effect to any precautions which His Highness may desire to suggest for the increased security of his dominions and his dynasty.

But you will explain to the Ameer how impossible it is for the British Government to maintain this community of interests with the Government of His Highness, or to protect the independence and integrity of his State, under conditions incompatible with the ordinary intercourse between friendly Courts.

The Viceroy is, moreover, surprised by the statement in your letter that the Ameer would be obliged to receive Russian Sahibs if he received the British mission intended to be sent by his Excellency.

As the responsible Representative of the Queen of England and Empress of India, the Viceroy cannot consider this excuse a valid one.

The Ameer must be aware that the British Government, acting on behalf of His Highness's wishes and interests, has obtained from the Government of the Czar written pledges not to interfere, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of Afghanistan.

The reception of a British Envoy cannot, therefore, necessitate the reception of a Russian one; for, in refusing to receive a Russian Envoy, His Highness would only be acting in conformity with the policy thus solemnly agreed upon.

The Viceroy is willing to believe that, in declining to receive the Envoy of the British Government, the Ameer may not, perhaps, have fully weighed all the considerations set forth in this letter, or realized their grave import.

If, on further reflection, His Highness should recognize the expediency of learning the true nature of his Excellency's views and dispositions in regard to matters which materially concern the interests of His Highness, Sir Lewis Pelly will still be authorised to wait upon the Ameer at such place as he may appoint; and, should the interviews consequent on this meeting lead to a more cordial and reliable understanding between the two Governments, the Viceroy will be happy to meet the Ameer in person at Peshawur in November next, if His Highness should so desire.

But you are, at the same time, to inform His Highness that, having due regard to all the circumstances of the present situation, and considering the friendliness and sincerity of the Viceroy's intentions, as well as the apparent mistrust with which your letter represents them to have been received by the Cabul Durbar, his Excellency is obliged to decline, as derogatory to the dignity of the British Government, and otherwise wholly inadequate, the alternative proposal of His Highness in regard to the deputation, on his part, of an Agent in view to becoming acquainted with what you designate "the objects sought" by the British Government.

If the Ameer, after deliberately weighing all the considerations now commended to his serious attention, still declines to receive the Viceroy's Envoy, the responsibility of the result will rest entirely on the Government of Afghanistan, which will have thereby isolated itself from the alliance of that Power which is most disposed, and best able, to befriend it.

You are hereby directed to communicate His Excellency's views to the Ameer, and to prepare a careful and complete statement of all that passes at your interviews, and of the decision of the Cabul Durbar, for transmission to me.

You will, at the same time, hold yourself in readiness to come to Peshawur without delay, should your presence be required by his Excellency.

Enclosure 11 in No. 36.

Dated Murree, 8th July 1876.

From Dr. H. W. BELLEW, C.S.I., to the AMEER OF CABUL.

KIND friend! Kindest of friends, His Highness Ameer Shere Ali Khan Bahadur, Wali of Cabul, may his prosperity endure for ever!

After salutation with both hands, and expression of desire for a meeting, begs to represent to that kind friend that this sincere well-wisher had entertained the hope of, ere this, having had the good fortune and honour of again meeting that illustrious Sovereign, and renewing the friendship so auspiciously begun on the occasion of the Umballa Durbar.

But to the purpose. It is not hidden from your Highness that his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General has conferred upon this well-wisher of your Highness the great honour of appointing him to attend his Excellency's proposed Envoy to your Highness, and this party looked forward with unfeigned pleasure to the prospect of again meeting many frontier friends. Very recently it has come to the knowledge of this writer that circumstances have intervened to delay the despatch of the proposed Envoy, and this sincere friend and well-wisher of your Highness takes the liberty, from motives of pure good-will and friendship, to address your Highness, in the hope that his representations will be accepted as those of an old friend of the Afghan people, amongst whom he has spent so many years of his life. My honoured friend! It is known to me that his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General has the most earnest desire for the consolidation on a firm basis of the friendship now existing between the Government of India and that of your Highness, and I am persuaded that a free and frank intercourse between the two Governments will conduce to the very material advantage of your Highness and your Highness's house. And it is this belief which urges me to address your Highness in this juncture, in the earnest hope that so good an opportunity may not be allowed to pass unheeded, for, as the poet said, "The lapsed moment, Oh! Ruhman, is gone for ever. 'The passed moment returns not again.'" To the wise a hint is enough.

This sincere friend presents his compliments and best wishes to His Highness the Sirdar Abdullah Jan, and hopes he is in the enjoyment of good health. More than this would exceed the bounds of respect. Farewell! Welfare in the future!

Enclosure 12 in No. 36.

EXTRACT FROM CABUL DIARY, from 9th to 12th June 1876, inclusive.

ON the 9th instant, Mirza Abdul Karim, the bearer of the murasilla of the Russian Governor-General, arrived at Cabul with the Agent of the Mir Munshi, who, as reported in Diary of the 1st instant, was sent to bring him. He was put up in the house of Sirdar Mahomed Yusaf Khan. The Durbar appointed no official, &c., to meet him on the road. He receives cooked food from the Ameer's kitchen. To-day he waited on the Ameer through Sirdar Mahomed Yusaf Khan, and delivered the murasilla to His Highness, and, after a formal interview of about half an hour, returned to the Sirdar's house. The British Agent has not yet read the murasilla, but it is reported that it is merely a complimentary one, conveying information of the fall of Kokend. God willing, a copy of it will be submitted by next post.

Enclosure 13 in No. 36.

EXTRACT FROM CANDAHAR NEWS-LETTER, No. 29, for the week ending 9th August 1876.

A CANDAHARI, who hires out baggage animals in Turkestan, Bokhara, and Cabul, and who has been on friendly terms with the writer (Daod Khan) from his infancy upwards, and who, for the last three or four years has been on intimate terms with Sirdar Mahomed Alam Khan, Loi Naib Bahadur, arrived at Candahar a few days before the death of the Sirdar. On the writer of this letter asking him for the news of the country, he said that Mahomed Alam Khan brought with him to Cabul secretly a Russian, who came from Turkestan. On his arrival at Cabul, by order of the Ameer, he went to reside in the house of Mirza Mahomed Tahir Khan, situated in the quarter of the town called Alli Raza Khan. Of the arrival of this Russian, which is kept secret, only the Ameer, Mahomed Alam Khan, and Mirza Mahomed Tahir Khan knew of it. When the Ameer has interviews with the Russian they take place secretly in the garden of the Fort, where they hold council together. A few days after the arrival of the Russian the Ameer sent for Mulla Mushk Alam, who is a man trusted by the Ameer, and of note in the country. He lives some distance from the city. The Ameer consulted with him, pointing out that he was on friendly terms with the British Government, that he could now get nothing from them, and was disheartened, and desired to fight with them. He asked, in the event of his doing so, whether the Mullas and Mahomedans would aid him, and whether it would be contrary to their religion to do so. The Mulla replied that, were he (the Ameer) to do so, it would be in accordance with his religion, and would benefit him in this world and in the world to come. Enquiries were made of the Candahari as to whether the British Agent at Cabul, Atta Mahomed Khan, or the Sadr-i-Azim, knew of this occurrence, and he replied in the negative. The writer can fully certify that the Candahari who gave him this news has been, for the last few years, an intimate friend of the late Mahomed Alam Khan; that he felt it to be his duty to give this news as told to him, and that, in writing it, he has only done what was right and proper; that, if true, it is of value, if false, telling what was told to him can do no harm.

Enclosure 14 in No. 36.

Dated 3rd September 1876.

From AMEER OF CABUL to COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR.

(After compliments.)

YOUR letter of 8th July concerning certain matters was duly received by me, and was an occasion of pleasure to me. I understood its purport. I also arrived at a clear comprehension of the meaning of the letter addressed by you to the Agent. I have already made a friendly representation of my wish that, in accordance with the custom observed in past years, and with existing cordial relations, my Envoy might be received by the British Government for the better understanding of the objects of both States.

Now, though I still retain the same wish, nevertheless, in consideration of the views of the British Government expressed in your letter to the Vakil, I have come to this conclusion, that if an Envoy of the British Government, and a selected trusted Representative of this Government, should meet on the frontier to explain mutually the views and wishes of their respective Governments, it would be a very advantageous arrangement; or, should that course not approve itself to the British authorities, then, that the British Agent at Cabul, who has long been intimately acquainted with all my wishes, should be summoned to his own Government, and expound the whole state of affairs, and, having fully understood the desires and projects of the British Government, should return back to me, and explain them all to me in private, after which I should be the better able to decide what course it is incumbent on me to adopt in the interests of my country.

Dated 14th Shaban=3rd September 1876.

Enclosure 15 in No. 36.

Dated 4th September 1876.

From BRITISH AGENT at Cabul to COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR.

FOR two days there was constant consultation in the private Durbar of the Ameer about the letter of 8th July. The conclusion at last arrived at was, that either the British Government should first call for an Agent of the Cabul Government, or that the Representatives of the two States should hold a conference on the border, or else, that the British Government should summon their Agent now in Cabul, and, having learnt from him the whole of the views entertained by the Cabul Government, should explain to him their own objects and wishes, and then send him back again, that the Cabul Government might, after comprehending the desires of the British Government, take such action as should be considered advisable.

After the enclosed murasilla to your address was written, His Highness sent for me, and handed it to me for transmission. If the Government approves of the third plan suggested, I could come at once. Even if the first or second propositions be accepted, it would be well to send for me, so that I could verbally explain all that I have heard or observed in the Durbar at Cabul after many years residence in this capital.

I had frequently spoken to the Sadr-i-Azim on the subject of this letter. After the murasilla now sent was written, he told me that, if the English Government approved of either of the first two propositions, no other man but himself would be sent from Cabul, and that, on account of his former intimacy with the Commissioner of Peshawur (Colonel Pollock), they would be able, when they met, to talk over all matters frankly and fully together.

Enclosure 16 in No. 36.

Dated 16th September 1876.

From COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR to AMEER OF CABUL.

(After compliments.)

THE murasilla from your Highness, dated 14th Shaban, to the address of Colonel Sir Richard Pollock, arrived after that gentleman had taken his departure for England on leave for three months. Judging that the letter was on State affairs, I opened and read it, and communicated the purport of it to his Excellency the Viceroy. In reply, I have this day received the orders of his Excellency to the following effect, viz., that the Viceroy, having considered the subject of the communication from your Highness, regrets that your Highness has left the question of the reception of a complimentary mission in obscurity. But, with regard to the proposals contained in your Highness's letter, his Excellency, animated by the most friendly and cordial sentiments towards your Highness, is pleased to express his willingness to receive the British Agent immediately, on condition that your Highness should yourself explain to him fully and confidentially your views, so that the Agent, on having the honour of waiting on the Viceroy, should be able to explain them confidentially in detail, as proposed in your Highness's letter. In that case, in the same manner, the Agent will be frankly informed as to the views of the British Government, and, returning to Cabul, will expound them to your Highness.

This also I am to represent to your Highness, that on the 10th October the Viceroy will leave Simla for a tour through Cashmere and along the northern and western frontiers, and will pursue his journey to Bombay and Delhi, where he will hold an Imperial Assemblage for the proclamation of the title of Empress of India recently assumed by Her Majesty the Queen of England. On this account it is important that the Agent should start immediately, so as to reach Simla before the 10th of October.

Enclosure 17 in No. 36.

Dated 16th September 1876.

FROM COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR TO BRITISH AGENT at Cabul.

THE answer to the Ameer's letter, dated 14th Shaban, is sent to you herewith. You will yourself present it to the Ameer, after making complimentary enquiries from me after His Highness's health. As suggested by his Excellency the Viceroy, His Highness the Ameer will explain all matters to you; and, as soon as you have thoroughly understood His Highness's meaning, you must start at once, and travel without delay. When you get to Peshawur, you will be able to go on to Simla by dāk and rail.

You must understand that the reason why it is so important that you should make such haste to reach Simla is, that his Excellency the Viceroy starts on the 10th October on a journey to Cashmere and the North-West Frontiers, and, when he has started on his journey, he will no longer be at leisure to receive you.

You must say to all who may ask about your journey that you have been permitted to return to the Punjab to look after the arrangements for the jaghir that the Government has lately bestowed upon you, and use discretion, so that no one shall speculate on the real cause of your journey. I think it very probable that I shall have returned to Peshawur by the time you arrive. At any rate, I wish you to understand, from what I have written above, that it will not be possible for you to see the Viceroy unless you reach Simla before the 10th of October.

Enclosure 18 in No. 36.

SUMMARY of a CONVERSATION with Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Native Agent at Cabul, held at Simla on the 7th October 1876. (Extract.)

PRESENT :

Sir Lewis Pelly.
Lieutenant-Colonel O. T. Burne.
Captain Grey.

AFTER an interchange of the usual complimentary inquiries, the Agent submitted that, in obedience to instructions, he had waited on the Ameer at Cabul, and had learned from His Highness his view of the relations at present subsisting, and those to be desired, as between himself and the Government of India.

The Ameer had declared that all his wishes had already been communicated to our Government, either by himself at the Umballa Durbar in 1869, or by his Agent, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, at Simla, in 1873, or in the correspondence which passed at or about that latter period.

Being pressed to explain more in detail the views or wishes which the Ameer expressed at his interview, the Agent repeated that the Ameer had no further wishes than those already on record, and deemed that a renewal of a request for their fulfilment would lead to no solid result, as nothing had come of his previous efforts.

The Agent was then requested to state in particular his own estimate of the feelings and causes which had estranged the Ameer from the British Government, and had induced His Highness to object to the reception of a complimentary mission.

The Agent replied that he could not pretend to be acquainted with all that passed in the mind of the Ameer on the above subjects; but that, in so far as he could ascertain, among the causes of estrangement and annoyance were the following :—

1st.—The Ameer and his Minister, Syud Noor Mahomed Khan, had been extremely disappointed by the decision and consequences of the Seistan Boundary Commission, in which, after dissuading His Highness from an appeal to the sword, we had raised his hopes of an equitable settlement under our arbitrament, and had then given award in terms unjust towards him and injurious to his interests.

2nd.—That our recent proceedings in the Khelat territories had given umbrage to the Ameer, who regards those territories as having formed a portion of the Afghan State since the time of Ahmed Shah Dooranee. But the Agent, on being asked if he were speaking seriously, laughed, and admitted that this grievance was of a sentimental character, and not seriously urged.

3rd.—That our proceedings in 1874, or remonstrances on the occasion of the incarceration of the Ameer's son, Mahomed Yakoob, had irritated the Ameer, who was strongly averse from our intervention in this domestic affair, and suspected us of being in communication with Mahomed Yakoob or his party. The Agent stated that the Ameer was all the more irritated by our proceedings, because he had been previously assured, in 1869, that any attempt to disturb his rule on the part of a rival would be regarded by us with severe displeasure; that subsequently his son had unmistakably rebelled against his authority, and plotted against his father's life and rule; and that, notwithstanding this, we interfered, almost authoritatively, in his favour.

4th.—The Ameer had taken exception to our transmitting presents by the hand of Ibrahim Khan to Wakhan, without His Highness's consent or knowledge.

5th.—That the results of the mission of Syud Noor Mahomed in 1873 had offended the Ameer; while the treatment which the Syud pretends to have received at our hands, as well on the occasion

of that mission as during the period of his being associated with us in the Seistan Boundary Commission, had annoyed the Syud, who, on further finding that both his missions had proved failures, ceased any longer to counsel the Ameer to friendly and close alliance with the British, and used all his influence in an opposite direction. The Syud is still embittered against us.

Upon being asked what were the specific grounds of the Syud's complaint in respect to the treatment he had received, the Agent explained that among those causes were the disregard of the Syud's requests, the pressure put upon him to accede to our views, and the scant courtesy shown to him at Simla. He remembered with much soreness that an officer, provoked at his want of accord, had used towards him some angry expression in English.

6th.—In the opinion of the Nawab, the Ameer was not pleased with the reference made to his advisers in a recent letter addressed by the Commissioner of Peshawur to him (the Agent). When that letter was read out, some of his advisers had remarked—"The British will require the removal of Noor Mahomed Shah," to which the Ameer had replied—"Yes, and the removal of all of you."

7th.—That His Highness is under the impression that our lines of policy and action in his regard have been traced towards objects of our own self-interest, irrespective of the interests of Afghanistan; that he has thus come to question our consistency and good faith, while his counsellors are habitually seeking hidden meanings in our communications.

8th.—That the principal object of Syud Noor Mahomed's mission to Simla in 1873 was to secure a definite Treaty of Alliance with the British Government; and that, this Treaty signed, the Ameer would have been prepared to aid us with a contingent in the event of war; but that our proceedings on that occasion showed that, while we desired to depute Political Agents into Afghanistan, and induce the Ameer to guide his policy by our advice, we were unprepared to bind ourselves to any future course in regard to him. Under these circumstances, His Highness had been unwilling to bind himself by our wishes, and had consequently declined to accept our proffered subsidy. He looked for something more valuable than money.

As regards the Ameer's objections to receiving the mission which his Excellency the Viceroy had proposed sending to Cabul, the Agent stated—

1st.—That His Highness was under the impression that, after all that had occurred in 1873 and since that time, no practical result would follow the mission, and that he entertained no hope of an improvement in our mutual relations.

2nd.—That the presence at Cabul of even a temporary mission might create excitement, and be attended with personal risk to the Envoy.

3rd.—That His Highness feared that the mission might merge into one of a permanent character, and that the Envoy, like our Political Agents at the Courts of the Indian Native States, might become a referee for discontented Afghan subjects; that, in any case, the permanent presence of a mission would embarrass His Highness in his internal administration, causing annoyance to the patriotic party, and raising the hopes of the disaffected.

Another reason advanced by the Ameer for declining the mission was, that a pretext would thereby be afforded to the Russians for deputing a similar mission to Cabul; that the circumstance of their having given assurances to the contrary would not stop them; that the Russians broke treaties at pleasure, were very pushing in their policy, and feared no one. The recent political history of Europe showed that the English were unable to compel the Russians to adhere to treaties, and were equally impotent to arrest Russian aggressions. The Ameer was well aware that, sooner or later, Russia would attack Afghanistan, and this with ulterior objects; but that His Highness also knew that in such crisis the British would defend him in their own interests. His Highness does not suspect us of conspiring with Russia to his prejudice; nor does he suspect the British of coveting any portion of his territory, which, at the utmost, could not yield them more than a crore of rupees worth of revenue, while it would cost them tenfold that sum to hold the country. As to Russian Agents at Cabul, the Agent admitted that one had recently arrived at Cabul, and thence returned to Russian territory. Two Russian Agents were still in Cabul, but were, the Agent said, men of no consequence, and were not often honoured with interviews by the Ameer.

The Agent, on being reminded that the option was accorded the Ameer of receiving the mission either at Cabul or at any other point, explained that the Ameer held it concerned his own dignity not to leave his capital for that purpose; that His Highness pretended to be a Sovereign equal with, or even superior in dignity and power to, the Shah of Persia, and was even now dissatisfied with the titles accorded him in British correspondence. At the same time, the Agent was of opinion that the Government of the Ameer is not so firmly established as to admit of his leaving Cabul so long as Mahomed Yakoob Khan remains there in confinement.

As to Mahomed Yakoob Khan in person, the Agent considers that we have overrated his character and abilities. His successes have been principally attributable to his well selected instruments. He showed himself to be extremely rash when he came alone to Cabul, and then bearded the Ameer in his own capital. The Sirdar once had a party composed in large part of Heratees, Mohmunds, and some Chiefs, but this party is now broken up.

As to Sirdar Abdullah Jan, the Agent thinks it too soon to estimate his future. He doubts this Sirdar becoming a man of mark. As yet he is without power or party.

Reverting to the subject of the mission the Agent added that one reason for the Ameer's objecting was his fear that the Envoy might press him on behalf of Mahomed Yakoob Khan, whose cause the British had so frequently favoured.

The Agent, being asked as to the general situation in Afghanistan, replied that at present no communication passed between the Courts of Teheran and Cabul; that the Ameer regards the Agents from Russia as sources of embarrassment; that quiet prevails along the Herat frontier; that the frontiers of Maimenah, Shibbergan, Andakhoe, &c., are tranquil; that the principal Usbeg and Eimak Chiefs are at Cabul; that the Ameer has no relations with the Turkomans, but will be prepared to afford them asylum when Russia drives them from Merv, and that, as to the British Government, His Highness entertains no hope of support from us, either for himself or his dynasty, unless as against Russia; that our policy is dictated by the convenience of the moment; that at Umballa we had

engaged to regard with severe displeasure all attempts to impair his power and rule, and yet, that we had subsequently rather encouraged Mahomed Yakoob.

The interview being now terminated, Captain Grey accompanied the Agent on his ride home, and afterwards visited him, in view to quietly ascertain (without committing Government in any way) somewhat more as to the Ameer's real position and views.

During the ride to his house the Agent informed Captain Grey that the position of the Ameer is certainly precarious, and that, in his opinion, he would be glad to come to our terms if he were once convinced of our meaning real business, but that we must be clear and open in our communications, as the Afghans have come to suspect a second meaning in all that we utter.

The Agent recommended that we should agree to our Envoy meeting Syud Noor Mahomed Shah on the frontier, in view to arranging for the reception of the mission, &c. These details, the Agent thinks, might be smoothly arranged if we were prepared to re-assure the Ameer of our future support, on which his Highness does not at present place the slightest reliance.

On the morning of the 8th instant, Captain Grey paid the visit to the Agent, previously arranged, and learnt from him the details contained in the following note of his conversation :—

"I visited the Nawab this morning to ascertain what, in his opinion, were the Ameer's probable demands.

"He promised by repeating that the Ameer himself would put forward none, considering it useless to do so, but would wait to know what we proposed. At the same time, there could be little doubt that the requests brought forward in detail in 1873 would be those that would be again urged by the Ameer should he be led to believe that there is any chance of our really befriending him.

"So far as the Nawab is acquainted with the feelings of the Ameer and his advisers, the matters which they have at heart are—

"1st.—That no Englishmen should reside in Afghanistan, at any rate at Cabul.

"2nd.—The British Government should utterly disclaim connection with Mahomed Yakoob or any other pretender (actual or possible) to the Afghan Throne, agreeing to recognize and support only his declared heir.

"3rd.—That we should agree to support the Ameer, on demand, with troops and money in all and every case of attack from without. Also, should he call upon us to do so, to aid him in the event of internal disturbance.

"4th.—That we should come to some permanent arrangement regarding subsidy. All those hitherto bestowed have been expended. The treasury is empty; the revenue, which is under a million sterling, is quite inadequate to the maintenance of his present force of some 75,000 troops. Consequently the force is underpaid, ill-found, and inefficient, and our help is needed to make it efficient. The Ameer is also keen upon having a *piéd à terre* in British territory, whither to send his family and property when he clears for action with the Russians.

"5th.—That the British Government should engage to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

"6th.—That in any engagement entered into, an expression to the following effect be embodied :— 'The British Government regards the Ameer's friends and enemies its own, and the Ameer similarly regards those of the British Government.'

"7th.—That we should alter the style in which we address the Ameer, according him more dignified titles. He considers himself quite the equal of the Shah of Persia."

Enclosure 19 in No. 36.

MEMORANDUM of an INTERVIEW at Simla between His Excellency the Viceroy and Nawab Att Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Cabul, on 10th October 1876.

PRESENT :

His Excellency the Viceroy.
Sir L. Pelly.
Lieut.-Colonel O. T. Burne.
Captain Grey.

THE Viceroy opened the conversation by recapitulating all the heads of the information furnished on the 7th instant by the Agent, respecting the views and feelings of the Ameer. The Agent having acknowledged that his statements had been correctly repeated to the Viceroy, His Excellency said that this information was very full and interesting, but quite new, although it ranged over a period of two or three years. The Agent's diaries during the last six months, and those furnished under the preceding Viceroy, contained merely reports of events, without comment or explanation, and without any expression of the Agent's own views. Why was this?

The Agent disputed the justice of this description of his reports; but, on being further pressed, observed that, in the first place, he had received no encouragement or instruction from the Government to furnish it with impressions and opinions as well as facts; and, in the next place, it was not safe to put very confidential matter into the Cabul Diaries.

The Viceroy then requested the Agent to understand that henceforth he would be expected to keep the Government fully informed, not only of all that actually takes place at Cabul, but also of his own impressions as to the cause and character of the events reported by him, as well as the dispositions, motives, and influences, of the chief actors in Afghan affairs. He must do this fully, even at the risk of occasionally expressing mistaken views, and take his own precautions for the safety of his dispatches as far as Peshawur, at which Station the Commissioner would be responsible for their safe transmission to the Viceroy.

His Excellency then proceeded to say that he regarded, with no other feeling than that of profound compassion, the present situation of the Ameer, and the state of mind attributed by the Agent to His Highness ; for whilst, on the one hand, it was evident that His Highness believed he had good cause to resent the past policy, and mistrust the present attitude of the British Government, on the other hand, it was equally clear that the Ameer very inadequately realised the gravity and imminence of the danger into which he is drifting under the influence of these unfortunate impressions ; or the practical impossibility of maintaining himself in a position of independence, isolated from the protection, or exposed to the mistrust of the British Government.

The Ameer had apparently come to the conclusion that, having nothing to hope from us, and, at the same time, nothing to fear, he may safely stand aloof from the British Government ; confident that, in the event of external attack, we shall be obliged to help him, for the protection of our own interests, even if we are under no contract obligation to do so.

This was a very natural conclusion ; but, unfortunately for the Ameer, there was a fatal flaw in its premises. It is true that, if the Ameer proves himself our friend and loyal ally, not our interests only, but our honour, will oblige us to defend his territories and support his throne. But the moment we have cause to doubt his sincerity, or question the practical benefit of his alliance, our interests will be all the other way, and may greatly augment the dangers with which he is already threatened, both at home and abroad. As regards the former, the British Government can only assist those who value its assistance ; and the assistance which the Ameer seems at present disinclined to seek or deserve may, at any moment, be very welcome to one or other of those rivals, from whom he will never be free till he has our assured support. As regards the latter, our only interest in maintaining the independence of Afghanistan is to provide for the security of our own frontier. But the moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and firmly allied State, what is there to prevent us from providing for the security of our frontier by an understanding with Russia, which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether ? If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia does ; and she desires it at his expense.

As matters now stand, the British Government is able to pour an overwhelming force into Afghanistan, either for the protection of the Ameer, or the vindication of its own interests, long before a single Russian soldier could reach Cabul. His Excellency illustrated this statement by detailed reference to the statistics of the Russian Military Force in Central Asia, and the British Military Force in India, showing the available troops of either power within certain distances of the City of Cabul.

The Viceroy then said that, if the Ameer remained our friend, this military power could be spread round him as a ring of iron, and, if he became our enemy, it could break him as a reed. But our relations with Afghanistan could not remain as they are. They must become worse or better. It was his Excellency's sincere desire that they should become better ; and, on his part, he was cordially willing to do all in his power to make them so.

The Viceroy, however, pointed out that he could not help a State which would not allow him the means of helping it ; nor undertake responsibility for the protection of a frontier which he is unable to look after by means of his own officers. Unless we can have our own Agents on the Afghan frontier, and thus know what is going on there, and beyond, we cannot effectually defend that frontier. It is out of the question that we should be committed to seeing the Ameer through a war with Russia, without being in a position to prevent his becoming involved in such a war.

It was natural enough that, in the present state of his relations with us, the Ameer should view with aversion, and even alarm, the presence of British Agents in any part of Afghanistan. There is probably at present no part of Afghanistan in which the Ameer's hold over his own subjects is not liable to be weakened by any doubt in their minds as to the friendliness of our attitude towards him. And, in the unhappy ambiguity which still characterises his relations with us, the Ameer's people might suppose that the British Government had sent its Agents into Afghanistan, to exert pressure on His Highness, to threaten, or to bully him, to spy out the nakedness of his land, or encourage the disaffection of his subjects. The Ameer, however, must surely perceive how different would be the result, and how advantageous to himself, if the presence of any British Agent in Afghanistan were preceded by the publication of such a document as his most powerful predecessors had been eager to possess ; frankly declaring to all the world that the British Government is the friend of his friends, and the enemy of his enemies. The Ameer's people would, in that case, recognize in the Representatives of the British Government the most potent supporters of his authority, and their influence would go far to consolidate his rule. On such conditions, moreover, the residence of a British officer at Herat would be a significant advertisement to all the external enemies of the Ameer that the power of England is there upon the watch to defend him from aggression ; and that whoever touches him will be touching us.

In short, the Viceroy re-affirmed the necessity of the British Government watching the Afghan frontier if it is to undertake the protection of that frontier ; and to this arrangement it is necessary that the Ameer should accede ; as also to the reception of special missions when requisite, if his relations with the British Government are to be maintained at all.

It is indispensable that his Excellency should be in a position to acquaint himself with the true state of things in Afghanistan. The Vakil had said that the Ameer was strong, but what were the facts admitted by himself ? His own son was his opponent. This son had been imprisoned certainly, but was still so formidable that the Ameer could not leave Cabul on his account. It was believed that conspiracies were rife in favour of this son ; that the people were discontented on account of the conscription ; that the treasury was empty ; and, in fact, that the Ameer's position was surrounded with difficulties.

This, said his Excellency, is the man who pretends to hold the balance between England and Russia independent of either ! His position is rather that of an earthen pipkin between two iron pots.

The Viceroy went on to observe that British policy does not permit of the alteration of definite treaty engagements. The Ameer has hitherto had only verbal understandings with us. The letter

given him by Lord Mayo was not in the nature of a treaty engagement, and was, no doubt, vague and general in its terms.

The Ameer has now the opportunity of concluding arrangements which will make him the strongest sovereign that has ever sat on the throne of Cabul.

The Ameer complains of the insufficient dignity of his titles, and desires to be treated on the same footing as the Shah of Persia. But Persia has shown every disposition to enter into the category of civilized states. The Shah receives at Teheran a large English mission on a permanent footing, and entertains Englishmen, who can travel throughout Persia, and penetrate to all parts of the country, under the protection of the Persian Government. Let Afghanistan act in the same way, and the Ameer may then claim to be the Shah's equal.

The Viceroy then proceeded to detail the concessions he was prepared to make, and the conditions on which he would make them—

CONCESSIONS.

- (1.)—That the friends and enemies of either state should be those of the other.
- (2.)—That, in the event of unprovoked aggression upon Afghanistan from without, assistance shall be afforded in men, money, and arms; and also, to strengthen him against such aggression, the British Government is willing, if he wishes, to fortify Herat and other points on the frontier, and, if desired, will lend officers to discipline the Army. But these would be matters entirely for the Ameer's consideration, the British Government having no desire to urge them.
- (3.)—That Abdullah Jan shall be recognized as the Ameer's successor.
- (4.)—That a yearly subsidy shall be afforded to the Ameer, the amount of which, and other details, will be settled by the Plenipotentiaries.

CONDITIONS.

- (1.)—That the Ameer refrain from external aggression, or provocation of his neighbours, and that he hold no external relations without our knowledge.
- (2.)—That he decline all communication with Russia, referring his (?) Agents to us.
- (3.)—That British Agents reside at Herat and elsewhere on the frontier.
- (4.)—That a mixed Commission of British and Afghan officers shall determine and demarcate the Ameer's frontier.
- (5.)—That arrangements be made, by allowances or otherwise, for free circulation of trade on the principal trade routes. In the cost of these arrangements the Ameer will be assisted by the British Government.
- (6.)—That similar arrangements, with similar assistance, be made for a line of telegraph, the direction of which shall be subsequently determined.
- (7.)—That Afghanistan be freely opened to Englishmen, official and non-official, and arrangements be made by the Ameer, as far as practicable, for their safety, though, of course, His Highness will not be absolutely held responsible for isolated accidents.
- (8.)—The Viceroy will forego the establishment of a permanent Envoy at Cabul on condition—
 - (1.)—That the Ameer depute an Envoy to the Viceroy's head-quarters.
 - (2.)—That he receive special missions whenever requisite.

The Viceroy further added that, if the Ameer required it, he was prepared to undertake the safe custody of Mahomed Yakoob.

The Viceroy then concluded by saying that the Ameer, while refusing the Mission originally proposed, had suggested two alternatives—

- (1.)—That the Cabul Vakil should come to Simla to detail the Ameer's views, and learn those of the Viceroy.
- (2.)—That his Agent should meet a British officer on the frontier, and discuss matters with him.

The first proposition had been acceded to with good results. His Excellency had learnt the Ameer's feelings, and the Vakil was put in possession of his own intentions. His Excellency would now accede to the second proposal. If the Ameer were prepared to treat on the basis required by the Viceroy, he should at once send Syud Noor Mahomed Shah to come to an arrangement on that basis with Sir Lewis Pelly, meeting him at Peshawur, Jellalabad, or wherever the Ameer might desire. His Excellency had deputed Sir Lewis Pelly, as being entirely in the confidence of the Cabinet and of himself. Dr. Bellew was appointed to assist him, as being believed to be a person acceptable to the Ameer, and on friendly terms with Syud Noor Mahomed Shah.

Unless, however, the Ameer was prepared to enter into such a Treaty as proposed by his Excellency, it would be useless for him to send his Agent to discuss matters further, as no discussion on any other terms can be admitted. If, however, he agrees to the Treaty on this basis, it might be drawn up by the Plenipotentiaries, and the ratifications exchanged, either at Peshawur—by the Ameer meeting the Viceroy there in November, if the negotiations could be disposed of in time or at Delhi, if the Ameer accepts the Viceroy's invitation to the Imperial Assemblage there.

Enclosure 20 in No. 36.

MEMORANDUM of the SECOND INTERVIEW at Simla between his Excellency the Viceroy and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Agent at Cabul, on the 13th October 1876, after consultation in Council in regard to certain points connected with its purport.

PRESENT :

His Excellency the Viceroy.	Lieut.-Colonel O. T. Burne.
Sir L. Pelly.	Captain Grey.
Mr. T. H. Thornton.	

HIS Excellency commenced by acknowledging the fulness and importance of the information which the Vakil had now laid before him regarding the state of affairs at Cabul. He said he had

treated the Vakil confidentially, and had stated, without reserve, all that he had in his mind. He had no doubt that the Vakil would convey this faithfully to the Ameer, and he trusted that it would cause the Ameer to lay aside his present attitude of reserve, and be equally frank and open. The Viceroy's object was, that the Ameer should understand everything in his Excellency's mind, so that, if the Plenipotentiaries met, nothing should come as a surprise. At the same time, the Vakil should understand that his Excellency attached certain conditions to the opening of negotiations, without which it was needless for the Ameer to send down his Representatives—

(1.)—The location of British officers upon the Afghan frontier.

(2.)—An attitude of friendship and confidence on the part of the Ameer.

As there were some points to which the Viceroy might have omitted reference at the first interview, he would proceed to recapitulate them.

First, as regards a pied-à-terre for the Ameer in British territory, the Viceroy was quite willing to agree to the Ameer's wishes in this respect, which, as far as was in the power of the British Government, should be complied with. The details must be settled hereafter.

Secondly, when the Viceroy agreed to recognize Abdullah Jan, this was not a mere form of words; it was, of course, impossible beforehand to make stipulations providing for every contingency that may arise: but the British Government's intention was to give the fullest effect to an engagement of this nature, compatible with the condition, urged by the Ameer himself, of abstention from unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. It would be, of course, impossible that the British Government should undertake to reverse accomplished facts. If the Ameer, or his heir, were ever actually ejected from the throne of Cabul, the British Government would not undertake a war with the Afghans for their restoration. If, however, the Ameer gave notice in due time, while still in possession of his throne, that he was in difficulties, and needed material assistance, such assistance would be afforded within the limits of what might be found practically possible at the time. But no such assistance would be practically possible without greatly improved facilities for postal and telegraphic communications between British territory and Cabul; nor even then, if the Ameer keeps us in ignorance of his true situation, disregarding our advice till he is in extreme need of our help, and concealing his difficulties till we can neither avert them nor extricate him from them. The Ameer will, therefore, perceive that the first step towards giving practical effect to any such agreement must be the establishment of mutual confidence and better means of communication between the two Governments.

The Viceroy wished to put no pressure on the Ameer in regard to an alliance which was so advantageous to His Highness; but, if he is to guarantee the Ameer against external attack, and to revert internal disturbance, he must be enabled to watch against the former by means of reliable Agents on the frontier, and against the latter by free communication with the Ameer on all occasions, to be carried on through the medium of special Missions or otherwise.

Should the Ameer not consider the advantages worth the concession required by him, viz., British Agency on the frontier, and a really friendly attitude on the part of the Ameer himself, it would then be needless for him to depute his Minister to meet the Viceroy's Envoy, and the Viceroy would be free to adopt his own course in his re-arrangement of frontier relations, without regard to Afghan interests.

The Viceroy concluded by saying that he reposed full confidence in the British Agent, and trusted to him to bring the Ameer to a comprehension of the real position of affairs; he hoped the Agent would be able to induce the Ameer to be present at the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi, whither all neighbouring Independent Rulers had been invited, and where the ratifications of the Treaty, should it be concluded, could be advantageously exchanged. An unusual opportunity would be thus afforded for manifesting, in the most public manner, the intimate political relations subsisting between His Highness and the British Government, and the recognition of Sirdar Abdullah Jan as heir-apparent.

The Viceroy then handed to the Agent an Aide Mémoire* for his guidance as to what he was authorised to state to the Ameer on the part of his Excellency; also a letter for the Ameer on the subject of the proposed negotiations, conveying also a formal and friendly invitation to the Ameer on the part of the Indian Government to the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi.

He then presented the Agent with a watch and chain, and bestowed on him a khillut of Rs. 10,000, in acknowledgment of the appreciation of the Government of his past faithful service.

Enclosure 21 in No. 36.

AIDE MÉMOIRE for the BRITISH AGENT at Cabul.

I AUTHORISE the Agent to tell the Ameer that I am glad to find it in my power to relieve his mind from many apprehensions as to my intentions, which appear to have been caused by circumstances previous to my assumption of the Government of India.

2. I authorise the Agent to tell the Ameer that, if His Highness wishes to make me his friend, I will be a warm and true, a fast and firm, friend to him, doing all that is practically in my power to stand by him in his difficulties, to cordially support him, to strengthen his throne, to establish his dynasty, and to confirm the succession in the person of his son Sirdar Abdullah Jan.

3. I am, therefore, willing to give him a Treaty of friendship and alliance, and also to afford him assistance in arms, men, and money, for the defence of his territory against unprovoked foreign invasion. I am further willing to give him immediate pecuniary assistance, and to give to his son, Abdullah Jan, the public recognition and support of the British Government.

4. But I cannot do any one of these things unless the Ameer is, on his part, equally willing to afford me the practical means of assisting his Highness in the protection of his frontier, by the residence of a British Agent at Herat, and at such other parts of that frontier, most exposed to danger from without, as may be hereafter agreed upon.

I do not even wish to embarrass the Ameer, whose present difficulties I fully sympathise with, by carrying out this arrangement until after the signature of a Treaty of Alliance between us, on terms which ought to satisfy His Highness of the perfect loyalty of our friendship; nor until after the Ameer shall have had the means of making known to his people that the presence of a British Agent in

Afghanistan signifies that he is there without interfering in internal State matters, as the firm supporter of the Ameer and of the heir-apparent, to aid them with all the influence and power of the British Government in defending their country against foreign aggression, and to discourage attempts on the part of the disaffected to disturb its internal tranquillity or weaken the throne of His Highness.

5. It will be the duty of any such British Agents to watch the external affairs of the frontier, furnishing timely and trustworthy intelligence thereof to the Ameer, as well as to the British Government. Should the Ameer at any time have good cause to complain that any British Agent has interfered in the internal affairs of the country, the Agent will at once be recalled.

6. I have no wish to disturb the existing Native Agency at Cabul, or to urge upon the Ameer the reception of a permanent British Envoy at his Court, if His Highness thinks that the presence of such an Envoy would be a source of embarrassment to him. But, in that case, I should, of course, expect that no obstacle be placed in the way of confidential communications between myself and His Highness, by means of special Envoys, whenever the interests of the two Governments may require them.

7. In short, it is my object and desire that the Treaty of friendship and alliance, as well as the presence of British Agents on the Afghan frontier, should be a great strength and support to the Ameer, both at home as well as abroad, and not a source of weakness or embarrassment to him.

8. I am quite ready to consult with the Ameer, in a friendly and confidential way, through our respective Representatives, as to the best means of placing our relations on the permanent footing of a Treaty engagement by which his independence and dignity will be assured in a manner satisfactory to himself as well as to the British Government. But, unless the Ameer agrees to the arrangement indicated in paragraph 4 of this Note, and cordially enters into it, it will not be practically in my power to undertake any obligations on his behalf, or to do anything for his assistance, whatever may be the dangers or difficulties of his future position.

Enclosure 22 in No. 36.

Dated Simla, 11th October 1876.

From the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA to His Highness AMEER SHERE ALI KHAN,
Wali of Cabul and its Dependencies.

(After compliments.)

On my arrival in India, I instructed my Commissioner at Peshawur to intimate to your Highness my friendly desire of deputing a special and temporary mission to your Court at Cabul for the purpose of announcing to your Highness, in the most complimentary manner, the formal assumption of the title of "Empress of India" by Her Majesty the Queen, as well as my own assumption of the Viceroyalty of India.

It would also have been agreeable to me, and I believe satisfactory to your Highness, had my confidential Envoy been permitted to proceed to your capital, and had his arrival been followed by frank communications, tending to render the relations between the British Government and that of your Highness of a cordial character.

Your Highness did not respond to my friendly offer; and a perusal of your Highness's reply, as well as of some previous correspondence which I found on record, induced me to infer that your Highness was under a misapprehension as to my real intentions.

I, therefore, directed the Commissioner again to address your Highness, and from your reply I learned that it would be agreeable to your Highness, either that the British Agent at Cabul should first come to Simla for the purpose of personally explaining to me the views of your Highness, or that my Envoy should meet your Minister on the frontier.

Accordingly, the British Agent has now waited on me with full particulars, and I have enabled and desired him to convey to your Highness, in the most friendly manner, an unreserved and sincere explanation of my own views.

Your Highness will thus be assured by the Agent that I shall be prepared to comply with the wishes which you announced through your Agent at Simla in 1873, and to which you have adhered in more recent communications.

Reciprocally, your Highness will, I doubt not, be prepared to enable the British Government to undertake the weighty obligations it will incur on your behalf by agreeing to the arrangements which will be submitted to you by the Agent who conveys this letter, and in the absence of which the British Government could not practically fulfil those obligations.

Should your Highness still desire to enter into a Treaty engagement on the basis above referred to, I shall be happy, in compliance with your Highness's suggestion, to instruct my trusted friend, Sir Lewis Pelly, to hold himself in readiness to meet your Highness's Minister immediately at Peshawur, or elsewhere, for the discussion of details and the embodiment of our respective wishes in a definite form, to be approved and ratified by your Highness and myself.

I have instructed the Agent to present to your Highness, together with this letter, an invitation from myself, as the Representative of Her Majesty, to the great ceremonial which I am about to hold at Delhi, on the 1st of January next, for the proclamation of Her Majesty's Imperial title. To this great ceremony I have also invited the Governors of the French and Portuguese Possessions in India, and those Kings and Princes in whom Her Majesty gladly recognizes the Sovereign allies and neighbours of Her Indian Empire.

Trusting that I may have the high satisfaction of receiving your Highness also, as an illustrious guest of the British Government on that occasion, I shall much appreciate so auspicious an opportunity for exchanging with your Highness the ratifications of the above-mentioned Treaty, and for renewing to you the assurance of my personal regard, as well as the friendly interest taken by my Government in the security of Your Highness's throne and the prosperity of your dominions.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness.

Enclosure 23 in No. 36.

Dated Mushobra, near Simla, 17th October 1876.

From T. H. THORNTON, Esq., D.C.L., to Sir LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I. (Extract.)

HAVING been present at the interviews which lately took place between the Viceroy and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Native Agent at Cabul, you are aware that the Agent has been authorised by Lord Lytton to return to the Court of the Ameer of Cabul, charged with messages from his Excellency, who has assented to the Ameer's proposal that the Minister of His Highness, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, should meet you, either at Peshawur, or at some point on Afghan territory, for the purpose of there endeavouring to effect with you an agreement as to the terms of closer and more satisfactory relations between the British Government and that of His Highness. You are also aware that his Excellency has invited the Ameer to attend the ceremonial about to be held at Delhi on the 1st of January next, for the purpose of there exchanging with the Viceroy in person the ratification of the Treaty of Alliance which you are authorised to negotiate with Syud Noor Mahomed Shah.

2. In accordance with the arrangements thus proposed, I have now to instruct you to proceed, at your early convenience, to the neighbourhood of Peshawur, and to wait there the Ameer's answer to the messages now on their way to His Highness from the Viceroy. This answer will be communicated to you by the Commissioner at Peshawur, and you will then either await at Peshawur the arrival of Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, or else proceed at once to meet the Minister at any part of the Afghan territory which may be indicated in His Highness's reply to the Viceroy's letter, or in any communication from the Cabul Agent to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

3. For your more complete information, in regard to the object and character of the negotiations which you are authorised by the Governor General in Council to open with the Ameer's Minister on behalf of the British Government, I am directed to furnish you, confidentially, with certain documents. With the contents of these documents I believe you are already well acquainted, but I am to commend them to your careful and reiterated perusal.

4. The main objects of your negotiations with the Ameer's Minister will be those ascribed by the Earl of Derby to the general policy of the British Government as regards Afghanistan, in his Lordship's communication to the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James, copy of which is herewith enclosed. These objects are—1stly, to provide for the external security of Afghanistan; and 2ndly, to ensure the internal tranquillity of that state in a manner conducive to British interests.

5. The time has now arrived when, in the opinion of the Governor General in Council, the attainment of the above-mentioned objects demands more definite arrangements than have hitherto existed between the Government of India and that of Afghanistan. The tone which you should adopt and adhere to in the discussion of such arrangements is so clearly prescribed, and so fully explained by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, in his Lordship's Secret Despatch of the 28th February 1876 (to which I am to direct your special attention), that on this point I need not instruct you further.

6. The conditions on which the Governor General in Council is now prepared to enter into closer and more definite relations with the Government of Afghanistan are in every particular the same as those desired by the Ameer himself on the occasion of his visit to Umballa in 1869, and again in more or less general terms so urged by him on the Government of India through his Minister Syud Noor Mahomed Shah in 1873.

7. The enclosed papers will shew you that, in 1869, the Ameer lost no opportunity, directly and indirectly, of stating that the paramount object of his heart was the conclusion of a Treaty with the Viceroy, declaring the friends and enemies of His Highness to be those of the British Government, and *vice versa*, and that on this condition he was willing to receive British Agents in various localities along the Afghan frontier, for the better protection of those interests which would be publicly recognised in the proposed Treaty as common to the two allied Governments. In other words, there was in 1869 nothing to which the Ameer would not accede if the British Government were prepared to acknowledge and support him and the heir he might appoint; he was open "to any proposition for securing his northern border;" and, whilst doubtful of any Russian power for aggression for some years to come, he still thought precautions should be taken, and expressed his desire to construct forts on his own part, or under British superintendence, and to admit European garrisons if ever desired; he, moreover, at that time affirmed that he would gladly see an Agent or Engineer Superintendent in Balkh, Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul, which might lead to the supposition that his independence was undermined.

8. You will further learn from the subjoined papers that the Ameer and his advisers were equally explicit in the profession, not only of their desire, but of their ability (if once assured of an open alliance with the British Government) to facilitate friendly intercourse, trade, and traffic between this Empire and all parts of His Highness's dominions.

9. The enclosed documents will also shew you that in his personal interviews with Lord Mayo the Ameer spoke earnestly in the sense of the wishes and desires which he had previously expressed to others, saying that the "tranquillity of the country, which the Viceroy had so much at heart, would be the natural consequence of the security of his power and dynasty, and that all things, including the increase of trade (which results from the prosperity and wealth of a nation) which the British Government might desire, would follow from the establishment of a firm and permanent government."

10. The accompanying letter from the then Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to the Foreign Secretary attests the emphatic character of the terms in which the Ameer repeated his wishes to Sir Donald Macleod; urging that "a clause might be introduced into any official communication to him, to the effect that we have not, and will not have, relations of friendship with any one in Afghanistan apart from the Ameer;" adding that "a fire had been lit in that country by the declaration that we would acknowledge any one who should win his way to the throne, and that nothing short of a declaration of this kind would suffice to extinguish it."

11. It is unnecessary here to explain the various reasons which, in 1869, and again in 1873, induced the British Government to decline the proposal for a definite Treaty of Alliance which was then urged on their acceptance by the Ameer of Cabul. I need only observe that those reasons had reference to a

situation which has been essentially altered by the progress of events during the last seven years, and the position of affairs both in Europe and Central Asia at the present moment.

12. This altered situation is such, in the opinion of the Governor General in Council, as to render inexpedient any prolongation of uncertainty as to the policy of the Afghan Government, or its practical means of self-defence in the event of future complications in Central Asia.

13. The Governor General in Council is, for this reason, prepared to contract with the Ameer of Cabul a definite and practical alliance on the terms desired by His Highness in 1869 and 1873, without exacting from the Ameer any conditions of alliance to which the anticipatory assent of His Highness was not freely given in those years.

14. You are aware that the Ameer has been informed by the Viceroy, through Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, that his Excellency is ready to afford His Highness immediate and material assistance in the protection of the Afghan frontier against foreign aggression, on the condition desired by the Ameer in 1869; viz., the location of competent British Agents on that frontier, for the purpose indicated in the general conferences on the occasion above referred to. On this point, therefore, your negotiation with the Ameer's Minister will be confined to the friendly arrangement of the measures necessary to give practical effect to this principle.

15. In so doing, you will be careful to consult the dignity and convenience of the Ameer in every way not incompatible with the attainment of the object in view. The Ameer, in 1869, appears to have expressed his reluctance to receive a permanent European British Agent at Cabul, for reasons which he then explained. If those reasons still exist in the mind of His Highness, the Governor General in Council, respecting their sincerity, will not urge such an arrangement on his acceptance. At the same time, it may be well that you should point out to the Afghan Envoy the probable advantage which, in the event of any sudden accident to the health or the life of the Ameer, the interests of the heir-apparent would derive from the presence in Cabul of a competent British Representative, whose influence might effectually assist the Durbar in preventing the attempts likely to be made, should such a contingency occur, to inflict upon the country the calamities of a civil war by disturbing the peaceable succession of the established dynasty.

16. As regards the security of trade between the territories, and the encouragement of friendly interests between the subjects of the two Governments, as well as mutual aid in the management of Pass tribes and the maintenance of safe border highways, you will invite the Afghan Envoy to discuss with you, in the frank and friendly spirit evinced by himself and the Ameer during the negotiations of 1869, such measures as may be expedient for the attainment of these objects.

17. On behalf of your own Government you will be equally frank and conciliatory. You will fairly point out to the Afghan Envoy the reciprocal character of those advantages, on behalf of which the loyal co-operation of his Government is desired and expected, in regard to the protection of trade, and the security of peaceful travellers; but you will abstain from putting forward any unreasonable demands, and you will not propose to make the Afghan Government responsible for the safety of British subjects entering its dominions without a passport from the British Government. This Government does not desire to impose on the Ameer burdens which His Highness is demonstrably unable to sustain. Its object is not to weaken but to strengthen his hands.

You will, however, expect from him the amendment of that tone of evasion and mistrust which has recently characterised his language in reference to the possibility and reciprocal benefit of improved intercourse between his own subjects and those of the British Government.

18. You will impress on the Ameer's Minister that the British Government will expect His Highness to recognise fairly and fully the duties incumbent on him as the avowed friend and ally of Her Majesty, and to give loyal effect to the declarations made by him to the Viceroy in 1869, that, "if the British Government would recognise him and his dynasty, there was nothing he would not do in order to evince his gratitude, and to comply with the wishes of the Indian Government in any particular, and support them with his means and life; it being understood that the slightest failure on the part of himself or his descendants should vitiate all engagements on our part."

19. For the speedy improvement of the means of communication between the two Governments, it appears to the Governor General in Council very desirable that the Ameer should co-operate with the Government of India in establishing and maintaining a line of telegraph between certain points on Afghan and British territories, the selection of which may properly form one of the subjects of your negotiation. The same observation applies to the means of working and protecting any such line or lines of telegraphic communication. In the discussion of the measures necessary for that purpose, you will evince every reasonable readiness to comply with such wishes or suggestions as the Ameer's Minister may submit to you on behalf of His Highness. On this point, I need only add that the British Government is prepared to bear the cost of laying down the lines, if the Ameer will guarantee the protection of those parts of them which are within his own territories, and come to some mutual agreement as to the safety of those portions passing through the intermediate borders.

20. There are many other conditions which, though not *sine qua non* to the opening of negotiations, are essential to the satisfactory conclusion of them, and which should be agreed to by the Ameer before the British Government can, on its part, formally undertake the protection of His Highness at home and abroad, within the limits indicated by the Viceroy to the Cabul Agent.

21. In the first place, it is obvious that, if the British Government is to undertake any responsibility for the defence of the Ameer's territories from foreign aggression, the Ameer's external policy must not be conducted without reference to its advice. It will, therefore, be necessary that your negotiation should secure to the British Government an effective control over the foreign relations of Afghanistan. A stipulation to this effect can be worded in general terms, and in the manner which you may think least derogatory to the dignity and independence of the Ameer, which it is most desirable to uphold in the eyes of his own subjects.

22. The next point demanding your attention, and which must be pressed upon the consideration of the Afghan Government, is the attitude now assumed by that Government towards the subjects and representatives of your own. This attitude on the part of the Ameer should be frankly and promptly abandoned. The British Government cannot be his friend in need, and his friend in deed, if the friendship on which he is to reckon in his needs finds, meanwhile, no recognition in his deeds. You will,

therefore, give the Ameer's Envoy to understand that the offers of assistance in men, money, and arms, are conditional on a distinct understanding that the Ameer will encourage on the part of the tribes and Sirdars under his authority, and maintain on his own part, free, frequent, and friendly intercourse with the British Government and all its subjects.

23. The various modes in which practical effect may be given to this understanding will be the natural subject of discussion, and detailed arrangement, between yourself and the Ameer's Representative.

24. Not the least important of the subsidiary arrangements on which the Governor General in Council desires you to come to an understanding with the Ameer's Representative will have reference to mutual aid in the more friendly and effective control of the Afreedee tribes who now infest the Khyber Pass, and not only impede free access between Peshawur and Cabul, but surround an important portion of our north-western frontier with a fringe of turbulent barbarism the continued existence of which is most inconvenient to the Government of India. The independent character of these tribes, the practical difficulty of exerting over them any effective control either from Cabul or from Peshawur, and the general character of our relations with them up to the present moment, as well as of their relations with the rest of the Afghan population, are all so well and accurately known to you that it is hardly necessary to do more than commend this object very earnestly to your attention.

25. The general character and extent of such Imperial support as the Ameer and his dynasty may be fairly entitled to expect from the British Government, under the terms of the proposed Treaty of Alliance, are also clearly indicated by the negotiations which took place in 1869 on the subject of a similar instrument. The British Government has never desired, and can never desire, to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; nor is it probable that it will ever again be disposed to undertake such a war as was undertaken by it on behalf of Shassujah for the re-imposition of a dethroned Prince upon the throne of Cabul.

26. For the same reason, the British Government cannot contract any obligation to support the Princes of Afghanistan against the opposition of the Afghan nation, or any large majority of their subjects whose loyalty has been alienated by misgovernment or oppression. But, subject to these reasonable and necessary limitations, the British Government will do all that may be practically in its power to maintain the just authority of the Ameer, or his recognised successor, against those intrigues and conspiracies of unlawful and unscrupulous pretenders to the throne which are incompatible with the settled order, good government, and peace of the country. The precise form which, in case of need, the British Government may be prepared to give to such assistance must, of course, depend upon the circumstances of the moment, which are not susceptible of anticipatory definition in any formal document.

27. Assuming the Ameer's loyal fulfilment of all his own obligations under the terms of the proposed Treaty, the British Government will be willing to afford His Highness, if he desires it, pecuniary or military assistance in the fortification of his frontier, or to provide him with the services of experienced British officers for the better organization of his military force. It is also willing to embody in the terms of the proposed Treaty its distinct recognition of the order of succession as contemplated by His Highness in the person of Abdulla Jan.

28. Whilst thus placing before you the general views and orders of the Government of India on the subject of the important negotiations with which you are entrusted, I am to state that it is not intended to fetter your discretion with reference to any stipulation not mentioned in this instruction as being essential. But you will understand that in the Treaty you are authorised to negotiate with the Ameer's Minister there must be a fair and full reciprocity of benefit to the contracting parties.

For the weighty obligations which, on this condition, the British Government is not unwilling to undertake in the interests of the Ameer, it will be your duty to secure an adequate return substantially advantageous to British interests.

29. To afford you the means of quick and confidential communication with the Viceroy during the course of your negotiations, I hereby furnish you with a Cipher Code. In your use of this Code, you will, on the one hand, abstain from unnecessary reference to the Viceroy in regard to matters of minor importance; and, on the other hand, you will keep his Excellency fully informed in regard to demands which ought not to be complied with, or concessions which ought not to be granted, without his sanction.

30. In conclusion, I am to express the confidence felt by the Governor General in Council in your ability, tact, and experience. In the difficulties of your negotiations, you may be assured of the sympathy and support of the Government of India.

Enclosure 24 in No. 36.

AIDE MÉMOIRE for TREATY.

WHEREAS a Treaty of friendship and amity was contracted between the British Government and the Ruler of Afghanistan in 1855: And whereas the course of events has rendered it expedient to revise and supplement that Treaty in the interests of the two Governments: Therefore, the following articles are hereby agreed upon between the Right Honourable Baron Lytton, G.M.S.I., Viceroy and Governor General of India, on behalf of the British Government on the one side, and His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, Ruler of Afghanistan, on the other.

Preamble.

ARTICLE 1.

The British Government engages to respect the territories of Afghanistan now in the possession of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan; and His Highness Shere Ali Khan, on behalf of himself, his heirs and

successors, makes the like engagement in regard to territories in alliance with, or under the rule and protection of, the British Government.

ARTICLE 2.

Between the British Government and that of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, Ruler of Afghanistan, his heirs and successors, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship. The friends of the one Government shall be the friends of the other; and the enemies of the one Government shall be the enemies of the other.

ARTICLE 3.

In the event of the territories now possessed by His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan being invaded by a foreign enemy, the British Government will aid His Highness, in the defence of those territories, with men and material of war; it being clearly understood, and hereby provided, that the conduct of the Ameer and his Government shall, at the same time, be in strict conformity with the declarations contained in the above Article 2; and that His Highness shall have refrained from all provocation of, aggression on, or interference with the States and territories beyond his present frontier, save with the knowledge and consent of the British Government.

ARTICLE 4.

In accordance with this understanding, His Highness the Ameer agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States in harmony with the policy of the British Government.

ARTICLE 5.

For the better protection of the Afghan frontier, it is hereby agreed that the British Government shall, on its part, depute accredited British Agents to reside at Herat, and such other places in Afghanistan as may be mutually determined by the High Contracting Powers; and that the Ruler of Afghanistan shall, on his part, depute an Agent to reside at the Court of the Viceroy and Governor General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.

ARTICLE 6.

His Highness the Ruler of Afghanistan, on his part, guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of British Agents whilst on Afghan soil; and the British Government, on its part, undertakes that such Agents shall in no way interfere with the internal administration of Afghanistan.

ARTICLE 7.

Furthermore, with a view to facilitate expeditious and friendly intercourse between the two allied Governments, it is hereby agreed that such lines of telegraph as may be necessary for that purpose shall be, from time to time, constructed by the British Government in the territories of the Ruler of Afghanistan.

ARTICLE 8.

His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan also undertakes, on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, to offer no impediment to British subjects peaceably travelling or trading within his dominions, so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 9.

In proof of its desire to see the Government of His Highness Shere Ali Khan consolidated, and undisturbed by domestic troubles, the British Government hereby agrees to acknowledge whomsoever His Highness may nominate as his heir-apparent, and to discountenance the pretensions of any rival claimant to the Throne.

ARTICLE 10.

The British Government, its Officers and Agents, will, as heretofore, abstain from all interference in the domestic administration and internal affairs of Afghanistan; except in so far as their assistance may at any time be required and invoked by the Ameer, his heirs and successors, to avert from that country the calamities of a recurrence to civil war, and protect the peaceful interests which this Treaty is established to establish and promote. In that case, the British Government will afford to the Government of Afghanistan such support, moral or material, as may, in its opinion, and in general accordance with the foregoing declaration, be necessary for the assistance of the Ameer, his heirs and successors, in protecting equitable authority, national contentment, and settled order, from disturbance by the personal ambition of unlawful competitors for power.

ARTICLE 11.*

* The wording of this article must be most carefully considered and recast by Sir L. Pelly, in consultation with the Commissioner of Peshawur.

L.

Trade shall pass uninterrupted between the territories of the High Contracting Powers, subject only to, &c. &c.

* * * * *

For this purpose, certain routes shall be appointed, and His Highness the Ameer will use his best endeavours to ensure the protection of traders, and the free transit of traffic along these routes. The selection of such routes, the measures to be taken for their security, and the tariff of duties leviable

upon merchandise carried over such routes, shall be settled by Commissioners to be jointly appointed by the two Governments.

ARTICLE 12.

The routes thus selected shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may deem most expedient for the general convenience of trade and traffic, and under such financial arrangements as shall be mutually determined between them. The Ameer Shere Ali Khan undertakes, on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, to co-operate cordially with the British Government in its endeavours to keep all such roads and passes free from marauders, and to maintain the general tranquillity of the mountain tracts lying between British and Afghan territories.

ARTICLE 13.

His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan furthermore engages, on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, to support the British Government in checking and suppressing the trade in slaves, and to prohibit the practice of kidnapping or seizing human beings within his dominions for the purpose of selling them into bondage.

ARTICLE 14.

For the further support of His Highness the Ameer in the permanent maintenance of his authority, and efficient fulfilment of the engagements undertaken by His Highness on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, in accordance with this Treaty, the British Government agrees, on condition of a faithful performance of the obligations herewith contracted, to pay His Highness, his heirs and successors—

Enclosure 25 in No. 36.

AIDE MÉMOIRE FOR SUBSIDIARY SECRET AND EXPLANATORY AGREEMENT.

1.

IN regard to Article 3, it is understood by the two contracting Powers that the words "invaded by a foreign enemy" shall be held to include European as well as Asiatic enemies.

2.

It is likewise understood, in regard to Article 4, that, in return for the important pledge involved in the above article on the part of the British Government, the Ameer binds himself to abstain from discussion of political, international, or State matters with any Foreign Government, save in friendly concert with the British Government, to whom His Highness will unreservedly communicate all correspondence, or overtures, of this nature.

3.

It is likewise understood, in regard to Articles 5 and 6—

1st.—That, unless or until otherwise mutually arranged between the two Governments, a Native Agent only need reside at Cabul city.

2nd.—That, wherever in the opinion of the Viceroy of India, it may be necessary to communicate direct with the Ameer on matters of an important or confidential character, a special British Envoy shall be deputed on a temporary mission to the Court of the Ameer.

3rd.—That the principal duty of the British Agent or Agents shall be to watch events outside the frontiers of Afghanistan, and to supply timely information to the British and Afghan Governments of any political intrigues or dangers threatening the peace, stability, or integrity of the Afghan dominions.

4th.—That the local Afghan authorities shall cordially co-operate with the British Agent or Agents for the common interests of their respective Governments.

4.

It is likewise understood, with regard to Article 7—

1st.—That the cost of the construction of a telegraphic line or lines shall be borne by the British Government, and that of the establishment and maintenance of such line or lines by the Ameer in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon between the two Governments.

2nd.—That, whilst the Ameer engages to be responsible for the protection of such portions of the line or lines as may be within the limits of his own territories, the protection of any part thereof across tracts intervening between Afghan and British boundaries shall be provided for as the two Governments may mutually arrange.

5.

It is understood, in regard to Article 8, that, until otherwise arranged, British subjects shall not enter Afghanistan without the authoritative and written permission of their Government, based on a mutual and cordial understanding between the two Governments.

6.

It is likewise understood, in regard to Article 10, that the British Government in no way desires to change its settled policy of non-interference with the internal affairs or independence of the Afghan nation; it will, therefore, only afford material assistance to the Ameer, his heirs and successors, at their express request; provided also, that such request shall be accompanied by timely and adequate information, and that the British Government shall be the sole judge of the manner, time, and expediency of furnishing such assistance.

7.

It is likewise understood that, for the support of the Ameer in the maintenance of his lawful authority, and the efficient fulfilment of the engagements now undertaken by him on behalf of himself, his heirs

and successors, the British Government will, on condition of a faithful performance of the obligations herewith contracted, pay His Highness, his heirs and successors, a sum of 20 lakhs of rupees immediately on the ratification of the present Treaty, and afterwards an annual sum of 12 lakhs of rupees, in addition to such other material assistance in officers, men, or money, as may be deemed from time to time beneficial for the interests of the two neighbouring Governments.

Enclosure 26 in No. 36.

PRIVATE LETTER from Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, dated Cabul, 23rd November 1876.

YESTERDAY morning His Highness the Ameer sent for the Sadr-i-Azim, the Mustowfi, and the Wazir-ool-dowlah Kharijah to his private apartment, and took counsel with them about the communications made by the Agent and the letters brought by him from his Excellency the Viceroy, desiring them to weigh all considerations, and give him their best advice in the interests of the Afghan State and people. What their advice was, after the consultation then held, has not been made known in detail. At 2 P.M. the same day His Highness sent for the Agent, and, in the presence of the three Ministers above named, began to discuss with him those important matters. The conversation was long continued, and, though no definite decision was arrived at, the general result of their observations was that the Government of Afghanistan was not in a position to receive British officers within its frontiers. The contemplation of such an arrangement filled them with apprehension.

The Agent endeavoured to explain away the objections raised, and to allay their fears to the best of his ability. The meeting was dissolved after three hours, and further discussion postponed till a future occasion.

The Agent will continue to report the progress of negotiations, and will not fail to endeavour to convince His Highness of the advantages to his Government to be looked for from the proposals made.

Enclosure 27 in No. 36.

TRANSLATION of LETTER, dated 5th December 1876, from Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Cabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

AFTER holding councils and consulting his Durbar officials, the Ameer summoned me yesterday at 4 P.M. All the Durbar officials in concert gave opinions that the request of the (British) Government should be declined. When (with the exception of the Sadr-i-Azim) these officials went (to their houses), after some assurances and great encouragement, I represented to the Ameer, in presence of the Sadr-i-Azim—"Every member of Durbar cannot be able (lit. it is not his business) to reflect on the consequences (lit. beginnings and ends) of difficulties in State matters. Discrimination between good and bad (consequences) in delicate State matters cannot be made without (great) experience. In this question of the (British) Government, your Highness should use your own judgment as to its advantages and disadvantages (to you), and settle it as soon as possible." After great deliberation and lengthy discussions, His Highness somewhat yielded (lit. arrived at a right conclusion), and observed that he would send the Sadr-i-Azim to my house this morning, that we should discuss personally with one another as to (his) loss and gain in this matter, and then wait together on him to-day to communicate (the result of our discussions) to him. Accordingly, the Sadr-i-Azim called on me to-day at 7 A.M. First I gave him various assurances, and then discussed the question with him, and, on giving him some arguments as to its results, made him yield (lit. tender) a little. Then we both waited in person on the Ameer, and, after some assurances and representations as to the advantages of the promotion (lit. firmness) of friendship existing between the (two) Governments, made efforts (lit. attempts) in a pacific and pressing manner ("sard-o-garm"—cool and warm) for the realization of the wishes of the (British) Government. His Highness considered over this matter for some time, and then asked the Sadr-i-Azim to give an opinion, and the latter expressed himself less disinclined or indisposed ("irkhai-inan"—loosening reins) than on previous days. On the conclusion of our discussions, it appeared to-day, from the tone of the Ameer's remarks, that he would probably agree to the residence of British officers on the border. He observed that his councils had not been brought to a conclusion, and that he would give a reply after full consultation (with his officials). Though I have not yet become quite confident of the realization of the objects (of the British Government), I hope, with the aid of God, that success may be attained (lit. it is not improbable that failure would not ultimately be the result in them).

Enclosure 28 in No. 36.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from Nawab Atta Mehomed Khan, British Agent at Cabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, dated 7th December 1876.

TO-DAY I waited on the Ameer to pay respects to His Highness, and, in private, solicited him to give a reply to the questions of the British Government. His Highness observed to the Sadr-i-Azim—"To-morrow I will attend the Durbar later. You should summon—

The Mustowfi,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs,
The Hashmut-ul-Mulk,
Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan,
Sirdar Sherdil Khan, and
Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan,

and hold a Conference with them as to the advantages and disadvantages to this Government, and communicate to me the result of your councils in a free and unrestrained manner, in order that the matter

may be settled. I do not join at this sitting, because (I desire) that you may in an independent (lit. fearless, 'bilalihaz') manner discuss with each other with full far-sightedness as to the loss and gain and advantages and disadvantages of the (two) Governments."

His Highness then told me that a suitable reply would be given after full deliberation in this delicate matter, in which permanent loss or gain of reputation is concerned. I met the Sadr-i-Azim, and asked him to give a decision (lit. took steps to gain our objects). He said that, as far as possible, he would make efforts in this matter to-morrow. I am giving assurances separately to the other Durbar officials to realise these wishes, and it remains to be seen (what will be their opinions).

Enclosure 29 in No. 36.

TRANSLATION of LETTER, dated 11th December 1876, from Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Cabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

I ASKED the chief Durbar officials to give a reply to the questions of the (British Government). Discussions between the Ameer and the Members of Durbar continued for two days, and then they observed privately—"Yielding to necessity, and in view to the continuance of the friendship existing between (the two) Governments, the location of British officers on the border may be approved of, but some conditions in regard to their residence must be fixed for use for the future (lit. one day). The Sadr-i-Azim and Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan Ishakzai should go to British territory with the British Agent at Cabul to represent these conditions and other questions (lit. objects) of the (two) Governments, and get them sanctioned (lit. confirmed)." These conditions have not been made known. I waited on the Ameer yesterday, and solicited His Highness again to give a reply in this matter. His Highness observed—"We are occupied in this delicate (State) matter, and have become somewhat inclined to sanction these questions (lit. the proposal is somewhat meeting with success). God willing, in a short time a suitable reply will be given." I intimated to him the advantages to (his) Government, and represented that the sooner he would settle this matter the more beneficial it would be (to him) to (the best of) my judgment, and that it would not be advantageous to make these important matters lengthy. It remains to be seen (what will be his decision). I am making great efforts.

Enclosure 30 in No. 36.

TRANSLATION of LETTER from Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Cabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, dated 18th December 1876.

To-day I held discussions in a suitable manner for three hours with the Ameer and the Sadr-i-Azim on the questions of the British Government, and then His Highness observed—"I propose to depute

* Sister's son of Mirza Mahomed Hossain Khan, Mir Munshi.

"with you the Sadr-i-Azim, the Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, and Aka Said Ahmed Khan* to British territory, in order that, after making representations as to the views of the Cabul Government, they may bring British officers for residence on the border. However, as this matter is a most delicate one, and requires far-sightedness, councils have not yet been brought to a conclusion. On the termination of the councils a suitable reply will be given. To make haste

† On 27th December 1876.

(Signed) F. R. POLLOCK,
Commissioner.

matter after the "Id-u-Zuha" festival.†

"in such important matters is not advisable." In short, the Ameer awaits the arrival of the Kohistan Chiefs to consult with him. They have not yet arrived. The Cabul authorities will probably give a final (lit. full) reply in this

Enclosure 31 in No. 36.

TRANSLATION of PERSIAN LETTER, dated 21st December 1876, from the British Agent at Cabul to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

YESTERDAY, in the matter of the wishes of the (British) Government, the Ameer observed as follows:—

"Since the day of the commencement of friendship between the Government of Afghanistan and the British Government up to the present time, as (shown) in former letters and documents, no effort has been spared (lit. interference or disturbance caused) by the Government of Afghanistan which God has given (me) in making the foundation of the palace of the friendship existing between the (two) Governments firm. The members of this Government have always paid respect to (their) true (lit. pure) friendship with the British Government. Now, for some time past, the British authorities continually send communications in support of their confirmed views for the residence of British officers on the border. It is (well known) that this Government, which has been granted (to me) by God, has repeatedly (lit. several times after the first motion) and several times before the termination (of the question) made representations in various ways as to the points which we (Afghan Government) regard as important. Even now, in my opinion, the residence of British officers on the border would not at all be advantageous to the (two) Governments. However, as the British authorities insist on this question every day, I have proposed, but merely to strengthen (my) friendship with the British Government, that after the 'Id-u-Zuha' festival the Sadr-i-Azim and Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan should go with the British Agent at Cabul to British territory; and, after making representations as to the

views (of the Cabul Government) settle the questions and some important conditions, and then agree to the residence of British officers on the border."

In short, I submit this letter after perusal by the Ameer.

Enclosure 32 in No. 36.

TRANSLATION of LETTER, dated 21st December 1876, from the British Agent at Cabul to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

I AGAIN solicited the Ameer to give a reply to the questions of the British Government, and, in consequence of my having used much pressure, councils between His Highness and his chief Durbar officials continued on the 28th instant from 4 p.m. to 7 p.m., and on the 21st from 8 p.m. to 12 noon. At 1 p.m. His Highness summoned me, and I made lengthy discourses in a very suitable (lit. energetic) manner till 5 p.m., with arguments as to advantages and disadvantages and loss and gain, and then His Highness observed,—“God willing, for ever, the friendship existing between our Government and the British Government will remain more firm than before, and this true friendship will never be disturbed. Whatever objections or pleas (lit. discussions) have been hitherto made as to the residence of British officers on the border are owing to the savage conduct of the people (lit. contrary demeanour of the countries) of Afghanistan, and even now we agree to their residence on the border owing to helplessness ('na-etaj'). But in this matter it is most incumbent on us to represent some important conditions to the British Government; and, with a view to representing these conditions (lit. difficulties), and settling all the questions (lit. objects) of the (two) Governments, I depute the Sadr-i-Azim and Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan to British territory, (and desire that) they should go with you after the Id-u-Zuha festival, and, after stating all the difficulties, and settling all questions of the (two) Governments, bring the British officers to live on the border.”

By desire of the Ameer I enclose a Persian letter, after perusal by His Highness. The Durbar has not yet proposed that a murrasila (to address of British Government) anent the deputation of the Sadr-i-Azim should be written. At present I have only received this information, that the chief Durbar authorities, in private, propose the following conditions:—

1st. Should by any accident any injury occur to the life or property of any British officer in Afghanistan, steps should be taken (in such matters) according to the custom and law of Afghanistan, and the British Government should not put much pressure on the Afghan Government.

2nd. The duties of all British officers on the border should be fully defined (lit. limited); they should not secretly or openly interfere with the internal civil and military affairs of Afghanistan.

3rd. Should a Russian Agent come to Afghanistan, contrary to the wishes of the British Government, to make representations regarding any object ("wasila"), the British Government should make their own arrangements to prevent his arrival, and give no trouble as to this prevention to the Afghan Government.

* Meaning (in my judgment) that should the assistance in money, &c., offered by British Government seem insufficient to the Afghan Government, they may be allowed to decline any assistance, while still permitting the residence of the British Officers.

(Sd.) F. R. POLLOCK,
Commr. and Supdt.

* 4th. Should the British Government not give full aid in money, arms, &c., for the satisfactory promotion of the strength of Afghanistan, (other) assistance should be accepted on (lit. taken), and, without any desire for an exchange or equivalent, (the Cabul Government) should allow British officers to remain on the border merely on (the understanding of) the friendship (existing between the two Governments).

It remains to be seen what will further happen: whatever happens will be reported.

Enclosure 33 in No. 36.

TRANSLATION of LETTER, dated 25th December 1876, from the Agent at Cabul to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

YESTERDAY I waited on the Ameer and asked His Highness to fix a date for the departure of the Sadr-i-Azim. His Highness observed: “Unless any accident occurs, the Sadr-i-Azim will be sent with you on Sunday, the 31st December 1876. As the Sadr-i-Azim has been ill for some time, care should be taken that (you proceed by) short marches.” I submit this letter for your information. The date of arrival at Peshawur will be reported when we leave. It has been mentioned in to-day's diary that Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan desires to go to wait on the Akhoond of Swat. I think he goes with the advice of the Durbar authorities. The real object in his going is probably this, that the Akhoond may be consulted on those questions for the settlement of which the Sadr-i-Azim proceeds to British territory. Councils continue in this matter, and whatever further happens will be reported.

Enclosure 34 in No. 36.

MEMORANDUM by Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., dated Peshawur, 28th January 1877.

AT noon this day I visited the Cabul Envoy, and was received by him in a friendly manner. I found him engaged with some written papers and books, and attended by two servants whom he dismissed on my entry.

After health enquiries on behalf of Sir Lewis Pelly, there was a prolonged pause, during which he maintained a thoughtful look, only breaking the silence to call a domestic and order tea to be served.

When the tea was brought, I took the opportunity to say that I hoped he found everything in the house to his liking, and begged that, if anything had been omitted, he would consider himself as in his own home and order what he wanted. He replied that he was perfectly happy and comfortable on that score, and that all the arrangements made for his reception were more than he could desire. He then paused again for a brief interval, and then observed that his thoughts dwelt on the business that had brought him here.

I said I hoped it would all turn out satisfactorily, as personally I had a great regard for himself and for the Ameer, and from my long acquaintance with the Afghan people felt an interest in their prosperity and welfare.

He replied—

"I reckon you as our friend, and I know that the Ameer esteems you as such, and often speaks of you in terms of commendation, but it is different with your Government. The Ameer now has a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government, and he has many reasons for this mistrust."

I observed that I was much concerned to hear him say this, as I had always considered that the disposition of the British Government towards that of the Ameer was of a most friendly character, and that I felt sure, from all that I could see as a private individual, that its most earnest desire was to see the Ameer's Government strong and prosperous, and consolidated on a firm basis.

The Envoy rejoined with some animation—

"This is what you say. But the promises of your Government are of one sort and their acts of another. Now listen to me. I tell you what I know. It is twenty-two years since the Government of the Ameer made a treaty with John Lawrence Sahib, and it has not from that time to this diverged from it. At that time the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan refused to consent to the residence of British Officers in his country, because he knew the lawless character of his people, and how they had killed Englishmen in the streets of Cabul at the time of Shah Shuja's overthrow. Well, his explanation was accepted and friendship continued, and then after a time the Ameer (Sher Ali Khan) came down and met Lord Mayo. Again the question of British Officers was advanced, and on the same grounds objected to. After this you came with Pollock Sahib to Seistan. You will recollect that on one occasion he spoke in praise of Yakub Khan, and I immediately warned him that if he desired to secure the Ameer's confidence he would never mention the name of Yakub Khan again. Well, when I returned from Teheran I met Lord Northbrook, and discussed various matters at Simla, where the question of British Officers coming to Afghanistan was again mooted. Now, why all this pressing to send British Officers to Afghanistan when you declare that you have no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan? It has roused the suspicion of the Ameer, and his suspicion is confirmed by the arbitrary acts of your Government, and he is now convinced that to allow British Officers to reside in his country will be to relinquish his own authority, and the lasting disgrace thus brought on the Afghan people will be attached to his name, and he would sooner perish than submit to this. The British nation is great and powerful, and the Afghan people cannot resist its power, but the people are self-willed and independent, and prize their honour above life. Now, I will tell you what has turned the Ameer's confidence from your Government (Sarkar). In Lord Mayo's time his confidence was perfect, and he agreed to refer all overtures and correspondence received from Russians to Lord Mayo, and to send back such replies as the British Government might desire, and he did so in perfect good faith. But what came to pass in the time of Lord Northbrook? I will now tell you. Lord Northbrook wrote to the Ameer on behalf of Yakub Khan, who was in prison at Cabul, to send him back to Herat, and said that if he were reinstated there the friendship between the Ameer's and the British Government would remain intact. Now, the Ameer was angry and resented this interference with his home Government, and, since he has not sent Yakub Khan back to Herat, he considers the friendship between the two Governments is no longer intact. Then, again, after the mission to Yarkand returned, Lord Northbrook sent a man called Ibrahim Khan with presents to the Mir of Wakhan by way of acknowledging his attention to the British Officers who visited that part of the country. But no reference was made to the Ameer, nor was his permission asked before dealing direct with one of his responsible Governors. Now, when I came here, I did not send for your Arbabs to come out and meet me at the frontier. You did this yourselves, and I appreciate the honour; but if I had summoned them it would have been a breach of propriety. So was the other case. This act threw the entire Durbar into alarm for the security of their authority, and, now that it is again requested that British Officers be allowed to reside in the country, the Ameer and all his people object, knowing that they will lose their own authority. Again, Grey Sahib wrote me a letter recently, referring to my acquiescence, when at Simla, to the coming of British Officers to Cabul. It was as much as an order for my death. It was laid before the Durbar, and I was at once pointed out as the encourager of your Government in this design. I have said all this to you in private, but there are other things I will say in the presence of the Mir Akhor. Then, after that, I will go into all particulars *seriatim* in private with Pelly Sahib, either at his house or when out driving, or elsewhere. But matters have now come to a crisis, and the situation is a most grave one. This is the last opportunity for settlement, and God only knows the future."

During all this long discourse, which I have put down as closely as I remember it, the Envoy spoke with a marked earnestness and gravity. Towards the latter part of his speech, E. A. C. Mirza Ghulam Ahmud entered the room, but, the Envoy merely acknowledging his presence by a slight inclination of the head and smile of recognition, he remained standing at the door.

I now rose to leave, and, after hearing from the Envoy that it was arranged he should receive and return the visit of Brigadier-General Ross to-morrow, asked him whether he would wish to attend the Penny Readings at the 51st Regiment Rooms in the evening of that day; and, arranging to accompany him on that occasion, as he expressed his wish to attend, I took leave of him at the door in a friendly manner.

This visit was paid at my request, simply in view to making complimentary enquiries and asking the Envoy when he would like to commence our discussions.

28th January 1877.

(Signed) LEWIS PELLY, Envoy.

Enclosure 35 in No. 36.

Peshawur, 30th January 1877.

FIRST MEETING between Sir Lewis Pelly, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Sadr-i-Azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at noon, 30th January 1877.

PRESENT :

Sir Lewis Pelly, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Cabul Envoy.

Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Court of Cabul.

Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, deputed by His Highness the Ameer of Cabul.

Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Interpreter.

Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary of the Cabul Envoy.

Sir Lewis Pelly opened the discussion, after compliments, by observing that His Highness the Ameer had addressed two letters to his Excellency the Viceroy, in one of which His Highness stated that he had deputed Syud Noor Mahomed Shah as his Envoy to the British Government, and that he would make known His Highness's wishes; whilst in the other letter it was written that the Envoy above named would explain the reasons of His Highness's inability to take part in the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi.

On this the Cabul Envoy said that, with reference to the Ameer's inability to take part in the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi, he would speak afterwards; but, with reference to the 1st letter, he would observe that there was no mention of any wishes on the part of the Ameer; the letter merely stated that the Ameer's Envoy would make known the state of affairs. In the first instance, the Commissioner of Peshawur wrote to the Ameer that Sir Lewis Pelly had been nominated as Envoy to His Highness, but the Ameer expressed his wish to send Syud Noor Mahomed Shah down instead. The desire to send a British Officer originated with the British Government. It devolves on the British Government to make known its wishes.

Sir Lewis Pelly observed that, on the arrival of the Viceroy in India, there were two matters which rendered it desirable that he should make a friendly communication to the Ameer, viz., the assumption by Her Majesty the Queen of the title of Empress of India, and the assumption by his Excellency of the office of Viceroy and Governor General of India. And his Excellency the Viceroy had considered that this communication would be most pleasantly made by sending a special Mission to His Highness's Court, thereby affording also an opportunity of discussing other important matters of State, and of removing any misapprehensions which might have occurred between the two Governments.

The Cabul Envoy here interposed with some energy and warmth, saying—

"Was the misapprehension (the Persian expression used was '*nahumwaree*,' unevenness) on our part or on that of both sides? Further, when did the misapprehension occur—before the arrival of the Viceroy, or after? If before his arrival, then what is it? And if after, then also, what is it? For we have had no communication, and no misunderstanding has occurred since his arrival."

In reply, Sir Lewis Pelly observed that when the Viceroy arrived in India he perceived that some misunderstanding existed between the two Governments, and it was, in part, to clear up this misunderstanding and make known the good wishes and friendship of the British Government, that the Viceroy desired to depute Sir Lewis Pelly as his Envoy to the Ameer. But when the Viceroy learned that the Ameer preferred, in the first instance, to depute Syud Noor Mahomed Shah to India, or that the British Agent at Cabul should proceed to the Viceroy's Court in order to ascertain how matters really stood, his Excellency summoned the British Agent from Cabul, and, having heard all he had to say, again despatched him to Cabul with a friendly letter addressed to the Ameer, and with an "*Aide Mémoire*" of what he might assure His Highness that the Viceroy was prepared to do for him, provided the Ameer rendered this aid possible by consenting to certain essential conditions, and with instructions to explain them fully to His Highness the Ameer. The Viceroy also intimated through his Agent that, should the Ameer so wish, his Excellency would depute Sir Lewis Pelly to meet Syud Noor Mahomed Shah at Peshawur or elsewhere, and there negotiate. The Viceroy, having subsequently learned through his Agent that the Ameer accepted his "*sine quâ non*" to opening negotiations, and had deputed his Minister Syud Noor Mahomed Shah to negotiate at Peshawar, has deputed Sir Lewis Pelly to meet Syud Noor Mahomed Shah at Peshawar, with the most friendly object of re-establishing the relations of the two Governments on a firm, and reliable, and lasting basis.

Accordingly, added Sir Lewis Pelly, his Excellency the Viceroy has concluded, from a perusal of the letter sent to his Excellency by his Agent at Cabul with the cognizance of the Ameer, and from the fact of the Ameer's Envoy having come to Peshawar, that the Ameer has accepted the "*sine quâ non*" condition that British Officers may reside on the frontiers of Afghanistan for the purpose of their watching exterior events, and of informing their own Government as well as that of the Ameer of the state of affairs beyond the frontiers. The acceptance of the principle that British Officers may reside in Afghanistan is absolutely necessary as a preliminary to the commencement of negotiations. This point being granted, other details can be discussed and settled hereafter. But, unless the principle of British Officers residing on the Afghan frontiers, and of informing the British Government of events passing on or beyond those frontiers, be conceded, it is impossible for the British Government to take upon itself the formal responsibility of assisting the Ameer to defend his country from the attacks of external foes.

Syud Noor Mahomed Shah desired more than once to interrupt and defer this point to a later period of the negotiation. But Sir Lewis Pelly begged that he might repeat that the Viceroy understands from the letter of his Excellency's Agent at Cabul, and from the arrival of His Highness's Envoy at Peshawar, that the principle of the residence of British Officers on the Afghan frontiers has been accepted and agreed to by the Ameer.

Sir Lewis Pelly then, and at the desire of the Cabul Envoy, reiterated the above condition, in order that it might be perfectly understood word for word, so that nothing might remain obscure. And Sir Lewis Pelly added that he desired to speak on this and all other matters with the greatest frankness and sincerity, and in the most friendly manner, so that all questions might be thoroughly understood by

both sides, and leave no room for its being subsequently said by either side that such and such words were not so understood at the time.

On this particular condition, however, Sir Lewis Pelly said he had no discretionary powers. His instructions from the Viceroy were categorical as to the admission of the principle that British Officers should be permitted to reside permanently on the frontiers of Afghanistan, and that, until he is clearly informed that the Ameer accepts this principle, Sir Lewis Pelly could not otherwise even commence negotiations, although the settlement of the details by which the arrangement would be carried out might form a subject of full and free discussion. It was far from being the wish or intention of the Viceroy unnecessarily to embarrass the Ameer.

The Cabul Envoy made no direct reply to this, but for some time busied himself in perusing the notes made by his Secretary, and then, after a few unimportant remarks in Pushtoo, referred again to the word "misapprehension," which had been translated "*nāhamwārī*," and observed—

"In the commencement of the conversation Sir Lewis Pelly said that Syud Noor Mahomed Shah had been deputed to meet Sir Lewis Pelly to clear up some misapprehension. What was this misapprehension? Be pleased to inform me, in order that I may be prepared to discuss the point."

Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that he was not sure whether the precise word "*nāhamwārī*" was in the Viceroy's communications. But he would look at them again, and inform the Cabul Envoy at the next meeting. Meanwhile Sir Lewis Pelly was bound by the exact words of the Viceroy's letter.

The Mir Akhor, having twice fallen asleep during the discussion, now begged permission to proceed to say his prayers, and the meeting closed.

Before separating, the hour for the next meeting was fixed at 3 p.m. on the following day, Wednesday, 31st January 1877.

Memo.

Peshawur, 30th January 1877.

Before leaving the room, however, the Cabul Envoy said he wished to say, as a private individual, and not in an official sense, one word which was in his mind—

"Your Government," he said, "is a powerful and great one; ours is a small and weak one; we have long been on terms of friendship, and the Ameer now clings to the skirt of the British Government, and till his hand be cut off he will not relax his hold of it."

"Whatever be the issue of our negotiations, personally I shall always entertain the sentiments of brotherhood with you (Sir Lewis Pelly) in remembrance of your kindness to me at Bushir, which I have often mentioned in Durbar. However this business may be decided, our wish is only for friendship with the British Government."

Enclosure 36 in No. 36.

Peshawur, 1st February 1877.]

SECOND MEETING between Sir Lewis Pelly, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Sadr-i-Azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at noon, on the 1st February 1877.

PRESENT:

Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Secretary and Interpreter.
Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Cabul Envoy.
Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at the Court of Cabul.
Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, deputed by the Ameer.
Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary of the Cabul Envoy.

SIR LEWIS PELLY began by observing, in reference to Syud Noor Mahomed Shah's question put at the close of the last conference, that the word "*nahamiduri*" appeared to him to represent the meaning he desired to convey.

Syud Noor Mahomed Shah asked the meaning of the word "*nahamiduri*," and was informed that it meant "unevenness," but that, if another expression were desired, the word "*fahmī na sawab*," or misapprehension, would do.

Sir Lewis Pelly referred the Envoy to the Viceroy's letter dated 11th October, and to the "*Aide Mémoire*" given by the Viceroy to the British Agent for the information of the Ameer. The "*Aide Mémoire*" was then read by the British Agent.

The Envoy remarked that the "*Aide Mémoire*" stated the apprehension and anxiety to be on the Viceroy's part.

Sir Lewis Pelly then caused the "*Aide Mémoire*" to be again read, and pointed out that the object

The word "misapprehension" is contained expressed was to "relieve his (the Ameer's) mind from many in paragraph 3, of the Viceroy's letter of "apprehensions as to my (the Viceroy's) intentions, which appear 11th October 1876, addressed to the Ameer. "to have been caused by circumstances previous to my (the (Signed) L. P. "Viceroy's) assumption of the Government of India, and by a "policy which His Highness had considered to be neither hot nor cold."

The Envoy asked what apprehensions (*andeshā*), as the Ameer has had none? He has never committed any act contrary to correspondence which has taken place between the two Governments, and has therefore given no cause to awaken anxiety on the part of the British Government.

The Syud then remarked parenthetically that he hoped Sir Lewis Pelly would not suppose that he wished to give unnecessary trouble in asking this question. Sir Lewis Pelly replied "By no means. We shall never arrive at a really satisfactory understanding concerning the future until we have thoroughly understood and cleared up the past." Sir Lewis Pelly continued that he would endeavour

to explain some among the apprehensions (*andeshā*), and which appeared to have been consequent upon certain wishes and requests made known by the Ameer at the conference with Lord Mayo at Umballa in 1869, and at the interviews of Syud Noor Mahomed Shah himself at Simla in 1873, and in a communication received through the British Agent at Cabul in May 1873.

The Envoy asked Sir Lewis Pelly to specify the wishes and requests to which he alluded. Sir Lewis Pelly then caused the following extract from the Note of the interview which had taken place between Lord Mayo and the Ameer on the 29th March 1869 to be translated to the Envoy:—

EXTRACT.

"To this the Ameer replied that the friendship with his father was a 'dry friendship' and one-sided; he seemed unwilling, though pressed on the subject, to give any more distinct or decided expression to his feelings and wishes, though his Minister at last explained that they were, first, guarantee of the Ameer and his family against all comers whilst in actual possession of the throne; second, such present assistance in money and arms as could be given."

"At length, after some hesitation, and conversation in Pushtoo with his Minister, Noor Mahomed, he declared that it was his earnest wish that the Government of India should recognize and acknowledge, not only himself, but his lineal successors in blood (*munwa outladi mun**), and this phrase he repeated several times, with great earnestness and emphasis. He explained again and at some length that to acknowledge the ruler *pro tem.* and *de facto* was to invite competition for a throne and excite the hopes of all sorts of candidates; that, if the British Government would recognize him and his dynasty, there was nothing he would not do in order to evince his gratitude and to comply with the wishes of the Indian Government in any particular, and support them with his means and his life, it being understood that the slightest failure on his or his descendants' part should vitiate all engagements on ours."

The Envoy begged the favour of Sir Lewis Pelly causing translations of all the documents he had referred to being made for his (the Envoy's) perusal, and that the further discussion of the Ameer's requests and apprehensions might be deferred pending the preparation of those translations.

The Envoy, having observed that it was necessary in these discussions to proceed link by link of the chain, otherwise confusion would ensue, begged that the meeting might now terminate for to-day.

Enclosure 37 in No. 36.

NOTE.

Peshawur, 3rd February 1877.

THE translations promised at the last interview having been sent this morning to the Cabul Envoy, Sir Lewis Pelly proceeded to the conference room at the hour appointed for meeting. On arrival there he received, through the Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, a verbal message from the Cabul Envoy to the effect that he had received the translations and had perused them. He would now refer to his own papers, and make his reply on Monday; till these translations were replied to and disposed of, he could not enter upon the discussion of other questions. But he would be glad to meet Sir Lewis Pelly now in an unofficial manner if convenient.

Sir Lewis Pelly replied that he would be happy to meet the Envoy in the manner proposed at the conference room.

The Envoy having arrived, Sir Lewis Pelly observed that he was willing to meet the Envoy's wishes for a postponement of further discussion until Monday, 5th instant, at noon. And that, in view to obviate unnecessary delay, he would now ask the Envoy whether he had a clear recollection of the contents of the *Aide Mémoire* sent by the Viceroy for the information of the Ameer by the hand of Nawab Mahomed Atta Khan. Sir Lewis Pelly added that, if the Envoy so wished, he would be happy to cause the *Aide Mémoire* now to be read over to him.

The Envoy asked for a copy of the *Aide Mémoire*, and Sir Lewis Pelly said he would telegraph to the Viceroy on the subject.

Sir Lewis Pelly then mentioned that the Viceroy has expressed his desire for a most friendly and suitable reception of the Envoy, and doubtless would be glad to hear of his comfort and happiness.

The Envoy begged Sir Lewis Pelly to submit his respectful compliments to the Viceroy, and remarked that on all previous occasions of his coming to British territory he had been made most comfortable and happy by the honourable reception accorded to him, but on this occasion he had been treated with even greater consideration, and could find no words to express his gratitude. His happiness, the Envoy continued, was perfect whilst he was here, but its endurance would depend upon the way in which he should part from Sir Lewis Pelly after completing his negotiations.

Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that the Envoy was well aware of the sincerely friendly intentions of the Viceroy, and that it would depend on the Ameer whether the Envoy's departure should prove as happy as he desired.

The Envoy replied—"No, it depends on you," and, then correcting himself, added, "In truth, it depends neither on you nor on the Ameer, but on justice."

It was then arranged that the Envoy and Sir Lewis Pelly should resume their discussions on Monday, 5th instant, at noon.

Enclosure 38 in No. 36.

Meeting between Sir LEWIS PELLY, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and SYUD NOOR MAHOMED SHAH, Sadr-i-Azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at 11 a.m., 5th February 1877.

PRESENT:

Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
 Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul.
 Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly.
 Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at the Court of Cabul.
 Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, deputed by the Ameer of Cabul.
 Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary to the Cabul Envoy.

THE Afghan Envoy stated, in his note of the first conference, he finds that the *andesha* (anxiety) was prior to the arrival of the present Viceroy.

The Envoy proceeded to say that he does not consider the present Viceroy as distinct from his predecessor.

"I confidently believe," he said, "the present Viceroy will acknowledge in their exactitude all the conditions and agreements that the English Government have made with the Afghan Government, and every agreement which the present Viceroy makes with the Afghan Government after any length of time, every Viceroy who shall succeed him will recognize the agreements of this Viceroy as well as of those who have preceded him. But, if this Viceroy should make an agreement, and a successor should say, I am not bound to it?"

Sir Lewis Pelly replied with reference to the old Treaty. The Envoy here interrupted, and said all Sir Lewis Pelly was about to say would come afterwards, and wanted a yes or no. Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that, with the permission of the Envoy, he would make his own remarks in the manner which might appear to him to be proper.

As regards the old Treaty, Sir Lewis Pelly repeated—It appears that it gave no satisfaction to the Ameer, who had repeatedly requested an agreement of a more specific and detailed character.

The Viceroy has now recently offered to the Ameer a Treaty of a more specific and intimate character, viz., a Treaty of defensive and offensive alliance, and one tending to strengthen and secure his dynasty and power by the public recognition and support of the British Government, provided the Ameer should agree to the conditions which are absolutely necessary as a means towards enabling the Viceroy to carry out the heavy obligations he would undertake under such an instrument.

These conditions were long ago explained to the Ameer by the Agent, and the Ameer took two months to deliberate, after which he accepted the conditions preliminary to negotiation, and deputed his Envoy with full powers. The Viceroy now confidently expects a prompt and definite reply to his proposal of a defensive and offensive alliance.

The Envoy asked whether all the agreements and treaties from the time of Sir John Lawrence and the late Ameer up to the time of Lord Northbrook and the present Ameer are invalid and annulled.

Sir Lewis Pelly replied that he had no authority to annul any Treaty, but to propose to revise and supplement the Treaty of 1855 in the manner proposed by the Viceroy in his communication to the Ameer, and accepted by the Ameer through the British Agent.

The Cabul Envoy repeated the above to assure himself that he had perfectly understood it, and then said, "Supposing the present Viceroy makes a Treaty with us, and, 20 years after he has gone, another Viceroy says he wishes to revise and supplement it, what are we to do?"

Sir Lewis Pelly replied—"If one party to a Treaty expresses, as the Ameer has done, dissatisfaction with its provisions, and requests the other party to the instrument to give formal assent to certain desired additions to the instrument, and should the other party to the Treaty accede to the proposed additions or modifications, it is right, and in accordance with international practice, that the Treaty should be revised and supplemented."

The Envoy replied—"The first proposition was that Sir Lewis Pelly desired to remove certain anxiety from the mind of the Ameer. If there should come any anxiety in the mind of the Ameer, it is owing to transgression of previous agreements: and our opinion is the same as that which from the time of the late Ameer and Lord Lawrence to the time of the Umballa Durbar, and till the arrival of the present Viceroy, has always been mentioned in our past correspondence. And we are firmly of those opinions now. Therefore, how can we consent to the addition of such hard conditions, the performance of which in Afghanistan will be impossible, as we can show by many proofs?"

Sir Lewis Pelly asked whether the Envoy intended him to understand that the Ameer declines to admit the principle of the condition that British Officers should be permitted to reside on the frontiers of Afghanistan for the purpose of watching events beyond those frontiers, and of reporting to the Ameer and the British Government. Sir Lewis Pelly added that he would beg the favour of the Envoy's affording a well-considered reply, since, if that principle were not admitted, he (Sir Lewis Pelly) would be unable to open negotiations for the proposed Treaty of Alliance.

The Envoy replied—"If the Ameer saw the welfare of both sides in such a difficult matter, and consented to it, where would be the necessity of all this talking? Therefore now, after mentioning the considerations as to the inadvisability of this matter, I will discuss the proposals for the settlement of the conditions, in this very particular, of the residence of British Officers, without entering upon other matters in regard to the Treaty, in so clear and friendly a manner that it may be thoroughly understood by both sides, and this, in order that no doubt may remain in the mind of either party. With respect to the extracts from the records of the Meeting at Umballa, which you have given me, I desire to comment upon them, that they may all be made clear, in order that there may be no misunderstanding, in the course of the friendship of the two Governments, in any matter which may hereafter become the cause of regret."

Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that he would be most happy, and was most desirous, to discuss all the details of the proposed Treaty, but that before doing so he must be explicitly assured that the above-mentioned principle is accepted. On this point Sir Lewis Pelly had no discretionary power. He trusted, therefore, that the Envoy would not impute to him any want of courtesy or disinclination to negotiate if he again requested the favour of the Envoy's distinctly informing him whether the Ameer adheres to his assurance that the above-mentioned principle is admitted, or whether His Highness now withdraws from that assurance. And Sir Lewis Pelly again explained that the reason for the Viceroy declaring the admission of this principle to be a *sine quâ non* to the opening of negotiations is that he cannot formally take on himself the weighty obligations incidental to assisting the Ameer to protect his frontier against foreign aggression, except the Ameer is prepared to allow him the means by which alone he can satisfactorily observe, and become informed of, events passing on and beyond his frontiers.

Sir Lewis Pelly added—"It being of course distinctly understood that these Officers will be expressly prohibited from all interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan."

The Cabul Envoy replied—"I have nothing to say as to the consideration of the Treaty, but my object for present consideration is this, viz., that I may explain to you the true facts of past circumstances in reference to this subject, and what is the desire of the Ameer, and also what are the views of the whole Afghan people, who withdraw from this proposal; I beg you first to listen to what I say, and to consider it well. I will explain why they withdraw from this proposal, so that you may understand it, and no doubt may remain on the subject."

Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that he would be glad to hear him.

The Cabul Envoy then said—"The meeting between the Ameer and Sir D. Macleod took place at Lahore and not at Umballa. But what you have stated that the Ameer said is not so; because the Ameer expressed no wish for any Government matter, and his coming was merely to make known his friendship, in order that it might be known to everybody that 'at the time of revolution in Afghanistan the British Government did not ask after my welfare, but that I, at the first opportunity, came down; that, in accordance with former friendship and past agreement and correspondence, I might show that I was constant and firm.' And this was known to the British Agent at that time, as was written to Lord Lawrence. Again, at Lahore Sir D. Macleod desired an interview, and it was at his desire the meeting took place. Whatever was advanced was advanced by Sir D. Macleod, and the Ameer only replied to him. And now it is said the Ameer made the first advance.

"Again, regarding the letter not satisfying his friends in Afghanistan, and by his returning without its alteration, they would consider he had gained nothing by his journey.' I beg to observe that these words did not occur in that interview. Yes; the word *dushmani* (enmity) did occur, and I will explain in this meeting how it came to be mentioned. But what is written in the extract—'this is not possible, and he (the Ameer) allowed it to pass, but said that, if he did so and so, according to our decision, he hoped the Queen would be informed that his wish was still such'—is not correct. This also was not said on that day. The copy of the written record of that day's interview is here; let it be examined and ascertained how the fact stood, see paragraph 5, viz., who asked the question and what was the reply? But the paragraph about *dushmani* (enmity) is correct, for the Ameer said—'Let the enemies and friends of both sides be equally considered enemies and friends.' It will be seen in paragraph 5 of the record.

"But in the Simla discussion with Lord Northbrook the word *dushmani* (enmity) was omitted in official papers, and the Ameer also was pleased with this. When I come to mention the discussion at Simla, I will more carefully explain this matter, and it will also be borne out by the papers of the Ameer."

In reply, Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that there appeared to be a difference between the Afghan and the English records of the proceedings at the Umballa Conference. He could only go upon the records on which he was instructed; but, in regard to the letter of Sir D. Macleod, Sir Lewis Pelly believed that, although the interview may have had place at Lahore, it was reported from Umballa, as the letter is dated from that place.

The Cabul Envoy remarked on this—"I do not say there has been any alteration of the writing; but whatever I have said, or may say, in these meetings, I will produce in support of the authority of your own Government for you. If you have received other instructions, what do I know?"

The Cabul Envoy continued—"The interview between the Ameer and Lord Mayo also was owing to a privately expressed wish on the part of Lord Mayo. Gray Sahib came to me, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, and said that Lord Mayo expressed his wish to speak with the Ameer in private. The Ameer consented to his wish, and they had a meeting. Therefore I now ask, according to your own records of that meeting, and not according to my own account of it. According to your statement, the Ameer said this. What did Lord Mayo say in reply to the Ameer, to produce an anxiety (*andesha*) in the mind of the Ameer on his return to his own country? What was the result of that meeting, that the Viceroy should now wish to remove anxiety from the mind of the Ameer? Some of the translated papers you have given me are correct, and are remembered by me."

Sir Lewis Pelly replied that apparently the anxiety was caused in the Ameer's mind through the British Government deeming that it was not then necessary to formulate all the Ameer's wishes in a Treaty.

The Cabul Envoy replied—"I hope our friendship will always remain strong and lasting on both sides, in accordance with the old agreements; but if such very serious discussions are to arise in the path of friendship at any time upon doubtful expressions, it gives room for much regret and despair."

"I also desire to state that at Umballa, after the interview between Lord Mayo and the Ameer, a written paper was drawn up and given to the Ameer. These words, which you have written as from the Ameer, should appear in that document. Let it be referred to, for the question was then settled by it. Since then there has been no reference to the subject. Let that paper be consulted, for from it the matter will be well ascertained and understood, and it is incumbent to act upon its terms, and not to permit any transgression of them; and if they are transgressed it will be a cause of great regret to us. Further, in my opinion, the Ameer returned from Umballa without anxiety."

Sir Lewis Pelly begged to be informed what written paper the Cabul Envoy referred to, and whether he could bring a copy or give its date.

The Cabul Envoy said he would produce a copy of it at the next meeting if possible, and if not, would at all events indicate its date.

The Conference was fixed to meet at noon to-morrow, and then broke up.

Mir Akhor left at 1 p.m., or before.

Enclosure 39 in No. 36.

Meeting between Sir LEWIS PELLY, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and SYUD NOOR MAHOMED SHAH, Sadr-i-Azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at noon of the 6th February 1877.

PRESENT :

Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul.

Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly.

Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at the Court of Cabul.

Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, deputed by Ameer of Cabul.

Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary to Cabul Envoy.

THE Cabul Envoy began by saying he would give Sir Lewis Pelly a copy of the convention* (*wasica*) made between Lord Mayo and the Ameer at Umballa; and if he would observe, by way of precaution, there would be some slight difference in the copy, it would not be of an important kind. The Cabul Envoy then read the above letter, and Sir Lewis Pelly begged he might be favoured with a copy of it.

* The Dictionary renders *wasica* = convention. But Syud Ahmed states that *wasica*, as currently used in these regions, means a document.

(Signed) L. P.

To this the Cabul Envoy replied, he would give him a copy† when this discussion was disposed of, and he entered into discussion of details.

† Vide P.S.

Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that he was at present awaiting a reply to a telegram which he had last evening addressed to the Viceroy, and that in the meantime he would not press for an explanation of the discussion to which the Cabul Envoy referred. Sir Lewis Pelly would only remark *en passant* that, had the Ameer not still retained anxiety in his mind after the conclusion of the Umballa Conference, it is improbable that he would have addressed to Lord Northbrook, through the British Agent, his letter of 1873, and have deputed Syud Noor Mahomed Shah himself to the Conference which ensued on the Ameer's letter.

"The Cabul Envoy replied that, whenever you do press for a discussion, it will be well. My desire is that I may make clear these matters with the greatest pleasure to you, that no doubt may remain in the mind of either party. In my making these explanations to you, all these particulars will be in their proper places made known to you. After you have well weighed them, let me know whatever is your opinion."

Before separating, some friendly conversation took place, which the Envoy requested might not be put in the Record of Proceedings. Finally the Envoy explained, in reference to his statement of yesterday, that he did not intend by it either to reject or accept the Agency clause; that he begged to be allowed two or three more days in which to state what the Ameer had directed him to submit, and that he would then give a definite answer to the question of Agency.

P.S.—My principal object in endeavouring to obtain the Envoy's Persian version is to compare it with the English version. As the Envoy read the Persian, it seemed to me that the words conveyed more than Lord Mayo intended to express: for example, my ear caught the Persian words for severe *punishment* in connection with the eventuality of internal disturbance of the Ameer's rule.

Enclosure 40 in No. 3.

NOTE of Dr. Bellew's Private Interview with Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, dated Peshawar, 7th February 1877. (Extract.)

THE Cabul Envoy, though better to-day, was not well enough to attend Conference, and desired Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan to explain the reasons of his inability to do so to Sir Lewis Pelly. The Nawab stated that the Cabul Envoy was in some pain till nearly midnight, and then after the employment of his own remedies fell asleep, and is better to day, but still not fit to do business.

At 2 p.m. I visited the Cabul Envoy, to inquire after his health on behalf of Sir Lewis Pelly. He received me in his private sitting room. I found him alone, with one servant in attendance, whom he dismissed on my entry. The Envoy had just risen from his couch, on which he had been reclining. After compliments, and a lengthy account of his illness, which it appears is the result of a chronic stricture of the urethra of many years standing, he remarked that the hard work during the preceding two days of writing his Despatches to the Ameer on the subject of his conferences with Sir L. Pelly, and which occupied him far into the night, had somewhat fatigued him, but that the rest he had enjoyed to-day had restored him to his usual health.

The Cabul Envoy continued that he would be able to resume his conference with Sir Lewis Pelly to-morrow, and begged that I would intimate to Sir Lewis Pelly that he wished to state his own case on the part of the Ameer's Government in detail, beginning with the Treaty made by the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan with Sir John Lawrence, then with a review of the meeting between the present

Ameer and Lord Mayo, and finally with a brief summary of the discussions he had with Lord Northbrook at Simla. He begged that he might be heard throughout without remark or reply on the part of Sir Lewis Pelly, and that all he stated might be at the time taken down in writing. When he had finished his statement, which he said he hoped to do in two sittings, he would beg Sir Lewis Pelly to consider and weigh well all that he had said, and then to state on his own part the proposals he had to make on behalf of the British Government. He did not wish for an immediate rejoinder, the Envoy continued, from Sir Lewis Pelly, but would prefer that he considered and weighed all that had been stated by him (the Cabul Envoy) with care and foresight, for three or four or more days, before he (Sir Lewis Pelly) entered on the subject of the proposals of the British Government. The Cabul Envoy would then hear all that Sir Lewis Pelly had to say, and would in his turn give a final and definite reply, which would settle the business.

The Cabul Envoy here paused a short time, and then said:—"It is a very serious business, and this is the last time that the Ameer will treat with the British Government. God grant that the issue be favourable (well). But you must not impose upon us a burden which we cannot bear, and if you overload us the responsibility rests with you." I interposed here, and asked the Cabul Envoy what the burden was which he alluded to. He at once replied:—"The residence of British Officers on the frontiers of Afghanistan." He then went on with some warmth and excitement to enlarge upon the objections of the Afghan people to the presence of foreigners in their territories, and upon the difficulty the Ameer would experience in protecting them from insult and injury in the event of his acceding to the condition of their residence in his country. He said further that he did not see why they were wanted on the frontiers at all, and, even if there, what good they could do; for they would be utterly useless and helpless without the cordial support of the Ameer.

I remarked that it was of course understood that the Ameer, in accepting the condition of British Officers being posted as Government Agents on his frontiers, if indeed he did accept the condition, did so with the conviction that it was for his own advantage, and was prepared to protect them and assist them as friends of himself and his Government.

The Cabul Envoy, in reply, shook his head negatively, and said—"We mistrust you, and fear you will write all sorts of reports about us, which will some day be brought forward against us and lead to your taking the control of our affairs out of our hands." I replied that I felt sure that the disposition of the British Government towards that of the Ameer was most friendly, and that its most sincere wish was to see the Ameer's authority and country secured to himself and his heirs on a secure and a lasting foundation, and referred, in proof of its entire disinclination to interfere in the affairs of its neighbours, to the condition of the border tribes between the territories of the British and Cabul Governments, all of whom enjoyed their former independence without the smallest encroachment on the part of the British Government, though it had been their immediate neighbour for nearly thirty years. On the contrary, I continued, the British Government not only entirely withheld from any attempt to enter their territories, but altogether abstained from interference in their internal affairs, and at the same time, as a mark of its good-will, whilst exacting no concession from them in return, allowed these border tribes the most free access to its territories, and granted them the same protection of the laws as its own subjects enjoyed. "You may rest assured," I added, "that it is the sincere wish of the British Government to see the Ameer and his dynasty firmly secured on the throne of Cabul as its trusty friends and allies, and it behoves the Ameer to ponder well before he rejects its proffered friendship."

The Cabul Envoy replied that the Ameer and his people thoroughly appreciated the friendship of the British Government. "We know," he said, "who rescued Herat from the Persians and gave it to the late Ameer. We will not now speak of Seistan, but we know who assisted Turkey against Russia in the Crimea, and we know who is the friend of Turkey in this Servian revolt. We know on which side our interests lie. But this is a question I shall discuss in conference with Sir Lewis Pelly."

Referring again to the Servian revolt, the Cabul Envoy enquired whether it was true, as commonly stated, that the Russians had instigated the rebellion, and, producing a map, asked me to point out the positions on it of Herzegovina, Servia, Bulgaria, Crimea, Circassia, &c. Whilst looking over the map, the Cabul Envoy enquired how it was that the nations of Europe permitted Russia to send her soldiers to fight in the Servian ranks whilst the Russian Ambassador remained at Constantinople.

I told him my information did not enable me to answer his enquiry. The Cabul Envoy then alluded to the military preparations of Russia, and, pointing to Circassia on the map, said the corps d'armées there were in a position to threaten both Turkey and Persia.

The Cabul Envoy next observed that he was to meet Sir Lewis Pelly at 4 o'clock, and I consequently took leave of him.

Enclosure 41 in No. 36.

Meeting between Sir LEWIS PELLY, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and SYUD NOOR MAHOMED SHAH, Sadr-i-Azim, Envoy of Ameer of Cabul, at noon of the 8th February 1877.

PRESENT:

Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
 Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul.
 Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly.
 Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at the Court of Cabul.
 Munshi Muhammed Baqir, Secretary to the Cabul Envoy.

SYUD NOOR MAHOMED SHAH opened the discussion by stating that he wished to make a detailed statement of his case on the part of the Ameer, and begged that he might be heard throughout without reply from Sir Lewis Pelly, until he had finished what he had to say, which he desired might be taken down in writing.

Sir Lewis Pelly observed that he would gladly accede to the request of Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, and hear what he had to say.

On this, without further remarks, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah said—

“In respect to the paper of the British Agent in 1873, with an extract from which I have been furnished by Sir Lewis Pelly, I am not well informed regarding it. I do not know whether the Ameer actually did so speak word for word; but I may say, in respect to the perfect candour of the Ameer's heart towards the British Government, which he then had and still has, that in all his conversations with the British Agent he explained the state of affairs in his usual friendly manner.

“Again, with respect to the terms of the letters (*wasica*) of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, who wrote—‘Always write and communicate with the British Government, in regard to matters between the two Governments, without fear.’ If the whole of that letter be here quoted, it will lead to delay. I therefore refer to the letter of the 12th of October 1868, in which Lord Lawrence wrote—‘The consent and approval of Her Majesty the Queen of England has been accorded to this letter after mature reflection and deliberation.’ Therefore, in order to re-assure the authorities of the British Government, lest they should think the Ameer does not respect those promises, and, in his own opinion considers these promises of the British Government as worthless, I may state that, if the authorities of the British Government have a regard for their own promises and act upon them with sincerity, in accordance with the customary friendship which was formerly, and is now, observed between the two Governments, there is no ground for any anxiety.

“I will also mention the reason for this in a friendly manner, after the settlement of the question now before us, should the decision turn upon details; otherwise not.

“Again, in regard to the meetings I had with Lord Northbrook and the Foreign Secretary at Simla, as mentioned in the paper furnished to me by Sir Lewis Pelly, I beg to observe that so many discussions were held in that place that not a single subject was left out; but if all those discussions were to be gone over and explained now it would so lengthen what I have to say that I should fail in my object. I will therefore speak of them in a summary manner.

“In the first place, I would ask whether my going there was by the desire of the Ameer or by the desire of Lord Northbrook. Again, out of all the discussions which took place there repeatedly, and in which not a single subject escaped mention, I am now only furnished with an extract in which the head and foot are concealed and something from the waist is made known; or, in other words, one paragraph of its many paragraphs is brought forward, and so on.

“First, as to what it is alleged that I said there. The subject alluded to was there discussed and decided and finally settled, and not a shred of the various questions discussed was allowed to remain unconsidered. So it should be now.

“Then in respect to the word ‘wishes.’ It was not that the Ameer deputed me of his own wish. It was in this wise:—The British Government, in the first instance, wrote to the British Agent to inform the Ameer that ‘in these days certain matters are appearing in the newspapers. They are not to be relied upon. The object of my writing is that the former Viceroy had written to you on a certain date, saying that the communications addressed by the British Government to the Russian Government continued in force.’

“In the next place, in letters written to the British Agent on the 23rd and 26th of March 1873 by the British Government, it was stated that an officer of rank would proceed to Cabul in order to explain to the Ameer the final settlement of the Seistan question. The Cabul authorities gave their reply to these letters through the British Agent. In summary, it was to the effect that ‘the circumstances of the final settlement are not known to us. We wish to be informed of the nature of the settlement, and if it be in accordance with the views and powers of this God-granted Government, then so much the better. But if not, and it be contrary to the views and power of this Government, then the state of our affairs will be notified to the English Government. And, if the coming of the above-mentioned officer be for some other matter connected with the welfare of Afghanistan, let us be informed of it.’

“In reply to this, the British Agent received a letter, dated 12th October 1873. In that letter it was stated that ‘the purpose of the sincere friend is this, that a British officer should be deputed for two objects, *viz.*, the intimation of the final decision of the Seistan question, and also of certain matters connected with the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, in order that he may explain certain communications which have passed between the two exalted Governments of England and Russia, and regarding which the Viceroy previously wrote.’

"When the Ameer perceived that Lord Northbrook was very persistent, the Ameer communicated his views, in conformity with his customary friendship, to the British Agent. In brief, they were to the effect that 'having perused the letters of the Viceroy of India, dated 24th June 1870 and 1st May 1872, and 9th May 1872, and also the letters of General Von Kaufmann, the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend, concerning the former arrangements made for the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, and which are now before me, it seems, in my opinion, suitable that the Governor-General of India should, in the first instance, honour my Agent with an interview, in order that he may learn the nature of the new communications regarding the frontiers referred to, and ascertain the views of the British Government; and, after having thoroughly understood these, he should return to me, in order that I may consider how they may be gradually carried out.'

"On the receipt of this communication by the Viceroy of India, the Viceroy, in the spirit of the agreement which existed between the two Governments, asked that an official of the Ameer's might be deputed to him. The Ameer accordingly deputed me (Syud Noor Mahomed Shah) as his Envoy to the British Government. Lord Northbrook, on the conclusion of the discussion on the 30th August 1873, said to me (Syud Noor Mahomed Shah)—'I have asked for you to be deputed from a wish of my own.' This fact will be seen by reference to the discussion. The 'wishes,' therefore, 'on whose part were they?' And as to other wishes also, it will be seen from the discussions, by whom they were expressed,—I refer to the discussion of 12th July 1873 at Simla. Ascertain from whose side the desire for the discussion originated. In that discussion I received from Lord Northbrook re-assurances as to the absence of aggression on the part of the Russians, and also on the part of those tribes which are under the influence of the Russians, and at the same time I ascertained that there was a possibility of aggression. This threw a doubt upon the letter of 24th June 1870 from Lord Mayo, which in the matter of confirming the communication of General Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Turkistan, stated—'There is a perfect assurance; do not on your part bring any doubt upon it.' And so also with other promises from that side of the North, the detail of which here is not necessary, because you can consult those papers in which the explanation is recorded.

"In that meeting Lord Northbrook, of himself, observed without my asking him—'It is necessary that the Ameer be informed that, since the country of Afghanistan is situated between the territories of the English and Russian Governments, it is therefore advantageous that the Government of Afghanistan should be strong and independent.' He also said of his own accord, without my expressing any wish on the subject,—'In regard to invasion of the Afghan frontier by a foreign enemy, it is probable that in such case the English would assist the Ruler of Afghanistan in repelling such aggressors.' But the nature of this assistance was left obscure both in his writings and sayings. When I saw that Lord Northbrook was, without any expression of views on my part, very persistent in this particular matter, I said, owing to his persistence, that the people of Afghanistan did not place so much reliance on the promises of Russia as they did upon the assistance of the British Government. I said also that I could not speak further on the subject with him, nor could I say all that was in my mind until I had considered the matter and talked it over with the Foreign Secretary. This concluded our interview. The reason I had for not discussing this subject with Lord Northbrook was that I did not consider it suitable to do so orally, without previous conversation with the Foreign Secretary."

At this point Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, who had evidently been somewhat inconvenienced by his ailment during the latter part of his statement, paused, and, expressing himself unable to continue the topic, begged that the Conference might be adjourned to Saturday.

Enclosure 42 in No. 36.

Meeting between Sir LEWIS PELLY, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and SYUD NOOR MAHOMED SHAH, Sadr-i-Azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at noon of the 10th February 1877.

PRESENT:

Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
 Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul.
 Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly.
 Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at the Court of Cabul.
 Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, deputed by the Ameer of Cabul.
 Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary to the Cabul Envoy.

THE Envoy opened the proceedings with the continuation of the statement of his case on the part of the Ameer, at the point where he left off on the previous meeting. He proceeded to say that he had several meetings with the Foreign Secretary and the Under Secretary between the 12th and 19th of July, with many arguments, and observed that, if he went into them all again on this occasion, it would greatly lengthen what he had to say. "The summary of it," he said, "is this: 'There is no need for this assistance. The previous promises and pledges between the two parties are sufficient. They, however, said the matter which was discussed between us should be written. But I told them that, if they considered that such want of assistance did exist, the people of Afghanistan would not be satisfied with such indefinite promises, and I adduced many arguments.

“ in proof. On the contrary, I said that the promises and the writings of the previous Viceroys “ on this matter would be vitiated and invalidated.

“ The translated paper given to me by Sir Lewis Pelly is correct; but I even said more than it contained, for I said besides—‘ Let all this be entered in the letter from Lord Northbrook to the ‘ Ameer.’

“ Subsequent to this, in a second interview with Lord Northbrook on the 30th of the same month, owing to the persistence with which he referred to the matter, I represented that ‘ the sort of ‘ assistance that you mention would not satisfy the people of Afghanistan. I have spoken on this ‘ subject with many proofs to the Secretary, and, if the British Government should make any promise, ‘ let it be in the terms that I have proposed to the Foreign Secretary.’ I also repeated the same in brief to Lord Northbrook, and my reasons for mentioning the subject in brief to Lord Northbrook were these—viz., that in the commencement of the conversation of that day he told me that, although he was informed word for word of what I had said to the Foreign Secretary, he wished them to be repeated in brief by me to himself.

“ Again, as to the present assistance for the future, and for strengthening the frontiers. Since I mentioned in our meeting of Thursday last what Lord Northbrook had said at our first interview of 12th July, regarding Afghanistan being a ‘ buffer ’ between the two Governments, there is no necessity to repeat it. Also, considering the promises made by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, with the same views and arguments, and which I mentioned on Thursday in connexion with the letter of the British Agent, there is no need to refer to them again.

“ In respect to the point that the people of Afghanistan would not be satisfied with such a sort of promise, there was much difference of opinion, and the discussion continued for a month.

“ At last, on the 30th of August of that year, I had a third interview with Lord Northbrook, in which all the subjects were thoroughly discussed, and so nothing was left unconsidered. You can consult the facts of that interview from the records of your own Offices.

“ After that, on the 3rd or 4th of September, I had some conversation with the Secretary, which brought the discussion to a close.

“ As regards the word ‘ enmity,’ it is correct. But the Viceroy said that such expressions are not used in State papers. I also being pleased at the non-usage of such expressions in State papers, said nothing.

“ As regards the name of Russia, which I mentioned in connection with aggression, it was owing to an observation made by Lord Northbrook in the interview of the 12th of July, who said, ‘ It is necessary that the Ameer should be informed that, since the country of Afghanistan is a ‘ buffer ‘ between the territories of the English and Russian Governments, it is therefore advantageous for ‘ Hindustan that Afghanistan should be strong and independent.’ Therefore, since he called Afghanistan the buffer against Russia, does this, or not, prove the aggression of Russia? Ultimately the Viceroy observed that ‘ even a friendly Government can become an aggressor. But the English ‘ Government, considering the repeated certain assurances which they have received from the Russian ‘ Government, cannot entertain any likelihood of it.’ After hearing this, I remained silent, because I thought that unity and friendship between Governments is a matter of the greatest importance.

“ After all these lengthy discussions, Lord Northbrook, on the 6th of September 1873, gave me a letter to the address of the Ameer. In reply to this letter, the Ameer wrote in detail concerning its several points. Two of the sentences in this letter were to the following effect :—

“ 1st. ‘ What you have written concerning the northern frontier with your pearl-studded pen has been ‘ understood by this friend in its exactitude. This humble supplicant at the Divine Throne renders ‘ his thanks to God, and expresses his gratitude that, praised be God the Almighty, lasting peace and ‘ tranquillity are established in all Governments, and doubts and oppositions from all sides have been ‘ removed ; and such security has been attained in all kingdoms, that no one will transgress his own ‘ frontiers, and nobody will dispute or discuss with anybody within their own limits, and the word ‘ ‘ enmity ’ is no longer used in State papers and documents, and tranquillity and security are enjoyed ‘ by all nations at large.’

“ 2nd. ‘ That which that kind friend had penned with the pen charged with friendship, to the effect ‘ that the course which was pursued towards this friend by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo would ‘ continue to be observed on the part of that side. This expression is the cause of many rejoicings. ‘ My kind friend ! after those discussions which took place at Simla with Sayadat Panah Syud Noor ‘ Mahomed Shah there was no necessity for these discussions. That very arrangement and agreement ‘ at Umballa is sufficient, so long as from the side of Her Most Gracious Majesty, the Great Queen of ‘ England, the foundation of friendship shall remain intact and stable. Please God Almighty, from the ‘ side of this supplicant at the Divine Throne, also the foundation of friendship and union will remain ‘ strong and firm as at the time of the interview at Umballa, where I met Lord Mayo, whose authority ‘ is in my hand, as also the document of Lord Lawrence, which is now in my possession.’

“ Again, regarding the letter of Mr. Macnabb to the address of the British Agent, asking permission for Colonel Baker, who was proceeding from Teheran to India, to be allowed to pass through Afghanistan, the Ameer wrote to Lord Northbrook in reply—‘ In the matter of the passage of such ‘ men as Colonel Baker and others through the limits of Afghanistan, since the Envoy of this party, ‘ at the time of the interview and conference on all these subjects with that kind Sahib, explained ‘ the matter in detail, to the effect that in the Afghanistan limits there were many objections, there- ‘ fore, for this reason, there is no need for repetition.’

“ The above-mentioned Lord Sahib wrote in reply that ‘ the difficulties which that kind friend ‘ experiences in the case of European guests travelling in Afghanistan are apparent to this friend. ‘ He is unable to extend the same hospitality to the servants of Her Exalted Majesty the Great ‘ Queen as this friend accords to the servants and subjects of that kind friend in Hindustan.’

"Again, at the time of his departure, Lord Northbrook sent a communication to the Ameer, the substance of which I will now repeat from memory. If there should be some slight difference in the wording, let it not be a matter of blame. In brief, its substance was to this effect—'I am going, and I leave with the friendship remaining on the same firm footing as before, and my successor will also maintain the same course.'

"Therefore, till the time of the departure of Lord Northbrook, that previous course continued to be observed. From the discussions, then, that have taken place in these meetings at Peshawar, what anxiety can there be in the mind of the Ameer, that you should now remove it?"

The Cabul Envoy here observed that he had now concluded what he desired to say, and that there was no grievance in the mind of the Ameer in respect to the matters referred to by Sir Lewis Pelly, but that discontent had really found place in the Ameer's mind in connection with other questions; and if Sir Lewis Pelly would permit him to enumerate the causes of this discontent in a friendly unofficial way, and without provoking controversy by a reply, he (the Envoy) would do so.

Sir Lewis Pelly expressed his readiness to hear whatever the Cabul Envoy might have to say, and begged to inform him that it was the desire of the Viceroy to learn all the causes of anxiety that there may be in the mind of the Ameer.

The Cabul Envoy then proceeded to say that if any anxiety have already come into the mind of the Ameer, or should hereafter come, it will be from other causes. "I will, therefore, owing to friendship and expectation of favour, mention some of them.

"The first cause is this:—At the end of the year 1869, or in the beginning of the following year, all the Chiefs of Beloochistan, having been honoured by an interview with the Ameer at Cabul, presented a petition the purport of which was to this effect—'Owing to the claims of State which you have upon us, be pleased to settle the affairs amongst ourselves.' The Ameer, owing to his consideration of the requirements of certain State matters at the time, sent that petition through your Agent to the English Government, but since then no answer has been received by the Ameer in regard to it from the English Government.

"The second cause is this:—In regard to the matter of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, it was written in a communication from Lord Mayo that 'if efforts and endeavours should appear on the part of domestic rivals, in order to disturb the position of that kind friend in the Government of Cabul, and again kindle the fire of civil war, this circumstance will certainly be the cause of the severe displeasure of the English Government, and further, from time to time, they will adopt such means and measures in this matter as may be deemed advisable under the circumstances of the time.' Moreover, I told Commissioner Pollock Sahib, in the journey to Seistan, that 'if you value the friendship of the Ameer, do not say anything in this matter.' Of course he will have written to his own Government.

"Again, Mr. Macnabb in 1873 wrote to the British Agent—'Inform the Ameer that on the part of the British Government nothing will be said to the Ameer.'

"Further, in the interview at Simla one day, the conversation between Lord Northbrook and myself turned accidentally, on this subject. Lord Northbrook said to me orally—'In the matter of Yakub Khan, I have no concern that I should say why and wherefore, or do so and do so. In such matters, if the Ameer should ask my advice, I will advise him according to my knowledge; whether he act upon that or not, it does not matter to me, because the Ameer will do what he considers advisable for his own welfare.'

"Consequently, when the Ameer, for State reasons of expediency, prohibited Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan from returning to Herat, and imprisoned him, the English Government, in place of severe displeasure and efforts and endeavours, in order that the foundation of the Government of the Ameer should be strong, and in spite of the declaration of the above-mentioned Lord Sahib that 'I have no concern in this matter,' wrote to the British Agent through Ommanney Sahib, the Deputy Commissioner, who said—'A telegram has arrived from the Foreign Secretary to Government of India. Be so good as to inform His Highness the Ameer that the Viceroy urgently desires the observance of those conditions on which Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan came, and that they should be fulfilled. In this case, the good name of the Ameer and the friendship of the British Government will remain intact, and the Viceroy will be glad if he is re-assured as soon as possible in regard to the above-mentioned circumstances, and that he also be informed of the real state of the case.'

"Now I will put the question—Is this, or is it not, an interference in the affairs of the Afghan Government, tending to diminish its independence?"

"Again, that which you have written by way of note furnished to me in this present Conference, to the effect that 'we will bind ourselves in writing that, should any disturbance arise within Afghanistan, the English Government, supporting the Ameer, will suppress the internal disturbance.' Now, since Lord Mayo has already given a writing in this matter, what necessity is there for its repetition? Let that document be acted upon. It is sufficient, and, if that should not be sufficient, in what manner can the present writing suffice?"

At this point the Cabul Envoy, expressing himself fatigued by the day's exertions, begged that the meeting might be adjourned, and observed that he hoped to finish all he had to say, in putting forward the statement of his friendly and unofficial explanations, at the next Conference.

Enclosure 43 in No. 36.

Meeting between Sir LEWIS PELLY, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and SYUD NOOR MAHOMED SHAH, Sadr-i-Azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at noon of the 12th February 1877.

PRESENT :

Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
 Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul.
 Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly.
 Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at the Court of Cabul.
 Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, deputed by the Ameer of Cabul.
 Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary to the Cabul Envoy.

AFTER interchange of the usual complimentary greetings, the Cabul Envoy requested permission to continue his friendly and unofficial statement of miscellaneous anxieties which had heretofore arisen in the mind of the Ameer.

The Envoy then said the third cause of anxiety was this: In the matter of Ibrahim Khan going with a letter and presents from the English Government to the Mir of Wakhan, for the reason that the said Mir had hospitably entertained Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon and other officers. In the first instance, intimation was received by the British Agent at Cabul that he should obtain the permission of the Ameer for his coming. The Cabul authorities expressed many objections in the matter to the Agent, the detail of which objections you can ascertain from the records of the Agent, and part of them is to this effect, viz., that this course is contrary to the observance of the rule and customs of the two exalted Governments, and it is not even the usage of this country. This matter was yet under consideration, and no final answer was received from the English Government, when the above-named Ibrahim Khan came to Cabul without the permission of the Ameer.

Now I beg you to observe this:—When a servant of the Ameer's Government, by the permission of that Government, performs an act of hospitality, and employs some local Malik (Chief) of these on the spot on that duty, and then a letter from the Viceroy, or the Lieutenant-Governor of Lahore, is sent with presents to that local Malik, it raises a doubt in the minds of the people as to what may have been said to that local Malik, the Mir of Wakhan. Many speculations on this subject are already current amongst the people of Afghanistan, and in this matter particularly they now say—On one occasion a Sahib came by permission for one or two days to the frontier, and even then there was so much wilfulness (*isrāri* = obstinacy) that a letter with presents was sent to the Malik of that place by the Viceroy of India. If they be permitted to reside on our frontiers, in the course of time, what may not occur? And how shall we provide against such a difficulty? For in this matter of Wakhan they have directly interfered in the affairs of Afghanistan.

The fourth cause was in the matter of the Seistan question, the decision of which is known, and consequently needs no repetition; for if I entered into its explanation, it would greatly prolong the business; but if there be a necessity for its explanation, I will refer to it after the special subject now before us is disposed of, shall I consider it advisable at the time; otherwise I will not.

Now, if there be cause for anxiety (*andesha*) in such matters as those referred to, there is much more in the proposal which is now under discussion, for its adoption in Afghanistan is very difficult, and its result will be remorse (*pashemani*); because, referring to the former state of affairs at the time that the late Ameer and Lord Lawrence met at this very Peshawur and concluded a Treaty, this very question which we are now discussing was mooted between them. Had its entertainment been possible, it would have been at that time acceded to, for the above-mentioned Lord was very well acquainted with the circumstances of Afghanistan, and its good and evil were clearly known to him. The late Ameer himself explained in detail to Lord Lawrence that the entertainment of this proposal was impossible, and that it could not be carried out at his hands. And Lord Lawrence consequently settled and decided the point, and, for the sake of maintaining the mutual friendship, omitted the proposal from the written Treaty. Let this be considered, and let no proposal be brought forward between us which may abrogate that Treaty and other assurances.

Again, Lord Lawrence, at the time of his departure from India in 1868, wrote a letter to the Ameer, which explains and bears testimony to that Treaty. It was written—If you do not give up from your hands this manner of friendship which you now have with the English Government, that Government has now necessity to employ an equalizing influence (*tasarrufi adila*) in Cabul, and friendship will be firm throughout Afghanistan in the former manner.

It was also written—Your sincere friend has adopted the course which is now made current in relation to the affairs of Afghanistan advisedly, and after mature reflection and consideration, and Her Exalted Majesty the Great Queen of England has approved and consented to it. That kind friend (the Ameer) will have ascertained from the nature of his own action in the Treaty and compact with the English Government that there is no fear of change in the course mentioned, nor of interference by the English Government in the internal affairs of that dominion (Cabul), or in the administration of that kind friend (the Ameer).

It was also written—Let it be considered certain that if that kind friend (the Ameer), in order to benefit by the Treaty and compact with the English Government, do not deviate from the former course, there will never be any mistake in his administration.

There were also other things written in that letter which I need not adduce. You can peruse the letter and ascertain what they are. But it is our earnest hope that, in conformity with that letter, no change be now made.

With respect to the letters and other successive communications from Lord Mayo, it was especially stated in one letter—Whatever wish of your own you may put before this Government will meet

with attention and respect. Lord Mayo, in conformity with the former friendship, most thoroughly maintained and strengthened the friendship in accordance with the customary usage.

Now our wish is that, in accordance with the writings of Lord Mayo, you will act in conformity with the former assurances. Let not such matters come between us as will make us suspicious of State affairs (Government deeds) and scatter away former assurances, especially a matter the performance (*mustiar*) of which is impossible.

As to the state of affairs from the time Lord Northbrook came to India till the time he left India. Although there were discussions on the subject, still he left the friendship without change, in conformity with the conduct of his predecessors, and in conformity with the preceding usage. As I have already mentioned all these circumstances here in Peshawar there is no need to repeat them.

I beg the favour of your consideration of the true facts of the state of affairs in Afghanistan with justice and impartiality. The condition of the Afghan people is perfectly well known to the authorities of the English Government. There is no need therefore for a detailed mention of them. I will only allude to some of them briefly.

In the first place, the people of Afghanistan have a dread of this proposal, and it is firmly fixed in their minds, and deeply rooted in their hearts, that, if Englishmen or other Europeans once set foot in their country, it will sooner or later pass out of their hands. In no way can they be re-assured on this point, and it is impossible to remove these opinions from their minds, for they adduce many proofs in support of them, the mention of which now would greatly prolong this discussion.

Therefore, since the opinions of the people of Afghanistan are such, the protection of the Englishmen in the midst of those hill tribes is difficult, nay impossible, because the whole army and the subjects of the Government are of these mountain people.

It is necessary to view the subject with justice. It is known what were the acts of the Afghan people at the time the army of your Government was in that country, and Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk was with you, and I need not therefore relate them. What deeds did they do in the very bazar of Candahar and Cabul? One of them was hanged for an act perpetrated by him. A few days later another committed the same act. This state of affairs continued for three years, and was not stopped.

But, besides this, there are some people who out of hostility to the Ameer would secretly kill some Sahib in order to mar the friendship of two Governments. Was not the Commander-in-Chief of the Ameer's Army murdered by these people in the very midst of twenty thousand of his troops?

Now the Ameer would have to protect the Sahibs with his Army; but, if he could not protect the life of his own Commander-in-Chief, then in what manner could he protect the life of any other person?

Again, if at any time a disturbance or revolution should occur in Afghanistan, the Sahibs would be certainly destroyed; and this is a point which needs no explanation, for it is well known; because in times of disturbance in Afghanistan, from the days of Timur Shah to the present day, very many of the noblest men of Afghanistan itself have perished, and many of their greatest chiefs and leaders have been murdered. Were I to enter into details on this subject, it would greatly lengthen my discourse. But, if you should so desire, I will relate to you the circumstances under which each one of them was killed.

Therefore in case that, from some cause or other, the Sahibs should be killed, where would the consequence lead to? Eternal reproach and bitterness against Afghanistan would be the result, and their friendship with the English Government, being destroyed, would be exchanged for enmity.

Let it be remembered that one English Sahib on this frontier of Peshawar was murdered between the frontiers of two Governments, and, notwithstanding the enquiries made in accordance with the approval of Lord Northbrook, as was admitted by him in the discussion at Simla, and who subsequently wrote to the Ameer expressing his satisfaction thereon, the final issue has been the defection of Nouroz Khan, who, having robbed a kafila, has taken to flight. This enquiry put the Ameer to great expense, and was attended with the loss of many lives, and the only result has been the closure of the road up to the present time, owing to the resentment of the people.

Now, what would be the consequences should such an occurrence happen on those far-distant frontiers, the inhabitants of which comprise people of all sorts of tribes?

Therefore, what would be the advantage if the Ameer should comply with such a proposal, in which there is both loss of reputation and injury to Afghanistan, as well as bitterness of feeling, besides alienation of the two Governments either now or hereafter? Under the previous arrangement, up to the present, nothing has occurred contrary to friendship, in conformity with the terms of writings and documents.

And what advantage is there, that the Ameer should now knowingly make such an arrangement, the result of which would be enmity and regret to the two Governments, and alienation of the friendship between them? If he now undertake this difficult task, and it be impossible to carry it out, you will be the first to say, why do you enter into an arrangement which it is impossible to perform? And what will all people and all nations on the face of the earth say? And further, since, with all the treaties and documents of the British Government which he has in his hand, no blame can be attached to the Ameer, any alteration now will impose a load of blame on him which will be both injurious to Afghanistan and reprehensible also. Now, blame is the worst of all things in any matter. Why, therefore, should the English Government, notwithstanding the friendship which the Ameer so much expects from them, be disposed to impose such a load of blame upon so sincere a friend?

In the first day's conference, in the outset of the conversation, you proposed to remove any anxieties that might be in the mind of the Ameer. Now, will this remove the anxiety from the mind of the Ameer, or will it raise a fresh anxiety, not only in the mind of the Ameer, but in the minds of all the people of Afghanistan? Therefore I now expect from the great civilized English Government that they

1032
141071

will well weigh the several arguments I have adduced in conversations and discussions, and quotations I have made from papers and documents, as well as what I have said on the head of the customary usage and the impracticability of this proposal, owing to the views of the people of Afghanistan and the actual condition of their country, in order that they may arrive at a just and correct opinion as to who has the right on his side and what is best. And I beg that the English Government will not raise a question which will abrogate the former treaties and agreements, and the past usage, in order that the friendship should continue strong on the same footing as hitherto.

Enclosure 44 in No. 36.

Meeting between Sir LEWIS PELLY, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and SYUD NOOR MAHOMED SHAH, Sadr-i-Azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at noon of the 15th February 1877.

PRESENT:

Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul.
Dr. W. H. Bellew, C.S.I., Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly.
Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at the Court of Cabul.
Mir Akbor Ahmed Khan, deputed by the Ameer of Cabul.
Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary to the Cabul Envoy.

SIR Lewis Pelly commenced by saying—I assure the Envoy of the close attention I have paid to all he has been so good as to state, and that what has fallen from his lips appears to me to strengthen a conviction at which the Viceroy has long ago deliberately arrived, viz., of the necessity which existed for frank, confidential, and personal explanations between the two Governments, in view to removing misapprehensions concerning the past and as to the nature of the Viceroy's own intentions for the future. An opportunity for these explanations has happily now been found in our present meeting, and I would premise that the motive of the Viceroy in desiring, by means of this Conference, to arrive at a satisfactory understanding is, not to interfere in Afghanistan, but to avert the danger of future interference by others; and Sir Lewis Pelly continued—In handing to the Envoy some extracts from the records of the Government of India, my object was, not to enter into controversy concerning the past, but to prove to the Ameer the careful consideration which the Viceroy has accorded to the wishes of His Highness (as recorded in those extracts) for a formal and permanent alliance of a defensive-offensive and dynastic character. It is clear to the Viceroy that one of the causes which has led to a diminution of the confidence and satisfaction evinced by the Ameer on the occasion of his visiting the late Lord Mayo at Umballa is to be found in the fact that the British Government, both then and subsequently in 1873, deemed it premature and otherwise inexpedient to comply with the above-mentioned wishes of the Ameer, and declined to commit itself to any engagement. Another cause of mutual misapprehension has been the want of frequent, cordial, and confidential communications between the two Governments. The Envoy's recapitulation of the Ameer's real grievances and anxieties, and of what has happened in past times, shows that His Highness has for years been more or less estranged from the British Indian Government, on grounds which have only recently come to the knowledge of the present Viceroy, and which would probably have been prevented by a better knowledge of the Ameer's feelings. It is, in the opinion of the Viceroy, certain that, had an intelligent British Officer been in direct personal communication with the Ameer, many of the alleged causes of His Highness's grievances and consequent resentment could not have taken place. Referring further to the Ameer's real grievances,* which the Envoy had alluded to in a friendly and unofficial manner, and had properly explained to be apart from the subject of the proposed negotiation, I felt no hesitation in declaring myself quite willing to listen to the Envoy's enumeration of these, because I am aware that the Viceroy has always wished to be thoroughly informed of His

* *Vide* the Envoy's remarks on the Seistan Commission. The intervention in the case of Yakub Khan. The affair of Colonel Gordon and the Yarkand Mission. The appearance of Colonel Valentine Baker on the Afghan Frontier.

Highness's real views, desires, and requests on all matters affecting their common interests.

Again I acceded to the Envoy's request that his statement of grievances might be made *ex parte* and without reply, not through lack of argument and other opposing matter for a reply, but I refrain from controversy upon past affairs.

Sir Lewis Pelly proceeded—The Viceroy, having given every practicable consideration to the circumstances of the past relations between the two Governments, and having carefully studied the position of the Ameer in relation to the existing political situation in Central Asia—a situation which shows that the integrity and independence of Afghanistan and the consolidation of the Ameer's rule may ere long be imperilled—deems it equitable, and for the common interest of both Governments, that he should inform the Ameer of his willingness to accord him (the Ameer) open and active support against his danger of interference from without.

The Viceroy further desires that this concession should be unaccompanied by any demands on his part whatsoever, or by any conditions other than such as are reasonable in themselves, or plainly necessary to enable him to fulfil the obligations which he would undertake in ratifying a Treaty of the contemplated character. That among these conditions is one which is so obviously essential to

the proposed undertaking that it would be futile to open negotiations except this condition should be agreed upon as a preliminary, viz., the admission on the part of the Ameer of the principle that the British Government shall be allowed to station British Agents on the frontiers, which this Government undertakes to aid in defending; for it is manifest that the Viceroy could not pretend to protect those frontiers except he should be enabled to collect, through his own responsible Agents, timely intelligence of what might be passing on or beyond them, and so prepare himself for meeting contingencies, and for explaining to Her Majesty's Government, from independent, unprejudiced, and official sources, the facts of any alleged aggression, and the necessity which existed for repelling the same.

In insisting, however, on the admission of this principle as a *sine quâ non* to the opening of negotiation, the Viceroy has no wish or intention unnecessarily to embarrass the Ameer in the exercise of it, and would therefore leave the settlement of the details for giving effect to this principle to be arranged in the present Conference.

As regards the Treaty of 1855. The Envoy has declared that the Ameer holds it to be still valid, and adheres to its terms. The Viceroy also admits this Treaty to be still in force, and on his part will, in the absence of a revised Treaty, observe its terms. But I would remind the Envoy that the first article of this Treaty provides for perpetual friendship, which between States implies good neighbourhood, and that the third and last article of the same Treaty binds the Government of the Ameer to join the British Government in war with any other power, but does not, in any manner or degree, bind the British Government to aid the Ameer against his enemies, whether foreign or domestic. Finally, said Sir Lewis Pelly, the Viceroy, in now offering to enter into the proposed formal public engagement, concedes what he believes the Ameer to have heretofore wished or requested, and evidences, to the utmost of his power, his sincere desire for cordial and intimate relations with the Government of Afghanistan. It now rests with the Ameer, through you, His Highness's Envoy Plenipotentiary, either to meet the Viceroy in the trusting spirit he displayed at Umballa in 1869, and accord to the Viceroy the means of affording the Government of Afghanistan open and active support, or else to reject the advantages offered.

But, in the most friendly manner, I beg the Envoy to understand that, if the Ameer reject all we offer and all we ask, and no basis of negotiation is left, the Viceroy, while observing the terms of the Treaty of 1855,* will decline to support the Ameer and his dynasty in any troubles, internal or external, and their unknown consequences, and will continue to strengthen the frontier of British India without further reference to the Ameer, in order to provide against probable contingencies.

* The Envoy at this point interrupted, and wished Sir Lewis Pelly to alter the wording of his remarks in view to specifying more clearly what was meant by strengthening the frontier, and in view also to showing that the Treaty of 1857 was referred to as well as that of 1855. The Cabul Envoy then with great emphasis repeatedly declared the Ameer adheres to the Treaty of 1857 as well as to that of 1855. Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that the Articles of Agreement of 1857 did not supersede, but confirmed, the Treaty of 1855. Sir Lewis Pelly declined to alter the wording of his remarks, but said that when he had concluded he would be happy to reply to the Cabul Envoy's questions on the above subject.

As the question, now immediately under discussion, relates only to the admission of the principle that British Agents shall be permitted to reside on the Afghanistan frontiers, my remarks have been confined to this subject, taken in connexion with the question of frontier defence. But I need not assure the Envoy that, should this principle be admitted, I shall be happy to discuss, in the most friendly and fair manner, the details of a formal agreement under which the British Government would bind itself, not only to a defensive-offensive alliance, but to the public recognition of the Ameer's heir, and to affording His Highness support against factious disturbance within.

Sir Lewis Pelly here concluded his remarks. On this, the Cabul Envoy observed that he did not understand what was meant by strengthening the frontier of India without further reference to the Ameer.

Sir Lewis Pelly said in reply—The Viceroy will take such measures as he may deem wise and lawful for strengthening the frontier of British India and providing for the safety and repose of that empire; and this without communication with the Ameer.

The Cabul Envoy on this asked—In regard to the strengthening of the frontier of British India, without reference to the Ameer, which you have alluded to, I would ask—Does this mean, within the territories of the Ameer of Afghanistan, or otherwise?

I have already stated, Sir Lewis Pelly replied, that the object of the present Conference is not to interfere with Afghanistan.

I have also stated that the Viceroy will observe the terms of the Treaty of 1855, even if the proposed negotiation do not have place.

I now repeat that the Viceroy has no intention of interfering with the jurisdiction of the Ameer in any territory where we have recognized that jurisdiction. The Cabul Envoy here remarked that he would give his definite answer on the Agency clause on Monday, 19th instant. The meeting then closed.

Enclosure 45 in No. 36. (Extract.)

Meeting between Sir LEWIS PELLY, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and SYUD NOOR MAHOMED SHAH, Sadr-i-Azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at noon of the 19th February 1877.

PRESENT:

Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
 Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul.
 Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly.
 Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at the Court of Cabul.
 Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, deputed by Ameer of Cabul.
 Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary to Cabul Envoy.

Sir Lewis Pelly commenced by saying that, in accordance with the arrangement made between the Cabul Envoy and himself on the 5th instant, the Cabul Envoy had made his statement concerning the past, and Sir Lewis Pelly had offered his remarks thereon. Sir Lewis Pelly would now, in accordance with the above-mentioned arrangement, request the favour of the Cabul Envoy affording him a definite reply as to whether the Ameer still adheres to, or withdraws from, the assurance given to the Viceroy by His Highness, to the effect that he agrees to the principle of British Agents being allowed to reside on the Afghan frontiers, in view to the protection of those frontiers by observing and reporting the events that may have place on or beyond those frontiers.

The Cabul Envoy here said that, in accordance with what he said on Monday to the effect that, had the Ameer seen any advantage to the two sides from this difficult proposal and consented to it, there would have been no necessity for all this discussion, but that he would to-day in this meeting finish all he had to say on the matter, and give his definite reply to the question put by Sir Lewis Pelly; but, if it were not considered so by Sir Lewis Pelly, he was present to hear what he might have to say. He then proceeded to say—

I beg to say that, since it is the hearty desire of both sides that the misunderstandings connected with past matters, and also connected with the explanation of the wishes of his Excellency the Viceroy, should be removed, it affords room for hope and pleasure, because the true state of affairs, being understood by both sides, will be based upon the firmness of the old friendship. His Excellency the Viceroy especially should be well informed as to the true state of affairs in Afghanistan, and he should kindly pay attention to them as to what degree and of what kind his power is in a matter which is impossible.

As to the matter of the past, I have explained them in these meetings of some days past. There is no need for repetition. It is a matter which has been disposed of. It will be for both sides to act on that footing. And as to the future, that also I have explained with sundry quotations during the seven conferences of the month of Mohurram 1294 H. (corresponding with 17th January to 16th February 1877). You will through them have been informed of the state of the case. Notwithstanding that the explanation of the condition of Afghanistan was made, especially in the conference of the 27th of that month (corresponding with 12th February 1877), it will be again clearly and confidentially made known in the contents of these following paragraphs.

I beg to state that it was the cordial desire of His Highness the Ameer that in these friendly and confidential conferences at Peshawar the discussion together should be with sincerity of purpose, so that, in accordance with the tenor of past writings, no doubt should remain on any matter on either side. And its object was this, that the usual friendship should remain firm on the former footing.

As to what has been written in the matter of non-interference in Afghanistan, it is certain that the British Government will never in any manner interfere in such manner as to cause an anxiety in the mind of His Highness the Ameer, or his successor; or to shake the independence of Afghanistan.

As to the matter of removing the danger of future interference by others; in this matter the Government of Afghanistan is rendered without want by the successive writings of Lord Mayo and of Von Kauffmann, the Russian Governor-General in Tashkend, who wrote in the first letter; and this is a summary of one of its paragraphs, viz., "there will be lasting peace and friendship between us and you. I have no intention to interfere or meddle with the Government of the Afghans." Further, Lord Mayo repeatedly gave a general confirmation to his papers, especially this first paper of his, which he expressly and wholly confirmed; and His Highness the Ameer forwarded his reply to it in accordance with the advice of the above-named Lord.

Lord Northbrook also confirmed those papers, and, in accordance with the writings of Lord Granville and Prince Gortchakoff, which he gave me at Simla, thoroughly reassured me upon them. On the 6th September 1873 he wrote to His Highness the Ameer, and the following is an extract from that letter;—"The Russian Government has expressed that it considers all the territories in the possession of that kind friend to be the property of Afghanistan; and Prince Gortchakoff has expressed to the Prime Minister of Her Majesty the Queen that the Emperor of Russia does not consider Afghanistan to be amongst those territories in which the counsel of the Russian Government would have effect." And this also, "no kind of interference and meddling which can be the cause of injury to the independence of Afghanistan is even thought of."

Lord Northbrook also wrote—"The Government of Russia has asserted that it has accepted the boundaries of the territories of that kind friend such as they were specified in the letter of Lord Granville, dated 17th October 1872." He also wrote to the effect that the Ameer should rest assured of peace and prosperity, and that he need fear no kind of aggression, or interference, in the territories mentioned in the aforesaid letter of Lord Granville. "The Russian Government," he wrote, "has taken upon itself the responsibility of restraining the tribes which are under the influence

“ of its counsel from aggression upon the territories of that kind friend, such as their limits were defined in the afore-mentioned letter of Lord Granville.”

Lord Northbrook also wrote to the effect that the Ameer should adopt the chief object mentioned in the letter of Lord Granville. And that chief object was this, that in the States of Central Asia, as regards relations with him, peace and tranquillity should subsist between them, and that in future there should be no aggression from one side of the specified frontier to the other. He also wrote to the effect that the result of correspondence which had passed between the Governments of Russia and England was to strengthen Afghanistan, and to remove all fears and dangers which were apprehended from without; and he assured the Ameer that he need have no misgivings as to external danger to his territories, and could, with leisure and security, devote himself to the internal advancement and organization of his territories.

Therefore the authorities of the Government of Afghanistan have the most perfect confidence that there can be no deviation from the tenor of these writings, which have been briefly mentioned, in respect to the peace and tranquillity and lasting friendship of the States, in accordance with the reply of His Highness the Ameer to the letter of Lord Northbrook of the 6th September 1873. If there should be a want of confidence in the substance of these successive writings approved by Governments, or the probability of a causeless want of confidence in them becoming a reason for displeasure to the Governments, what propriety is there in this? It is far from the welfare of States if there should be the possibility of objection to the promises made by such religious Governments and such Ministers and Viceroys. If the authorities of the Government of Afghanistan were, without cause, to think there was the probability of objection to the treaties and agreements they have in their hands, it would undoubtedly be contrary to confidence and amity and friendship.

As on the first day of our conference the discussion commenced with the subject of the misapprehensions in the mind of the Ameer prior to the arrival of the present Viceroy, and extracts were quoted in support thereof from the records of the meeting at Umballa and conversations at Lahore and Simla, it is necessary that I (should) now explain the matter. In the conferences of the 8th and 10th of February I explained this matter with proofs in support of my words, and disposed of the wishes of the Ameer. Those same arguments are now applicable, and need not be repeated.

As to what was said in respect to the probability of the misapprehension of the Ameer not having occurred had the Viceroy had better knowledge of the views of His Highness. From my statements of the 10th and 12th February it is clear that whatever has occurred has been with knowledge, and not without knowledge. My object in these statements was this, that the authorities of the British Government should not show such inattention in the formalities of friendship to the rights of the Ameer; and, in conclusion, I explained the grounds of anxiety in such a difficult matter as the question now under discussion, the carrying out of which in Afghanistan is impossible and embarrassing. My object is this, that you should not throw such new causes for anxiety, not only into the mind of the Ameer, but upon the whole of Afghanistan.

As to what was said in reference to the external danger, I beg to observe that danger is of two kinds, internal and external; the internal danger owing to the residence of English officers on the frontiers, is apparent, and admits of no doubt. Matters would fall out in accordance with my description of the state of affairs in Afghanistan in the Conference of the 12th February. Therefore consider what will be the beginning, and what the end, of such a measure. As to external danger, as I have already shown to-day, I do not entertain its probability.

As to a new Treaty, I have said nothing, and, holding aloof, will say nothing. I will discuss your special proposal and dispose of that.

In respect to the Treaty of 1855, which has been repeatedly mentioned, I beg to observe that I have made no mention of the Treaty of 1855. I have stated that the late Ameer and Lord Lawrence met and made a Treaty and Covenant. But, now that the subject of the Treaty has come before me, I beg to point out that the Treaty of 1855 was made with the late Sirdar Ghulam Hyder Khan, and the Treaty of 1857 by the late Ameer himself with Lord Lawrence. Further, the last letter of Lord Lawrence in 1868 was sent to the Ameer by way of a written (*wasica*) authority, and the subsequent conversations with Sir D. Macleod, Lieutenant-Governor of Lahore, were in accordance with it; as also were the documents of Lord Mayo from Umballa in 1869, and the papers of Lord Northbrook from Simla, including the last letter at the time of his departure, together with other State papers which I have already referred to to-day. These are all connected one with the other; they are not separate, they are one. Of course, the tenor of all these will be attended to. If there be want of acknowledgment, and want of regard to the tenor of one of them, it will undoubtedly be the cause for want of acknowledgment and want of regard to the whole of them.

With special reference to the Treaty of 1857 which the late Ameer made with Lord Lawrence: Inasmuch as the condition of Afghanistan was thoroughly well known to Lord Lawrence, he bound himself, in the 7th Article of that Treaty, that the British Government might maintain an Agent at Cabul on the part of the English Government, but he was not to be an Englishman. The Government of Afghanistan will never in any manner consent to acknowledge the abrogation of this article.

With reference to the desire of his Excellency the Viceroy for cordial and intimate relations with the Government of Afghanistan, and that it now rests with His Highness the Ameer, in the trusting spirit he displayed at Umballa in 1869, to be in accord with the Viceroy, I beg to enquire what has occurred contrary to that trusting spirit of Umballa in communications and State observances. The Ameer is, with sincerity of purpose, in accord with his Excellency the Viceroy, in accordance with those communications and the former course. And, as to according his Excellency the Viceroy a “means,” I beg to say that no better means exist than those of the past, which formerly, in the time of perplexity, and subsequently up to the present time, have produced sincerity and good deeds

from time to time. If I were to mention them in detail, it would prolong our discussion; but if you wish me to do so, I will describe them.

The Ameer has always received the praise and approval of past Viceroys on account of those of his good deeds, as is manifest in their letters to him. Her Majesty the Queen has also given her approval to them. How then can he now hope to accord a new means which is not in his power?

As to rejecting of advantages, has anybody ever rejected his own advantages? As to the cordial desire of his Excellency the Viceroy for the advantages of the Ameer, it is based upon such new and hard conditions, especially the residence of British officers upon the frontiers, which of itself is clearly a cause for the rejection of his proposed advantages, that there is no need for the Ameer to reject them. As to the admission of this principle of the residence of British officers on the frontiers, which has been repeatedly brought forward, although I have distinctly explained the matter in my description of the condition of Afghanistan in the Conference of the 12th February, I would now beg to observe as follows:—His Excellency the Viceroy will, of course, through your agency, consider the whole of the quotations I have made in these conferences from beginning to end. First, he will consider the treaties and agreements and writings, from time to time, without rejection. Second, the assurances of the Government, which I have adduced this day in the commencement of this statement, to the effect that the probability of external danger had been removed. Third, he will, under the conditions of Afghanistan, consider this chief proposal of the British Government is difficult. Inasmuch as this chief proposal, owing to successive causes, is impossible, I will again refer to documents. And first, to the letter of his Excellency the Viceroy to the address of His Highness the Ameer, dated 11th October 1876, which was sent by hand of the British Agent. In that letter it is stated to the effect that, when the British Government takes upon itself weighty matters on behalf of the Ameer, the Ameer will, for facilitating these weighty matters, acquiesce in whatever the above-mentioned Agent, bearer of the letter, may explain to him; and, in the absence of this, the English Government will not be able to carry out the matters mentioned. Further, you yourself, in the discussion of the first day's conference, stated, and have repeated on various occasions in these conferences, that, unless His Highness the Ameer accepted this principle of the residence of English officers on the frontiers of Afghanistan, it was not possible for the English Government to take upon itself the responsibility of aiding to repel an external enemy. It was further stated that his Excellency the Viceroy has no wish or desire to embarrass the Ameer in the matter of carrying out this proposal for the residence of English officers on the frontiers of Afghanistan. I beg to assure you that it is a matter of satisfaction, and enough of hope, to the Ameer, that His Highness the Ameer has withdrawn from this source of embarrassment. He has, therefore, no weighty matter to anew present before the English Government; nor does he put upon the English Government the responsibility of assistance to repel an internal enemy; nor has he entrusted the protection of those frontiers from an external enemy to the English Government; nor has he the power to consent to so difficult a matter, the result of which will be nothing but reproach to the Ameer himself, because the territories of Afghanistan have not in themselves the power to endure such a measure as the residence of British officers in their frontiers.

Therefore I earnestly hope, for the welfare of the two Governments, that his Excellency the Viceroy, through your good offices, will, with great frankness and sincerity of purpose, act in conformity with the course of past Viceroys, and that by means of his own good acts the relations of friendship and unity may be increased.

As to what was said in reference to no basis being left for negotiation, I beg to observe, in a friendly and frank manner, that the basis which has been laid for you by the wise arrangements of previous Councillors and Ministers of Her Majesty the Queen of England in London, of Her Viceroys in India, after mature deliberation and thought, from time to time, during the course of all these past years, and has been approved of by Her Majesty the Queen, still exists. Friendship has remained firm upon it since a very long time, and the previous Viceroys have written their praise and commendation to His Highness the Ameer for his worthy acts. What matter then has appeared, which is contrary to the tenor of past written communications, that there should be now no basis left for negotiation?

The Government of Afghanistan is certain that the British Government, of its own perfect honesty, will continue constant and stable to that firm basis.

The Cabul Envoy having finished his reply, Sir Lewis Pelly commenced.

Then the Envoy declines the *sine qua non* preliminary. As I have already said, I decline to leave the point immediately before us, and go into controversy. But, since the Envoy has stated that the Ameer has always adhered to the terms of the old Treaty, I would ask the Envoy whether he considers the repeated refusal of the Ameer to receive temporary and special friendly missions, the rejection even of British Agents, the absolute and permanent closing of Afghanistan against British subjects and their trade, and the denial to an English traveller of passage towards British India, are acts of friendship and good neighbourhood, or consonant with the spirit of the first article of the Treaty still subsisting? Or does the Envoy suppose that there is any other potentate, claiming to observe civilized treaty relations, who would venture thus to treat Englishmen?

Again, the Envoy has stated to the effect that letters received from Von Kauffmann, the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend, have removed all need for fear as respects Russia. And, in making this statement, the Envoy has doubtless afforded what he may deem to be adequate consideration to the events of the past three years in the direction of Khiva, Bokhara, Khokand, and the Turcoman border. Nor can the Envoy have forgotten the representation which the Ameer has heretofore made to the British Government of India as to his apprehensions of Russian aggressions. But all these matters are for the judgment of the Afghan Government. England has no reason to fear Russia.

In conclusion, the Envoy Plenipotentiary on behalf of His Highness the Ameer of Cabul having declined to admit the principle that British Agents shall be allowed to reside on the frontiers of

Afghanistan for the purposes already mentioned by me, I have no powers or authority to open negotiations. I am willing, however, as requested by the Envoy, to refer what he has said to the Viceroy, and to await his Excellency's written reply. But in the meantime the commencement of negotiations must be postponed, and I feel bound to tell the Envoy that, in my opinion, there is no probability of the British Government agreeing to negotiate on any basis other than that to which my powers have already been confined; and I fear that the Ameer has missed an opportunity, which may never recur, of greatly strengthening his position.

The Cabul Envoy, having heard the remarks of Sir Lewis Pelly, begged that all he had said to-day might be submitted to the Viceroy at Calcutta, and his Excellency's written reply be awaited, on receipt of which the Envoy would point out what he thought expedient or inexpedient in his Lordship's decision, and then, either himself give a definite reply, or, if he should be unable to do so, would refer to the Ameer for further instructions.

Proceedings for the day then closed.

Enclosure 46 in No 36. (Extract.)

Dated 15th March 1877.

From Sir LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I., to H. E. SYUD NOOR MAHOMED SHAH.

At our last conference on the 19th February, your Excellency expressed a wish that I would submit all you had stated to the Viceroy at Calcutta, and await his Excellency's written reply, on receipt of which you would point out what you thought expedient or inexpedient in his Lordship's decision, and then give a definite reply, or, if you should be unable to do so, would refer to His Highness the Ameer for further instructions.

I lost no time in submitting your Excellency's statement to his Excellency the Viceroy, who read it with interest and attention, and authorized me, by telegraph, to express to your Excellency his thanks for the care you had taken to explain fully the views and feelings of the Ameer in regard to the relations between His Highness and the British Government.

Your Excellency's ill condition of health deprived me of the pleasure of communicating to you, in person, the Viceroy's agreeable telegram, and I, therefore, transmitted it to you through the Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan.

I have now received from his Excellency the Viceroy the written instructions which we have been awaiting, and, learning with the most sincere regret that your Excellency's health continues to be so impaired as to render it impossible for you to meet me in conference, I am reduced to communicating by letter.

The Viceroy understands that, before entering into any practical negotiations, you desire to be made acquainted with the general impressions left in the mind of the Viceroy by a perusal of your above-mentioned statement, and I am instructed to comply with this wish.

Your Excellency's statement appears to the Viceroy virtually to consist of two parts, one of which refers to the past, the other to the present.

The first is not susceptible of discussion with a view to any practical result, since it relates exclusively to events which cannot be recalled. I sincerely regret to learn by it that the Ameer has been for years secretly harbouring in his mind a sentiment of resentment towards the British Government in consequence of three or four incidents in the conduct of its relations with His Highness, which caused him, at the time of their unnoticed occurrence, feelings of annoyance, only now for the first time made known to the Viceroy. The Viceroy is confident that the causes of annoyance enumerated by your Excellency were not occasioned by any deliberate or intentional, or even conscious, disregard of the Ameer's feelings on the part of the British Government. His Excellency has no doubt whatever that most of them might, and would, have been prevented by the presence of a discreet and intelligent British officer at Cabul, had such an officer been admitted to that unrestricted intercourse with the Government of His Highness which an experience tested by centuries, and gratefully acknowledged by every civilised State in the world, has proved to be the only practical means of maintaining amicable and mutually advantageous relations between neighbouring States. Such States must always have many interests in common, on which misunderstandings can hardly fail to arise if their Governments have no adequately confidential and authoritative medium of communication with each other.

The impression, therefore, which the Viceroy derives from his perusal of the first portion of your Excellency's statement greatly increases his regret that the Ameer should still feel himself precluded, by the rude and stationary condition in which Afghanistan has remained under the administration of His Highness, from receiving a British Envoy at his Court, and thereby placing his relations with the British Government on a footing commensurate with the rank and dignity which, were it possible, the British Government would willingly accord to the Ruler of Afghanistan in the international hierarchy of those States with which the Government of the British Empire maintains diplomatic relations. As, however, the objections entertained by the Ameer to any such arrangement have always been represented to the British Government as invincible, as the practical impediments to it, which, in the time of His Highness's father, were occasioned by the then unsettled and turbulent condition of the Afghan population and the comparative weakness of the sovereign power, appear to have increased rather than diminished under the reign of His Highness, and as the British Government has most certainly no desire or intention whatever to urge upon the Ameer the adoption of this, or

any other, arrangement which His Highness does not spontaneously and cordially recognise to be conducive to his own advantage and that of his dominions, it is useless to dwell on the considerations suggested by the first portion of your Excellency's statement, since the only practical conclusion to which it points is one which the Ameer has no disposition to accept and which the British Government has no desire to force on his unwilling acceptance.

His Excellency the Viceroy turns, therefore, to the consideration of the second portion of your Excellency's statement. But, in doing so, he must confess that he experiences the greatest difficulty in understanding the real drift and purport of it; which, he trusts, he may have misapprehended. So far as he does understand it, it seems to amount to this,—that the Ameer, although dissatisfied by the result of his relations with the British Government up to the present moment, is equally dissatisfied with all the proposals the British Government has now spontaneously made for the improvement of them; whilst, at the same time, he has, on his part, no counter-proposals to make for the attainment of that result. If this be indeed the case, there is, so far as the Viceroy can judge, no basis left for negotiation between us. In the proposals it has already made through Atta Mahomed, and for the negotiation of which the Viceroy understood the Ameer's Minister to be appointed with full powers, but which he has hitherto declined to discuss, the British Government went to the utmost limit of concession and proffered aid, in order to prove the sincerity of its goodwill. If, therefore, those proposals be rejected unconditionally, or entertained only on conditions obviously inadmissible, the British Government shall have no choice but to regard His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali of Cabul henceforth as a neighbour with whom its relations are neither satisfactory nor susceptible of improvement.

Your Excellency's language, however, leaves the Viceroy somewhat in doubt whether the objections you urge on the part of the Ameer have reference to the arrangements His Highness was authorised to rely upon our willingness to agree to, and even to propose, were the British Government assured that they would be agreeable to himself; or only to a proposal which he apparently supposes the British Government likely to urge on his acceptance, although it has never given him any ground for such a supposition. Your Excellency has laid so much stress on the 7th clause of the Treaty of 1857, which has nothing whatever to do with the matters now under consideration, and has taken so many pains to explain the various reasons why the Ameer still declines to receive a resident British Officer at Cabul, whilst at the same time you have so carefully avoided all reference to the reception of British Officers in other parts of Afghanistan, that the Viceroy knows not whether he is to understand your statement as a refusal to entertain any proposal for the residence of British Officers, for certain purposes, on certain points of the Afghan frontier, or merely as a refusal to re-open the question, which the British Government has never desired or attempted to re-open, of appointing a British Officer to reside at Cabul. The British Government does not propose the appointment of a resident British Officer at Cabul; and the reason is, that it has never had any cause to anticipate that such an arrangement would be agreeable to the Ameer, whose appreciation of his own interests the British Government is not concerned to contest or discuss so long as it involves no aggression upon the interests of the British Empire. The Viceroy has, however, intimated to the Ameer his willingness to discuss with His Highness the terms of a definite Treaty of Alliance involving the appointment of competent officers in other parts of Afghanistan, to aid both His Highness and the British Government in watching the progress of events which the Ameer has repeatedly represented as sources of alarm to him; and the reason is, that many previous utterances, on the part both of the present Ameer and of His Highness's father, had induced the British Government to believe that the advantages of such an arrangement would be cordially welcomed and gratefully appreciated by his Highness. If, as your Excellency's language tends to imply, this belief was entirely erroneous, there is an immediate end of the matter; for the British Government has not the slightest desire to urge upon an unwilling neighbour an arrangement so extremely onerous to itself. As, however, your Excellency, whilst elaborately answering a proposal which the British Government has not made, and which you had no right to attribute to it, have left altogether unnoticed those proposals, which are the only ones your Excellency is authorized to discuss, I am therefore instructed by his Excellency the Viceroy to request your Excellency to state distinctly and promptly whether he is to understand that the Ameer does not now desire the alliance of the British Government, and that His Highness refuses to receive British Officers in any part of Afghanistan. For a plain answer to this plain question no further reference to Cabul is needed, or can be awaited.

Your Excellency expressed a desire to discuss with me the expediency or in expediency of the conclusion arrived at by the Viceroy after perusal of your Excellency's statement. But the Viceroy does not permit any such superfluous criticism. The Ameer was afforded ample time and opportunity to consider the expediency or in expediency of the Viceroy's conclusions (which the Envoy's statement leaves unaltered) before he accepted them as a basis of negotiation. He cannot discuss this now. In the communications made by the Viceroy to His Highness from Simla in the month of October last, the Ameer was distinctly informed that, unless he was prepared to recognize in principle the expediency of appointing British Officers to reside on certain parts of the Afghan frontier, it would be useless to appoint Envoys for the negotiation of a Treaty entirely conditional upon that arrangement. His Highness was at the same time earnestly requested to consider very carefully the expediency of the proposal then made to him, before committing himself to a decision. He did take many weeks to consider it; when, after having thus deliberately considered it, he appointed his Minister to negotiate with me the best means of carrying it out, the Viceroy was entitled to assume, as he naturally did assume, that the principle clearly explained by him to be the only possible basis on his part had been duly and fully accepted by His Highness, and that the expediency of carrying it out was no longer open to discussion. Your Excellency's present ignoring of the past

recognition of that principle, and attempting to discuss the expediency of it as an open question, is a breach of the understanding on which the Viceroy agreed to receive you as the Ameer's representative in this negotiation.

If, however, as would seem to be the case, the Ameer, influenced by circumstances or considerations still unknown to the Viceroy, has completely changed his mind since he entered upon the negotiation (which, in its present form, was originated by His Highness), the very last thing desired or attempted by the British Government would be to pin His Highness pedantically to the fulfilment of an understanding from which he now wishes to withdraw, or the adoption of an arrangement which he does not regard with satisfaction. So far from wishing to urge upon his reluctant consideration the expediency of British Officers being appointed to assist him in the defence of his frontiers, I am to inform your Excellency that the proposal of this arrangement was regarded by the British Government as a great concession; and that the British Government will most assuredly not allow its officers to undertake duties on behalf of Afghanistan involving a residence in any part of that country, unless their presence there is specially invited and cordially welcomed by the Ruler of it, whoever he may be, and their personal safety and comfort solemnly guaranteed by the same authority. Therefore, if the Ameer has made up his mind that he has no reason to desire a definite alliance with the British Government on the above-mentioned basis, it only remains for your Excellency to say so plainly and without hesitation.

I desire to make your Excellency clearly understand that you need be under no apprehension of any disposition on the part of the British Government to urge upon the consideration of the Ameer proposals which His Highness is not disposed to accept, on behalf of arrangements which could have no possible value in the Viceroy's eyes without the cordial concurrence of His Highness; and to which indeed nothing less than the complete assurance of the Ameer's loyal appreciation of their generosity could ever reconcile the British Government. The Viceroy observes that your Excellency has incidentally referred to existing Treaties as an alternative basis of negotiation. I am to point out to you that these existing Treaties have long ago been negotiated and concluded, and, not having been since then disputed by either party to them, afford no basis whatever for further negotiation. When the Viceroy agreed to the Ameer's proposal that His Highness, who had declined to receive a British Envoy on Afghan territory, should appoint an Afghan Envoy, with full powers, to meet the Viceroy's representative on British territory, it was not for the discussion of old contracts, but for the preparation of new ones.

If, therefore, the Ameer has no desire whatever to place his relations with the British Government on a new and better footing, there is nothing left to propose or discuss; and, in that case, the two Governments will, in accordance with the wishes of His Highness, revert to their previous relative positions. But those relative positions appear to be so completely misapprehended by the Ameer, and they have been so erroneously described by your Excellency, that I must point out to you very plainly, and, if possible, remove from your mind, the dangerous misconception by which much of your language to me on this subject appears to have been strongly influenced.

Your Excellency's contention is that the British Government is already bound, by its existing engagements with the Ameer, to support and defend His Highness against any foreign or domestic enemy; and that consequently the Ameer has nothing to gain by a Treaty of Alliance which, so far as the British Government is concerned, would be a mere re-statement of the obligations it has already contracted on his behalf, whilst, so far as His Highness is concerned, it would impose upon him obligations altogether new.

This is, I think, a fair summary of your Excellency's argument: and the argument would be perfectly sound if its premises were true. But, unfortunately for the Ameer, they are fundamentally erroneous. The only obligations ever contracted on behalf of each other by the British Government and the Barakzai Rulers of Afghanistan are embodied in two Treaties, of which the first was signed in 1855 and the second in 1857. The second of these two Treaties was contracted for a special and limited purpose, and with exclusive reference to an occasion which has long since passed away. This second Treaty, therefore, belongs to the class of Treaties known as transitory Treaties; and on both sides the obligations contracted by it have lapsed, as a matter of course, with the lapse of time. The first of the two Treaties, however, clearly belongs to the class of Treaties called perpetual. The obligations embodied in it were contracted with general reference to the permanent relations between the two Governments; and on each of the contracting parties those obligations still remain binding.

The Treaty of 1855 contains only three articles. The first stipulates that there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the East India Company (to whose Treaty rights and obligations the British Government has succeeded) and the Ameer of Cabul, his heirs and successors. The second binds the British Government to respect the territories possessed by the Ameer at the time when the Treaty was signed, that is to say in 1855, and not to interfere with them. The third article binds the Ameer, his heirs and successors, not only to respect the territories of the British Government, but also to be the friend of its friends, and the enemy of its enemies. It is to be observed that this Treaty contains no corresponding obligation on the part of the British Government. The British Government is not without cause to complain that the Ameer's conduct of late years has been inconsistent with the obligations contracted by the Government of His Highness under the terms of Article I of this Treaty of 1855. Friendship between neighbouring States does not necessarily involve liabilities on the part of either State to furnish the other with material assistance; but it does necessarily involve the uninterrupted maintenance of friendly intercourse, and the fairly reciprocal recognition and discharge of all the customary duties of good neighbourhood.

Now, not only are all the territories of the British Government freely open at all times to all the subjects of the Ameer, but His Highness has received from the British Government repeated gifts of

arms and of money, as well as a consistent moral support both at home and abroad, *e.g.*, since 1868-69 the British Government has given to His Highness 12 guns, 21,400 rifles, 11,000 muskets, 1,200 carbines, 1,000 pistols, and a quarter of a million of money. In return for these advantages to His Highness, what has the British Government received from the Ameer? The territories of His Highness have been, and continue to be, inhospitably closed to all the subjects of the British Government, with whom the Ameer forbids his own subjects to hold any kind of friendly intercourse. Trade, traffic, travel, all the customary bonds of union between neighbouring and friendly States, have been systematically discouraged and practically prohibited to British subjects in Afghanistan by His Highness.

The Ameer has refused permission to the Envoy of the British Government, bound on a peaceful mission to another neighbouring State, to pass through his territory; and the determination of His Highness to withhold from the British Government all such natural good offices has been conveyed to it in terms scarcely consistent with courtesy, and certainly not consistent with friendship. Colonel Macdonald, a British subject, was barbarously murdered on the borders of the Ameer's territory by a person subject to the authority of the Ameer, and for whose punishment His Highness was, therefore, responsible. But, instead of cordially and efficiently co-operating to avenge this crime, the Ameer has allowed the murderer to remain at large. The Viceroy forbears to dwell upon the Ameer's discourtesy in leaving wholly unanswered the proposal made to His Highness by the late Viceroy for the demarcation of his boundaries, in refusing to receive a complimentary mission from the present Viceroy, and in taking no notice whatever of the very friendly invitation to Delhi which was subsequently addressed to His Highness. More serious grounds of complaint exist in the fact that the closing of the Khyber Pass for the last two years appears to be mainly attributable to the unfriendly influence of the Ameer; that His Highness has openly received at Cabul in an authoritative manner, and subsidised, the heads of frontier tribes who are in the pay and under the control of the British Government; that he has, for some time past, been speaking and acting in such a manner as to indicate hostile designs upon territories beyond his own, and in the neighbourhood of the British frontier; and that, even since the commencement of the present negotiations, he has been openly and actively endeavouring to excite against the British Government the religious animosities of his own subjects and of the neighbouring tribes by misrepresenting the policy, and maligning the character, of the British Government.

In short, the whole conduct and language of the Ameer during the last four years has been one chronic infraction, or evasion, of the first article of the Treaty of 1855. But this Treaty cannot be abrogated without the mutual consent of the two contracting parties to it; and, so long as it remains valid, the Ameer is legally bound by it to co-operate with the British Government, if called upon to do so, in attacking its enemies and defending its friends, although the Treaty does not place the British Government under any reciprocal obligation on behalf of the Ameer. His Highness indeed was so conscious of this fact, when he met the Earl of Mayo at Umballa, that he then vehemently complained of the Treaty of 1855 as "a one-sided Treaty," and earnestly solicited from the British Government a new Treaty based upon the terms which the present Viceroy was prepared to offer the Ameer in the month of October last.

It is clear, therefore, that, under the terms of the Treaty of 1855, the British Government has contracted no liabilities whatever on behalf of the Ameer.

I now turn to the consideration of the subsequent Treaty signed in 1857. This Treaty consists of thirteen articles. The first of them recites the circumstances arising out of the war then being waged between the British and Persian Governments, which induced the British Government to "agree, out of friendship, to give the Ameer" of Cabul one lakh of rupees monthly during the continuation of that war, upon certain conditions. The second, third, fourth, and fifth articles specify these conditions: whereby, in return for the pecuniary assistance guaranteed to him by Article I., the Ameer undertakes to maintain his army at a certain strength, to appoint and maintain a Vakeel at Peshawur, and to receive at Balkh, Cabul, Candahar, and other places in Afghanistan, British officers with suitable establishments, whose duty shall be to ensure the subsidy granted the Ameer being devoted to the purpose for which it was given. The sixth Article stipulates that this subsidy shall cease at the conclusion of the war between England and Persia, or at any previous date preferred by the British Government. The seventh Article, to which your Excellency has made special reference, stipulates that, on the cessation of the subsidy, the British officers shall be withdrawn from Afghanistan, but that the Ameer shall continue, during the pleasure of the British Government, not only to receive at Cabul a permanent resident Vakeel appointed by the British Government, but also to appoint and keep, on behalf of the Afghan Government, a permanent resident Vakeel at Peshawur. Your Excellency further stated that the Ameer has scrupulously adhered to the terms of this seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857; but, so far as the Viceroy is aware, His Highness has not for many years fulfilled the last-mentioned condition of the article. All the remaining articles of the Treaty refer exclusively either to the preceding stipulations, or else to special circumstances, considerations, and conditions occasioned by, and ceasing with, the war between England and Persia, which led to the signature of the Treaty of 1857.

The Viceroy would not have thought it worth while to say anything at all about this Treaty of 1857, if your Excellency had not laid such special stress upon its seventh article; which is indeed the only one of all its articles that has reference to the conduct of general relations between the two Governments. It is obvious, however, that no Treaty stipulation was required to oblige the British Government not to appoint a resident British officer at Cabul without the consent of the Ameer; for it is not practically in the power of one State to accredit a representative to the Court or Government of another without the consent of that Court or Government; nor could such an absurd idea

ever occur to the Government of any civilized Power. It is equally obvious that the seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857 was not intended to bind, and could not possibly bind, the Ameer never under any circumstances, or at any future time, to assent to the appointment of a resident British officer at Cabul; for such a stipulation would have been clearly inconsistent with the freedom and dignity of the two contracting Powers. It is, therefore, certain that there is in the seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857 absolutely nothing whatever to preclude the British Government from pointing out, at any time, to the Ameer the advantage, or propriety, of receiving a British officer as its permanent representative at Cabul, nor even from urging such an arrangement upon the consideration and adoption of His Highness in any fair and friendly manner. But it so happens that the British Government has not proposed, and does not propose, or intend to propose, that arrangement. Consequently, your Excellency's remarks on the Treaty of 1857 are not to the point, and need not be further noticed.

Now, these two Treaties, of 1855 and 1857, are the only ones which, up to the present moment, the British Government has ever contracted with the Barakzai Rulers of Afghanistan; and it is as clear as anything can be that neither the one nor the other imposes on the British Government, either directly or indirectly, the least obligation, or liability, whatever, to defend, protect, or support the Ameer, or the Ameer's dynasty, against any enemy, or any danger, foreign or domestic.

Your Excellency, however, appears to be under an impression that obligations and liabilities of this kind, though not contracted under any Treaty, have been none the less incurred by the British Government through certain written and verbal assurances received by the Ameer in 1869 from Lord Mayo, and by His Highness's Envoy in 1873 from Lord Northbrook. This impression is entirely erroneous; and I am, therefore, to examine in detail the facts and circumstances referred to by your Excellency in support of your assumption that the Ameer of Cabul has, at the present moment, any claim upon the unconditional support of the British Government.

The words referred to by your Excellency as having been addressed by Lord Mayo to the Ameer on the 31st of March 1869 were as follows:—

“Although, as already intimated to you, the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between that Government and your Highness have lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as Ruler of Cabul; and rekindle civil war; and it will further endeavour, from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor.”

Now, what were the circumstances in which these words were uttered? Only just established on a throne to which he had fought his way through a long and bloody civil war, the Ameer had come to Umballa, anxious for the support and protection of the British Government, and hopeful of obtaining from it a Treaty of Alliance. Disappointed in that hope, he eagerly sought the then Viceroy to give him some written assurance of the good-will and friendship of the British Government, which might serve to strengthen his position when he returned to Cabul, by convincing both his subjects and his rivals that his relations with that Government were of a thoroughly cordial and satisfactory character. In compliance with this request, the words above quoted were addressed to His Highness by the then Viceroy. Such were the circumstances in which they were uttered. What, then, were the meaning, purpose, and intention of their utterance? It is self-evident, in the first place, that, whatever their meaning, and whatever their purpose, they were not intended to have the force of a Treaty; for the British Government had just declined the Ameer's request for a Treaty of Alliance with it, and it could have had no possible reason for declining the Treaty, if it were prepared to accept on his behalf, in a form equally conclusive, all the liabilities of an alliance.

The meaning and purpose of the Viceroy's assurance to the Ameer in 1869, however, are clearly indicated and explained, beyond all possibility of question, by the context, as well as the circumstances, of his Excellency's address to His Highness at Umballa. In that paragraph of the address which immediately precedes the one I have quoted (because it is the one to which your Excellency has referred) the then Viceroy expressed his confidence (a confidence founded on the assurances of His Highness) that the Ameer was about “to create a firm and merciful administration,” and “to promote the interests of commerce in every province of Afghanistan.” In encouraging recognition of these excellent intentions (never fulfilled by the Ameer) and of the closeness with which the bonds of friendship were then drawn between the British Government and His Highness (whose subsequent conduct has relaxed them), the Viceroy assured the Ameer that the British Government would view with severe displeasure any attempt to disturb his throne. It is perfectly clear, however, that the Viceroy did not, and could not, thereby commit the British Government to an unconditional protection of the Ameer, or to any liabilities on behalf of His Highness which were not dependent on his future conduct towards the British Government and his own subjects. In short, the plain meaning of the Viceroy's statement was neither more nor less than an assurance that, so long as the Ameer continued to govern his people justly and mercifully, and to maintain frank, cordial, and confidential relations with the British Government, that Government would, on its part also, continue to use every legitimate endeavour to confirm the independence, consolidate the power, and strengthen the Government of His Highness.

In precisely the same spirit, and from the same point of view, the present Viceroy authorised the Cabul Agent to assure Shere Ali, last October, that if His Highness sincerely desired to deserve the friendship, and thereby secure the protection of the British Government, they would be cordially

and unreservedly accorded to him. But His Highness has evinced no such desire; and it is absurd to assume that, because the British Government would have viewed with severe displeasure in 1869 any attempt to disturb the throne of a loyal and trusted ally, it is, therefore, bound in 1877 to protect, from dangers incurred regardless of its advice, the damaged power of a mistrustful and estranged neighbour.

His Excellency the Viceroy instructs me to inform your Excellency plainly that the British Government neither recognizes, nor has ever recognized, any such obligation. British influence is so paramount throughout the East that the Government of India need rarely have recourse to arms in order to protect the friends who are faithful to it, or to punish those who are faithless. There is no neighbouring State which is not strengthened by the bestowal, and weakened by the withdrawal, of its friendship.

The observations above made in allusion to Lord Mayo apply to the statement made by Lord Northbrook in 1873 to the Ameer's Envoy at Simla. Your Excellency on that occasion represented and explained to the Viceroy the apprehensions and anxieties occasioned to the Ameer by the recent advance of the Russian Power in Central Asia. His Highness, fearing that, without the declared alliance and material support of the British Government, his independence might ere long be exposed to dangers with which he could not cope single-handed, had instructed you to solicit once more from the British Government a definite Treaty of Alliance on the basis of reciprocity, as well as material assistance in arms and money. Lord Northbrook declined to give the Ameer the Treaty which His Highness asked for. And therefore, as in the previous case at Umballa in 1869, it is clear that any subsequent verbal assurances given by Lord Northbrook to the Envoy were not intended to commit, and could not possibly commit, the British Government to any of those liabilities which it would have contracted on behalf of the Ameer had the Viceroy felt able to comply with the request of His Highness by signing with him a Treaty of Alliance. Your Excellency then endeavoured, as you have again endeavoured on the present occasion, to maintain that the British Government had already contracted such liabilities by virtue of assurances received in time past from Lord Lawrence and the Earl of Mayo. In reply to this assertion, Lord Northbrook laid before your Excellency the whole of the correspondence which had passed between his Excellency's predecessors and the Ameer, and requested you to point out in it a single word confirming, or justifying, the statement he had made, "that the British Government was bound to comply with every request preferred by the Ameer." Your Excellency, however, was unable to do so and acknowledge the fact. Lord Northbrook then gave your Excellency the following assurance: that in the event of any imminent aggression upon the territories of His Highness, "should the endeavours of the British Government to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British Government were prepared to assure the Ameer that they would afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money; and would also in case of necessity aid him with troops;" adding, however, that "the British Government held itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent; moreover, the assistance would be conditional upon the Ameer himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations."

It is sufficiently apparent that this personal assurance committed the British Government to no pledges which were not carefully guarded on every side by positive conditions with which the Ameer has, of late, evinced no disposition to comply. On receipt of it, your Excellency left Simla, apparently disappointed, and observing that the Ameer was not likely to derive from it much comfort or support.

Your Excellency doubtless will perceive and acknowledge that, in intimating to the Ameer, last October, his willingness to grant him not only money, arms, and should he require it the services of British officers, but also a definite Treaty of Alliance such as the Ameer had twice vainly solicited from the British Government,—once in 1860, and once again in 1873,—the present Viceroy was offering His Highness altogether new, and very substantial advantages. It appeared to the Viceroy that relations of mutual reserve and mistrust between neighbouring States so closely contiguous, and having in common so many interests, as Afghanistan and the Empire of India, were much to be deplored; more specially in the interest of the Afghan State. An attentive study of the correspondence to which your Excellency has referred induced him to think that, in judging of the unfriendly attitude which, during the last few years, the Ameer has thought fit to assume and maintain towards the British Government, it would be ungenerous not to make great allowances for the disappointment and mortification with which His Highness appeared to have regarded the reiterated failure of all his previous efforts to enter into closer relations with that Government; the extent to which the increasing weakness and isolation of his position might have aggravated this feeling, and the fact that the unfortunate imperfection of the hitherto existing means of communication between the two Governments afforded to neither of them any adequate opportunity of avoiding or removing those causes of irritation which might be solely attributable to their ignorance of each other's motives and interests. The Viceroy, therefore, came to the conclusion that, if the Ameer still sincerely desired the open alliance and protection of the British Government, and was prepared to prove the sincerity of that desire by taking practical steps for placing his relations with it on a thoroughly cordial and satisfactory footing, the wishes of His Highness in regard to the Treaty of Alliance, and any other reasonable evidence of our confidence and friendship, should receive from us a similarly frank and cordial response. Her Majesty's Government concurred in that conclusion; and it was in all sincerity that the Viceroy authorised the British Agent at Cabul to say to the Ameer—"If you really desire to secure and reciprocate our friendship you shall have it without reserve, and find in us a firm and faithful ally."

It would appear, however, from the whole tone of your Excellency's language, and from the statement so carefully made by your Excellency of the Ameer's present views and sentiments, and submitted by me at your Excellency's request to the Viceroy, that His Highness now no longer desires the British alliance and protection. The British Government does not press its alliance and protection upon those who neither seek nor appreciate them. This being the case, it only remains for the Viceroy to withdraw, at once, the offers made to the Ameer in the month of October last; and, in so doing, to express his deep regret that these offers, and the spirit in which they were made, should have been so completely misunderstood and so publicly misrepresented by His Highness. Such unwarrantable misrepresentations of our recent policy, however, render it necessary to guard against similar misrepresentation of our present position. I am, therefore, to explain distinctly to your Excellency, and to place on record, in language not susceptible of misconstruction, that, in withdrawing from the Ameer those offers of material assistance in reply to which His Highness has instructed you to inform me that he neither requires nor is disposed to accept them, the British Government harbours no hostile designs against Afghanistan.

The British Government has no sort or kind of quarrel with the people of Afghanistan. It sincerely desires their permanent independence, prosperity, and peace. It has no conceivable object, and certainly no desire, to interfere in their domestic affairs. It will unreservedly respect their independence, and should they at any time be united in a national appeal to its assistance it will doubtless be disposed, and prepared, to aid them in defending that independence from aggression. Meanwhile, the Afghan people may rest fully assured that so long as they are not excited by their Ruler, or others, to acts of aggression upon the territories or friends of the British Government no British soldier will ever be permitted to enter Afghanistan uninvited.

But the British Government repudiates all liabilities on behalf of the Ameer and his dynasty. The British Government does not, indeed, withdraw from any obligations previously contracted by it; but it absolutely and emphatically denies that it has ever incurred any such obligations as those imputed to it by your Excellency; and it further affirms that it will never, in any circumstances, undertake such obligations without adequate guarantees for the satisfactory conduct of the Ameer.

At the same time, the British Government will scrupulously continue, as hitherto, to respect the Ameer's independence and authority throughout those territories which, up to the present moment, it has recognized as being in the lawful possession of the Ameer, and will duly abstain from interference so long as the Ameer, on his part, no less scrupulously abstains from every kind of interference with tribes or territories not his own.

The Ameer, therefore, so long as he remains faithful to those Treaty stipulations which your Excellency has involved on behalf of His Highness, and which the British Government fully recognises as still valid, and therefore binding upon the two contracting parties, need be under no apprehension whatever of any hostile action on the part of the British Government.

(Signed) LEWIS PELLY.

Enclosure 47 in No. 36.

MEMORANDUM.

ON 16th March, about 12 o'clock, Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary to the Cabul Envoy, waited upon Sir Lewis Pelly at the request of the Cabul Envoy. The Munshi stated that he now wished to answer the remarks made by Sir Lewis Pelly at the last meeting of the conference.

Sir Lewis Pelly replied that the arrangements entered into between himself and the Cabul Envoy at the conference had been, that the Cabul Envoy should make his statement uninterrupted, that afterward Sir Lewis Pelly should reply, and that the Cabul Envoy should then give a definite answer on the Agency clause.

The Cabul Envoy had occupied the whole time of three conferences in making his statement, absolutely uninterrupted by Sir Lewis Pelly. Sir Lewis Pelly had then replied briefly, and had requested the promised definite answer. The Cabul Envoy had then again requested a delay of a week in order to make some additional remarks and give his definite answer. Sir Lewis Pelly had acceded to this request, and the Cabul Envoy had then given an answer which, though inexplicitly worded, appeared to Sir Lewis Pelly to amount to a rejection of the principle of the Agency clause.

Sir Lewis Pelly had informed the Cabul Envoy accordingly, and had explained to him, that such being the case he had no power or authority to open the proposed negotiations.

The Cabul Envoy had then requested that his statement might be submitted to the Viceroy, and the reply of the Viceroy be awaited, when he (Cabul Envoy) would certainly give his definite answer.

Sir Lewis Pelly had acceded to this request, and, before the meeting closed for that day, reminded the Cabul Envoy that the Cabul Secretary had not written down the last remarks which he (Sir Lewis Pelly) had made.

The Cabul Envoy had therefore explained that he was too tired and ill to sit in conference any longer that evening, but that he would meet for the purpose of writing it down the next morning.

On the following morning the Cabul Envoy sent to say he was too ill to attend conference, and from that date (the 20th February) until to-day (16th March) the Cabul Envoy has continued to send messages to Sir Lewis Pelly to the effect that he (the Cabul Envoy) was too ill for work.

On several occasions Sir Lewis Pelly caused it to be intimated to the Cabul Envoy that his Secretary had not written down Sir Lewis Pelly's final remarks. Sir Lewis Pelly had explained that the writing them down or not was a matter wholly for the consideration of the Cabul Envoy, but that

if the Cabul Envoy did wish to have them written Sir Lewis Pelly would be happy, either to send the Secretary to the Cabul Envoy's house, or receive the Cabul Envoy's Secretary at his house for the said purpose. After a lapse of many days, *i.e.*, about a fortnight ago, the Cabul Envoy sent his Secretary, and the remarks were taken down; and from that date to this Sir Lewis Pelly has heard no more of the matter.

Yesterday Sir Lewis Pelly had the honour of sending, by his Secretary, to the Cabul Envoy the written reply of his Excellency the Viceroy, drawn out in the Persian language; and now, within a few hours of receiving that reply, instead of affording the promised plain and definite answer, the Cabul Envoy has sent his Secretary to submit that he has prepared a rejoinder to the remarks made by Sir Lewis Pelly on the 19th February.

Sir Lewis Pelly therefore requested his Secretary to inform the Cabul Envoy that, the arrangements agreed upon between them for the conduct of discussion at the conference having been amply fulfilled, he could not postpone the Viceroy's more recent reply and revert to a portion of the discussion which had been concluded.

But that if, in giving his promised definite answer to the Viceroy's communication, the Cabul Envoy should make any relevant remarks, Sir Lewis Pelly would be happy to receive them with his wonted courtesy.

The Secretary then explained that the Cabul Envoy was too ill to consider the Viceroy's reply; but Sir Lewis Pelly contended that the Viceroy's communication required only a simple yes or no, and that if the Cabul Envoy were sufficiently in health to dictate criticism on Sir Lewis Pelly's former remarks, which the Secretary admitted he had in his pocket, the Envoy was also well enough to dictate a plain yes or no to the Viceroy's question on the admission, or otherwise, of the principle of the Agency clause.

The Cabul Secretary persisted in endeavouring to induce Sir Lewis Pelly to accede to the Cabul Envoy's wish, and Sir Lewis Pelly firmly replied that he must categorically decline.

The Cabul Secretary then said that it would be a long time before the Cabul Envoy would be well enough to consider the Viceroy's reply, evidently intending hereby to gain time for a further reference to Cabul; but Sir Lewis Pelly again firmly urged that the Viceroy had distinctly stated in his instructions that, the principle of the Agency clause having already been considered and admitted by the Ameer in Cabul, and subsequently fully discussed in conference, a further reference to Cabul would not be needed, and would not be awaited for the disposal of this point.

If, therefore, the Cabul Envoy adhered to his refusal of the *sine quâ non* preliminary all that was necessary was for him to say so, and that he could supplement his refusal after his return to Cabul.

Sir Lewis Pelly asked when he might expect a reply to the Viceroy's instructions. The Secretary replied that he had no instructions to answer any question.

Sir Lewis Pelly then said he could only express his regret that the Secretary had troubled himself to come over.

Sir Lewis Pelly having then sent a polite message, and expressed hopes for the speedy recovery of the Cabul Envoy, the Secretary withdrew.

Enclosure 48 in No. 36.

Extract from KAZI SYUD AHMED'S Diary of News for the 22nd March 1877.

A FEW Chiefs of Kandahar who were discontented with the Ameer have gone over to the side of the English at Khelat, on account of which the Ameer feels very anxious.

Russian couriers bring letters for the Ameer almost every week by the way of Sheikh Ali through Hazarajat. The Ameer sends answers through Shaghasi Sherdil Khan, Governor of Turkestan.

The Ameer is now quiet, does not talk of jihad openly, but preparations are otherwise being made all the same. It is said that the Ameer is waiting for a reply to the letter he has sent to the Russians asking their advice in his project of jihad.

The sons of Sirdar Mahomed Sharif Khan have sent a letter to the Akhund of Swat begging him to write and ask the Ameer to allow their father to come back to Cabul. The Akhund has given no reply yet.

Enclosure 49 in No. 36.

CIPHER TELEGRAM, dated 26th March 1877.

From Sir LEWIS PELLY to the VICEROY.

THREE o'clock a.m. I regret to report the Cabul Envoy died about an hour ago. I am despatching an express courier to Ameer.

Enclosure 50 in No. 36.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th March 1877.

From Sir LEWIS PELLY to the VICEROY.

IN consultation with Sir Richard Pollock, deputations of condolence are being sent to the Afghan Mission; the leading members of the Kazikhel will be present on my part at burial service, and

cause the customary funeral feasts, &c., to be provided, flags at fort and general quarters hoisted half-mast, sixty minute guns, being the number of the years of deceased, will be fired, commencing as the corpse leaves the house, mixed deputation of native officials and gentlemen accompanying corpse to Boorj Hurri Sing, from which point Khalil Arbab and following accompanying corpse to frontier. Mission requested that no military guard might be furnished. Sir Richard and I pay visit of condolence to Mission to-morrow morning. Courts closed to-day.

Enclosure 51 in No. 36.

Dated Peshawar, the 26th March 1877.

From Sir LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I., to His Highness the AMEER OF CABUL.

AFTER compliments,—

It is with feelings of profound regret I have learned that Your Highness's Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Sadr-i-Azim, died at his residence in Peshawar about an hour ago, *i.e.*, about 2 o'clock this morning.

Your Highness is doubtless aware that the Sadr-i-Azim has, for some time past, been more or less suffering, and that every effort was made on the part of the British authorities to be of aid and service to him in his illness. For some little time, beginning from the 27th February, the Sadr-i-Azim desired and received the professional attendance of the Civil Surgeon at this station, and at his Excellency's request the Civil Surgeon discontinued his visits on the 9th March.

I need not assure your Highness that it will be the wish of his Excellency the Viceroy that every possible respect should be shown in Peshawar to the memory of the deceased, and that everything should be done which may be of service to the gentlemen of the Mission in their bereavement.

Permit me to add that by the death of his Excellency the Sadr-i-Azim I am sensible that I have lost a colleague who was a devoted servant of your Highness and a sincere well-wisher of the Afghan and British Governments. Personally, I feel I have lost in Syud Noor Mahomed Shah a friend whom I have known for 16 years.

I beg your Highness to accept the expression of my sincere sympathy in the loss which your Highness has sustained.

Enclosure 52 in No. 36.

CIPHER TELEGRAM, dated 30th March 1877. (Extract.)

From the VICEROY, Calcutta, to Sir LEWIS PELLY, Peshawar.

CLOSE conference immediately, on ground that basis on which we agreed to negotiate has not been acknowledged by Ameer; that, Mir Akhor not being authorized to negotiate on that basis, nor you on any other, conference is terminated *ipso facto*; and that you will leave Peshawar on a stated day. The date of it you will fix yourself, but it should be as early as conveniently possible, in order to show we are in earnest and avoid further entanglement. Let your language to Mir Akhor be most friendly. If, in the meanwhile, new Envoys or messengers arrive to continue negotiation you will tell them that your powers are terminated. On closing conference, write to Ameer friendly letter notifying the fact.

I entirely approve your letter to Ameer.

No. 37.

Secret.—No. 64.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

MY LORD,

India Office, London, 4th October 1877.

1. HER Majesty's Government have considered with the attention due to the importance of its contents the Secret Letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 13, dated the 10th May last, reporting the transactions which preceded the Conference lately held at Peshawar between Sir L. Pelly, on behalf of your Government, and Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Prime Minister of the Ameer of Cabul, the course of the discussions which then took place, and the views of your Excellency in Council in regard to the results of the Conference and your future relations with the Ameer.

2. Before making the general observations which are suggested by the papers under notice, it is my agreeable duty, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to convey to your Excellency their full and cordial approval of the proceedings of your Government, their high sense of the patience and discrimination shown by your Excellency

throughout the negotiations, and their entire satisfaction with the manner in which, under your Excellency's instructions, the discussions with the Afghan Envoy were conducted by Sir L. Pelly.

3. The considerations which led Her Majesty's Government to desire the presence of British Officers at certain points on the frontiers of Afghanistan were set forth at length in my Despatches addressed to your Excellency's predecessor on the 22nd January and 19th November 1875, while the instructions furnished to your Excellency under date the 28th February 1876, in regard to frontier matters generally, placed you in possession of their views as to the manner in which the requisite negotiations with the Ameer might most conveniently be commenced, and authorized you to make concessions to His Highness, which, it was known, had in former years been greatly desired by him, and which could not fail both to strengthen his own power and promote the permanent interests of his dynasty.

4. When vesting your Excellency with discretion to offer to the Ameer large pecuniary aid, a decided recognition by the British Government of the order of succession established by him in favour of his younger son, Abdullah Jan, and an explicit pledge, either by treaty or otherwise, of material support in case of unprovoked foreign aggression on his territories, Her Majesty's Government were justified in hoping that advantages so great would be accepted by the Ameer in the spirit in which they were offered, and that His Highness would not hesitate to allow to their Agents unrestricted access to positions in his dominions where their presence would not, even in appearance, prejudice his personal authority, and where they would be favourably situated for acquiring early information of any circumstances which might threaten disturbance to the independence or tranquillity of his dominions.

5. But, while holding this reasonable expectation, Her Majesty's Government did not disguise from themselves that of late years the conduct of Shere Ali had been such as to indicate a possibility that, owing either to confirmed disbelief in the sincerity of the British Government or to doubts of its power, the Ameer might reject the proposals which you were authorised to make to him. This contingency rendered it desirable to proceed with caution, but, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, afforded no sufficient reason why the necessary overtures should not be made; on the contrary, it seemed to them in the highest degree expedient that the real sentiments of the Ameer should be ascertained beyond doubt.

6. Upon this point the history of the events reported in the letter under reply is unhappily conclusive, and demonstrates but too plainly how erroneous was the opinion expressed so recently as the year 1875 by Sir R. Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawur, that "no unfavourable change had occurred in the disposition of the Ameer." Shere Ali's confidential Envoy stated explicitly that his master had "now a deep-rooted" mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government, and ample confirmatory evidence of this fact has been furnished by the refusal of the Ameer to receive at Cabul or elsewhere the temporary mission which you proposed to send to him; by his obstinate objection to accept the principle of free access for British Officers to Afghanistan as a preliminary to negotiations plainly declared to have for their object arrangements which had been pressed for by His Highness in 1869 and again in 1873; and by the attitude of positive hostility which he assumed while the discussion between his Envoy and Sir L. Pelly were proceeding at Peshawur.

7. It would be futile to discuss the causes which may have led to this complete alienation of the Ameer, or to speculate how far, and in what proportions, it may be attributable to the circumstances upon which Syud Noor Mahomed Shah dwelt with so much persistence, to imperfect appreciation of the political situation in Europe and Asia, or to foreign intrigue. Your Excellency judged correctly that, the fact having been established, continuance of the negotiations was unlikely to lead to permanently satisfactory results, and, in taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the death of the Afghan Envoy to close the Conference, you adopted that course which was in all respects the most expedient.

8. Although that cordial agreement between the British and Afghan Governments, which is so much to be desired in the interests of both powers, still remains, therefore, to be effected, Her Majesty's Government cannot regard the result of recent proceedings as either unimportant or unsatisfactory. The position of the British Government towards that of the Ameer has been clearly defined. His Highness has now been informed in unmistakeable language that under the terms of the Treaty of 1855—which alone of the two treaties contracted between the British and Afghan Governments has a character of perpetuity—the British Government has incurred no liabilities whatever

on his behalf; and it has been distinctly intimated to him that neither by Lord Mayo in 1869 nor by Lord Northbrook in 1873 was any assurance given of unconditional protection, nor any obligation contracted towards him which was not dependent on his future conduct towards the British Government and his own subjects. Any illusions, therefore, which Shere Ali may have entertained upon this point have been effectually dissipated. He has further learned that the British Government will not undertake the formal responsibility of assisting him to defend his country from the attacks of external foes, or of supporting his dynasty against sedition, unless British Officers are allowed to reside on the frontier for the purpose of acquiring information for communication to their Government, and unless His Highness is himself prepared to receive, when necessary, the confidential Agents of the Viceroy of India.

9. To both the parties to them, therefore, the recent negotiations may prove to have been beneficial. The British Government has for the first time become acquainted with the real sentiments with which it is regarded by a ruler as to whose disposition it was important there should be no uncertainty, and can regulate its policy accordingly; the Ameer, on his part, now knows the precise terms on which he may obtain the support of the British Government for himself and his heir. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, His Highness may well be left for a time to reflect upon the knowledge which he has acquired. There are already indications of a change for the better in the attitude of the Ameer. Her Majesty's Government trust that the improvement may be progressive, and that His Highness may ere long awake to the fact that, while his interests are bound up with those of the Government whose alliance he has lately rejected, the converse proposition is by no means equally true. This result may in the end be most speedily attained by abstention for the present, on the one hand, from any hostile pressure on His Highness, and on the other, from any renewed offer of the concessions which have been refused.

10. The policy of Her Majesty's Government towards the Ameer under present circumstances has, indeed, been anticipated by your Excellency in the assurance conveyed to the Afghan Envoy by Sir L. Pelly under your instructions, that "while repudiating all liability on behalf of the Ameer and his dynasty, the British Government will continue as heretofore to respect his independence and authority throughout those territories which, up to the present moment, it has recognized as being in the lawful possession of His Highness, and will abstain from interfering therein so long as the Ameer, on his part, no less scrupulously abstains from every kind of interference with tribes or territories not his own." Her Majesty's Government would have been glad had the Ameer, by a cordial acceptance of the propositions made to him, allowed them to substitute for the attitude of indifference indicated by the terms of the above assurance one of hearty co-operation for the protection of common interests. The integrity of the Ameer's dominions is liable to be menaced either by direct foreign attack or by the results of domestic discord. Foreign aggression may not be, and probably is not, at all imminent; though the prospect of it has more than once, in recent years, excited the fears of the Ameer; but danger from the members of his own family must be ever present to the mind of His Highness, who can scarcely reckon with confidence upon immunity from it during his lifetime, and must be well aware that it is certain to ensue upon his death.

11. The independence of Afghanistan is a matter of importance to the British Government, and, as an essential part of arrangements for its protection, Her Majesty's Government would still be glad to station Agents upon whom they could rely at Herat and Candahar. In the event, therefore, of the Ameer, within a reasonable time, spontaneously manifesting a desire to come to a friendly understanding with your Excellency on the basis of the terms lately offered to, but declined by him, his advances should not be rejected. If, on the other hand, he continues to maintain an attitude of isolation and scarcely veiled hostility, the British Government stands unpledged to any obligations, and, in any contingencies which may arise in Afghanistan, will be at liberty to adopt such measures for the protection and permanent tranquillity of the north-west frontier of Her Majesty's Indian dominions as the circumstances of the moment may render expedient, without regard to the wishes of the Ameer Shere Ali or the interests of his dynasty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 38.

MEMORANDUM.

Some time ago I was asked whether I would object to an opinion I had once expressed, adverse to Sir John Jacob's proposal to advance a division of the Indian Army to Quetta, being quoted in a discussion in the House of Lords.

I replied that, whilst deprecating public discussions of the question, which lay bare all our weak points to our enemies, I had no objection to my opinion being quoted, provided it were added at the same time that I considered the circumstances had so completely changed as to justify me in a change of the views formed 10 or 12 years ago.

I considered the advance, when first proposed, to be unnecessary, and open to the objection of leaving the Bolan Pass and the Scinde desert between it and its supports.

I consider now that the advance is necessary, and that its political advantages would far outweigh its military disadvantages, provided that proper measures are taken to support it.

The military disadvantages are greatly reduced by the progress of the railroads, which renders it now quite possible to make a branch railway for a considerable part of the distance towards Quetta, and the Scinde canals have carried water throughout the west bank of the Indus.

When the occupation of Quetta was first advocated it was viewed as a strategical point to take in flank any Russian or Persian expedition against Cabul. There is now no question of an expedition launched from a distant base against Cabul, but there is a question of a steady approach of Russia by absorption of territory, by maturing her communications with Russia, and by forming new bases of operation in the fertile valley of the Oxus.

Already Shere Ali, through causes on which I will hereafter touch, has his ear (and probably his hand) open to the Governor of Turkestan.

If we have Russian possessions near to us, we shall find the Government of India far more expensive and more difficult than it has hitherto been.

If we compare the present situation of Russia in Central Asia with what it was 20 years ago we must expect the close approximation of our frontiers in less than the same time, unless we can find means of preventing it.

Does not the example of Turkey, with her tributary States stirred into rebellion by emissaries from Russian societies, show the mischief which Russia might work in India when her close neighbourhood would give her easy opportunities of communication?

It appears to me to be our clear policy to exercise all our observation and watchfulness so as to detect any further advances, and to use all the influence that we can bring to bear in Europe to prevent them for the future.

I am not in any way an advocate for advancing into Afghanistan contrary to the wish of the Ameer Shere Ali, but we have a right by treaty to go to Quetta, and I believe that our occupation of it, if carried out when we were on good terms with him, would not have been considered an aggression. But his present alienation, his apparent understanding with Russia, and his assumption of a claim on Quetta, form a sufficient reason, if none other existed, for our occupation of that post.

The disturbed state of the Khelat territory resting on our border, the impotence of its ruler to restore or maintain order, the obstruction to our trade with Candahar, rendered it necessary for some one to interfere. If our abstention from all action had continued we should have had no just right to complain if the ruler of Afghanistan, or the Shah of Persia, had stepped in and taken the place which we had abdicated.

We have unfortunately managed Shere Ali badly. Perhaps it might not have been possible, with our scruples, and his want of them, to have managed him advantageously; but it must be admitted that we have not given him the reasons to unite himself with us that he naturally expected.

First, we stood aloof in his struggles for life and empire, ready to acknowledge whoever might prove the master of Afghanistan.

Then, when Shere Ali had subdued his enemies, he came forward to meet us with an alliance, but we were willing only to form an imperfect alliance with him.

He was willing to trust us, provided that we would trust him; but we felt that we could not bind ourselves to unreserved support of a power whose ideas of right and wrong were so different from ours.

We therefore proposed to bind him, leaving ourselves (according to his idea) free, and he recoiled from this bargain.

His friendly feelings, however, were not entirely alienated by that experience of us; he abstained from any action towards Seistan at our desire, and he believed that the

mediation which we pressed upon him would have ended by the restoration of the portion of Seistan that Persia had occupied in his days of trouble.

And not only Shere Ali, but the whole Afghan people, believed that we should restore to them what they had lost.

When they found that we had allowed Persia to obstruct and ill-treat our arbitrator, and to retain much of her encroachments, they looked upon us as a weak and treacherous people who, under the guise of friendship, had spoiled them in favour of Persia.

This I believe to be the root of Shere Ali's discontent with us.

Our going to Quetta (illustrated by all the hostile intentions attributed to it and industriously advanced in the newspapers by opponents of the measure) has naturally been seized upon by Shere Ali, in his present frame of mind, as a cause of offence.

If we consider the anarchy and bloodshed which have prevailed in the Khelat territory since we withdrew our protection and support from its ruler, the stoppage of our trade with Afghanistan and Persia by the slaughter and plunder of the traders, in fact, the complete closing of the highway,—if we look to the constant disturbances of our borders formerly by the tribes over whom the Khan claimed authority but whom he could not control, and compare that state with the present condition of peace and order (ensuring the security of the Khan himself and his people) we cannot doubt that we have been fully justified by necessity, and by the interests of humanity, as well as by treaty, in assuming our present position.

We are thereby enabled to assist the Khan with money and advice, by our influence over his turbulent feudal neighbours, and by restoring to comparative tranquillity the country which was formerly a theatre of bloody struggles and treacherous murder.

Our policy of masterly inactivity, or rather of receding from every difficulty until what were matters easy of suppression have grown into serious dangers, has continued too long, and if it is maintained will lead us to disaster.

It has been frequently asserted, by people with pretensions to speak with authority, that we shall be secure if we remain within our mountain boundary.

But this is at variance with all history. A mountain chain that can be pierced in many places is no security if you hide behind it. India has been often entered through her mountain barrier, which was never defended. India waited to fight the battle in her own plains, and invariably lost it.

How much Austria lost in not defending the Bohemian mountains! What might have been the position of the Turks had they properly secured the passage of the Balkans?

Afghanistan is closed to us, but the one post of Quetta that we can hold by right of treaty should be made secure; its communications should be completed, and a proper support provided. To retreat from it now would do the power of England more injury in India than the loss of a battle.

NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

30th May 1878.

No. 39.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th June 1878, from Viceroy, Simla, to Secretary of State, London.

NEWSLETTERS from Kabul and Peshawar have been received to effect that Amir has been informed by Russian Agent, and by Tashkend Governor-General's letter, that Envoy sent by Russian Emperor will shortly visit Kabul as Ambassador. These reports require verification.

No. 40.

From the Viceroy, Simla, dated June 19th 1878.

In continuation of my telegram of 7th June, we have received further corroborative information from various sources of mobilization of Russian forces in Central Asia, opening of road towards Afghanistan, and pressure on Ameer to receive important Russian Embassy.

These reports not yet fully substantiated, and their degree of importance cannot be precisely ascertained, but we transmit information for such use as may be considered desirable.

No. 41.

TELEGRAM, from Viceroy, Simla, to Secretary of State, London, dated
1st July 1878.

FOLLOWING message received from Cavagnari. Begins: A Peshawar merchant has received special information from his firm at Bokhara that a Russian force of 30,000 men has arrived at Karshee, and the merchant is recommended to send no more merchandise until further instructions. A letter from Kabul reports that, on the 13th instant, an Agent from Russia reached Kabul, and informed the Amir that the Russians are about to establish cantonments at Sherabad, and at the ferries of Kilif and Karki on the Oxus. Ends. Points named are on direct route from Tashkend to Kabul, and cantonment at Kilif would bring Russians in immediate contact with Afghanistan. While numbers are evidently grossly exaggerated, the mass and concurrent testimony of reports regarding Russian movements is so great that we cannot altogether disregard them.

No. 42.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1878.

From VICEROY, Simla, to SECRETARY OF STATE, London.

BRITISH Native Medical Officer lent some time ago to Amir returned on leave to Peshawar, the 21st instant, reporting that Kauffmann, with troops, had reached Karki, and was personally proceeding to see Amir. Afghan officials at the Oxus tried to stop him, pending Amir's orders; but he declined to obey them. Amir thereupon sent orders forbidding opposition to Russian officers. Native Doctor heard Amir tell his Minister in durbar, 7th July, that Kauffmann, or officer of equal rank from Tashkend, had crossed Oxus on road to Kabul, refusing to be stopped. I refrained from telegraphing this information to you, pending confirmation. Have now heard from Peshawar reported arrival of Russian officer at Kabul with large military escort. This, of course, cannot be Kauffmann, and may be Native of rank in Russian service; though all accounts as yet point to European officer. If such Mission be authenticated, I will telegraph again. It will be difficult to act or instruct frontier officers without definite indication of views of Cabinet on such conduct on part of Russia and Amir, having regard to Russia's formal promises and Amir's refusal to receive British Mission in any shape. What I shall then require to know without delay is, whether this will be treated by Her Majesty's Government as an Imperial question with Russia, or left to us to deal with as a matter between Amir and Government of India. In latter case, I shall propose, with your approval, to insist on immediate suitable reception of European British Mission. I will communicate with you further on measures which may in this contingency become necessary for securing due permanent preponderance in Afghanistan. The alternative would be continued policy of complete inaction, difficult to maintain and very injurious to our position in India.

No. 42A.

From VICEROY, 31st July 1878.

Following message received to-day from Peshawur. Message begins,—

Three special messengers from Kabul have just arrived. They left Kabul nine days ago. Three Russians in European costume have reached Kabul accompanied by Cossacks and Uzbeg horsemen. Sirdar Ibraheem Khan was sent to meet them.

The chief of mission talks Persian, but not fluently. Kauffmann is called Gobernath. This officer is called Gobernath. Last part pronounced shortly.

One messenger speaks of him as Deputy Governor-General. Possibly it may be General Abramoff, Governor of Samarcand.

Message ends.

No. 43.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 1st August 1878.

Your telegrams relating to Kabul received. Make yourself certain of the facts before insisting on the reception of British envoy. Perhaps you might send a Native to ascertain whether Russians are really there, and telegraph to me when the truth is known.

No. 44.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 2nd August 1878.

YOUR telegram of yesterday—Kabul. Native had been already sent for purposes you suggest. Reports at present confirmed from independent sources by three messengers from Kabul, by letters mentioning officer in charge of Mission by name, and by details of rank and title of officer, constitution of escort, and honours and salutes with which Mission has been received.

No. 45.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd August 1878.

From VICEROY, Simla, to SECRETARY OF STATE, London. (Extract.)

FURTHER confirmation received of presence of Russian Mission at Kabul headed by General Abramoff, Governor of Samarkand, who is mentioned by name.

Referring to my telegram of 30th, we desire to point out that present situation requires immediate correction. It will soon be known throughout India that Russian officers and troops have been received with honour, and are staying at Kabul within short distance of our frontier and our largest military garrison, while our officers have been denied admission there.

We have further reports of Russian officers having visited and been well received at Maimena.

To remain inactive now, will, we respectfully submit, be to allow Afghanistan to fall as certainly and as completely under Russian power and influence as the Khanates. We believe we could correct situation if allowed to treat it as question between us and the Amir, and probably could do so without recourse to force. But we must speak plainly and decidedly, and be sure of your support.

It appears to us that the contingency contemplated in the Secretary of State's letter, No. 2 of 2nd January 1875, has arisen; and we propose, therefore, in the first place, to insist on reception of suitable British Mission at Kabul. To this we do not anticipate serious resistance; indeed, we think it probable that Amir, adhering to his policy of playing Russia and ourselves off against each other, will really welcome such Mission, while outwardly only yielding to pressure. We would thus endeavour to effect arrangements similar to those urged on us by your Lordship's predecessor in despatch above quoted, but avoiding all dynastic obligations. It is possible we should find considerable difficulty in obtaining Amir's assent to such arrangements; but in hands of skilful negotiator, difficulties might be overcome, and at least it is desirable to make the effort in the first instance. Amir is aware we are in position to enforce our demands. Failing in these endeavours to re-establish the preponderance of British influence in Afghanistan which we believe to be necessary for the safety of India, we shall then have to consider what measures are necessary for the protection and permanent tranquillity of our North-west frontier, as indicated in last paragraph of Secretary of State's despatch, No. 64 of 4th October 1877. We earnestly solicit an early reply as situation is urgent.

No. 46.

From SECRETARY OF STATE, 3rd August 1878. (Extract.)

ASSUMING the certainty of Russian officers at Kabul, your proposals to insist on reception of British envoy approved. In case of refusal you will telegraph again as to the steps you desire to take for compelling the Ameer to receive your Mission.

No. 47.

From VICEROY, 5th August 1878. (Extract.)

YOUR telegram of 3rd.—Kabul. No hostile action shall be taken without full previous communication with you.

No. 48.

No. 53 of 1878.

Government of India—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 5th August 1878.

WE have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of telegraphic reports and correspondence regarding the entry into Afghanistan, and the arrival and reception at Kabul, of a Russian Mission to the Amir. We propose to report in full hereafter upon the course of these events and upon our proceedings in dealing with the situation.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

R. STRACHEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 48.

TELEGRAM, dated 5th June 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Viceroy, Simla.

REPORT received that the Russian Agent at Kabul has informed Amir that European Russian Envoy of equal [status?] to the Governor-General of Tashkend will shortly visit Kabul. Governor-General has written to the Amir to the same effect; adding that he must be received as [an Ambassador?] sent by the Emperor of Russia.

The son of the Khan of Khiva is to be employed with 800 horsemen to protect the working-parties on both sides [of the] road about to be constructed between Khiva and Charjui, and thence to Akcheh; and now to accompany the Envoy to Kabul. Amir has summoned a [council] of the leading Chiefs to deliberate whether he should join Russia or England.

Enclosure 2 in No. 48.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st July 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Simla.

CHETAN Shah has arrived. He corroborates the intelligence I have recently reported regarding Russian pressure on the Amir, and military preparations in Trans-Oxus. He states that Kauffmann, with some troops, has arrived at Karki, and that he himself is on his way to Kabul to see Amir. The Afghan officials at the Oxus tried to stop him, pending the Amir's orders; but he declined to obey them. The Amir, on receipt of this report, sent orders that no interference with the Russian officers should be offered.

Enclosure 3 in No. 48.

TELEGRAM, dated 23rd July 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Simla.

I HAVE cross-examined Chetan Shah about the report he sent me. He states that he heard the Amir tell his Ministers in durbar, on the 7th July, that he had received report from Balkh that Kauffmann, or an officer of equal rank to him, from Tashkend, had crossed Oxus and was on his way to Kabul, and refused to be stopped. Chetan Shah appears to have studiously avoided political matters while at Kabul. I am inclined to regard his news as the old story I have already reported regarding an officer of rank being about to visit Kabul; and I think it improbable that it is Kauffmann himself, but one of his officers. Judging from the movement from Chikishliar, I think Russians are endeavouring to persuade Amir to give them right of way through North-west Afghanistan towards Merv, and, failing, will probably commence to open up direct communication from Charjui and Karki; this being quite beyond Afghanistan limits.

Enclosure 4 in No. 48.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th July 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Simla.

A MAN who left Kabul fourteen days ago reports that the arrival of a Russian of high rank, accompanied by 100 Cossacks and 200 Usbeg horsemen, was daily expected at Kabul, and that the Amir was preparing to receive him with great honour. Buktyar Khan communicated the above information.

Enclosure 5 in No. 48.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th July 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Foreign Secretary, Simla. (Extract.)

REPORTS received of the arrival at Kabul of a Russian officer accompanied by a large escort, variously reported at from 200 to 400 horsemen. I have been unable to ascertain whether he is dressed in European or Native costume.

Enclosure 6 in No. 48.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Simla.

THREE special messengers from Kabul have just arrived; they left Kabul nine days ago. Three Russians in European costume have reached Kabul accompanied by Cossacks and Uzbek horsemen. Sirdar Ibrahim Khan was sent to meet them. The Chief of the Mission talks Persian, but not fluently. Kauffmann is called Gobernat. This officer is called Gobernah, last syllable pronounced short. One messenger speaks of him as Deputy Governor-General; possibly it may be General Abramoff, Governor, Samarkand.

Enclosure 7 in No. 48.

TELEGRAM, dated 31st July 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Simla.

A LETTER has just arrived by special messenger for Sirdar Jalaludin Khan, which Agents have seen. In it General Abramoff is mentioned by name as the Chief of the Mission. I sent a special Agent to Kabul on the 15th instant, and he ought to return within the next few days. I am doing everything in my power to get strong evidence of the presence of a European Russian officer at Kabul. I believe it is true, as it is reported from many quite independent sources.

Enclosure 8 in No. 48.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st August 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Simla.

AN arrival from Kabul reports that salute of guns was fired in honour of Russian Mission, and that the Chief of the Mission is spoken of as the General Sahib.

No. 49.

No. 61 of 1878.

Government of India—Foreign Department. •

Secret.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 19th August 1878.

WITH our despatch No. 53, dated 5th August, we forwarded telegraphic reports and correspondence regarding the arrival and reception at Kabul of a Russian Mission to the Amir, and we promised to report hereafter the course of these events and our proceedings in dealing with the situation.

2. We have now the honour to forward copies of telegrams from the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar which report the further proceedings of the Russian Mission at Kabul. It will be seen that the Russian Envoy was received in Durbar on the 26th July, and is said to have presented two letters to the Amir—one from His Imperial Majesty the Czar and the other from the Governor-General of Tashkend. At a second interview on the 2nd or 3rd August the Amir handed to the Envoy a written reply, the contents of which are not known, and which was immediately despatched by special horsemen to Russian Turkistan.

3. On receiving your Lordship's approval, by telegram, of our proposal to depute a British Envoy to Kabul, we offered the appointment to Sir Neville Chamberlain, who has accepted it. He will be accompanied, for political duties, by the officers named in the margin, and by an escort of 250 sabres. The Mission will start very early in September, and we enclose a copy of the instructions issued to the Punjab Government, requesting that the necessary preparations may be made with the utmost despatch. We have also decided to send a special native emissary to the Amir in advance of the Mission, in order that His Highness may have due notice beforehand that the Envoy is coming, and that the necessary arrangement may be made for his passage through Afghan territory. For this duty we have selected Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, C.S.I., formerly British Agent at Kabul, who will leave Peshawar on the 23rd August. We enclose copy of the letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to the Amir which the Nawab will present to His Highness upon his arrival at Kabul.

Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I.
Major O. B. C. St. John, R.E.
Captain St. V. A. Hammick.

(A medical officer.)

We, have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 49.

Telegram, dated 8th August 1878.

FROM MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Peshawar, to PRIVATE SECRETARY to VICEROY, Simla.

NEWSLETTER of 30th July from Kabul reports that, on the 26th, Amir received Russian Envoy in Durbar. Envoy presented two letters—one from the Governor-General of

Tashkend, which Amir gave to his Secretary to read; the other from the Czar, which Amir kept, but did not open. Presents of some rifles and watches were given by the Envoy to the Amir and his Ministers.

A review of the troops was fixed for the 2nd instant.

Enclosure 2 in No. 49.

Telegram, dated 11th August 1878.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Peshawar, to PRIVATE SECRETARY to VICEROY, Simla.

KABUL newsletter, dated 3rd instant, reports review of the troops on 2nd; after which Envoy had interview with Amir, during which Amir gave a written reply to the letter Envoy had brought; special horsemen, Russian and Afghan, with these despatches, left Kabul for Turkistan. Nature of the Amir's reply not known.

Enclosure 3 in No. 49.

No. 1,681 P., dated Simla, 13th August 1878 (Confidential).

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I AM directed to inform you that an English officer of high rank will proceed, very early in the month of September next, from Peshawar to Kabul on a political Mission. He will be accompanied by at least three English officers, besides a medical officer.

His Excellency the Viceroy will be especially obliged if His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will be pleased to issue urgent orders for the preparation, at Peshawar, of all arrangements connected with the proper outfit and camp-equipage of the Envoy and his staff. It may be necessary to provide a few good horses, to retain servants in red livery, and otherwise to furnish the camp in a manner suitable to the occasion. Any assistance that the Foreign Department can contribute will be at once given on application.

Enclosure 4 in No. 49.

Dated Simla, 14th August 1878.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness AMIR SHER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kabul and its Dependencies.

THE authentic intelligence which I have lately received of the course of recent events at Kabul and in the countries bordering on Afghanistan, has rendered it necessary that I should communicate fully and without reserve with your Highness upon matters of importance which concern the interests of India and of Afghanistan. For this reason I have considered it expedient to depute a special and confidential British Envoy of high rank, who is known to your Highness, his Excellency General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, to visit your Highness immediately at Kabul, in order that he may converse personally with your Highness regarding these urgent affairs. It appears certain that they can be best arranged for the welfare and tranquillity of both States, and for the preservation of friendship between the two Governments, by a full and frank statement of the present position. This letter is therefore sent in advance to your Highness by the hand of Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, C.S.I., a faithful and honoured Sirdar of my Government, who will explain all necessary details as to the time and manner of the Envoy's visit. It is asked that your Highness may be pleased to issue commands to your Sirdars and to all other authorities in Afghanistan upon the route between Peshawar and Kabul, that they shall make, without any delay, whatever arrangements are necessary and proper for effectively securing to my Envoy, the representative of a friendly Power, due safe conduct and suitable accommodation according to his dignity, while passing with his retinue through the dominions of your Highness.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself.

No. 50.

No. 67 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 26th August 1878.

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 61, dated 19th August 1878, we have the honour to enclose a copy of a telegram received on the 21st August, communicating the intelligence that the Heir-Apparent to Kabul and its dependencies, Sirdar Abdulla Jan, died at Kabul on the 17th August.

2. This event is likely to be of great political importance, but as yet we cannot attempt to say in what direction, or to what extent, it will modify the course of affairs at Kabul. We have considered that it is advisable to adjourn the departure from Peshawar of the Mission which we are sending to the Amir, so that it may not reach Kabul before the customary period of mourning (40 days) shall have terminated. And we have despatched to Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, for delivery to the Amir, a second letter, conveying the Viceroy's personal expression of condolence with His Highness upon the loss of his son.

3. We have nevertheless directed Nawab Gholam Hussein himself to leave for Kabul in advance of the Mission as soon as possible. We consider that it is inexpedient to relax, beyond what is decorous under the circumstances, our preparations for the speedy departure of the Mission, or to defer giving the Kabul Government formal notice of its coming; because we wish the Amir to be convinced that he may expect its certain arrival, upon urgent business, at an early date. It is, moreover, obviously desirable that the expedition should not reach Kabul late in the autumn.

4. We enclose copy of the Viceroy's letter to the Amir, and of the latest telegraphic reports and orders.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 50.

Telegram, dated 21st August 1878.

From Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar, to VICEROY, Simla.

EXPRESS dāk received from the Mustaufi, in reply to my letter of the 13th to him; announces the death of the Heir-Apparent on the 17th instant, the day on which my letter reached Kabul; and states that, under the circumstances, he could not mention the subject of Native Envoy's coming to the Amir. And he hopes that Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan will remain at Peshawar till further notice. Letter dated Kabul, the 17th instant.

Enclosure 2 in No. 50.

Telegram No. 1753P., dated 22nd August 1878.

From VICEROY, Simla, to Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar:

YOUR telegrams of yesterday.—Gholam Hussein should await at Peshawar receipt of second letter for Amir from Viceroy now under preparation, to start as soon as possible

after receipt. Meanwhile, reply to Mustaufi, expressing great regret for death of Heir, but add that Viceroy's letters being urgently important, Gholam Hasan will start in few days for Kabul. British Mission must now follow later in September. Remain yourself at Peshawar for the present.

Enclose 3 in No. 50.

LETTER to His Highness the AMIR OF CABUL, dated Simla, 23rd August 1878.

AFTER the despatch from Simla of my letter dated 14th August 1878, which Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan will deliver with this letter to your Highness, I received from Peshawar the melancholy news that your Highness has suffered a great affliction in the untimely death of Sirdar Abdulla Jan, the Heir-Apparent to Kabul and its dependencies. I desire to express to your Highness personally the sincere regret which this intelligence has caused to me; but life and death are in the hands of God, and resignation to His will is unavoidable. In consequence of this calamity I have directed my Envoy to postpone for a short time his departure, in order that your Highness may not be troubled by any public business, however important and urgent, until the usual period of mourning shall have elapsed.

No. 51.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 8th September 1878.

AMEER, after much pressure from Mustaufi, has attended durbar for a short time.

Abramoff reported to have left Kabul 25th, escorted by regiment of Afghan cavalry and Ameer's moonshee, leaving subordinates and escort at Kabul.

Nawab Gholam Hussein left Peshawur 30th, reached Dakka 1st, left same night for Jellalabad, was escorted and well treated by commanders at Ali Musjid and Dakka; since then Nawab only allowed to make short marches, apparent object to delay reply.

Mustaufi writes to Deputy Commissioner 2nd September that he cannot act or communicate with Ameer, therefore necessary for Nawab to remain at Peshawur. To Buktia Khan he writes, same date, that he has informed Ameer, who says he cannot attend to such business, and matter must be deferred. I have telegraphed to Commissioner to inform Mustaufi that Mission will in any case leave Peshawur about 16th, that its objects are friendly, but that a refusal of free passage and safe conduct will be considered act of open hostility.

Our Mission will be accompanied by two Native nobles, members of Jeypore and Tonk families, who have eagerly and gratefully accepted the offer.

No. 52.

No. 79 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (Extract.)

MY LORD,

Simla, 9th September 1878.

IN our letter of the 19th August,* we reported to your Lordship our preparations for the deputation of General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., early in September, upon a special Mission to the Amir of Kabul. His departure has been

* No. 61, Secret.

adjourned, as was explained in our subsequent letter of the 26th August,† in consequence of

† No. 67, Secret.

the death of the Heir-Apparent to the Kabul throne, but the Mission will now leave Peshawar about the 16th instant.

2. We enclose copy of our Resolution† formally appointing Sir Neville Chamberlain; and detailing the officers and gentlemen who will accompany him on political duty and upon his personal staff. It will be seen that two gentlemen belonging respectively to Hindu and Muhammadan families of the first rank in India, have joined the Mission. We considered that it would be politically advantageous to attach them to it; and our offer to do so was accepted by them at once and very willingly.

3. A copy of the letter from the Viceroy which Sir Neville Chamberlain will deliver to the Amir is also enclosed.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 52.

No. 1911P.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Political.

Resolution.

Simla, 7th September 1878.

THE Viceroy and Governor-General in Council has been pleased to appoint His Excellency General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in Madras, to proceed to Kabul as Envoy Extraordinary on a Special Mission to His Highness the Amir of Kabul and its dependencies. The officers named below are attached to the Mission upon political duty and to His Excellency the Envoy's personal staff:—

Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I.
Surgeon-Major H. W. Bellew, C.S.I.
Major O. B. C. St. John, R.E.
Kazi Syud Ahmed, Attaché to the Foreign Department.

Maharaj Pertab Sing, of Jodhpur.
Sirdar Obed Ulla Khan, of Tonk.

Captain St. V. A. Hammick, Military Secretary to His Excellency the Envoy Extraordinary.
Captain F. M. Onslow, Madras Cavalry, Aide-de-Camp.
Lieutenant N. F. F. Chamberlain.

(Signed) A. C. LYALL,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 2 in No. 52.

To His Highness AMIR SHER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kabul and its Dependencies.

MY HONOURED AND VALUED FRIEND,

IN my letter of the 14th August 1878 I informed your Highness that I had considered it expedient to depute his Excellency General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, to visit your Highness immediately at Kabul, in order that he might confer personally with your Highness regarding certain matters of urgency and importance which concern the interests of India and of Afghanistan. The departure of my Envoy was postponed for a time in consequence of the great affliction which befel your Highness in the death of Sirdar Abdulla Jan, the Heir-Apparent to Kabul and its Dependencies. The Mission is now about to set out from India; and this letter will be delivered to your Highness at Kabul by my Envoy in person, who will communicate unreservedly with your Highness upon the

reasons and objects of his coming. General Sir Neville Chamberlain possesses the full confidence of this Government; and whatever he may say should be understood to have been said by myself. I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself,

Your Highness' Sincere Friend,

(Signed) LYTTON,

Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Simla, the 7th September 1878.

No. 53.

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, 17th September 1878.

Native Agent reached Kabul 10th instant. Well received along the road. Had private interview on 12th with Ameer, to whom he delivered Viceroy's letters. Ameer stated that Russian Mission had come to Kabul with his permission, but evinced no desire to receive British Mission; concerning which he held dilatory and unsatisfactory language.

Ameer's officers at Ali Musjid has been asked to guarantee safety of Mission through Khyber Pass, failing which, arrangements will be made directly with Khyberrees, whose head men and hostages are at Peshawur.

No. 54.

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, 21st September 1878.

Chamberlain reports from Peshawur that it is quite evident Ameer is bent on utmost procrastination, and determined on making acceptance of our Mission dependent on his pleasure and choice of time; we have given formal public notice to Ameer by Viceroy's not unfriendly letters that Mission is going on business of highest importance to both States. Ameer has received these letters, discussed them with our native emissary, and had full time for reply and arrangements on road. Mission already delayed fourteen days beyond date originally fixed, and five days beyond adjourned date last notified to Ameer, while in India considerable public preparations for Mission have been made. Therefore, now to await at Peshawur Ameer's pleasure would be to abandon whole policy and accept easy repulse at outset; it was essential to test practically Ameer's real intentions, and further delay would have much endangered arrangements concluded with Khyberrees for safe conduct to Ali Musjid; consequently Mission moved this morning to Jamrud; thence Cavagnari advances to Ali Musjid with small escort to demand passage; if reply from Ameer's officials there is satisfactory, Mission proceeds, and any subsequent instructions can follow Mission, which will not reach Kabul until about fifteen days later; if reply unsatisfactory, Mission withdraws definitely, and further measures proposed will be reported to you. Intelligence just received that Mir Akhor at Ali Musjid has at last received instructions to arrange safe conduct of Mission to Kabul. Cavagnari's advance to Ali Musjid will verify this promptly.

No. 55.

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, 22nd September 1878.

Following telegram received last night from Sir Neville Chamberlain.

Message begins: Cavagnari reports that we have received a decisive answer from Faiz Mahomed, after personal interview, that he will not allow Mission to proceed. He crowned the heights commanding the way with his levies, and though many times warned by Cavagnari that his reply would be regarded as reply of the Ameer said he would not let Mission pass. Shall I make another attempt to-morrow morning, and try to bring Faiz Mahomed to reason, or make him fire upon us? Postscript: I have just met Cavagnari, who has given me full details. I am positively of opinion that any further attempt will only bring more disgrace upon us. Message ends.

Following reply despatched. Begins: Your telegram to-day, accepting the reply of Faiz Mahomed to ultimatum by Cavagnari as positive refusal by Ameer to let Mission pass, which has been pointed by a decisive show of force, I consider Mission must now withdraw, and that you should spare no pains to detach Khyberees permanently from Ameer. Inform Faiz Mahomed by letter that his answer to Cavagnari's demand and his action will be treated as those of the Ameer. Send letter to Gholam Hassan simultaneously, communicating briefly what has passed, and instruct him to return immediately. Reply ends.

The interview lasted three hours in presence of Native members of Mission.

I am now issuing orders for assembly of force at Thul and Quetta.

I shall use every endeavour to adjourn collision and obtain peaceful solution. No troops shall enter Afghanistan without full previous reference to you.

No. 56.

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, 23rd September 1878.

Sir Neville Chamberlain, on withdrawing Mission, guaranteed full aid and protection of British Government if needed to Khyberree tribes who escorted Cavagnari to Ali Musjid. I have confirmed this promise.

No. 57.

TELEGRAM from Secretary of State, 24th September 1878.

Yours 23rd.

Regret news. Send full information of facts and proposed measures.

No. 58.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th September 1878, from Viceroy, Simla.

Facts already given in mine of 17th, 21st, and 22nd. Amir has not replied, or indicated intention of replying, to my letters received by him 12th instant. He merely informed messenger verbally that British Government must indefinitely await his pleasure on subject of them which he would consider whenever it suited him, adding that Russian Mission had come with his permission, and that, in the present state of relations with us, he saw no reason for our sending British one. Departure of Mission had been twice postponed in consideration for Amir's bereavement, but customary period of mourning had elapsed. Ample time allowed for reply to Viceroy's letters and preparation for receiving Envoy, and, in face of prompt courteous reception of Russian Mission at Kabul, Chamberlain and self considered it absolutely incompatible with dignity of British Government, and seriously injurious to position, to keep Mission indefinitely awaiting Amir's pleasure at Peshawar.

Satisfactory arrangements having been concluded with Khaibarīs to escort Mission to Ali Masjid, and safety of Mission depending on prompt execution thereof, Mission advanced to Jamrud, whence Major Cavagnari proceeded with purposely small escort to Ali Masjid, where Mission was repulsed with strong demonstration of force as already reported. This took place in presence of the six Native noblemen and gentlemen attached to Chamberlain's staff. Officer commanding fort said he had incurred Amir's severe displeasure by passing Native messenger with Viceroy's letters, and, but for personal friendship, would, in obedience to Amir's orders, have shot down Cavagnari and his suite. Chamberlain writes thus:—No man was ever more anxious than I to preserve peace and secure friendly solution, and it was only when I plainly saw Amir's fixed intention to drive us into corner, that I told you we must either sink into position of merely obeying his behests on all points, or stand on our rights and risk rupture. Nothing could have been more distinct, nothing more humiliating to dignity of British Crown and Nation; and I believe that, but for decision and tact of Cavagnari at one period of interview, lives of British officers and Native following were in considerable

danger. End of Chamberlain's letter. Mission has consequently now been dissolved. Khaibaris acted admirably at risk to themselves from Amir's resentment, against which Chamberlain, with my entire approval, has guaranteed them complete protection.

No. 59.

No. 93 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 26th September 1878.

WE have regularly transmitted to your Lordship, by telegraph, reports of our proceedings taken in pursuance of our resolution to depute Sir Neville Chamberlain upon an urgent and important Mission to the Amir of Kabul. And we now enclose the further telegrams up to the recall of the Mission.

2. Sir Neville Chamberlain reached Peshawar on the 12th September, and placed himself in direct preliminary correspondence with the Amir's officers stationed upon the frontier, to whom it was necessary to give notice of his movements, and from whom their instructions had to be elicited. The general tenor of this correspondence, with the principal events and circumstances attending the departure of the Mission from Peshawar and its withdrawal in consequence of the armed resistance offered at Ali Masjid by the Amir's officers, have been reported to your Lordship by our telegrams.

3. We have now the honour to enclose papers giving in detail the course of these affairs as they occurred after Sir Neville Chamberlain's arrival at Peshawar, and upon his intimation to the Afghan officials that he desired a passage to Kabul. The information which had been received, early in September, from Kabul, clearly indicated the desire of the Amir to withhold any decisive expression of his intentions regarding the reception of the Mission, his object being to keep the Mission waiting indefinitely. But it had been plain from the first that a procrastinating and ambiguous policy on his part, which had been anticipated with certainty, would, unless at once put aside, assuredly involve the Mission in discredit and ultimate defeat. Sir Neville Chamberlain was therefore authorized to send early notice to the Mustaufi that the refusal of the free passage would bring matters to an issue.

4. It was, moreover, essential, in order that there might be no subsequent shifting of responsibility, that the Amir's officers upon the road to Kabul should know what had been written to the Mustaufi, in time for taking orders from head-quarters before the Mission should leave British territory. But as the communication of this notice to the Amir's Minister and officers, disconcerted and crossed whatever plans for temporizing may have been entertained, it unavoidably gave offence to His Highness; and the reports that the passage of the Mission would be refused and resisted grew stronger and multiplied. The Government of India were, nevertheless, reluctant to afford to the Amir even the slight ground for umbrage which might be taken at our arranging separately with the independent tribes who hold the entry to the Khaibar Pass, for the safe conduct of the Mission through their lands, before the Amir's dispositions had been fully ascertained. Faiz Muhammad, who commands at the fort of Ali Masjid in the Pass, was therefore asked whether he would give the necessary guarantee. On this point, however, the reply was that no orders had been received; although an officer of the Amir's had already come express to Ali Masjid with secret instructions, and had returned. On the 15th September Sir Neville Chamberlain addressed to Faiz Muhammad the letter (of which we enclose copy) conveying a formal summons to him to allow passage to the Mission; and subsequently informed him that his answer would be expected after the arrival of the Mir Akhor, a confidential officer of the Amir in charge of frontier affairs. The Mir Akhor arrived on the 18th; but no satisfactory reply was received; and Sir Neville Chamberlain's proposal to put the intentions of the Amir to a practical test was at last approved.

5. This being the state of affairs, the entire Mission moved from Peshawar to Jamrud on the morning of the 21st, and Major Cavagnari, accompanied by the two Native

gentlemen who had joined the Mission, advanced with a small escort in the afternoon to Ali Masjid to demand a passage. He was conducted to the fort by the Chiefs of the Khaibar tribes, who had agreed at the risk of incurring the Amir's hostility, to bring our officers face to face with the Amir's Commander. The result was completely decisive. Faiz Muhammad not only opposed an absolute and repeated refusal to the demand for a passage, but made all preparations for supporting his refusal with all the armed force at his command; and it is known that the garrison had been hastily reinforced for the occasion. The Mir Akhor was in the fort, but did not appear at the personal interview between Major Cavagnari and Faiz Muhammad, which lasted long; though he is understood to have been watching the proceedings. Major Cavagnari finally returned to Jamrud; and upon receipt by telegraph of Sir Neville Chamberlain's report of the affair, the Viceroy at once directed him to return to Peshawar.

6. It is to be regretted that this final endeavour on the part of our Government to arrive at some definite understanding with the Amir of Kabul should have been thus met with repudiation and affront. We submit, nevertheless, that the situation of affairs, and their tendency, left us no choice but to make the attempt; and that we employed the only method which offered any chance of success. The obviously growing estrangement of the Amir, his attitude toward us of exclusion and scarcely veiled hostility during the past twelve months, and his disregard of the amicable overtures made to him in 1876-77, gave to his formal reception, in August last, of Russian emissaries the character of a grave political declaration. It appeared quite possible, however, that the significance of this event might have been over-rated or misconstrued in India, or that the Amir himself might be induced, by timely diplomatic representations, to realize the gravity of his action, and to appreciate its inevitable effect upon his relations with our Government. But the only hope of clearing up any such misunderstandings, or of bringing our legitimate influence to bear upon the Amir, lay in the renewal of direct personal intercourse with him through a British Envoy. And there appeared to be no way left open by which this end could be attained, other than the simple and straight course of despatching a Mission immediately to Kabul. To have asked the Amir whether he would receive the Mission, and to have awaited his time and pleasure, would have been a futile repetition of an experiment which had failed already. The repulse of Sir Neville Chamberlain by Sher Ali at his frontier while the Russian emissaries are still at his capital, has proved the inutility of diplomatic expedients, and has deprived the Amir of all claim upon our further forbearance.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 14th September 1878.

From Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

FAIZ MUHAMMAD KHAN has sent to summon back the Khaibar headmen now at Peshawar. Khaibaris wish to know what they are to do. If they disobey this order they will lose the subsidy now paid them by the Kabul Government. If the British Government wishes to continue the present negotiations, it must guarantee the Khaibaris their allowances in future, and manage them direct. This, it is believed, they are desirous of arranging. Such a measure may prove an obstacle in arranging matters with the Amir. If the Khaibaris return to the Pass, it prevents our bringing to an immediate issue with the Amir's officials the question of the Amir's intention regarding the passage of the Mission; and this appears to be the object of Faiz Muhammad, who probably is not prepared to oppose by force the passage of the Mission, and is desirous of preventing its reaching Ali Masjid, which it can only do by an arrangement with the Khaibaris. Sir Neville thinks that, unless the Viceroy is willing to assent to indefinite delay, or to direct the Mission to advance by some other route, the Khaibaris should be dealt with as proposed. The negotiations hitherto carried on with the Khaibaris were on the understanding that no active opposition should be made by the Amir or by his officials. The allowances nominally given by Amir amount to about forty thousand Kabuli rupees per annum.

Enclosure 2 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 14th September 1878.

To Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

YOUR telegram of this day. Care is required to avoid giving Amir any plausible ground for complaint by separate arrangement with Khaibaris before he has offered open opposition to Mission. I recommend special messenger to Faiz Muhammad, with letter stating that Mission starts immediately, referring to recent visit of Mufti Shah Muhammad and summons to Khaibari headmen, and requiring immediate plain answer whether Faiz Muhammad, having, as we know, received instructions from Kabul, is prepared to guarantee safety of Mission through Pass. If he replies Yes, then I would let headmen obey his order, and Mission would advance, holding him responsible under guarantee. If he replies No, or gives evasive answer, or no answer within reasonable time, then make arrangements independently with Khaibaris, placing responsibility on Faiz Muhammad, and advance. Khaibari headmen should be informed of our action, and detained pending result, and guaranteed allowances and permanent protection in any event. This is my view; but Sir Neville's decision on the spot will be accepted and supported.

Enclosure 3 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 15th September 1878.

From Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

YOUR telegram to-day. Letter has been sent to Faiz Muhammad in accordance with Viceroy's cipher message of last night. Limit of delay in replying fixed at 18th instant, and of course we cannot act before this date. If answer is favourable we advance at once; if otherwise I commence the alternative negotiations.

Enclosure 4 in No. 59.

Dated Peshawar, 15th September 1878.

From His Excellency General Sir NEVILLE B. CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., Envoy and Plenipotentiary, Kabul Mission, to FAIZ MUHAMMAD KHAN, Commanding at the Fort of Ali Masjid, in the Khaibar Pass.

A. C.—I write to inform you that, by command of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, a friendly Mission of British officers, with a suitable escort, is about to proceed to Kabul through the Khaibar Pass, and intimation of the despatch of this Mission has been duly communicated to His Highness the Amir by the hand of the Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan.

I hear that an official from Kabul has recently visited you at Ali Masjid, and he has doubtless instructed you in accordance with His Highness the Amir's commands. As, however, information has now been received that you have summoned from Peshawar the Khaibar headmen with whom we were making arrangements for the safe conduct of the British Mission through the Khaibar Pass, I therefore write to inquire from you whether, in accordance with the instructions you have received, you are prepared to guarantee the safety of the British Mission to Dhakka, or not; and I request that a clear reply to this enquiry may be speedily communicated by the hand of the bearer of this letter, as I cannot delay my departure from Peshawar. It is well known that the Khaibar tribes are in receipt of allowances from the Kabul Government, and also, like other independent tribes on this frontier, have relations with the British Government. It may be well to let you know that when the present negotiations were opened with the Khaibar tribes, it was solely with the object of arranging with them for the safe conduct of the British Mission through the Khaibar Pass, in the same manner as was done in regard to the despatch of our Agent, the Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan; and the tribes were given clearly to understand that these negotiations were in no way intended to prejudice their relations with His Highness the Amir, as it was well known that the object of the British Mission was altogether of a friendly character to His Highness the Amir and the people of Afghanistan.

I trust that, in accordance with the instructions you have received from His Highness the Amir, your reply to this letter will be satisfactory, and that it will contain the required assurances that the Mission will be safely conducted to Dhakka. I shall expect to receive your reply to this letter not later than the 18th instant, so please understand that the matter is most urgent.

But, at the same time, it is my duty to inform you, in a frank and friendly manner, that if your answer is not what I trust it will be, or if you delay to send an early reply, I shall have no alternative but to make whatever arrangements may seem to me best for carrying out the instructions I have received from my own Government.

Enclosure 5 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 16th September 1878.

From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

REPLY received from Faiz Muhammad. States that, as yet, he has no orders from the Amir to allow the Mission to proceed, but that the Mir Akhor was expected hourly at Ali Masjid, and that,

as he is a man of position, he may have received some orders, or may be able to discuss matters with the British officers. Faiz Muhammad suggests that we should wait and see whether Mir Akhor's visit is productive of a friendly issue, and not risk collision by advancing at present. I think I should await the Mir Akhor's arrival, and write back to that effect. I have written at length by this post, and I sent copy of documents.

Enclosure 6 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 16th September 1878.

From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

LETTER received from Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan, announcing his arrival at Kabul on 10th instant; and that he was well received during journey, and hospitably entertained on arrival. He was received by the Amir on the 12th.

Enclosure 7 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 17th September 1878.

From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

NATIVE Envoy presented the letters from the Viceroy to the Amir at a private interview, no one else being present. The Amir then handed the letter from the Commissioner to the Address of Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan to the latter to read. This letter was that sent in accordance with the Viceroy's cipher telegram of the 7th instant. One of similar purport was sent at the same time to the Mustaufi. These letters went by the Amir's post from Peshawar.

Amir was very much displeased, objected to the harsh words, and said, "It is as if they were come by force. I do not agree to the Mission coming in this manner; and until my officers have received orders from me, how can the Mission come? It is as if they wish to disgrace me; it is not proper to use pressure in this way; it will tend to a complete (rupture?) and breach of friendship. I am a friend as before, and entertain no ill-will. The Russian Envoy has come, and has come with my permission. I am still afflicted with grief at the loss of my son, and have had no time to think over the matter. If I get time, whatever I consider advisable will be acted upon. Under these circumstances they can do as they like." Nawab adds that the advance of the Mission should be held in abeyance, otherwise some harm will occur. Should the Amir decide to receive Mission, he will of his own accord, and will make all necessary arrangements. If Mission advanced now, Nawab anticipates resistance. Letter ends.

With reference to my previous telegram about the expected arrival of (Mir Akhor?) at Ali Masjid, I think Government had better await the result of any communication he may make, as possibly he may have later instructions from the Amir. It is worthy of notice that the letter Amir desired Nawab to read, and which contained the expressions he objected to, was that addressed by the Commissioner to the Nawab, which the latter had not previously seen, and which Amir had no right to desire him to open and read to him, being a confidential letter.

Full details by to-morrow's post.

Enclosure 8 in No. 59.

Telegram dated 17th September 1878.

To Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

I SEE no reason to anticipate more definite instructions by Mir Akhor than those brought by Mufti Shah; and letter from Faiz Muhammad and Amir's replies to Nawab both clearly indicate intention of endeavouring to delay Mission indefinitely.

I therefore consider that date originally named to Faiz Muhammad should be adhered to; and that, if no satisfactory assurance of safety through Pass is received by to-morrow, independent negotiations should be concluded as rapidly as possible with Khaibaris, and Mission should advance without any avoidable delay, in accordance with instructions, till forcibly opposed.

Enclosure 9 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 17th September 1878.

From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

I HAVE delayed sending again to Faiz Muhammad Khan to ascertain the nature of the Mir Akhor's last instructions to him until I have your approval for carrying out that step. I have considered it best to do this, considering the nature of the Nawab's letter telegraphed to your Lordship last night. Please say if you wish the communication to be made.

Enclosure 10 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 17th September 1878.

To Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

YOUR latest telegram this day. I have no objection to your writing back to Faiz Muhammad as you propose.

Enclosure 11 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1878.

From Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

ALL reports agree that Ali Masjid officials will oppose passage of the Mission. I personally doubt that they will do so by force of arms. The test will be applied when Mission reaches the first point of contact with Kabul officials. To effect this as speedily as possible, and to avoid the extreme measure of permanently detaching the tribes from Amir's control, I am negotiating with Khaibaris to escort, as a matter of ordinary safe conduct, the Mission to Ali Masjid, and back if necessary. Khaibaris promise a reply to-morrow, as they have sent to the Pass to consult their clansmen as to whether they can do this in spite of the prohibitory orders they have received from Amir's officials. If they agree to this Mission can advance at once.

Enclosure 12 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1878.

From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

THE Mir Akhor has arrived at Ali Masjid. General opinion is that resistance to the passage of the Mission will be offered by the Kabul officials, as Faiz Muhammad, and indeed the Amir himself, have intimated to us; and I now consider it useless to communicate again with the officials at Ali Masjid. If your Lordship, after consideration of the Nawab's last letter just telegraphed, is unwilling to assent to further delay, we will continue our arrangements now in progress with the Afridis to endeavour to get as far as Ali Masjid, where the actual intentions of the Kabul officials can alone be tested. Am I authorised to endeavour to detach the tribes permanently from the Amir's control, in order to effect the above object, if it cannot be done otherwise? It should be clearly understood that our doing this will be viewed by the Amir as an act of hostility.

Enclosure 13 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 19th September 1878.

To Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

YOUR telegram of yesterday. Further delay is certainly most undesirable. I approve negotiation with Khaibaris for safe conduct to Ali Masjid, and permanently detaching tribes from Amir if necessary. Early practical test of Amir's intentions desirable. Your letter to Faiz Muhammad received, and highly approved.

Enclosure 14 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1878.

From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

ANOTHER letter received from Nawab Gholam Hasan Khan after an interview with Wazir Shah Muhammad, who assured Nawab, on his oath, that the Amir intimated that he would send for the Mission in order to clear up mutual misunderstandings, provided there was no attempt to force this Mission upon him without his consent being first granted according to usual custom; otherwise he would resist it, as coming in such a manner would be a slight to him. He attributed the English grievances against him to mischievous reports of newswriters. He reiterated his Quetta grievances, &c. He says he did not invite the Russian Mission, but that, as his country was quite exposed, and he was estranged from the English, he was obliged to let them come on after they crossed the Oxus. He denies that the Russians came for any other purpose than to exchange civilities in consequence of their having a common boundary with Afghanistan. He believes that a personal interview with British Mission will adjust misunderstandings. He has no wish to give Russians a right of way through his country. He says that there has been sickness at Kabul, and that some of the Russian servants are lying ill; but that, as soon as they recover, he hopes to give

them their *congé* in a suitable manner, after which he will send a confidential messenger to escort the British Mission. He undertakes to be responsible for the safety of the Mission, and its good treatment if he invites it. He wishes Mission to remain a short time longer at Peshawar. He stated that friendship has existed between the two Powers for a long time, and that he does not wish to destroy it; that in two or three days he will send for the Nawab, and, after consultation with him, will fix a date and make all arrangements for the coming of the Mission; that the Nawab should write and say that the sending of the Mission without Amir's consent will be a slight on the Amir. Nawab thinks that the Russian Envoy will be dismissed after the Eed, and that the Amir will then send for the British Mission. Letter ends.

It is my impression from the above that Amir has received his answer from Tashkend.

Another telegram follows immediately.

Enclosure 15 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 19th September 1878.

To Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

YOUR cipher telegram of yesterday was received after the despatch of mine. Nawab's letter makes no change in situation, and should not delay your movements. Reply may, however, at once be sent to Nawab, stating you reciprocate friendly sentiments expressed to him by Wazir Shah Muhammad on behalf of Amir; that your departure has been already postponed through reluctance to interfere with mourning, and in order to give time for arrangements on road; and that you trust that this delay will have enabled Amir to make necessary preparations, so that the invitation which he has expressed his readiness to send may reach you on frontier of his territory.

Enclosure 16 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 19th September 1878.

From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

THE following is an abstract of a letter just received from the Nawab, dated Kabul, 15th instant. Full translation will go by post.

The Nawab says that the Amir is in a bad humour, and the Ministers tell me that on account of grief and indisposition he cannot bear to hear alternately harsh and conciliatory language. The Ministers express hope that when replies were received to the Nawab's letters of the 12th and 13th, the reception of the Mission will be satisfactorily arranged for. Further, that if Mission starts on 18th, without waiting for the Amir's permission, there would be no hope left for the renewal of friendship or reconciliation. In such a case we cannot hold ourselves responsible for anything. What will happen, will happen. If Mission will await Amir's permission everything will be arranged, God willing, in the best manner, and no room will be left for complaint in the future. The Minister adds that the Amir is much annoyed by the various unbecoming communications, some to his own address, some to his officers. Communications should not be written in an authoritative tone, nor should any be addressed to his officials, as they are the servants of the Kabul Government, and not of the British. The Kabul officials have no power to do the slightest thing without the order of the Amir. Everything should be done quietly and in a friendly manner, and consistently with the dignity of the Kabul Government. The post-runners left by the Nawab had been ordered away. The Nawab writes that what he communicates is what he hears from the Wazir; that people are prevented from having any intercourse with him, that nobody visits him, and that he receives his food from the Amir. The Nawab says that if the Mission does not start on the 18th, there will still be an opening for further discussion. Also, that whether the Amir fulfils his promise to send for the Mission or not, he thinks the Amir will reply to the letters of the Viceroy. In the event of rupture and disturbances taking place there will be no chance left for further discussion. The Nawab asks to be furnished with instructions.

It is now quite evident that the Amir is bent on stretching procrastination to the utmost, and determined on asserting his claims to total independence of action by making the acceptance of the Mission dependent on his sole pleasure and dictation when it shall be received. If these points be yielded, then he holds out the hope that he will hereafter, at his own time, send a person to bring the Mission, and receive it honourably. It has been said in the clearest language by the Amir himself, by his Minister, and by his officers in command of his outposts, that they will, if necessary, stop the advance of the Mission by force. That determination is just as clear, to my mind, as if half of our escort had been shot down. Unless your Lordship accepts this position, all chance of a peaceful solution seems to me gone. The Amir is bent on upholding his own will and dignity at any cost to the dignity of the British Government. Our Agent at Kabul writes as if it was our duty to accept wholly the views of the Amir. He asks for answers to his letter when there is nothing to reply to; this is evidently done by the dictation of the Amir. I suggest that the Nawab be recalled. He has done what he was sent to do. Will your Lordship sanction my recalling him?

Your Lordship's telegram of this morning received. Negotiations with Passmen in progress. No answer as yet; too soon to expect one. All the sections of the tribes have to be consulted: this takes time.

Enclosure 17 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 20th September 1 78.

From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

THE Khaibaris agree to escort the Mission to Ali Masjid, or to any nearer point, until we come into contact with the Amir's authorities. They do not hold themselves responsible for what may then happen. They will also, if necessary, give us safe conduct back. They require a day to make their arrangements. We encamp to-morrow near Jamrud, and the next morning will advance towards Ali Masjid. A small party will suffice to test things as well as the whole escort, and I consider it most desirable to reduce to a minimum any indignity which may be offered to our Government. I shall, therefore, not move the camp from Jamrud until we know that we can pass on.

* Referring to your Excellency's telegram received last night, I will not write to the Nawab until I receive a reply to my long telegram of yesterday afternoon.

Enclosure 18 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 20th September 1878.

From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

I HAVE already given orders, as intimated, for the Mission to move to-morrow. I am of opinion that the Mission should stand fast, and that Cavagnari, with a small escort, should go to-morrow to Ali Masjid to hear from the lips of the Amir's officer in command there, whether he will allow the Mission to pass or not. If he says No, I should consider that answer the same as if we had been fired on. I should cease negotiation, and recal Mission and Nawab. It is my strong conviction that resistance is intended, and every Native thinks so also. After long warning and considerable preparation, we cannot now move forward out of our territory and be openly turned back without being disgraced in the eye of India. This means loss of prestige, which I think should be avoided. The Amir's policy is to claim full liberty to decide on the acceptance or not of the Mission, and, if we attempt to go against his will, to say we used force. If we accept his first argument (?) there is no certainty. Finally, it is no (?); if the second (?), it implies we go to war with him. I would sooner have the latter without the insult.

Please instruct me at once whether to move to-morrow or to send Cavagnari.

Enclosure 19 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 20th September 1878.

To Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

YOUR second telegram of to-day. I consider that Mission should move out of Peshawar to Jamrud, and that Cavagnari should proceed thence with a small escort to Ali Masjid and demand immediate passage. If this is not given, I propose to withdraw Mission, and break off negotiation. Telegraph answer received.

Enclosure 20 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 21st September 1878.

From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

THE Mission Camp is at Jamrud. I join it this afternoon. Major Cavagnari goes on to Ali Masjid to demand that the Mission be allowed to pass on to-morrow. He will return with the answer to Jamrud. It shall be telegraphed to your Lordship. Information just come in that early yesterday the Mir Akhor received a letter from the Amir, directing him to allow the Mission to pass, and to stop the Afridis collecting. The report in the town is that it is peace between the English and the Amir.

Enclosure 21 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 21st September 1878.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

I HAVE received news from Ali Masjid, which I believe-true, that the Mir Akhor, who had come to oppose the passage of the Mission, received an express from the Amir yesterday morning (20th),

saying that the Mission was to pass. Mir Akhor and Faiz Muhammad abused the Amir freely in the presence of my informant, and countermanded the collecting of the Twah Afridis. No preparations made for stopping Mission. Troops have returned from Khaibar to Dhakka. I am told that there will be no opposition beyond Ali Masjid, the tribes merely expecting a present for escorting.

I gave this news to Cavagnari before he left this morning for Jamrud, where the Mission is to-day. Sir Neville Chamberlain leaves for Jamrud this afternoon. Cavagnari rides into Ali Masjid to-day to demand safe passage for Mission.

Enclosure 22 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 21st September 1878.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

FAIZ MUHAMMAD positively refuses to allow passage of Mission. Was blamed for allowing Nawab to pass. Consequences were explained, but the refusal was absolute.

Enclosure 23 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 22nd September 1878.

From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Jamrud, through Peshawar.

JUST received your Lordship's sanction for the return of the Mission to Peshawar. It will do so at once. Letters will be sent off at once to Faiz Muhammad Khan at Ali Masjid, and to the Nawab at Kabul. The reports of Major Cavagnari and Colonel Jenkins of their interview with Faiz Muhammad will be sent to-day by post.

Enclosure 24 in No. 59.

Telegram dated 22nd September 1878.

From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

I HAVE returned to Peshawar. What are your Lordship's orders as to the Mission, and especially as to the Native Noblemen attached to it? As the Khaibaris asked me what they were to do if the Amir interfered with them, I replied that the last soldier should be sent, and the last rupee spent, in protecting them. I told them that they had done their work well for us, and that we considered them as friends. Is Amir's postmaster to be allowed to remain here, and others known to be Amir's agents and those of his officials, after the indignity the British Government has suffered by the Amir's repelling Mission? I think we are bound to take immediate steps openly to resent the affront, and to show our well-wishers that they will receive support from us.

Enclosure 25 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 22nd September 1878.

To Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

YOUR telegram of 22nd. Your Mission, which has rendered a highly-valued service, can now be dissolved, and Lyall will at once communicate with its European members their respective destinations. Cavagnari should continue, and complete, as speedily as possible, detaching negotiations sanctioned in my previous telegram. I shall be glad if Native Noblemen attached to Mission will now afford me opportunity of personally thanking them at Simla before they return home. Let me know if they may be expected. Should either of them desire it, I will, with the acquiescence of the heads of their States, arrange for their suitable personal association with any military operation now rendered necessary. Amir's postmaster may remain at Peshawar for the present, pending assurance of Nawab's safe return. Immediate steps will now be taken in conformity with policy indicated in my Minute as applicable to present situation. About your own movements I telegraph separately.

No. 59A.

No. 96 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 3rd October 1878.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of Peshawar Diary No. 34, dated 25th September 1878.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

R. STRACHEY.

S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure in No. 59A.

PESHAWAR Diary No. 34, dated 25th September 1878. (Extract.)

YESTERDAY the 24th, a letter, dated 19th September, was received from Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan from Kabul to the address of Munshi Bakhtyar Khan. It is to be found as Appendix I. of this Diary. It was accompanied by another letter from the Nawab to the Munshi without date, written apparently at the same time, but which had been sent by other means than the Amir's post. The first suggests the wording of a letter to be written to the Amir, and begs that it may be couched in friendly terms. The second implies that the first was written at the instance of the Amir and his Wazir, and gives the real state of affairs between himself and the Amir.

(Signed)

W. G. WATERFIELD, Major,
Commissioner.

Translation of Letter, dated 19th September 1878, from NAWAB GHOLAM HUSSEIN
KHAN to MUNSHI MUHAMMAD BAKHTYAR KHAN.

A. C. I beg to state nowadays the temper of the Amir is quickly disturbed by certain words in the letters from that direction (India), and he considers them as a slight upon his government, and in this state of the case it is impossible that matters can end well. I therefore write to say, in accordance with my humble opinion, that should the Commissioner approve of delay, and not consider it objectionable, a letter to the following purport might be addressed to the Amir, both by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Commissioner:—"After compliments. We have recently heard that your Highness has been grievously afflicted with sorrow in consequence of the lamented death of the heir-apparent, and that Your Highness has shown displeasure (or felt hurt) at certain expressions in friendly letters which were sent from this side out of friendly motives to Your Highness. It is, therefore, clearly intimated that a Mission of British officers has been appointed by this Government simply on account of the welfare and friendship existing between the two Governments. Until a meeting is effected and mutual discussions arrived at, no settlement is possible. Therefore, in reliance on the former friendship, it is intimated that the Mission of British officers is now at Peshawar ready to meet your Highness, and it is advisable that you issue orders to your officials for safe conduct and supplies on the journey, and (at the same time) favour me with a hint, so that I may despatch the mission with a suitable escort from this place to meet and discuss matters with your Highness, and having agreed on what is to the interests of both Governments, and to their mutual welfare, the same be acted upon accordingly. Therefore an early and favourable reply is requested. Compliments and good wishes."

My friend, the Amir is in these days full of grief, and you yourself know all well. It is as well to remember and word the letters in a conciliatory tone with the view to soliciting an increase of friendship and good-will and not their daily destruction. Compliments and good wishes.

TRANSLATION of Letter from NAWAB GHOLAM HUSSEIN KHAN to MUNSHI MUHAMMAD
BAKHTYAR KHAN. (Without date.) (Extract.)

THE facts are these: Whatever I write is what I hear from the Wazir or from the Amir, and some sentences are from myself. Considering that the post is in the hands of the Amir, and that nobody is allowed to communicate with me, you may imagine what sort of an account I can give. The temper of the Amir is hasty (or touchy), and he gives little or no attention to the letters from the British Government. The reason of his not inviting the English Mission is the intention to delay. Three Russian officers have gone back and two are still in Kabul. I suspect that the coming of the English Mission is impossible so long as the Russians are here (or until the Russians have gone back). If the British Government is content to delay for its own purposes, then conciliatory letters may prove useful, but in the event of delay being considered injurious, then my stay here is of no profit, and I should be recalled in some suitable manner. If you think it fit, represent this state of affairs, and communicate the contents of the second letter. The reason of the people being kept away from me is the want of trust in everybody. The supply of cooked food is still continued to me, and there is no sign of unkindness towards me. On the contrary, my treatment may be considered kind.

No. 60.

No. 95 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 3rd October 1878.

OUR last Despatch, dated September 26th,* reported to your Lordship that the

* No. 93, Secret.

Amir's Commander at the Kabul Frontier Fort of Ali Masjid had opposed armed resistance to the passage of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission, and that we had consequently directed Sir Neville Chamberlain to return to Peshawar. The Mission has since been dissolved.

2. Sir Neville Chamberlain's final report of his proceedings will be transmitted to your Lordship very shortly. In the meantime, we have the honour to enclose copies of the reports submitted to him by Major Cavagnari and Colonel Jenkins, who were sent in advance to Ali Masjid to demand a passage, of their interview with the Amir's Commander.

3. We shall submit, at a very early date, to your Lordship papers showing the measures which we have decided to take upon this clear evidence of the attitude assumed toward the British Government by the Amir of Kabul. It will be recollected that the Amir and his officials had been duly forewarned, directly and indirectly, that a refusal of free passage to the Mission would be regarded as an act of open hostility. We have directed the assemblage of troops upon certain points of our frontier, with a view to early ulterior operations. And we have arranged with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to make certain specific arrangements for the better watching of the border around the entry of the Khaibar Pass, and for the support of the tribes in that quarter which are acting with us. The negotiations of the Political Officers with the independent tribes in this vicinity for securing their adherence, and for detaching them from the Amir's influence, have proceeded favourably.

4. We also enclose copies of the more important reports and orders that have been received and issued.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

R. STRACHEY.

S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 60.

Dated 22nd September 1878.

From Major N. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., on Special Duty, Kabul Mission, to His Excellency General Sir NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary, Kabul Mission.

IN obedience to your Excellency's instructions, I left Peshawar early yesterday morning, with the view to proceeding to the fort of Ali Masjid in the Khaibar Pass, in order to ascertain from the Amir's officials in charge of this post whether they would permit the British Mission to pass through the Khaibar, and be responsible for its safety and proper treatment during its journey to Kabul, or not.

2. On arrival at Jamrud, where the camp of the Mission was pitched, I communicated with Colonel Jenkins, Commanding the escort, and it was arranged that he and Captain W. Battye, with a small escort of cavalry, should accompany me on my Mission.

3. Negotiations had been concluded on the previous day with the Khaibar headmen present at Peshawar to escort the British Mission from Jamrud to Ali Masjid, or to any other point within the Khaibar at which the Amir's officials might be stationed, and back to the British frontier if it was necessary to return. I therefore sent off the Khaibaris who had preceded me to the camp at Jamrud, to make arrangements through the Pass; and I deputed messengers to Ali Masjid to inform the Mir Akhor and Faiz Muhammad Khan, the Commandant of the fort, that I, with two other British Officers, were leaving Jamrud for Ali Masjid, in order to have a personal interview with them.

4. After waiting a sufficient time at Jamrud to enable the Khaibaris and my messengers to get well ahead, I left camp and entered the Pass. On reaching Mackeson's Bridge, I was met by one of my messengers, who was returning from Ali Masjid, and who informed me that Faiz Muhammad Khan had desired him to return and request the officers to halt at whatever place the messenger should meet them, and that he would come to interview them. As this was palpably an attempt to gain time—a line of conduct the Amir's officials are specially proficient in—and as it was my object to get as near Ali Masjid as possible, so that there should be no question as to the responsibility of the Amir's officials for any obstruction I might meet with, I directed the messenger to return and inform the Khan that I intended to proceed onward until I met him.

5. When we reached the heights above Lala China, which are about a mile from Ali Masjid and within sight of the fort, some of the Khaibar headmen met us, and informed me that the ridges in front of us, which completely commanded the remainder of the road to Ali Masjid, were held by the Amir's levies (Khasadar), who would not let our party pass. We also observed large numbers of men descending from Ali Masjid to strengthen these positions, indicating beyond doubt that there was every intention to oppose us if we attempted to proceed. As these pickets were within the limits of that portion of the Pass the Khaibaris who accompanied me were responsible for, I sent a party of them to parley with the levies; but the latter threatened to fire if any one approached. I therefore sent another messenger to Faiz Muhammad Khan, inviting him to come and meet me, or to arrange for my safe passage to Ali Masjid, as his men held command of the road and refused to allow my party to advance. As some time passed, and no definite answer was received, I sent one of the Kalil

* Afridi Khan of Mulazai.

Khans* who had accompanied me, to ascertain the position of affairs; but shortly afterwards I received a report that the Khan had been stopped and was not permitted to advance.

6. I then prepared to write a letter to the address of the Mir Akhor and Faiz Muhammad Khan, informing them that I had been stopped by the advanced pickets of the Ali Masjid post under their command, but that I intended to proceed until fired upon, and that if this occurred the responsibility would be theirs, and that the act would be held to indicate that, as† the Amir of Kabul's representatives

† *Sic* in orig.

absolutely declined to allow the British Mission to advance, I intended to let a reasonable interval pass, and then, if no satisfactory reply was received Colonel Jenkins and I, with a few men, were to advance towards Ali Masjid until fired upon, when we would have retired under cover of the remainder of the escort which was to be left with Captain Battye on the heights where we had halted.

7. Before this letter was ready for despatch, a message was brought me from Faiz Muhammad Khan to the effect that he was about to come to a ruined tower in the bed of the stream just below where we were halted, and that, on his arrival there, he would send for myself and three others and would hear anything we had to communicate.

8. As it appeared to me that it would have been an indignity to have remained and waited until Faiz Muhammad Khan would send for me, as well as to be dictated to as to the number of men that should accompany me (it would have been different had I been permitted to proceed with my escort to the fort of Ali Masjid, when, of course, I would only have entered the post with as many men as the officers in command chose to admit), I determined to advance at once with as many men as I thought fit to take, and endeavour to meet Faiz Muhammad Khan before he should reach the spot named by him.

9. Accordingly, Colonel Jenkins, myself, and one or two of the Guide Cavalry, with some of the Khaibar headmen, and the Native gentlemen marginally noted, descended without delay into the bed of the stream and advanced to meet Faiz Muhammad Khan. A party of Afridis, headed by Abdulla Nur, a Kuki Khel Afridi Malik in receipt of special allowances from the Amir, attempted to stop me, saying that only four persons should advance. I rode past him, telling him that my mission concerned the Kabul officials, and that I desired to have no discussion with the Afridis. The

Nawab Bahadur Sher Khan.
Arbab Sarferaz Khan.
Arbab Fateh Muhammad Khan.
Afridi Khan.
Munshi Bakhtiar Khan.
Abbas Khan, and several others.

Malik made no further opposition—in fact, he knew that most of his tribe were with me, and he himself was only acting a part to save his allowances.

10. After meeting Faiz Muhammad Khan and exchanging salutations, I pointed to what I considered a suitable place for an interview—it was a watermill with some trees close by it, and on the opposite side of the stream to the spot originally named for the place of meeting. Faiz Muhammad Khan was accompanied by the Naib, or Deputy, of the Mir Akhor, a considerable number of the Ali Masjid levies, and some of the Afridi headmen of the upper villages of the Khaibar; and their respective followers.

11. When we had seated ourselves, I commenced the interview by pointing out to Faiz Muhammad Khan that he and myself were servants of our respective Governments, and had met to carry out whatever orders we had received; so that, whatever the result of our meeting might be, there need be nothing personal between him and myself. After the Khan had fully reciprocated this friendly sentiment, I proceeded to state that he was well aware that the British Government had decided on sending a friendly Mission of European British Officers, accompanied by a suitable escort, to His Highness the Amir of Kabul; that the Mission was encamped at Jamrud, and intended to proceed through the Khaibar on the following day; that, in consequence of various reports received, I had been deputed by my Government to ascertain from the Amir's officials at Ali Masjid whether they had received instructions, or were prepared to guarantee the safe passage and proper treatment of the Mission during its journey to Kabul, or not; and I hoped that, if there was any latitude for independent action in the orders he had received from Kabul, he would do all he could towards an amicable adjustment of affairs between the two Governments. Faiz Muhammad Khan replied that he had every desire to act in a friendly manner, and that, actuated by such motives, he had allowed Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan to proceed without any detention, but that his action in this respect had met with disapproval from the Kabul Durbar; that if he had not been friendly disposed he would not have consented to the present interview, or have restrained his levies from firing on my party; that he had received no orders from the Amir to let the Mission pass his post; and that, without such orders, he could not let it proceed; but that if the Mission would only wait for a few days he would communicate with Kabul and ask for orders. I replied that my orders were distinct, and that I was instructed to say that the Mission would advance on the next day, unless I received a reply from the Amir's officials that its advance would be opposed; and I begged the Khan not to take upon himself such a heavy responsibility as to say he would oppose the advance of the British Mission, unless his orders were clear and distinct in the matter; for, whatever his reply was, it would be considered as that of the Amir of Kabul. Faiz Muhammad Khan replied that he was only a sentry, and had no regular troops, but only a few levies; but that such as his orders were, he would carry out to the best of his ability, and that, unless he received orders from Kabul, he could not let the Mission pass his post. I rejoined to this, that it did not signify what the actual strength of his post was, as the Mission was a friendly one and bent on peaceful objects, and I again urged him not to take such a grave responsibility if he had any option in the matter. He replied that it was a very heavy matter for him to decide upon; as, on the one hand, he could not act without orders from Kabul, while, on the other hand, he was told that his reply would be considered as that of the Amir of Kabul. He then began with much warmth to question the friendly intentions of the British Government by stating that it was not a sign of friendship for the British authorities to negotiate direct with the Khaibar tribes, who were subjects of the Amir of Kabul and in receipt of allowances from that ruler, and induce them to escort Nawab Ghulam Hussein, and also some British officers (meaning my party), without the Amir's permission. I replied that there was no cause for dissatisfaction in what had been done in the matter. It was never anticipated that a friendly Mission would have met with any opposition, as such Missions are never opposed in any civilized country; and that the arrangements made with the Afridis were merely to induce them to undertake the safe conduct ("*badragga*") of a peaceably disposed Mission, which every independent Pathan tribe has a right to undertake in its own country. Faiz Muhammad Khan continued with increasing warmth to allude to the subject, and there was an uneasy sort of murmuring commencing amongst the people around, which appeared to me (and, as I afterwards ascertained, the same idea occurred to Colonel Jenkins and to some of the Native gentlemen with me) to indicate that, if the discussion was any longer prolonged, the movement alluded to might assume a more decided form, which might possibly be one which our small party could not deal with in a suitable manner. I therefore interrupted the Khan by saying that the subject was one which it did not behove subordinates to discuss, and that, if the Amir considered what had been done as a grievance, I had no doubt that the British Government would give him a suitable answer. I then asked the Khan for the last time if I correctly understood him to say that, if the British Mission advanced as intended on the following day, he would oppose it by force; and he replied that such would be the case. I then got up and shook Faiz Muhammad Khan by the hand, and assured him that I had no unfriendly feelings against him personally, and that I hoped to meet him again on some future occasion. I then turned to the Native gentlemen who were with me, and asked them if they did not consider a clear and decisive answer had been given; and they replied that it was so.

12. In fact, there was scarcely any necessity for an interview to settle this point, as the hostile preparations made by the Ali Masjid garrison on seeing my party approach, notwithstanding that my object in coming, and the small strength of my escort, had been communicated to, and received by, the Commandant of the Fort, and the Amir's representative, the Mir Akhor, would ordinarily have been quite sufficient to indicate predetermined affront and insult; and I believe that, with any other of the Amir's officials but Faiz Muhammad Khan, who, from first to last, has behaved in a most courteous manner, and very favourably impressed both Colonel Jenkins and myself, a collision

of some kind would have taken place. The general belief is that Faiz Muhammad Khan was acting under the direct orders of the Mir Akhor, who had been purposely deputed by the Amir to supervise Faiz Muhammad Khan's management of Khaibar affairs, and to see that, without orders to the contrary, he checked the advance of the British Mission. I have no doubt that Faiz Muhammad Khan softened down a great deal of the insult that was intended, though, short of actual collision, it is impossible to imagine what more could be done to effect the Amir's object.

13. The Khaibaris, as far as their conduct was tested, acted faithfully to their engagements, and, but for their assistance, we should not have been able to bring matters to a definite issue with the Amir's officials without a great deal of trouble, expense, and delay.

14. The interview with Faiz Muhammad Khan being concluded, we returned to Jamrud, and I returned to Peshawar and personally reported to your Excellency all that had taken place.

15. In conclusion, I would desire to bring to your Excellency's favourable notice the ready and courteous assistance I received from Colonel Jenkins.

The Khaibar arrangements were managed by Arbab Fateh Muhammad Khan, and I purpose bringing his services to notice in due course.

Enclosure 2 in No. 60.

Dated, Camp, Peshawar, 22nd September 1878.

From Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. JENKINS, Commandant, Corps of Guides (Q.O.), to Captain
ST. V. HAMMICK, Military Secretary to Sir Neville Chamberlain.

I HAVE the honour to make the following report for the information of his Excellency General Sir Neville Chamberlain, G.C.B.

2. According to his orders, I marched from Peshawar, early on the 21st September, with the camp of the Kabul Mission, and reached Jamrud soon after 7 o'clock.

3. About 8 o'clock, Major Cavagnari arrived in camp, and told me that he was going up to Ali Masjid to get an answer from the Officer Commanding regarding the passage of the Mission through Ali Masjid, and its safe conduct to Kabul.

4. After a short delay to allow the headmen of the Kuki Khel Afridis to send some of their people ahead of us up the Khaibar Pass, to tell Faiz Muhammad Khan that Major Cavagnari was coming to talk to him, and that he had only a small escort with him, Major Cavagnari and I started from Jamrud, having with us Captain Wigram Battye and twenty-four men of the cavalry of the Corps of Guides.

5. We marched by the gun road made by Colonel Mackeson in (1840), which we found in very good order, and, before noon, reached a hill, from which we could plainly see Ali Masjid, about three-quarters of a mile distant from the fort.

6. When the people in Ali Masjid saw our uniform on the hill, they immediately made preparations to resist us. Some manned the walls of the fort, and some occupied a ridge, along the foot of which the road between us and Ali Masjid ran. At the same time, one or two signal shots were fired.

7. If we had advanced, then I am sure that we should have been at once engaged with three or four hundred men under circumstances of great disadvantage, for we should have been fighting on the lower ground, with the enemy strongly posted on our front and right flank. Besides this, I am persuaded that the Amir's officers would have excused themselves from all blame for what might have happened, by saying that we had rashly come into collision with their troops without giving time for explanation.

8. Under these circumstances, Major Cavagnari, wisely, I think, decided to remain on the hill where we were for a short time, but it was agreed that if Faiz Muhammad could not be induced to come and meet us, Major Cavagnari and I, with a couple of men, were to go towards the fort and get an answer to the question he had come to ask.

9. After waiting on the hill for about two hours, during which more than one message was sent to Faiz Muhammad Khan, Afridi Khan, Arbab of Malazai, came back to say that the Sirdar was coming to meet us in the valley below, where we were standing. Shortly after this, we saw Faiz Muhammad coming with fifty or sixty followers, and Major Cavagnari and I, with two men of the Guides, went down and met him. Major Cavagnari had also with him Fateh Muhammad Khan, Arbab Afridi Khan, and a few of the Kuki Khel Afridis who had come with us up the pass; also Bahadur Sher Khan, the Bangash Chief.

10. After shaking hands with the Sirdar, we crossed the stream, and sat down under a tree close to the village of Lala Chinu. Directly we sat down, several more of the Sirdar's followers turned up, and we had 150 or 200 of them close round us while we sat and talked.

11. Major Cavagnari began by saying that the British Government was sending a peaceful Mission to the Amir Sher Ali Khan, of which due notice had been given to the Amir, that the camp of the Mission was at Jamrud, and that he came to ask for a passage through Ali Masjid, and a safe conduct to Kabul.

12. The Sirdar replied that he had already written more than once to say that the Mission could not pass Ali Masjid without the Amir's sanction, which had not been received, and that we must wait, and that he would again refer to the Amir for orders on the subject.

13. Major Cavagnari said that the Sirdar's letters had been received, but that the British Government would not believe that a peaceful Mission, going to the Amir on business of importance, would

be refused a passage, and had, therefore, sent one of its own officers to ascertain how matters stood. Major Cavagnari added that, as the Amir knew that the Mission was on its way to him, if it was stopped at Ali Masjid, the British Government would consider that the Amir had himself stopped it.

14. The Sirdar owned that this was true.

15. Major Cavagnari then asked whether, under these circumstances, the Sirdar would oppose the passage of the Mission; and the Sirdar said that he would most certainly do so. In fact, the Sirdar never flinched from first to last, but gave us distinctly to understand that he would oppose the passage of the Mission by force, and that it was waste of time to argue with him.

16. Major Cavagnari then said to the Sirdar—"You are a servant of the Amir, and you take upon yourself to stop a Mission going to him from the British Government, with which he has long been on friendly terms. How do you know that the Amir himself will not be very angry with you for doing this?"

17. The Sirdar replied—"What friendship is there in what you are doing now? If the Amir had given me orders, I would have gone down to Jamrud to meet you, and bring you up the Pass; but now you have come here on your own account, and bribed the Amir's servants to give you a passage. You are setting Afridis against Afridis, and will cause strife and bloodshed in this country, and you call yourself friends!"

18. The Afridis who were standing round us applauded this speech; and it would not have been prudent to have continued to converse in this tone. Therefore Major Cavagnari said to the Sirdar—"We are both servants—you of the Amir of Kabul, I of the British Government. It is no use for us to discuss these matters. I only came to get a straight answer from you. Will you oppose the passage of the Mission by force?"

19. The Sirdar said—"Yes, I will; and you may take it as kindness, and because I remember friendship, that I do not fire upon you for what you have done already." After this we shook hands, and mounted our horses; and the Sirdar said again—"You have had a straight answer."

20. We returned to Jamrud by the road we came, and reached camp about 5 o'clock in the evening.

21. I was very much struck with the behaviour of Kuki Khel Afridis who went with us up the Pass. Their conduct was excellent throughout the day.

Enclosure 3 in No. 60.

No. 2049P, dated Simla, 24th September 1878 (Confidential).

Memorandum from A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Military Department.

THE undersigned is directed to inform the Military Department that General Sir Neville Chamberlain's passage to Kabul upon a Mission to His Highness the Amir, was barred at Ali Masjid, where armed resistance was offered by the Amir's garrison. Sir Neville Chamberlain consequently withdrew to Peshawar, and the Mission has been dissolved.

2. The undersigned is now directed to communicate the following measures, determined upon by the Government of India for carrying into effect the dispositions which have become necessary in consequence of this demonstration of hostility on the part of the Amir of Kabul.

3. A military force will assemble at Thul in the Kohat District, upon the frontier of Afghanistan, with all possible expedition. The regiments composing it, which will move separately to the place of assemblage, will be drawn partly from the army under the command of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and partly from the Punjab Frontier Force. The Military Department is requested to concert the necessary arrangements with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and with his honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The force at Thul will be held in readiness for a possible movement across the frontier into the Kuram Valley, which is a part of the territory of the Amir of Kabul. As the collection of troops upon this point of the border is likely to cause alarm to the independent tribes who occupy the country in the vicinity, the officers with whom these tribes are in political relations will be instructed, through his honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, to reassure them in regard to the friendly character of the movement, so far as the tribes are concerned, and to secure their good-will. It will be explained to the tribes that they will be treated as allies, and their independence carefully respected, though the British Government may possibly occupy a part of the Amir's territory.

4. The garrison at Quetta should be strengthened by sending forward a first reinforcement upon the scale already settled, as soon as the arrangements for transport and supplies have been completed. It is understood that this force will move for Quetta, partly by the routes crossing the British frontier from the Dera Ghazi Khan District on the more direct lines towards Dadar and the Bolan Pass, and partly by the usual road from Jacobabad. The requisite instructions will be sent to the Punjab Government, and to the Agent, Governor-General for Biluchistan, to secure the co-operation of the tribes on and beyond the frontier, and of the Khan of Kelat; and in order that all political questions connected with the passage of troops through foreign territory may be adjusted. But for these purposes, it is very essential that the Foreign Department and the Government of the Punjab should receive early precise intimation of the routes to be used.

5. It has also been decided by the Government of India that a second force shall be held in readiness by the 1st of November, for advance to Quetta in the event of ulterior operations in Afghanistan beyond Quetta becoming necessary. The strength of this column should be sufficient to enable it to cross the Afghan frontier in the direction of Kandahar, and to threaten that place, if the course of affairs render this operation desirable. It is understood that this force will assemble at Multan and Dera Ghazi Khan, and that if it is ordered to march, it will, if this be found practicable, follow the same routes which will have been taken by the Quetta reinforcements. On these points also early intimation should be given to the political and civil authorities for the necessary arrangements and preparations.

6. Negotiations are proceeding with the independent tribes adjoining the frontiers of British India and of Biluchistan, with the object of detaching them altogether from political connexion with the Amir of Kabul. The Foreign Department will keep the Military Department duly informed of their progress and result, so far as they affect the military operations contemplated.

7. In regard to the temporary camp which is to be placed during the ensuing cold weather at Lugari Barkhan, the Military Department is requested to consider and inform the Foreign Department whether the existing orders are to stand, or in what manner, and to what extent, they should now be modified.

Enclosure 4 in No. 60.

No. 2050P., dated Simla, 24th September 1878.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to
LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I AM directed to address you on the subject of our relations with Afghanistan.

2. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor is aware of the circumstances which led to the despatch of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission to the Court of the Amir of Kabul. His Honour has also been informed that the Mission, at starting, was arrested by the armed resistance which the Amir's officers offered at Ali Masjid to its advance. The Amir has thus committed an act of open hostility which relieves the British Government from any obligation to use further forbearance towards him; and may possibly necessitate early military operations upon the North-western Frontier, and the advance of our forces across the British frontier into the Amir's territory.

3. Under these circumstances, I am to request that his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will instruct the several officers in charge of our frontier relations to lose no time, and spare no efforts, to detach from all political connexion with the Afghan Government those independent tribes lying outside the northern portion of the Punjab border, whom it is most important, either upon military or political grounds, to bring permanently under our own influence to the exclusion of that of the Amir. Of these, the principal are understood to be the several sections of the Afridis who hold the Khaibar Pass, and certain sections of the Wuziris whose country adjoins the route of the Kuram Valley.

4. I am also to refer to my letter No. 1185 P., dated the 11th June, regarding the advances made by the Musa Kheyl Pathan tribes near the Derajat Frontier. There is now, I am to say, no reason why they should not be invited to discuss the terms upon which they may be admitted into substantial engagements with the British Government upon a basis of service and protection, if his Honour considers this course to be practical and politically advantageous under present circumstances. Similar instructions with regard to the Kakar Pathans on the Thul-Chotiali route have been sent to the Agent to the Governor-General for Biluchistan.

5. In conclusion, I am to ask whether the Lieutenant-Governor considers that any important section of the Mohmands, who hold the country to the north-west of Peshawar, are likely to desire to attach themselves to the British Government, and whether, having in view their situation and resources, any engagement with them could be advantageously negotiated. His Excellency the Viceroy has reason to believe that simultaneous action upon the Mohmands will assist arrangements with the Khaibaris.

No. 61.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 19th October 1878.

AMEER's expected letter received, following is the full text of it:—

After compliments; your Excellency's despatch regarding the sending of a friendly message has been received through Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan; I understand its purport, but the Nawab had not yet had an audience, nor had your Excellency's letters been seen by me when a communication was received to the address of my servant Mirza Hubibullah Khan, from Commissioner, Peshawur, and was read. I am astonished and dismayed by this letter, written threateningly to a well-intentioned friend, replete with contentions, and yet nominally regarding a friendly mission. Coming thus by force, what result, or profit, or fruit could come of it? Following this, three other letters from above-mentioned source, in the very same strain, addressed to my officials, have been perused by me. Thus, during a period of a few days several letters from that

quarter have all been before me, and none of them have been free from harsh expressions and hard words, repugnant to courtesy and politeness, and in tone contrary to the ways of friendship and intercourse. Looking to the fact that I am at this time assaulted by affliction and grief at the hand of fate, and that great trouble has possessed my soul, in the officials of the British Government patience and silence would have been specially becoming. Let your Excellency take into consideration this harsh and breathless haste with which the desired object and place of conference have been seized upon, and how the officials of the Government have been led into discussion and subjection to reproach. There is some difference between this and the pure road of friendship and goodwill. In alluding to those writings of the officials of the opposite Government which have emanated from them, and are at this time in the possession of my own officials, the latter have in no respect desired to show enmity or opposition towards the British Government, nor, indeed, do they with any other Power desire enmity or strife, but when any other Power, without cause or reason, shows animosity towards this Government, the matter is left in the hands of God and to His will.

The esteemed Nawab Gholam Hussein, the bearer of this despatch, has, in accordance with written instructions received from the British Government, asked for permission to retire, and it has been granted. Dated Sunday, 6th October.

No. 62.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 19th October 1878.

LETTERS from Commissioner referred to by Ameer were written under following circumstances. Commissioner had on several occasions communicated with Mustaufi about proposed mission. Nawab started with my letters to Ameer on 30th August, and was well received at first stages by Ameer's authorities, who have been subsequently blamed by His Highness for letting him pass. On 6th September information received that Nawab was being delayed, and only allowed to proceed by short marches. Letters simultaneously received from Mustaufi stated that it was necessary Nawab should remain at Peshawar, as Ameer declined to attend to business, which must, therefore, wait till after Ramyan. Commissioner was instructed to inform Mustaufi that Nawab had already started, and departure of mission could not be delayed beyond 16th September, to which date it had been postponed, so as not to arrive till after Ramyan and expiration of full period of mourning; that its object and character were friendly, and refusal of its safe passage would be regarded as an act of open hostility.

No. 63.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 19th October 1878.

AMEER's present letter, written after a month's deliberation, leaves still unanswered my amicable proposal of 14th August, contains no apology for public affront to British Government, and indicates no desire for proposed Mission or improved relations. In the opinion of Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir N. Chamberlain, Mr. Lyall, and all persons here familiar with Oriental style, the tone of the letter is intentionally rude, and conveys a direct challenge. It will certainly be so regarded by all our Native subjects, as it was written after the Ameer had been informed through Nawab of affront at Ali Musjid and light in which we view it. Any demand for apology would now, in my opinion, be useless, and only expose us to fresh insult, whilst losing valuable time. I will telegraph in detail proposed reasons this afternoon after special Council.

No. 64.

From VICEROY, 19th October 1878. (Extract.)

SPECIAL Council assembled to day for consideration of Ameer's letter. Following measures proposed :—

1. Immediate issue of manifesto defining cause of offence, declaring friendly disposition towards Afghan people, reluctance to interfere in their internal affairs, and fixing sole responsibility on Ameer.

2. Advance into Kurram valley on completion of force now collecting at Thul.

3. Expulsion of Ameer's garrison at Khyber Pass.

4. Advance from Quetta on Pisheen, if necessary, to Candahar.

Advantages of delay none; disadvantages obvious. Distrust of our resolve to act already prevails widely, will increase daily, much raising Ameer's prestige, lowering ours. Shall lose present opportunity of securing adherence of independent tribes.

We therefore urgently request immediate sanction to measures stated above.

No. 65.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY of STATE, 25th October 1878.

Do not consider matters to be at present ripe for taking all the steps you mention in your telegram, October 19th.

Am of opinion that before crossing the frontiers of Afghanistan a demand, in temperate language, should be made for an apology and acceptance of a permanent British Mission within the Afghan frontiers, and that a reply should be demanded within a time sufficient for the purpose. Send by telegram text of your letter before it is despatched. In the meantime the massing of troops should be continued and adequate forces assembled at the various points at which attack would be made in case of war. There must be no mistake as to our show of power to enforce what we require. This *locus penitentie* should be allowed before hostile acts are committed against the Ameer.

No. 66.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY of STATE, 30th October 1878.

Text of letter, as approved, to be sent to the Ameer :

I have received and read the letter which you have sent me by the hands of my Sirdar. It will be in your recollection that immediately on my arrival in India I proposed to send you a friendly Mission for the purpose of assuring you of the good will of the British Government, and of removing those past misunderstandings to which you have frequently alluded.

After leaving this proposal long unanswered, you rejected it, on the grounds that you could not answer for the safety of any European Envoy in your country, and that the reception of a British Mission might afford Russia a pretext for forcing you to receive a Russian Mission. Such refusal to receive a friendly Mission was contrary to the practice of allied States, yet the British Government, unwilling to embarrass you, accepted your excuses.

Nevertheless you have now received a Russian Envoy at your capital, at a time when a war was believed to be imminent, in which England and Russia would have been arrayed on opposite sides, thereby not only acting in contradiction to the reasons asserted by you for not receiving a British Mission, but giving to your conduct the appearance of being actuated by motives inimical to the British Government.

In these circumstances, the British Government, remembering its former friendship with your father, and still desiring to maintain with you amicable relations, determined to send, after such delay as the domestic affliction you had suffered rendered fitting, a Mission to you under the charge of Sir Neville Chamberlain, a trusted and distinguished officer of the Government, who is personally known to you; the escort attached to his Mission, not exceeding 200 men, was much less numerous than that which accompanied you into British territory, and was not more than was necessary for the dignity of my Envoy. Such Missions are customary between friendly neighboring States, and are never refused except when hostility is intended.

I despatched by a trusted messenger a letter informing you that the Mission accredited to you was of a friendly character; that its business was urgent, and that it must proceed without delay.

Nevertheless, you, having received my letter, did not hesitate to instruct your authorities on the frontier to repel the Mission by force. For this act of enmity and indignity to the Empress of India in the person of her Envoy, your letter affords no explanation or apology, nor does it contain any answer to my proposal for a full and frank understanding between our two Governments.

In consequence of this hostile action on your part, I have assembled Her Majesty's forces on your frontier, but I desire to give you a last opportunity of averting the calamities of war.

For this it is necessary that a full and suitable apology be offered by you in writing, and tendered on British territory by an officer of sufficient rank.

Furthermore, as it has been found impossible to maintain satisfactory relations between the two States unless the British Government is adequately represented in Afghanistan, it will be necessary that you should consent to receive a permanent British Mission within your territory.

It is further essential that you should undertake that no injury shall be done by you to the tribes who acted as guides to my Mission, and that reparation shall be made for any damage they have suffered from you; and, if any injury be done by you to them, the British Government will at once take steps to protect them.

Unless these conditions are accepted, fully and plainly, by you, and your acceptance received by me not later than the 20th November, I shall be compelled to consider your intentions as hostile, and to treat you as a declared enemy of the British Government.

No. 67.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 30th October 1878. (Extract.)

If your messenger refused admission to Afghanistan telegraph forthwith.

If reply not clear and categorical, must be treated as refusal.

We have assumed that Khyberees have received some damage, but are at present not threatened, nor demanding immediate aid. Our pledge to them must be fulfilled to the letter, and in case of need at once.

No. 68.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 31st October 1878.

Yours 30th. Can you indicate views on military operations in event of an unfavourable reply.

No. 68A.

No. 116 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 31st October 1878.

WITH reference to paragraph 2 of our despatch No. 95, dated 3rd October 1878, we have the honour to forward the Report made to us by Sir Neville Chamberlain of his proceedings in connection with the Mission it was proposed to send to Kabul.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

R. STRACHEY.

S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure in No. 68A.

Dated Simla, 12th October 1878.

From His Excellency Sir NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., late Envoy Extraordinary to Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

MY several confidential telegrams and letters which I despatched from Peshawar, placed his Excellency the Viceroy in early possession of all that was taking place; but it now remains for me to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a more formal and connected report of the proceedings of the Mission. I regret that indisposition since my return to Simla has prevented my discharging this duty at an earlier date.

2. On the 7th September you communicated to me the orders of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, and on the following morning I left Simla.

3. I reached Peshawar on the evening of the 12th; and at once placed myself in communication with Major Waterfield, the Commissioner; and also with Major Cavagnari, who was then specially charged with the conduct of our intercourse with Kabul and with the Afridi tribes.

4. The position of affairs at that time was as follows. The Mission was directed to leave Peshawar on the 16th, or as soon after as possible, so as to reach Kabul about the end of the month, by which time the full period of mourning and of the Fast (Ramzan) would have ended. This was also the time named by the Minister as the period when His Highness the Amir of Kabul would be able to attend to State affairs. Major Cavagnari, in obedience to instructions previously communicated to him by his Excellency the Viceroy, was then in course of arranging with the independent Khaibari tribes for the safe conduct of the Mission through the Pass as far as Ali Masjid, at which place it would come into contact with, and under the protection of, the officers of His Highness the Amir of Kabul. This was, in fact, to follow the course adopted in the case of the Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan, who had been previously sent to Kabul, to convey to the Amir a letter of condolence from His Excellency the Viceroy on the loss of the Heir-Apparent, and also a letter to announce the coming of the Mission.

5. Arrangements with the independent tribes always take time, but all seemed to be going on satisfactorily, when, on the morning of the 14th, intimation was brought to Major Cavagnari that Faiz Muhammad Khan, the Commandant of the Amir's troops stationed at Ali Masjid, had sent in to Peshawar to summon back to the Pass all the Khaibari Maliks, or headmen, who were then in course of negotiating with Major Cavagnari. The Maliks applied to Major Cavagnari to know what course they should adopt, as they felt that, if they disobeyed, they would risk the loss of the allowance they were then in receipt of from the Amir.

6. This action on the part of the Amir's officials was most discourteous, if not hostile; for the occupation of Ali Masjid by the Amir's troops had been of no long duration, whilst indeed it could at no time have been carried out had the measure been objected to by the Government of India. It was, however, impossible that such occupation could, under any circumstances, be accepted by the British Government as being allowed to interfere with, or to become a bar to, our right to hold independent relations with these tribes, or to interfere in any manner with our previously existing relations with them.

7. The Afridi mountains border the Peshawar Valley for many miles. The trade of the tribes is also exclusively with that valley and with our subjects. We have, therefore, continual intercourse and dealings with each other; and, in the main, we live together in friendly relations.

8. Whilst it was quite beyond reason to accept the position now assumed by Faiz Muhammad Khan, still, so great was the desire not to give the Amir any plausible ground of complaint, that the course was adopted of addressing to Faiz Muhammad a courteous and friendly letter,* explaining to him the object of the Mission, and our motive for arranging with the Pass-men for its safe conduct as far as Ali Masjid.

9. The purport of this letter was explained by Major Cavagnari to the Maliks, who fully understood and approved of its conciliatory nature, and expressed themselves as willing to abide by the result. They were further told that up to that time it was considered that their previous arrangements with the Amir were held to be in force; that nothing had occurred to put an end to them; but that if the Amir, because of their relations with us, stopped their allowance, it would then be continued to them by the British Government.

10. I, at this period, wrote to his Excellency the Viceroy that I was not sanguine of receiving a satisfactory answer, for I felt that a man in a subordinate position like that held by Faiz Muhammad would never dare assume the responsibility of acting as he had done without orders, and that, therefore, he had, most probably, only carried out the instructions he had received from Kabul. However, the object of the Mission was to promote peace, and to bring about, if it was possible, a return to friendly and close relations with the Amir, so that I still urged that all reasonable delay should be overlooked, so as to give Faiz Muhammad time to refer for orders to his nearest superior—the Mir Akhor—should he consider it desirable to do so—rather than to seem to assume the position of forcing on matters to a decisive issue sooner than was absolutely indispensable.

11. So far from Faiz Muhammad Khan feeling any embarrassment in replying to my letter, he did so at once, and I received his answer† late on the afternoon of the 16th. There could be no room for misunderstanding his meaning. He was a soldier in command of an outpost, had no orders to allow the Mission to pass, and would stop it by force of arms if need be. The position thus assumed was, in fact, to imply that the relations then existing between the Amir and the British Government were tantamount to a state of war, and thus all doubt was removed as to the nature of the orders given to Faiz Muhammad, or the source from which they

* Enclosure 4 in No. 59.

† Copy annexed.

emanated. Just one ray of hope might, however, be extracted from his last paragraph. The Mir Akhor was, he said, just about to arrive at Ali Masjid from Dhakka, he might be the bearer of fresh instructions from Kabul, and he recommended me to delay the advance of the Mission.

12. My first impulse was to await the arrival of the Mir Akhor at Ali Masjid, and then to address him direct, but as time passed on, I felt that if the Mir Akhor's visit to Ali Masjid was of a friendly character, it would have been his first duty to make this known to me, whilst to repeat to him the assurances already made to Faiz Muhammad Khan, would be to risk placing my Government in the position of seeming to plead for privileges which belonged to it as of right.

13. News of the Mir Akhor's arrival duly reached me; and it was reported that his object, instead of being of a friendly character, was to see that Faiz Muhammad did not flinch from the execution of his orders.

14. It was now clear to me that all hopes of a peaceful advance of the Mission—except possibly upon conditions to be dictated by the Amir—were at an end; and that it only remained to carry out the orders of my Government in bringing to a decided issue whether the Amir's troops would, or would not, offer hostile opposition to the advance of the Mission.

15. If there had been any room for previous doubt as to the intentions and acts of the Amir's officials stationed at Ali Masjid, the mask had now been completely thrown aside; for it was well authenticated that both Faiz Muhammad Khan and the Mir Akhor were not only doing everything in their power to prevent the Afridis located nearest to us from giving us a passage, but were endeavouring to induce those sections of the tribe located beyond Ali Masjid, and who were therefore more under their immediate control, to intervene between us and their clansmen, in order to thwart our negotiations with them, and to make them, under any circumstances, close the Pass to the advance of the Mission.

16. If our negotiations, which had for their object merely to enable us to have a right of way as far as Ali Masjid, were to be continued with any chance of success—or if, indeed, our right to contract engagements at all with the independent Pass tribes was to be upheld—there was now nothing left for it but for us also to throw off the reserve which, out of consideration for the Amir, had already hampered us so much in coming to terms with the Afridis. Accordingly, with the sanction of His Excellency the Viceroy, the Afridi Maliks were told (on the 19th) that we were ready to deal with them independently of all other considerations—that we repeated the promise of indemnifying them for any loss they might sustain from the Amir withdrawing his allowance; and that we were, in fact, prepared, if necessary, to take over the whole Pass arrangements into our own hands for the future, and to pay them the Pass-money out of the British Treasury.

17. The day following (the 20th), the Maliks announced the assent of their tribesmen to escort the Mission to Ali Masjid, or to any nearer point until we should come into contact with the Amir's officials; and that they would also, if necessary, give it safe conduct back to Jamrud. They asked for the delay of one day to enable them to make their arrangements for the security of the Pass.

18. Whilst the events above narrated were taking place, letters arrived from the Nawab. These announced his arrival at Kabul, and subsequent interviews with the Amir, and with His Highness' Ministers. At these interviews the Nawab was told of the bad humour of the Amir, because of the grievances of which His Highness considered himself to be the victim at the hands of the Government of India, though the Amir admitted that we also might have complaints against him. The Nawab was also told that the Russian Mission had come with the sanction of the Amir, and that it would be honourably sent away after the Eed, and that, as to the English Mission, it should not be pressed upon him inopportunely; but that His Highness claimed the right to have time to consider the matter as to its reception, and that if, after reflection, its reception should prove agreeable to him, he would then fix the time for its arrival, and make suitable arrangements to receive it honourably. The Nawab was made to repeat these communications in his letters; and was further made to express the Minister's hope that the answers to his letters would, God willing, bring about a reconciliation between the two Governments, but that, if the British Mission started on the 18th, or without the previous sanction of the Amir, matters would assume a different aspect.

19. With reference to the above, I feel called upon to say that the Nawab was merely the bearer of the Viceroy's two letters to the Amir, and was charged to announce verbally and formally to His Highness the despatch and advent of the Mission. The Nawab had no authority otherwise to represent the British Government. He was invested with no diplomatic powers; and it was altogether beyond his province to enter into communications with the Kabul Government on State affairs. His letters, as a matter of fact, merely echoed the views or wishes—or, more strictly speaking, the mere words—of the Amir; and it was manifestly no part of my duty to send answers to such communications.

20. Whatever may have been the nature of the relations entered into between the Amir and the Russian Mission—or whether His Highness' mind was made up, or not, as to any definite course of future policy—it is, I consider, beyond question that his object was to procrastinate, and to defer as long as possible being forced into giving any definite answer to the Viceroy's letters; and further, to prevent, if possible, the passage of the Mission through the few miles of the Khaibar which separate Jamrud from Ali Masjid. His Highness hoped thereby to prevent the officers of the two Governments from coming into personal contact; and his mind was made up that, if they did so before he accorded his assent for the onward passage of the Mission, it should be stopped, and stopped, if need be, by force of arms and by bloodshed. The acts of His Highness' officers at Ali Masjid, His Highness' own words to the Nawab, and the words of his Minister to the same person—all bore testimony to this intention. It was tantamount to saying that if the British Government would renounce all right to independence of action, and leave it to the Amir to decide whether the Mission should be received or not, and if to be received, to leave it to him to decide the precise time, that then,

at his pleasure, he would give an answer, when, if it was favourable to us, he would depute a suitable person to receive the Mission, and treat it honourably.

21. Most assuredly no Asiatic Prince has ever thus treated the British Government unless prepared to go to war; and equally certain is it that the Amir would never have thus dealt by the Russians, unless ready to trust to the same arbitrament. In fact, we have it in his own words to the Nawab, that he invited the Russian Mission—and be it remembered it came at *its own appointed time*—not deeming it advisable to break with the Czar.

22. On the 21st, the Mission moved to Jamrud and encamped there for the day. Major Cavagnari was deputed to ride on to Ali Masjid with a small escort, to demand from the Amir's officials permission for the advance of the Mission. A report of his interview with Faiz Muhammad Khan is annexed.* It announced the fixed intention of the Amir's authorities to

* Note.—Also a copy of report by Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins, commanding the escort.
(See enclosures to No. 60.)

oppose the passage of the Mission; and it is evident that, but for the tact displayed by Major Cavagnari at one period of the interview, even the lives of the British officers and of their small escort were endangered.

23. This result having been reported by telegraph to the Viceroy, I, early on the morning of the 22nd, received his Excellency's orders to return with the Mission to Peshawar. Before doing so,

I addressed a letter* to Faiz Muhammad Khan at Ali Masjid, informing him of the withdrawal of the Mission, and that his act would be viewed as being that of the Amir. I also sent a letter* to the Nawab, directing him to immediately take leave of the Amir, and to return forthwith to Peshawar.

24. As I was about to mount my horse to leave camp, I saw the friendly Afridi Maliks. I told them they had honourably discharged their engagement with us, and that their service was considered the same as if they had escorted our last baggage-animal safe under the walls of Ali Masjid. They appeared pleased at this recognition of their services; but as my remarks drew from some of them the question as to what they should do if the Amir visited them with his displeasure because of their engagement with us, I replied without hesitation that we should take them under our protection, and would defend them to the last. This promise subsequently received the full approval and confirmation of his Excellency the Viceroy.

25. The Mission had failed—it had been turned back at the threshold of the Amir's dominions, with an affront delivered before all the world. It failed, because of the Amir's indifference to any indignity imposed by him on the British Government; whilst he himself would not tolerate anything which could be strained to bear the appearance of even a slight to his kingly privileges.

26. It seems to me that a reasonable way of judging of our position is to suppose the conditions inverted. Let it be supposed that the Amir had considered that his interests and his honour called for the immediate despatch of an envoy to the Government of India to discuss pressing differences in a friendly manner; that he had deputed a confidential agent of rank to the Viceroy to announce the approaching departure and early arrival of a Mission; that the Government of India, thereupon, had sent no direct answer to the Amir, but had endeavoured to bar the passage of the Mission through neighbouring friendly tribes; and that, on its succeeding in reaching our most distant outpost, it had been met and turned back by the threat of a resort to force if it ventured to continue on its errand. There can, I think, be no room for two opinions unless the relations between neighbouring states are to relapse into the worst form of barbarism, and to be controlled only by brute instincts and by brute force.

27. It may be said with certainty that a Mission despatched under such conditions would have met with no success had it been allowed to advance, and that it was better to fail at starting through a direct insult than to reach Kabul to arrive at no result.

28. Before concluding this report, I desire to correct a misapprehension which has prevailed as to the strength of the military escort attached to the Mission. It consisted of 150 cavalry and 50 infantry, or a total of 200 men; and, considering the description of country to be traversed, and the habits of the tribes to be passed through, this number was not in excess of requirements.

29. My Mission was not of the nature of a surprise, and to be conducted secretly and expeditionally; it had, therefore, according to custom, to be accompanied by a proportionate amount of camp equipage, baggage, and transport animals; whilst in addition to our own requirements was added the charge of valuable gifts to be presented to the Amir. I had, in fact, to go in the most open and formal manner, to represent the dignity of my Sovereign and the claims of my country; and to do this suitably, a certain amount of outward state was customary and necessary.

30. No exception is ever taken by this Government to the amount of escort which accompanies any foreign Prince visiting India; and whenever the Amir of Kabul, or one of the Princes of that house, has come to India, he has invariably been accompanied by an escort far in excess of that which I was to take; although, be it added, any individual of any nationality may traverse the length and breadth of India, unarmed, with perfect security and without let or hindrance.

31. Finally, I would observe that so great was my desire to prevent, if possible, any false rumours of armed preparations preceding me to Kabul, that I even requested the Brigadier-General commanding the Peshawar garrison to suspend the movement of troops ordinarily carried out at that period for the preservation of the men's health, consequent upon the setting-in of the sickly season.

Enclosure 1 in No. 68A.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from FAIZ MUHAMMAD KHAN to His Excellency Sir NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN (letter not dated).

A.C.—YOUR friendly letter which you sent me by the hands of Arbab Fateh Muhammad Khan has reached me to-day, the 17th Ramazan (16th September). I was gratified by the perusal thereof, and feel obliged.

Kind (Sir), you mention therein that you have been ordered to proceed on a friendly Mission to Kabul, and that you are negotiating with the Afridis for an escort to Dhakka. But the Afridis are a faithless (literally, "fearless") and covetous race. No confidence can be reposed in their engagements. Their headmen and chiefs are all with us, and in receipt of allowances from His Highness the Amir. The letter which my kind friend Major Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawar, wrote on the subject of the advance of a friendly Mission to Kabul, I have forwarded by the hands of my servant to the Mir Akhor, our superior and chief at Jelalabad; but as yet we have received no orders from Kabul or Jelalabad which we might communicate to you, whether to let the British Mission to proceed or to stop it. When we hear that the Amir has no objection (to your going), we shall do you good service, and escort you to Dhakka, whether there be any Afridis or not; for the friendship between you and the late Amir Sahib is clearer than the sun. When we receive orders from the capital (Kabul) to invite you, we shall be bound to serve you well. But as yet we have received no orders to let you go. We are servants to carry out the orders (of our master). Should you come without His Highness's permission or orders, it will lead to a collision between us and the Afridis on one side, and you on the other; all hopes of friendship will be lost.

While I was writing this letter, a man arrived from Dhakka with the news that the Mir Akhor would shortly be here with two sowars. As he is a great man, he may have brought some orders which he, by way of friendship, will communicate to you. He will also learn your views ("jawab-o-sawal"). What I have stated above is all that I have to communicate. Further, you are at liberty to do what you like. Whether you stop at Peshawar until the Mir Akhor arrives, and has a friendly communication with you, or you proceed at once by force, you can do what you choose.

Enclosure 2 in No. 68A.

Dated, Camp Jamrud, 22nd September 1878.

From His Excellency Sir NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., to FAIZ MUHAMMAD KHAN, Commanding H.H. the Amir's Troops at Ali Masjid.

A.C.—YOU are aware that the camp of the British Mission arrived at Jamrud yesterday, with the object of proceeding to-day through the Khaibar Pass on a friendly Mission to His Highness the Amir of Kabul. Major Cavagnari and two other British officers were deputed yesterday afternoon, under my orders, to hold an interview with you, in order to obtain from you, as His Highness Commandant at Ali Masjid, the necessary assurances of safe conduct to enable the Mission to proceed on its journey.

The said officers were prevented from approaching the fort of Ali Masjid, as your pickets were posted commanding the road, and refused to allow them (the officers) to advance. After these British officers had sought and obtained an interview with you at a place (Lala China) some short distance this side of Ali Masjid, and after you had been warned by them that your reply would be regarded as that of His Highness the Amir of Kabul, you declared that you had received no instructions to permit the British Mission to pass your post, and stated that you would certainly oppose it by force if it advanced. I am therefore commanded by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to inform you that your reply is considered as being that of His Highness the Amir of Kabul, and the British Mission is now returning from Jamrud to Peshawar. I again assure you that the British Government entertains nothing but friendly feelings and intentions towards the Chiefs and people of Afghanistan.

Enclosure 3 in No. 68A.

Dated, Camp Jamrud, 22nd September 1878.

From His Excellency Sir NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., to NAWAB GHULAM HASAN KHAN, on Special Duty at Kabul.

A.C.—I SEND, for your information, copy of a letter I have just addressed to Faiz Muhammad Khan, Ghilzai, Commanding His Highness the Amir of Kabul's troops at Ali Masjid.

I am commanded by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General to direct you, immediately on receipt of this letter, to take leave of His Highness the Amir of Kabul and to return at once to Peshawar.

No. 69.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 1st November 1878. (Extract.)

Yours 31st. If answer unfavourable you are to treat Ameer as a declared enemy of the British Government. The military measures must be decided upon as to time and place by your military advisers.

No. 70.

*TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 4th November 1878.

Ultimatum to Ameer delivered to Faiz Mahomed at Ali Musjid on 2nd November, and receipt obtained. Duplicate sent by post.

We consider attempt to send special messenger would cause probable failure; certainly delay.

No. 71.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 5th November 1878.

Yours 1st. I understand from it that I am to act on 21st without further reference in the event of no answer, or an unfavourable answer, being received, and only to refer for further instructions if the answer is of a character which seems to me to require this.

No. 72.

TELEGRAM from the SECRETARY OF STATE, 7th November 1878.

Yours of 5th correctly assumes the understanding.

No. 73.

Secret, No. 49.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA in COUNCIL.

MY LORD,

India Office, London,
18th November 1878.

* No. 53, Secret, 5th August 1878.

[	61,	"	19th	"	"
"	67,	"	27th	"	"
"	79,	"	9th Sept.	"	"
"	86,	"	16th	"	"
"	93,	"	26th	"	"
"	95,	"	3rd October	"	"

Para. 1. The letters* and telegraphic despatches which your Government has transmitted to me, reporting the circumstances connected with the reception of a Russian Mission at Kabul in July last, and the subsequent rejection by the Ameer Shere Ali Khan of the special Embassy accredited to

his court by your Excellency, have been considered by Her Majesty's Government with the care due to their importance.

2. The various communications which have from time to time passed between the Government at home and that of India, ending with Lord Salisbury's Despatch of the 4th of October last year, contain a complete exposition of the general policy of the British Government towards Afghanistan, and set forth, moreover, the considerations which lately induced Her Majesty's Government to endeavour to place their relations with the Ameer on a more satisfactory footing. In order, however, that no misapprehension may exist on this subject, I deem it advisable to recapitulate some of the

leading features of that policy, and to trace the course of events which have led to the present condition of affairs on the frontier.

* ARTICLE I.

Between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan, Walee of Kabul and of those countries now in his possession, and the heirs of the said Ameer, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship.

ARTICLE II.

The Honourable East India Company engages to respect those territories of Afghanistan now in His Highness's possession, and never to interfere therein.

ARTICLE III.

His Highness Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan, Walee of Kabul, and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, engages, on his own part and on the part of his heirs, to respect the territories of the Honourable East India Company, and never to interfere therein, and to be the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company.

† Minute, 30th April 1855, in Secret Letter, No. 3, of 10th May 1855.

“ Government of India on its western frontier as complete security against a foreign “ and distant enemy as it is possible for us in the nature of things to compass.”

3. Although much difference of opinion has existed, and still exists, amongst eminent authorities on the subject of the frontier policy to be pursued by the Indian Government, that difference has reference rather to the methods to be followed than to the objects in view. The consistent aim of the British Government during a series of years has been to establish on its North-Western border a strong, friendly, and independent State, with interests in unison with those of the Indian Government, and ready to act, in certain eventualities, as an auxiliary in the protection of the frontier from foreign intrigue or aggression. The Treaty of 1855* negotiated by Lord Dalhousie, with the approval of Lord Aberdeen's Government, and still in force, bears witness to the importance then attached to friendly relations with Afghanistan. It was described by the Governor-General† in words which fully explain its intended effect: “ The treaty gives to the “ Government of India on its western frontier as complete security against a foreign “ and distant enemy as it is possible for us in the nature of things to compass.”

4. The question, however, has assumed special prominence since the period of the transfer to the Crown of the direct administration of India. The growing interest in the subject has been the result partly of the increased responsibilities assumed by the Government of Her Majesty in maintaining Her Indian Empire, and partly of the intestine disorders to which Afghanistan became a prey after the accession of the present Ameer to the throne in the year 1863. Upon Lord Lawrence devolved the direction of the policy to be adopted in this new state of affairs, and that statesman considered that the objects of the British Government would be best obtained by abstaining from active interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and by the friendly recognition of the *de facto* rulers of that country, or of portions of it, without undertaking inconvenient liabilities on their behalf. On this basis Lord Lawrence thought that the British Government would have the greatest chance of gaining the permanent friendship and alliance of the Afghan people. The outposts of Russia were then distant from the borders of Afghanistan, and His Lordship's Government attached no special importance to the probability and danger of the growth of the former power in the direction of India, which, they considered, would in any case best be restrained or rendered innocuous by a friendly understanding on the subject between the English and Russian Cabinets.

5. The views of Her Majesty's Government of that day on the subject of their relations with Afghanistan were in complete harmony with those of Lord Lawrence. They did not desire to exercise active influence at Kabul, nor to interfere in the conflicts then rife between contending parties in Afghanistan, so long as those conflicts did not jeopardise the peace of the frontier. This policy was therefore adhered to, although not without some inconvenient results, during the civil war which raged for so many years after Shere Ali's accession, and might not unreasonably be thought suited to the circumstances of the time. But the final and unaided success of the Ameer in regaining his throne, in the autumn of 1868, in some measure changed the position of affairs, and, in the opinion both of Lord Lawrence and of Her Majesty's Government, justified some intervention in His Highness's favour, and the grant to him of such assistance in money and arms as appeared conducive to the maintenance of his authority.

6. The policy followed by Lord Mayo's administration in its dealings with Afghanistan was to a considerable extent in accord with the course of action thus finally adopted in the autumn of 1868 by his predecessor. Whilst, however, Lord Mayo did not deviate, in any material degree, from the attitude of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, which had been so long maintained, he recognized Shere Ali as the *de jure* as well as the *de facto* ruler of that country, and, in a letter addressed to that prince, engaged to view with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of his rivals to disturb his position. This step, added to the marked personal influence obtained by Lord Mayo over the Ameer, was sufficient at the moment to remove a certain feeling of resentment which had

been generated in his mind by the apparent indifference shown by the British Government to the result of his struggle for power, and, at the same time, rendered His Highness's position at Kabul more assured than that of any previous ruler.

7. The advances of Russia in Central Asia had not, up to this period, assumed dimensions such as to cause uneasiness to the Indian Government. Lord Mayo agreed, therefore, in the views of his predecessor, that the best means of averting interference on the part of the Turkistan authorities in the affairs of Afghanistan would be by a frank interchange of views on that subject between the Government of Her Majesty and that of the Czar. Her Majesty's Government had independently arrived at the same conclusion, and early in 1869 initiated friendly negotiations at St. Petersburg, which terminated in a very distinct understanding on this subject, and in the recognition by the Czar's Government of the limits of the Ameer's territories, in complete accord with the wishes of Shere Ali and of the British Government.

8. The policy of his predecessors was that substantially followed by Lord Northbrook, although the rapid development of events in Central Asia was gradually increasing the difficulty of abstaining from closer relations with the ruler of Kabul. The capture of Khiva by the forces of the Czar in the spring of 1873, and the total subordination of that Khanate to Russia, caused Shere Ali considerable alarm, and led him to question the value of the pledges with reference to Afghanistan which had been given by His Imperial Majesty to England, and which had been communicated to His Highness by the British Government. Actuated by his fears on this score, His Highness sent a special envoy to Simla in the summer of that year, charged with the duty of expressing them to the Government of India.

9. Finding that the object of the Ameer was to ascertain definitely how far he might rely on the help of the British Government if his territories were threatened by Russia,

* Telegram from Viceroy, 24th July 1873.

† Telegram to Viceroy, 26th July 1873.

Letter from Viceroy, 6th September 1873, in Secret Letter, No. 75, dated 15th September 1873.

Lord Northbrook's Government was prepared* to assure him that, under certain conditions, the Government of India would assist him to repel unprovoked aggression. But Her Majesty's Government at home did not share† his Highness's apprehension, and the Viceroy ultimately informed the Ameer that the discussion of the question would be best postponed to a more convenient season. The effect of this announcement on his Highness, although conveyed in conciliatory language, was not favourable; the policy which dictated it was unintelligible to his mind, and he received it with feelings of chagrin and disappointment. His reply to Lord Northbrook's communication was couched in terms of ill-disguised sarcasm; he took no notice of the Viceroy's proposal to depute a British Officer to examine the northern frontier of Afghanistan; he subsequently refused permission to Sir Douglas Forsyth to return from Kashgar to India through Kabul; he left untouched a gift of money lodged to his credit by the Indian Government, and generally assumed towards it an attitude of sullen reserve.

10. Such was the position of affairs when Her Majesty's present advisers assumed office in 1874. The maintenance of Afghanistan as a strong and friendly power had, at all times, been the object of British policy. The method adopted in attaining that object had not met with the success that was desirable. Its accomplishment was, nevertheless, a matter of grave importance, and it had now to be considered with reference to the rapid march of events in Turkistan. Her Majesty's Government could not view with indifference the probable influence of those events upon the character of an Asiatic prince whose dominions were thereby brought within a steadily narrowing circle between two great military empires, and although no immediate danger appeared to threaten British interests on the frontier of Afghanistan, the situation in Central Asia had become sufficiently grave to suggest the necessity of timely precaution. Her Majesty's Government considered that the first step necessary was the improvement of their relations with the Ameer himself. With this object in view, they deemed it expedient that His Highness should be invited to receive a temporary mission at Kabul, in order that an accredited British Envoy might confer with him personally upon what was taking place, might assure him of the desire of the Queen's Government that his territories should remain safe from external attack, and at the same time might point out to him the extreme difficulty of attaining this object unless it were permitted by him to place its own officers on his frontier to watch the course of events beyond it. It was true that the Ameer's relations with the Russian Governor General of Turkistan had of late become more intimate, and that a correspondence which that official had

commenced with the Kabul Durbar in 1871, and which, at one time, had caused serious disquiet to the Ameer, was being carried on with increased activity, whilst His Highness's original practice of consulting the Indian Government as to the replies to be sent to General Kauffmann's communications had been discontinued. Nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government were willing to believe that Shere Ali, if his intentions were friendly, would be ready to join them in measures, advantageous to himself, and essential for the protection of common interests.

11. In view of these interests, and of the responsibilities which had morally devolved upon the British Government on behalf of Afghanistan, looking also to the imperfect information available in regard to the country, in respect to which those responsibilities had been incurred, Lord Northbrook's Government had, in 1873, expressed the opinion that the temporary presence in Afghanistan of a British officer, as then proposed by them, might do much to allay any feelings of mistrust lingering in the minds of the Afghan people, and might at the same time prepare the way for eventually placing permanent British representatives at Kabul, Herat, and elsewhere. Encouraged by this opinion, Her Majesty's Government came to the conclusion that, although Lord Northbrook's efforts to attain the desired object had not met with success, the time had come when the measure thus indicated could no longer with safety be postponed. Your predecessor in Council had indeed, whilst appreciating all the advantages to be anticipated from it, frankly represented to Her Majesty's present advisers the difficulties attending the initiation of it; he believed the time and circumstances of the moment to be inopportune for placing British agents on the Afghan borders; and was of opinion that such a step should be deferred till the progress of events justified more specific assurances to Shere Ali, which might then be given in the shape of a treaty, followed by the establishment of agencies at Herat and other suitable places. Her Majesty's Government, however, were unable to agree in this view; they deemed it probable that if events were thus allowed to march without measures of precaution on the part of the British Government, the time would have passed when representations to the Ameer could be made with any probability of a favourable result; and they considered it important that the actual sentiments of His Highness, in reference to which different opinions were held by different authorities, should be tested in good time.

12. Accordingly, on your Excellency's departure from England to assume the Viceroyalty, Her Majesty's Government instructed you to offer to Shere Ali that same active countenance and protection which he had previously solicited at the hands of the Indian Government. It was clearly impossible, however, to enter into any formal engagement, in this sense without requiring from the Ameer some substantial proof of his unity of interests with the British Government. Whilst Her Majesty's Government, therefore, authorised your Excellency to concede to His Highness substantial pecuniary aid, a formal recognition of his dynasty, so far as it would not involve active interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and an explicit pledge of material support in case of unprovoked foreign aggression, you were directed not to incur these heavy responsibilities unless Shere Ali, on his part, were prepared to allow a British agent, or agents, access to positions in his territories (other than at Kabul itself), where, without prejudicing the personal authority of the ruler, they could acquire trustworthy information of events likely to threaten the tranquillity or independence of Afghanistan.

13. The measures which your Excellency adopted on your arrival in India to give effect to the instructions of Her Majesty's Government were framed with discretion, and in a spirit of consideration towards Shere Ali. You sent your Native Aide-de-camp, Rissaldar-Major Khanan Khan, to that prince, charged with the duty of informing him of your desire to depute temporarily to his capital, or to any other point in Afghan territory agreeable to His Highness, a special Envoy, whose mission was not merely to be one of compliment but one for the discussion of matters of common interest to the two Governments; and you took care to convey to His Highness verbal assurances of the friendly character of your advances to him. But Shere Ali rejected your overtures and declined to receive your Envoy.

14. Your Excellency exhorted the Ameer to consider seriously the consequences of an attitude which might end in compelling the British Government to look upon him thenceforth as a prince who voluntarily desired to isolate his interests from those of the British Government. In a conciliatory spirit you abstained from pressing upon him the reception of your Envoy, and you acceded to a suggestion of His Highness that your Vakeel at Kabul should make personal representations to you on the Ameer's behalf.

These representations proved to be a recapitulation of grievances dating from 1872, and were briefly as follows:—

1. The communication which he had received from the late Viceroy in 1874, on behalf of his rebellious son, Yakub Khan, whom he had imprisoned.
2. The decision on the question of the Seistan boundary.
3. The gifts sent by the late Viceroy direct to the Chief of Wakhan, who is a tributary to the Ameer.
4. The repeated rejection of his previous requests for an alliance and a formal recognition of the order of succession as established by him in the person of his son Abdoollah Jan.

15. These grievances appeared to weigh heavily on His Highness's mind, and you therefore lost no time in assuring Shere Ali, through the Vakeel, of the friendly feeling of the British Government towards him, of your desire to remove, by a frank exchange of views all causes of irritation on his mind, and of your willingness to accede to his proposal that, in lieu of Sir L. Pelly proceeding to Kabul, an Afghan Envoy should be deputed to meet one from your Excellency at Peshawur.

16. Your Vakeel thereupon returned to Kabul, charged with the duty of explaining to the Ameer, with the assistance of a clearly worded *aide mémoire*, the favourable treaty which the British Government was prepared, upon certain conditions, to negotiate with him, and its desire to clear up past misunderstandings. His Highness evinced no cordiality in his reception of him; but after some delay he deputed to Peshawur his minister, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, there to carry on with Sir Lewis Pelly the negotiations which Her Majesty's Government had considered of sufficient importance to have taken place on Afghan soil with the Ameer himself. Although the Ameer had been informed in writing, both of the concessions which the British Government was ready to grant to him and the conditions attached to them, and although, at the same time, it was signified to him that it would be of no avail for him to send his envoy to Peshawur unless His Highness were prepared to agree to those conditions as the bases of the proposed treaty, it became apparent in the course of the conference that the Minister had received no specific authority to accept them. As, moreover, the language and conduct of Shere Ali, which had so long been dubious, became openly inimical, you judiciously took advantage of the sudden death of His Highness's Envoy to discontinue negotiations, the bases of which had been practically rejected.

17. This step on your part, as well as all your proceedings throughout the year preceding the conference, met with the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government. As observed by my predecessor in his Despatch of the 4th October 1877, Her Majesty's Government had felt justified in hoping that the advantages which they were ready to tender to the Ameer would have been accepted in the spirit in which they were offered. At the same time, the attitude of His Highness for some years past had been so ambiguous as to prepare them for a different result. Far, however, from regarding the possibility of failure as affording sufficient grounds for total inaction, and continued acquiescence in the existing state of relations with the Ameer, they had arrived at the conclusion that while the prevailing uncertainty as to His Highness's disposition rendered caution necessary in their advances, it was in itself a reason for adopting steps which would elicit the truth. From this point of view Her Majesty's Government could not regard the result of the Peshawur conference as altogether unsatisfactory, inasmuch as they were no longer left in doubt as to the reality of the Ameer's alienation, which had previously been a matter of speculation. On the other hand, the proceedings at the conference, and the previous negotiations, had placed before the Ameer in a clear light the views of Her Majesty's Government as to their existing obligations towards him, and had, at the same time, informed him of the terms, so favourable to his interests, on which they were willing to draw closer the bonds of union between the two countries, and to place their mutual relations on a footing more advantageous to both.

18. Their overtures having been thus treated, Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that no course was open to them but to maintain an attitude of vigilant reserve until such time as the Ameer might better realize his own position and interests. This view had been anticipated by you in the final assurances conveyed to the Afghan Envoy by Sir Lewis Pelly, and your policy since the close of the Peshawur conference has been in accordance with it. Whilst carefully watching the course of affairs in Afghanistan, so far as the imperfect means of obtaining information has admitted, you abstained from all interference in them, in the hope that time would enable His Highness to realize the dangers accruing to himself by the rejection of the friendly advances of the British

Government. That hope, however, has not been realized. The Ameer has persisted in his unfriendly isolation, and ultimately, having two years ago declined to receive a British Envoy, even temporarily, within his territory, on the ground that he could not guarantee his safety, nor thereafter be left with any excuse for declining to receive a Russian mission, he has welcomed with every appearance of ostentation an Embassy from the Czar, despatched to his Court at a time when there were indications that an interruption of friendly relations between this country and Russia might be imminent.

19. In these circumstances your Excellency represented to Her Majesty's Government that a policy of inaction could no longer be persisted in, and that the Ameer's reception of the Russian Mission at such a time, and under such circumstances, left him no further excuse for declining to receive at his capital an Envoy from the British Government. Your Excellency, proposed, therefore, to demand a reception of a Mission to Kabul, headed by an officer of rank, in the person of Sir Neville Chamberlain, whose name and family were held in high esteem by the Ameer.

20. This proposal was approved by Her Majesty's Government. It was evident that a potentate who willingly admitted to his capital, at a critical period, Envoys of a Power which at the moment might be regarded as making its advances with objects not friendly to the British Government, could not reasonably refuse to receive a Mission from a power with which he had continuously been in alliance. Your Excellency in Council did not anticipate any such refusal, and Her Majesty's Government saw no reason to question the soundness of your opinion on this point, based, as it must have been, on the best information at your command.

21. The anticipations both of Your Excellency and of Her Majesty's Government were, however, disappointed by the event. In a friendly letter, carried to Cabul by the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, you informed the Ameer of the date on which Sir Neville Chamberlain was to leave Peshawur, and you gave His Highness adequate time in which to issue orders to his local officials for the reception of the Mission. You caused it, moreover, to be intimated to His Highness and his officials that a refusal of free passage to the Mission would be regarded by you as an act of hostility. The orders sent to the Afghan officers at Ali Musjid were, nevertheless, the reverse of what you had a right to expect, and Major Cavagnari, who went in advance of your Envoy, was distinctly informed that any attempt to enter Afghan territory would be resisted by force, of which an ostentatious display was at once made.

22. This conduct on the part of the Ameer was wholly without justification. He was aware from various communications addressed to him by your Excellency's predecessors, that the Russian Government had given assurances to the Government of Her Majesty to regard his territories as completely beyond its sphere of action; he was equally aware that the whole policy of the British Government since his accession to the throne had been to strengthen his power and authority, and to protect him from foreign aggression, although the methods adopted for doing so may not have at all times accorded with His Highness's own views; he had received from the British Government evidence of goodwill, manifested by large gifts of money and arms, as well as by its successful efforts in obtaining from the Czar's Government its formal recognition of a fixed boundary, agreeable to himself, between his kingdom and the neighbouring Khanates; his subjects had been allowed to pass freely throughout India, to the great benefit of the trade and commerce of his country; and in no single instance has the Ameer himself, or any of his people, been treated unjustly or inhospitably within British jurisdiction. By every bond of international courtesy, as well as by the treaty engagement of 1855 existing between the two countries, binding him to be the friend of our friends and the enemy of our enemies, the Ameer was bound to a line of conduct the reverse of that which he adopted.

23. In reporting to Her Majesty's Government the forcible rejection of your friendly Mission, your Excellency expressed the conviction of the Government of India that this act deprived the Ameer of all further claim upon the forbearance of the British Government, and necessitated instant action. Her Majesty's Government were, however, unwilling to accept the evasive letter brought from Kabul by the Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan as Shere Ali's final answer to your Government, and determined to give him a short time for reconsideration. While, therefore, Her Majesty's Government acknowledged fully as binding on them the pledges given by Sir N. Chamberlain to the friendly Chiefs and people who undertook the safe conduct of his Mission, they decided to make an effort to avert the calamities of war, and with this object instructed your Excellency to address to His Highness a demand, in temperate language, requiring a full and suitable apology within a given time for the affront which he has offered to the

British Government, the reception of a permanent British Mission within his territories, and reparation for any injury inflicted by him on the tribes who attended Sir N. Chamberlain and Major Cavagnari, as well as an undertaking not to molest them hereafter. These instructions were promptly carried into effect by Your Excellency's Government, and the Ameer has been informed that unless a clear and satisfactory reply be received from him by the 20th November, you will be compelled to consider his intentions as hostile, and to treat him as a declared enemy.

24. It only remains for me to assure your Excellency of the cordial support of Her Majesty's Government in the onerous circumstances in which you are placed, and to state that I have received the commands of Her Majesty to publish this Despatch for the general information of the public, in anticipation of the papers connected with the important question with which it deals. Those papers are in course of preparation, but, as they cover a period of not less than fifteen years, they must necessarily be voluminous.

I have, &c.,

CRANBROOK.

LONDON:

Printed by GEORGE EDWARD EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

AFGHANISTAN, No. 2.

FURTHER PAPERS

RELATING TO THE

AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1878.

[C.-2191.] *Price 3d.*

LIST OF PAPERS.

No.	—	From	To	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1	Letter	- Government of India.	Secretary of State	1873. 28 March (No. 32.)	Proposed deputation of Mr. Macnabb to Cabul.	3
2	"	- " " with	2 enclosures.	22 May (No. 46.)	Same subject - -	4
3	"	- Capt. Grey -	Syud Noor Mahomed.	1876. 13 Oct.	As to relations with Afghanistan.	9
4	"	- Sir L. Pelly -	" " -	13 Oct.	Same subject " -	10
5	"	- " -	Viceroy -	1877. 27 Feb.	Letter to Afghan Envoy regarding Jehad.	11
6	"	- Syud Noor Mahomed.	Sir L. Pelly -	3 March	Reply to the above - -	12
7	"	- " " with	24 enclosures.	1878. 16 Sept. (No. 86.)	Movements of the Nawab Ghulam Hussein. Communications to the Ameer's Officials.	13
8	"	- " " with	2 enclosures.	31 Oct. (No. 117.)	Letters from the Ameer in reply to those from the Viceroy.	18
9	"	- " " with	3 enclosures.	7 Nov. (No. 119.)	Negotiations with Tribes of the Khairhar Pass.	19
10	Proclamation by the Viceroy	- - -	- - -	21 Nov.	Causes of rupture with the Ameer.	20
11	Telegram	- Secretary of State	Viceroy -	30 Nov.	Requests text of letters from Commissioner of Peshawur to the Ameer's Officials.	21
12	"	- Viceroy -	Secretary of State	1 Dec.	Gives text of letter of 7th September to the Mustaufi.	21
13	"	- Secretary of State	Viceroy -	3 Dec.	Requests further particulars -	22
14	"	- Viceroy -	Secretary of State	4 Dec.	Reply to the above - -	22

CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

No. 32 of 1873.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To His Grace the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Fort William, 28th March 1873.

WE have the honour to forward copy of papers relative to the arrangements made for communicating to His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan the decision of Her Majesty's Government on the Seistan boundary question. These arrangements are fully detailed in the letter to the Punjab Government, dated the 21st March 1873.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
R. TEMPLE.
B. W. ELLIS.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Khureeta, dated Fort William, 21st March 1873.

From his Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness the AMEER of AFGHANISTAN, Wali of Cabul.

WITH reference to Your Highness' letter, dated 13th November 1871, Your Highness will remember that the Commissioner of Peshawur subsequently expressed a hope on the part of my predecessor that when the Seistan boundary settlement was over you would be able to arrange for an interview with an officer of my Government, who would explain the details and lay before Your Highness some considerations affecting the welfare of Afghanistan.

Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs having confirmed General Goldsmid's award, I have deputed Mr. Donald Macnabb, Commissioner of Peshawur, an officer of high rank and dignity, in whom I have full confidence, to explain to Your Highness the details of the boundary, and to place before you certain papers relating to the final settlement of the question. Mr. Macnabb will also explain to Your Highness the negotiations which have now been satisfactorily concluded with the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, whereby the Russian Government have agreed to recognize and respect the integrity and independence of the territories now in Your Highness' possession.

Whatever Mr. Macnabb may tell Your Highness on these two important questions, consider as coming from myself.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1. (Extract.)

No. 534 P., dated Fort William, 21st March 1873.

From SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, Foreign Department, to SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of the PUNJAB.

IN continuation of the correspondence on the subject of the Seistan boundary, I am directed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to forward, for the information of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, an extract from a telegram dated

7th March, intimating that Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has confirmed General Goldsmid's award. The Lieutenant-Governor is aware that (under the terms agreed to by His Highness the Ameer in his letter of 13th November 1871 to the Viceroy, received under cover of your No. 451, dated 23rd November 1871,) this decision of Her Majesty's Government is final, and binding upon both parties.

2. On 15th December 1871, the Commissioner of Peshawur was instructed to inform the Ameer that the Viceroy hoped, when the arbitration was over, to arrange for an interview between the Ameer and some officer of the British Government, who would explain the details and lay before His Highness some considerations affecting the welfare of Afghanistan. It is with respect to this proposed arrangement that I am now instructed to address you.

3. His Excellency in Council had hoped that General Pollock would have been able to return to India and be the medium of communicating the settlement to the Ameer. His Excellency in Council felt that, considering the connection of General Pollock with the previous discussions and inquiry in Seistan, this arrangement would probably have been most satisfactory to the Ameer. Circumstances, however, do not admit of General Pollock's return from England at present, and other arrangements must be had recourse to.

4. The Governor-General in Council proposes, if it be agreeable to the Ameer, to depute a British officer with full instructions to visit His Highness at Cabul or Jellalabad or Candahar, or any other place in Afghanistan which the Ameer may name as most suitable. Probably Mr. Macnabb, the Commissioner of Peshawur, would be the best officer to select for this purpose.

5. I enclose, for the Lieutenant-Governor's information, a copy of General Goldsmid's arbitral award, and a map showing the boundary which has now been finally decided on by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as ultimate arbitrator. The evidence on which this decision has been arrived at is already known to Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, the Afghan Commissioner, who has probably explained all the circumstances to the Ameer. His Excellency in Council will therefore abstain from making any reference to the evidence, which (including the appeal from General Goldsmid's award made on both sides) has been fully and carefully weighed by Her Majesty's Government with a view to a settlement in accordance with the rights and best interests of both parties. It will, however, be the duty of the officer deputed to meet the Ameer to explain the details of the actual award with fulness and accuracy, and to leave with His Highness a Persian translation of the award and of the map. Translations will accordingly be forwarded to you in due course for that purpose.

No. 2.

No. 46 of 1873.

Government of India—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To His Grace the DUKE of ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Simla, 22nd May 1873.

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 32, dated the 28th March last, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of further correspondence relative to the deputation of a British Officer to explain to the Ameer of Cabul, at a personal interview, the particulars respecting the Seistan Boundary Settlement.

2. It is the wish of His Highness in the first instance to depute an Agent from Cabul to confer with the Viceroy on the subject, and his Excellency has expressed his willingness to receive such an Agent.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

NORTHBROOK.

R. TEMPLE.

B. W. ELLIS.

H. W. NORMAN.

ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.

E. C. BAYLEY

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

No. 67 C., dated Peshawur, 5th April 1873.

From COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division, to SECRETARY to the
GOVERNMENT of INDIA, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward translations of two letters from the Agent at Cabul, dated 31st March 1873.

2. The first of these letters is a reply to my letter of the 23rd March, written on the receipt of telegraphic instructions from the Secretary, Punjab Government, directing the Agent to communicate to His Highness the Ameer the wish of the Government that a British Officer shall have an opportunity of meeting His Highness to explain the details of the decision of the Seistan boundary. This letter, though written by the Agent is, as he explains, really drafted by the Ameer's orders by the officials of his Durbar after a lengthened discussion, the details of which are given in the Agent's second letter.

3. There can be no doubt that the second letter was written at the express request of the Cabul Court, as a means of bringing indirectly to the notice of the Government the anxieties and expectations that now occupy the attention of the Ameer's counsellors; but the Ameer himself cannot have been aware of the style and purport of some of the observations made, which I am sure would not have met with His Highness' approval.

This letter is in the handwriting of Moonshee Bukhtiar Khan, attached to the Agency, and is, I conceive, compiled by him from notes made of the discussions in Durbar at which he was permitted to be present. It is signed by the Agent.

4. I have, as authorised by your telegram of the 21st March, told the Agent to inform His Highness of the confirmation by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the arbitral award regarding Seistan; and have also intimated that advantage would be taken of an interview between the Ameer and a British Officer deputed by the Government to make His Highness fully acquainted with the progress and conclusion of the communications which have taken place between the British Government and the Government of Russia, on the subject of the boundaries of Afghanistan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of CABUL AGENT'S LETTER, dated 31st March 1873, to the COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT of Peshawur Division.

THE Ameer, after perusing your letter to me of the 23rd March, received by me on the 27th March, and after consultation with the officers of his Durbar, said: If it is the wish of the British Government that one of their officers should proceed to Cabul to explain the details of the decision, it would be a cause of satisfaction to my mind if I were first informed, in general terms, what decision has been arrived at, that I might reflect on it. If this decision is in accordance with my sentiments good and well. Should it be out of my power to carry out the conditions of the decision, I will explain the circumstances to the Government. If the coming of the Sahib, in addition to Seistan matters, concerns the prosperity, consolidation, and other arrangements of the affairs and frontiers of the whole kingdom that God has given me, I should wish to be kindly informed of this beforehand.

This letter is sent after perusal by His Highness the Ameer.

Enclosure 3 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from the Agent at Cabul, dated 31st March 1873, to COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

AFTER receipt of your letter of the 23rd March, there was consultation among the officers of the Durbar for three days as to whether the deputation of an English officer was merely to explain the decision of the Seistan boundary question, or whether he would be entrusted with the communication of some important information concerning the frontiers of Afghanistan. There was lengthened discussion on this point. Some said it had been mentioned in the murrasillas of his Excellency the Viceroy to the Ameer, that on the conclusion of the Seistan decision a Sahib should be sent to Cabul with a view to the advantages of the State. And though nothing was yet known of what the advantage referred to was to consist in, many of the

Durbarees indulged in extravagant hopes, in the belief that the Sahib would be sent not alone to explain the decision of the Seistan boundary, but because of the near approach of the Russians, and the obvious tendency of their policy, which is to extend their power in Asia; he may be sent to arrange for the strengthening of Afghanistan, and the determination of its limits, as the boundaries of Afghanistan may be termed the frontiers of Hindoostan, and there is no possibility of establishing the frontiers of Afghanistan firmly without the intervention of the English Government; and that strength cannot be established without assistance in the munitions of war and large sums of money before any emergency actually arises. If the coming of the Sahib is only with reference to the Seistan question, and not for the lasting advantage of Afghanistan, it will be a great injury to the Afghan Government, as there exists in some quarters a great respect and consideration for the Afghan Government derived from its association with that of England, which will disappear if the support of England is withheld, especially the neighbouring countries will note any falling off in interest taken by England in the welfare of Afghanistan. The facts of the case as regards Seistan are these: that at this time had it not been for the constant restraint of the servants of this Government, in accordance with the wishes of the English Government, there would not have been the slightest difficulty in taking advantage of the disturbances in Seistan and the disposition of its people to occupy the whole as the Persians did. In fact, if the people in that direction were allowed to act, and the Turkomans stirred into action, it would be easy to take not Seistan alone but Meshed also; and, as Meshed could so easily be brought under the power of Afghanistan, it would not be difficult to put Afghanistan in a position of superiority to Persia. But what can be done when, because of their desire to preserve the goodwill of England, the officers of Afghanistan have made no move? If the Government of England has upheld General Goldsmid's decision of the Seistan boundary, it will be a cause of great injury both apparent and real; as, in the first place, Ibrahim Khan and Mahomed Shureef Khan, and others, who have lands both in Seistan Proper and Outer Seistan, will be disheartened, and the lot of those who are at the same time subjects of both the Persian and the Afghan Governments will be a hard one, and as it will be unavoidably necessary for both Powers to keep a certain number of troops on their respective borders, it will be difficult to avoid small misunderstandings and collisions which will one day lead to serious disturbances. It will be impossible to demarcate the line drawn by General Goldsmid through the uninhabited country without great expense.

Again, when increasing the numbers of the Afghan army, we hoped that the English Government would help us with arms and money, and give us a hint, either secretly or openly, to advance our frontiers in the Seistan direction. Had we not expected this, our original forces were sufficient for our country as it existed. If we should now reduce this newly-raised army, all those evils which are to be dreaded at some distant day would come on us at once in consequence of our weakness. One reflection arising from the Seistan decision is that, as the British Government, though considering Seistan to belong of right to Afghanistan, has divided that country between Persia and Afghanistan in order to avoid dispute, it may be that one day the Government of Bokhara, acting under Russian instigation, may lay claim to a portion of Balkh on the ground that it is part of Turkistan, and the English Government may, in order to prevent an open rupture, agree to the cession of Maimana or Budukshan or any other Province, and in this way Afghanistan may become dismembered. It is to be remembered that whenever the Russians, either in the current year or the next, take possession of Merve, only 12 marches will separate them from Herat, and there are no mountain ranges or other obstacles on the road. Undoubtedly, as soon as they have established themselves in Merve, the Russians will begin to enter into negotiations of friendship, trade, and political relations with the Cabul Government either openly or secretly, and we shall be placed in a most difficult position on account of our alliance with England in dealing with the questions brought forward by Russia, so that extreme emergencies will arise with which we shall be unable to cope. From all that appears in the English papers about the preparations for the advance of a Russian army, and all that the merchants tell us of the intention of Russia to open up Western Asia, it is clear the day will come when the Ruler of Afghanistan will either have to agree to all that Russia proposes, or to abandon his country, as neither are the Afghans able to contend with and check the Russians, nor is there any hope of an English army being sent into Afghanistan to protect it. Nor has the English Government as yet fixed on any place or provision in Hindoostan or Europe to which the nobles of Afghanistan may retire if driven from their own country. Taking all these matters into consideration, it would seem to be advisable that an Agent should be sent to ascertain first of all the views of the English Government

on the Seistan boundary, and all other questions affecting the interests of Afghanistan. Some of the councillors advised that before sending an envoy to Hindoostan, a written explanation of the Seistan decision should be solicited. If the decision is one that is acceptable to the Cabul Government, and no injury to Afghanistan is to be dreaded from it, and if the British Officer be empowered to make communications indicative of the care of the British Government for the firm establishment of all the boundaries of Afghanistan, and such intention of the British Government be communicated to us by letter, it will be advisable to make arrangements for the reception of the officer deputed to Cabul, and if the result of the interview with him be not satisfactory on all points, it will then be necessary to send an envoy to Hindoostan. If the English officer is to be sent simply to explain the Seistan boundary decision that could be done by written communication, and there is no necessity for a Sahib to undertake the trouble of the journey on this account; indeed, that would be a distinct loss to the Afghan Government. There are only two results to be expected; either the decision will be pleasing to the Cabul Government, or it will be displeasing; if it is displeasing to the Cabul Government, and that Government, seeing injury to its own interests in the proposed arrangements, should have any objection to urge, the British Government would certainly be annoyed, and it would become generally known that there was a feeling of dissatisfaction between the two Governments, and if the decision is accepted the ancient rights of Afghanistan must be abandoned. If the decision be communicated by letter, an answer can be sent by letter after mature consideration such as shall best conform to the interests of both countries.

In fine, after lengthened arguments between the Ameer and all his advisers, it was resolved to draw out a draft of an answer to your letter to me, and to give it to me with the request that I would transmit a copy of it to you. I have, therefore, copied it word for word, and have sent it to you separately as representing the answer given by His Highness the Ameer to the communication made by me to His Highness under your instructions. The real wish of the Ameer is that he should first be informed by letter of the points on which the British Government wish to make communications to him through the medium of one of their officers deputed to Cabul, so that he may weigh the matter in his mind and give a suitable answer.

Enclosure 4 in No. 2.

No. 77 C.

From D. C. MACNABB, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to
C. U. ARCHISON, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

SIR,

Dated Peshawur, 14th April 1873.

ON the 4th instant I wrote two letters to the Agent at Cabul, one specifying, for the information of His Highness the Amir, the two subjects which it is the wish of his Government should be fully explained to His Highness at the proposed meeting, and the other desiring him to ascertain the wishes of the Amir on the subject of his Excellency the Viceroy's offer of Enfield Rifles for the use of his troops.

The Agent writes on the 10th instant that he has communicated the purport of these letters to the Amir, and that His Highness expressed his intention of deliberating on both matters before making any answer. I have, therefore, the honour to communicate this report of the Agent for your information as explaining the delay in the receipt of an answer.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) D. C. MACNABB,
Commissioner and Superintendent.

Enclosure 5 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of LETTER, dated 14th April 1873, from the AGENT at Cabul to
COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

AFTER mastering the contents of your letter to me, dated 4th instant, which was received by me on the 9th idem, and after consulting with his Durbar officials, the Ameer remarked as follows:—

“As the interests of this Government, which God has given me, and those of the British Government, are virtually in all conditions identical, the meeting of a British

Officer deputed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India with me will afford me much gratification. As regards the Seistan question, full information about the confirmation of the award of Major-General Sir F. Goldsmid has reached me; and I have gleaned information about the ancient boundary of Northern Afghanistan from the murrasillas of his Excellency the Viceroy, dated 24th June 1870, 1st May 1872, and 9th September 1872, and the murrasilla of Von Kaufmann, Russian Governor-General at Tashkend. As for the recently defined boundary of Northern Afghanistan, whatever views the British Government may have entertained about it, great anxiety weighs on me day and night, and I am not in any moment relieved from it, that the juxtaposition of boundaries with Russia will involve difficulty in making provision for the security of the borders in the interests of both Governments. Under these circumstances, I consider it advisable that one of my agents should first wait on his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to ascertain the real views of the British Government in both of these two matters, and other major or minor border affairs, satisfactorily, and to represent my views about the interests of both Governments carefully and in detail, in order that, on receipt of full information about the views of the British Government, these matters may be satisfactorily settled after deep consideration and the most careful deliberation on their probable consequences. However, if the British Government prefer to depute an English Officer to me, notwithstanding their cognizance of my views on the considerations above mentioned, and my anxious precautionary reflections, or consider it desirable to do so after granting a meeting to my Agent, bearing the representations he will make on my part, and acquainting him with the views of the British Government, I have no objections to either course. Information should be kindly sent to me as to which of these views has been approved of by the British Government in order that I may make arrangements accordingly."

This letter has been submitted after perusal by the Ameer.

Enclosure 6 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of LETTER, dated 14th April 1873, from the AGENT at Cabul to COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

IN reply to your letter to me of 4th instant, which reached me on the 9th idem, on the subject of the proposed deputation of a British Officer to Cabul, I beg to submit the observations made by the Ameer in the Persian language under a separate letter after perusal by His Highness. After the receipt of your letter under reply, the Ameer held a private Council for some days with his Durbar officials. Some said that the decision in the Seistan question is the same which is contained in the award of Major-General Goldsmid there is no necessity of illustrating it further. They, moreover, said that regard should be paid to the fact that if an English Officer deputed by the British Government presses it on them to accept this decision, and they refuse to do so in the interests of the Government, such direct refusal at a personal interview will undoubtedly weaken the friendly relations existing between the two Governments. Further, that if the said British Officer makes any communications in the form of advice or instructions regarding the internal affairs of Afghanistan about Sirdar Mahomed Yakooob Khan and other Sirdars or Chiefs, it will clearly be most injurious to their interests. In addition to these representations they stated that if the deputation of an English Officer is intended for the discussion of some important matter of decision of boundaries, the settlement of such a question is hardly possible without the conference of the Ameer with his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India. His Highness remarked that, though in reality the settlement of border affairs is impossible without such conference, he will see about it when a wish for it is intimated to him by the British Government; that at present it is advisable that Syud Noor Mahomed Shah should be deputed as an Agent to wait on his Excellency the Viceroy to make and hear communications about boundary affairs, and that the British Government may send their Agent either before the departure of His Highness' Envoy or depute him in company with him on his return from India.

Enclosure 7 in No. 2.

No. 82 C., dated Peshawur, 19th April 1873.

From COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division, to SECRETARY to the
GOVERNMENT of INDIA, Foreign Department.

IN forwarding the translations of the Agent's letters, dated 14th instant, I have the honour to observe that my letter, instructing him to inform His Highness the Ameer, on a suitable opportunity, that the subject of his relations with Sirdar Yakoub Khan would not be broached at the proposed meeting, must have crossed these letters.

In three days more we may hope to learn whether His Highness' views as to the expediency of the meeting underwent any modification after the receipt of that communication.

Enclosure 8 in No. 2.

No. 763 P., dated Simla, 25th April 1873.

From SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, to COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT of Peshawur Division.

I AM directed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to acknowledge receipt of your letters, Nos. 81C and 82C, dated 19th instant, intimating the wish of His Highness the Ameer to depute one of his Agents to wait on the Viceroy before making arrangements for the conference suggested in my letters to the Punjab Government, No. 534 P., dated 21st March and No. 562 P., dated 22nd March 1873.

In proposing that you should visit the Ameer, His Excellency in Council was actuated by the desire of communicating to His Highness the Ameer the earliest possible authentic information regarding the Seistan boundary settlement, and the progress and conclusions of the communications which have taken place between the British Government and the Government of Russia, on the subject of the extent of His Highness' dominions.

As His Highness the Ameer, however, intimates that full information about the confirmation of General Sir F. Goldsmid's award has reached him, and that he has gathered information on the other subject from various documents, His Excellency in Council is quite prepared to meet the Ameer's wishes in the matter, and postpone further official communication to His Highness on the above subjects until the Agent whom His Highness may depute has had an opportunity of seeing the Viceroy.

I am to request that on the arrival of His Highness' Agent at Peshawur you will report the fact by telegraph, and, with the permission of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, make all necessary arrangements for his journey to Simla with comfort, and for his honourable reception and treatment on the way.

No. 3.

Dated Simla, 13th October 1876.

From CAPTAIN GREY to SYUD NOOR MAHOMED SHAH.

(After compliments.)

Be it known to you that the present Viceroy is as well disposed towards the Ameer as was Lord Mayo; but I am surprised to ascertain from Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan that the Ameer's own sentiments are considerably changed since Lord Mayo's day.

As you have frequently expressed friendship towards me, and must be well aware of my good-will, I have no hesitation in writing freely on this subject.

I know that you consider you have ground for annoyance at what passed in 1873, and all I can say is let bygones be bygones.

At the present conjuncture there can be no doubt that a nobleman of your high feelings and sagacity, who has, all his life, had nothing but his master's interests at heart, will put aside all considerations, save those of the advantage of his country.

What these are will be explained by Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, and I firmly rely upon your wisdom and foresight to approve them, and to lead the Ameer to do so.

You will see that the Viceroy has accepted all the propositions which you made in 1873, imposing only the condition that he should be enabled to watch a frontier for which he renders himself responsible, and that the Ameer, his friend and ally, should receive his Envoys.

It would, indeed, be a strange friendship which shut the door in the face of the messengers of one's friend.

You know that at Umballa you said that, when affairs in Afghanistan had somewhat settled down, there would be no objection to the residence of British officers anywhere save at Cabul. Now the Viceroy does not the least want to place an Envoy at Cabul. He only requires to have officers at Herat and other points on the frontier.

Again, in 1873, at Simla, you gave your opinion that British officers should come and go to define the Afghan frontier; and that, when the people were thus accustomed to their presence, the Ameer would not object to their permanent residence on that frontier.

At that time the Viceroy objected to assuming the responsibility for the Afghan frontier, so the other arrangement also fell through. Now the Viceroy does assume that responsibility; the other condition ought, therefore, also to be accepted, the reasons being that the Viceroy's arrangements turn upon this condition, and the Treaty itself depends upon it.

In conclusion, your friend has to say: If there was vacillation before, it was on this account that, in the absence of a Treaty between the two States, Ministers at home, and Viceroys in this country, exercised an unfettered discretion; but where a Treaty has been entered into, every one will be bound by its conditions.

P.S.—I very strongly hope that the Ameer will accept the invitation to Delhi. That Assemblage will not be one only of Feudatory Chiefs; but, on the contrary, the Viceroys of the French and Portuguese Powers, and the Rulers of Burma and Nepal, are invited. The Ameer's presence will show his good-will toward the Empress of India, whose assumption of that title will there be proclaimed, and the whole will learn therefrom how close is the bond of union between the two States.

No. 4.

Dated Simla, 13th October 1876.

From Sir LEWIS PELLY to SYUD NOOR MAHOMED SHAH.

Your friendly message, sent by our friend Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, has reached me, and I am happy in hearing of your health and prosperity. It is agreeable also to me to know that you do not forget the pleasant days we passed together at Candahar, when you so kindly troubled yourself to render my visit all that could be desired.

It seems likely, and I sincerely hope, that we may soon meet again; and I feel I need not assure you that in any duties which I may have to discharge in association with you, it will be my sole wish to aid you in placing the relations of the Afghan and British Governments on such a footing as shall leave no room for questioning the real and intimate friendship, and the permanent unity and policy, of our Governments.

I earnestly trust, too, that the present frank and cordial expression of his views by His Excellency the Viceroy may be met in a similar manner by His Highness the Ameer, and may result in consolidating His Highness' rule, in strengthening his dominions, and in securing the stability of His Highness' dynasty. If civil war in Afghanistan henceforth be averted by good arrangements, and the Ameer's son, Abdullah Jan, and after him, his heir, should succeed peacefully to the *musnud*, Afghanistan would be greatly benefited.

A word is enough between friends. Pray write to me freely, addressing your letters to the care of the Commissioner of Peshawur.

No. 5.

Dated Peshawar, 27th February 1877. (Extract.)

From Sir LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I., to the VICEROY.

I HAVE addressed the Envoy as desired in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th instant, and now beg to enclose a copy of my draft.* The Envoy has at once sent a verbal reply through Atta Mahomed Khan, to the effect that he will lose no time in causing the jehad to be put a stop to, and will send me a satisfactory written reply so soon as he is able to work.

* Enclosure attached, No. 1.

Enclosure in No. 5.

Draft of the Letter to the Afghan Envoy.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS—

I HAVE, on a previous occasion, addressed your Excellency, either personally or through Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, in a friendly and unofficial way, concerning the reports which reached me from many quarters of the Ameer's misrepresentations of our acts and proposals, and of His Highness' endeavours to excite a pretended jehad against the British Government in India at the very time when you, his Envoy Plenipotentiary, are here,—a public guest on British soil,—for the declared purpose of friendly negotiations. Since the last occasion on which I communicated with your Excellency on this subject, the reports have become more numerous, and have been confirmed from many independent sources, and are all consistent in showing the persistent and public manner in which the Ameer is appealing to his subjects to join in a jehad openly aimed at the British Government. Now the Ameer is free to accept, or to reject, the most friendly proposals on the part of His Excellency the Viceroy, which I had hoped to have the honour of discussing with your Excellency in the intended negotiations. But I must protest against misrepresentations wilfully and publicly made, and against the Ameer preaching a jehad at Cabul, whilst His Highness' Envoy Plenipotentiary is professing to negotiate on friendly terms at Peshawar. And I am instructed to request from your Excellency the favour of explicit explanations—

First, as to the Ameer's public accusations against the British Government founded on statements which both the Ameer and the Envoy must know to be without foundation.

Second, as to the Ameer's repeated appeals to his subjects openly aimed at the British Government.

Third, of the Ameer's reported conferences with the Russian Agents, and of his correspondence with the Russian authorities, regarding his military arrangements.

Finally, the Viceroy has reason to believe that the bearing of the Ameer's officials is increasingly unfriendly towards the British Agency at the Court of His Highness; that intercommunications between the Agency and the people of Cabul has been publicly prohibited by the Mayor of the City of Cabul; that the British Agent is apprehensive as to his personal safety.

As to the reasons for all these demonstrations no one knows better than your Excellency that the British Government is perfectly sincere in its assurance, repeatedly given, that it has not the slightest intention of attacking the Ameer; and the Viceroy deems the present attitude of His Highness to be irreconcilable with his being in possession of full and faithful reports of that of the British Government.

The Government of India notices with surprise the libels deliberately disseminated on it, and cannot doubt that the Ameer will take the earliest opportunity of explaining these proceedings, and causing the libels to be retracted as publicly as they have been promulgated.

I am also again to request that your Excellency will make such communications to Cabul as may put a stop to wilful and injurious misrepresentations of the objects of the proposed friendly negotiations.

No. 6.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from His Excellency the CABUL ENVOY to COLONEL SIR LEWIS PELLY, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, dated Saturday, the 3rd March 1877.

A. C.—

The letter, dated 27th February 1877, which you sent by hand to Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, reached my residence in Peshawar Cantonment on Tuesday, the 13th of the month of Safar (begins Tuesday evening), and the tenor of your friendly writing is ascertained.

It is true that either through Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan or personally you have stated that reports have reached you from many quarters, to the effect that the Ameer was exciting a jehad against the British Government. Kind friend! I at that time told Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan that during the time I was there these matters had not place, and even now I am unaware as to what sort of matter this is. Secondly, I verbally told yourself (that kind friend) that this sort of matters pass in a variety of forms from mouth to mouth of the public till at length the news-writers write all sorts of things. Further, I place no reliance upon such statements. How can one rely upon the statements of the common people (public)? For when Captain Cavagnari, Deputy Commissioner, came to the frontier of his own limits on the road to Koorum, what papers and statements did not trustworthy men write, viz., that such a large army is coming to Koorum, and that the British Government has such and such designs? The most noble Ruler (the Ameer) placed no reliance upon them. In what manner, then, can the authorities of the British Government place reliance upon such statements? Kind friend! I again write that I have no acknowledge of these affairs.

In case, however, there should be something of the kind, whether the Government be a great one or a small one, and such an impossible measure be desired by a great Government, then every Government takes counsel for itself of the royal family, and also of the nobles and learned men, as well as of the chiefs of tribes and camps. Therefore, in such a matter, the carrying out of which is recorded upon the responsibility of that people, it is incumbent on the King that he should consult with every tribe in this matter. With every tribe which may be consulted, it is the custom that each one, in consultation, should separately express his own opinion. And those persons, when they return to their own audience-halls, are questioned by their people; for each has his own tribe and people, and each tells them that he advised such and such. And when the matter is talked of in those counsel-chambers, it becomes altered and changed, and then these people, when they go to their own homes, again say something else which produces another alteration. Besides this, there are interested persons who, for purposes of their own, add other matters to it, and send it off to news-writers in a different character. To believe in such sort of statements is far from friendship.

Again, you have written that "it now rests with His Highness the Ameer to accept or to reject the most friendly proposal of His Excellency the Viceroy which I had hoped to have had the honour of discussing with you, his Envoy, in these negotiations." Kind friend! With much deference I beg to say that from the day I arrived in the nine conferences I have veiled nothing of the true state of the case. Whatever has been said in those nine conferences, and especially in the last conference on Monday, the 19th February, no change in that can be accorded.

That which you have written that "I feel bound* you are professedly conducting friendly negotiations at Peshawar." I repeat those very words of that kind one. From the day that I came to Peshawar with what varied arguments have I endeavoured to strengthen the customary friendship on the old footing! And in what manner did I bring it to an end in the last paragraph on Monday, the 19th February? Therefore, it is also surprising to me why you should not trust my word, but rely upon that of news-writers.

In the matter of the accusations you have written of—Kind friend! From the day that I arrived, if there be a single matter on which it can be adduced that it was based on accusation, be pleased to make it clear. It is expected that that kind one will pay attention to my conversations and not to the absurdities of news-writers.

And that which you have written in regard to the Russian Government. This a very great question (*amriazim*), and I am also not instructed in this question that I should say anything. But since I am sorry at the mention of such a matter, I will, by reason of right say, briefly from myself in a friendly manner, that from the day the most noble Ruler (Ameer) returned from Umballa to his capital of Cabul, the paper that came from the Russian Officers was opened, and the wax and seal removed in the presence of this

* Sentence incomplete.

very Agent of the British Government who is now present here, and who was summoned nightly for the purpose. After two or three days' consultation, that very paper, in the original English, Persian, and Russian, was forwarded to Lord Mayo, and by his advice a paper was written to the Officer of the Russian Government. From that day to the present day, what paper has come from the Russian Government a copy of which is not in the record office of the British Government? And what paper from the Ameer has been sent to them which is contrary to the tenor of that first paper which was written in consultation with Lord Mayo? You advance objection to those very writings which in this particular were from the British Government.

As to the Russian Agents: Will you (please) prove when a Russian Agent came into Afghanistan? Couriers of the Russian Officer, who are Mussulmans of the Syud and Sahibzada clan (both religious classes), do come for the purpose of delivering letters. If from the accident of winter, &c., he should remain five days or so; nobody has said to a guest, "Get those out of my house." Since this matter of the Russian Government is a very great question, I cannot say more than this.

When I become honoured by returning to the most noble Ruler the Ameer, having thoroughly informed him of the views of the British Government in this particular, this point will become very well and satisfactorily cleared up. And that which you have written in respect to your own Agent, your Agent is present here with the Ameer, none of the nobles or chiefs are more respected and honoured than he has been. And what is the matter that they have kept concealed from him?

That which you have written that "the people of the city of Cabul have been publicly prohibited by the Mayor of the city of Cabul from going to the Embassy quarters." I have no belief in this.

In the matter that "there is not the slightest intention of attacking the Ameer." My friend! From the day that this friendship has continued, especially in these present discussions at Peshawar, in which the whole discourse has been full of this, that the British Government (has declared that it) will in no manner interfere with or aggress upon the territories of the Ameer and of Afghanistan in which there should be displeasure to the Ameer or his successor, or there should be a decline in the independence of that Government. Neither has the Ameer at any time shown any reliance upon the sayings of people with interested motives in respect to the British Government. The regard has always been and will be for the friendship of the British Government.

And that which you have written, viz., "Retract these libels in the same public manner that they have been promulgated." My friend! I will never admit that anybody can have made an accusation against the British Government. But in the particular of a proclamation in respect to the matters which have come to pass between us when I have reached the Ameer's presence, and there informed him of the friendly views of the British Government so far as I have seen and known, and also of these matters of contrary dispositions as to what is the reality of them and what their nature; having there weighed all these matters together with minuteness, it will be promulgated in a highly satisfactory manner as may be suited to the case, so that those proclamations shall openly reach the British Government.

Written on Saturday, 3rd March 1877.

No. 7.

No. 86 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 16th September 1878.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegraphic reports and orders in connexion with the Mission to Kabul.

2. Your Lordship will perceive that Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, who was sent in advance of the Mission, left Peshawar on the 30th August, that he has been well received at all the stages on the road, and that on the 4th September he reached Jelalabad, where he was visited and entertained by the Governor. On the 8th September a letter was despatched to the Mustafi informing him that the Mission would leave Peshawar on or about the 16th September. The substance of the letter was also made known to the Afghan authorities at Ali Masjid, Dhakka, and Jelalabad; and

an answer was received from Faiz Muhammad Khan, who commands at Ali Masjid, to the effect that without permission from Kabul he cannot permit the Mission to pass unopposed. It will be observed that subsequently, on the 13th September, he received secret orders by express from Kabul.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 23rd August 1878. (Extract.)

From Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

The Mir Akhor has been suddenly summoned to Kabul from Jelalabad, probably in connection with Khaibar negotiations. Order reached Jelalabad 18th.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

Telegram No. 1,790 P., dated 26th August 1878.

To MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

MUSTAUFY should be told that Mission leaves Peshawar on 16th, and Gholam Hussein might, on arrival at Kabul, intimate quietly that departure of Mission on fixed date is certain, and that attempts to prevent or delay journey will indicate distinctly unfriendly resolutions on the part of Kabul Government.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 26th August 1878.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

MESSAGE received. Does your Lordship desire the intimation to Mustaufi to be sent at once, or when Gholam Hussein leaves?

Enclosure 4 in No. 7.

Telegram No. 1805 P., dated 27th August 1878.

To MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

Your telegram 26th. Intimation should be sent at once to Mustaufi, but delay until 30th morning the departure from Peshawar of Gholam Hussein.

Enclosure 5 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 27th August 1878.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

Your letter of 23rd, and packet, just received. In accordance with the Viceroy's telegram of to-day, Gholam Hussein Khan will leave on the morning of the 30th instant.

Enclosure 6 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 29th August 1878.

From Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

NATIVE Envoy leaves this to-morrow morning, halts for the night in the Khaibar, and proceeds to Dhakka on morning of 31st. I will leave this on 1st, and will reach Simla on morning of 4th. My object in remaining here to-morrow and next day is to note the results of Khaibar arrangements.

Enclosure 7 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 30th August 1878.

From Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

NATIVE Envoy left this morning. I am hourly expecting news from Ali Masjid as to his progress.

Enclosure 8 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 31st August 1878.

From Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

NATIVE Envoy reached Ali Masjid yesterday afternoon, was hospitably entertained by Faiz Muhammad Khan, Ghilzai; Shinwari Maliks preparing to entertain him at Lwargui. It is expected he will reach Dhakka this afternoon. I leave to-morrow morning; will reach Simla early on 4th. Latest advices from Kabul, dated 21st, state that, on 20th, Amir, after much persuasion from Mustaufi, attended durbar for a short period.

Enclosure 9 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 31st August 1878.

From Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

ILAHÍ BAKSH, Peshawar merchant, has received letter from Kabul, dated 25th: states that Abramoff, accompanied by Mirza Muhammad Hasan, Amir's Mir Munshi, has left for Russian Turkistan, but has left his two subordinate officers at Kabul; and it is given out he will return after consultation with the Governor-General of Turkistan. General opinion in Kabul is that the Amir will receive British Mission.

Enclosure 10 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 31st August 1878.

From Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

FROM the open way Faiz Muhammad Khan has acted, he himself having accompanied Envoy from Ali Masjid *en route* to Dhakka, it may be inferred that secret instructions have been issued to Amir's officials, and that Envoy will not be detained at Dhakka. A reply to my communications of 23rd ought, in the course of a day or two, to be received from Mustaufi. Commissioner will receive and communicate contents.

Enclosure 11 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 1st September 1878.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

LETTER just received by Bakhtiar Khan in reply to his private communication to Mustaufi. Writer states that all arrangements for Gholam Hasan's journey will be made.

Enclosure 12 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 3rd September 1878.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

GHOLAM HUSSEIN reached Dhakka 1st September; was leaving midnight towards Jelalabad. Hospitably entertained by General Gholam Haidar, who gives him escort.

Enclosure 13 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 5th September 1878.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

GENERAL GHOLAM HAIDAR KHAN has sent back our postal runners from Dhakka. I propose sending any communications for our Vakil to said General, to go to Kabul as before with Amir's post. Inference is, Amir sanctions our Vakil's visit to Kabul.

Enclosure 14 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 6th September 1878.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

MUSTAUFU writes to Deputy Commissioner, dated 2nd September:—Your letters received, but we cannot act or communicate with Amir. It is necessary for Nawab to remain at Peshawar. Mustaufi writes to Bakhtiar Khan, same date:—Your letters received; matter understood. I have informed Amir of coming of the Vakils. Amir remarked that he was unfit to attend to such business. I privately informed you that this matter must be deferred, perhaps after the Ramzan, Amir replied. Letter ends.

Since 27th, some change has taken place. Nawab is only allowed to make short marches, so that reply may not reach Peshawar by 16th; and Amir probably desires to receive some communication from Russia before sanctioning British Mission.

Enclosure 15 in No. 7.

Telegram dated 6th September 1878.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

LETTERS received by Bakhtiar Khan from Faiz Muhammad Khan from Khaibar Pass, that he is to send no more letters through him, but through the post office, and advising him that the passing of the Vakil or Envoy is to depend on the permission Amir. This letter was written in Kabul for Faiz Muhammad.

Enclosure 16 in No. 7.

Telegram No. 1907 P., dated 7th September 1878.

To COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

YOURS of yesterday. Inform Mustaufi, both directly and indirectly, that Mission will leave Peshawar about 16th, whether Nawab has reached Kabul or not; that the object of the Mission is friendly, but that a refusal of free passage and safe conduct to Kabul will be considered as an act of open hostility. Letter should also be written to Nawab Gholam Hussein directing him to push on to Kabul as fast as he can, and show firmness in resisting endeavours to delay him.

Enclosure 17 in No. 7.

Telegram No. 1910 P., dated 7th September 1878.

To COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

In continuation of this day's telegram, tell Mustaufi that it has been arranged that Mission shall not arrive until after Ramzan.

Enclosure 18 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 8th September 1878.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

Two telegrams (dated 7th) received. Letter will be despatched to Mustaufi through Amir's post this day. I suggest sending similar information to Ali Masjid, Dhakka, Jelalabad. Officer commanding must communicate with Kabul for instructions and regarding supply. Mustaufi's letter may be delayed. Early orders solicited.

Enclosure 19 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 8th September 1878.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

ORDERS also sent to Nawab Gholam Haidar (?), in accordance with the telegraphic instructions.

Enclosure 20 in No. 7.

Telegram No. 1920P., dated 9th September 1878.

To COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

YOUR telegram 8th. The substance of your letter to Mustaufi may be communicated to Ali Masjid, Dhakka, Jelalabad, for information of what has been written to Kabul, not as a separate notice addressed direct to local officials.

Enclosure 21 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 8th September 1878.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

LETTER received from Nawab. Has had fever from the heat. On leaving Dhakka was met by Kotwal of Jelalabad. Reached Jelalabad 4th; received by son Mir Akhor; was visited and entertained by Mir Akhor. Leaves 5th for Kabul.

Enclosure 22 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 10th September 1878.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

YOUR Excellency's orders carried out. Information sent to Ali Masjid, Dhakka, and Jelalabad.

Enclosure 23 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 11th September 1878.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

REPLY received by Bakhtiar Khan from Ali Masjid to my letter of yesterday that without permission from Kabul he (Faiz Muhammad Khan) will not allow the Mission to pass unopposed. Letter civil but firm.

Enclosure 24 in No. 7.

Telegram, dated 13th September 1878.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

MUFTI SHAH MUHAMMAD, Manager of Frontier Affairs, visited Ali Masjid and communicated secret instructions to Faiz Muhammad, and returned express to Kabul yesterday.

No. 8.

No. 117 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 31st October 1878.

WE have the honour to forward the full text of the Amir's letters as carefully
translated at Simla.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

Translation of Letter from AMIR SHER ALI KHAN, of Kabul, to his Excellency the
VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, dated 8th Shawal (6th October).

AFTER the usual complimentary beginning.—Be it known to your Excellency (Janáb) that your Excellency's friendly letter, which was sent by the hands of the highly-honoured Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan, and which contained the news of the deputation of a friendly Mission, namely, a Mission from the British Government, has been perused by me; and on perusal I have fully informed myself of its contents. But the above-named Nawab had not yet been honoured with an interview, and your Excellency's friendly letter had not yet been seen by me, when a letter addressed by Major Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawar, to Mirza Habibulla Khan, an official of this God-granted Government, having arrived here, was perused by this supplicant before the throne of God. And great surprise and astonishment was caused by the writing of the officer above mentioned—that is, the Commissioner. What can be the

* Literally, "blustering," or
"full of noise."

result, meaning, and advantage of such a vehement* communication to an ally and friend, and of advancing by force a friendly Mission in this manner.

Subsequently three more letters from the same officer, in the same tone and style, to the address of the officials of this God-granted Government, were seen. Moreover, in the course of a few days, several other letters, which were received from that direction, were seen. These were not free from harsh and rough words and expressions, which are inconsistent with the forms of courtesy and civility, and contrary to the mode of friendship and sympathy.

In consequence of the attack of grief and affliction which has befallen me by the decree of God, great distraction has seized the mind of this supplicant at God's threshold. The trusted officers of the British Government, therefore, ought to have observed patience, and to have stayed, at such a time; and this would have been the most commendable and appropriate course. Your Excellency should be pleased to have regard to (mulahaza farmáyand) this harsh (style of) address and provocation, as well as to the altercation with such anger with my officials. How inconsistent is this with the sublime way of friendship and alliance! In any case the officials of this God-granted Government, notwithstanding the threatening communications of the officials of the British Government, which communications are still in the possession of the officers of this Government, will not evince any hostility or opposition to the British Government. Moreover, they do not entertain any hostile or antagonistic feelings toward any Government whatever. But should any Government entertain without cause any hostile and inimical feelings towards this God-granted Government, I

commit all my affairs to the merciful God, upon whose
will and intention all matters depend. He alone
suffices for us, and He is the best to be trusted.†

† Literally, "the best Wakeel."

The highly-honoured Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan, who is the bearer of this friendly letter, has, in accordance with the instructions received from the officers of the British Government, asked leave to return, and the requisite permission has been granted.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

Translation of Letter from AMIR SHEER ALI KHAN to His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of India, dated 8th Shawal (6th October).

A.C.—Be it known to your Excellency that your Excellency's most friendly letter, expressing deep sorrow and regret at the death of my beloved son, Sirdar Abdulla Khan, the Heir-Apparent to the God-granted Government of Afghanistan, which your Excellency sent by the hands of Nawab Ghulam Hussein, has been perused by me. The sorrow and regret which your Excellency, in conformity with the forms of friendship and amity, has expressed regarding this mournful event, which has taken place by decree of God, is indeed according to the rules of friendship and concord, and to the behaviour of friends to friends in affliction. But as no one can resist or escape the Divine decree, it is fitting and appropriate under all circumstances to submit and resign one's-self to the will of God. What more of friendliness can be written?

No. 9.

No. 119 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable Viscount CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 7th November 1878.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of telegraphic correspondence relating to the negotiations with the tribes of the Khaibar Pass.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
N. B. CHAMBERLAIN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 9.

Telegram, dated 31st October 1874.

From Major CAVAGNARI, Jamrud (through Peshawar).

RECONNOITRED to-day the Kajuram plain, the winter settlements of the Tirah Afridis. Have received a deputation from the principal headmen of the Kambar Khel Afridis, who offer to send in their Jirga. I am now in communication with all the principal Afridi tribes who are connected with the Khaibar. The Shinwaris appear most desirous for a settlement with us, and will supply mules. Six men died yesterday at Ali Masjid.

A man from Turkistan reports arrest by Russians of Takhtamash Beg, son of Abdul Ghafur Beg, in the Oratippa district, and that Russians are advancing on Kashgar.

In Ghazni the Mullahs are inciting the people to a religious war.

Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

Telegram, dated 1st November 1878. (Extract.)

From Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

ALL sections of Khaibaris have separately attended, and have expressed their willingness to resume former relations for Government control of Khaibar. They have promised to furnish levies to assist during any military operations, and will give selected hostages as guarantees of good faith.

Enclosure 3 in No. 9.

Telegram, dated 2nd November 1878.

From Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

TEN days or a fortnight will probably elapse before all the tribes can assemble here to arrange some united course of action regarding their withdrawal from their relations with the Amir. At a week's notice, the sections that have promised active co-operation can collect their armed men.

No. 10.

PROCLAMATION issued by the VICEROY, in English, Persian, and Urdu, on the
21st November 1878.

THE Viceroy of India to the Ameer Sher Ali Khan, of Kabul, to his Sirdars and subjects, and to all the people of Afghanistan. It is now 10 years since the Ameer Sher Ali Khan, after a prolonged struggle, had at last succeeded in placing himself upon the throne of Kabul; at that time his dominion still needed consolidation, and the extent of it was still undefined. In these circumstances the Ameer, who had already been assisted by the British Government with money and with arms, expressed a wish to meet the Viceroy of India; his wish was cordially complied with; he was courteously received and honourably entertained by the Viceroy at Umballa; the countenance and support he had come to seek were then assured to him; he at the same time obtained further unconditional assistance in arms and money. These tokens of the good-will of the British Government, which he gratefully acknowledged, materially aided the Ameer after his return to his own country in their securing his position and extending his authority; since then the Ameer Sher Ali Khan has received from the British Government, in confirmation of its good-will, large additional gifts of arms; the powerful influence of the British Government has secured for him formal recognition by the Emperor of Russia of a fixed boundary between the Kingdom of Kabul and the Khanates of Bokhara and Kokand; the Amir's sovereignty over Wakhan and Badakshan was thereby admitted and made sure, a sovereignty which had till then been disputed by the Russian Government; his subjects have been allowed to pass freely throughout the Indian Empire, to carry on trade, and to enjoy all the protection afforded by the British Government to its own subjects; in no single instance have they been unjustly or inhospitably treated within British jurisdiction; for all these gracious acts the Ameer Sher Ali Khan has rendered no return, on the contrary he has requited them with active ill-will and open discourtesy. The authority over Badakshan, acquired for him by the influence of the British Government, was used by him to forbid passage through that province to a British officer of rank returning from a mission to a neighbouring State; he has closed, against free passage to British subjects and their commerce, the roads between India and Afghanistan; he has maltreated British subjects, and permitted British traders to be plundered within his jurisdiction, giving them neither protection nor redress; he has used cruelty and put to death subjects of his own on the mere suspicion that they were in communication with the British Government; he has openly and assiduously endeavoured by words and deeds to stir up religious hatred against the English, and incited war against the Empire of India. Having previously excluded British officers from every part of his dominions, and refused to receive a British mission; having left unanswered friendly communication addressed to him by the Viceroy, and repelled all efforts towards amicable intercourse between the British

Government and himself, he has, nevertheless, received formally and entertained publicly at Kabul an embassy from Russia; this he has done at a time when such an act derived special significance from the character of contemporaneous events in Europe, and the attitude of England and Russia in relation thereto. Furthermore, he has done it well knowing that the Russian Government stands pledged by engagements with England to regard his territories as completely beyond the sphere of Russian influence. Finally, while this Russian embassy is still at his capital, the Ameer has forcibly repulsed at his outpost an English envoy of high rank, of whose coming he had formal and timely announcement by a letter from the Viceroy, attesting the importance and urgency of the envoy's Mission. Even then the British Government, still anxious to avert the calamities of war, deferred hostile action, and proffered to the Ameer a last opportunity of escaping the punishment merited by his acts. Of this opportunity the Ameer has refused to avail himself. It has been the wish of the British Government to find the best security for its Indian frontier in the friendship of a State whose independence it seeks to confirm, and of a Prince whose throne it has helped to support. Animated by this wish, the British Government has made repeated efforts to establish with the Ameer Sher Ali Khan those close and cordial relations which are necessary to the interests of the two neighbouring countries, but its efforts, after being persistently repulsed, have now been met with open indignity and defiance. The Ameer Sher Ali Khan, mistaking for weakness the long forbearance of the British Government, has thus deliberately incurred its just resentment. With the Sirdars and people of Afghanistan this Government has still no quarrel, and desires none. They are absolved from all responsibility from the recent acts of the Ameer, and as they have given no offence, so the British Government, wishing to respect their independence, will not willingly injure or interfere with them, nor will the British Government tolerate interference on the part of any other power in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Upon the Ameer Sher Ali Khan alone rests the responsibility of having exchanged the friendship for the hostility of the Empress of India.

No. 11.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, 30th November 1878.

SEND text of letters from Commissioner referred to in Ameer's letter of 6th October.

No. 12.

FROM VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 1st December 1878.

YOUR telegram 30th. Following is text of Commissioner of Peshawur's letter, 7th September, to Mustaufi. Letter begins—"After compliments, I write this friendly letter to inform you that the 16th or 17th September has been fixed for the departure of a Mission of high rank from the British Government to Kabul, and that the Mission will start whether Nawab Gholam Hossein shall or shall not by that time have had the honour of waiting on His Highness the Ameer. The object for which Mission is deputed is friendly, and the refusal of free passage to it, or interruption, or injury to its friendly progress will be regarded as act of hostility. I am to explain that the Mission will not in any case enter capital of Kabul before expiry of the month Ramazan. In conclusion may you keep well." Letter ends.

Following is text of letter from Commissioner to Gholam Hossein. Begins same as other down to word "hostility." Then continues thus—"You should, under all circumstances, use all endeavours to reach Kabul soon. Should any impediments be interposed to your journey in such case it is fit you should act firmly." Second letter ends.

Please remember that these letters are a continuation of preceding correspondence between English and Kabul officials, in which the latter said matter must be wholly deferred pending Ameer's pleasure. Letter to Gholam Hossein, opened by Ameer, was private to our own officer.

No. 13.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, 3rd December 1878.

Yours 1st. Gives text of two letters, Ameer refers to four.
What are the other two?

No. 14.

Telegram from the VICEROY to the SECRETARY OF STATE, 4th December 1878.

Yours of 3rd. The four letters to which the Ameer alludes in his letter of 6th October are the Commissioner's letter to the Mustaufi, and simultaneous communications containing similar notice to the Ameer's Officers at Ali Musjid, Dakka, and Jellalabad.
These latter were sent for information and not as separate notices.

LONDON:

Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

EAST INDIA (AFGHAN PAPERS).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons,
dated 9 December 1878;—*for*,

“ COPIES of TELEGRAM from Viceroy to Secretary of State of the 18th day of February 1875 :”

“ Of REPLY of Secretary of State of the 23rd day of February :”

“ And, of TELEGRAM from Viceroy to Secretary of State of the 24th day of March.”

India Office, }
10 December 1878. }

EDWARD STANHOPE,
Under Secretary of State.

COPY of TELEGRAM from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 18th February 1875.

YOUR Despatch of 22nd January, Secret, No. 2, para. 6. We have nothing on record to show that Amir has ever expressed his readiness to permit presence of a European Agent at Herat; therefore we cannot agree that if his intentions are still loyal he will make no serious difficulty. Recent circumstances render this very doubtful, and his objections might not proceed from improper motives. Para. 5. Are the instructions to be carried out at once, or is discretion left to the Government of India as to time and opportunity? We think present time and circumstances are very unsuitable for taking initiative.

COPY of TELEGRAM from Secretary of State to Viceroy, 23rd February 1875.

YOUR telegram of 18th.

How much delay do you contemplate? Three or four months would be within discretion given by Despatch. If you contemplate much longer delay, explain reasons in Secret Despatch, that Government may consider them.

Events here make Russian activity more probable.

For Amir's expressions, *see* Report of Secret Council, Lahore, 17 March 1869; Girdlestone's Official Note, 26 March, and Captain Grey's Note, 31 March 1869. Ask Pollock, Thornton, Girdlestone.

COPY of TELEGRAM from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 24th March 1875.

YOUR telegram of the 23rd February, Lieutenant Governor, Sir Richard Pollock, and General Reynell Taylor are strongly opposed to inviting Ameer to accept British officer at Herat. I shall therefore use discretion given to postpone action. The opinion of the Lieutenant Governor and of the Punjab officials will be considered by Government of India at Simla without delay, and a despatch written conveying our opinion.

EAST INDIA (AFGHAN PAPERS).

COPIES of TELEGRAM from Viceroy to Secretary of State of 18 February 1876; of Reply of Secretary of State of 23 February; and, of TELEGRAM from Viceroy to Secretary of State of 24 March.

(*Lord Robert Montagu.*)

*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
12 December 1878.*

EAST INDIA (AFGHANISTAN EXPEDITION).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons,
dated 10 December 1878;—for,

“COPY of OPINIONS recorded since Tuesday last by MEMBERS of the
COUNCIL of the SECRETARY of STATE for INDIA in reference to the
EXPENDITURE for, and other Matters connected with, the MILITARY
EXPEDITION against AFGHANISTAN.”

India Office, }
12 December 1878. }

EDWARD STANHOPE.

OPINION of Sir *Erskine Perry*.

I DESIRE to record shortly the reasons why I voted to-day for an augmentation of the Native Army in India, and the arguments I used to show that no portion of the charge of the present war ought to be thrown on the revenues of India.

It is the first opportunity that has been given to the Council of India to express an opinion as to the justice or expediency of the war, and I regret that it has arisen now. I should have preferred that when the Secretary of State was asked in Parliament, what are the views of your Council on the subject, he should have been able to reply, “I don’t know; the law does not compel me to consult them, and I have not consulted them.” This places us, no doubt, in a rather humiliating position, and it is strange that we are the only body of men in the United Kingdom who have been precluded from expressing our opinions either to Government or to the public on this momentous question. Still it is the position assigned to us by law, and, at all events, it relieves us of all responsibility.

Now that we are called upon to pay out of the revenues of India the first charges of the war, it is, I think, imperative on those who, like myself, entertain strong convictions that the war is unjust in its inception, unnecessary if the wise policy of our predecessors had been maintained, and probably disastrous, in the results which may be anticipated, to the best interests of India, to put their views on record.

I will not dilate on the justice or injustice of the war. If it is justifiable, it is so on European grounds, on broad views of Continental policy, subjects on which I have no special information, nor the slightest authority to speak. I will only say, as a jurist, that I have been shocked at the doctrine lately put forth by high legal authority, that the main principles of international law are not applicable to the East. Those principles are founded on large views of morality and justice, and if it is forbidden to a civilised power in Europe to use poisoned weapons, to shell defenceless towns, to massacre or enslave prisoners, to invade a weak state because the possession of it would be convenient to the captor, according to my judgment these proceedings are equally forbidden to a civilised power in Asia.

But the argument I desire to impress upon your Lordship is, that so far as the interests of India are concerned, the war is wholly inexpedient, and that no portion of the charge of the war ought to be thrown on her revenues. India has nothing to fear from Afghanistan. A century ago an Afghan invasion was a possibility, and caused a great panic; no one is silly enough to put forward such an anticipation now. Nor do I rest on the ground that India is extremely poor, that taxation has been already carried quite as far as is wise, and that to impose additional taxation for an Afghan war is extremely dangerous. I believe

all this is true, still if the present war is necessary for the defence of India, it is incumbent on India to spend her last rupee in the contest.

But I deny absolutely that the interests of India demand a war. Lord Lytton has told us, more than once, that the Central Asian question is not an Indian but a European question, that it depends on the policy of the Cabinet.* I bow to the reasoning, the soundness of which I am not in a position to judge, but as an Indian politician charged by Parliament with the protection of the revenues of India, I maintain that it is unjust to throw any of the cost of an Imperial policy on the revenues of that extremely poor country.

I will not enter here into the probable charges of the war, for neither I nor my colleagues have had time to make the necessary calculations, as the proposition has been placed before us as an urgent measure to be passed at once, and not brooking even two or three days delay, so as to secure the attendance of a full Council, and I deeply regret this on account of the unavoidable absence of Sir Frederic Halliday and Sir H. Norman.

But what principally disturbs my mind is the future burthen that will be imposed on Indian resources by our Afghan conquests. If England pays, as she ought to do, the whole charge of the war, this will be but a small amount of the expenditure which even the most successful Afghan campaign will necessitate. Suppose that the war costs even twenty millions sterling, this would involve a charge on English revenues of between six and seven hundred thousand pounds a-year. But if we shall be led on, as I greatly fear we shall, by military and political exigencies, to occupy or annex Afghanistan, the charge on Indian revenues of such an occupation has never been estimated at less than three or four millions annually. No one farthing of this can ever be expected from England.

In order to prevent any misunderstanding of my argument, I desire to say that I have always thought it possible that, as a matter of self-defence, and on the broad ground of *salus reipublicæ* it might be necessary some day to take military occupation of the Afghan country. With this view I brought before Lord Salisbury's attention, in a note against the occupation of Quetta, the following forcible opinions of a most distinguished soldier statesman, Major General Sir Henry Durand. In reply to arguments similar to what we hear now, but brought forward in 1869, by Sir Bartle Frere, and then rejected by the whole of the Government of India,† Sir Henry Durand minuted as follows:—"It is easy to conceive circumstances which might combine to render the partial or entire occupation of Afghanistan necessary as a theatre for offensive operations on our part in aid of Afghan resistance to invasion from the westward. It is a country admirably adapted for giving the fullest effect to the destructive warfare which Afghans thus supported could wage, with small loss to themselves against hostile columns."

"If our position on the Indus frontier be one of unmistakeable strength it will long paralyse aggressive presumption. I know that we could again seize Afghanistan if it were advisable or necessary, and that with our Indian frontier complete in its communications, parallel and perpendicular, no power on earth could shake us out of that country. I know, too, that with the Afghans friendly and cordial we could, without the actual seizure of the country for ourselves, organise its defence in a most destructive manner against hostile invasions; but neither alternative is at present imposed upon us as of the smallest necessity; and I am absolutely opposed to precipitative complications, and plunging into certain difficulties out of respect for nervous apprehensions, the realisation of which is—if it ever take place—remote, and can be met when the time comes, whichever way may be most advisable."

Sir Henry Durand thought in 1869 that no hostile invasion of India was at all probable; I am of exactly the same opinion in 1878; and I firmly believe that Her Majesty's Government concurs in the same view.

For the above reasons I should have been disposed to vote against the present charge on the revenues of India, but looking upon it only as an advance to the Imperial Government, feeling also that it is expedient no time should be lost in providing

* See Beluchistan Blue Book, No. 2, p. 356, para. 17.

3, p. 131, para. 12.

† An exceedingly strong Government, consisting of Lord Lawrence, Sir William Mansfield, Mr. Massey, Sir Henry Durand, and Sir Henry Maine.

providing for a necessity growing out of actual war, and having been given the power under Section 23 of 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106, of recording my opinions, I have voted with my colleagues in the affirmative.

3 December 1878.

(signed) *E. Perry.*

OPINION of Sir *Barrow H. Ellis.*

THE Government of India has asked, by telegraph, for sanction to a large increase of the native army. Every Member of Council would, I am sure, desire, as I do, to give cordial assistance to the Government in India to enable them to prosecute the war with energy, and bring it to a successful conclusion. I have no doubt, therefore, as to the propriety of agreeing to the present proposal, but as it involves a large expenditure which has to be incurred in consequence of a war beyond the frontiers of India, it is our duty to take this the first opportunity that has offered, to record an opinion as to the mode in which the cost of the war should be defrayed. It is true that the decision rests with the Houses of Parliament, but it is none the less the duty of the Council to state its views, and if they are to be stated at all, an expression of opinion can be of use only if recorded before a final decision is arrived at.

It is not for me to justify the war, nor to seek to determine the causes that have led to it, except in so far as they bear on the question whether the charge ought to be borne by Indian revenues or by the Imperial Treasury. Had the war been undertaken on account of aggression by Shir Ali, or because the Afghans menaced the peace and security of India, then doubtless, at whatever cost, the charge would fairly have been debitable to India, but surely no one will allege these to be the causes of the war. It is not anything that Shir Ali has said or done that *per se* justifies the extreme step of declaring a war that must at best cost much money, and many valuable lives. The war is clearly the outcome of events in Europe, and the necessity for it has arisen from the action of Russia, which action again was devised as a support to schemes in Europe; it is thus in the interests of the Empire, and in furtherance of European policy, that the war has been brought about, and it is in these considerations that its justification must be found.

I trust, therefore, that it will be borne in mind that the mere fact of the *locale* being on the Indian frontier ought not to be made an excuse for placing a new burthen upon India. In any case substantial aid will be freely given by India in the supply of war material, and in meeting the ordinary cost of a large portion of the troops engaged; the additional charges involved ought to be accepted by the British nation, and this liability I doubt not will be generally recognised. The people of India are unrepresented, and it is the more incumbent, therefore, that the British nation should impose on India no charge of this kind that is not just, and beyond challenge. Taxation is already as heavy in India as it well can be, and the people will feel the more new taxes, which in any case would cause grave dissatisfaction—not to say discontent, when the imposition of such taxes is due to an expenditure which ought in fairness to be borne by the Imperial Exchequer, and not by the already over-weighted Indian taxpayer.

(signed) *B. H. Ellis.*

4 December 1878.

OPINION of Sir *Robert Montgomery.*

I VOTED in the Council, on Tuesday the 3rd instant, for the increase to the Native Forces here noted.*

I desire to put on record my reasons for the same, and to state my views as to the payment of this increase, and also for all extraordinary charges connected with the war now being waged with Afghanistan.

It

* 96 Sowars per regiment, Bengal and Punjab Frontier Cavalry; 200 Sepoys per regiment, per Bengal and Punjab Frontier Native Infantry.

It must be remembered that the origin of the complications in Afghanistan was in the pressure put by the English Government upon Russia in Europe. If this pressure had not led the Russians to interfere in Afghanistan it is highly improbable that any war against that country would have been necessary.

The War is for Imperial purposes, beyond the boundaries of India ; and I hold that, as in the war with Abyssinia, so in this war, *all* extraordinary charges, and *all* charges for troops replaced, should be paid for by the Imperial Government.

The course of events during and after the conclusion of the war may necessitate a considerable permanent addition to the military, civil, political, and administrative charges of India. This increase should be *shared by* the Imperial Government.

(signed) *R. Montgomery.*

5 December 1878.

OPINION of *R. A. Dalyell, Esq.*

*21 & 22 Vict.
c. 106, s. 23.

I DESIRE that my "opinion and reasons" may be placed on record as to the telegram sanctioning the increase to the Bengal Native Army, which was passed at the last Council, but in regard to which some "differences of opinion" existed among the members present.* I think that any delay in the dispatch of the telegram would have been in the highest degree inexpedient, and might have resulted in crippling the Military Department in their eventual operations in Afghanistan. At the same time, in voting in favour of a measure which must involve a heavy charge upon the revenues of India, I wish it to be distinctly understood that, in my humble opinion, the expenditure likely to be incurred in connection with the present war on the north-west frontier should not be allowed to fall exclusively upon those revenues. Though I altogether disagree with the views which have been expressed by Sir Erskine Perry as to the inexpediency of our present policy in regard to Afghanistan, and though, after a careful study of the papers on the subject, I am quite satisfied that, in the interests of India, Her Majesty's Government could not have adopted any other course than that which they have determined to follow, I concur with him in considering that the war upon which we have entered is to some extent "Imperial" as well as "local" in its objects. It seems to me that the steps which have been taken, as I think properly, by the Government of India, have been rendered necessary by the European interests of the British Empire as well as by the special interests of India, and on this ground I think that it would be only just that a considerable portion of the burden should be transferred to the finances of Great Britain.

R. A. Dalyell.

5 December 1878.

OPINION of Sir *William Muir.*

PROPOSED INCREASE TO THE INDIAN ARMY.

Now that war has commenced there should, of course, be no hesitation in supporting the Government of India in all measures for the successful prosecution, and speedy termination, of the campaign, and in this among the rest.

But the proposal raises some collateral questions of vital importance. Such are, the relative strength of the Native and British elements in the Indian Army ; and, further, the expediency of employing the Contingents of Native Courts, whether in the field, or on garrison duty. Both very critical questions indeed ; but, for the moment, they must be left aside.

The present consideration is, Who is responsible for the cost of the war ? I wish briefly to explain why I think the British nation is.

I will first notice the position created by Lord Lytton's earlier action. The policy of his predecessors reversed, the Viceroy pressed a British Resident on Afghanistan ; and this being declined, we withdrew, and left the Ameer to his own devices, entirely isolated from our alliance and support.

Hitherto

Hitherto the Ameer (making due allowance for his morose and intractable temper) had been not unfriendly, communicating as he did to us the letters received from Russian officers, and his replies. Certainly up to that time he had entertained the utmost distrust and fear of Russia, and had looked to us for support against aggression from that quarter. Now when the Native Embassy was withdrawn, and diplomatic relations with the Viceroy suspended, he maintained all round a sullen reserve, making no advance in any quarter.

So strong was this feeling, that though cast adrift and greatly irritated by us, the Ameer, for above a year, and up to a comparatively recent period, showed no symptoms whatever of drawing towards Russia. And so he would have remained, as far as we have the means of judging, in sullen isolation, *but for the events which transpired on the conclusion of the Turkish War.*

That was an affair in which India had small concern. The Citadel of Eastern Europe was in check, and the British Government moved to release it. It was, again, as a counter-move that Russia stretched her hand out in the far East to touch us in what she conceived our tenderest and most vulnerable point. Thus it was a matter arising out of British interests, dependent at least on the balance of power in Europe, and having relation to India only in so far as the power and prestige of her Protector was involved, which originated the war. A Russian Mission was sent to Cabul; the Ameer, deserted by us, was unable longer to maintain his isolated position, and so he fell into the hands of Russia. But it was a European, not an Indian, cause which led to this.

It may be replied that it was Lord Lytton's previous action, taken in the interest of India, which was, if not directly, yet mediately, the real ground of hostilities. If the Native Embassy had not been withdrawn, and diplomatic communication thus broken off, the catastrophe (it might be urged) would in all probability never have occurred. We should have maintained our influence with the Court of Cabul, and have expostulated with the Ameer on his attitude towards Russia (if indeed such attitude would in that case have been possible at all); and the Ameer, no doubt, as in all previous times, would have been amenable to our friendly reclamation.

All this may be true; and yet the fact remains that, however unsatisfactory the state of isolation into which Lord Lytton's action had thrown the Ameer, there is every reason to believe that in such state of isolation he would to this moment have remained, but for the *contre-temps* in Europe. Undoubtedly, India is responsible for all acts done in her behalf, whether wise and just, or the reverse. Still where, as in the present case, war is attributable, proximately at all events, to action taken not for Indian, but for European, interests, would it be fair to charge the cost of such a war on India? It certainly would not be generous.

6 December 1878.

W. Muir.

EAST INDIA (AFGHANISTAN
EXPEDITION).

COPY of OPINIONS recorded since Tuesday last by
MEMBERS of the COUNCIL of the SECRETARY of
STATE for INDIA, in reference to the EXPENDITURE
for, and other Matters connected with, the MILITARY
EXPEDITION against AFGHANISTAN.

(*Mr. Faneett.*)

*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
13 December 1878.*

AFGHANISTAN.

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons,
dated 20 February 1879;—for,

“ COPY of MINUTES recorded by Lord *Canning* and the Members of his
Council in February 1857 as to the AGREEMENT with AFGHANISTAN.”

India Office, }
24 February 1879. }

EDWARD STANHOPE,
Under Secretary of State for India.

MINUTE by the Right Honourable the Governor General of India
(Lord *Canning*), dated 5th February 1857.

A DESPATCH from Peshawur of the 24th of January brings the agreement signed and sealed between the Honourable East India Company and the Ameer Dost Mahomed, which has been the subject of negotiations during the last three weeks.

This agreement fixes the relations and reciprocal obligations of the British Government with the Ruler of Cabul for the duration of the war with Persia.

The full and graphic narrative of the conferences given in Sir J. Lawrence's despatches will be read with interest, and I wish to take the earliest opportunity of expressing my high opinion of the ability and good judgment with which the two negotiators on the part of the East India Company, Sir J. Lawrence and Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Edwardes, have discharged their task. These officers deserve the cordial thanks of the Government of India.

Two schemes by which aid should be given to the Afghans against Persia were discussed at these conferences. First, the subsidizing of the Ameer's forces to such an extent as should enable him to attempt the recovery of Herat, the reasons for rejecting which have been already recorded; and next, the supplying the Ameer with such means as should make his frontier secure against further encroachment from Persia. It is to this last object that the agreement is directed.

The chief substance of the engagements is as follows:—The Ameer is to maintain a force of 18,000 infantry, of which 13,000 shall be regular troops, besides his present force of artillery and cavalry. The practical effect of this will be to add to his army about 8,000 men for the defence of the frontier.

The Government of India is to pay to the Ameer one lac of rupees a month until peace shall be declared between England and Persia, or for any shorter time, to be determined at the pleasure of the Governor General.

British officers may be stationed at Cabul, Candahar, Balkh, or elsewhere, according to the places at which the Afghan army may be assembled. Their business will be to see that the subsidy is used for its proper purpose. These officers are to be withdrawn when the subsidy ceases, and it is understood that for the present none shall be sent to Cabul.

Vakeels will be interchanged between Cabul and Peshawur.

The Ameer is to communicate to the Government of India any overtures which he may receive from Persia and from the allies of Persia during the war.

The Government of India engages to overlook the past hostilities of all the Afghan tribes.

Four thousand muskets are to be supplied to the Ameer.

These provisions are, I think, sound in policy, liberal, and simple. I believe them to be wise in reference to present circumstances, and calculated to

encourage in the Afghan people a right understanding of our policy and confidence in us. They tend to redress the somewhat one-sided character of the Treaty of 1855, in which we appeared to take more than we gave. They show that, whilst we desire to assist and secure the Afghans against aggressions from the west, we are not seeking a pretence for sending a single British bayonet across their eastern frontier, and that, in return for our assistance, we do not even ask for a voice in their councils, or for the smallest right of interference in their internal affairs. If anything can persuade an Afghan that we are not for ever casting covetous eyes upon his country, and that all we desire is that it should be governed peaceably after his own fashion, he ought to believe it now. But the mistrust of us in Afghanistan is wide and deep-seated; we shall overcome it only by slow degrees; and all that can reasonably be hoped is, that the spirit in which the late negotiation has been conducted by the British representatives, the engagement which has been contracted, and the mode in which it will be carried out, will be so many steps towards that end.

A more immediate gain consists in the check which the engagement will give to any further encroachments by Persia on the Afghan frontier, and that the means provided will be sufficient for this purpose may be inferred from the fact that the Ameer himself has asked for nothing more as necessary to it.

It is my earnest hope that whatever dimensions the war in which the Government of India is engaged may assume, the relations of the British Power with Afghanistan may remain upon a footing similar to that upon which they are now placed. The aid to be given by us may be greater or less in amount, and the immediate object of it may change with circumstances; but I trust that it will never be extended to any other aid than that of money, arms, and counsel.

I will go the length of saying that under no circumstances can it, in my opinion, consist with sound policy that a British army should cross the boundary of Afghanistan. It would be presumption to lay this down dogmatically. But I do not hesitate to declare that I can with difficulty imagine such a contingency; and that as to adopting the measure for the sake of driving a Persian army from Herat, I should hold it to be an act of the gravest importance.

I will very briefly state the grounds upon which I rest this opinion. It is not that I deny it to be important to the British power in India that Herat should be in friendly, or at least not in hostile, hands; but I believe this to be an object for which it is possible to pay too dearly, and the advantages of which would be perilled by the very means which have been suggested for its attainment.

I put out of consideration all question of cost in money, all difficulties incident to the carrying on of a great operation of war at a distance of more than 500 miles from our frontier, whence every supply must be drawn over a country which could contribute nothing appreciable to the support of a British army. I will not even reckon what the numbers of that army must be in order to make a reverse or check impossible. These are matters which must come into the account, more or less heavily, from whatever quarter we may seek to strike a blow at Persia. My objection is, that a British force could not march through Afghanistan, carry on operations in that country, even against a common enemy, and return within its own territory, without the most serious hazard of a rupture with the Afghans themselves. The seeds of that rupture would be found in the jealousy and hatred with which a large portion of the nation, and that the most warlike, regard us; in the unavoidable pressure and hardship which the presence of a large army imposes, even upon a friendly country; in the want of union and subordination among the people themselves; and in the conflicting interests of the chiefs upon whom, after the Ameer, we should have to depend. Of these differences, already notorious enough, the account of the negotiations and the expressions of anger and bitterness wrung from the Ameer at Peshawur contain remarkable proof. That such a rupture would be imminent, almost from the day on which we set foot in the country, is the opinion of some who know the Afghans best. My own concurrence adds nothing to the testimony; but I doubt whether any one who reads the narrative of the late negotiations at Peshawur will consider that opinion groundless or even exaggerated. If, as was there reluctantly declared to us, the appearance of one or two European officers at Cabul in the Ameer's train is likely to raise in the

the minds of his people feelings of suspicion against himself as having sold them, and of vengeance against the Englishman, what would be the prevailing feeling at the presence of a British army traversing the whole breadth of the country for a purpose which must make its stay long and indefinite, and presenting constant points of irritation and collision with every class? Cabul, no doubt, is the focus of Afghan bigotry and antipathy to the English name, but those feelings are not confined to Cabul.

It is needless to say that, if offence were given to us in Afghanistan, we could not again afford to leave that country without exacting prompt atonement. The power of the British Government would have to be asserted at any sacrifice, and when by this we had exasperated all Afghanistan anew, it would benefit us little to have taken Herat, lying far away upon its extreme frontier, out of the hands of Persia.

I would, therefore, seek the recovery of Herat by any means rather than by operations against Herat itself, and the more so that such operations, however successful, would achieve nothing more than that one object.

For any other purposes Persia is unassailable on that side. No vital point is within practicable reach of her eastern frontier, and there would be no means of increasing or continuing the pressure with a reasonable hope of exacting satisfaction upon the many other points of difference which have arisen between the British and Persian Governments, and which, to judge from the communications which lately passed between Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and Feruk Khan, may be less easy of settlement than the question of Herat itself. An expedition directed to Herat will be effective only as regards Herat, and, as long as we have other ends to attain, it will be no equivalent for operations against Persia on her more vulnerable side.

For these reasons I am strongly opposed to the march of a British army across Afghanistan. I will not here pursue this subject further by considering under what, if any, circumstances it would be a wise policy to send a British force beyond our western frontier in anticipation of the advance of an enemy upon our own territory. The case has not arisen, nor, as I hope, is it likely to arise at present; certainly it cannot come upon us without a long note of preparation.

But the policy to be adopted in regard to Herat is intimately mixed up with that question, and upon this it is right that I should here speak.

We have hitherto solemnly declared that policy to be that Herat should be independent, that is, that it shall belong neither to the Shah of Persia nor to the Ameer of Cabul. We have declared this to both sides; and in the case of the Shah, it has been made the basis of an agreement between the two Governments; that agreement is now cancelled, and the British Government is entirely free to reconsider its policy.

I trust that the maxim that Herat shall remain in its own state of independence will not again be proclaimed as an object to be contended for, or even to be desired, by the British Government. I believe the independence to be visionary and unattainable. In the course of the late contest no one man, family, or tribe, has shown any pretensions to rule in Herat, which would justify the hope that, if established in possession of the town and its territory, the possession would be maintained without aid from one side or the other. The two last rulers have been mere puppets, and I see no chance that the next will be very different.

If, upon recovering Herat from Persia, we set it up as an independent State, my belief is, that we shall set up a sham which we shall not be able to sustain. I do not share the opinion that there is danger or trouble to British India in the consolidation of the Afghan nation. On the contrary, I believe that we cannot encourage that consolidation too much. The Afghans themselves, even if united, can never be formidable to the British power, if only we will deal wisely with them. Their strength as aggressors ceased to be any reasonable source of alarm to us from the time when the plain of Peshawur and the Trans-Indus Valley passed away from them, and the Sikhs no longer intervened between us. Now that a wise foresight has fixed our boundary at the foot of their own impassable mountains, leaving no room for a single battalion to deploy against us, we stand in a position of security as regards aggression from that quarter which, I venture to think, calls for a change of policy. Instead of being content that Afghanistan should continue divided, and thereby weak for offence, I would

desire to see it united and strong; a compact barrier in our front. By encouraging this as far as lies in our power, at all events by not opposing it, we have a far better chance of extending our influence across the breadth of Afghanistan up to Herat than by laying down, as a condition, that Herat shall be "maintained in its own state of independence."

That it shall be independent of Persia, we may rightfully claim, for Herat is Afghan, and not Persian. But that it must be independent of the chief authority at Cabul, I would not require, or even concede. I would concede it no more than I would concede the pretension now put forward by the Shah that Kandahar must be independent of that authority.

That all Afghanistan should be united under one strong hand is probably not attainable at present; it is, indeed, nearly certain that with the death of Dost Mahomed a further disruption will take place. But the policy of the British Government should, as I venture to think, still remain the same, to encourage, as far as it can properly, and without undue interference do so, the union of Cabul, Kandahar, and Herat, under one head, or at least under one influence; such an union presents to us, if we rightly take advantage of it, nothing but an increase of security. Our relations with the frontier tribes will, indeed, remain pretty much what they are, whoever may be their nominal chief. Differences must still be settled by our own rifles and the mountain train; and this may be done, as it has been done more than once within the last few months, without any loss of good-will on the part of the Government of Cabul. It should be our object to convince that Government and the people of Afghanistan that they have nothing to fear from us unless when injury has been done to us; that we are ready to help them whenever they are attacked from without, just as we are now helping them; and that we have no desire to send a single Englishman, armed or unarmed, into their country, except with their own good will. If we can accomplish this, and I do not know why it should not be accomplished, the strength of the Afghan Government and the extension of its influence will be gain to us, and we shall have done all that can be done towards making Afghanistan politically, what it already is physically, our first bulwark against the north and the west.

If, on the contrary, we persevere in our late policy of forbidding that Cabul and Herat shall come under the same authority, I know no means by which we can maintain an influence in the latter place short of being ready at all times to interfere in its affairs by arms.

These considerations lead me to the conclusion that, whilst the conditions of peace with Persia should strictly preclude all interference by that country in the affairs of Afghanistan, whether at Herat, Kandahar, or elsewhere, they should contain no admission on the part of England that such an exclusion is to be imposed upon the ruler of Cabul, nor any engagement that the British Government shall interpose to prevent or dissuade the Ameer from any course which he may think right to pursue within the limits of Afghanistan.

MINUTE by the Honourable *J. A. Dorin*, dated 7th February 1857.

I CONCUR most thoroughly and cordially with the Right Honourable the Governor General as to the policy to be pursued towards Herat.

Events have proved that Herat is incapable of maintaining its own independence. If it has been unable to resist the feeble efforts of Persia, it could have no chance of successfully opposing any more powerful aggression.

In the natural order of things, and from position, Herat must rest for support either on Persia or Afghanistan. It is itself Afghan, and does not of right belong to Persia, and I venture to think that, as regards the interests of British India, it is of infinite importance that Herat should revert to Afghanistan, and, if possible, be consolidated with it in one compact and powerful union.

I conceive that British India, in alliance with a strong national Government in Afghanistan, will be the natural check to Persia in possible combination with any northern or western power.

There is no likelihood of any junction between Persia and Afghanistan. The fact of the Persians being Shiah, while the Afghans are Soonees, renders any compromise

compromise of religious animosities in favour of a coalition against British India in the highest degree improbable.

While, on the other hand, the mountainous barrier between Afghanistan and India leaves no apprehension that the strength of the former can be really embarrassing to the latter power.

But, in truth, though comparatively strong, Afghanistan can never be of a weight to oppress India. It may be a match for Persia, but in seasons of difficulty will find its security in the co-operation and alliance of its all-powerful neighbour, the Government of British India.

No one has been more sensible of this than the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, with whom we have concluded the present compact, and than whom Afghanistan has never had a more intelligent and energetic ruler.

It is, I think, open to no reasonable doubt, that if the hands of the Government of India had been free in time, and it had been able to assure the Ameer of its sympathy and support, Herat would never have fallen into the hands of Persia. Unaided and alone in its so-called independence, Herat was powerless in its own defence. Assisted by the Ameer, and admitted into the confederacy of the states of Afghanistan, no force that Persia could have brought against this national coalition would ever have reduced Herat to submission.

It was fatal to the freedom of Herat from Persian dominion, and therefore so far injurious to the interests of British India, that the Government of India was not at liberty to assure the Ameer of its countenance in the event of his advancing to the relief of Herat. It was fatal to the interest of Herat that the British Government was bound to regard it as independent of Afghanistan, and I earnestly hope that so grave an error will never be repeated.

I consider that the mode in which the negotiations with the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan have now been conducted and concluded by the able officers to whom their management was confided is deserving of the highest commendation, and I rejoice to believe that the Government of India has added another solid link to the chain of mutual interest which binds it in alliance to Afghanistan.

MINUTE by the Honourable Major General *J. Low*, dated 8th February 1857.

I HAVE much satisfaction in recording my cordial concurrence in the views of the Right Honourable the Governor General as to the policy which ought to be pursued by the Government of India as regards the little principality of Herat, and should seriously deprecate, under almost any circumstances that can occur for many years to come, such a measure as that of our sending a large army (and no small one should ever be sent thither) again into Afghanistan.

To my mind there are several objections to such a scheme which are not mentioned by the Governor General, but my chief objections are precisely those which are so clearly expressed in the following words made use of in His Lordship's Minute, viz.:—"I put out of consideration all question of cost in money, all difficulties incident to the carrying on of a great operation of war at a distance of more than 500 miles from our frontier, whence every supply must be drawn over a country which could contribute nothing appreciable to the support of a British army. I will not even reckon what the numbers of that army must be in order to make a reverse or a check impossible. These are matters which must come into the account more or less heavily from whatever quarter we may seek to strike a blow at Persia. My objection is, that a British force could not march through Afghanistan, carry on operations in that country, even against a common enemy, and return within its own territory, without the most serious hazard of a rupture with the Afghans themselves. The seeds of that rupture would be found in the jealousy and hatred with which a large portion of the nation, and that the most warlike, regard us, in the unavoidable pressure and hardship which the presence of a large army imposes even upon a friendly country, in the want of union and subordination amongst the people themselves, and in the conflicting interests of the chiefs upon whom, after the Ameer, we should have to depend."

In regard to the suspicious dread of the designs of our Government and the hatred of our countrymen on the part of the Afghan nation, which are alluded to in the above extract, I shall only add the expression of my belief that those feelings respecting us are so intense among the population of Cabul and the districts in its vicinity, that there is but small chance of any great change taking place in that respect until after the death of nearly all the individuals in Cabul, men and women, who can personally remember our invasion of the country in 1838, and the severe misfortunes and heavy losses to which vast numbers of families and individuals were subjected in consequence of that invasion.

With respect to Herat, as I feel convinced that the ruler of that small territory can never for any considerable period of time maintain himself in real independence of both Persia and Afghanistan, I anxiously hope that Her Majesty's Government will take the opportunity of this rupture between England and Persia, which cancels all our previous engagements with the Shah, to abandon the former scheme of preventing the Ameer of Cabul from taking possession of Herat. It appears to me that it will be quite sufficient for our purposes to insist upon it that Herat shall not belong to Persia.

On the other hand, although I am quite sensible of the probable advantage which it would be to British interest if Herat were to become part and parcel of a strong Government in Afghanistan (of which Cabul should be the capital), yet I look upon the future state of the Afghan kingdom to be so very uncertain, and especially after the death of Dost Mahomed, that I would earnestly recommend that we should never hamper ourselves by giving any guarantee that Herat shall be kept in subordination to Dost Mahomed, even if he should in a short time hence (as I hope he may) obtain possession of that fortress.

I would deal quite candidly both with the Shah of Persia and the Ameer of Cabul in the matter; to the Shah I would plainly say that we consider it necessary for the tranquillity of our Indian North-West frontier that Herat should not belong to Persia; and to the Ameer I would say that we hope he may be able to keep Herat, which will be greatly to his own advantage, and indirectly to our advantage also, as it is always good for us that our friend should be prosperous and strong, but that we have no reason to care so much about Herat as to incur much further expense about it, and still less to incur any responsibility as to the internal condition of a place so distant from our Indian dominions.

Since the above was not only drafted, but also copied fair for my signature, I have re-perused the Governor General's Minute of the 6th instant. By that perusal I perceive that I have too much dwelt upon some points which were already better explained by his Lordship, but time is, at present, precious. I therefore abstain from writing a fresh and shorter paper, and I beg to conclude this one by expressing my earnest hope that when concluding peace with Persia Her Majesty's Government may see fit to adopt, to their fullest extent, the opinions recorded by the Governor General in the concluding paragraph of the above-mentioned Minute.

MINUTE by the Honourable *J. P. Grant*, dated 8th February 1857.

I most cordially concur in all that the Right Honourable the Governor General has said on the question of interference in order to maintain Herat as an independent state, separate from the rest of Afghanistan. It is plain that Herat is not strong enough to maintain herself unaided against Persia; after a heroic resistance it has fallen into the hands of the aggressor, and our expedition to the Persian Gulf was too late to save it. But the length of the conflict shows that if the rest of Afghanistan had made common cause with Herat, the whole strength of Persia would have failed to make any impression against it. And this is not the first time that the Afghans of Herat have shown themselves worthy of freedom from a foreign yoke. That it is best for British interests that the whole of Afghanistan should be united is a question admitting of no dispute. That such a union, whether it be absolute under one chief, or federal, is best for all Afghanistan, is equally indisputable, and this being so, I do not see how we should be justified, if circumstances are tending to bring such
a union

a union naturally about, in interfering to prevent it, even in the way of influence and advice. All pretension on the part of Persia to a right of objection to so natural a result of her unprovoked attack upon a part of Afghanistan is absurd. Before this act of monstrous aggression, Persia had no more real right to interfere with the affairs of Herat than she now has to interfere with those of Candahar, which she openly claims to have, or with those of Cabul, which by inference she claims to have, or with those of Peshawur, which it is quite possible one of these days she, or some other power for her, may be claiming to have. After this aggression, a Persian remonstrance against a purely defensive arrangement which her own action, and the disclosure of her unjust and greedy designs have rendered a matter of obvious necessity, could be treated only as an attempt to follow up diplomatically a design which she cannot now carry out by force of arms.

The question of a British expedition to wrest Herat from Persia, and to restore it to the Afghans, its native and rightful rulers, has not yet arisen as a practical question for consideration. But if Persia persists in prolonging the war, this question will demand a practical solution, for I presume that no one doubts that, if all circumstances in Afghanistan were favourable, to go directly at that which we are fighting about, near our own frontier, would be a very much cheaper and speedy way of obtaining our object, than to expend all our endeavours upon a distant sea expedition in the design of so distressing the enemy on the opposite side as to induce him to drop his prey on this side. If, as we did once before, we succeed now in the Gulf merely by frightening the enemy, the question of an expedition to Herat does not arise, and all is well. But if, before he will be brought to reason, it be necessary to do him real and vital injury, the question will immediately arise. It will then be a serious question, for we can no longer disguise from ourselves the fact that if we are at war in the Persian maritime provinces next cold season, and if we rely wholly upon our action for bringing this vexatious affair to an early conclusion, we shall have a vast operation upon our hands, an operation for which it is confessed that the Indian army alone is insufficient, and which, therefore, by requiring troops from home especially for the purpose, may be said to exceed the dimensions of a mere Indian war.

We have already found that merely to occupy the Persian seaboard is much more costly to us than to the Shah, that the vitals of the country on that side are protected by a shell which it is difficult to penetrate, and that when this shell shall have been penetrated, although a moderate army will do for fighting, a very large force will be required to secure our communications with our base. We have had one lesson to show us what it is to neglect these, in precisely similar circumstances.

These are the considerations which make me regard this question as one that should not be resolved decidedly in the negative till we have weighed all arguments on both sides well, and till we have made ourselves quite sure, not by inference only, but by direct local inquiry, that the suppositious facts on which the reasoning against the more natural and simple course of direct action rests, are to their full extent well founded, and if so, that there is no possibility of the facts of the case assuming hereafter a new shape. The fact founded upon it is the intensity of the jealousy and hatred of the Afghans generally towards us, in consequence of our invasion of 1838.

It appears to me that the attention of Major Lumsden during his residence at Candahar might very properly be pointed to this question of fact. I think in this affair it would be prudent to be guided very much by the information which intelligent officers may acquire in the country; our relations of amity with Dost Mahomed have been so very recently established, that our ablest officers on the frontier are confessedly in extreme ignorance of the politics and popular feelings beyond the passes.

From *a priori* argument, I am bound to say that I do not take quite so strong a view as the Governor General and General Low appear to take of the hopelessness of our regaining the confidence and good-will of the generality of the Afghan chiefs sufficiently for the purpose. I believe no one holds that there would be any difficulty in a march to Herat, and in beating the Persian army there, and in retaking the place, if the Afghan feeling towards us were what it was before 1838. Now taking Herat from the Shiah and delivering it back unconditionally to the Afghans should do something towards healing old

sores, and even the attempt should be popular in Afghanistan. We find that although Dost Mahomed, for, I doubt not, the most solid reasons (to which the late assassination of Lieutenant Hand in the Khyber Pass gives a key) strenuously resisted the deputation of British officers to Cabul, he approved of their going to Candahar, and all his chiefs wished for them even at Cabul; the motives of the chiefs may have been selfish, but if the general feeling of the higher classes had been so intensely bitter as is presumed, would these chiefs have ventured to express their wishes, or would they have tried to overcome Dost Mahomed's objection?

Moreover, feelings, whatever they are, may change under changing circumstances. It is, indeed, 15 years since the Afghan disasters, but it is but a year or two since we have been friends with the Afghans. They have hardly tasted our money yet, and if the war lasts another year they will like us better, and dislike the Persians more than now.

I beg to be understood as not intending to dispute the force of the Governor General's remarks on this point, and as not by any means recommending now an expedition next year to Herat. I contend only for keeping the question open pending careful inquiry on the spot by intelligent officers, and subject to the ever-changing course of events impossible to be foreseen. I suggest no more than that the Governor General should not be forbidden in all circumstances from taking such a step, if hereafter he should come to the opinion that the time has come for it.

MINUTE by the Honourable *B. Peacock*, dated 9th February 1857.

I ENTIRELY agree with the Right Honourable the Governor General as to the great ability and judgment with which the late negotiations with the Ameer Dost Mahomed have been concluded by Sir J. Lawrence and Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Edwardes, and that the cordial acknowledgment of this Government should be conveyed to them.

I also fully concur in all that has been urged by his Lordship in opposition to the march of a British army to Herat. I do not apprehend that any danger or inconvenience could arise from the consolidation of Cabul, Candahar, and Herat under one ruler or under one influence; on the contrary, I believe that such a state of things, if it could be brought about and maintained, would be the most conducive to the interest of British India. But I do not think that the advantages to be derived from subjecting Herat to the influence of the rulers of Cabul, or even of placing it under their immediate government, is so great as to render it politic to continue a war, which must necessarily be attended with great expenses and considerable difficulties, in order to obtain that end, and, if Persia be willing to submit in other respects, I should be content to see Herat restored to the condition in which it was placed by the Agreement of 1853, nor would I object even to engage that the British Government should use its good offices with Dost Mahomed or the ruler of Cabul to prevent them from interfering with the independence of Herat.

If we should say to Persia, as suggested by our honourable colleague, General Low, that we consider it necessary for the tranquillity of our frontier that Herat should not belong to Persia, and should also state that we desire to see Herat under the rulers of Cabul, Persia will reply that she considers it necessary to the tranquillity of Persia that Herat should not belong to the rulers of Cabul and Candahar. If we insist that it shall be placed under the rulers of Cabul and then put upon a different footing to the *status quo ante*, we may involve ourselves in difficulties with other nations who may consider or contend that the tranquillity of Persia would thus be placed in jeopardy, and I cannot think that it would be worth involving ourselves in such difficulties for the sake of subjecting Herat to the rulers of Cabul, who, when they have got it, will probably be unable, without continual and powerful assistance from the British Government, to maintain their force there. It should also be borne in mind that, in answer to a question lately put by Prince Gortchakoff to Lord Wodehouse, whether England would allow Dost Mahomed to occupy Herat, his

Lordship

Lordship replied that Her Majesty's Government wished the *status quo* to be preserved at Herat, and that he did not suppose that they desired to see Dost Mahomed any more than the Persians take possession of Herat; that what we required was that Herat should be left unmolested by the Persians, whether Dost Mahomed or any other Afghan chief ruled at Candahar. In my opinion, the best policy would be to consent to the independence of Herat, and, unless we are prepared to insist that it shall be subject to the rulers of Cabul, I do not think that we could say to Dost Mahomed, as suggested by our honourable colleague, General Low, "that we hope he may be able to keep Herat," nor do I see how we could (not) refuse to engage in any treaty of peace with Persia to use our good offices with Dost Mahomed or the ruler of Cabul for the time being, for the purpose of preventing any attempt on their part to interfere with the independence of Herat.

AFGHANISTAN.

COPY of MINUTES recorded by Lord Canning
and the Members of his Council in February
1857 as to the AGREEMENT with AFGHANISTAN.

(*Mr. Grant Duff.*)

*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
25 February 1879.*

72. Under 1 oz.

AFGHANISTAN

BOMBAY BRANCH

OF THE

Royal Asiatic Society.

CLASS

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons,
dated 7 March 1879;—for,

C O P Y

OF THE

REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTS

ON THE

OPERATIONS IN THE KHOIST VALLEY,

IN JANUARY 1879.

India Office,
14 March 1879. }

EDWARD STANHOPE,
Under Secretary of State for India.

(No. 43 of 1879.—Military Department.)

To the Right Honourable Viscount *Cranbrook*, Her Majesty's Secretary of
State for India.

My Lord,

Fort William, 7 February 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, the Papers
noted in the margin, relating to Major General Roberts' operations in the
Khost Valley, and the defeat of the enemy near Matoon on the 7th January
1879.

From Quarter-
master General
in India, No. 186-
F C, dated 17
January 1879, and
Enclosures.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Lytton*.

Fred. P. Haines.
A. J. Arbuthnot.
A. Clarke.
J. Strachey.
E. B. Johnson.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.

FIELD OPERATIONS.

From Colonel *C. C. Johnson*, C.B., Officiating Quartermaster General in India,
to Colonel *H. K. Burne*, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military
Department, Calcutta, No. 186-F C, Field Operations—Kabul; dated Army
Head Quarters, Camp Umballa, the 17th January 1879.

I AM directed by his Excellency the Commander in Chief to forward, for the
information of the Government of India, the accompanying narrative by Major
General *F. S. Roberts*, C.B., V.C., Commanding the Kuram Field Force, of the
circumstances attending the occupation of the Khost district by the troops
under his command, and to request that printed copies of the report and its
enclosures may be furnished for record.

No. —, dated
10 January 1879.

2. The sketch map referred to has not yet been received, but will be for-
warded subsequently, after copies have been taken.

2 REPORT ON MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTS' OPERATIONS

From Major General *F. S. Roberts*, c.B., v.C., Commanding the Kuram Field Force, to the Quartermaster General in India, Army Head Quarters; dated Camp Matun, Khost Valley, the 10th January 1879.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief and of the Government of India, the following narrative of the circumstances attending the occupation of the Khost district by the force under my command.

2. On the 2nd January I marched from Hazar Pir with the undermentioned troops, viz.:

Squadron 10th Royal Hussars.	No. 1 Mountain Battery.
Wing 72nd Highlanders (200 men).	No. 2
Three troops 5th Punjab Cavalry.	21st Punjab Native Infantry.
	28th " " "

Colonel Barry Drew (with the 1st Infantry Brigade Staff) was in command of the infantry portion of the column, Colonel H. Gough, c.B., v.C., of the Cavalry, and Lieutenant Colonel A. Lindsay, R.A., of the Artillery.

3. The first march, 10½ miles, was to Jaji Maidan. The road passed over open rolling hills, and presented no difficulties: it could easily be made practicable for wheeled guns.

Jaji Maidan consists of a cluster of about 10 small villages situated in a basin formed by low hills.

The troops had to encamp in the rice fields, which are dry and suitable for the purpose at this season, but it would be almost impossible to place troops anywhere near the village during rainy weather. The people of Jaji Maidan were very civil, and the camp was abundantly supplied with fuel, milk, fowls, &c.

4. The next day the column marched to Nar, one of the Bakh group of villages at the northern end of the Khost district. The road lay for five miles up an open valley with low hills on each side, easily accessible by infantry, and with several small villages scattered about, until a *Kotal* or pass was reached which commanded a view of part of the Khost plain. The ascent to the *Kotal* is easy and open, but the descent on the Khost side is, for a short distance, very rough and steep. The hills close in on the road at this point, and though they are easily practicable for infantry, and are free from forest, yet the broken nature of the ground renders this part of the route defensible, and if held by an enemy, strong detachments of infantry would be required to crown the heights on each side of the pass.

These remarks apply, of course, with increased force to an advance made from below, *i.e.*, the Khost side. This difficult part of the road only continues for about four miles, when the bed of a wide nullah is reached, which opens gradually. The total distance from Jaji Maidan to the village of Nar is about 11 miles.

5. As I had received information that the Mangals might possibly attempt to attack my baggage while marching through the pass, and as the camels could not possibly arrive in our camp until long after dark, I resolved to halt the Commissariat convoy (which carried 15 days' provisions for the column, and consisted of nearly 900 camels) at the village of Dhani, situated about a mile on the Jaji Maidan side of the kotal. A squadron of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, No. 1 Mountain Battery, and the 21st Punjab Native Infantry were also halted there as an escort for the convoy. The whole joined our camp at Nar the next morning, without having been molested on the road.

6. The column halted at Nar on the 4th January.

7. On the 5th January we marched six miles over a perfectly open and level plain to the village of Khubi.

8. Muhamad Akram Khan, the Afghan Deputy Governor of the Khost district, came into our camp to-day, accompanied by a small escort.

I had been in correspondence with him for several weeks, and he had agreed to maintain order in Khost until our arrival, stipulating in return that we should guarantee his personal safety, and allow him subsequently to proceed either to Kabul or to British territory, as he might desire. To these conditions

I had

I had agreed, in the hope that by this means our occupation of the Khost Valley might be accomplished without bloodshed, and with the least possible disturbance to the settled government of the country. It also seemed desirable that we should obtain possession of the fort at Matun uninjured, and of the office records which Muhammad Akram Khan was reported to possess, and which it was believed would afford full details regarding the revenues which the Amir derived from both the Khost and Kuram Valleys.

Before marching from Hazar Pir I sent a letter to Mahamad Akram Khan, informing him of our intended advance, and requesting him to meet me at the village of Khubi. This he did, and on his arrival in camp I received him in durbar. He then returned to Matun.

9. On the 6th January the whole column marched to Matun, and encamped outside the Afghan fort. The road, after passing for three miles across an open plain, led over a kotal, and then for about two miles through some low hills till the plain was reached, in which are situated Matun and numerous other villages.

The whole district is richly cultivated, and produces large quantities of rice, wheat, &c.

The people also possess considerable herds of cattle and sheep. The total distance from Khubi to the Afghan fort is about eight miles.

10. Mahamad Akram Khan met me on the march half-way, and conducted me to the fort, which was found to be in indifferent order, and of the same general plan as, but smaller than, the fort at Kuram.

The garrison consisted of 200 matchlock-men (Jezailchis), who received me at the entrance.

11. Since our entry into the Khost Valley I had remarked that, though no disturbance had occurred, an uneasy feeling was apparent among the inhabitants.

Some of the most influential Maliks had not come to pay their respects until sent for, and others who met us on the road had asked for permission to return to their homes before they had even accompanied me to our camp. It was very evident, in short, that the arrival of a British force was not a welcome event to the inhabitants of the country; but I hoped that after a time the people would become reassured, and that, as had happened with the Turis and Jajis, our presence would be accepted as inevitable, and even ultimately as a change for the better.

12. The cause of this state of feeling soon became apparent. After my arrival at Matun Fort, Mahamad Akram Khan took an early opportunity of informing me that the Mullas, of which this province possesses a large number, famous for their learning and fanaticism, had been actively engaged in raising religious prejudices against us, and in calling on the people to collect, attack our camp, and endeavour to expel us from the country.

13. There can be no doubt that such exhortations were powerfully aided by the apparent weakness of our force, the small numbers of which seemed in the popular judgment quite inadequate for the occupation of an extensive country such as Khost. The Mullas, moreover, securely counted on the assistance of the neighbouring hill tribes; and in this they were not disappointed.

14. Mahamad Akram Khan stated that he had received information of large numbers of Mangals assembling; that they were being joined by some of the inhabitants of the Khost Valley; and that it was very probable our camp would be attacked that night.

15. I therefore strengthened the usual picquets, and took every military precaution that the circumstance seemed to require.

16. I also sent for the Maliks of the neighbouring villages, and requested Colonel Waterfield to address purwanas to them to the effect that if our camp was attacked, summary and severe retribution would be exacted from all who had given admittance to Mangals or other persons having hostile intentions towards us. This measure had the desired effect, for before midnight nearly all the Matun Maliks came into camp, and informed me that the Mangals had departed for their homes, and that they themselves would remain in our camp as hostages for the good behaviour of the villagers. The night passed quietly.

17. On the following morning I sent some of the Maliks to ascertain whether the Mangals had really dispersed. They returned with the information that the men had started for their homes as they had promised, but being met by large numbers of their tribes, men on their way to Matun, the men had returned; that considerable numbers of Mangals and other hill men were now present in the valley; that before long several thousands would be collected; and that our camp would certainly be attacked at night.

18. On receiving this intelligence I sent out a troop of the 5th Punjab Cavalry under Major J. C. Stewart, accompanied by Captain Carr, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, to endeavour to ascertain the real position of affairs. The troop had not ridden two miles from our camp when it was fired upon, and soon after the first shots were heard, it became clear that the enemy, numbering certainly several thousands, had collected round three sides of our camp.

19. It was evident to me that the time had arrived when prompt and vigorous action was required to ensure our safety. The strength of the column, which amounted to about 2,000 men, all told, was insignificant in comparison with the number we might find arrayed against us; we were separated by many miles of difficult country from our nearest support; and I judged it to be a matter of urgent necessity that the tribes who had dared to organise an attack on our camp should receive speedy and severe punishment.

20. In the first instance I reinforced Major Stewart's troop with all the cavalry at my disposal, under Colonel Hugh Gough, C.B., V.C., retaining in camp only 25 sabres of the 5th Punjab Cavalry. I also sent six companies of the 28th Punjab Native Infantry and No. 2 Mountain Battery in support of the cavalry.

These troops operated to the north west of the camp where the enemy appeared to have the greatest strength.

21. The right or eastern flank of the camp was protected by a wing of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry under Major F. W. Collis, and two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery.

The other wing of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry under Captain J. G. T. Carruthers, and the remaining two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, covered the rear of the camp, while the front and left flank were defended by the wing of the 72nd Highlanders under Lieutenant Colonel W. H. J. Clarke.

The whole of the troops in and around the camp were placed under command of Colonel Drew.

22. I directed Colonel Drew merely to hold his own until Colonel Gough had disposed of his enemy in his front.

23. This task Colonel Gough performed in a very admirable manner, as detailed in the annexed report. Dismounting part of his force he engaged the enemy, drove him up into the higher ranges of the hills, and kept him well in check until the infantry and guns arrived. Colonel Gough then assumed command of all the troops in that part of the field, retired his cavalry under cover of the infantry and artillery fire, and formed them up in the plain, ready to cover the withdrawal of the infantry when the time for doing so should arrive.

The squadron of the 10th Hussars under Major T. J. W. Bulkeley did good service on this occasion, and killed many of the enemy by their carbine fire.

The conduct of the 5th Punjab Cavalry under Major Williams was not less steady.

The guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, under Captain G. Swinley, were extremely well served, and their fire was very effective.

The 28th Punjab Native Infantry, who were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J. Hudson, had my orders not to follow the enemy into the hills. The regiment executed to my satisfaction the duty of keeping him in check.

24. Having satisfied myself that we had completely repulsed the enemy on our north-west side, I returned to the camp and ordered Colonel Drew to carry the villages on our right and rear, from which the enemy had fired on the troops; and to burn them as a punishment to the inhabitants for having given shelter to our assailants.

25. During this operation the troop of the 5th Punjab Cavalry under Major Stewart, which I had brought with me from Colonel Gough's command, made a very effective charge on a number of the enemy, who were escaping from the rear of a village on which the infantry were advancing, and killed about 20 of them.

26. Before it was dark all the troops had been withdrawn to camp, and so completely had the enemy been beaten that they did not venture to follow up our retiring troops, according to the usual Pathan custom. Indeed from the first moment our men opened fire, it was evident that the enemy could not stand in front of our rifles.

27. In the evening I sent for the head-men of the Matun villages, and told them that they had brought this punishment on themselves; that it was my earnest desire to have avoided all bloodshed; and that they must now see the futility of attempting to withstand disciplined troops, however small their number might appear to them to be.

28. The punishment that these people have received has been severe, but the lesson was certainly needed, and I have every reason to expect that the results will be satisfactory.

The principal head-men of the valley have already come into camp, and others from more distant parts of the country are said to be on their way. In the meantime I am neglecting no means to assure the people that they have nothing to fear from us so long as they abstain from hostile acts. That, on the contrary, it is the desire of the British Government to treat the people of this country with forbearance and consideration, and that this force has entered Khost with the sole view of ousting the Government of the Amir of Cabul.

29. There is evidence that the combination against us was wide-spread, and that if a severe example had not been made of those who fought against us on the 7th instant, the ill-feeling would have extended. It might, under those circumstances, have become impossible to leave any portion of my small column here. The aspect of affairs has now changed; the head-men of nearly all the neighbouring villages have come in, and the remainder are reported to be anxious to submit. This, of course, is all that is required, and Colonel Waterfield agrees with me in thinking that an adequate force could now be left here with safety, provided that the troops in the Kuram Valley are maintained in sufficient strength to keep open our long line of communication.

30 I purpose therefore to leave the undermentioned troops in the Matun Fort at this place, viz.:—

Half a Mountain Battery.

Two troops Native Cavalry.

A regiment of Native Infantry.

31. Regarding the detailed arrangements which are necessary for the safety and supply of this detachment, I will do myself the honour to address you in a few days.

32. In conclusion have to report that I have every reason to be satisfied with the steady conduct of the troops, notwithstanding that they were acting against vastly superior forces.

From Brigadier General *H. Gough*, C.B., V.C., Commanding Cavalry Brigade, Kuram Field Force, to the Assistant Quartermaster General, Kuram Field Force; dated Camp Matun, Khost Valley, the 9th January 1879.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following Report in connection with the cavalry under my command, concerned in the affair in the neighbourhood of this camp on the 7th instant.

1. On the morning of the 7th instant, information having been received that the Mangals, Waziris, and other tribes on this frontier, were assembling in
100. B force

force towards the west or left front of our camp, with the intention of making a combined attack on our position, I received orders from the Major General Commanding Kuram Field Force to send out a small party of cavalry to reconnoitre the ground from left, and ascertain the truth of the report

Forty sabres.

2. I accordingly detached a troop, strength as per margin, under Major J. C. Stewart, 5th Punjab Cavalry, accompanied by Captain Carr, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, to proceed in the direction indicated. They soon sent in intelligence that the enemy was in strong force in the cluster of walled villages to our left front, generally known as "Matun," and that on the approach of our small body of cavalry, they began to pour out in large numbers and to open fire upon them, the latter having now reached a distance of between two and three miles from our camp.

10th Royal
Hussars, 70 sabres.
5th Punjab
Cavalry, 130
sabres.

3. The enemy, taking advantage of the very broken ground and the low hills, made it their object to try and work round the cavalry, whose position now became somewhat critical; and under instructions from Major General Roberts, C.B., V.C., Commanding the Force, I ordered out the remainder of the cavalry in camp (consisting of one squadron 10th Royal Hussars, and a wing of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, strength as per margin, the former under Major Bulkeley and the 5th Punjab Cavalry under Major Williams), to proceed to support.

4. Accompanying the cavalry in the direction where Major Stewart was engaged with the enemy, I found the latter in strong force (at that time apparently about 1,000 strong, though much scattered, and subsequently reinforced by at least 500 more), in possession of the low hills at the foot of the mountains, and occupying a strong position.

5. I at once ordered the 10th Hussars up to the foot of some advanced rising ground, which afforded excellent cover, and they, dismounting, quickly took up an excellent position on the crest of the low mounds, and opened a steady and well directed fire on the enemy. Major Williams also, under my direction, brought up the 5th Punjab Cavalry to the foot of some low detached hills on our right, and also opened a brisk fire from dismounted men.

The effect of this combined movement was that the enemy began to retire, and I again advanced the troops, the 10th Hussars taking up an excellent position for dismounted work on a low hill, and opening fire on the enemy's right, whilst a troop of the 5th Punjab Cavalry made a brilliant charge up another hill in the centre of the enemy's position, and, rapidly dismounting, commenced to harass them in their retreat. This charge, which was personally led by Major Williams, struck me as one of the most gallant episodes in cavalry warfare I had ever seen. The remainder of the 5th Punjab Cavalry also advanced under good cover, and maintained a heavy and effective fire.

6. At this period, another force of the enemy began to pour out of the villages to our left and left front, and tried to work across to reinforce those with whom we were engaged; but foreseeing their object, I detached a troop of the 10th Hussars under Captain Barker to move to the left, and take up a position under cover of some low shrubs and trees, from which he was able to open an accurate and very effective fire, which rapidly dispersed them. This fire was especially effective as the enemy were completely in the open; and from our position we could plainly see the shot falling among them, and the occurrence of several casualties in their ranks.

7. The other troop of the 10th Hussars now advanced to a more advanced position, and kept up a well sustained fire in the retreating enemy, who were working their way up the rocks and crags in the greatest confusion, and never ceasing their flight till they got shelter behind the sky line of the highest ridges.

8. The 28th Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Hudson, and No. 2 Mountain Battery under Captain Swinley, R.A., now arrived on the scene of action, having been dispatched by the Major General Commanding to our assistance. The cavalry had, however, done their work so effectually, that the enemy had retired out of rifle range.

The

The infantry now relieved the cavalry from the positions they held in the hill sides, and the Mountain Battery commenced shelling the enemy on the mountain top, making excellent practice, and completely preventing them from making any show.

9. Meantime, whilst the above had been proceeding on our left and left front, another attack on the enemy had developed itself on the left rear of our camp, and Major Stewart with his small party of the 5th Punjab Cavalry had gradually worked round, through the broken ground and nullahs, to the scene of action. Here he hovered about the enemy, harassing them most effectually, and under the orders of the Major General Commanding he was enabled to make a very gallant and successful charge on a large force of the retreating enemy, driving them in utter rout in all directions. That his troopers did their work right well is proved by the fact that upwards of 20 bodies were found on the ground, dead from sabre wounds, whilst probably as many more escaped wounded.

10. The enemy on our left and left front having retreated to the mountain tops, I now, under instructions from the Major General Commanding, commenced a gradual retirement of the force under my command, which we did very slowly and steadily, under cover of the mountain guns and alternate retirements of the infantry, the cavalry on the left flank being held in readiness to make a dash should the enemy attempt to follow us in the open ground. However, no attack or even any attempt to follow was made on their part, a fact, I believe, almost unprecedented in hill warfare.

It would be impossible to make more than a conjecture at the enemy's loss in this attack, but I should be inclined to put down their casualties as pretty considerable, and I think I am borne out in this conjecture by the fact of their being too beaten to attempt harassing us in any way.

11. When the retirement was completed, I received orders to take the cavalry to the left rear, and see if we could pursue the retreating enemy, but, after a gallop of about three miles over a rough country, we arrived only to find that the villages had been deserted by the enemy, who were now quite out of sight.

12. Darkness now setting in, and the country being unsuited to cavalry, as well as the fact that the enemy had got too great a start of us, precluded all idea of further pursuit, and I therefore ordered all the troops under my command to return to camp.

13. In conclusion, I would beg to recommend to the favourable consideration of the Major General Commanding the following officers who came under my command during the day's operations.

Lieutenant Colonel Hudson, Commanding 28th Punjab Infantry, who brought up his fine regiment in excellent formation and most steadily to our support.

Major B. Williams, Commanding 5th Punjab Cavalry, who throughout the day was of the greatest assistance to me in every way, and whose brilliant charge I have already noticed.

Major J. C. Stewart, 5th Punjab Cavalry, commanding a detached troop of his regiment, and who distinguished himself greatly under the personal command of the Major General Commanding the Force.

Major Bulkeley, Commanding the Squadron, 10th Royal Hussars, who showed a fine example to his men of steadiness under circumstances so novel in cavalry warfare, and also Captain Barker of the same regiment, who commanded a detached troop well and effectively.

Captain Swinley, Royal Artillery, Commanding No. 2 Mountain Battery, who did excellent work with his guns and materially assisted our retirement.

My thanks are also due to my personal staff during the day, viz., Captain Carr, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General and Lieutenant J. P. Brabazon, Officiating Brigade Major of Cavalry, who were with me throughout the operations and afforded me every assistance.

The excellent and steady conduct of the troops, both European and Native, was above all praise.

KURAM FIELD FORCE.

RETURN of CASUALTIES in Action at *Matun* on the 7th January 1879.

SUMMARY.

Officers, 44. Killed, nil. Wounded, nil. Missing, nil.

Non-commissioned Officers and Men, 282. Killed, nil. Wounded, nil. Missing, nil.

Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Men, 1,760. Killed, 2. Wounded, 6. Missing, nil.

NOMINAL ROLL OF KILLED.

CORPS.	Regi- mental Number.	Rank and Name.		Nature of Wound.
5th Punjab Cavalry -	187	Duffadar -	Hussun Khan -	Shot through heart.
21st P. N. Infantry -	1,858	Sepoy -	Hushmut Ali -	Bullet wound in head.

WOUNDED.

No. 2 Mountain Battery	402	Gunner -	Fuzl Khan -	Slight sword-cut in left arm.
5th Punjab Cavalry -	167	Duffadar -	Hushmut Jung -	Severe bullet wound in leg.
Ditto - - -	1,604	Sowar -	Bhoop Sing -	Severe, arm and chest, by bullet.
Ditto - - -	1,445	Ditto -	Jhunda Singh -	Slight sword-cut, right wrist.
Ditto - - -	1,804	Ditto -	Yetbar Shah -	Slight sword-cut, left knee.
21st P. N. Infantry -	1,786	Sepoy -	Rehmutoolah Khan.	Severe bullet-wound in ankle.

(signed) *W. Galbraith*, Major,
Assistant Adjutant General, Kuram Field Force.

(signed) *F. S. Roberts*, Major General,
Commanding Kuram Field Force.

AFGHANISTAN.

COPY of the REPORT of Major General ROBERTS
on the OPERATIONS in the KHOST VALLEY, in
January 1879.

(*Mr. Onslow.*)

*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
17 March 1879.*

100.

Under 1 oz.

EAST INDIA (KHOST VALLEY).



RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons,
dated 16 June 1879;—for,

“ COPY of PAPERS relating to the Proceedings of Major General Roberts
in the *Khost Valley* on the 7th and 8th days of January 1879.”

India Office, }
17 June 1879. }

EDWARD STANHOPE,
Under Secretary of State for India.

(No. 144 of 1879.—Military Department.)

To the Right Honourable Viscount *Cranbrook*, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for India.

My Lord,

Simla, 8 May 1879.

From the Quarter-
master General in
India, No. 1430A.,
dated 15 April
1879, and En-
losures.

WE have the honour, in continuation of our telegraphic message of the 26th
ultimo, to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, the Papers noted
in the margin, relating to the proceedings of Major General Roberts in the
Khost Valley on the 7th and 8th January last, which were made the subject of
debate in the House of Commons on the 17th February.

2. We consider Major General Roberts' explanation to be a satisfactory
answer to the allegations made against him.

We have, &c.

(signed)

Lytton.

F. P. Haines.

A. J. Arbuthnot.

A. Clarke.

J. Strachey.

E. B. Johnson.

W. Stokes.

A. R. Thompson.

FIELD OPERATIONS.—KABUL.

From Colonel *C. C. Johnson*, Officiating Quartermaster General in India, to
Colonel *H. K. Burne*, c.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military
Department (No. 1430 A.) ; dated Simla, 15th April 1879.

THE accompanying letter,* with its Enclosures, from Major General F. S. Roberts, c.B., v.c., Commanding the Kurram Field Force, I am desired by the Commander in Chief in India to forward for the information of Government; and, in doing so, to state his Excellency's opinion that, as regards the prisoners who were killed and wounded in their attempt to escape, the guard had no alternative but to act as they did when they found the rifles of the sentries were being seized, and the men they were placed in charge of actually escaping.

2. The Papers attached show that as soon as the attack on the camp was repulsed, every attention was paid to the wounded, and, in fact, that they were treated with every consideration and kindness.

3. With regard to the other points, his Excellency considers that Major General Roberts was fully justified in acting as he did.

From Major General *F. S. Roberts*, c.B., v.c., Commanding Kurram Field Force, to Colonel *C. C. Johnson*, Officiating Quartermaster General in India (No. 439); dated Camp Peiwar, 1st April 1879.

I HAVE read in the London "Times" of Tuesday, 18th February, a report of the Parliamentary debates of the previous evening, during which Mr. Anderson asked the Under Secretary of State for India regarding the truth of certain newspaper reports which had been published about my proceedings in Khost on the 7th and 8th January. I beg the favour of being permitted to state, for the satisfaction of his Excellency the Commander in Chief and of the Government of India, what really occurred on that occasion.

2. Mr. Anderson quotes newspaper accounts to the following effect:—

(a) That I caused "numerous villages" to be "looted" and burnt.

(b) That before the cavalry charged the enemy, I ordered them to take no prisoners.

(c) That "some 90 prisoners" who had been taken were tied together by ropes; that on their making some attempt to escape, they were set upon, and many of them were slaughtered "in their bonds"; and that "the dead, the living, the dying, and the wounded were still tied together, and all were lying huddled up in one confused mass of bodies."

3. The first statement,—that I caused numerous villages to be looted and burned,—is correct. The exact number so treated was eleven; and I considered their punishment in this manner both deserved and necessary, for the following reasons:—

4. In paragraph 15 of my despatch to you, dated Camp Matun, 10th January 1879, I reported that Mahomed Akram Khan, the late Afghan Governor of Khost, had informed me on the 6th January that "large numbers of Mangals were assembling, and that they were being joined by some of the inhabitants of the Khost valley, and that it was very probable our camp would be attacked that night."

5. In paragraph 17 of the same despatch I wrote as follows:—

"I therefore sent for the *maliks* of the neighbouring villages, and requested the Political Officer, Colonel Waterfield, to address '*parwanas*' to them, to the effect that, if our camp was attacked, summary and severe retribution would be exacted from all who had given admittance to Mangals or other persons having hostile intentions towards us."

6. On the morning of the 7th January, I received intelligence (paragraph 18 of despatch) "that considerable numbers of Mangals and other hillmen were present in the valley, in consequence of which I sent over a party of cavalry to endeavour to ascertain the real position of affairs (paragraph 19), who were fired upon before they had ridden two miles from our camp."

7. My despatch continued as follows:—

"Soon after the first shots, it became clear that the enemy, numbering certainly several thousands, had collected round three sides of our camp (paragraph 20). It was evident to me that the time had arrived when prompt and vigorous action was required to ensure our safety. The strength of the column, which amounted to but 2,300 men all told, was insignificant in comparison with the numbers we might find arrayed against us. We were separated by many miles of difficult country from our nearest supports; and I judged it to be a matter of urgent necessity that the tribes who had dared to organise an attack on our camp should receive speedy and severe punishment."

8. The despatch then describes the military operations, which resulted in the expulsion of the enemy from the villages adjacent to our camp, and their complete dispersal.

9. When

9. When this was done, I considered it necessary to put into effect my threat of the previous evening, "that summary and severe retribution would be exacted from all who had given admittance to Mangals, or other persons having hostile intentions towards us." The warning thus given had been conspicuously disregarded; our unarmed camp-followers had been cruelly murdered in villages within half a mile of our camp, our baggage animals at graze had been carried off, and our troops had been fired upon from the very villages which had been expressly told what punishment they might expect to receive for treacherous conduct towards us.

10. I therefore gave orders for certain villages which had harboured the enemy, and from which hostile shots had been fired, to be plundered and burned. This was an act of retributive justice which I considered necessary for the due safety of the troops under my command; and I submit that both the circumstances of the time and the subsequent result fully justified the action which I judged it necessary and prudent to take. The punishment was not inflicted without consideration and discrimination. No villages were burned which had not made common cause with the enemy against us; and, in illustration of this statement, I beg to append a sketch map which was made on the spot, and which will sufficiently show that only particular villages were punished.

11. Regarding the cavalry being ordered to "make no prisoners," the facts are these. When the enemy, numbering some 400 men, were seen running out of a village which was being attacked in front by infantry, I ordered Major J. C. Stewart, 5th Punjab Cavalry, who had with him about 40 sabres, to charge them. He said: "Am I to make prisoners, Sir?" I replied: "No, do not stay to do that; your party is too small. Disperse them as best you can." By this order I meant him to understand that he was to kill as many of the enemy as he could, but that he was to keep his men together, and not to let them scatter, or encumber themselves with prisoners. The result of the charge was, that between 30 and 40 of the enemy were killed. This was the number given in the official telegram, but a "nought" got added during its transmission, and the number killed appeared in the newspapers as "between 300 and 400." Under the circumstances of the time, it would have been extremely rash in Major Stewart to have attempted to make prisoners; and I conceive that I was perfectly justified in giving him the order I did.

12. With reference to Mr. Anderson's third statement, I beg to submit copies of reports from Major W. Galbraith, Assistant Adjutant General to the Kurram Field Force, Major F. W. Collis, Commanding 21st Punjab Native Infantry, and Surgeon W. E. Griffiths of the same regiment, in which the circumstances connected with the attempted escape of the prisoners are fully detailed. These men were taken in a village from which shots had been fired on our troops, and they were detained under a guard of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry at the request of the Political Officer, in order that he might have an opportunity of ascertaining from them what tribes had participated in the threatened attack on our camp. I very much regret the loss of life which took place on this occasion, but it was unavoidable. The native officer in command of the guard was placed in a difficult position. He was responsible that the prisoners did not escape. One man had already succeeded in doing so; some were struggling with the sepoy of the guard for the possession of their rifles; one had tried to seize the officer's sword, and had been pistolled by him; and all were attempting to free themselves from the ropes with which they were fastened. The picquets all round were firing; and it appeared probable that a night attack on our camp, with the intention of releasing the prisoners, was in actual progress.

13. Under these circumstances I consider that the native officer was absolutely free from blame in issuing the order which he did to kill the prisoners who were attempting to escape. I inquired carefully at the time into the case; and I arrived at the opinion that the Jemadar was certainly not responsible for the death of these unfortunate men. He acted to the best of his judgment, and in accordance with the customs of war; and, however much the loss of life is to be deplored, I conceive that he was perfectly justified in the line of action which he adopted.

14. The statement, that, "the dead, the living, the dying, and the wounded were lying huddled up in one confused mass of bodies," is a distortion of the truth. This state of things undoubtedly existed immediately after the prisoners had been killed; but it existed for a few minutes only, and was unavoidable. The attached letters narrate what really occurred; and it will be seen from them that no time was lost in separating the dead, and attending to the wounded. The newspaper correspondent leaves his readers to infer that nothing was done to relieve the sufferings of the wounded, or to distinguish the living from the dead; but this is inaccurate, and his letter appears to have been written with the view of presenting a vivid and thrilling, rather than a true, account of what happened.

From Major *F. W. Collis*, Commanding 21st Regiment Punjab Native Infantry, to the Assistant Quartermaster General, Kurram Field Force (No. 108); dated Camp Shinak, 20th March 1879.

IN reply to your letter attached, I have the honour to state that, at about 6 p. m. on the evening of the 8th of January, at Matoon, on hearing shots fired to the right front of the camp by one of our picquets, I and all the officers of the regiment under my command assembled at the quarter-guard, near where the prisoners were confined. There were eighty-one prisoners. On hearing the shots, the prisoners got up in a mass, and called out in Pushtu to each other, "Get up; let us run away." Some of them seized the rifles of the sentries who were over them, and tried to get possession of them. Three of the rifles were seriously damaged in the struggle.

The native officer in command of the guard called out to them in Pushtu to keep quiet, or they would be shot down; but the warning had no effect, and they still kept on struggling and trying to get away.

One prisoner succeeded in doing so; and was shot when passing the picquet, about 200 yards to the right front of the camp.

The native officer, seeing that a number of the men had got loose from the ropes by which they were tied, ordered the sentries to fire on them, as they still kept on trying to get away. The sentries did so, and shot dead nine prisoners and wounded thirteen. The prisoners then became quiet.

During this time the regiment had fallen in, and was posted to protect the camp. Directly the alarm was over, I and all the officers of the regiment went to where the prisoners were, and commenced to separate them from the dead and wounded. The medical officer of the regiment was on the spot at once, and, assisted by a surgeon of another regiment, attended to the wounded, until all had been looked at and their wounds carefully dressed, which operation was not finished till about 2 a.m.

The wounded were made as comfortable as was in our power to do, by getting them straw to lie on, and covering them with tarpaulins.

I would beg to add that all the officers of the regiment were present up to the time the last wounded man was attended to, and all did their utmost to relieve the sufferings of the wounded.

From Surgeon *W. E. Griffiths*, in Medical Charge, 21st Regiment P. N. I., to the Adjutant, 21st Regiment Punjab Native Infantry (No. 226); dated Camp Shinak 20th March 1879.

IN accordance with instructions received, I have the honour to furnish, for the information of the Commanding Officer, a report regarding the prisoners who attempted to escape from the guard of the 21st Regiment Punjab Native Infantry at Camp Matoon on the evening of the 8th January 1879.

Within a few minutes after the firing commenced, I reached the quarter-guard of the 21st Regiment Punjab Native Infantry; and as soon as the tumult was quelled, I proceeded to examine the state of the prisoners. I found that nine were dead, and I had them removed immediately to another locality. No time was lost in separating those who were wounded. These numbered 13. A thick bed of straw was made on the right of the quarter-guard, each prisoner being

being carefully moved thereto by *kahars*. A tarpaulin was thrown over them. I then proceeded to examine and attend to each case, one by one; and in this I was ably assisted by Surgeon Cotton, of the 72nd Highlanders, and Hospital Assistant Chunder Bhan, 21st Regiment Punjab Native Infantry. I found that of the 13 prisoners, five were mortally wounded. These were attended to first, their wounds (almost entirely bayonet wounds) dressed, and anodynes given to relieve pain. Then the remaining eight wounded prisoners were attended to; only one of these required a major operation, namely, amputation of the left upper arm, the result of a bayonet wound. The other seven were not badly wounded. Their injuries were attended to, and they were subsequently allowed to leave the camp. I would beg to remark that the wounded prisoners received every possible care and attention; and I believe that I am speaking correctly by saying that neither Surgeon Cotton nor myself left the prisoners until they had been properly attended to in every respect, and that we were upwards of five-and-a-half or six hours with them, not having finished our duty until 2 a.m. on the morning of the 9th January.

STATEMENT of Circumstances which occurred in connection with the Prisoners taken near *Matoon*, in the *Khost Valley*, on the 7th January 1879.

ON the 7th of January, after their repulse from camp, about 1,500 to 2,000 of the enemy retired to a village one-and-a-half miles to the south-west. They were followed by a troop of cavalry, upon whom they fired from the walls.

On the approach of reinforcements, they withdrew across a wide *nalla*, a small number only having their retreat from the village intercepted. These, after some parley, surrendered.

Having been ordered to take no prisoners, we were about to release them, when it was ascertained that many belonged to the Waziris and other hill tribes unconnected with Khost. It was therefore determined to take them to camp for the orders of the General.

A few wounded men were found in the village and were all released, some old men and lads being also left to take care of them.

Eighty-five prisoners were marched to camp, and by the General's orders were placed in charge of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry.

On the morning of the 8th, the General directed that they should be supplied with food, and that twenty at a time should have liberty to cook, and exercise their limbs.

About 8 o'clock p.m. the camp was alarmed by a number of shots fired on both flanks and in rear. I was sent to ascertain the cause.

While making inquiries at the picquets of the 21st, I was informed that the prisoners had been shot down in an attempt to escape.

I hastened to the spot. On my way, I saw two men lying dead, one about fifteen yards, the other about five, from the place in which they had been tied. The rest were lying huddled together.

The sentries informed me that, "on hearing the first shot at the outposts, a number of the prisoners had sprung up from the ground, and attempted to overpower them. The night being very dark, and the affair so sudden, they imagined that all or most of the prisoners had succeeded in freeing themselves, and there being but ten sentries, they were obliged to shoot the men who grappled with them."

"Three rifles were injured in the struggle. One prisoner rushed at the native officer and seized his sword. A sentry shot him through the head. But few shots were fired, and none except at those who grappled with the sentries, or attempted to escape."

The alarm in front having now ceased, Major Collis, Commanding 21st Punjab Native Infantry, returned from his picquets and ordered the removal of the dead and wounded. I reported to the General, and he directed me to see that everything possible was done to relieve the wounded.

The officers of the 21st personally assisted in cutting the ropes of those who were still bound. Some were extremely contumacious; and I saw one rush at the sepoy who had just released him. Three men intervened, and with difficulty secured him.

6 CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE KHOST VALLEY.

When all had been examined, it was found that one prisoner had escaped, 63 were unhurt, nine were wounded, and 12 killed, including the two I had first seen and one who was shot outside the line of picquets.

I reported to the General, who ordered the unwounded prisoners to be placed in three parties in charge of separate guards, in order to deter them from another outbreak.

Straw was also, by his instructions, provided for the wounded, and a temporary shelter of tarpaulins erected for them. Medical officers attended to them during a great part of the night ; and in the morning they were taken into hospital, where they received every care and attention.

W. Galbraith, Major,
Asst. Adjt. Genl., Kurram Field Force.

EAST INDIA. (KHOST VALLEY).


COPY of PAPERS relating to the Proceedings of
Major General Roberts in the *Khost Valley* on
the 7th and 8th days of January 1870.

(Mr. Edward Stunlop.)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
17 June 1870.

234.

Under 1 oz.



AFGHANISTAN, No. 3.

FURTHER PAPERS

RELATING TO THE

AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1879.

[C.—2250.] *Price 2½d.*

LIST OF PAPERS.

No.		From	To	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1	Telegram	- Secretary of State -	Viceroy	- 1878. 5th December	Request for text of con- versations at Umballa in 1869, and at Simla in 1873.	3
2	Telegram	- Viceroy -	- Secretary of State.	5th December	Reply to the above	3
3	Letter	- Viceroy - With 8 Enclosures.	- Secretary of State.	12th December (No. 147.)	Transmitting papers called for in telegram of the 5th December 1878.	3

CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY.

SEND Home full text of conversations of 1869 between Amir and Mayo, and between Kabul Minister and others, and record of Amir's secret Council; also text of conversations of 1873 between Kabul Minister and Aitchison.

No. 2.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, dated Lahore, 5th December 1878.

YOUR telegram, 5th December, requiring papers, conversations of 1869. Have telegraphed Calcutta for records; will send whatever papers are found.

No. 3.

Foreign Department.—Secret, No. 147.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Camp, Lahore, 12th December 1878.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's telegram, dated 5th December 1878, calling for copies of various papers connected with Kabul affairs. I enclose duplicates of all the papers which it has been possible to collect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

SECRET COUNCIL held by the AMÍR in the FORT of LAHORE in the SAMMAN BURJ on the 17th March 1869. PAPERS OF 1869.

His Highness the Amír of Kabul	-	-	President.
1. Syad Núr Muhammad Shah	-	-	} Members.
2. Ishak Akasi Sherdil Khan	-	-	
3. Mirza Muhammad Hussan, Mir Munshi	-	-	

QUESTION put by the Amír.

Should the British inquire what is your object and desire, what reply should be given?

REPLY given by No. 1 Member.

"As far as possible, nothing should be said which would indicate want or covetousness. But only this should be said, that regarding the house of the British as your own house, it was necessary that you should have expressed your desire to meet the British authorities, and evinced your good-will and friendship towards the British Government; therefore, your Highness first intimated your desire to do so, and having been asked to come over, you have come down; that your Highness has been much pleased, and has no other object than that the British Government should treat you with patronizing kindness."

The Amír and the second and third Members:—"Yes; this would be the proper reply."

Ishak Akasi Sherdil, the second Member, said:—"Notwithstanding this, if the British authorities should insist and say that your Highness should nevertheless say what your desires are, and the Government would accede to them, then your Highness should say that you are much obliged for the assistance which Her Majesty has given you, without any wish to interfere with your Government. Your Highness should then go on to say that the British authorities should, in the first instance, inform you of their sentiments, and you would then give a reply."

The Amír and the other Members approved of this suggestion.

Syad Núr Muhammad Shah said—"Should the opening of the Khaibar route and the chastisement of the Afrídi, Momand and Shánwari tribes be urged on you here also, as the Commissioner of Pesháwar at the first interview said to some of our men, that the Amír should be persuaded to open out the Khaibar route and to make a road, it should be replied that these are matters of minor importance; the most important matter of all should be attended to, which is this: that Russia is daily extending its conquests and has come up to the confines of Balkh and Herát. The British Government should take measures openly for the protection of those borders; and you were prepared with your heart and property to oppose the Russians for the sake of protecting your country and in deference to the wishes of the British Government. Lastly, that your Highness would in no way fall short of evincing your good-will and friendship towards the British Government. Let the British Government state the measures they propose to take in this matter; the external enemy should be first attended to."

The Amír and the other Members concurred in, and approved of, this suggestion.

The Amír then said—"Should the British authorities propose that a European Agent be stationed at Kabul itself, although I am myself agreeable to such arrangement, but the people of Kabul are turbulent and mischievous. Should such European Agent be injured in any way, which God forbid, I would be disgraced. The late Amír, my father, on these very considerations, refused to have a European Agent at his capital. But if an Agent be located in the interior, at places like Kandahár, or Balkh, or Herat, there would be no objection. Such an arrangement would be advantageous to both the Governments; for instance, at the present time the people of Lower Seistán have commenced encroachments on the Candahár boundaries. Lower Seistán was formerly always attached to Afghánistán, and has been occupied by Persia only since a short time. We are not aware what agreement exists between the British and Persian Governments regarding Lower Seistán. If there should be a European Agent on the border, he would be possessed of the necessary information, and would be at hand to consult regarding affairs relating to territories beyond the borders."

All the Members approved of what the Amír had said.

The first and second Members said—"Doubtless, the reply to be given to the requests of the British authorities should be to the effect, that the object is to maintain cordial and sincere alliance between the two States. Your Highness can accede to the wishes of the British Government only so far as is compatible with the wishes of your people, your religion, and your authority, so that nothing may happen at any time opposed to the mutual friendly relations."

"The policy of your Highness should be in the first instance to ascertain the sentiments of the British Government. Should the authorities express themselves verbally, they should be asked to reduce them to writing, so that we may discuss them in our own Councils, and then your Highness could state your views after due deliberation."

After this the Amír sent for the treaties entered into between the late Amír and the British Government, and perused them.

His Highness then said that he approved of the determination come to in the Council.

I expect that the Amír will express himself to the above effect to the Government. I have ascertained the result of the discussion, and submit the same for the information of the Government.

His Highness individually is a sincere friend of the Government; but in regard to some matters he is suspicious of his brothers and the tribes.

(Sd.) X. Y.

The 18th March 1869.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

NOTES of the FIRST MEETING between His Excellency the VICEROY and His Highness the AMÍR OF KABUL, at 4 p.m., 29th March 1869.

Present :

1. His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General.
2. Sir Donald Macleod, Lieutenant-Governor.
3. His Highness the Amír.
4. The Minister of His Highness, Núr Muhammad, Syad.
5. The Foreign Secretary, W. S. Seton-Karr, Esq.
6. Captain Grey, Interpreter.

AFTER compliments, and an expression of His Excellency's hope that the Amír had been satisfied with his reception, the Viceroy intimated to him that it was the firm desire of the British Government to see established at Kabul a just, strong, and independent government, in whose administration the Government of India would exercise no interference, and which should not bear the appearance of being maintained mainly by extraneous aid. His Excellency added that this would, in a great measure, depend on the Amír himself.

The Amír, for some time, could not apprehend the exact force of His Excellency's words, and he kept on repeating that a great deal depended on the Government of India, and on the line of policy which it proposed for itself in future; that he was disposed to look to that Government in all things; and that assistance and support must be open in order to be useful.

After the views of the Viceroy had been fully and clearly explained to His Highness, His Excellency told him in pointed language that he must now state distinctly by what particular acts of ours we could help him to establish a strong and independent rule at Kabul.

To this the Amír replied that he had already committed his sentiments to writing; that he had explained his views both to Sir John Lawrence and to the present Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab; and that the friendship with his father was a "dry friendship" and one-sided; he seemed unwilling, though rather pressed on the subject, to give any more distinct or decided expression to his feelings and wishes, though his Minister at last explained that they were—*first*, guarantee of Amír and family against all comers whilst in actual possession of the throne; *second*, such present assistance in money and arms as could be given.

His Excellency again pressed the Amír to state distinctly the precise mode in which he thought we could help him, but he replied in general terms. At last he broke out, and with great vehemence declared that the premature recognition of Azim Kham in November 1867 had been the main cause of all the bloodshed and misery which had since occurred; that Azim Khan at that time did not hold the whole of Afghanistan; that he was not the lawful ruler; and that it was our recognition which enabled the usurper to hold his position for two years. The tardy recognition of himself in 1863 seemed also to rankle in his mind; and in regard to the treaty with the Dost in 1855 he said it was a one-sided treaty and a "dry friendship."

Sir Donald MacLeod here observed to me, in English, that he was extremely surprised at this statement; that he had been on most confidential terms with the Amír since his arrival, and that he had never in any way referred to the subject.

From this Lord Mayo at once saw the real object of his visit, which was to obtain from us a promise that in no case would we repeat the policy of 1867, and acknowledge a *de facto* ruler while any part of Afghanistan remained in his hands. He declaimed at great length on this point, and became very excited. His Excellency told him that they were not there to discuss past events; that their business was with the present, and to provide against evils for the future.

At length, after some hesitation and conversation in Pushtu with his Minister, Nur Muhammad, he declared that it was his earnest wish that the Government of India should recognize and acknowledge not only himself but his lineal successors, or successors in blood (*man-wa-áulad-i-man**), and this phrase he repeated several times with great earnestness and emphasis. He explained again, and at some

* *Nuslan ba'd Nuslan*, or generation to generation.

length, that to acknowledge the ruler *pro tem.* and *de facto* was to invite competition for a throne, and excite the hopes of all sorts of candidates; that if the British Government would recognize him and his dynasty there was nothing that he would not do in order to evince his gratitude, and to comply with the wishes of the Indian Government in any particular and support them with his means and his life, it being understood that the slightest failure on his or his descendants' part should vitiate all engagements on ours.

The Viceroy here remarked that it was impossible to prophesy or to anticipate events, that we must deal with the present, and that His Highness could not expect him to enter into engagements as to a state of circumstances which might never occur.

At another period of the discussion he urged that friendship between nations and states could not remain hidden; and that a man might just as well try to extinguish the sun by putting his hand before his face; that whatever assistance was afforded to him by the British Government could not remain concealed, and would lose its value if it could, but must be known to all States in India and Asia.

To this His Excellency replied that mystery or concealment was the last course he should ever take; that the acts of the British Government must have shown His Highness that our friendship for him was open and warm; that his predecessor had, at a most critical moment, supplied him with money and arms; and that he himself had publicly admitted that to those acts he mainly owed his throne; that the splendour and consideration with which he had been received at Umballa would show to the world the estimation in which he was held; and that we had no intention to deviate from the course which we had adopted since he had last regained his throne; that we desired to see him firmly established as Ruler of Kabul; and that he should speedily establish tranquillity and good government throughout all his territories.

The Amír then said that the tranquillity of the country, which the Viceroy had so much at heart, would be the natural consequence of the security of his power and dynasty, and that all things, including the increase of trade (which results from the prosperity and wealth of a nation), which the British Government might desire, would follow from the establishment of a firm and permanent government.

After much conversation of this character, it was arranged that the Viceroy should send the Amír a letter the next day, in which the desire of the Government of India for a strong and independent rule would be set forth, as well as its deep interest in the affairs of Afghánistán, and its personal recognition of, and friendship for, himself; and he was informed that the Government, as circumstances would permit, would consider how, without direct interference, it could aid him in this paramount object—the formation of a strong and independent power.

This assurance seemed partly to satisfy him; and he was altogether, at this part of the conference, in a different frame of mind after the above incident than he was at first, when he seemed suspicious that our expressions meant more than appeared or than he understood.

His Excellency then directed his attention to trade and commerce, and the facilities of intercourse between India and Afghánistán, the Amír always replying that trade had been much impaired and interrupted by intestine wars, and that, with order and harmony, trade and commerce would flourish again.

As regards routes into India, he announced his determination of reviving the subsidy paid to the Khaibaris, and raising it to what it had been in the time of his father. He said that besides the route into India by the Khaibar Pass there are two other routes in the same range which turned off before the locality where the Khaibaris had the power of stopping the traffic; and there was also a road through the Kurram Valley, and another one into the Deraját; “Tatina” and “Kuruppa” through the Momunds, whose chief was connected with him by marriage, and under his entire influence, and which had always been safe; the “Peiwar,” which he hoped to render practicable; the “Gwaleyri,” which he could not do much in, but which was only the Povindah Pass, and always had been, and would be, traversed by those merchants with the strong right hand.

He spoke of the roads leading to Turkistán, generally recommending that *via* Kandahár and Herát as safe and easy throughout its length. All routes through the Paropamisus were safe, but very difficult till they reached the plains of Balkh. The Khulum or Táshkurghán (Big stone) route, however, was habitually traversed, and, as being the shortest from Kabul and Pesháwar, would receive his attention.

All these would be kept open. He added that the custom dues had fallen off immensely since the time of his father, owing to these commotions and this warfare, and that he hoped they might again be raised to their ancient figure, which he put at 28 or 30 lakhs.

He was then told that the Government of India wished to present him with some artillery, and he was asked whether he would prefer a field battery or two siege guns and a howitzer. He expressed a great desire for *breech-loading* guns as striking terror into his enemies.

His Excellency told him that the Government would consider the matter.

The interview ended.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM ON CONVERSATIONS held with the Confidential Minister of His Highness the AMÍR SHERE ALI by Captain GREY, on Special Duty with His Excellency the VICEROY, on the 31st March 1869.

THE Amír is prepared to act on what he may see is the nature of the friendship the British propose to afford him—if, as hitherto, merely acknowledging the ruler of Kabul *de facto*, well and good; but if prepared to acknowledge and support him and the heir he may point out (acknowledges that any such must be distinctly brought forward now, the contrary having produced the present troubles), there is nothing he will not accede to.

He is open to any proposition for securing his northern border; while doubtful of any Russian Power for aggression for some years to come, still thinks precautions should be taken; would construct forts on his own part, or under our superintendence, and admit European garrisons if ever desired; would gladly see an Agent or engineer superintendent there* (in Balkh), Herat, or anywhere but actually in Kabul, which might lead to the supposition of his being a puppet. There would be no danger for such, did they respect the Afgháns and themselves, and Afghán enmity is far more bitter against Persians and their friends than ever it was against us at the bitterest; and, with us acting as their friends, they will co-operate with a hearty friendship and energy in the field which we can little imagine. Our troops would have no work save in the actual shock of battle; every other military duty would be performed, and requisites supplied so effectually that no thought or precaution on the part of columns or garrisons of ours would be required.

With regard to the western frontier he leaves it to our sense of our own dignity and his to oppose this infraction of the treaties of 1856-7, and rectify the border between Ghain and Lash Jowain to twenty farsangs (a farsang is three and a half miles) west of the latter, as it has been since the days that Dost Mahomed recaptured Kandahar and its appanages from Kohen Dil Khan. He would require nothing but arms and treasure, and would himself act against the Persians, thus showing his sincerity and the non-existence of relations between himself and them; he merely would ask that, under the terms of the treaty, we would, on reference to us, support him in objecting to its infraction by the Persians. The aggression is formidable from the commanding positions assumed on the communications, not from the value of the tract itself.

With regard to the eastern border, he would undertake to manage all the Berdooran tribes. He proposes to introduce a thorough reform into his administration, whereby his sons will not be independent princes as under the Dost, but governors of provinces;† and being more directly subordinate and weaker, will merely collect and remit his revenues and carry out his amelioration policy of direct collection and cash payments; the effects of this will eventually extend to the tribes; meanwhile he will make their principal men his own by allowances, and will also, by force if necessary, check every further attempt to give us trouble.

With regard to trade, he will undertake to make the principal routes safe; those of the Paropamisus are so; the Herat route always was so; and though the Khulum one is at present closed, his troops will clear Tukhtapool on his return. Through the Sulimane Range he will secure the Khaibar, Tatara and the Gwaleyri route by "Mowajibs" (allowances). He recalls to the mind of the Government how that when Yakooob Khan's mother's brother, Sáadut Khan, was complained against merely by the Commissioner of Pesháwar he removed him, confined him, and he died in confinement, and the substitution of a safe man kept many thousand Mohmunds out of the fray (Ambela). He appeals to this specimen of what he was willing to and could do when not bound to the Government in any way, as a proof of the friendship he can now display.

When the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab sent him written questions, he did not know his ground, and answered evasively; he now speaks openly and specifically; his wish is to return hearty friendship with entire confidence, and puts himself at the disposal of the Government. He himself has throughout sought our friendship; had it been extended three years ago, when the reasons which hold good now were equally strong, when his own case was better, and his cause stronger, three years' affliction would have been spared. When the Wazir recommended him, after the refusal of 1867, to try once again, he determined he would not till he had recovered Kabul for himself, he did so, and then he wrote; now it is afforded he will show himself worthy of it. He will, with our help, arrange the country somewhat, and then commence any internal measures we may wish and receive any officers we may desire.

(Signed) H. GREY.

(True Copy.)

(Signed) W. S. SETON-KARR.

* On the northern border.

† This he has done.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

NOTES of a CONVERSATION held at UMBALLA on 1st April 1869; Present MR. SETON-KARR, Foreign Secretary; MAJOR POLLOCK, Commissioner of Peshawar; SYAD NUR MUHAMMAD SHAH, Minister of the Amír; MR. THORNTON, Secretary to Government, Punjab; and MR. GIRDLESTONE, Under Foreign Secretary.

THE Minister began the conversation with saying that he thought we wished him to commit himself. The Commissioner and the Foreign Secretary took considerable pains to re-assure him. I. What are His Highness' wishes with reference to trade between India and Afghánistán. The Minister then said—"You have given us guns, treasure, &c., &c. You would not do so without some special motive. What is your motive?" The Secretary answered—"In order that the Government on our borders may be independent and strong, just as Kashmir and Nepal are." As a proof of our good intentions, the late policy with respect to the Kashmir succession was explained to the Minister. Upon this the Minister said that he accepted the explanation, and would not credit us with ulterior motives. He hoped we should have a good understanding, and the advantage of it to us would be that were the Russians or other enemy to come, even though the Afgháns of themselves could not successfully keep them out of their country, they could harass them in every way. The fact of the good understanding will spread fast over Asia. Ten thousand will know it this year; twenty-thousand next year, and then a lakh, and so on. "We know the Russians," he continued, "to be great tyrants, and not so trustworthy as you. In old days in Afghánistan you showed a want of consideration to those who were most entitled to it." From the public reception at which he was present the other night he saw that this policy had been put aside, and that little Native princes of the Punjab, such as he had met, were fairly and honourably treated. "You do not want our country, and, were you to get it, there would be no profit to you."

Referring to the first question, the Minister said that kingcraft belongs to Kings, and trade to traders; but still the more trade prospers the greater will be the customs dues of the Kings. Any road by which we wish traders to pass to and fro into his country shall be maintained and be kept safe. The horses of Afghánistán go mostly to Bombay and Bangalore; they are passed by Committees into the Government service, and command prices from Rs. 500 to Rs. 600. The horse trade with Pesháwar has fallen off considerably owing to a less demand. If the merchants in one year sell a thousand at Government prices, a second year they would probably send fifteen hundred; and on the contrary, if no remounts were required for a year or two, merchants would have to sell their horses to private individuals for smaller sums.

At Mr. Thornton's request, under instructions from the Lieutenant-Governor, the question was put whether the Amír would object to the establishment of a public post for the benefit of traders and others. The Minister answered that there would be no objection whatever.

It is the wish of the British Government that on his return to Kabul the Amír, as soon as circumstances will permit, should indicate the passes which might be most adapted for trade, and should consider how he could make them safe and practicable, and the British Government, on receiving intimation to the above effect, will give general publicity to the same for the trading public. "In the way of

This remark of the Minister was by the way.

"friendliness, and not in the way of enmity, I dread one thing." "You are," he said, "so very particular and exacting. I make a promise, and then, supposing I do not perform it to the day and hour, you are down upon me at once, and keep on writing letters to spur me on. I may have been breaking my heart probably to keep to my word, but you will allow nothing for change of circumstances."

The Minister referred to his answer already given to the Punjab Government, that when the Amír returned he would do all in his power to conciliate the tribes and keep the people in order, and said he considered this the best answer which could be given. By forbearance with the tribes confidence will be instilled amongst them, "but it is of no use for you to take a stick on one side and we on the other." The Amír is ready to encourage his subjects to resort to the fair at Pesháwar.

II. What can the Amír do, so far as his influence extends, to keep the wild tribes of the frontier in order? The Minister was told that if presently the Amír liked to send any of his great Ministers in a private capacity to England, every facility should be shown, so that they might see everything of interest. It was quite possible, he was told, that the British Government would appoint an officer in attendance, if men of rank went, and might contribute something towards the cost of the visit. There would be no fear that religious influence would be brought to bear on any persons going. Also the British Government would

forward the education of any young Afgháns whom the Amír might wish to send for the purpose of learning our military system, our manufactures, the science of telegraphy, railways, &c. The Minister said he would speak to the Amír. This, he said, might perfect our "Amezish" or intercourse, and those who had visited England would come back, comprehending the benefits of our civilization; and so there would be a greater binding of the two nations. But he would take the Amír's views clearly on this, as the above were his own sentiments only.

The Minister remarked that he did not wish to commit himself, and asked rather anxiously whether European Agents were intended, observing, at the same time, that it was no use to send any but Muhammadans; Hindus were of no good at all. He begged that his reply might not be put on paper. He said that he first distinctly wished to ascertain the Amír's sentiments. He mentioned that there was now a man named "Unwár" at Kandahar, who supplied information to the officer (Sir H. Green was the name he gave) on the Scinde frontier. But he added he was looking far forward, and the day might come when the "Russ" would arrive and the Amír would be glad not only of British Officers as Agents, but of arms and troops to back them.

The Minister, on being told that the British Government would allow Afgháns to come into India, to Rurki, Lahore, Calcutta, &c., to learn our arts and trades, answered that he would consult the Amír.

The Secretary remarked that in this morning's conversation he had reserved nothing, and had nothing to reserve, to which the Minister answered that he was in precisely the same condition, and that in fact, since the interchange of civilities, he felt as a man might feel who had changed his religion.

(Signed) C. GIRDLESTONE,
Under Foreign Secretary.

[Note.—In the Government of India Enclosure of 10th May 1877, sending home an Extract of above, Captain Grey was mentioned as having been present at this conversation, but this was apparently a clerical error.]

Enclosure 5 in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM of a CONVERSATION held at UMBALLA on April 3rd 1869.

Present :

W. S. Seton-Karr, Esquire, Foreign Secretary.
Syad Núr Muhammad Shah, Minister of the Amír.
T. H. Thornton, Esquire, Secretary to Government, Punjab.
Major Pollock, Commissioner of Pesháwar.
Charles Girdlestone, Esquire, Under Foreign Secretary.

REFERRING to the points which were reserved in the conversation of April 1st, 1869, the Minister said that there was no occasion to include Ghazni as a place of residence for a British Agent, as Ghazni was included in Kabul. The Amír was ready to have a writer to accompany him wherever he moved, and to allow of men in Turkistán and Balkh, when the country was more settled. The Minister himself considered Unwar, the present news-writer at Kandahár, to be "a thorough rascal." Any Agents so sent were to be merely for the sake of sending intelligence. The great danger of these Agents was, unless they were treated as they wished, they vilified the Government in their reports. As an instance, he quoted that when the Amír was defeated at Kandahár, Azím Khan sent to Unwar khillats, money, &c., and in return Unwar wrote false accounts of Shere Ali's proceedings, and flaming reports of Azím Khan's power and success. "If you do not believe me," he urged, "send for the diaries of that period from Jacobabad." As long as the Amír gave the news-writer *dilása* (smoothed him down) it was all very well. With these reservations the British Government has full power to send news-writers. If any news-writer was personally offensive to the Amír, the Secretary explained, of course the Government would not continue him in his post or insist on his retention.

The Minister, on being asked whether the Amír wished to send Afgháns to learn trades and so forth at Rurki and other places in our territory, answered curtly, "it cannot be done, you might write a whole book of objections about it, but if ever we change our minds on this subject we will let you know. The Amír has personally no objection, but fears the interpretation his people might put on the arrangements. The fruits of the Amír's visit to the Viceroy cannot be properly understood yet by

" Afgháns. They would understand the aid given to their Sovereign to be conditional " on Afghán youths being Anglicised." The same reasons apply to sending Afgháns to Europe. After a few years, as suspicion gets dissipated, the Amír, if he thinks fit, will intimate his desire for men being sent. " Just think," he said, " a short time ago " such an interview as has taken place would never have entered into any one's " imagination. It has happened; what more can be said? And who could have " expected, a year since, that I should have been sitting here alone, talking in a friendly " manner to four English Officers."

(Signed) CHARLES GIRDLESTONE,
Under Foreign Secretary.

At the close of the interview the Foreign Secretary took the Minister apart and clearly explained to him His Excellency's instructions, that under no circumstances was the Amír to expect that British troops would cross the border to put down civil war or domestic contention.

This intimation was repeated to the Minister by the Foreign Secretary at a subsequent interview, and the Minister's reply on both occasions was clear and satisfactory as to the Amír's full understanding on this point.

(Signed) W. S. SETON-KARR,
Foreign Secretary.

Enclosure 6 in No. 3.

NOTES of the SECOND MEETING between His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL and the AMÍR of KABUL, held at 4 o'clock p.m. on the 3rd of April 1869, after which the AMÍR took his final leave of His Excellency.

Present :

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General.
The Amír Shere Ali Khan.
The Honourable Sir D. Macleod, Lieutenant-Governor.
Syad Núr Muhammad Shah.
W. S. Seton-Karr, Esquire, Foreign Secretary.
Major F. R. Pollock, Commissioner, Pesháwar.
Captain Grey, Interpreter.

THE Governor-General commenced by expressing his satisfaction at finding that his letter had gratified the Amír: to this he entirely assented, and expressed much gratitude.

The Governor-General then said that he trusted that the Amír would, when he had established himself in his Government, be able to assist in promoting the peace of the frontier, which the Amír promised he would do, sooner or later, according to his ability. As regarded the publication of my letter, he said he would, on reaching Kabul, or about a month hence, make it generally known, and explained that it would be impossible and undesirable to keep it secret from all in Afghánistán, high or low. He thought that we had better wait till then, which the Governor-General agreed to do, observing that it was most desirable that at some very early period the exact truth should be known to all States. He then said that the Afgháns, though suspicious at first of relations with the British, must now be pleased, but that they were a stupid race; but, any way, he would "drive if he could not lead them." He observed that "you could not take in " wisdom (*akl*) as you could sustenance—by eating a loaf of bread;" also he said that his neighbours, Persians and Russians, who had not hitherto interfered with him, might become the aggressors on learning that he had attached himself to us,—this was the first time he had mentioned either Russian or Persian to the Governor-General,—when the Governor-General expressed his hope that he would strive to spread civilisation among a people so distinguished for courage, high spirit, and sagacity; and quoted ourselves as an example of how a nation, by cultivating the arts of both war and peace, might rise from barbarism to the utmost heights of civilisation. The Amír replied that it rested with Providence; that God had indeed fitted *us* thus to improve, but had made the Afgháns, notwithstanding their many good qualities, crassly stupid; but that he was one himself, and knew how to manage them. The Viceroy explained to the Amír that, powerful as the British Government was in India, it had to regard the wishes of the Queen and Her Ministers at home, as well as the will of the nation, as expressed in

Parliament. After some explanation he seemed to take this in. It was therefore most desirable that His Highness should evince an interest in maintaining peace and encouraging trade, both of which would be gratifying to the British people. His Excellency also explained that, at this moment, England was on most friendly terms with all European Powers, and that there was no probability of any misunderstanding which could result in war. He then very shrewdly remarked that, with such terrible engines of war as were now invented, nations would not engage hastily in hostilities.

The Governor-General then pointed out Major Pollock as the channel for communication, which he trusted would be frequent; and the Amír said he regarded him as a near neighbour (*hamsáya*).

His Excellency introduced the subject of the succession, and said it would afford the British Government much satisfaction to be made aware of the heir whom the Amír might nominate, so as to avoid contentions for the future; to which the Amír pointedly replied that he would inform him on that head by letter on reaching Kabul.

The Governor-General then dismissed the Amír with best wishes for his return journey and success.

(Signed) W. S. SETON-KARR.

The 4th April 1869.

Enclosure 7 in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS between the FOREIGN SECRETARY and KABUL ENVOY on the 19th and 20th July 1873. PAPERS OF 1873.

THE Envoy was requested to state specifically the various points on which he wanted information or an explanation. His remarks, with the Secretary's replies, are given below:—

1. The Envoy drew attention to the passage marginally quoted, in Earl Granville's Despatch of the 17th October 1872, and observed that, the object of the correspondence between Russia and England being to secure "*peace and tranquillity*," he would wish it to be distinctly stated that the expression referred merely to external relations and not to the internal affairs of Afghánistán. That, for instance, the absence of security of life and property in Afghánistán itself would not be held to constitute a condition of affairs that would invalidate the arrangement entered into between Russia and England. The Envoy wished it to be clearly understood that the condition of affairs alluded to by the expression in question should be held to be *first*, that the countries on both sides of the recognized frontier should abstain from interference with each other either in the way of actual aggression or by proceedings liable to cause each other annoyance; *secondly*, that the Afgháns should be allowed to follow their own laws and customs in their own territories; *thirdly*, that the internal administration of the States on both sides of the frontier should be free from interference.

Answer.—The Secretary replied that in his opinion the expression alluded to embraced all these things and had no reference to the internal condition of the countries on both sides of the border. In all communications however that may take place with Russian officials or subjects, the Secretary added that it would be advisable for the Amír so to frame his communications and proceedings as to promote mutual trust and confidence.

2. Alluding to a further passage* in the same despatch from Earl Granville, the Envoy observed that His Lordship used the word claims, which is not applicable to an assertion of rights over territory of which the Amír has actual possession, and further went on to say that Bokhára admits these claims. In the event of Bokhára or any other country questioning the right of the Amír at any future time, the Envoy wished it to be understood that the settlement of the boundary is final, and that any future objection which might be made to it should not afford an opening for a reconsideration of the question.

Answer.—The territories referred to were now recognized by England and Russia as being in the actual possession of the Amír of Afghánistán. The admission of Bokhára as to the claim was quoted as evidence in the Amír's favor, and as strengthening his case. Now that the boundary has been actually accepted by Russia, no objections on the part of Bokhára or any other country can be entertained.

3. The Envoy observed that the recent correspondence between the English and Russian Governments regarding the northern boundaries of Afghánistán contained no assurances on the part of Russia against aggression on Afghánistán.

Answer.—The recent correspondence referred to related only to the particular question as to what territories actually belonged to Afghánistán. The Russian assurances as to non-aggression have already been fully quoted in the letters from Lord Mayo to the Amír, and are, moreover, contained in the letters which are printed at length in the collection of papers laid before Parliament, a complete copy of which will be furnished to the Envoy if he wished it.

4. The Envoy continued that whatever assurances the Russians might give the Amír would rely only on definite promises of assistance given by the British Government. He proceeded to explain the dangers which were apprehended by Afghánistán in consequence of the rapid advances made by the Russians in Central Asia. In a year or two, he said, it was certain they would take possession of Merv, whereupon the Turkomán tribes would take refuge in the district of Badghies* and the neighbourhood

* The North-West district of Afghanistan watered by the River Moorghab and its tributaries.

of Herat. When in Afghán territory the Turkománs, who know no other avocation but that of plunder, would certainly not forsake their predatory habits and would thus afford the Russians an excuse for calling on the Amír to restrain them. No proper control can be exercised by the Amír on these wandering tribes, and a demand would then be made by Russia to allow a force to be cantoned in Badghies for the purpose of controlling them. Again, the Russians will certainly advance beyond Bokhára and establish cantonments in Kerki, Charjooee, and other places near the Afghán frontier; and their next step will be to call upon the Kabul Government to enter into engagements for facilitating trade, and for the establishment of a Russian mission and agents as in other countries. It would be impossible for the Amír to accede to these requests, compliance with which would certainly lead to complications and troubles. In view then of these apprehended dangers, the Envoy said it was the expectation of the people of Afghánistán that the British Government will attentively consider their situation and suggest what reply should be made to the overtures of Russia, and at the same time that the British Government will state definitely what assistance would be given to Afghánistán in such an emergency.

Answer.—With regard to the fear of Russian interference with Afghánistán, the explicit assurances already given should quiet the Amír's apprehensions. The other matters referred to are all events in the unknown future and may never occur. In regard to them, therefore, no general directions could be laid down. If any of them were to occur, the advice to be given and the action to be taken would very much depend on the particular circumstances of the case. The best preventive which the Secretary could suggest against the apprehended dangers was that there should be at the Court of the Amír a British Officer of high standing, and in the full confidence of the Government of India, who could advise His Highness as to the circumstances of each case, and give advice with regard to the action which, in cases of emergency, it might be necessary to take till the Government of India could be communicated with. With regard to the location of Russian Agents in Afghánistán, the Envoy would learn from the printed papers that Prince Gortschakoff had expressed an opinion that, while he saw no objection to English Officers going to Kabul, he agreed with Lord Mayo that Russian Agents should not do so.

5. The Envoy said that the Russians have annexed territories close up to the frontiers of Afghánistán, and the Amír, believing the attitude they have assumed to be threatening to the peace of his territories, expects that the British Government will render him large present assistance in money and arms so as to enable him to strengthen his frontier. This request of His Highness is grounded, moreover, on the promises made by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo.

Answer.—The Secretary replied that, in the absence of instructions from His Excellency the Viceroy, he was unable to reply to the specific request preferred by the Envoy. Lord Mayo, in his letter to the Amír, dated 31st March 1869, had said:—

“It is my wish, therefore, that Your Highness should communicate frequently and freely with the Government of India and its Officers on all subjects of public interest, and I can assure Your Highness that any representation which you may make will always be treated with consideration and respect.”

Any requests preferred by the Envoy would, therefore, certainly be treated with consideration and respect by His Excellency the Viceroy, but the Secretary was not in a position to state what view would be taken of this particular request.

6. The Envoy next observed that, in Lord Granville's letter of the 17th October 1872, His Lordship had said, with reference to the territories within the boundary now accepted, that the Amír "would have a right to defend these territories if invaded." This recognition of the Amír's right to defend his territories appeared, said the Envoy, to be qualified by what the Viceroy said in the course of the conversation of the 12th July with regard to the necessity for a reference to the Government of India in case of invasion. The Envoy, therefore, asked for an explicit explanation as to whether, in the event of a sudden invasion, the Amír would be authorized to repel it at once.

Answer.—Hostilities seldom, if ever, break out without some misunderstanding, which, before resort is had to arms, is generally the subject of explanation. If such misunderstanding were to arise, it would certainly be the duty of the Amír to seek the advice of the British Government; but if, during the course of negotiations, or at any other time, an actual invasion of His Highness' territories were to take place, the Amír would assuredly be at liberty to adopt such lawful measures as might be necessary for repelling it at once.

7. The Envoy asked that a written assurance might be given to him to the effect that if Russia or any State of Turkestan or elsewhere under Russian influence should commit an aggression on the Amír's territories, or should otherwise annoy the Amír, the British Government would consider such aggressor an enemy, and that they would promise to afford to the Amír promptly such assistance in money and arms as might be required until the danger should be past or invasion repelled. Also, that if the Amír should be unable to cope single-handed with the invader, that the British Government should promptly despatch a force to his assistance by whatever route the Amír might require the same, the said force to be employed against the invader and to return to British territory when the invasion was repelled. No return for the assistance above-mentioned to be required by the British Government from Afghánistán. Such assistance to be rendered solely out of friendship to Afghánistán, and with the view of protecting the integrity of the frontier, so that the existing friendship of both countries should be maintained.

Answer.—The Secretary replied that he felt sure the British Government would never agree to assert in general terms that any one interfering with Afghánistán would be declared an enemy. Government must hold itself quite free to decide what the circumstances of each case might require. In regard to the question of assistance to Afghánistán he was unable to add anything to the expressions used by His Excellency the Viceroy, by whom alone further explanation on the subject could be afforded to the Envoy. Doubtless, added the Secretary, much would depend upon two considerations, *viz.*, (1st) that the Amír should fully and unreservedly have accepted and acted upon the advice of the British Government in his foreign relations; and (2ndly) the circumstances and extent of the invasion or interference. If assistance were given by the British Government it would doubtless be such as, in their opinion, would be sufficient to meet the circumstances of the case.

8. The Envoy represented that in the conversation of the 12th July with His Excellency the Viceroy, invasion or aggression on the part of the Turkománs, Khiva, Bokhára, and other countries under Russian influence, had been alluded to, but Russia had not been specifically mentioned.

Answer.—There seems no objection to specify the case of an invasion by Russia in the paper to be eventually given to the Envoy.

9. The Envoy read out a letter just received from Kabul, stating that the son of Koshad Khan of Merv had presented himself before the Amír on the part of all the Turkománs and represented that the Russians had sent a message to the Tekkeh tribe to say that the Turkománs were an independent people and had no recognized head, and all that they (the Russians) required of them was an unmolested passage for their troops, in return for which they would undertake to leave the tribes alone. The Turkománs had replied that they considered the Amír of Afghánistán as their head, and through the son of Koshad Khan they now professed their allegiance to the Amír, and asked his advice as to whether they should attack the Russians or allow them a free passage. The Turkomán Envoy required an early answer, and the Amír was therefore desirous of ascertaining the views of the British Government before replying to him.

Answer.—The Secretary replied that the matter would be submitted for the consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy. The country of the Turkománs lies beyond the recognized limits of Afghánistán. The Russians have a just and legitimate quarrel with the Khan of Khiva, to punish whom their troops were marching through the Tekkeh country. If the Amír thinks it necessary to give them advice it should be to

the effect that the Turkománs should allow an unmolested passage to the Russians, and in no way whatever interfere with their operations. The Russian expedition to Khiva, however, was probably by this time over, and the circumstances were probably passed and gone under which the letter referred to had been written. It would be advisable for the Amír to abstain as far as possible from interference in the affairs of the Turkománs beyond his frontier and to disclaim the proffered allegiance. While maintaining with them relations of peace, he should on no account assist the Turkománs, or in any way countenance them in opposing the Russians.

The Envoy then said (in answer to the Secretary's question) that he had no other explanations to ask or representations to make on the question of the boundary and the general relations between the British Government and Afghánistán. In regard to Seistan he wished for further time to consider the matter. Accordingly Tuesday, the 22nd, was fixed as the date for discussing Seistan matters.

21-7-73.

21-7-73.

(Signed) P. D. H.

(Signed) C. U. A.

Enclosure 8 in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS between the KABUL ENVOY and FOREIGN SECRETARY ON
the 31st July and 1st August 1873.

At the interview of the 30th of July, His Excellency the Viceroy requested the Envoy to discuss with Mr. Aitchison the following subjects:—

- (1.) The location in certain towns of Afghanistan of British officers as representatives of their Government.
- (2.) The expectations of the Amír with regard to the present assistance to be rendered to Afghanistan for the purpose of strengthening that country against foreign aggression.
- (3.) The measures that should be taken for strengthening the Seistan frontier, and the expectations of the Amír in connection therewith.

As regards the first, the Envoy observed that without enquiring what are the motives of the British Government in desiring to locate their representatives in Afghanistan, he would, if required, state plainly what were his views on the subject. As the question had not previously been alluded to before his departure from Kabul, he had received no instructions on the subject, and could therefore only speak in his private capacity.

The Secretary observed here, that before going any further, it would be as well that the Envoy should clearly understand what is the object of the British Government in wishing to locate their representatives in Afghanistan. In the first place, there is absolutely no intention whatever of exercising any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, though, of course, if consulted, the British representative would be always ready to offer his advice to the Amír. The first object in view was to obtain accurate information on all matters affecting the external relations of Afghanistan. In the recent correspondence regarding Seistan, for example, very contradictory accounts regarding occurrences in that province were received from Persia and Afghanistan. It is very important, looking to the responsibilities which England has now undertaken, that accurate information should be obtained by the British Government, and in many cases a British officer on the spot could settle differences which might otherwise give rise to serious complications and difficulties. Again, neither the British nor Russian Governments are in possession of very accurate information regarding the recently defined northern boundaries of Afghanistan. This was exemplified only the other day when a question arose regarding the Mir of Shignan. It is therefore very desirable that a British officer should visit those boundaries, so that Government may be in a position to reply authoritatively to any reference that may arise on the subject. It must also, added the Secretary, be obvious that if a British officer of high rank, and well acquainted with the views and policy of the British Government, was deputed to Kabul, the Amír would be able, in the event of any emergency arising, and when a reference to India was impossible, to consult the officer, and feel assured that he was not acting in opposition to the wishes of the British Government.

The Envoy replied that he understood the object of the British Government, and, personally, was well aware of the advantages that would accrue to Afghanistan from the presence of their representatives. Speaking, however, as a friend, and in the interests both of his own and the British Government, he could not recommend that a specific request should be preferred to the Amír for British officers to be stationed at certain

given places. His reasons were the following :—*First*, the Afghans are deplorably ignorant, and entertain an idea that the deputation of British Agents is always a precursor to annexation. *Secondly*, many proceedings of the Amír are such as would be disapproved by the British Government. Those who encourage the Amír in these would be only too ready to suggest to him that a British Agent would interfere to put a stop to such proceedings. *Thirdly*, there is a strong party at Kabul composed of the members of Dost Mahomed Khan's family, and of others in the confidence of the Amír, who are strongly opposed to His Highness entering into intimate relations with the British Government, which would have the effect of strengthening the Amír's hands in the administration of his country. The opportunity of these men is of course during a weak administration and in unsettled times.

Under the circumstances above mentioned, therefore, the Envoy was of opinion that to prefer a specific request to the Amír would give rise to mistrust and misapprehension. He would, therefore, recommend that in a separate letter, of which he would be the bearer, it should be suggested to the Amír that in view of the arrangements recently completed it would be highly desirable that a British Officer should inspect the western and northern boundaries of Afghanistan. That this Officer would proceed from Kandahar to the eastern extremity of the Northern Frontier, and, returning *viâ* Kabul, would communicate with the Amír regarding frontier matters. This Officer might, when at Kabul, have an opportunity of ascertaining the sentiments of the Amír with regard to the location of representatives, and might perhaps find that all difficulty had been removed. If necessary, however, the British Government might, on the return of such an Officer to India, again depute the same or another Officer to confer with the Amír regarding the results of the examination of the frontier. The visits of these Officers would familiarise the Amír and the people of Afghanistan with the idea of receiving a permanent British representative, and eventually the desired object might thus be attained.

The Secretary replied that the plan suggested by the Envoy appeared highly judicious, and he continued that the approaching deputation of a Mission to Yarkand afforded a favourable opportunity for carrying out the suggestion. It had previously been in contemplation by Government to direct Mr. Forsyth to return to India *viâ* Badakshan and Kabul, provided, of course, that the Amír had no objection to the measure.

The Envoy observed that as Mr. Forsyth's arrival in Afghanistan would probably not be for 18 months or two years, it would be advisable for the British Government in their own interests to avail themselves of the opportunity afforded by the recent boundary negotiations to suggest that an Officer should proceed at once *viâ* Kandahar to visit the eastern and northern frontier, returning by Kabul.

The Secretary then enquired whether, in the event of Mr. Forsyth's Mission returning *viâ* Badakshan, the Amír would be able to make the necessary arrangements for supplies, &c., in the north-east extremity of his territories. To this the Envoy replied that in the absence of any precise information regarding that portion of Afghanistan he could give no specific assurance, but there would be plenty of time before the return of the Mission to make all necessary enquiries.

The Secretary then suggested that the Amír might be asked to allow a British Officer to proceed to that portion of the frontier *viâ* Kabul, in anticipation of the arrival of the Mission, in order to make the necessary arrangements for them.

On the whole the Envoy thought it better that his previous suggestion of an Officer going round by Kandahar should be carried out. If, on arrival at Kabul, this Officer found that the Amír entertained no objection to the location of an Envoy there or elsewhere, there would of course be equally no objection to the Mission returning *viâ* Badakshan. On the other hand, if there were difficulties about the appointment of an Envoy, it would still be open to Government to allude to the return of the Yarkand Mission *viâ* Badakshan. He would suggest that in that case the Amír should be addressed on this subject in such a manner as neither to imply the possibility of refusal of permission, nor, on the other hand, as if the Mission would take that route without permission. At the same time the advantages of defining the Yarkand frontier in prolongation of that of Afghanistan should be pointed out to the Amír.

The Envoy professed himself anxious and willing, both in the interest of his own country and of the British Government, to secure compliance with the wishes of the latter in this respect. He would, after ascertaining the sentiments of the Amír, communicate, if required, with or without the cognizance of the Vakil at Kabul.

The next point discussed was that of the assistance to be given to the Amír, and first, with respect to the arms asked for by His Highness, the Envoy repeated the request

contained in the Kabul diaries, that the British Government should supply the Amír with 20,000 stand of arms, and he laid particular stress on 5,000 Sniders being included in the number. As regards pecuniary assistance, the Envoy was unable to name any specific sum, and he could only say that the Amír entertained hopes of being very largely assisted in this respect.

Next, with respect to the measures necessary for the defence of the Seistan frontier, the Envoy said that he was not in a position to do more than give a very rough estimate of the expenditure required. He had already mentioned the necessity for planting a colony at Tarakoo, and garrisoning that place, as well as Nad Ali, Killa Fath. For the irrigation of the lands destined to support that colony and the garrisons it would be necessary to excavate three canals leading from the Helmund to Tarakoo, Killa Fath, and towards Chuckunsoor. These would cost say ten lakhs. Then again the Tarakoo colonists would have to be paid their expenses to the colony, and for some time be supported by the Amír. They would also require advances to build houses, and to purchase agricultural implements and seed-grain. Altogether, perhaps, the measures necessary for the proper defence of the Seistan frontier would cost probably some 30 or 40 lakhs.

The Secretary explained to the Envoy that, of course, the British Government could not undertake to find the amount necessary for carrying out these measures. With reference also to the proposed excavation of canals he reminded the Envoy that by the arbitration no works are to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the requisite supply of water for irrigation on both banks of the Helmund.

The Envoy, however, remarked, with reference to this point, that the water for 20 such canals could be spared from the Helmund without decreasing the supply derived by Persia.

The Secretary then proceeded to say that Government were unable to share the apprehensions of aggression entertained by the Amír, and would not encourage him to launch out into any large expenditure for the purpose of guarding against this contingency. At the same time they were desirous to see the Amír strong, and were inclined to give him any reasonable assistance with this object. He invited the Envoy to state specifically his views in regard to the amount of assistance expected by the Amír. After considerable discussion, the Secretary informed the Envoy that Government was prepared to give the Amír, in addition to the arms which he had asked for, a present of ten lakhs in cash; this amount to include the five lakhs promised in Poona for indemnifying the sufferers from the Seistan raids. Five thousand stand of Enfield rifles would be given at once, and the remaining arms, including 5,000 Sniders, would be ordered from England.

The Envoy expressed an opinion that the Amír would not be satisfied with a present of 10 lakhs, which was so much below his expectations. Being pressed to state what amount would fulfil those expectations, he named 20 lakhs, adding at the same time that he had no authority for naming this figure; which was his own idea of the amount required.

The Secretary could hold out no hope of this amount being granted, but added that he would submit the matter for the orders of His Excellency the Viceroy.

On the 1st August the Secretary informed the Envoy that he had taken the orders of the Viceroy on the question of the pecuniary assistance to Afghanistan, and that His Excellency had expressed inability to offer a larger sum than 15 lakhs in all, including the value of the arms to be presented to the Amír. The question had been considered by His Excellency in a spirit of the utmost friendliness towards Afghanistan, and, looking both to the necessities of that country and the condition of the Indian finances, it was not considered necessary to fix a higher amount.

The Envoy was then informed in reply to his inquiries that 5 lakhs of the 10 was to be considered as a contribution towards the amount to be paid to the Seistan sufferers, and another 5 lakhs was to be considered as a contribution towards the general expenses of the Amír, which the Amír might, if he thought fit, expend in arrangements for the settlement of Seistan, or otherwise as he thought best. It was probable that the value of the arms would be about 4 lakhs, and any balance, therefore, that might remain from the other 5 lakhs would be sent to Afghanistan with the arms. If the Envoy considered it advisable orders would be at once given to have 10 lakhs ready at Peshawar to be forwarded to Kabul.

At the conclusion of the second interview the Secretary brought to the notice of Syad Nur Muhammad the conduct of Nowroz Khan, of Lalpura, in the matter of Arjan Khan, who in the year 1852 had attacked the Hushtnuggur Tahsil and murdered the Tahsildar and other officials. Since that event Arjan Khan had been an outlaw, and was only

heard of at intervals as a wanderer between Jellalabad and Swat, until the beginning of last year, 1872, when he made an attempt to settle himself at a place called Spinkwari, in the Ranizai country. The men of Totai and other Ranizai villages turned out and threw up for him the walls of two towers and several houses. The settlement of such a character on the British border being highly objectionable and dangerous to the peace of the border, the Ranizai Jirga were called to account by the British authorities, and shortly after the settlement was, in consequence, attacked and destroyed by the Uthman Khels of Prangar. It had recently been reported to Government that Nowroz Khan had called on the Uthman Khels to pay blood-money for the men killed in the attack on Spinkwari and to rebuild the fort and hamlet. The Secretary, therefore, requested that the matter might be enquired into on the Envoy's return.

The Envoy replied that he knew something of the facts of the case, and would make such arrangements on his return to Afghanistan as would in all probability insure a prompt and satisfactory settlement in future of all frontier matters between the British authorities and Nowroz Khan.

The Envoy made a special request that the present conversations should be considered as absolutely confidential.

P. D. H.
C. U. A.

LONDON:
Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

AFGHANISTAN, No. 4.

A D D R E S S
OF
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERTS
TO THE
C H I E F S O F K U R R A M,
ON THE
26th DECEMBER 1878.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



L O N D O N :
PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

[C.—2251.] Price $\frac{1}{2}d.$

1879.

ADDRESS.

COPY of an ADDRESS to JAJI and TORI MALIKS, dated Kuram, 26th December 1878.

KHANS and MalikS.—Since the arrival of the British force in this valley, many of you have received rewards for services rendered; I wished, however, to see you again before I leave Kuram for Khost in order to recognize those services publicly in Durbar.

Generally, I am satisfied with the reception I have met with in the valley; it was natural you should hesitate to believe we intended to afford you permanent protection so long as any vestige of the Amir's authority was before your eyes; you have seen the last trace of that authority swept away, and I have assembled you here to-day to tell you that neither Sher Ali Khan nor any other Amir of Kabul will ever again be permitted to reign over Kuram. Depend upon it you will never have cause to regret exchanging the Durani for British rule. I am not prepared to state what form of Government it may please the Viceroy and Governor-General to establish, but it will be such a Government as is best suited to your habits and customs. You have a right to expect protection to life and property, peace and prosperity, and I think you will all admit that you have a better chance of enjoying these advantages under the British than under the Duranis.

In return for these advantages, the British Government will demand from you implicit obedience to all orders that may, from time to time, be issued; you will be required to live peaceably, at the same time to retain the manly qualities of your race, and assist, as heretofore, to protect your homes and property from neighbouring tribes who are less civilized. The headmen of villages have large responsibilities; so long as they work for the welfare of the people, and in the interests of Government, they will be supported, and everything in reason will be done to increase their influence and power. They will be expected to control the bad characters in villages, and to prevent the escape of criminals; should they be unable to do so, it will be their duty to represent the same to the Government officials in order that assistance, if necessary, may be afforded to them. They will be made available for the collection of the Government revenue, and will receive remunerations for their services.

I wish to impress upon you all who are unaccustomed perhaps to good rule, that the British Government only issues orders which it intends should be obeyed; your religion will never be interfered with; your prejudices will be respected, and you will be allowed as much liberty as is compatible with good order, new roads will be made, existing roads will be improved, markets will be established for the sale of grain produce, and whatever you may be able to provide for the use of the troops will be liberally paid for. Many of you are already reaping the benefit of our advent; on the Paiwar Kotal, at Habeebkillah, and here at Kuram, considerable sums of money are paid daily as wages for labour, or in purchase of wood, matting, &c. &c. From no other Government could you expect such considerate treatment; during the few days which intervened between the flight of the Durani Government and the arrival of the British troops, the Turis and Bangashes plundered and dismantled both the forts at Kuram and to a certain extent the huts at the Paiwar Cantonment; I feel angry with the MalikS every time I enter the forts for not preventing the wilful destruction of property, and instead of punishing the offenders as we might have done, we are paying them for labouring at the restoration of the forts at Kuram. The Jaji MalikS of Lehwanie behaved differently and have reaped the benefit; believing what I told them before the capture of the Kotal, they preserved for our use the stores collected by the Amir for his army; for their service they have been well rewarded, and I am not likely to forget the good work they have done. The MalikS of Ali Kheyl either did not believe what they were told, or do not possess real influence over their villages, or they would have prevented the Amir's grain from being plundered, and would have been proportionately rewarded. The people of Ali Kheyl and Shumu Kheyl are further distant from Kuram, and have consequently come less in contact with us than the other Jajis, and for this reason perhaps feel more uncertain about their future than the Lehwanie Jajis and the Toris: I can only repeat to them the assurance I have already given, that from Thull

to the Shutar Gurdan, not a village, nay, not a yard of land, will be allowed again to come under the control of the Amir of Kabul; neither will the British Government ever again permit the Kabul Government to interfere in any way with the independent tribes bordering on British territory. I hope to see you again in a few weeks; during my absence I hope you will do all in your power to support the officers placed at the Kotal, at Habeebkillah, and at Kuram, and to gain for yourselves the good will of the Government. As a warning to those who are not inclined to listen to my advice I will remind them of the punishment which has recently overtaken two villages at no great distance from Kuram. The entry of the British force into the valley was necessarily rapid, and as being more convenient the road by the right bank of the river was taken; some few villages on the left bank of the Kuram have not yet been visited by our troops; owing to this, the Malik of Sudda and Ibrahimzai apparently thought we could not exact obedience to our authority, and permitted the line of telegraph running through their lands to be frequently interfered with. The people of Ibrahimzai even allowed a cavalry post to be attacked in the village itself, when a horse and a camel were killed; they gave no information and rendered no assistance; an example was necessary, and fines were inflicted; on Ibrahimzai Rupees 400, and on Sudda Rupees 500, and until these sums are paid, the headmen will remain in confinement; all will understand this warning. Summary punishment will follow any such offences and neglect of duty.

As I have said before, the British Government does not interfere with the religion of any of its subjects, but when Moollas and religious advisers leave religion and preach politics and oppose the ruling power, Government must interfere politically, and prevent the ignorant from being misled. Thus, one Moolla, formerly a Malik, is now in confinement to prevent his doing harm, and another Moolla, who was notorious as an ill-wisher to the British Government, who failed to pay his respects when called upon to do so, and who left his home, has had his house burnt as a warning to others.

I am extremely sorry that I should have been compelled to interfere with either of these men, and hope never to have to exercise my authority in a similar manner again. Moollas, who are dissatisfied with the British rule, should leave the country. Many of you are grey-beards, and have experience and wisdom; you should judge for yourselves whether what I am saying is not such as you would yourselves give to your children.

(Signed) FRED. ROBERTS, Major-General.



FURTHER REPORT

ON THE

INTERVIEW AT ALI MUSJID.

BETWEEN

BRITISH AND AFGHAN OFFICERS

On 21st September 1878.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1879.

[C.—2293.] *Price* $\frac{1}{2}d$.

CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 30 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, the 31st January 1879.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 116, Secret, dated the 31st of October 1878, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* from Major Cavagnari offering remarks in respect to a report of the discussion in the House of Commons on the actual circumstances of the interview between himself, accompanied by Colonel Jenkins, and Faiz Mahomed Khan, which took place at Ali Musjid on the 21st of September 1878.

* Dated 17th January 1879.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.

Dated Jellalabad, 17th January 1879.

From Major N. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., Political Officer, Jellalabad, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE just perused in the *Standard* of the 7th December a report of the discussion in the House of Commons regarding the interview which took place at Ali Musjid on the 21st September last. I deem it advisable to make the following remarks.

2. At the time of submitting our written reports to His Excellency Sir Neville Chamberlain, neither Colonel Jenkins or myself deemed it necessary to enter into too minute detail regarding the hostile appearances of things around us. Whatever danger there may have been of actual collision, we had returned without any such collision, and had effected the object for which we had been deputed, namely, to ascertain whether the British Mission would be allowed to proceed past Ali Musjid or not. We, therefore, from motives perfectly intelligible to all British officers, dwelt lightly on what had happened, and confined ourselves to giving a brief narrative of the interview, and deemed it only important to report with preciseness the actual reply given by Faiz Mahomed Khan, which was unmistakeably, "*that if the Mission advanced it would be opposed by force.*"

3. Our reports were, I think, sufficiently complete to show that the hostile preparations—notwithstanding that I had taken the precaution to send and apprise the Afghan officials of the approach of our small party for the purposes of a parley—fully justified Faiz Mahomed Khan in claiming credit for the friendly disposition he personally entertained, when he stated that it was only on that account *that he had restrained his men from firing on us*. I repeat what I stated in my report that Faiz Mahomed Khan behaved in a most courteous manner, and very favourably impressed Colonel Jenkins and myself, but he never flinched from the reply he was instructed to give. The Chancellor of the Exchequer rightly interpreted my meaning that Faiz Mahomed Khan had a very disagreeable duty to perform, and did it in a courtly and gentlemanly manner.

4. I may mention one more fact to show that it would be somewhat difficult to over-colour the hostile intention of the Afghan officials, as observed by those who took part in the proceedings. Turabaz Khan, a Duffadar in the Guide Cavalry, noticing the state of affairs, instinctively got ready a cartridge for immediate action. He is an Afridi, noted for cool courage and determination, and has been granted the "Order of Merit" for gallantry in the Sapri Expedition. He may perhaps be regarded as better able to form an opinion as to what was contemplated by the Afghans and Afridis who surrounded our small party than either Colonel Jenkins or myself, though we both fully appreciated the nature of the situation, and although personally grateful to Faiz Mahomed Khan for his courteous behaviour, we felt that, notwithstanding that his friendly disposition had averted a collision, there was, judging from the hostile preparations made, but slight difference as regards the indignity offered to the friendly British Mission, whether words or bullets conveyed the insult intended by the Afghan Government.

I FULLY concur in what has been written above by Major Cavagnari.

(Signed) F. H. JENKINS,
Brigadier-General,
Commanding 3rd Brigade.

LONDON:

Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

AFGHANISTAN, No. 6.



DESPATCH

FROM THE


GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

No. 136 of 1879,

FORWARDING

TREATY OF PEACE.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1879.

[C.—2362.] Price 1d.

DESPATCH.

No 136 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 2nd June 1879.

WE have the honour to inclose, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a Treaty of Peace between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies. This Treaty was concluded at Gandamak, in Afghanistan, on the 26th May last, and was ratified at Simla by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General on the 30th May. Copy of telegrams that passed between the Viceroy and the Amir, upon the signature by His Highness of the Treaty, is also inclosed.

2. We propose to address your Lordship at an early date upon the subject of the recent military operations in Afghanistan, and generally upon the course of political events and transactions which have led to the settlement, by this Treaty, of definite relations with His Highness the Amir.

We have, &c.

(Signed)	LYTTON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
"	A. CLARKE.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	W. STOKES.
"	A. R. THOMPSON.

TREATY between the BRITISH GOVERNMENT and HIS HIGHNESS MUHAMMAD YAKUB KHAN, Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, concluded at Gandamak on the 26th May 1879, by His Highness the Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan on his own part, and on the part of the British Government by Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I., Political Officer on Special Duty, in virtue of full powers vested in him by the Right Honourable Edward Robert Lytton, Bulwer-Lytton, Baron Lytton of Knebworth, and a Baronet, Grand Master of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Grand Master of the Indian Empire, Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

The following Articles of a Treaty for the restoration of peace and amicable relations have been agreed upon between the British Government and His Highness Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies :—

ARTICLE 1.

From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, and his successors, on the other.

ARTICLE 2.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies engages, on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects from any responsibility for intercourse with the British Forces during the war, and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from any punishment or molestation on that account.

ARTICLE 3.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States, in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Amir will enter into no engagements with Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any Foreign State, except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions the British Government will support the Amir against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished.

ARTICLE 4.

With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and for the better protection of the frontiers of His Highness' dominions, it is agreed that a British Representative shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable escort in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers, whensoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external fact. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may on his part depute an Agent to reside at the Court of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.

ARTICLE 5.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of British Agents within his jurisdiction; and the British Government on its part undertakes that its Agents shall never in any way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness' dominions.

ARTICLE 6.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies undertakes, on behalf of himself and his successors, to offer no impediment to British subjects peacefully trading within his dominions so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 7.

In order that the passage of trade between the territories of the British Government and of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, may be open and uninterrupted, His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan agrees to use his best endeavours to ensure the protection of traders and to facilitate the transit of goods along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan. These roads shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may decide to be most expedient for the general convenience of traffic, and under such financial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements made for the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads, for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon merchandize carried over these roads, and for the general protection and development of trade with and through the dominions of His Highness, will be stated in a separate Commercial Treaty, to be concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state of the country.

ARTICLE 8.

With a view to facilitate communications between the allied Governments and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that a line of telegraph from Kurram to Kabul shall be constructed by and at the cost of the British Government, and the Amir of Afghanistan hereby undertakes to provide for the protection of this telegraph line.

ARTICLE 9.

In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States which has been attested and secured by the foregoing Articles, the British Government restores to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies the towns of Kandahar

and Jellalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees on his part that the districts of Kurram and Pishin and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed,* shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government: that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts after deducting the charges of civil administration shall be paid to His Highness the Amir.

The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Khyber and Michni Passes, which lie between the Peshawur and Jellalabad Districts, and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these Passes.

ARTICLE 10.

For the further support of His Highness the Amir in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in consideration of the efficient fulfilment in their entirety of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing Articles, the British Government agrees to pay to His Highness the Amir and to his successors an annual subsidy of six lakhs of Rupees.

Done at Gandamak, this 26th day of May 1879, corresponding with the 4th day of the month of Jamadi-us-sani 1296, A.H.

(Sd.) AMIR MUHAMMAD
YAKUB KHAN.



(Sd.) N. CAVAGNARI, Major,
Polit. Officer on Special Duty.

(Sd.) LYTTON.



This Treaty was ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, at Simla, on Friday, this 30th day of May 1879.

(Sd.) A. C. LYALL,
Secy. to the Govt. of India, Foreign Dept.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th May 1879.

FROM MUHAMMAD YAKUB KHAN, AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, to VICEROY OF INDIA, SIMLA.

Now that the Treaty of Peace has been concluded, it only remains for me to express to Your Excellency, as the Representative of Her Imperial Majesty, my sincere hope that the friendly relations now established between the two States may day by day increase.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th May 1879.

FROM VICEROY OF INDIA, SIMLA, to HIS HIGHNESS the AMIR of AFGHANISTAN.

I HAVE received with sincere pleasure the news of the conclusion of peace between our two Governments, and Your Highness' friendly telegram. I feel confident that the Treaty now signed will conduce to the mutual advantage of the two States, and to the consolidation of Your Highness' authority; and I shall always earnestly co-operate towards the fulfilment of the good wishes expressed by Your Highness, which I cordially reciprocate.

* NOTE.—Omitted for the present.

L O N D O N :
Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

AFGHANISTAN, No. 7.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.


1879.

[C.—2401.] *Price 5d.*

LIST OF PAPERS.

No.	—	From	To	Date.	Subject.	Page
1	Telegram	- Viceroy - -	Secretary of State.	1878. 20th November	Issue of orders for advance of troops.	5
1a	Telegram	- Secretary of State	Viceroy -	21st November	Reply to the above -	5
2	Letter	- Government of India. With 1 Enclosure.	Secretary of State.	12th December (No. 154.)	Reply of Amir Shere Ali Khan to the Viceroy's Ultimatum.	
3	Letter	- Government of India.	Secretary of State.	27th December (No. 161.)	Formation of an auxiliary corps from the troops maintained by certain of the Punjab Native States.	6
4	Telegram	- Major Cavagnari -	Viceroy -	20th December	Flight of Shere Ali Khan from Cabul.	7
5	Firman issued by Ameer Shere Ali Khan			22nd December	Departure for St. Petersburg.	8
6	Letter	- Government of India. With Enclosure.	Secretary of State.	1879. 3rd January - (No. 5.)	Letter from Shere Ali Khan announcing his departure for St. Petersburg.	9
7	Telegram	- Lieutenant-General Stewart.	Secretary of State.	8th January -	Evacuation of Candahar by the Afghans.	10
8	Letter	- Herat Correspondent	Meshed Agent	12th January -	Departure of Ameer for St. Petersburg.	10
9	Letter	- Government of India. With 8 Enclosures.	Secretary of State.	27th March - (No. 70.)	Negotiations with Yakoob Khan.	10
10	Letter	- Government of India. With 4 Enclosures.	Secretary of State.	10th April - (No. 88.)	Same subject - -	14
11	Telegram	- Viceroy - -	Secretary of State.	6th April -	Substance of Treaty to be negotiated with Yakoob Khan.	16
12	Telegram	- Secretary of State	Viceroy -	8th April -	Reply to the above -	17
13	Telegram	- Viceroy - -	Secretary of State.	9th April -	Demand of Yakoob Khan for guarantee of protection against foreign aggression.	17
14	Telegram	- Secretary of State	Viceroy -	13th April -	Reply to the above -	17
15	Letter	- Government of India. With 3 Enclosures.	Secretary of State.	1st May (No. 104.)	Arrangements for personal interview between Yakoob Khan and Major Cavagnari.	17
16	Telegram	- Viceroy - -	Secretary of State.	5th May -	Departure of Yakoob Khan for British camp. Tender of services to Major Cavagnari by Azimuthula Khan, Ghilzie Chief.	18

No.	—	From	To	Date.	Subject.	Page.
17	Telegram	Viceroy	Secretary of State.	1879. 8th May	Arrival of Yakoob Khan at Gundamuk.	19
18	Telegram	Viceroy	Secretary of State.	8th May	Telegram from Yakoob Khan announcing his arrival.	19
19	Letter	Government of India. With 2 Enclosures.	Secretary of State.	8th May (No. 119.)	Yakoob Khan's journey to Gundamuk.	19
20	Telegram	Viceroy	Secretary of State.	23rd May	Articles of Treaty to be negotiated with Ameer.	21
21	Telegram	Secretary of State	Viceroy	23rd May	Articles of Treaty approved.	21
22	Telegram	Major Cavagnari	Secretary of State.	26th May	Signature of Treaty	21
23	Telegram	Viceroy	Secretary of State.	7th June	Presentation of the ratified Treaty to the Ameer in Durbar.	22
24	Letter	Government of India. With 3 Enclosures.	Secretary of State.	23rd June	Correspondence of the Ameer with the Viceroy and Major Cavagnari.	22
25	Letter	Government of India. With 1 Enclosure.	Secretary of State.	23rd June	Amnesty proclamation issued by the Ameer.	23
26	Letter	Government of India.	Secretary of State.	7th July	Review of late events in Afghanistan.	24



CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, LAHORE, dated 20th November, 1878.

Lahore, 10 p.m.

No reply having been received from Ameer, orders have been issued to-night for advance at all points to-morrow morning in accordance with our proposals of 19th October and your telegram 7th November.

No. 1a.

REPLY from SECRETARY OF STATE, 21st November 1878.

Your telegram of 20th. Proposed advance approved.

No. 2.

No. 154 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Camp, Lahore, 12th December 1878.

I HAVE the honour to enclose the translation made of the reply sent by the Amír Sher Ali Khan to my letter of the 29th October last to His Highness. The substance of this reply was telegraphed to your Lordship on the 5th December; and on the 7th, the full text was telegraphed.

2. The Amír's letter is dated 19th November, and was delivered at the head-quarters of the British Camp at Dacca on the 30th November. It has been ascertained that a messenger, bearing this or some other similar letter from the Amír, reached Basawal on the 22nd November, but that he returned with the letter to Kabul on hearing of the fall of Ali Masjid.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.

Enclosure in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of LETTER from HIS HIGHNESS the AMÍR of KABUL, to His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 19th November 1878.

BE it known to your Excellency that I have received, and read from beginning to end, the friendly letter which your Excellency has sent in reply to the letter I despatched by Nawáb Ghulám Hassan Khan. With regard to the expressions used by your Excellency in the beginning of your letter, referring to the friendly character of the Mission and the good-will of the British Government, I leave it to your Excellency, whose wisdom and justice are universally admitted, to decide whether any reliance can be placed upon good-will, if it be evidenced by words only. But if, on the other hand, good-will really consists of deeds and actions, then, it has not been manifested by the various wishes that have been expressed, and the proposals that have been made by British Officials during the last few years to Officials of this God-granted Government,—proposals which, from their nature, it was impossible for them to comply with.

One of these proposals referred to my undutiful son, the ill-starred wretch Muhammad Yákúb Khan, and was contained in a letter addressed by the Officials of

the British Government to the British Agent then residing in Kabul. It was written in that letter that if the said Yákúb Khan be released and set at liberty, our friendship with the Afghán Government will be firmly cemented; but that otherwise it will not.

There are several other grounds of complaint of a similar nature which contain no evidence of good will, but, which, on the contrary, were effective in increasing the aversion and apprehension already entertained by the subjects of this God-granted Government.

With regard to my refusal to receive the British Mission, your Excellency has stated that it would appear from my conduct that I was actuated by feelings of direct hostility towards the British Government.

I assure your Excellency that, on the contrary, the Officials of this God-granted Government, in repulsing the Mission, were not influenced by any hostile or inimical feelings towards the British Government, nor did they intend that any insult or affront should be offered; but they were afraid that the independence of this Government might be affected by the arrival of the Mission, and that the friendship which has now existed between the two Governments for several years might be annihilated.

A paragraph in your Excellency's letter corroborates the statement which they have made to this Government. The feelings of apprehension which were aroused in the minds of the people of Afghánistán by the mere announcement of the intention of the British Government to send a Mission to Kabul, before the Mission itself had actually started or arrived at Pesháwar, have subsequently been fully justified by the statement in your Excellency's letter that I should be held responsible for any injury that might befall the tribes who acted as guides to the Mission, and that I should be called upon to pay compensation to them for any loss they might have suffered; and that, if at any time those tribes should meet with ill-treatment at my hands, the British Government would at once take steps to protect them. Had these apprehensions proved groundless, and had the object of the Mission been really friendly, and no force or threats of violence used, the Mission would, as a matter of course, have been allowed a free passage, as such Missions are customary and of frequent occurrence between allied States. I am now sincerely stating my own feelings when I say that this Government has maintained, and always will maintain, the former friendship which existed between the two Governments, and cherishes no feelings of hostility and opposition towards the British Government.

It is also incumbent upon the Officials of the British Government, that, out of respect and consideration for the greatness and eminence of their own Government, they should not consent to inflict any injury upon their well-disposed neighbours, and to impose the burden of grievous troubles upon the shoulders of their sincere friends; but, on the contrary, they should exert themselves to maintain the friendly feelings which have hitherto existed towards this God-granted Government, in order that the relations between the two Governments may remain on the same footing as before; and if, in accordance with the custom of allied States, the British Government should desire to send a purely friendly and temporary Mission to this country, with a small escort not exceeding 20 or 30 men, similar to that which attended the Russian Mission, this Servant of God will not oppose its progress.

No. 3.

No. 161 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department. (Extract.)

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, the 27th December 1878.

* * * *

2. In October last, His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab reported that the Chief of the States, named in the margin, were anxious that their troops might be associated with any military movements that might take place on the frontier. Mr. Egerton expressed his belief that the offers which he communicated to the Government were spontaneous and genuine indications of the

Patála, Baháwulpur, Nábha, Jhind, Kapurthalla, Sirmur (Nahan), Malair Kotla, Faridkot.

loyalty of those who made them. To accept such offers, and to encourage such indications, was for several reasons politic and opportune; the feeling and spirit of the people generally in the Punjab were undoubtedly in favour of active reprisals against the Amir for his behaviour toward the Government of India, and the Chiefs were the natural and influential representatives of this feeling; while the Rajahs of Nábha, Jhind, and Patiála had been conspicuous in 1857 for their prompt and effective adherence to the British Government.

3. The Government of India, accordingly, cordially acknowledged and accepted the offers of the Punjab Chiefs; and His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor undertook the measures requisite for assembling the various contingents, and for slightly improving and assimilating their general organization. The troops furnished by the Nawab of Baháwulpur were detached to Multan, which is close to their own country, and where they could be at once useful on garrison duty; the other selected bodies of cavalry, infantry, and artillery were brought together at Lahore early in December, where they were placed under the command of Brigadier-General Watson. At Lahore the Viceroy, accompanied on the ground by the Maharaja of Kashmir and by the Chiefs whose men were paraded, reviewed the whole force, whose conduct and condition were very satisfactory. At the close of the review His Excellency addressed the officers, congratulating them and the Chiefs on the appearance of their men, and expressing his pleasure at this public demonstration of the readiness of the States' troops to join the Imperial Army. The entire corps is now on the march toward Peshawur.

4. We have received from very many other Chiefs in India, and from the Ministers of Hyderabad and Baroda, letters offering to send troops to serve with our army in the war which is now being prosecuted against the Amir Sher Ali Khan. Many of the Chiefs have placed all the resources of their States at our disposal, and some of them have expressed a desire to take a personal share in the campaign; Sir Salar Jung and his colleague have each asked permission to send a near relative to join the staff of the Generals commanding in Afghanistan, and arrangements are being made accordingly. We have been exceedingly gratified by such a wide manifestation of the loyal spirit which animates our feudatories, and by these proofs of their unhesitating adherence, in the present state of affairs, to the active policy of the Government. All these offers have been suitably acknowledged; although there are many obvious reasons why the great majority of them cannot, for the present at least, be accepted. We have indeed no intention, as matters now stand, of calling out any troops of the States besides those which, as this letter reports, have already been mobilized.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
A. R. THOMPSON.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

No. 4.

TELEGRAM, dated 20th December 1878.

FROM MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Ally Bughan through Jumrood, to VICEROY, Viceroy's Camp.

December 19th.—Authentic intelligence of flight of the Ameer from Cabul for Turkistan accompanied by the remaining officers of Russian Mission. Yakoob Khan released and left at Cabul. Full particulars will be communicated after interview with Resaldar-Major Nukhshdud Khan, pensioner, who will reach Jellalabad to-morrow. Ameer appears to have nearly lost all authority at Cabul, but* his departure, and his soldiers deserted in large numbers. Country between Jellalabad and Cabul in state of anarchy. Sirdar Khalu Khan has succeeded in preserving order at Jellalabad and in parts of Lughman. In order to restrain Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, the Ameer has sent the Sirdar's family to Turkistan. I am sending off at once a special messenger to Cabul to ascertain the sentiments of Yakoob Khan. Sir S. Browne and troops will reach Jellalabad to-morrow.

No. 5.

TRANSLATION of a FIRMAN issued by AMIR, SHER ALI KHAN, dated 22nd December 1878, communicated by the Meshed Agent.

LET the high in rank, &c., Sirdar Muhammad Omer Khan, the Governor of Herat, Tolmshir Sahib and Hasan Ali Khan, the Sipah Sala-i-Aazim, be honoured by this Royal Firman and know—

That, having previously announced the result of the fights of our victorious troops to-day, also that by the Grace of God a series of victories have been won by the lion-devouring warriors, we have deemed it necessary to announce the details of the same to you, so that you may be made fully aware of the facts.

The state of affairs and of hostilities on the Khyber frontier line are as follows :—At the outset there were only five regiments stationed at Ali Masjid as a permanent garrison when the British troops advanced to attack them. The said five regiments gave battle to fourteen of the infidel white regiments, and for about eight hours the roaring of the cannon and musketry, together with the clashing of the swords, were incessant; till, in accordance with the words of the holy verse, “There is no victory except that which comes from God,” the goodness and strength of the Almighty aided the lion-catching warriors, and they totally defeated the English Army, when a considerable number being killed and wounded on both sides a stop was put to further fighting and each side retired to his own camp.

Six days after, two other engagements took place at Peiwar, where the victorious troops, again in their zeal to push back the infidel army, brought on a day like that of the Day of Judgment, and rushing on like a torrent compelled the infidels to fall back.

Since then to the present moment the English troops have not dared to show fight, nor to make any advance. In fact, on account of the severity of the winter and especially by the action of Ooloosat people and the Afridi tribes, who are anxious for the infliction of loss on their (the English) lives and property, it is quite certain that they will not make any forward advance.

As perfect harmony exists in all the affairs of this mighty Government, most of the Nobles and Chiefs of this country have made certain representations to us in person with the view of putting a stop to this mischief which may affect the peace of this Government. The opinion of our ministers and military officers being also in conformity with our royal views, we have decided that to put a stop to the present trouble there is no alternative but to have recourse to friendly negotiations as opposed to hostility and warfare; for instance, although our enemy should give up his hostile attitude and the idea of interference in Afghanistan, yet having taken up arms against us he ought to be bound down by diplomatic action.

It now being winter and his advance difficult, and, as in the spring this evil will be sure to break out afresh, there is no better opportunity than the present, when the enemy has not the power of moving in consequence of the severity of the winter, that our royal self should proceed to the capital of Russia, and open an official correspondence with the British Government. We have accordingly, in conformity of the approval of our ministers and a number of our well-wishers, decided on proceeding to St. Petersburg, the capital of the Russian Emperor, and have appointed our elder and beloved son, Sardar Muhammad Yakub Khan, to act in our absence, leaving the whole of our Sardars, *viz.*, Sar Ghatamshir Bahadur Khan, Daud Shah Khan, Hyder Khan, Ghatamshir Bahadur, Muhammad Karim Khan, Ghatamshir Bahadur, the Mighty Regiments, Mirza Sayyid Ahmed Khan, Naib Muhammad Rahim Khan, the Royal Archives, the Treasury, and the special Chamberlains, under his immediate orders. We also, under an auspicious fortune, and putting our trust in Almighty God, left Kabul on the 13th December, accompanied by our illustrious brother (*sic*) Sardar Sher Ali Khan, Shah Muhammad Khan, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mirza Habibullah, the Mustaufi-ul-Momalek, Kazi Abdul Kadar Khan, a few servants, and one “Namadek Kadek Uptur,” the Russian envoys who also took part in the council we held respecting this journey together with the High Princes, Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan and Sardar Muhammad Taki Khan.

We received letters from the Governor-General, General Stolietoff, at the station named Sir Cheshmeh; Stolietoff, who was with the Emperor at Livadia having written to us as follows :—

“The Emperor considers you as a brother, and you also, who are on the other side of the water,* must display the same sense of friendship and brotherhood.

* *i.e.*, Oxus. The English Government is anxious to come to terms with you through the intervention of the Sultan, and wishes you to take his advice and counsel; but the

Emperor's desire is that you should not admit the English into your country, and, like last year, you are to treat them with deceit and deception until the present cold season passes away, then the Almighty's will will be made manifest to you, that is to say, the (Russian) Government having repeated the Bismillah, the Bismillah will come to your assistance. In short, you are to rest assured that affairs will end well. If God permits, we will convene a Government meeting at St. Petersburg, that is to say, a congress which means an assembly of powers. We will then open an official discussion with the English Government, and either by force of words and diplomatic action we will entirely cut off all English communication and interference with Afghanistan for ever, or else events will end in a mighty and important war. By the help of God, by spring not a symptom or vestige of trouble and dissatisfaction will remain in Afghanistan."

It therefore behoves our well-wishing servants to conduct the affairs entrusted to them in a praiseworthy and resolute manner better than before, and having placed their hopes in God, rest confident that the welfare and affairs of this glorious Government will continue on a firm footing as before, and the mischief and disaffection which seem to have arisen in the country will disappear.

Let it be known to the high in rank, Tolmshir Bahadur and Hafizulla Khan, Secretary to the Sipah Salar-i-Aazim, that, thanks to God, the trouble we have been taking for a series of years in instructing and improving the officers of our victorious regiments has not been lost, and in fighting the English troops they have displayed the same bravery as the force of the civilized nations. Not one of the victorious troops went to Heaven until he had himself slain three of the enemy. In short, they fought in such a way, and made such a stand, that both high and low praised them. We are fully confident that our victorious troops wherever they may fight will defeat the enemy.

The Herat Army is also noted for its bravery and discipline, a result of your devoted services. You will convey our royal satisfaction to all the troops and inhabitants of Herat, high and low, and tell them that our hope is that God and his Prophet may be as satisfied with them as we are.

No. 6.

No. 5 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 3rd January 1878.

ON the 28th of December 1878, his Excellency the Viceroy had the honour to telegraph to your Lordship the full text of a letter addressed by the Amir Shere Ali Khan to the officers of the British Government in which His Highness wrote that he was leaving his kingdom and was proceeding to St. Petersburg, in order to lay his affairs before the Powers of Europe. We have now the honour to forward printed copies of the letter in question.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

R. STRACHEY.

N. B. CHAMBERLAIN.

LETTER from the AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN to the OFFICERS of the BRITISH GOVERNMENT, dated 13th December 1878.

BE it known to the Officers of the British Government that this supplicant before God never supposed nor wished that the matters (in dispute) between you and myself should come to this issue (literally "should come out from the curtain"), or that the veil of friendship and amity which has for many years been upheld between two neighbours and adjoining States should without any cause be thus drawn aside.

And since you have begun the quarrel and hostilities, and have advanced on Afghan territory, this supplicant before God, with the unanimous consent and advice of all the nobles, grandees, and of the army in Afghanistan, having abandoned his troops, his

realm, and all the possessions of his crown, has departed with expedition, accompanied by a few attendants, to St. Petersburg, the capital of the Czar of Russia, where before

a Congress* the whole history of the transactions between myself and yourselves will be submitted to all the Powers (of Europe). If you have anything in dispute with me regarding State Affairs in Afghanistan, you should institute and establish your case at St. Petersburg, and state and explain what you desire; so that the questions in dispute between us may be made known and clear to all the powers. And surely the side of right will not be overlooked. If your intentions are otherwise, and you entertain hostile and vindictive feelings toward the people of Afghanistan, God alone is their protector and real preserver. Upon the course of action here above stated, this supplicant before God has resolved and decided.

No. 7.

TELEGRAM from LT -GENERAL STEWART to SECRETARY OF STATE, received 11th January 1879.

CAMAN Kushab, 8th.—Shortly after marching yesterday morning I received news that Governor of Kandahar with most of Kabul officials fled the previous night towards Herat; garrison with him are disbanded. Deputy Governor has sent offering submission. Troops will march through city of Kandahar to-day. Population everywhere friendly.

No. 8.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the HERAT CORRESPONDENT, dated 12th January 1879, communicated by the Meshed Agent.

A SERVANT of the Sepah Salar, who had been sent from here to Kabul, returned to-day. He brought several letters of the Amir Sher Ali Khan written from Bamian, to the Herat authorities, informing them that he (the Amir) having been repeatedly invited to St. Petersburg to attend a European Congress respecting his affairs, and the concluding of an alliance with Russia, and the Russian Envoy having also been instructed to urge his departure, he had accordingly left Kabul for St. Petersburg, taking Sardar Sher Ali Khan, Mirza Habibullah Khan, Mustaufi, the son of Sardar Muhammad Shereef Khan, and several others, as well as two Ressalas of horse with him.

He had also written that one or more engagements had taken place between the British and Afghan troops in the Khyber Pass, in which the former had been beaten back, and that the news of the capture of Jalalabad and Kandahar is quite false. That the (Herat) authorities were not to be alarmed in the least, but were to keep the country in perfect order and guard the frontiers until he should be able to arrange his affairs and return from Russia, and that he had entrusted the affairs of Kabul to Sardar Muhammad Yakub Khan.

It is also said that the British authorities instigated the Khyberis to fight with the Amir's troops, urging them to defeat them with great loss.

The Amir has removed all his family to Turkistan.

The horsemen ordered to Kandahar have not yet left here. I think the authorities are afraid to denude the city of cavalry.

No. 9.

No. 70 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Camp Lahore, the 27th March 1879.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of papers which relate to the overtures which have recently been made by Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan to Major Cavagnari, the Political Officer with the British Forces at Jelalabad.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.



Enclosure 1 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a Letter dated Thursday, 20th February 1879, from SIRDAR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I.

PREVIOUS to this I received from you a kind letter couched in friendly and sympathizing terms.

As the substance of that letter was friendship and kindness, and as it contained no clear and obvious expression which might form a basis for the settlement of the trivial dispute and the removal of the temporary hostility which have occurred, I also, in my reply, confined myself to the expression of friendship and fidelity, in the hope that I should speedily receive a second letter from you which might allude to friendship and for the removal of the temporary hostility, and which I would certainly have replied to in a becoming and proper manner.

Up to the present you have shown delay and hesitation, and, as you made no effort in sending it, (the "second letter") I did not know what advantage it was which you had in view, or what result it was which you desired.

Therefore, considering that delay in the attainment of what is desired tends to the extreme loss and injury of both parties, and with a view merely to the welfare of both sides, and the advantage of both States, I have not thought it proper to delay any longer.

It were better if the dispute were adjusted and the hostility removed from both sides.

For that reason I write in a friendly way to say that I wish to use every exertion in this matter, so that through the favour of God, and human endeavour, I may adjust the accidental quarrel, and remove the trivial hostility which has arisen between the two States, and may also obtain for myself very great credit on account of the benefit accruing to both parties. But I know not whether this accidental hostility and this petty dispute are capable of removal and adjustment, or not.

As I have a constant and firm trust in the officers of the illustrious British Government, and as they have the power in this good work, of getting me a good name, I hope and desire that, as is proper and becoming, they will exert themselves in the adjustment of this matter, and not prefer hostility and quarrelling to harmony and friendship.

It is clear that in enmity and strife there will be very great loss and injury to both parties; and no other result will be obtained.

Should this matter be susceptible of arrangement and adjustment, I hope you will kindly inform me, so that I may, in a similar manner, bring every human effort to bear on my exalted father in the hope that, perhaps, the friendship of this God-granted State with the illustrious British Government may remain constant and firm.

Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th February 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Jellalabad, to VICEROY, Calcutta. (Extract).

Letter from Yakub Khan, dated 26th February, just received by special messenger. Contents as follows:—

Since despatch of my last letter, news reached Kabul on the 26th February of the death of my father on the 21st February. As my father was an old friend of the British Government, I send this information out of friendship. Letter ends. Bearer of the letter is Shahghasi Shah Sarwar Khan, nephew of Shahghasi Sherdil Khan. Sirdars Ahmed Ali Jan and Ibrahim Khan have fled from this. Letter affords favorable opportunity for opening negotiations with Yakub Khan. The special messenger was urged to convey the letter as speedily as possible, and was only two days on the road. I suggest sending a friendly letter of condolence.

Enclosure 3 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER dated 26th February 1879, from SIRDAR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I.

PREVIOUS to this I sent you a letter dated the 29th of the month of Safar (21st February 1879), designed for the establishment of relations of friendship and the settlement of the quarrel which has broken out between the British and Afghan States, and stating

that if the matter were capable of adjustment, I would undertake to step in and use my endeavours to that end. That letter you, no doubt, have received.

I now write a second time, in accordance with former friendship to inform you that to-day, Wednesday, the 4th Rabi-ul-awal (the 26th February 1879), a letter was received by post from Turkestan announcing that my worthy and exalted father had, upon Friday, 29th Safar (the 21st February 1879), obeyed the call of the summoner and, throwing off the dress of existence, hastened to the region of the Divine mercy. Since every living thing must relinquish the robe of life, and must drink the draught of death, I remain resigned and patient under this heavy calamity and misfortune.

As my exalted father was an ancient friend of the illustrious British Government I have, out of friendship, sent you this intimation.

Enclosure 4 in No. 9.

TELEGRAM, No. 795A.P., dated 3rd March 1879.

FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Jellalabad.

Your telegram, 28th February, to Viceroy. Send Yakub Khan suitable letter of condolence as you suggest.

Enclosure 5 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., to SARDAR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, dated the 5th March 1879.

AFTER the expressions of sympathy and sorrow, which is the customary mode of racers of the straight path of this transient world, I beg to inform you that at this unfortunate moment I have received your mournful letter, intimating an event, in recording which the pen sheds the tears of sorrow and the paper utters the sounds of pain, *viz.*, the departure of His Highness the Amir Sahib Bahadur from this transient world, (to which every one must bid adieu), to the everlasting one, which is the real abode of all (human) beings. This sad news has caused an indescribable sorrow and pain to sincere friends.

Since "every being on the face of the earth must respond to the call of death," and quit this fleeting world, it behoves all survivors and the lonely travellers of this world to recline against the cushion of patience and submission to the will of Providence, since no good can result from the opposite course, as Urfi has said—"Were a meeting with a beloved one to be procured by weeping, one might weep for a number* of years in the hope of obtaining the desired meeting."

* Literally a hundred years.

I can suggest no other course than to have patience. May the most High and Glorious God, through His mercy and grace, assign the deceased Amir an abode in the highest heaven, and bestow on his heirs patience and comfort.

Enclosure 6 in No. 9.

TELEGRAM, No. 829P., dated 6th March 1879, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Jellalabad.

Your telegram to Viceroy, 26th February. Following reply should be sent to Yakub Khan. Letter begins:—

I have received the letter, dated 20th February, which your Highness has sent me; and it has been laid before his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council.

His Excellency has instructed me to reply to your Highness that it has always been the desire of the British Government to maintain peace and friendship with the Government, the Sirdars, and the people of Affghanistan. The events which caused the rupture of friendly relations between the two Governments, and which compelled the British Government to declare war against the late Amir Shere Ali Khan, have been publicly proclaimed, and are well known to your Highness.

His Excellency the Viceroy has now received with satisfaction the expression of your Highness' anxiety for the renewal of friendship between the two Governments, and the assurance of your desire to make every exertion for that purpose. I am consequently authorized to communicate to you the preliminary conditions upon which, if they are

agreed to, the Viceroy is prepared to entertain negotiations for the conclusion of peace and for the restoration of a friendly alliance between the two Governments.

In the first place, the following arrangements respecting the territories now in possession of the British forces, are necessary for the protection and permanent tranquillity of the North-west frontier of India :—

1. The Amir of Kabul must renounce all claim to authority over the Khyber and Michni Passes leading from Jellalabad into the Peshawur district, and over the independent tribes inhabiting the territory directly connected with these passes.

2. The district of Kuram, from Thull to the crest of the Shutargardan Pass, and the districts of Pishin and Sibi, will remain under the protection and control of the British Government.

In the next place, the foreign relations of the Kabul Government must be henceforth conducted in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government ; and European British Officers accredited to the Kabul Government, must be permitted to reside, with suitable personal guards, at such places in Affghanistan as may hereafter be determined upon.

It is necessary for the conclusion of any friendly settlement of affairs between the two countries, that the Government at Kabul shall agree to these preliminary conditions : the Viceroy will thereupon be prepared to enter into negotiations for peace and a cordial alliance on a basis conducive to the common advantage of the two countries, and to the stability and prosperity of the Kabul ruler. Letter ends.

Bukhtiyar Khan can take this reply to Yakub, with any subsidiary instructions. Acknowledge receipt of this message.

Enclosure 7 in No. 9.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th March 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

Your clear the line message of this day received and instructions understood.

Enclosure 8 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER, dated Wednesday, 12th March 1879.

From SIRDAR MAHOMED YAKOOB KHAN, to MAJOR N. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I.

AFTER compliments. Your friendly letter, dated the 7th March, in reply to my letter, has been received by the hands of Munshi Bakhtiar Khan ; and the whole of the contents have been fully understood. You state that you had submitted to his Excellency the Viceroy my former letter, which was simply designed for the renewal of friendship and the removal of the accidental enmity, and that his Excellency had instructed you to reply to it. You then state the object and desire of the British Government in three sentences, in detail, which I have fully comprehended.

In reply, I beg to say that I wrote to you before expressing my earnest desire, in the event of your agreeing to use every effort to restore friendship and remove enmity between the two contending parties, thereby gaining for myself a good name : and I also expressed a hope that the British Government, as it had the power, would, in this matter, get a good name for me.

I expressed that wish before the death of my father. When my father died, and the Government and Amirship of Afghanistan by the decision of the whole of the people of Afghanistan (all the chiefs and nobles and people having come and sworn allegiance) devolved upon me, I considered that it would be well for the welfare of both States if by any means strife and enmity could be changed into harmony and friendship, and the former amity restored. But I only meant so if it were compatible with my ability and capacity—to that extent I was ready to use every endeavour.

I now reply to your propositions.

1st. As this is beyond the strength and capacity of the officers of this God-granted Government, and is opposed to magnanimity and friendship, you should, out of magnanimity and friendship, depart from this condition, and, relinquishing the territories of the Afghan State which you have taken possession of recently, you should positively not interfere with them.

2nd. As this is a good and proper proposal and in conformity with friendship, there is no room for discussion or refusal. Certainly it will not be allowable for this Government, which intends friendship with the British Government, to enter into any friendship or relation with other foreign powers without the advice and consent of the officers of the British Government.

3rd. In the event of strong and firm friendship and harmony always existing between the Government of Afghanistan and the British Government, the Afghan Government out of friendship, agrees that, in accordance with the desire of the British Government several officers (*sahibs*) of rank with a proper escort, should reside on the part of the British Government in the capital only, which is Cabul, but they must not interfere in any of the affairs of Afghanistan. This to last until such time as the British Government obtains complete confidence in the constancy and faithful friendship of the Afghan Government. After that, they have the right either to withdraw the officers, or appoint them permanently, whichever they choose.

If the British Government from foresight and prudence approve and accept what has been written above, it will strengthen the friendship and tend to the welfare of both parties, and will, moreover, be in accordance with the practice of the great towards their neighbours. If, on the other hand, the British Government has other views and intentions, they are their own masters; no doubt that will come to pass which the Deity has willed.

No. 10.

No. 88 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Camp Lahore, 10th April 1879.

IN continuation of my despatch, No. 70, dated 27th March 1879, I have the honour to submit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of further correspondence*, between Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan of Kabul and Major Cavagnari, the Political Officer with the British Forces at Jellalabad.

2. After receipt and consideration of the two letters from the Sirdar which were sent to your Lordship with my despatch above cited, I instructed Major Cavagnari to send a courteous reply, and to ascertain through his messenger, whether the Sirdar desired to discuss personally with a British Officer the obstacles to a peaceful settlement. The letter† which Major Cavagnari accordingly wrote is inclosed. Sirdar Yakub Khan in his answer shows himself greatly averse to yielding on the question of relinquishing territory; but he appears to consider that an interview with the British Officer may be advantageous, and he offers to receive an Envoy.

3. I have accordingly directed Major Cavagnari to make the necessary preliminary arrangements for proceeding to Kabul. He will take with him a letter‡ from myself acknowledging Sirdar Yakub Khan's letter to me announcing his father's death. And he will be empowered to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a general Treaty, if the essential point in the conditions already tendered, which is now at issue, can be satisfactorily adjusted.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) LYTTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., to AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN of Kabul, dated Jellalabad, 23rd March 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Your Highness' friendly letter dated 12th March 1879, in reply to my letter of the 7th idem, together with a letter addressed to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, have been received by me and forwarded to His Excellency the Viceroy.

Meanwhile, I deem it proper to point out to your Highness certain matters of importance.

I am very glad to notice that your Highness has accepted two out of the three demands mentioned in my letter of the 7th instant, but I regret that your Highness has replied to the third demand in an uncertain manner ("mujmal"), and has, moreover, made a proposal that the British Government should absolutely withdraw from all interference in Afghanistan, and entirely evacuate the territory it has conquered.

I beg in a friendly manner to inform your Highness that this is a proposal which it is quite impossible for the British Government to accede to.

The point which your Highness has been asked to agree to is looked upon as most essential to the permanent security of the Indian frontiers, and has been adopted after much consideration with reference to the condition of Afghanistan.

I therefore entertain great hope that when your Highness has fully reflected upon the matter, you will not find this condition so difficult of acceptance, nor sufficient to prove an impediment to the development of friendly relations with the British Government which your Highness has expressed yourself desirous of effecting.

With this view I send your Highness this friendly letter by the hand of Munshi Bukhtiar Khan, and I indulge in a strong hope that, after reading it and reflecting upon the matter, your highness will send a suitable and satisfactory answer with due regard to your own personal advantage and with the view to cementing friendly relations between the British Government and Afghanistan.

I hope your Highness will always consider me as your friend and well-wisher.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated 29th March 1879.

A. C.—I have received your kind letter dated the 23rd March by the hand of Munshi Baktiar Khan, and have given the fullest possible consideration and reflection to what you have written, pressing me to accept the third condition; and that you consider such acceptance as conducive to the permanent concord and alliance of the two Governments. In the permanent friendship and loyal affection to the British Government which it is my strong wish and desire to obtain, it is fitting that the British Government, having in view its own greatness and eminence, should have conferred on me numerous benefits and constant recurring advantages, and should have from beginning to end kept my advancement and independence in Afghanistan. In my acceptance of the two conditions which I have declared, and which I firmly and sincerely resolved to carry out, if you will carefully reflect, you will see that very important interests and matters are contained; so that there is no further room for introducing or mentioning the third condition. I ask for justice in this matter from the British Government. When I have accepted a British Resident in my capital, permanent or temporary as the British Government may choose, and, turning away my eyes from all aid or friendship from other States, have put the hand of hope and dependence firmly on the wide skirt of the British Government, what would be becoming in the strong and grand British Government; to take away a small part of my kingdom, or to extend it a little? As I have sincerely, truly, and decidedly chosen the permanent friendship of the British Government, I hope and expect from that great and magnanimous Government that my request on this point may be accepted, and that the foundation of friendship and alliance may be very speedily and firmly laid; and that by making happy your faithful friend with appropriate kindnesses, you may render your Government famous in the world and among all nations by your kindness and favor to me. Please God, the advantage of such kindness will appear sooner than that which the British Government anticipates from its third condition.

For the sake of giving confidence in these statements, and of strengthening the foundation of friendship, if the British Government propose to appoint a Mission* of rank, such as yourself, to come to Kabul and see me, the real concord on both sides will be declared and proved face to face. I will certainly not oppose this proposal. In any case, I desire and expect good and advantage in every way from the British Government, and I look upon the friendship of that Government as entirely an advantage and the source of much good.

Jellalabad, 2nd April 1879.

(Signed) W. JENKYNs,
On special duty.

*In the original the English word is used, and is apparently understood by the Afghans as meaning an Envoy.

(Signed) W. J.

Enclosure 3 in No. 10.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., Political Officer, to AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, of Kabul, dated Jellalabad, 7th April 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—I have received your Highness' friendly letter of the 29th March 1879, by the hand of Munshi Bukhtiar Khan.

It is a matter of gratification to learn that your Highness earnestly desires the renewal of friendship between the two States, and that you recognise the advantage that will accrue to Afghanistan from an alliance with the British Government.

I observe that in the concluding portion of your Highness' letter you state that, if the British Government thinks proper to depute a Mission of rank to Kabul for the purpose of verbally discussing with your Highness the matters now under consideration, your Highness also will acquiesce in such an arrangement.

As it is probable that this may be productive of good, and may tend to remove whatever misunderstandings exist, I am directed to inform your Highness that the British Government will appoint a Mission of rank to proceed to Kabul, with a suitable escort on receipt of information from your Highness that the necessary arrangements for its journey and reception have been made.

I trust that your Highness continues in the enjoyment of good health, and that you will consider me your friend and well-wisher.

(Signed) N. CAVAGNARI,
Political Officer.

Jellalabad, 7th April 1879.

Enclosure 4 in No. 10.

Dated Camp Lahore, 11th April 1879.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA, to His Highness AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, Wali of Kabul and its dependencies.

MY HONOURED AND VALUED FRIEND,

I HAVE received Your Highness' friendly letter of the 13th March 1879, informing me of the death of your father His Highness the late Amir Sher Ali Khan. This news has caused me deep regret, and I desire to express my sympathy with Your Highness in the affliction with which you have been visited. But since every human being must taste the cup of death, and life and death are in the hands of the Almighty God, it is fitting for these reasons to have patience and to show submission to His will.

2. Your Highness furthermore informs me that the nobility and people of Afghanistan have unanimously acknowledged you as Amir, and have tendered their allegiance. This information undoubtedly increases my expectation that the wishes expressed in Your Highness' letter for the establishment of a basis of friendship, will be fulfilled.

3. The friendly letter, dated 29th March 1879, written by Your Highness to Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I., has been seen by me. In that letter it is said that if, for the sake of strengthening the foundation of friendship, the British Government propose to appoint an Envoy of rank, such as Major Cavagnari, to come to Kabul and see Your Highness, you will certainly not oppose this proposal.

I have accordingly deputed Major Cavagnari to visit Kabul, and this letter will be delivered by him in person to Your Highness. Major Cavagnari possesses my full confidence; he is authorised to communicate unreservedly with Your Highness upon the questions at issue between the two States, and he is to be considered as the representative of the Government of India.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness, and to subscribe myself as Your Highness' sincere friend.

No. 11.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 6th April 1879.

PLEASE telegraph views of Cabinet on following substance of Treaty to be negotiated with Yakoob : 1st, two Articles, formal ; 3rd, amnesty for assistance to us during the war ; 4th, Ameer agrees to conduct his foreign relations in accordance with advice and wish of British Government, will enter into no engagements or war with foreign State without concurrence of British Government ; 5th, qualified recognition of heir ; 6th, permanent British Resident at Kabul, and right to depute Agents to Herat, and other frontier places ; 7th, their safety and honourable treatment guaranteed by Ameer ; 8th and

9th, commercial facilities, protection of traffic, adjustment of duties, selection of open routes ; 10th, telegraph line ; 11th, restoration of Kabul territory now in our possession, except Kurram, Pisheen, and Sibi, Ameer renounces authority over Khyber and Michnee tribes and passes ; 12th, secures payment by Ameer of customary allowances to certain specified Sirdars ; 13th, subsidy to Ameer, amount not yet settled.

No. 12.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, 8th April 1879.

Yours on Treaty. All the Articles approved.

No. 13.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 9th April 1879.

My telegram 6th and yours of 8th. If in return for 4th Article, which places his foreign relations entirely in our hands, Yakooob asks protection from foreign aggression, a distinct answer will be required.

Please telegraph your views fully on this point.

No. 14.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, 13th April 1879.

IF YAKOOB faithfully conducts his foreign policy under our direction, we shall be prepared to support him against any foreign aggression which may result from such conduct with money, arms, and troops, to be employed at our discretion, when and where we think fit.

No. 15.

No. 104 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 1st May 1879.

IN continuation of the Despatch of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, dated Lahore, the 10th April 1879, No. 88, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of two letters, dated 20th April 1879, addressed by Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan to Major Cavagnari, the Political Officer with the British Forces at Jellalabad.

2. We also inclose, for facility of reference, copy of the telegram which we sent to Your Lordship on the 26th April, containing the substance of Major Cavagnari's reply.

3. A complete copy of Major Cavagnari's letter has not yet reached us.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated 27th Rabi-us-Sani (20th April 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that Munshi Mahomed Bakhtiar Khan having waited upon me delivered your friendly letter to me, which I have perused. I am exceedingly gratified with its contents, which allude to the cultivation of friendship, concord, and amity between the two great States. From its beginning to the end, your letter expresses perfect unity and identity (of wishes). It is hoped that from this sapling of friendship the functionaries of the two great Governments will cull the fruit of their wish, and that from this goblet of affection the Officers of that powerful Government and the Governors of this God-granted State will pour out a draught of their desire. Munshi Mahomed Bakhtiar has been given leave to return, and is proceeding towards you. I have made oral statements to him. He will, please God, communicate them to you one by one, and you will be pleased to rely upon them as true.

Enclosure 2 in No. 15.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated 27th Rabi-us-Sani (20th April 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—As Munshi Mahomed Bakhtiar Khan is now going to return to that direction, I take the opportunity of writing this short friendly letter to you to say that I have, on my own part, resolved to remove all doubts regarding friendship as well as to strengthen the friendly relations between the two States. God willing, I will leave for that direction and have the pleasure of seeing my friends. I hope you will reply to this epistle speedily, so that the terms (for the renewal) of friendship and concord between the two Governments may become known and manifest.

Further, all well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 15.

Telegram, dated 26th April 1879.

From VICEROY, Simla, to SECRETARY OF STATE, London.

Following from Cavagnari, 25th. Begins :—

FOLLOWING letter addressed to Yakub Khan made over to Bakhtiar with instructions to use every effort to procure early and favourable reply. Letter begins :—

After compliments and acknowledgment of his letter. “I gather from it that Your Highness wishes to arrange a friendly interview with the British Authorities, and desires to come in person for this purpose. This intention is indeed a true sign of that earnest desire for the establishment of friendly relations between the two Governments which Your Highness, in your recent letters, has frequently expressed, and which the British Government fully appreciate and reciprocate.

“I am consequently directed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to reply that on receipt of intimation of the date of Your Highness’ expected arrival at the British Camp, every effort will be made by the Officers of this Government to secure for Your Highness the most honourable treatment befitting your exalted rank during the period Your Highness, with whatever escort and retinue you may think proper to accompany you, shall remain as the guest of the British Government.” Finis.

No. 16.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 5th May 1879.

YAKOUB reached Butkhak 3rd May, on road towards British camp. Azimuthula Khan, Chief of Ghilzais, has joined Cavagnari and tendered services to British Government.

No. 17.

Telegram from VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 8th May 1879.

FOLLOWING from Cavagnari, 8th:—Ameer arrived at camp at half-past nine. His Highness appeared to be much impressed with his reception.

No. 18.

Telegram from VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 8th May 1879.

FOLLOWING telegram just received from Yakoob at Gundamuk. Message begins:—I beg to announce my arrival at the British camp. I trust your Lordship is in the enjoyment of perfect health. I sincerely hope that the result of my visit may be productive of sincere and lasting friendship between the two Governments. Message ends. I have sent friendly reply.

No. 19.

No. 119 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 8th May 1879.

IN continuation of our despatch, No. 104, dated 1st May 1879, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a translation of the reply sent by Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan to Major Cavagnari's letter to him of the 25th April. We also enclose translation of a letter from Munshi Bakhtiar Khan to Major Cavagnari, dated 1st May 1879.

2. Your Lordship has been informed by telegram of Yakub Khan's departure from Kabul on 2nd May and of the several stages of his journey towards the British Camp, where he is expected to arrive this day.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 19.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated 7th Jamadi-ul-Awal.—(30th April 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—I beg to write this friendly letter to inform you that your very friendly communication dated the 25th April 1879, sent by the hands of the worthy and intelligent Munshi Bakhtiar Khan, reached me at a very fortunate moment. Its gratifying contents, which notify the marks of noble friendship and give the glad tidings of the tokens of great affection between the two sublime States, have afforded me unbounded joy. The Munshi above-mentioned has strung one by one on the thread of description the pearls of your friendly hints and verbal messages with which you, actuated by the motives of most sincere friendship, entrusted him; and thereby he has opened the door of happiness and joy to the face of my heart. Inasmuch as the grasp of the desire of having an interview with the (British) Officers of high rank and holding a happy conference with them has taken hold of the skirt of my heart, I will, please God, set out from the capital (Kabul) for my destination on Monday the 10th Jamudi-ul-awal (3rd May 1879). Further, what can I write beyond expressions of friendship?

Enclosure 2 in No. 19.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from MUNSHI BAKHTIAR KHAN, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I.,
Kabul, 1st May 1879.

At 10 a.m. to-day I waited upon His Highness the Amir and inquired as to the stages by which he proposed to march. He stated that he intended to march by the following stages:—

2. About 9 or 10 o'clock to-morrow (2nd May) morning His Highness will leave the Bala Hissar and will march to Begrami.

3. The rest of the marches will be as follows:—

Saturday	3rd May	-	-	Butkhak.
Sunday	4th	„	-	Samuch-i-Mulla Umr.
Monday	5th	„	-	Sih baba.
Tuesday	6th	„	-	Jagdalak.
Wednesday	7th	„	-	Surkhpul.
Thursday	8th	„	-	Gandamak.

4. To-morrow (2nd May) evening His Highness the Amir will despatch an express sowar with a letter to you announcing the fact of his departure from Kabul.

5. His Highness the Amir observed to me that as the British officials were in light marching order, with a view to war, he would not trouble them to supply him with tents, but would bring with him tent equipage for himself and suit.

I told Bakhtiar Khan to apologize for any shortcomings on our part, but I shall nevertheless be able to prepare a respectable camp.—(Sd.) N. C.

6. As at present arranged the Amir's suite and following will amount to about 400 persons, which number may be increased or diminished on the road.

7. The Amir will have the following animals with him, viz.:—

450 horses.
50 camels.
2 elephants.

These will require only bhoosa and barley; but for the elephants green wheat as far as procurable will be requisite; if not procurable, bhoosa and flour may be given.

8. The British authorities will, of course, make any arrangements for supplies which they approve of: the Amir, being their guest, will not mention any wishes of his own.

A list of the quantities consumed will be afterwards sent. His Highness the Amir and his suite will bring their own cook.

I purpose pitching a camp for the Amir opposite the British Camp at Hashim Khel. I shall leave it to His Highness to decide whether he will protect his own camp, or wish us to do it. So that there may be no appearance of his being under any restraint.—(Sd.) N.C.

9. The site for the Amir's camp at Gandamak will be selected by the Political Officer near the British Camp in such place as may be approved of by him.

10. His Highness the Amir said that he hoped to be informed on his arrival at the Surkhpul of the time fixed for his entry into Gandamak and the arrangements for his reception.

The Surkhpul, from the tenor of Bakhtiar Khan's letter, seems to be regarded as doubtful whether we claim to be in possession of it or not. As it will please the Amir and be more convenient to us, I shall allow him to make his own arrangements for supplies there and only consider him our guest from the time he reaches Gandamak.—(Sd.) N.C.

He should be received at the Gandamak end of the Surkhpul. It has been arranged that he would collect his own supplies up to the Surkhpul.

11. The notables accompanying His Highness will be as follows:—

1. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan.
2. „ „ Tahir Khan.
3. „ „ Asaf Khan (son of S. Yahya Khan).
4. Sirdar Futteh Muhammad Khan (son of S. Zakariya Khan).
5. Sirdar Nek Muhammad Khan (commanding the body-guard).
6. Mustaufi-ul-Mamalik.
7. General Daud Shah.
8. Mirza Muhammad Nabi Khan (murasala nawis).

The Mustaufi and Daud Shah only will be taken into Council, the chief place being given to the Mustaufi.

12. The Amir also said that only three regiments would continue in Siah Sang till to-morrow for the salute on departure: the other troops that were in Siah Sang have to-day retired into the Bala Hissar and Sherpur.

No. 20.

Telegram from VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 23rd May 1879.

WE propose to approve immediate conclusion of following articles of the treaty with Ameer. Articles begin,—

1st. Perpetual peace and friendship.

2nd. Amnesty.

3rd. Ameer of Kabul agrees to conduct his relations with foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. Ameer will enter into no engagements with foreign States, and will not take up arms against any foreign State, except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions the British Government will support the Ameer against foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. British troops entering Afghanistan to repel foreign aggression will return as soon as object has been accomplished.

4th. Permanent British Resident at Kabul, with right to depute agents to Afghan frontier whenever necessary. Ameer may depute agents to India.

5th. Ameer guarantees safety and honourable treatment of British Agents.

6th. Agencies, and

7th. Commercial facilities to be settled for one year.

8th. Construction of telegraph line to Kabul.

9th. The British Government restores to Ameer of Kabul the towns of Kandahar and Jelalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British army, except the districts of Kurram, Pisheen, and Sibi. Ameer of Kabul agrees on his part that the districts of Kurram, Pisheen, and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed, shall remain under protection and administration of British Government, that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts, after deduction of civil charges, shall be paid to the Kabul Government. The British Government will retain in its own hands the complete control of the Khyber and Michnee passes, lying between the Peshawur and Kaaba districts, and of our relations with the independent tribes inhabiting the territory directly connected with these passes.

10th. Subsidy.

End of treaty.

Mixed Commission will demarcate boundaries of assigned districts. Early reply solicited.

No. 21.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, 23rd May 1879.

Yours to day. Articles approved by Cabinet.

No. 22.

From Major CAVAGNARI to SECRETARY OF STATE, 26th May 1879.

TREATY of peace with Ameer of Kabul signed to-day, 26th May.

No. 23.

Telegram from VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 7th June 1879.

FOLLOWING from Cavignari, 6th, begins,—Ratified treaty presented to Ameer this morning in Durbur, His Highness, after receiving it, expressed his earnest hope that he and his subjects of every grade would do all in their power to preserve and increase the friendship now established. In saying farewell to the General and other officers, the Ameer expressed the hope that when he visits India he may renew his acquaintance with them. Ends.

No. 24.

No. 153 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 23rd June 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, translation of a letter from His Highness Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan to the Viceroy, dated 30th May 1879, and copy of His Excellency's reply, dated 4th June 1879.

2. We inclose, also, a translation of a letter, dated 11th June, addressed to Major Cavagnari by the Amir, in which His Highness expresses much pleasure and satisfaction at the receipt of the Viceroy's letter.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 8th Jamadi-us-Sani 1296, Al Hijri (30th May 1879).

BE it known to the friendly heart of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India (who is exalted and mighty, the bearer of high titles, the dispenser of glory and greatness, and the centre of goodwill and friendship, may his prosperity increase), that since the day of my arrival at the British camp at Gandamak I have been very happy, and that I am exceedingly pleased with, and thankful for, the reception and treatment accorded to me by the British officers, which will (doubtless) tend to produce good results and bear the fruits of friendship, unity, and concord.

Although I had resolved to come to Simla and give myself the unbounded pleasure of a joyful interview with Your Excellency for the purpose of strengthening friendly relations, the combination of three several circumstances prevented me from carrying my intention into effect. These were, in the first place, the intense heat of the weather, which renders travelling extremely difficult; secondly, the existence of cholera, which, in obedience to the divine decree, has made its appearance in those quarters; and, thirdly, the anarchy existing in the interior of Afghanistan, to attend to which is the most important of all matters.

After completing a tour through the country, during which I shall inspect the frontiers and provinces, and introduce good government therein, I intend, God willing, towards the close of next cold season, to set out for my destination, and have a joyful meeting with Your Excellency, for the purpose of making firmer the basis of friendship and drawing closer the bonds of affection and amity in a most suitable and appropriate manner.

Further, what can I write beyond professions of friendship and good will.

Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA to His Highness
MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies.

MY HONOURED AND VALUED FRIEND,

Dated Simla, 4th June 1879.

MAY the prosperity of Your Highness, the well-wisher and cherisher of your friends, be increased, and may the causes of happiness and pleasure ever brighten the face of Your Highness's days.

Be it known to Your Highness's friendly heart that Your Highness's letter, dated 30th May 1879, has been received by me.

It gives me special pleasure to learn that Your Highness is well satisfied with the arrangements which were made by the British authorities for the accommodation of Your Highness and your suite at Gandamak. My desire was that everything possible should be done for the hospitable reception and entertainment of so honoured a guest.

I should have been greatly pleased if it had been possible for Your Highness to fulfil your kind intention of visiting me at Simla, as I am convinced that a meeting would have been most advantageous toward drawing closer the bonds of personal friendship and confirming the fortunate alliance which has now been concluded between the two States. But the impediments mentioned by Your Highness make it manifest that for several reasons the journey cannot at present be undertaken. Nevertheless, in accordance with the intimation which Your Highness's kind letter conveys, I anticipate confidently the pleasure of meeting Your Highness before long, at a more convenient season, in India.

May Your Highness's days be happy and prosperous to the fullest extent of your desires.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness, and to subscribe myself Your Highness's sincere friend.

Enclosure 3 in No. 24.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated Gandamak, 20th Jamadi-us-Sani 1296 A.H. (corresponding to 11th June 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Your friendly letter, dated Jellalabad, 9th June, enclosing a telegram to your address from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated the 6th June, in which congratulations are expressed for the victory of my troops over the Turkomans on the Herat frontier, and also His Excellency's letter to my address, was received and read by me on the evening of the 19th of the current Mahomedan month.

I was much pleased to hear of your health and welfare; and the frank and cordial expressions of friendship and kindness in the letter of His Excellency the Viceroy gave me the highest pleasure and satisfaction. I strongly hope that, in accordance with the rules of friendship, day by day and hour by hour every effort will be made by both sides to strengthen the alliance between the two Governments, not only at the time of the interview with His Excellency the Viceroy, which is alluded to in His Excellency's letter of the 8th Jamadi-us-Sani, but also before and after the interview.

You may continue perfectly assured with respect to me, and I hope you will write informing me of your welfare, until a meeting takes place, as this will afford me much pleasure.

No. 25.

No. 152 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 23rd June 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, translation of a proclamation lately issued by the Amir of Afghanistan, which grants a general amnesty to all Afghan subjects who have held intercourse with the

British forces during the war, and secures them from all punishment or molestation on this account.

2. The proclamation is issued in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the Treaty concluded between the British and Afghan Governments.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 25.

TRANSLATION of the Proclamation issued by the AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN.

PROCLAMATION issued by the Government of Afghanistan, dated Gandamak, Jamadi-us-Sani A.H. 1296=(June 1879).

WHEREAS perpetual friendship and peace have been established between the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan, all disputes and differences between those two Governments have been entirely removed.

It is hereby publicly proclaimed that a general amnesty has been granted to those subjects of the Afghan Government who have held intercourse with the British forces during the war. And the Afghan Government declares in writing that all its subjects shall be exempt from punishment or molestation, covert or overt, on account of such intercourse.

No. 26.

No. 160 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 7th July 1879.

In our despatch of the 2nd of June we transmitted to Her Majesty's Government a copy of the treaty concluded in May last with the Amir of Afghanistan; and we have now the honour to lay before Your Lordship a full report of our proceedings in connection with recent Afghan affairs.

2. Your Lordship's despatch of the 18th of November 1878 briefly recapitulated the leading features of the policy of the British Government toward Afghanistan, and reviewed the course of events and transactions which terminated with the reception of a Russian mission at Kabul, the deputation of Sir Neville Chamberlain as British envoy to the Amir, and the repulse of his embassy at Ali Musjid. Immediately upon that repulse being known, a demand for apology and reparation was addressed to the Amir; and, when no answer was received within the period prescribed, His Highness was declared an enemy of the British Government, and the British forces entered his kingdom on the 21st of November.

3. The plan of operations to be followed by the British army in Afghanistan had received our most careful consideration; and, in its scope and aim, it was strictly limited to the attainment of certain definite objects. We deem it now due, both to ourselves, and to Her Majesty's Government, by whom they were approved, to state and explain those objects before describing the measures adopted for the attainment of them.

4. For some time previous to the immediate occasion of the late Afghan War, the warning course of events beyond the north-west frontier of India had forced upon the anxious attention of this Government certain features in the character of that frontier which could not but be regarded as defective if judged by the well known axiom of modern military science,—that the strategic value of any natural obstacle, such as a river or a mountain range, is mainly dependent on the command of the points of issue

on both sides, and the consequent power of operating at will on either side of it. Before the war just ended in Afghanistan the north-west frontier of India was drawn along the eastern base of a vast and widely extended system of mountains. With the exception of the southern defiles (recently secured by the Khelat treaty of 1876), all the passes through that portion of the range which, sloping towards Afghanistan, rises immediately above the plains of India, were in the hands of wild, independent, and more or less hostile, tribes; and the army of India, if attacked upon this frontier by a skilful and powerful enemy, would have had no alternative between forcing the passes, under conditions of much difficulty and danger, in order to meet its adversary in a hostile country, far from its base, and without any friendly support within reach, or else, with a great and often almost impassable river at its back, awaiting his arrival behind a frontier line of one thousand miles in length, pierced by passes open to the enemy at points too numerous to be all effectually guarded. It is needless to dwell upon the serious character of the danger to which India would be exposed in any such eventuality.

5. On the other hand, apart from this serious strategic defect, our late land frontier had much to recommend it from an administrative point of view; and we consider that, when that frontier was first accepted, the adoption of it was justified by a reasonable regard to the political circumstances and general convenience of the moment. It was not deliberately selected, on strategic grounds, with a view to contingencies at that time remote; and, even then, there were not wanting eminent advocates for the adoption of the Indus River as a better strategic border than the mountain chain beyond it. But this mountain chain approximately represented the limits of the Sikh power, and of the territories which the Punjab campaigns had transferred to the British Government; and, conquest having been carried thus far, we think it was a wise decision not to carry it beyond the point at which military operations would have become more difficult and their results less satisfactory. Rich plains, although easily overrun, are easily held, and they remunerate the benefits conferred on them by improved administration. Wild mountain tracts are not only difficult to traverse and difficult to subdue, but, when subdued, the administration of them is unprofitable. The foot of the mountains offered to India a well-defined boundary; and, although the adoption of this line left our north-west border peculiarly exposed to injury and insult from the hill tribes around it, yet, on the whole, the inconvenience of remaining within it was less than the inconvenience of advancing beyond it. Between this line and the nearest outposts of the Russian power in Central Asia intervened nearly one thousand miles of difficult country, inhabited by warlike populations existing in various degrees of feudal relation to the Amirs of Kabul and the Khans of Khelat. So long as the land frontier of India was unexposed to the pressure of any political or military influences more formidable than those of the marauding tribes around it and the weak governments of barbarous states beyond them, its strategic defects might be contemplated without anxiety by the Government of India.

6. But the possibility of danger was not overlooked; and it is, we conceive, with a view to the prevention of it that the British Government, both in India and in England, has at all times attached supreme importance to the exclusion of foreign influence from Afghan and Biluch territory. Guided by this consideration, the invariable aim of its policy has been to secure the friendship, the confidence, and, in case of need, the co-operation of the Sovereigns of Kabul and Khelat. Unfortunately, however, causes, which we need not now examine, rendered fruitless the measures adopted for that purpose; and in 1875 our relations with these two sovereigns had become almost intolerable. The subsidy given to the Khan of Khelat had been withdrawn. The subsidy offered to the Amir of Kabul had been rejected. The whole of Biluchistan was in that condition of complete anarchy which so frequently precedes the loss of independence; and for the restoration of his authority the Khan was looking, not to his British, but to his Afghan and Persian, neighbours. For some time previous to this, the attitude assumed by the Amir of Kabul towards the Government of India had been growing more and more unfriendly and mistrustful; whilst the communications between His Highness and the Governor of Russian Turkestan had simultaneously increased in frequency and apparent confidence. In the meanwhile, the distance between the Indian and Russian Empires had been reduced from 1,000 to 400 miles, by advances exclusively on the part of the Russian military power.

7. In these circumstances, the Government of India could no longer afford to contemplate with indifference the strategic defects of its northwest frontier. We felt that strenuous endeavours should be made, without further loss of time, to find in the stability, friendship, and alliance of the trans-frontier states those sources of security from external danger which were not furnished by the condition of the frontier itself.

In Khelat our endeavours were not unsuccessful; and the treaty signed with that state in 1876 virtually placed in our hands the command of the southern passes, thus giving to India a strong frontier from the neighbourhood of Multan to the sea, a distance of 500 miles. This arrangement, moreover, by restoring order and reviving trade and agriculture throughout Biluchistan, has been eminently beneficial to the Khan and his subjects, in whom the Government of India found loyal and useful allies during the late Afghan war. All endeavours, however, to ameliorate our relations with the Amir of Kabul were completely abortive; and the unfriendliness of His Highness was apparently increased by the increasingly critical condition of relations between the British and Russian Governments, until at last it culminated in the open repulse of a British, after the open reception of a Russian, mission to his capital. From the foregoing summary of the circumstances and events immediately preceding the rupture of our relations with the Amir of Kabul it will be seen what cause we then had to view with grave anxiety the defective features of our Afghan frontier. It was not compatible with the policy and principles of this Government to have recourse to the sword for the remedy of those defects, but it was our paramount duty to India not to leave them unrepaired if we were successful in a war which we had made every effort to avert.

8. When, therefore, military operations against the late Amir of Kabul had been necessitated by circumstances already reported, we determined to direct them, not only to the punishment of an unprovoked affront, but also to the prompt and complete attainment of the following objects:—Firstly, the exclusion of all foreign influence from Afghanistan; and, Secondly, such a rectification of our Afghan frontier as would suffice to render impossible for the future the exclusion of British influence from that state. These, at least, are the results it was our object to secure; those which it was equally our object to avoid were more numerous; and since they materially affected our plan of operations, we must here indicate the nature of them.

9. When forced to declare hostilities against the Amir Sher Ali we were warned by several high authorities that a short or a small Afghan war would prove to be impossible; that we should be opposed in overwhelming numbers by the independent tribes whom the Amir (to quote his own words) had threatened to “roll against us like blasts of fire;” that, after forcing passes thus fiercely contested, we should be confronted by a united Afghan nation; that, having once crossed the frontier, we could not safely arrest our progress till we had completed the entire conquest of Afghanistan; that such a conquest could not be abandoned without the risk of renewing, and, perhaps, aggravating, our political dangers, nor yet maintained without heavily augmenting our financial and administrative burdens; and that, in either case, our utmost military success would bequeath to the Afghan people, whether as neighbours or as subjects, memories and sentiments of inextinguishable animosity; leaving to ourselves no practical alternative between the helpless contemplation of the confusion and anarchy created by our own action and the wholesale annexation of a barren country and a turbulent people.

10. The Government of India would have been inexcusable had it disregarded warnings so numerous and so authoritative. The dangers thus indicated were not underrated by us; but we had long and fully considered them from every point of view, in direct reference to carefully verified facts, and we were satisfied, by our knowledge of the actual condition of Afghanistan at the time when hostilities were declared, that no such dangers need be incurred if adequate precautions were taken to avoid them.

11. In the first place, for the rectification of our frontier as defined in paragraph 8. of this despatch, no great extension of territory was required. All we needed was the permanent command,—not of passes extending far into the interior of the vast mountain tract beyond our border, but of those which, piercing the extreme eastern edge of that tract as it rises immediately above the plains of India, constitute the only practicable approaches to our Empire from beyond its northern and western confines. The main defiles of the Mohmand and Afridi hills, converging towards Peshawur, are peopled by independent tribes, and have never belonged to the Amirs of Kabul. For the command of these passes it would probably suffice, after clearing them of the Amir's troops, to resume to ourselves the payment and control of the pass tribes. The valley of the Kuram, rising westward from the Punjab border between Kohat and Thal, terminates at the Shutur-Gardan, a high ridge of the Safed Koh Range; and an army holding that position would command, on the one side Kabul and Ghazni, on the other easy access into India. Our southern frontier, as before observed, had been greatly strengthened by our arrangements with Khelat, which gave us a strong position above the Bolan Pass. From Western Afghanistan, however, all the approaches to this position debouch in the fertile district of Pishin, which, bounded by the Kojak-Amran range, constitutes the great

natural granary of Quetta. Holding Pishin, and commanding the issues of the Kojak Pass, we could descend at will upon the plains of Kandahar, or advance to meet an enemy in the open field; whilst no enemy could debouch upon our own plains by the Bolan without first besieging and taking Quetta (no easy task), and then forcing a long and difficult pass, of which we hold the issues. For these reasons we regarded the permanent military command of the Kuram and Pishin districts as essential to the complete rectification of our frontier. But all such objects could certainly be attained without wholesale annexation, and possibly even without any actual acquisition of territory.

12. In the next place, many of the independent pass tribes were not indifferent, either to the Amir's withdrawal of the allowances they had formerly received from His Highness, or to the possible renewal of those they had at one time received from the British Government; and we had been careful to secure the neutrality of these tribes, so far as neutrality could be expected from robber hordes certain, in the event of any conflict between British and Afghan troops, to side with the victorious and fall upon the vanquished combatant. In the third place, an all-important change had been silently effected during the reign of Sher Ali in the social and administrative character of Afghanistan. This change was peculiarly favourable to our whole plan of operations, which had, indeed, been mainly determined by the knowledge of it.

13. During the reign of the Amir Dost Mahomed the fighting power of Afghanistan was mainly of a tribal and feudal character. From the time of his accession to the throne, however, it had been the aim of the Amir Sher Ali to break up this tribal organisation, and replace it by a mercenary army. The system of internal government thus introduced by His Highness had undermined the national foundations of his power. His standing army was regarded by the local chiefs as a menace to their independence. The compulsory enlistment of troops, for whose maintenance the nation was severely taxed, had extended the unpopularity of Sher Ali's rule to all parts of his dominions and all classes of his subjects. The administration, as well as the army, had become denationalised. The chief civil and military offices of the state, to which the custom of the country had given a somewhat family character, were, under the new system, necessarily entrusted to men with no power or influence independent of the Sovereign's favour. By thus centralising his authority the Amir had isolated himself from his sirdars; and an administration destructive of popular privileges was naturally unsupported by popular sympathies. Partly by the aid and countenance of the British Government, Sher Ali had gradually brought under his personal sway all the dominions formerly claimed by his dynasty; but for the government of them he was driven more and more, by increasing mistrust of his sirdars, his subjects, and his neighbours, to expedients which only increased a disaffection they were intended to suppress. The Afghans, in short, had grown weary of Sher Ali's domestic administration, whilst all their national sentiments and prejudices were opposed to that fatal intimacy with Russia which was the final error of his foreign policy.

14. Such being the actual condition of affairs in Afghanistan when war was declared by the British Government against the Amir of Kabul, it was no impossible task to maintain, between the Afghan people and their ruler, that practical distinction proclaimed by the Viceroy in the manifesto which accompanied the declaration of hostilities. We were persuaded that the sirdars and people of Afghanistan (if considerately treated by the military and political officers charged with the execution of our orders, which, on this point, were most explicit) would not make common cause with the Amir, or support him in resisting the chastisement he had so recklessly provoked. We were also persuaded that the resources of his country would fail the Amir, no less effectually than the disposition of his subjects, in any attempt to prolong such resistance after the fighting power of his army had been thoroughly broken. By far the most serious embarrassment we had to anticipate was, neither the hostility of the Afghan people nor the strength of the Afghan army, but the complete disintegration of the Afghan state which might not improbably result from the swift and total destruction of Sher Ali's personal power. With this contingency, which had engaged our lengthened and anxious consideration, we felt we must be prepared to deal in case of necessity. It was constantly before our eyes and in our thoughts during the period which elapsed between the declaration of hostilities and the signature of peace. As, however, it has not arisen, we need not now say more about it than that it was a contingency which we were at all times anxious to avert.

15. We have recorded and explained at some length the importance attached by the Government of India to the prevention, as well as to the promotion, of certain political results during the conduct of the war and the negotiation of the peace with Kabul because our entire plan of military operations was directly dictated, and all its strategic

combinations constantly restricted by these important political considerations. From first to last, throughout the recent campaign in Afghanistan, military action has been strictly subordinated to political purpose, and this acknowledgment is due to those able military officers whose discreet exercise of the political powers entrusted to them has greatly enhanced the practical value of their successful achievements in the field. It was necessary to inflict signal and public punishment on the late Amir Sher Ali Khan and to destroy his fighting power as speedily and completely as possible. These objects would have been most swiftly and simply accomplished by the immediate capture and temporary occupation of Kabul. But we had serious cause to apprehend that, by thus precipitating the downfall of Sher Ali, we might irretrievably shake to pieces all the independent materials of government in Afghanistan—bequeathing to Sher Ali's successor no stable basis of authority, and placing ourselves in a position from which we could not afterwards retire without surrendering to anarchy and civil conflict a state which it was our object to strengthen and consolidate in the manner most conducive to peaceable and friendly relations with it. For this reason, although the capture and occupation of Kabul involved no military difficulty and offered several military conveniences to the British columns which routed the Amir's army on the Peiwar and expelled his garrisons from the Khyber Pass, that measure was deliberately excluded from our plan of military operations for the opening of a war which we hoped to finish in a single campaign. The only advanced movements not originally included in this plan were the occupation of Jellalabad and Gandamak. But these measures were dictated by considerations partly of a sanitary, partly of a political character, and were undertaken with the certainty that they would not be opposed by any military force. The occupation of those points was intentionally temporary, but even in the selection of temporary outposts we were determined that the British troops should not occupy any position which they could not permanently hold in case of need without risk to their communications and supplies or from which they could not be withdrawn at any moment without detriment to our political interests and military reputation. We deem it due no less to the cause of historical truth than to the character of our Government and the right understanding of a policy which has been much misrepresented to place thus distinctly on record these decisions and the grounds of them. It remains to explain the further considerations which dictated the more important details of our military action and guided our constant endeavour to minimise the unavoidable expenditure of blood and treasure in the effectual attainment of its objects.

16. We have already stated the reasons which induced us to regard the Amir's standing army as the only fighting power we should have to deal with in Afghanistan. The known strength of that army was about 60,000 men. Its artillery we believed to be good, and this impression was confirmed by subsequent experience, but, with the exception of the breach loaders formerly given to His Highness by the Government of India, the musketry of the Amir's army was of course much inferior to that of our own. With this army the Amir, according to our anticipations, would have to garrison all his outlying provinces, protect his Persian flank, defend his capital and central districts, and at the same time resist our advance. It was, therefore, not difficult to calculate approximately the maximum force he could oppose to us at any given point. We consequently determined to attack him simultaneously on three different lines, thus obliging him to distribute his force or else to leave one or other of these lines undisputed.

17. The three lines thus selected were those of the Kojak, the Khyber, and the Kuram. These three lines were not only the most suitable for the immediate purposes of our attack, they also included all the advanced positions we had, for the reasons stated in paragraph 11 of our present despatch, determined to hold permanently. The line to which the Viceroy attached special importance was that of the Kuram. His Excellency believed that if the Amir allowed a British force advancing on this line to reach the Shutur-Gardan in full strength, both Kabul and Ghazni would remain completely at its mercy. He, therefore, anticipated strong resistance to our advance at some point in the Upper Kuram Valley, where the Amir's troops would command positions of great strength, easy to hold, and very difficult to attack. He calculated, however, that if Sher Ali's army were thoroughly beaten here, its defeat would immediately be felt in the very heart of the Amir's power, which must be more severely shaken by the loss of a battle in the Kuram than by a similar disaster in any other part of his dominions. Our object, therefore, in despatching a force to the Kuram, was to defeat and disperse any Afghan army which might be found there, and to seize with the utmost rapidity a position directly menacing Kabul and Ghazni, but without advancing beyond the Shutur-Gardan. This force was entrusted to the command of General Roberts.

18. The force operating on the Khyber line was commanded by General Sir Samuel Browne, whose instructions were to capture Ali Musjid, expel the Amir's garrisons from the Khyber, and occupy Lundi Kotal, Dakka, or such other point as might be found most convenient at the head of the Pass, thus threatening Jellalabad, but not advancing further.

19. Our longest line of operations lay in the direction of Kandahar; and it was, therefore, necessary that the force operating on this line should be proportionally stronger; as, whilst its transport and supply were more difficult, the rapidity of its movements was less essential to the primary objects of the campaign than that of the Khyber and Kuram columns. In order to cripple the financial resources of the Amir, it was deemed desirable to expel his authority from the richest districts of Western Afghanistan; and for this purpose the temporary occupation of Kandahar was clearly requisite. Such a measure, moreover, was dictated by two other considerations of a more far-reaching character. In the event of a complete disintegration of the Kabul Power, we could not allow Kandahar to fall into the hands of any chief or state whose possession of it we had not previously approved on conditions dictated by ourselves; and, in the event of re-established relations with the ruler of a united Afghanistan, the power of restoring Kandahar to such a ruler, also on our own conditions, could not fail to give us a most advantageous position from which to negotiate the terms of peace. The permanent retention of Kandahar, however, has never formed part of our political programme; and no endeavour has been spared during the war to render our temporary occupation of it as little burdensome as possible to its inhabitants. The command of the Kandahar force was entrusted to General Stewart; and his instructions were to carry out a reconnaissance in force as far as the Helmand and Khelat-i-Ghilzai; ascertaining the features and resources of the country in that direction, and attacking any enemy he might find within striking distance, but not establishing himself at any point beyond Kandahar.

20. The generals commanding the forces employed on the above-mentioned lines of advance were invested with the chief political authority beyond the frontier. Their instructions were to intercept the collection of the Amir's revenues, and preserve order throughout the country occupied by their troops. They were required to conciliate its inhabitants, and protect them from all avoidable injury. They were also to use their best endeavours to effect a friendly understanding with the tribes in their vicinity; but they were to avoid all unnecessary interference or collision with those tribes. When, in the development of operations opened on the Khyber line, the British troops had advanced to Jellalabad, Major Cavagnari was intrusted with the conduct of relations between the Government of India and the Afghan sirdars and tribes with whom that movement brought us into contact.

21. We calculated that all the operations thus ordered could be completed before the commencement of the winter, when the passes would be closed by snow, and a suspension of hostilities imposed on both belligerents by the rigour of the season. It was our hope that the previous success of our military operations would then set free at Kabul various political forces and interests specially favourable to negotiations for peace. In any case, the situation might advantageously be left to develop itself during the period of inaction which must necessarily elapse before the passes were again practicable for the passage of troops. We naturally desired to be spared the necessity for further operations, but we felt that, if forced to re-open the campaign in the spring of the following year, we should then be in a position to do so with every possible advantage on our side. Our advanced bases would have been firmly established, their communications thoroughly secured, the organisation of transport and supply completed for more extended lines of advance, and our political influence pushed far beyond the range of our military posts, upon the three main approaches into the interior of the enemy's country. In short, we considered that the precautions thus taken to minimize both the magnitude and cost of the military operations, and the number of political risks and responsibilities involved in them, were also best suited to facilitate further military action, should such action be unfortunately rendered necessary by the course of events between the close of 1878 and the spring of 1879.

22. Such was the general plan of the campaign opened by the Government of India in Afghanistan on the 21st of November 1878. On that date General Sir Samuel Browne entered the Khyber, and attacked the fort of Ali Musjid. The fire of the fort was well sustained and directed, and the defence made by the garrison of Ali Musjid for several hours was creditable to its spirit. But the position, having been turned during the night, was precipitately abandoned by the enemy with the loss of all his guns, stores, and camp equipage. Several of the fugitives were captured by our troops,

and the remainder were plundered and dispersed by the Afridis. Sir Samuel Browne met with no further resistance on his march to Dakka, which he held unmolested for some weeks; but this position being found inconvenient for the lengthened occupation of so large a force, the General was, in the month of December, authorised to advance beyond it, and occupy Jellalabad; which he did without resistance, receiving there the unconditional submission of the local officials, and their request for British protection. No attempt was made by the Amir's army, at any subsequent period, to resist the advance of the British troops on this line of operations.

23. On the same day, General Roberts entered the Lower Kuram Valley; and he subsequently occupied, without opposition, the head-quarters of the district, replacing the Amir's officials by his own. He found the people of this district willing to submit to his authority, and furnish provisions for the supply of his troops. Continuing his advance into the Upper Kuram Valley, General Roberts there encountered a large Afghan force, established in a position of great strength, strongly armed with well posted artillery, on the ridge of the Peiwar Kotal; which commands the valley on one side of it, and the road, on the other, towards the Shutur-Gardan. This force he at once attacked. The attack resulted in the sharpest, and most important, engagement that has occurred during the whole campaign. The strategic strength of the enemy's position was very great, but it was quickly turned by our troops who, under the skilful command of General Roberts, completely defeated and routed those of the Amir. The broken Afghan regiments fled across the Shutur-Gardan, leaving all their guns behind them; and the limit assigned to the advance of our Kuram force was thus speedily reached and secured without further resistance. General Roberts had been instructed to push his reconnaissances, as opportunity might offer, into the adjoining valley of Khost, with a view to prevent the Amir from drawing either supplies or revenue from that district; and this instruction he successfully carried out in the month of January.

24. General Biddulph, entering Pishin on the 26th of November, found it already evacuated by the Amir's troops. The small, but important, district of Sibi, lying upon our line of communications close to the Biluch border, had, in the meanwhile, been occupied by a British detachment on the 23rd of the same month. Much political inconvenience had been caused by the interposition of this small Afghan district in the midst of Biluch territory, with which it is almost entirely surrounded; and we had, therefore, determined upon its permanent withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the Kabul authority. In December General Stewart reached Pishin, and, assuming command of the Kandahar Expeditionary Force, crossed the Kojak Range with considerable difficulty owing to the want of roads. On the 9th of January, after a skirmish with the Amir's outposts, in which the Afghan cavalry showed itself completely unable to make any stand against our own, he entered Kandahar. The town surrendered quietly. On the 21st of January his cavalry had pushed as far as Khelat-i-Ghilzai, while Girishk, on the Helmand, was occupied by a force under General Biddulph. On the 26th of February General Biddulph's cavalry distinguished itself in the repulse of an attack upon his rear guard when returning to Kandahar. With the exception of these engagements the occupation of Kandahar and the reconnaissance of the Helmand were effected without resistance, or any serious manifestation of national resentment at the presence of British troops.

25. Thus, within two days after the declaration of hostilities, the affront received by Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission at Ali Musjid was appropriately avenged on the spot where it had been offered. Within two weeks after the same date the passes of the Kyber and the Kuram were completely in our hands, and the Amir's troops swept clean beyond the range of our operations. Not long afterwards Jellalabad and Kandahar were occupied without resistance; and before the end of January (that is to say, in less than three months from the commencement of the campaign) the greater part of Southern Afghanistan, from the Helmand to Khelat-i-Ghilzai, had passed into the possession of the British Government. The rapid success of our military operations completely confirmed the calculations on which they had been based. The Amir's standing army was defeated and dispersed beyond all possibility of recovery; yet his Sirdirs had not risen to the rescue of his power. His towns opened their gates without remonstrance to our summons; their authorities readily responded to our requirements; and their inhabitants evinced no disposition to forfeit the pecuniary advantages they derived from the presence of our troops. Nor was the neutrality of the independent tribes less satisfactory than the indifference of the Afghan people. From these tribes our convoys and outposts, especially along the Kyber Pass, were exposed to occasional annoyance; but, generally speaking, all the long lines of communication between our advanced positions and their bases in British India were far more facilitated by the friendly co-operation, than impeded by the occasional thefts and assaults, of the tribes along the tracts they

traversed. Three years ago no European British subject could approach the Kyber Pass without serious personal danger. But during the greater part of the recent campaign telegraphic communication from Peshawur to Jellalabad was maintained along the entire length of this Pass.

26. In the meanwhile, our anticipations as to the probable political effects of successful military operations on the Kuram line had been justified with startling rapidity and completeness. General Roberts routed the Afghan army at Peiwar Kotal on the 2nd of December. Following, as it did, so shortly after the capture of Ali Musjid and the expulsion of the Afghan garrisons from the Kyber Pass, this event completed the destruction of Sher Ali's power, which had already been much weakened by previous reverses. The detailed news of their total defeat was carried to Kabul, with all the rapidity of panic, by the Amir's beaten and demoralised troops. Their discomfiture was contagious; it infected the garrisons of the capital, and the columns on which the Amir was reckoning for the reinforcement of a position already irretrievably lost. Instantaneous and wholesale desertions attested the moral effect of General Roberts' decisive victory. The standing army of Afghanistan had ceased to exist, and with it disappeared an authority which had no other support. On the 19th of December we received from Major Cavagnari, by telegraph, authentic intelligence that the Amir Sher Ali Khan had fled from Kabul, accompanied in his flight by the remaining officers of the Russian Mission; and that, in the last moment of his hurried departure, he had released from prison, and invested with the regency, his long incarcerated son Yakub Khan. The Amir announced his departure by a letter addressed to the British authorities. In this letter His Highness informed us that he had abandoned his dominions with the intention of proceeding to St. Petersburg for the purpose of there laying his case before the European Powers.

27. In these circumstances we authorised Major Cavagnari to address to Yakub Khan a letter which, though couched in general terms, was friendly in its tone, and such as to afford His Highness an opportunity of separating himself, were he so minded, from the policy which had proved so disastrous to his father. We at the same time instructed our authorities upon the frontier to explain to the Sirdars and people of Afghanistan that the cessation or continuance of hostilities now mainly depended on the manifestation of their feelings and wishes in regard thereto. Sher Ali, however, appears to have left Kabul in the hope of promptly obtaining from Russia all the means he required for the renewal of hostilities with the British Government. This, at least, was the hope attributed to His Highness by his son, his Sirdars, and his subjects. Until the reasonableness of such a hope had been practically tested the dread of the Amir's return to power, and possible reconciliation with the British Government, sufficed to repress any manifestation of the national sentiment. The Amir had left his capital but not his country. He halted on the Afghan side of the Oxus, where he was believed to be in communication with the local authorities of the Russian Government. Yakub Khan was not regarded either by himself or his fellow-subjects as a free agent. His reply to Major Cavagnari's letter expressed no desire, on his own behalf or that of his father the Amir, for a reconciliation with the British Government. But at Kabul, where apparently such a reconciliation was not regarded as impossible, there seemed to be a prevalent impression that, if it took place, Sher Ali would be restored to power; and that, in that case, his vengeance would fall, without scruple or restraint, upon all who had incurred his displeasure or suspicion during the war. It was obviously the interest, and indeed the necessity, of all concerned in the development of this ambiguous situation to wait upon events; and we had at least the satisfaction of feeling that, from the commanding position we had already secured, we could better afford to wait than either Sher Ali or Yakub Khan.

28. Towards the end of January it was reported about our frontier that the Amir Sher Ali had died at Mazar-i-Sharif in the north of Afghanistan. Early in February we received from Sirdar Yakub Khan a spontaneous communication, which contained distinct overtures for a reconciliation with the British Government, and an offer of his good offices, as an intermediary between ourselves and his father, the Amir, for the removal of differences which he regarded as susceptible of adjustment. A few days later we received from the Sirdar a letter, dated the 28th of February, informing us of the death of the Amir, and his own accession to the throne. These letters were addressed to Major Cavagnari, who was authorised to respond to the latter by a suitable expression of the Viceroy's condolences, and to the former by a plain statement of the terms on which His Excellency in Council was prepared to entertain negotiations for peace.

29. Those terms were in accordance with the essential objects of the war, as described in the preceding paragraphs of our present despatch; and they were subsequently

embodied, without modification in the treaty of peace concluded with the Amir of Afghanistan. They required that the foreign relations of His Highness should be placed under the acknowledged control of the British Government; and they provided for the effectual fulfilment of the mutual obligations involved in that condition; firstly, by securing to us the command of the principal passes between India and Afghanistan, together with the administration of the three districts since assigned to us by the treaty, and, secondly, by the admission of a permanent British resident at Kabul, with the right to depute British officers, as occasion may require, to any part of the Afghan frontiers. The further commercial and telegraphic clauses of the treaty are the result of subsequent negotiations opened at Gandamak.

30. The Amir Yakub Khan agreed, without hesitation, to place his foreign relations under British control; he also at once accepted in principle, as a necessary consequence of this arrangement, our condition respecting European British agencies in Afghanistan. To our territorial conditions, however, His Highness, as might have been expected, evinced considerable repugnance, and for the withdrawal of them he made to us a strong appeal.

31. These conditions could not be waived without sacrificing one of the essential objects of the war; an object dictated to us by a deep concern for the permanent security of Her Majesty's Indian Empire. We were in a position to enforce them without further reference to the Amir; for we already held a much larger portion of Afghan territory than we had any desire to retain. It was, therefore, at all times open to us to proclaim the permanent extension of British jurisdiction to the districts of Kuram, Pishin, and Sibi. A similar course had been found convenient by Lord Dalhousie in dealing with the Court of Ava at the close of the last Burmese war. But the circumstances and objects of the second Burmese war were very different from those of the second Afghan war; and, for obvious reasons, we contemplated with great reluctance the adoption of any such course on the present occasion. We conceive that the Government of a powerful civilized state is in no circumstances morally free, because it is practically able, to consult its own convenience without reference to the manner in which the legitimate welfare of its weaker neighbours may be affected by its action or inaction. But special force was given to this consideration by all the circumstances and conditions of the late Afghan war. The efficient, but humane, prosecution of that war involved duties, not only towards the people of India, but also towards the people of Afghanistan; whose country we had not willingly invaded, and whose legitimate interests we had assuredly no wish or cause to injure. We desire the friendship and prosperity of that people, the confidence and stability of their ruler, and a mutual recognition of those peaceful interests which are common to their Government and our own. The withdrawal of our troops from their advanced positions in Southern Afghanistan without reference to the effect of such a measure on the country concerned, would have probably consigned all parts of the Amir's dominions to a condition incompatible with orderly government or tolerable neighbourhood. We had already secured possession of the improved frontier we required; but this was not enough. We had still to secure the exclusion of all foreign influence from the whole of Afghanistan, as well as the goodwill and confidence of the Afghan people and their ruler. To the attainment of these objects our policy had been not less steadily directed; for the undisturbed tranquility of any frontier must necessarily depend, to some extent, upon the peaceable condition of the countries with which it is contiguous, and the satisfactory character of relations with the Governments of such countries. Although, therefore, we could afford, far better than the Amir, to await the result of negotiations for peace, we deemed it our duty to spare no effort, consistent with the dignity of the British Crown, and the just interests of its Indian dominions, for the early establishment of mutually satisfactory relations with the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan.

32. So many and such mischievous misrepresentations of our Afghan policy, more especially in reference to territorial questions, had been propagated after the rupture of our relations with Sher Ali, that the Amir's reluctance to entertain any territorial basis of negotiation appeared to us very probably attributable to exaggerated and erroneous apprehensions as to the real character of the arrangements we deemed essential to the future security of our frontier. We felt, however, that their moderation must be admitted if they were compared with the conditions of a similar character hitherto dictated, at the close of victorious wars, by conquering to conquered powers; and we believed that, if the object and scope of them were thoroughly understood by the Amir, the last obstacle would be removed from the conclusion of a mutually honourable and advantageous treaty of peace between His Highness and the British Government. For this, it was necessary that there should be between us a frank interchange of views and

wishes on the subject of our relative positions. Such interchange of views could not be satisfactorily carried on by formal correspondence or without personal intercourse, but long and varied experience had convinced us that the policy of a European Government cannot be adequately interpreted or represented by Asiatic agents, however loyal and intelligent they may be. Many of our minor troubles on the frontier have been caused by the employment of Asiatics as mediums of communication between the British authorities and the border tribes, and whatever improvements have been effected during the last three years in our relations with those tribes and the neighbouring tribal States, such as Biluchistan, are due to the personal influence of British officers. Warned by this knowledge, we felt that to entrust the detailed explanation and discussion of our views to any Native agent would insure misconception and resistance on the part of the Amir. On the other hand, we reposed complete confidence in the discretion and ability of Major Cavagnari, and for all these reasons we were anxious to bring about, if possible, early and unreserved personal intercourse between him and the Amir of Kabul. Having regard to the Amir's position at that time, we did not feel justified in proposing that His Highness should leave his capital for this purpose, and having regard to our own position, we were fully conscious that our motives in proposing to Yakub Khan a personal conference with Major Cavagnari at Kabul, would probably be misconstrued by the public, and possibly misrepresented to the Amir. We considered, however, that we ought not to be deterred by this consideration from taking the course which we had good reason to regard as most conducive to the early re-establishment of peaceful relations with His Highness upon a thoroughly sound and honourable footing. We, therefore, authorised Major Cavagnari to address to the Amir proposals for a personal conference at Kabul on the subject of our territorial conditions. These proposals having been accepted, the native bearer of them was instructed to arrange with Yakub Khan for the proper reception of Major Cavagnari at the court of his Highness.

33. In the meanwhile, the suspended activity of our troops upon the Khyber line, had begun to exercise a very prejudicial influence upon our political, as well as our military position in Afghanistan. Although, for political reasons, the capture and occupation of Kabul had been excluded from our plan of military operations, it was obviously most inexpedient to proclaim or avow that decision. The continued inactivity of our forces, however, in positions so closely threatening the Afghan capital, and the comments made upon it by our own press, had gradually encouraged the people of Kabul and the intervening tribes, to attribute their freedom from molestation on our part to our concealed inability to advance any further. We had reason to believe that these impressions were strengthened by questions asked and opinions expressed in Parliament, of which the reports rapidly circulated beyond our frontier, were such as to suggest a conclusion that rather than incur the cost and inconvenience of further military operations, the British Government was ready to make peace with the Amir of Afghanistan on terms dictated, not by itself, but by His Highness. The result was an apparent disposition on the part of the Amir to assume towards us a more reserved and ambiguous attitude, and a recrudescence of petty, but vexatious and harassing attacks from the surrounding tribes, acting on the instigation of fanatical Mollahs from Kabul. These attacks gave rise to two actions, in which severe loss was inflicted on the Shinwari tribe by Brigadier-General Tytler at Deh Sarrak, and on the Khugianis by Brigadier-General Gough at Futtehabad. The tribes thus defeated are among the most restless and warlike of those with whom our troops were brought into contact during the recent campaign, and we cannot doubt that their complete discomfiture on the occasions above mentioned, contributed to the encouragement of pacific influences in the councils of the Amir. At the same time, the increasing heat of the weather and the defective sanitary conditions of Jellalabad, had begun to tell injuriously on the health of the large force concentrated in that locality, and due regard to the well-being of our troops necessitated an immediate change of quarters to some higher and healthier ground.

34. We consequently authorised General Sir Samuel Browne to advance a portion of his force as far as Gandamak. This movement was primarily dictated by sanitary motives of an urgent character, but in authorising it, we were not indifferent to the important political advantages it offered as a significant corrective to the erroneous impressions referred to in the preceding paragraph.

35. Within a few days after the occupation of Gandamak, a letter from the Amir announced his intention of proceeding to that place for the purpose of there entering into personal conference with Major Cavagnari. This was clearly a more satisfactory arrangement than the deputation of a British envoy to Kabul. Major Cavagnari was therefore instructed to arrange with General Sir Samuel Browne for the honourable

reception of His Highness, and was invested with full powers to represent this government in negotiations, respecting which he had previously been furnished with detailed oral instructions by the Viceroy at Lahore. The Amir reached Gandamak on the 8th of May, and was received there by the British authorities with all possible honour and hospitality. After the formal ceremonies of his reception, negotiations were opened by His Highness, and continued without interruption till the 26th of May, when the treaty of that date was signed in the British camp by the Amir on behalf of Afghanistan, and by Major Cavagnari on behalf of the British government.

36. The several Articles of this Treaty were framed in the belief that they fully secure all the objects of the war which have already been explained. The 3rd Article establishes our paramount position in Afghanistan and our adequate control over the Amir's external relations. Our obligation to assist His Highness against foreign aggression is the legitimate consequence of this condition, and it is required of us not less imperatively for the security of India than for the independence of Afghanistan. But the British Government could not have undertaken such an obligation if the means of fulfilling it had not been secured by the 4th Article of the Treaty, which provides for the residence at Kabul of a British representative, and for the right to depute British agents, as occasion may require, to all parts of the Afghan frontier. The Amir himself had requested that our permanent representative should reside at his capital, and from the opening of the negotiations, he has evinced no disinclination to the admission of British officers within his dominions. Such disinclination would, indeed, have been incompatible with any sincere desire for the advantages of British friendship and support, and the Amir's appreciation of these advantages has been manifested, not only by his conduct during the negotiations, but still more effectually by the alacrity and loyalty with which he is already carrying out his treaty obligations in reference to the amnesty clause, and other minor matters.

37. Under the 6th and 7th Articles of the treaty, His Highness engages to take measures for the protection and encouragement of commerce between India and Afghanistan. This engagement will receive practical development in a special commercial convention to be concluded within twelve months from the ratification of the treaty of Gandamak. Some such interval was required for the arrangement of details connected with the selection and improvement of roads, and for the examination of the nature and circumstances of the trade between the two countries, as well as for the reciprocal adjustment of duties. It is premature to forecast the ultimate results of arrangements now for the first time possible, in reference to the security and expansion of the overland commerce of India with other Asiatic countries. But on our western frontier access to and from India, although far from easy, is not impeded by such great natural barriers as elsewhere interpose almost insuperable obstacles to regular and frequent intercourse, by land, with the rest of Asia. On this part of our border the main hindrances to commerce have always been political, and of late years such hindrances were increased both by the chronic misrule and jealous isolation of the Afghan Government, and also by the inadequacy of internal restraints upon the marauding tribes who hold the passes. When these impediments disappear, we may look for a considerable expansion of the land-borne commerce of Northern India. Afghanistan itself is a country of no great productive resources, but it commands the routes which penetrate into Central and Western Asia; and the commercial classes, not only of that country, but also of those immediately beyond the Upper Oxus, are largely Indian, or of Indian descent. The trade of Afghanistan is principally in Indian hands; and the Russian Governor at Tashkend recently promulgated a severe edict against the Hindu bankers of Turkestan, who are mostly emigrants from the western districts of India. The route by Herat and Kandahar runs through the more open and fertile parts of Afghanistan, connecting the important towns of Herat and Kandahar. The treaty signed with His Highness the Khan of Khelat towards the close of the year 1876 effected the pacification of Biluchistan, and re-opened the great trade route, through the Bolan Pass, which has not since been interrupted. By that arrangement the commerce of Central Asia, after reaching Kandahar, is placed in safe connection with the railway system of India and the rising seaport of Kurrachi. There is already a noticeable tendency to increase in the number of caravans now annually passing the Bolan; and the merchants of Sind have always been among the most industrious and enterprising of our foreign traders. With proper management, therefore, and under a judicious system of transit duties, considerable expansion may be reasonably expected in the external commerce of India upon this important line. All such considerations will receive our careful attention in the negotiation of the Commercial Convention which remains to be concluded with the Amir of Kabul.

38. It may be here mentioned that our political officers who accompanied the columns withdrawn from Kandahar in the spring of this year have explored much of the country, hitherto almost unknown, which lies on the direct lines between Pishin and the Indian frontier below Dera Ghazi Khan. They have ascertained that the routes through this country traverse elevated valleys and high plateaux, where the climate is at no season of the year very unfavourable, and where supplies and water are comparatively abundant. The tribes who inhabit this region are less unfriendly to strangers than the northern Pathans; and the construction and maintenance of good fair weather roads present no serious difficulties. There is little doubt that this was the direction taken by the earlier trade routes into India from Persia and Southern Afghanistan, and on commercial as well as on military grounds the possibility of restoring those channels of communication deserves further examination.

39. The treaty of Gandamak provides for the immediate commencement of telegraphic communication between Kabul and India. The advantages of such communication are obvious; and the establishment of it will both illustrate and confirm the character of the change now effected in our relations with Afghanistan.

40. The territorial concessions imposed upon the Amir are light, and involve no permanent alienation of any part of the dominions claimed by his Government. The Khyber Pass has never formed part of those dominions; while the districts of Pishin, Sibi, and Kuram are retained by the British Government under an assignment. For the better protection and security of our frontier, and for the proper maintenance of communications with our advanced garrisons, which will observe and command the three principal passes into India, it was essential that these three districts should remain in our hands. But we have entertained no projects for establishing ourselves permanently in the interior of the country, or for occupying any posts not absolutely required for the defensive purposes explained in the 11th paragraph of this despatch. Accordingly the towns of Kandahar and Jellalabad are restored by the treaty of Gandamak to the Amir of Kabul. The passes of the Kojak Mountains will be carefully kept under our own control; and it is probable that the hill skirts of the Pishin country, like the upper districts of the Kuram Valley, will provide fresh and valuable sanitarium for our troops. But the local experience recently acquired by our expedition into Western Afghanistan has fully confirmed our previous impression that the strategic value of Kandahar exists only in connection with a system of frontier defence much more extensive than any we now require or have ever contemplated. Kandahar is now easily accessible from our advanced position in Pishin, and can, at any time, be occupied without difficulty; but the permanent occupation of it (involving the maintenance of long lines of communication) would have considerably increased our military expenditure without strengthening our military position. It is, however, mainly on political grounds that the retention of Kandahar was excluded from the conditions of the Treaty of Gandamak. Such a condition would have been extremely painful to the Amir, and detrimental to the strength and credit of his government. Without Kandahar it would be difficult for the central authority at Kabul to maintain any effective hold upon Herat; and the foreign occupation of so important a city, in the interior of his dominions, would have been inconsistent with those relations of friendship and mutual confidence which the treaty was designed to establish between the British Government and the Amir of Afghanistan.

41. Similar objections applied to the retention of Jellalabad. As a military position that town offers no advantages not better secured by a garrison on the Lundi Kotal ridge. It can at any moment be seized by a rapid advance from the Khyber, and to hold it as a permanent frontier garrison would require the prolongation as far as Gandamak of a troublesome line of military communications. Such an extension of our frontier, though necessarily increasing our permanent military expenditure, would also, no doubt, increase our permanent political influence over the adjacent tribes and petty chiefships to the north-east of the frontier thus extended. But the only political advantage thereby acquired would be the means of utilising those tribes and chiefships as a barrier, in case of need, against the action of any hostile power at Kabul; and for the control or punishment of such action material guarantees, far more effectual, are provided by the treaty, which secures to us the permanent military command of Kabul from the crest of the Shutur-Gardan. In short, we have framed this treaty with an earnest desire to render all the conditions of it not only consistent with but also conducive to the maintenance of that friendly and mutually advantageous footing on which it re-establishes our relations with Afghanistan; and from those relations we have laboured to eliminate every appreciable cause of irritation and disunion.

42. The engagements thus concluded at Gandamak with the Amir Yakub Khan represent and attest an important change in the whole condition of Central Asian affairs.

The magnitude of this change will be best appreciated when our present position and influence beyond the frontier are compared with what they were during the greater portion of the preceding period between the Umballa Conferences and the recent Afghan War. We do not, however, profess to ascribe any talismanic virtue to written engagements on the part of Afghan Princes. The late Amir Sher Ali, throughout the whole period of his reign, was under a formal treaty obligation to be the friend of the friends, and the enemy of the enemies, of the British Government; but that engagement in no wise prevented his adoption of a course which led him into inevitable rupture and open hostility with this Government. We regard the present treaty rather as the commencement than as the confirmation of a new and better era in our relations with Afghanistan. It provides for and facilitates the attainment of results incalculably beneficial to the two countries concerned. The character of those results, however, will, to a great extent, be determined by the steadiness with which the British Government maintains, and the intelligence with which its local agents carry out, the policy that has dictated this treaty—a policy which has for its object to substitute co-operation for isolation, and to replace mutual mistrust by mutual confidence. Nor do we disguise from ourselves that the practical value of the treaty mainly depends upon the character and disposition of the Amir and his successors. Relations established with Afghanistan under the most favourable conditions and with the most promising prospects may, of course, be again impaired either by the disloyalty of Afghan Princes or by the alienation of their unrequited confidence. In either case complications may arise, against which no present precautions on our part can completely guarantee our successors in the government of India. But, though anxious to deal considerably with the Amir's susceptibilities, and to take into the fullest account all the reasonable requirements and legitimate interests of his Government, we deem it absolutely requisite that, in countries like Afghanistan, the power of the British Government to punish its enemies and protect its friends should be so generally recognised as to render unnecessary the frequent assertion of it. We have, therefore, been careful to secure, for British interests and influence in Afghanistan, a position substantially independent of the personal caprices of any Afghan ruler; and for the effectual maintenance of that position the treaty provides strong material guarantees, by the territorial conditions which place the British power in permanent command of the main avenues from India to Kabul.

43. Your Lordship will, of course, understand that, in thus speaking of British interests and influence in Afghanistan, we mean the interests only of our alliance with that state in reference to external affairs, and the influence only which is necessary to maintain and direct a common policy on behalf of those interests. We in no wise contemplate any system of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; and the British Envoy at Kabul will be strictly required to abstain from such interference. The small subsidy which we grant to the Amir will, we hope, strengthen his hands in maintaining his authority.

44. Notwithstanding the conditions it imposes, the Treaty of Gandamak, so far as we can judge, is regarded with satisfaction by the Amir, to whose possession it restores important tracts of territory, which His Highness could not have recovered by the sword, and to the peaceful consolidation of whose authority it will, we trust, powerfully contribute. We desire to record our high appreciation of the signal ability with which Major Cavagnari conducted the negotiations to this successful conclusion; and it is, we think, difficult to over-estimate the value of his political services throughout the campaign. The political officers, generally, had difficult duties to perform, and they discharged them with great tact and efficiency.

45. We have also much pleasure in mentioning to your Lordship that, not only the justice of the war, and the humanity with which it has been waged by the British Government, but also the fair and generous terms on which we have concluded it, are now receiving unreserved recognition in numerous communications spontaneously addressed to the Viceroy by Her Majesty's feudatories and native subjects in all parts of India.

46. By the Khan of Khelat (with whom our relations four years ago had been very unsatisfactory) the cause of the British Government throughout this war has been well supported beyond the frontiers of India. It cannot be doubted that the conditions of the treaty signed with the Amir of Kabul at Gandamak in 1879 have been greatly facilitated by the results of the treaty signed with the Khan of Khelat at Jacobabad in 1876. Certain it is, that the military difficulties of the war, and the political impediments to the peace, now happily concluded, would have been seriously aggravated by hostile or untrustworthy conduct on the part of the Sovereign and sirdars of Khelat. For the fidelity with which the Khan has observed his treaty obligations, and for the uninterrupted

sympathy and goodwill of the Biluch tribes and sirdars we are largely indebted to the personal influence of Major Sandeman, and to the ability with which he has discharged his important duties as the Governor-General's agent in Khelat. We shall take an early opportunity of submitting to your Lordship the measures whereby we propose to mark our appreciation of the friendly and loyal attitude maintained by His Highness Khodadad Khan of Khelat throughout the progress and settlement of our disputes with the late Amir of Kabul.

47. It now only remains to notice those conditions of the treaty which have reference to the independent tribes of the Khyber and Michni Passes. We do not, of course, anticipate the immediate or habitual good behaviour of all these wild hillmen, whose tribal organisation is infinitely various, and whose management will doubtless require much skill and patience on the part of the political officers intrusted with that task. But it is a task which presents no difficulties insurmountable by the steady exercise of such qualities. At no time since the annexation of the Punjab has the mountain border of that province been wholly free from depredation and insult on the part of the surrounding tribes, nor can it be reasonably expected that what successive Governments of India have failed to accomplish in the course of thirty years will now be accomplished all at once. We must be prepared for occasional misconduct (especially during the first two or three years of the new arrangements), requiring from us recourse to punitive measures. But, apart from the indirect advantage of such increased respect as our authority has acquired from our military successes during the war, our practical power of controlling the border tribes has been greatly strengthened by the treaty. The Amir of Kabul has now neither the motive nor the means to incite these tribes to acts of hostility against us. The policy applied during the last three years to the pass tribes of Biluchistan has already effected the complete pacification of even their most turbulent sections, and the Bolan Pass, though unguarded by British troops, has been remarkably safe and quiet. These facts justify us in anticipating the most satisfactory results from the judicious and patient application of a similar system to the management of the Khyber and Michni Passes.

48. We cannot close this narrative of the second Afghan war without bringing prominently to your Lordship's notice the high character maintained by Her Majesty's troops, both English and Native, and their admirable conduct throughout the campaign. The enemy's positions in the Khyber and Kuram Passes were of great natural strength, but, though powerfully armed and vigorously defended, they were rapidly captured. His forces, dislodged from these positions with the loss of their guns and stores, were not merely defeated, but dispersed. In the advance to Kandahar, the superiority of the British cavalry was established as soon as tested, at the outset of the campaign. Against the valour and steadiness of the British soldier the fiercest assaults of the most warlike mountain tribes were as ineffectual as the organised resistance of the Amir's regular troops. Under conditions more trying than those of actual combat, the strictest discipline has been maintained throughout all ranks of the field forces, and the life and property of non-combatants effectually protected. It would be out of place in this report to specify particular services or particular regiments; but the Viceroy desires to record his high appreciation, in which we cordially concur, of the good service performed by the Native as well as the European regiments of the army of India in Afghanistan, where their discipline and courage were attested, not only by the uniform success of their arms, but also by the steadiness of their conduct under those trials and privations which are incidental to periods of inaction on the part of an invading army in a wild and inhospitable country.

49. We have also to acknowledge with sincere satisfaction the thoroughly creditable efficiency and patriotic spirit with which the contingents of the native states have sustained their honorable part in the labours of the late campaign.


We have, &c.

(Signed)	LYTTON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
"	A. CLARKE.
"	J. STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	W. STOKES.
"	A. R. THOMPSON.


LONDON :
Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

AFGHANISTAN, No. 8.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.



Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY,
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1879.

[C.-2402.] Price 1d.

DESPATCH.

No. 27.

Secret,
No. 27.

India Office,
London, 7th August 1879.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA
in Council.

MY LORD,

Para. 1. I have to acknowledge the receipt of letter from Your Excellency's Government, No. 136, dated the 2nd June last, transmitting, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the treaty of peace and friendship which you have concluded with the Ameer Yakoob Khan, and also of your subsequent letter, No. 160, dated the 7th July, received on the 2nd instant, explaining the considerations by which you were influenced in regulating the course of the recent campaign in Afghanistan and in the settlement of terms of peace.

2. My despatch of the 18th of November last reviewed the leading features of the policy followed by the British Government towards Afghanistan in such detail as to render unnecessary, on the present occasion, any further remarks on the subject. The refusal of the late Ameer, Shere Ali Khan, to admit within his territories an envoy from Your Excellency, after he had, in the summer of last year, welcomed a Russian mission to his capital, compelled Her Majesty's Government to demand reparation for the insult thus offered, and to intimate that his position would be regarded as that of a declared enemy unless the reparation required was afforded by a specified date. The Ameer had for some time previous adopted a course of conduct which tended to endanger both the security of the north-west frontier and the peace of the empire at large. This unfriendly attitude was met with forbearance, but the time at length arrived when it became necessary to abandon a policy which had apparently encouraged His Highness to undervalue the power, as he had already disregarded the wishes, of the British Government.

3. Her Majesty's Government were not without hope that the communication addressed to the Ameer would rouse him to a sense of his critical position, and that he would reply in such terms as might render hostilities unnecessary. This hope, however, was not fulfilled; the date specified passed without any reply from His Highness, and no alternative remained but prompt and decided action. The passage of the Afghan frontier by British troops was followed by the defeat of the forces which guarded it, and the rapid occupation of positions which placed the territories of the Ameer at the mercy of the British Government. Simultaneously with the advance of the troops, Your Excellency issued a proclamation, which clearly intimated to the Afghan sirdars and people that the invasion of their country was the consequence solely of the ill-advised conduct of their ruler; and that the British Government in no way desired to injure the people of Afghanistan, or to attach to them any share of responsibility for Shere Ali's proceedings. The considerations which led your Excellency in Council to anticipate important advantages from thus proclaiming a practical distinction between the Afghan people and their ruler, as set forth in the 13th paragraph of your letter of the 7th July, were weighty, and are proved by the result to have been based on an accurate estimate of public feeling in Afghanistan and of the extent to which the late Ameer, by his domestic and foreign policy, had alienated the feelings of his subjects.

4. There were grounds for believing that the rapid march of the British columns and the signal failure of the Afghan troops, although occupying formidable and well-selected positions, to offer any effective resistance, might satisfy Shere Ali of the rashness of his conduct and induce overtures from him of an acceptable character. The event, however, was different; within three weeks after the advance of Her Majesty's forces, the Ameer, having first released from prison his son Yakoob Khan, whom he at once appointed Governor of Cabul, quitted that city for Turkistan, accompanied by those members of the Russian mission who had remained at the capital after the departure of General Stoletoff.

5. The ultimate intentions of Shere Ali at this time are necessarily involved in some obscurity. Whatever they may have been, they were frustrated by his death on the 21st of February. Capricious at all times, and, in his later years, unfriendly as he had proved himself to be, Her Majesty's Government could not but receive with regret the intelligence of the decease of a prince with whom the Government of India had at one

period been on terms of cordiality, and who, moreover, had shown himself possessed of many of the qualities required in a ruler of Afghanistan. The event, followed as it was by the undisputed accession to power of the present Ameer, enabled your Excellency's Government to suspend further military operations, and unquestionably rendered less difficult the re-establishment of relations between the British and Afghan Governments on a satisfactory footing. Yakoob Khan had necessarily been free from responsibility for his father's policy; pacific overtures could, therefore, be made by him without humiliation, and he wisely took immediate steps to secure that alliance which his father had forfeited. His early communications addressed to your political officer at Gundamak indicated a desire for peace, and his eventual decision to leave his capital and proceed in person to the British camp afforded proof of his confidence in the moderation and justice of the British Government, and of his readiness to accept in principle the terms you were prepared to offer him, with the general nature of which he had been previously made acquainted.

6. This confidence was not misplaced, and to it, and to the correct appreciation shown by the Ameer of the true relative positions of the two Governments, must, in a great measure, be attributed the success of the negotiations which followed his arrival at Gundamak. I have already conveyed to you by telegraph the approval, by Her Majesty's Government, of the conditions of the treaty by which those negotiations were closed, and it is, therefore, only requisite for me now to make a few general remarks on some of its more important articles.

7. The second article, which guarantees an amnesty on the part of the Ameer in favour of those of his subjects who may have aided the British forces during recent operations, was essential to guard against the occurrence of reprisals such as followed the close of the last Afghan war. Her Majesty's Government learn with particular satisfaction that the Ameer has indicated in a practical way his desire to give effect to its stipulations, and they are confident that His Highness will take care that this desire is not contravened by any act or negligence on the part of subordinate officials. Her Majesty's Government attach special importance to this matter, which materially affects the honour of the British name.

8. The third article of the Treaty, which defines the future political relations of the two Governments, appears to Her Majesty's advisers to secure to each of the parties to it everything that is essential to their respective interests. On the one hand the Ameer undertakes to conduct his relations with foreign states in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government; on the other hand, he receives a guarantee against any consequences which may ensue to him from the due observance of this undertaking, and against unprovoked foreign aggression. At the same time, the concluding passage of the article indicates the strict adherence of the British Government to its oft declared policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, which is again plainly affirmed in the fifth article. It being obvious that, so long as His Highness conforms strictly to his treaty obligations, foreign aggression must necessarily be unprovoked by any spontaneous act on his part, Her Majesty's Government see every reason to believe that the unambiguous stipulations which have now been recorded in a solemn instrument will be conducive to the material prosperity of Afghanistan, to the tranquillity of India, and to the peace of Central Asia.

9. The conditions embodied in the fourth article in regard to the establishment of British agencies in Afghanistan are likely to secure the objects which Her Majesty's Government have in view. It is satisfactory that one of the first acts of the Ameer after opening negotiations should have been to express his desire to receive a permanent British resident at his capital. Although Her Majesty's Government always abstained from pressing this measure on the late Ameer in deference to his objections, they have never ceased to consider it in itself expedient; they believe that even the occasional presence at Cabul of an officer of sound judgment might have obviated many of the misunderstandings of recent years; they are satisfied that the objections expressed by Shere Ali will be shown to have been without substantial foundation; and they anticipate with confidence that the effect of the presence of a British officer at Cabul will be to consolidate that unity of policy between the Governments of India and Afghanistan which it is the first object of the treaty to establish. Her Majesty's Government are glad to observe that you have accorded to the Ameer the privilege of deputing his own agents similarly to India. They believe that many advantages will accrue to both Governments by the presence of an Afghan envoy of good sense and ability at Your Excellency's Court.

10. The right has properly been reserved to the British Government to send subordinate agents to the Afghan frontier, when such a measure may be considered necessary. With a competent resident at Cabul, the permanent location of English officers at Herat, Candahar, and other points on the frontier will, no doubt, be less essential than, up to the present time, Her Majesty's Government have considered it to be. It is clear, however, that the British Government cannot ensure the integrity of the Ameer's dominions against foreign aggression unless they have every reasonable facility for acquiring trustworthy information of events beyond the border through the channel of officers deputed from time to time to the frontier.

11. The territorial arrangements specified in Article IX. secure to the British Government that control over the western passes, and the tribes inhabiting them, which the course of events has rendered essential. The strategic defects of the Indian frontier in the direction of Afghanistan, as that frontier has existed since the acquisition of the Punjab, are very clearly stated in your letter of the 7th July. As is therein observed, it was not compatible with the policy and principles of the British Government to have recourse to the sword for the purpose of strengthening its position; but the successful conclusion of a war, which every effort was made to avert, has been legitimately used to remedy defects, of which the gravity could no longer be overlooked. Her Majesty's Government are gratified that it has been found possible to secure an object so important without actual annexation of Afghan territory, and, in particular, without a permanent occupation of the cities of Candahar and Jellalabad. They agree in the opinion of your Excellency in Council that the loss of those places, and especially of Candahar, would have been extremely detrimental to the strength and credit of the Afghan Government, while they see no reason to question the judgment of your competent professional advisers that it was not necessary, on strategic grounds, to incur so grave a political disadvantage.

12. Her Majesty's Government do not underrate the difficulties which may for some time be experienced in dealing with the tribes now first brought under the control of the Indian Government; but they are persuaded that the same energy and judgment which has been attended with such admirable results on the existing Punjab and Sindh frontiers will be equally successful in the new and more extended sphere in which those qualities will now be exercised.

13. The engagement in regard to the construction of a line of telegraph to Cabul through the Kurram valley, and the improvement of the present imperfect facilities for commercial intercourse between India and Afghanistan, which are embodied in Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the treaty, are cordially approved by Her Majesty's Government. Although the promises made by Shere Ali to the late Lord Mayo on this subject were never fulfilled, he lived to see the benefit which accrued to his country by the measures agreed upon by your Excellency's Government and the Khan and sirdars of Khelat, affecting the lower trade routes between Afghanistan and Beluchistan. The Ameer Yakoub Khan has only to observe the improvement in those regions, in the way both of extended trade and of increased civilisation, to appreciate the solid advantages which commercial facilities and improved communications bring in their train.

14. The subsidy accorded to the Ameer, under Article X. of the Treaty, appears to Her Majesty's Government to be moderate in amount, and necessary to the support of His Highness's legitimate authority. Experience has shown that it is difficult for the ruler of so poor a country as Afghanistan to dispense with material aid of this kind; but its continuance has properly been made dependent on the efficient fulfilment by the Ameer of the engagements which he has now contracted.

15. Her Majesty's Government have observed with great pleasure the loyalty manifested by the Native Chiefs and Princes of India, both individually and collectively, in the recent crisis. Their anxiety to take an active part in the war, and the unreserved manner in which they placed their resources at the disposal of your Excellency's Government, are gratifying evidences of unity of interests and mutual good feeling and confidence between the British Government and the great feudatories of the Empire. Equally satisfactory has been the conduct of the Khan of Khelat, whose friendly and loyal attitude, no doubt, greatly facilitated the military operations in Southern Afghanistan. Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to give the most favourable consideration to any measures which your Excellency in Council may propose for the purpose of marking their recognition of His Highness's services.

16. As I propose to address you separately in the Military Department on the purely military aspect of the operations now happily terminated, I confine myself at present to recording Her Majesty's complete satisfaction with the conduct of officers and men, European and Native, under circumstances trying to their endurance and discipline.

17. The various political officers attached to the columns and detachments in the field have had delicate and onerous duties to perform, and have discharged them in such a manner as to add materially to their reputations. The services of Major Cavagnari and Major Sandeman in particular have been of special importance to your Government. The value of Major Sandeman's personal influence over the Khan of Khelat and the Biluch sirdars can scarcely be over-rated; while Major Cavagnari's conduct of the various duties which fell to him during the campaign, and of the negotiations which have led to the restoration of peace with Afghanistan, was marked by tact and ability of a high order.

18. I have only, in conclusion, to express the deep interest with which Her Majesty's Government have perused the clear and able exposition of the policy of the Government of India in connection with recent Afghan affairs, which is contained in your letter, No. 160, of the 7th July, and their cordial approval of the proceedings of your Excellency in Council throughout the critical period which is now closed. In carrying out, from time to time, their wishes and instructions, your Excellency and your colleagues have displayed uniform discretion and judgment, and an accurate appreciation of the objects essential to be attained. Her Majesty's Government confidently believe that the policy embodied in the Treaty of Gundamak, to which your Excellency personally has so eminently contributed, will, if pursued consistently, secure both British and Afghan interests, and promote the stability and peace of the Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CRANBROOK.

LONDON:

Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

AFGHAN WAR (OFFICERS PRESENT WITH NATIVE REGIMENTS).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons,
dated 12 August 1879;—for,


“RETURN showing OFFICERS present with Regiments of NATIVE CAVALRY and INFANTRY, moved on account of the AFGHAN WAR, on the 1st day of September 1878; those who subsequently Joined who became Non-Effective, and the Cause and Date, and those who remained Effective, completed up to the 30th day of June 1879 (in the same Form, and in completion of Return, East Indian Army, presented on the 14th day of July).”

India Office, }
6 February 1880. }

EDWARD STANHOPE,
Under Secretary of State.

(*Sir Henry Havelock.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
18 March 1880.



B E N G A L A R M Y.

RETURN showing the Rank and Names of the BRITISH OFFICERS serving with each Regiment of NATIVE CAVALRY and INFANTRY, employed in or moved for the AFGHAN CAMPAIGN of 1878, on the 1st day of September 1878, either in the Advanced Columns or in Support, with Names of the Officers subsequently attached to each, and the Casualties amongst them, made up to the 30th day of June 1879.

D A T E.	Name of the Regiment.	Station from which it was moved for the War.	To which Force attached.	Rank and Names of the British Regimental Officers (including Staff Corps).	If become Non-effective, give Cause.	D A T E.
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	8th Bengal Cavalry (Late 18th Irregular Cavalry.)	Mooltan	1st Division, Kandahar Force - Lieutenant General Stewart's Force.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>		
				1 Colonel - B. W. Ryall, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				2 Major - H. Chapman, Staff Corps -	- ditto - - ditto.	
				3 Captain - A. F. Lindsay, Staff Corps -	On general leave - - -	- May 1879
				4 Ditto - J. A. McNeale, General List, Infantry.	1 July 1879.	
				5 Lieutenant - J. L. Abernigh-Mackay, Staff Corps.	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				6 Ditto - G. H. Lumsden, 43rd Foot (on probation).	Sick at Mooltan - - -	30 Oct. 1878
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>	Furlough to 1 July 1879.	- May. 1879
				7 Lieutenant - F. G. Pollock, 51st Foot (on probation).	On privilege leave to 1 July 1879.	
	Returned to India, 18 April 1879.			8 Ditto - J. F. D. Fordyce, Staff Corps -	to 1 July 1879.	
				<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>	Appointed to the Corps. Joined	1 Nov. 1878
				1 Major - O. Barnes, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				2 Lieutenant - E. J. F. Wood, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from furlough - -	- Nov. 1878
				3 Ditto - C. E. Pollock, 1-8th Foot (on probation).	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				4 Ditto - F. H. R. Drummond, 109th Foot (on probation).	Leave on medical certificate to 1 July 1879.	
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>	Effective on 1 July 1879.	
				5 Colonel - C. H. Palliser, C.B., Staff Corps -	Rejoined from privilege leave -	- May 1879
				6 Captain - S. D. Barrow, Staff Corps -	Appointed Brigadier General, Kandahar Force.	
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	10th Bengal (the Duke of Cambridge's Own) Lancers. (Late 2nd Regiment Hodson's Horse.)	Umballa	2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>	Rejoined from Field Service Privilege leave 60 days -	- Oct. 1878
				7 Lieutenant - A. Burlton-Bennett, Staff Corps -	to 1 July 1879.	2 Nov. 1878
				8 Major - A. England, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from Field Service at Nowshera to 1 July 1879.	- June 1879
				9 Captain - D. M. Strong, General List, Infantry.	Leave on medical certificate -	- Dec. 1878
					to 1 July 1879.	- April 1879
					Rejoined from furlough -	9 Jan. 1879
					Leave on medical certificate -	- June 1879
					to 1 July 1879.	
					Rejoined from furlough -	9 Jan. 1879

RETURN RELATING TO THE AFGHAN WAR.

3

From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	11th (Prince of Wales' Own) Bengal Lancers. (Late 1st Sikh Cavalry).	Nowshera	1st Division Peshawar Valley Force. Lieut. General Sir S. Browne's Force.	Present on 1 September 1878.					
				1	Major -	- R. E. Boyle, Staff Corps -	-	Sick at Peshawar. Rejoined regiment. Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Nov. 1878 - Dec. 1878
				2	Ditto	- A. H. Prinsep, late 4th E.L.C. -	-	On general leave to 1 July 1879.	28 June 1879
				3	Captain	- W. J. Bax, General List, Infantry -	-	On privilege leave to 1 July 1879.	30 June 1879
				4	Lieutenant	- H. H. R. Heath, Staff Corps -	-	On privilege leave. Rejoined -	12 Sept. 1878 10 Nov. 1878 30 June 1879
Returned to India 14 June 1879.				5	Ditto	- H. T. G. Burne, Staff Corps -	-	On privilege leave to 1 July 1879. Assistant Military Accountant at Rawal Pindi.	20 Jan. 1879
				Subsequently joined.					
				6	Lieutenant	- S. B. Beatson, Staff Corps -	-	Rejoined from general leave. On privilege leave to 1 July 1879.	13 Sept. 1878 30 June 1879
				7	Captain	- S. A. Swinley, General List, Cavalry.	-	Rejoined from privilege leave. Died -	9 Oct. 1878 24 May 1879
				8	Lieutenant	- E. E. Money, Staff Corps -	-	Joined from leave at depot, Nowshera. Rejoined head-quarters. Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Jan. 1879 26 Mar 1879
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	12th Bengal Cavalry (Late 2nd Sikh Cavalry.)	Jhelum	Koorum Force - Major General Roberts' Force.	Present on 1 September 1878.					
				1	Lieut. Colonel	- H. H. Gough, C.B., V.C., Staff Corps.	-	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- May 1879
				2	Ditto	- H. A. McNair, Bengal Infantry	-	On furlough to 1 July 1879.	
				3	Captain	- J. H. Green, Staff Corps -	-	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				4	Ditto	- M. J. Moore, General List, Cavalry.	-	Leave on medical certificate to 1 July 1879.	- June 1879
				5	Lieutenant	- W. B. Wilson, Staff Corps -	-	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				Subsequently joined.					
				6	Lieutenant	- J. B. Lynch, Staff Corps -	-	Rejoined from privilege leave. Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Oct. 1878
				7	Ditto	- W. W. Lean, Staff Corps -	-	Appointed to the Corps. Joined. Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Oct. 1878
				8	Captain	- A. P. Broome, General List, Infantry.	-	Appointed to the Corps. Joined. Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- April 1879
				9	Ditto	- A. J. T. Welchman, General List, Infantry.	-	Attached to the Corps. Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- May 1879

RETURN RELATING TO THE AFGHAN WAR.

RETURN showing the Rank and Names of the British Officers serving with each Regiment of Native Cavalry and Infantry, employed in or moved for the Afghan Campaign of 1878, &c.—*contd.*

D A T E.	Name of the Regiment.	Station from which it was moved for the War.	To which Force attached.	Rank and Names of the British Regimental Officers (including Staff Corps).	If become Non-effective, give Cause.	D A T E.
BENGAL ARMY—continued.						
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	13th Bengal Lancers (Late 4th Sikh Cavalry.) Returned to India, 8 June 1879.	Rawal Pindi	2nd Division Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>		
				1 Major - C. R. Pennington, Staff Corps -	Privilege leave - - - - -	18 June 1879
				2 Lieutenant - G. W. Deane, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				3 Ditto - A. R. Murray, Staff Corps -	Attached to Depot, Corps of Guides -	- May 1879
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				4 Major - W. H. Macnaghten, late 5th E. L. C.	Rejoined from furlough - - -	10 Sept. 1878
					Proceeded on leave - - -	27 May 1879
					up to 1 July 1879.	
				5 Captain - H. E. Ryves, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from privilege leave -	17 Sept. 1878
					Commanding Depot at Rawal Pindi to - Jan. 1879	1879
					Privilege leave from - - -	17 June 1879
					to 1 July 1879.	
				6 Lieutenant Colonel R. C. Low, late 4th E. L. C.	Rejoined from privilege leave -	13 Oct. 1878
					Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				7 Lieutenant - F. S. Gwatkin, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from privilege leave -	10 Oct. 1878
					Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				8 Captain - A. P. Broome, G. L. Infantry -	Rejoined from privilege leave -	15 Oct. 1878
					Transport duty - - -	- 1879
					Transferred to 9th Bengal Cavalry -	27 Jan. 1879
				9 Ditto - J. F. Carthew, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from furlough - - -	- Dec. 1878
					Died - - -	4 May 1879
					Rejoined from furlough - - -	- Jan. 1879
					Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				<i>Present on 1 January 1879.</i>		
				1 Lieut. Colonel T. G. Ross, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				2 Major - R. C. W. Mitford, Staff Corps -	District leave - - -	29 May 1879
					to 7 June 1879.	
					Privilege leave - - -	14 June 1879
					to 1 July 1879.	
				3 Captain - R. Bardley Wilnot, Staff Corps	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
From 1 January to 30 June 1879.	14th Bengal Lancers (Late Murray's Jat Horse.)	Peshawar -	Kuram Field Force - General Sir F. S. Roberts, V.C., K.C.B.		- ditto - - -	
				4 Ditto - C. S. Morrison, Staff Corps -	District leave - - -	29 May 1879
				5 Ditto - J. P. C. Neville, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
					Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				6 Lieutenant - L. S. Peyton, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				7 Ditto - C. J. S. Whittall, Staff Corps -	Died - - -	20 June 1879
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				8 Lieutenant - P. N. Bairnsfather, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from furlough - - -	- Mar. 1879
					Still effective on 1 July 1879.	

RETURN RELATING TO THE AFGHAN WAR.

Return showing the Rank and Names of the British Officers serving with each Regiment of Native Cavalry and Infantry, employed in or moved for the Afghan Campaign of 1878, &c.—*contd.*

D A T E.	Name of the Regiment.	Station from which it was moved for the War.	To which Force attached.	Rank and Names of the British Regimental Officers (including Staff Corps).	If become Non-effective, give Cause.	D A T E.
BENGAL ARMY—continued.						
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	6th Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 43rd Native Infantry.)	Lucknow -	3rd Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>		
				1 Colonel - G. H. Thompson, Staff Corps -	Leave from - 28 April 1879	
					to 5 May 1879.	
					Leave from - 22 June 1879	
					to 1 July 1879.	
				2 Captain - W. Atkins, General List, Infantry	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				3 Ditto - W. J. A. Birch, Staff Corps -	- ditto - ditto.	
				4 Lieutenant - C. H. Westmorland, Staff Corps	- ditto - ditto.	
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				5 Lieutenant - H. R. Tate, 1-3rd Foot (on probation).	Appointed to the Corps. Joined Still effective on 1 July 1879.	6 Oct. 1878
				6 Ditto - L. M. Boileau, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from furlough - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	28 Nov. 1878
				7 Lieut. Colonel - R. H. Inglis, Bengal Infantry -	Rejoined from furlough - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	19 Jan. 1879
				<i>Present on 1 January 1879.</i>		
				1 Lieut. Colonel - P. H. F. Harris, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
From 1 January 1879 to 30 June 1879.	11th Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 70th Native Infantry.)	Rawal Pindi -	Kuram Field Force - General Sir F. S. Roberts, K.C.B., V.C.	2 Captain - A. J. Stead, General List, Infantry	- ditto - ditto.	
				3 Lieutenant - V. A. Schalch, Staff Corps -	- ditto - ditto.	
				4 Major - H. G. Becher, Staff Corps -	- ditto - ditto.	
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				5 Colonel - C. F. G. Lamb, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from officiating command of Rawal Pindi Brigade.	2 Jan. 1879
					Furlough to England - to 10 June 1879.	- Mar. 1879
					Retired -	11 June 1879
				6 Lieutenant - A. P. Williamson, 1-18th Foot (on probation).	Appointed to the Corps, and joined Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Feb. 1879
				7 Captain - E. P. Ommanney, Staff Corps -	Appointed to the Corps, and joined at Kohat.	- Mar. 1879
					Rejoined head-quarters - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- April 1879

RETURN RELATING TO THE AFGHAN WAR.

7

From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	12th (The Kelat-i-Ghilzie) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late Regiment of Kelat-i-Ghilzie.)	Jullundur	2nd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir Browne's Force.	Present on 1 September 1878.		Privilege leave from - - - Rejoined - - - On leave on medical certificate from - to 1 July 1879. Still effective on 1 July 1879. On 10 days' leave - - - to June 1879. Still effective on 1 July 1879. On Command at Fort Ludhiana - Rejoined - - - Furlough on medical certificate - to 1 July 1879. Rejoined from privilege leave - Still effective on 1 July 1879. Rejoined from privilege leave - In charge of sick at Quetta to February 1879. Transferred to 7th Native Infantry - Rejoined from general leave - Leave on medical certificate - to 1 July 1879. Rejoined from furlough - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	15 Sept. 1878 25 Oct. 1878 29 Nov. 1878 - May 1879 - Sept. 1878 - Oct. 1878 - April 1879 8 Sept. 1878 17 Sept. 1878 - June 1879 8 Oct. 1878 - April 1879 11 Nov. 1878		
				1	Colonel - - - R. H. Price, Staff Corps - -				
				2	Captain - - - H. S. Anderson, General List, Infantry.				
				3	Lieutenant - - - J. W. E. Angelo, Staff Corps -				
				4	Captain - - - A. G. Hartshorne, General List, Infantry.				
				Subsequently joined.					
				5	Lieut. Colonel - - - W. Macdonald, Staff Corps -				
				6	Lieutenant - - - J. F. Worledge, 45th Foot (on probation).				
				7	Ditto - - - A. F. Barrow, Staff Corps -				
				8	Captain - - - A. Oldham, General List, Infantry				
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	14th (The Ferozepore) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late Regiment of Ferozepore.)	Peshawar	3rd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir Browne's Force.	Present on 1 September 1878.		Wounded - - - In arrest - - - to 18 March 1879. Cashiered - - - Transferred to 27th Native Infantry - Rejoined - - - District leave from - - - to 1 July 1879. Vacated on promotion - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879. Rejoined from privilege leave - Furlough on private affairs - - - to 1 July 1879. Rejoined from privilege leave - Brigade Major, Peshawar Valley Field Force. to June 1879. Effective, 1 July 1879. Rejoined from furlough - On leave from - - - to 5 March 1879. On privilege leave from - to 1 July 1879. Appointed to the Corps, and joined - On Command at Simla to 1 July 1879.	21 Nov. 1878 23 Dec. 1878 19 Mar. 1879 27 Nov. 1878 29 Dec. 1878 20 June 1879 - June 1879 2 Sept. 1878 - Feb. 1879 26 Sept. 1878 16 Dec. 1878 18 Nov. 1878 24 Feb. 1879 - June 1879 - June 1879		
				1	Captain - - - J. G. Maclean, General List, Infantry.				
				2	Ditto - - - J. Cook, Staff Corps -				
				3	Major (now Lieut. Colonel). - - - W. Campbell, late 71st Native Infantry.				
				4	Lieutenant - - - J. W. Hogge, Staff Corps -				
				Subsequently joined.					
				5	Lieutenant - - - C. J. Jamieson, Staff Corps -				
				6	Major - - - R. A. Wanchope, Staff Corps -				
				7	Lieut. Colonel - - - L. H. Williams, Staff Corps -				
				8	Lieutenant - - - H. H. Ozzard, Staff Corps -				

Return showing the Rank and Names of the British Officers serving with each Regiment of Native Cavalry and Infantry, employed in or moved for the Afghan Campaign of 1878, &c.—*contd.*

RETURN RELATING TO THE AFGHAN WAR.

D A T E.	Name of the Regiment.	Station from which it was moved for the War.	To which Force attached.	Rank and Names of the British Regimental Officers (including Staff Corps).	If become Non-effective, give Cause.	D A T E.
BENGAL ARMY— <i>continued.</i>						
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	15th (The Loodianah) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late Regiment of Loodianah.)	Sialkot	1st Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Kandahar Force. Lieutenant General Stewart's Force.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>		
				1 Colonel - R. Barter, Staff Corps -	Appointed Brigadier General, 1st Infantry Brigade, Kandahar Force.	24 Oct. 1878
				2 Captain - D. W. Inglis, General List, Infantry.	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				3 Ditto - R. E. S. Smyth, General List, Infantry.	- - ditto - - ditto.	
				4 Ditto - F. A. Remington, Staff Corps -	Furlough on medical certificate to 1 July 1879.	1 Feb. 1879
				5 Lieutenant - H. A. Abbott, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				6 Major - G. R. Hennessy, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from privilege leave Still effective on 1 July 1879.	5 Sept. 1878
				7 Lieutenant - R. C. Hadow, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from privilege leave Still effective on 1 July 1879.	29 Sept. 1878
				8 Captain - A. J. Nicholson, General List, Infantry.	Appointed to the Corps. Joined Cashiered - - -	- Oct. 1878 - 17 Dec. 1878
				9 Lieutenant - N. R. Stewart, 68th Foot (on probation).	Appointed to the Corps, and joined Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Mar. 1879
				<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>		
				1 Colonel - E. B. Clay, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				2 Major - A. Copland, Staff Corps -	- - ditto - - ditto.	
				3 Lieutenant - H. T. Faithfull, Staff Corps -	- - ditto - - ditto.	
				4 Ditto - W. S. Hewett, 1-14th Foot (on probation).	- - ditto - - ditto.	
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				5 Captain - J. E. Waller, General List, Infantry.	Rejoined from privilege leave Still effective on 1 July 1879.	3 Oct. 1878
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	19th (Punjab) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 7th Punjab Infantry.)	Mooltan	1st Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Kandahar Force. Lieutenant General Stewart's Force.	6 Ditto - W. H. Browne, Staff Corps -	Appointed to the Corps. Joined Struck off.	- Sept. 1878 - Dec. 1878
				7 Lieutenant - W. S. Marshall, 40th Foot (on probation).	Appointed to the Corps. Joined Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Nov. 1878
				8 Captain - D. E. Gouldsbury, Staff Corps -	Rejoined - - -	- Jan. 1879
				9 Lieut. Colonel - C. H. Bergman, Bengal Infantry	Joined from Depot - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- April 1879

From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	20th (Punjab) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 8th Punjab Infantry.) Returned to India, 17 June 1879.	Peshawar -	Present on 1 September 1878.			1st Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.		Still effective on 1 July 1879.	16 Sept. 1878 - Jan. 1879 1 Feb. 1879	
			1	Lieut. Colonel	-					R. G. Rogers, Staff Corps
			2	Major	-					H. W. Gordon, Staff Corps
			3	Ditto	-					J. Bartleman, Staff Corps
			4	Captain	-					G. M. D. Hill, General List, Infantry.
			Subsequently joined.							
			5	Captain	-					W. H. Meiklejohn, General List, Infantry.
			6	Ditto	-					L. B. Irwin, Staff Corps
			7	Lieutenant	-					W. O. Harris, Staff Corps
			8	Ditto	-					W. C. Faithfull, 1/6th Foot (on probation).
9	Major	-	P. Roddy, v. c. (unattached)	Appointed to the Corps, and joined Still effective on 1 July 1879.	-	Mar. 1879 1 June 1879				
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	21st (Punjab) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 9th Punjab Infantry.)	Rawal Pindi	Present on 1 September 1878.			2nd Infantry Brigade, Kuram Force. Major General Roberts' Force.		Appointed Brigadier General 2nd Infantry Brigade, Kuram Force. Leave on medical certificate Privilege leave - - - Rejoined - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879. Still effective on 1 July 1879.	{ 28 April 1879 to 1 July 1879 18 Sept. 1878 3 Oct. 1878 2 Sept. 1878 - Jan. 1879 7 April 1879 29 June 1879 7 Oct. 1878 15 June 1879 15 Oct. 1878	
			1	Colonel	-					J. B. Thelwall, c.B., Staff Corps
			2	Captain	-					J. G. T. Carruthers, General List, Infantry.
			3	Lieutenant	-					H. H. Swetenham, Staff Corps
			Subsequently joined.							
			4	Lieutenant	-					W. H. Young, 67th Foot. (on probation).
			5	Captain	-					G. H. C. Dyce, Staff Corps
			6	Captain (now Major).	-					F. W. Collis, Staff Corps
			7	Lieutenant	-					C. M. Fitzgerald, Staff Corps

Return showing the Rank and Names of the British Officers serving with each Regiment of Native Cavalry and Infantry employed in or moved for the Afghan Campaign of 1878, &c.—*contd.*

D A T E.	Name of the Regiment.	Station from which it was moved for the War.	To which Force attached.	Rank and Names of the British Regimental Officers (including Staff Corps).	If become Non-effective, give Cause.	D A T E.
BENGAL ARMY—continued.						
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	23rd (Punjab) Regiment of Native Infantry (Pioneers). (Late 15th Punjab Infantry.)	Simla	2nd Infantry Brigade, Kuram Force. Major General Roberts' Force.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>		
				1 Lieut. Colonel - A. A. Currie, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	2 Dec. 1878
				2 Captain (since Major). - A. D. Anderson, Staff Corps -	Killed in action - - -	-
				3 Captain - - - H. Paterson, Staff Corps -	Rejoining duty - - -	- Jan. 1879
				4 Ditto - - - S. V. Gordon, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- April 1879
				5 Lieutenant - - - D. Chesney, Staff Corps -	- - ditto - - ditto.	-
				6 Ditto - - - A. E. Jones, Staff Corps -	- - ditto - - ditto.	-
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	24th (Punjab) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 16th Punjab Infantry.)	Jhansi	1st Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	7 Lieutenant (now Captain). - V. G. L. Eyre, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from privilege leave Still effective on 1 July 1879.	24 Sept. 1878
				8 Captain - - - J. F. J. Miller, Staff Corps -	Appointed to Corps, and joined Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- April 1879
				<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>		
				1 Lieut. Colonel - F. B. Norman, Staff Corps -	On special duty - - -	- Mar. 1879
				2 Captain - - - E. Stedman, Staff Corps -	Rejoined - - -	- April 1879
				3 Lieutenant - - - H. R. Marrett, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	-
				4 Ditto - - - J. G. Ramsay, Staff Corps -	- - ditto - - ditto.	-
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	24th (Punjab) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 16th Punjab Infantry.)	Jhansi	1st Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	5 Lieutenant (now Captain). - J. J. Money-Simons, Staff Corps -	On duty at Peshawar - - -	- May 1879
				6 Lieutenant - - - P. H. Wallerstein, Staff Corps -	Privilege leave - - -	17 Oct. 1878
				7 Lieut. Colonel - W. A. Franks, Bengal Infantry -	Rejoined - - -	- Nov. 1878
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				5 Lieutenant (now Captain). - J. J. Money-Simons, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from privilege leave Garrison Class, Agra - - -	- Sept. 1878
				6 Lieutenant - - - P. H. Wallerstein, Staff Corps -	Rejoined. Transport duty at Mooltan - - -	27 Sept. 1878
				7 Lieut. Colonel - W. A. Franks, Bengal Infantry -	to 1 July 1879.	- Oct. 1878
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	24th (Punjab) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 16th Punjab Infantry.)	Jhansi	1st Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	5 Lieutenant (now Captain). - J. J. Money-Simons, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from Staff employ On sick list - - -	- Oct. 1878
				6 Lieutenant - - - P. H. Wallerstein, Staff Corps -	On leave, medical certificate to January 1879.	- Dec. 1878
				7 Lieut. Colonel - W. A. Franks, Bengal Infantry -	On leave, medical certificate to 1 July 1879.	2 June 1879
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				5 Lieutenant (now Captain). - J. J. Money-Simons, Staff Corps -	Appointed to Corps, and joined Sick at Peshawar - - -	- Jan. 1879
				6 Lieutenant - - - P. H. Wallerstein, Staff Corps -	to 30 May 1879.	- May 1879
				7 Lieut. Colonel - W. A. Franks, Bengal Infantry -	Leave on medical certificate from to 1 July 1879.	1 June 1879
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		

From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	25th (Punjab) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 17th Punjab Infantry.)	Umballa -	1st Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Kandahar Force. Lieutenant General Stewart's Force.	Present on 1 September 1878.						
				1	Lieut. Colonel	J. W. Hoggan, Staff Corps			Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				2	Captain	W. V. Ellis, Staff Corps			- - ditto - - ditto.	
				3	Lieutenant	G. H. B. Coats, Staff Corps			- - ditto - - ditto.	
				Subsequently joined.						
				4	Lieutenant	P. E. Anderson			Rejoined from privilege leave Sick list - - - - - to 1 July 1879.	- Sept. 1878 - June 1879
				5	Ditto	W. G. Yate, Staff Corps			Rejoined from temporary Staff employ With sick at Quetta - - - - - Rejoined - - - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Sept. 1878 - Dec. 1878 - Jan. 1879
				6	Captain	J. N. Steel, General List, Infantry			Rejoined from sick leave - - - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	20 Sept. 1878
				7	Lieutenant	C. H. H. Beley, Staff Corps			Rejoined from Staff employ Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Oct. 1878
				8	Lieut. Colonel (now Brevet Colonel).	N. Barton, Staff Corps			Rejoined from privilege leave Still effective on 1 July 1879.	14 Oct. 1878
				Present on 1 September 1878.						
				1	Lieut. Colonel	M. G. Smith, Staff Corps			Privilege leave - - - - - to 1 July 1879.	- June 1879
				2	Lieutenant	S. H. P. Graves, Staff Corps			Still effective on 1 July 1879	
				3	Ditto	H. A. Ravenshaw, Staff Corps			- - ditto - - ditto.	
				Subsequently joined.						
				4	Major	A. Tulloch, Staff Corps			Rejoined from privilege leave On command at Khojak Pass Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Sept. 1878 - Jan. 1879
	26th (Punjab) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 18th Punjab Infantry.)	Mean Meer	2nd Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Kandahar Force. Lieutenant General Stewart's Force.	5	Captain (now Major).	A. B. Hepburn, Staff Corps			On command at Umritsar. On privilege leave - - - - - Rejoined - - - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Sept. 1878 - Nov. 1878
6				Captain	C. J. R. Fulford, Staff Corps	Rejoined from privilege leave Proceeded to Staff College -	- Sept. 1878 - Mar. 1879			
7				Lieutenant	L. Denning, Staff Corps	Joined from furlough at Mean Meer Depot. Rejoined head-quarters Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Oct. 1878 - Dec. 1878			
8				Ditto	H. G. Ryland, Staff Corps	Appointed to the regiment - On command at Khojak Pass to Struck off - - - - -	4 Oct. 1878 - Jan. 1879 - April 1879			

Return showing the Rank and Names of the British Officers serving with each Regiment of Native Cavalry and Infantry employed in or moved for the Afghan Campaign of 1878, &c.—*contd.*

D A T E.	Name of the Regiment.	Station from which it was moved for the War.	To which Force attached.	Rank and Names of the British Regimental Officers (including Staff Corps).	If become Non-effective, give Cause.	D A T E.
<i>BENGAL ARMY—continued.</i>						
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	27th Punjab Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 19th Punjab Infantry). Returned to India 27 June 1879.	Nowshera	2nd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>		
				1 Major - - - H. H. Birch, Staff Corps - -	Killed at Ali Musjid - - -	21 Nov. 1878
				2 Lieut. Colonel - - C. J. Hughes, Staff Corps - -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				3 Captain - - R. A. Swetenham, Staff Corps - -	Garrison Class, Rawal Pindi - -	- Sept. 1878
					Rejoined - - -	26 Oct. 1878
					On sick leave - - -	- Nov. 1878
					Rejoined - - -	- Dec. 1878
					To Depôt, Nowshera - - -	- Feb. 1879
					Rejoined head-quarters - - -	- March 1879
					Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				4 Lieutenant - - T. O. Fitzgerald, Staff Corps - -	Killed at Ali Musjid - - -	21 Nov. 1878
				5 Ditto - - S. W. T. Roberts, 39th Foot (on probation),	Garrison Class, Rawal Pindi - -	- Sept. 1878
					Rejoined - - -	- Dec. 1878
					On sick list to January 1879.	
					Died on - - -	16 June 1879
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				6 Sub Lieutenant (now Lieutenant).	Rejoined from 4th Battalion, Rifle Brigade. Still effective on 1 July 1879.	24 Oct. 1878
				7 Colonel - - J. Doran, c.b., Staff Corps - -	Rejoined from temporary command of Rawal Pindi Brigade.	30 Oct. 1878
					Appointed Brigadier General, 2nd Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Peshawar Field Force.	12 Nov. 1878
					Rejoined regiment - - -	- June 1879
					Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				8 Captain - - J. Cook, Staff Corps - -	Appointed to the regiment - - -	27 Nov. 1878
					Left - - -	29 Dec. 1878
				9 Lieutenant - - J. W. Thruston, 1/4th Foot (on probation).	Appointed to the regiment - - -	2 Dec. 1878
					On sick list - - -	- June 1879
					to 1 July 1879.	
				10 Major - - L. Macdonald, Staff Corps - -	Appointed to the regiment - - -	21 Dec. 1878
					Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				11 Captain - - C. W. Babington, General List, Infantry.	Rejoined from furlough - - -	31 Dec. 1878
					Still effective on 1 July 1879.	

From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	28th (Punjab) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 20th Punjab Infantry.)	Moradabad	2nd Infantry Brigade, Kuram Force. Major General Roberts' Force.	1	Lieut. Colonel	Present on 1 September 1878. J. Hudson, Staff Corps	Privilege leave to 1 July 1879.	28 June 1879
				2	Captain (now Brevet Major).	H. S. Marshall, General List, Infantry.	On recruiting duty	21 Jan. 1879
				3	Captain	F. A. S. D'Acosta de St. Laurent, Staff Corps.	Rejoined on	26 Mar. 1879
				4	Lieutenant	C. J. Denny, Staff Corps	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Nov. 1878
				5	Ditto	H. F. Lyons Montgomery, Staff Corps.	On sick list	2 Dec. 1878
				6	Major	Subsequently joined. G. S. Hills	Proceeded on sick leave for three months	1 Mar. 1879
				7	Lieutenant	A. A. Lane, 51st Foot (on probation).	Rejoined on	2 Mar. 1879
				8	Ditto	A. R. Porter, Staff Corps	Rejoined on	10 April 1879
				1	Colonel	Present on 1 September 1878. G. G. Cunliffe, Staff Corps	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	28 June 1879
				2	Captain	F. R. C. Voyle, Staff Corps	On privilege leave from to 1 July 1879.	12 Oct. 1878
				3	Lieutenant	R. N. Harrington, Staff Corps	Rejoined head-quarters	23 Oct. 1878
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	29th (Punjab) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 21st Punjab Infantry.)	Talagang	1st Infantry Brigade, Kuram Force. Major General Roberts' Force	4	Ditto	R. W. MacLeod, 51st Foot (on probation) (now in Staff Corps).	On sick list	9 Nov. 1878
				5	Lieutenant (now Captain).	Subsequently joined. A. J. F. Reid, Staff Corps	Appointed to corps and joined	31 Jan. 1879
				6	Major	G. N. Chauner, V.C., Staff Corps	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Sept. 1878
				7	Colonel	J. J. H. Gordon, Staff Corps	Left sick at Talagang	22 Oct. 1878
				8	Lieutenant	H. P. Picot, Staff Corps	Leave on medical certificate to 1 July 1879.	17 Oct. 1878
				9	Captain	R. H. F. Rennick, Staff Corps	Rejoined on 1 July 1879.	3 Sept. 1878
				10	Lieutenant	W. H. Jamieson, Staff Corps, prov.	Rejoined from privilege leave	5 Oct. 1878
				11	Captain	C. E. Branson, General List, Infantry.	On sick list to	- Mar. 1879
							Leave on medical certificate to 1 July 1879.	- Mar. 1879
							Rejoined from privilege leave to 1 March 1879.	6 Oct. 1878
							Privilege leave from	1 Jan. 1879
							On recruiting duty	2 Mar. 1879
							Rejoined on	11 Mar. 1879
							Leave on medical certificate to 1 July 1879.	- June 1879
							Rejoined from privilege leave	- Oct. 1878
							Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Nov. 1878
							Appointed to Corps, and joined	- Nov. 1878
							Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Nov. 1878
							Appointed to the Corps, and joined	- Nov. 1878
							Station Staff Officer at Kuram	- Dec. 1878
							Detached at Peiwar	- Mar. 1879
							to February 1879.	- Mar. 1879
							Civil employ	- Mar. 1879
							to 1 July 1879.	23 Dec. 1878
							Joined at Hazir Pir	- Mar. 1879
							Rejoined head-quarters	- Mar. 1879
							Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Mar. 1879
							Rejoined from depot	14 Mar. 1879
							Still effective on 1 July 1879.	

RETURN showing the Rank and Names of the British Officers serving with each Regiment of Native Cavalry and Infantry employed in or moved for the Afghan Campaign of 1878, &c.—*contd.*

D A T E.	Name of the Regiment.	Station from which it was moved for the War.	To which Force attached.	Rank and Names of the British Regimental Officers (including Staff Corps).	If become Non-effective, give Cause.	D A T E.
BENGAL ARMY—continued.						
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	32nd (Punjab) Regiment of Native Infantry (Pioneers). (Late 24th Punjab Infantry.)	Camp Quetta	2nd Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Kandahar Force. Lieutenant General Stewart's Force.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>		
				1 Colonel - W. D. Morgan, Staff Corps	Privilege leave -	- Nov. 1878
				2 Lieut. Colonel - H. Fellowes, Staff Corps	Succeeded to Colonel's allowances -	12 Dec. 1878
				3 Captain - A. P. Samuells, General List, Infantry.	Died -	9 April 1879
				4 Ditto - E. C. S. Jackson, General List, Infantry.	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				5 Lieutenant - C. Hogge, Staff Corps	On Sick List -	- Oct. 1878
				6 Ditto - H. C. Halkett, Staff Corps	With Depot at Quetta to -	28 Feb. 1879
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		1 Mar. 1879
				7 Major - C. E. Bates, Staff Corps	On sick leave -	- May 1879
				8 Lieutenant - C. B. Porter, Staff Corps	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
	45th (Rattray's Sikhs) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 1st Bengal Police Battalion) (Rattray's Sikhs.)	Allpore	2nd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>	On privilege leave to 1 July 1879.	
				1 Colonel - C. B. Basden, Staff Corps	On sick leave -	- Dec. 1878
				2 Lieut. Colonel - F. M. Armstrong, Staff Corps	Rejoined from Civil employ -	- Nov. 1878
				3 Major - C. L. Woodruffe, Staff Corps	Sick at Quetta -	- to Mar. 1879
				4 Lieutenant - H. N. McRae, Staff Corps	On leave, medical certificate -	- Mar. 1879
				5 Ditto - R. C. S. Macauland, Staff Corps	to 1 July 1879.	
				6 Ditto - F. M. Barclay, Staff Corps	Rejoined from 30th Native Infantry In Field Hospital -	- Nov. 1878
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		- April 1879
				7 Lieutenant - H. R. L. Holmes, 2-22nd Foot (on probation).	Leave on medical certificate -	- April 1879
				8 Captain - R. J. Waller, Staff Corps	to 1 July 1879.	
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	45th (Rattray's Sikhs) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 1st Bengal Police Battalion) (Rattray's Sikhs.)	Allpore	2nd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>	Rejoined from furlough -	- Dec. 1878
				1 Colonel - C. B. Basden, Staff Corps	Privilege leave from -	5 June 1879
				2 Lieut. Colonel - F. M. Armstrong, Staff Corps	to 1 July 1879.	
				3 Major - C. L. Woodruffe, Staff Corps	Appointed to the Corps, and joined Court-martial duty, Rawal Pindi -	- Jan. 1879
				4 Lieutenant - H. N. McRae, Staff Corps	to 1 July 1879.	- June 1879
				5 Ditto - R. C. S. Macauland, Staff Corps	On leave -	{ 17 Oct. 1878
				6 Ditto - F. M. Barclay, Staff Corps	Retired -	{ 1 Nov. 1878
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		2 Nov. 1878
				7 Lieutenant - H. R. L. Holmes, 2-22nd Foot (on probation).	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				8 Captain - R. J. Waller, Staff Corps	- ditto - ditto.	
	45th (Rattray's Sikhs) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 1st Bengal Police Battalion) (Rattray's Sikhs.)	Allpore	2nd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>	- ditto - ditto.	
				1 Colonel - C. B. Basden, Staff Corps	- ditto - ditto.	
				2 Lieut. Colonel - F. M. Armstrong, Staff Corps	- ditto - ditto.	
				3 Major - C. L. Woodruffe, Staff Corps	Wounded -	17 Mar. 1879
				4 Lieutenant - H. N. McRae, Staff Corps	Died -	1 April 1879
				5 Ditto - R. C. S. Macauland, Staff Corps		
				6 Ditto - F. M. Barclay, Staff Corps		
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				7 Lieutenant - H. R. L. Holmes, 2-22nd Foot (on probation).	Appointed to Corps, and joined On sick list -	- Sept. 1878
				8 Captain - R. J. Waller, Staff Corps	to March 1879.	- Feb. 1879
	45th (Rattray's Sikhs) Regiment of Native Infantry. (Late 1st Bengal Police Battalion) (Rattray's Sikhs.)	Allpore	2nd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>	Rejoined from furlough -	- Feb. 1879
				1 Colonel - C. B. Basden, Staff Corps	Effective 1 July 1879.	- May 1879
				2 Lieut. Colonel - F. M. Armstrong, Staff Corps	Sick list from -	
				3 Major - C. L. Woodruffe, Staff Corps	to 13 July 1879.	
				4 Lieutenant - H. N. McRae, Staff Corps	Leave on medical certificate -	14 June 1879
				5 Ditto - R. C. S. Macauland, Staff Corps	to 1 July 1879.	
				6 Ditto - F. M. Barclay, Staff Corps		
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				7 Lieutenant - H. R. L. Holmes, 2-22nd Foot (on probation).		
				8 Captain - R. J. Waller, Staff Corps		

From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	1st Goorkha Regiment (Light Infantry). Returned to India 18 April 1879.	Dharmasala	2nd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Kandahar Force. Lieutenant General Stewart's Force.	Present on 1 September 1878.			Leave to Bombay, preparatory to retirement. Retired - - - - - Proceeded on leave preparatory to furlough on medical certificate to 1 July 1879. Proceeded on furlough, private affairs - Rejoined on - - - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879. Still effective on 1 July 1879. - - ditto - - - ditto.	- Dec. 1878 31 Dec. 1878 - Dec. 1878 30 Sept. 1878 27 Jan. 1879 - Dec. 1878
				1	Colonel - - -	J. S. Rawlins, Staff Corps -		
				2	Captain (now Major).	G. Young, Staff Corps -		
				3	Captain - - -	G. F. Churchill, Staff Corps -		
				4	Lieutenant - -	J. P. W. Spankie, 2-22nd Foot (on probation).		
				5	Ditto - - -	R. C. Temple, 1-21st Foot (on probation).		
				Subsequently joined.				
				6	Lieutenant - -	G. H. Robinson, Staff Corps -		
				7	Major - - -	C. St. J. B. Barnett, Staff Corps -		
				8	Lieutenant - -	H. H. Ozzard, Staff Corps -		
Arrived from Cyprus, 11 October to 30 June 1879.	2nd (Prince of Wales' Own) Goorkha Regiment (the Sirmoor Rifles). (Late Sirmoor Rifle Regiment.) Returned to India 9 June 1879.	Dehra Dun	2nd Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	Present on 1 September 1878.			Rejoined from privilege leave Leave - - - - - Rejoined - - - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879. Rejoined from Detachment at Simla Privilege leave from - - - to 1 July 1879. Appointed to the Corps. Joined - Struck off - - - - - (To 14th Native Infantry.) Rejoined from furlough Still effective on 1 July 1879. Rejoined from furlough - - - On leave - - - - - Rejoined - - - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	1878 1879 1879 1878 1879 1879 1878 1879 1878 1878 1878 1878 1879 1878 1879 1878 1878 1879 1

Return showing the Rank and Names of the British Officers serving with each Regiment of Native Cavalry and Infantry employed in or moved for the Afghan Campaign of 1878, &c.—*contd.*

D A T E.	Name of the Regiment.	Station from which it was moved for the War.	To which Force attached.	Rank and Names of the British Regimental Officers (including Staff Corps).	If become Non-effective, give Cause.	D A T E.
BENGAL ARMY— <i>continued.</i>						
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	3rd Goorkha (the Kemaon Regiment). (Late Kemaon Regiment.)	Almora	2nd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Kandahar Force. Lieutenant General Stewart's Force.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i> 1 Lieut. Colonel - H. H. Lyster, v.c., Staff Corps -	Rejoined from privilege leave Sick list - - - - -	26 Sept. 1878 - May 1879
				2 Major - - - - - L. Smith, Staff Corps -	Died - - - - -	26 Jan. 1879
				3 Captain (now Major). - R. E. K. Money, Staff Corps -	On sick list - - - - -	- Mar. 1879
				4 Lieutenant - - - - - C. Pulley, Staff Corps -	to April 1879. Effective on 1 July 1879.	
				5 Ditto - - - - - A. G. F. Browne, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				6 Colonel - - - - - A. Paterson, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from privilege leave Still effective on 1 July 1879.	26 Sept. 1878
				7 Lieutenant - - - - - J. L. O'Brien, Staff Corps (Wing Officer 4th Native Infantry).	Attached to the Corps - - - - -	- Oct. 1878 - April 1879
				8 Major - - - - - G. C. Gregory, Staff Corps -	Sick list - - - - - to May 1879. Still effective on 1 July 1879.	6 Nov. 1878
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	4th Goorkha Regiment - (Late extra Goorkha Regiment.) Returned to India 12 June 1879.	Baklok	1st Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	9 Captain - - - - - D. E. Goulksbury, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from furlough Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Nov. 1878 28 Dec. 1878
				<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>		
				1 Colonel - - - - - J. A. Tytler, c.b., v.c., Staff Corps	To command of 2nd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Peshawar Field Force. to 1 July 1879.	11 Nov. 1878
				2 Lieut. Colonel - - - - - J. P. Turton, Staff Corps -	Sick list - - - - - to June 1879. Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- May 1879
				3 Major - - - - - F. F. Rowcroft, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				4 Captain - - - - - E. P. Mainwaring, General List, Infantry.	On sick list - - - - - to January 1879. Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Dec. 1878
				5 Ditto - - - - - G. W. Rogers, Staff Corps -	On Staff employ in the field to 1 July 1879.	11 Nov. 1878
				6 Lieutenant (now Captain). - C. A. Mercer, Staff Corps -	On furlough - - - - - Rejoined - - - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	15 Sept. 1878 15 Oct. 1878
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	4th Goorkha Regiment - (Late extra Goorkha Regiment.) Returned to India 12 June 1879.	Baklok	1st Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	7 Lieutenant - - - - - H. J. Bolton, 4-60th Foot (on probation).	Appointed to Corps, and joined Still effective on 1 July 1879.	8 Sept. 1878
				8 Ditto - - - - - C. G. Aylie, 1-14th Foot (on probation).	Appointed to Corps, and joined Still effective on 1 July 1879.	13 Oct. 1878
				9 Captain (now Major). - J. Hay, Staff Corps -	Rejoined from furlough Still effective on 1 July 1879.	11 Nov. 1878

From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	5th Goorkha Regiment (the Hazara Goorkha Battalion).	Abbottabad	2nd Infantry Brigade, Kuram Force. Major General Roberts' Force.	Dera Ghazi Khan	1st Punjab Cavalry (Punjab Frontier Force.)	Present on 1 September 1878.		Admitted to Colonel's allowances still effective on 1 July 1879. Died of wounds received on 13 December 1878. General leave - - - Rejoined - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879. Still effective on 1 July 1879.	27 Sept. 1878 18 Dec. 1878 - Sept. 1878 - Sept. 1878	
						1	Colonel - - - P. F. Gardiner, Staff Corps			-
						2	Captain - - - J. Cook, v.c., Staff Corps			-
						3	Ditto - - - C. F. Powell, Staff Corps (2nd Punjab Infantry).			-
						4	Lieutenant - - A. R. Martin, Staff Corps			-
						5	Ditto - - - C. C. Chenavix-Trench, Staff Corps			-
						Subsequently joined.				
						6	Captain - - - L. R. Battye, Staff Corps			-
						7	Major - - - A. Fitzhugh, Staff Corps			-
						8	Ditto - - - W. H. Unwin, Staff Corps			-
						9	Lieutenant - - C. C. St. G. Lucas, Staff Corps			-
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	1st Punjab Cavalry (Punjab Frontier Force.)	Dera Ghazi Khan	2nd Division, Kandahar Force. Lieutenant General Stewart's Force.	Dera Ghazi Khan	1st Punjab Cavalry (Punjab Frontier Force.)	Present on 1 September 1878.		Proceeded on Escort duty - - to March 1879. Still effective on 1 July 1879. On command at Dera Ghazi Khan On convoy duty - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879. Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Oct. 1878 - Oct. 1878 - Nov. 1878 - Dec. 1878 - Feb. 1879 - April 1879	
						1	Major - - - G. C. Bird, Madras Staff Corps			-
						2	Captain - - - J. R. B. Atkinson, General List, Infantry.			-
						3	Lieutenant - - W. F. Hennell, Staff Corps			-
						Subsequently joined.				
						4	Major - - - C. S. Maclean, Staff Corps			-
						5	Captain - - - H. De la M. Hervey, Staff Corps			-
						6	Ditto - - - D. S. Cuninghame, Staff Corps			-
						7	Lieutenant - - A. M. Muir, Staff Corps			-
						Rejoined from privilege leave Still effective on 1 July 1879. From survey duty, Fort Munro Still effective on 1 July 1879. From escort duty - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879. From civil employ - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879.				

RETURN RELATING TO THE AFGHAN WAR.

From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	(Queen's Own) Corps of Guides (Punjab Frontier Force.)	Mardan	1st Division, Peshawar Valley Force (Infantry, 3rd Brigade). Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	1	Present on 1 September 1878. Lieutenant Colonel F. H. Jenkins, Staff Corps		Appointed Brigadier General, Peshawar Field Force.	-	Der. 1878
				2	Major -	R. B. P. P. Campbell, Staff Corps	Rejoined -	-	April 1879
				3	Ditto -	G. Stewart, Staff Corps	Privilege leave to 1 July 1879.	-	June 1879
				4	Captain -	R. C. Hutchinson, Madras General List, Infantry.	Privilege leave to June 1879.	-	Sept. 1878
				5	Ditto (now Major.) -	W. Batiye, Staff Corps	On remount duty, to 1 July 1879.	-	Jan. 1879 to
				6	Lieutenant -	M. C. Cooke-Collis, Staff Corps	Ditto, from.	-	May 1879
				7	Ditto -	W. R. P. Hamilton, Staff Corps	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	-	2 April 1879
				8	Subsequently joined. Captain -	A. G. Hammond, Staff Corps	Killed in action -	-	1879
				9	Lieutenant -	F. D. Batiye, Staff Corps	On command -	-	Dec. 1878
				10	Ditto -	H. W. Hughes, Staff Corps	to April 1879.	-	Jan. 1879
				11	Ditto -	A. R. Murray, Staff Corps	On command to March 1879.	-	June 1879
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	1st Sikh Infantry - (Punjab Frontier Force.)	Kohat	3rd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	1	Present on 1 September 1878. Major -	A. G. Ross, Staff Corps	Rejoined from privilege leave	-	Sept. 1878
				2	Captain -	F. R. Begbie, Staff Corps	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	-	Sept. 1878
				3	Lieutenant -	J. A. H. Pollock, Staff Corps	Rejoined from privilege leave	-	Oct. 1878
				4	Ditto -	H. Mansfield, 83rd Foot (on probation).	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	-	Oct. 1878
				5	Subsequently joined. Captain -	J. M. Sym, Staff Corps	On duty, Kohat -	-	Sept. 1878
				6	Ditto -	A. F. Lambe, Staff Corps	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	-	Sept. 1878
				7	Lieutenant -	A. C. Bunney, Staff Corps	Proceeded on temporary leave	-	Oct. 1875
				8	Captain -	F. F. Bruce, Staff Corps	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	-	Sept. 1878
				9	Ditto -	C. C. Brownlow, Staff Corps	Rejoined from privilege leave	-	Oct. 1878
				10	Lieutenant -	W. R. Yelding, 54th Foot (on probation).	On duty at Kohat to February 1879.	-	Nov. 1878

Return showing the Rank and Names of British Officers serving with each Regiment of Native Cavalry and Infantry employed in or moved for the Afghan Campaign of 1878, &c.—*contd.*

D A T E.	Name of the Regiment.	Station from which it was moved for the War.	To which Force attached.	Rank and Names of the British Regimental Officers (including Staff Corps).	If become Non-effective, give Cause.	D A T E.
BENGAL ARMY—continued.						
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	2nd (or Hill) Sikh Infantry	Dera Ghazi Khan	Mithankot	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>		
				1 Colonel - R. D'O. C. Bracken, Staff Corps	On sick leave at dépôt Dera Ghazi Khan to March 1879.	- Oct. 1878 - Dec. 1878
				2 Captain - F. E. Hastings, General List, Infantry.	Ditto - to 1 July 1879.	- May 1879
				3 Ditto - W. O. Thompson, Staff Corps	On command - to June 1879.	- Nov. 1878 - Feb. 1879
				4 Lieutenant - C. G. M. Fasken, 2-16th Foot (on probation).	Effective on 1 July 1879.	- Dec. 1878
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				5 Lieut. Colonel - J. J. Boswell, Staff Corps	On command - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Oct. 1878 - Nov. 1878
				6 Lieutenant - W. F. C. Plowden, Staff Corps	Rejoined from privilege leave - On command - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Oct. 1878 - Nov. 1878
				7 Ditto - E. C. Rodney, 63rd Foot (on probation).	Appointed to Corps and joined At dépôt, Dera Ghazi Khan to June 1879.	- Oct. 1878 - Dec. 1878
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	1st Punjab Infantry (Punjab Frontier Force.)	Quetta	2nd Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Kandahar Force.* Lieutenant General Stewart's Force. * Returned to India (by wings) 18 March and 16 May 1879.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>	Transferred to 13th Native Infantry -	- June 1879
				1 Major - F. J. Keen, Staff Corps	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				2 Ditto - T. Higginson, Madras Staff Corps	- ditto - - ditto.	
				3 Captain - H. Howell, Staff Corps	Furlough on medical certificate - to 1 July 1879.	- Feb. 1879
				4 Lieutenant - T. C. Pears, Staff Corps	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				5 Sub-Lieutenant - C. B. Brownlow, 1-17th Foot (on probation).	Attached to 2-60th Rifles - to 1 July 1879.	- Dec. 1878
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				6 Captain - H. F. Showers, Staff Corps	From Staff employ - On special duty - to 1 July 1879.	- Oct. 1878 - June 1879
				7 Lieutenant - P. E. Henderson, Staff Corps	Appointed to Corps and joined Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Oct. 1878
				8 Captain - L. R. H. D. Campbell, Staff Corps	Rejoined from furlough - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Nov. 1878
				9 Ditto - A. Vallings, Staff Corps	Rejoined from furlough - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Dec. 1878

From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	2nd Punjab Infantry (Punjab Frontier Force.)	Kohat	Returned to India 2 April 1879.	Present on 1 September 1878.			Still effective on 1 July 1879. - ditto - ditto. Attached to 4th Punjab Infantry Transferred to 5th Goorkhas	- Oct. 1878 - 17 Nov. 1878
				1	Lieut. Colonel	- H. Tyndall, Staff Corps		
				2	Captain	- J. M. D. Loves, Staff Corps		
				3	Lieutenant	- A. Daniell, Staff Corps		
				4	Ditto	- C. C. St. E. Lucas, Staff Corps		
				Subsequently joined.				
				5	Major	- E. A. Codrington, Staff Corps		
				6	Captain	- A. H. Turner, Staff Corps		
				7	Ditto	- A. D. Strettell, Staff Corps		
				8	Lieutenant	- B. M. Allen, Staff Corps		
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	5th Punjab Infantry (Punjab Frontier Force.)	Kohat	Returned to India 2 April 1879.	Present on 1 September 1878.			On sick list Still effective on 1 July 1879. Still effective on 1 July 1879. - ditto - ditto. On command at Kohat On furlough to 1 July 1879. Rejoined from privilege leave Still effective on 1 July 1879. Rejoined from privilege leave On command at Kohat to February 1879. Kohat to 1 July 1879. Rejoined from privilege leave Still effective on 1 July 1879. Rejoined from furlough Still effective on 1 July 1879. Appointed to Corps and joined Still effective on 1 July 1879. Appointed to Corps and joined Still effective on 1 July 1879.	{ - Oct. 1878 - Dec. 1878 - Feb. 1879 - Sept. 1878 - Oct. 1878 - Nov. 1878 - April 1879 - Oct. 1878 - Dec. 1878 - Dec. 1878 - June 1879 - Nov. 1878 - June 1879
				1	Major	- J. W. McQueen, Staff Corps		
				2	Ditto	- H. M. Pratt, Staff Corps (2nd Sikhs).		
				3	Captain	- C. Mc G. Hall, General List, Infantry.		
				4	Lieutenant	- J. E. Mein, Staff Corps		
				Subsequently joined.				
				5	Lieutenant	- R. F. Jameson, Staff Corps		
				6	Ditto	- C. W. Young, 81st Foot (on probation).		
				7	Captain	- C. Young, General List, Infantry		
				8	Lieutenant	- G. Gaisford, Staff Corps		
9	Ditto	- J. P. Sparling, 67th Foot (on probation).						
10	Ditto	- A. W. McKinstrey, 2-17th Foot (on probation).						

RETURN RELATING TO THE AFGHAN WAR.

Return showing the Rank and Names of the British Officers serving with each Regiment of Native Cavalry and Infantry employed in or moved for the Afghan Campaign of 1878, &c.—*contd.*

DATE.	Name of the Regiment.	Station from which it was moved for the War.	To which Force attached	Rank and Names of the British Regimental Officers (including Staff Corps).	If become Non-effective, give Cause.	DATE.
BENGAL ARMY—continued.						
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879. Returned to India, 9th June 1879.	Bhopal Battalion (Late Bhopal Levy.)	Sehore	1st Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	1 Colonel - - - H. Forbes, Staff Corps - - - <i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>	Appointed to Command 3rd Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Peshawar Field Force. to 1 July 1879.	8 April 1879
				2 Captain - - - G. R. Peart, Bombay Staff Corps	At Hoti Murdan to April 1879.	- Sept. 1878
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		- April 1879
				3 Lieutenant - - - E. S. Masters, 2/1st Foot (on probation).	At Ali Musjid - - - Privilege leave, from - - - to 1 July 1879.	12 June 1879
				4 Ditto - - - W. J. Orr, Bombay Staff Corps -	Appointed to Corps. Joined Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Nov. 1878
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	Mhairwarra Battalion (Late Ajmere and Mhairwarra Police Battalion.)	Ajmere	2nd Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	5 Lieutenant Colonel H. M. Wemyss, Staff Corps -	Appointed to Corps. Joined At Hoti Murdan to 1 April 1879. At Ali Musjid - - - Effective on the 1st July 1879.	- Dec. 1878
				<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>		- April 1879
				1 Lieutenant - - - O'M. Creagh, Bombay Staff Corps	Attached to Corps temporarily, and joined. Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- May 1879
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				2 Major - - - F. W. Boileau, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	1 Nov. 1878
				3 Lieutenant - - - A. G. A. Durand, Staff Corps -	Appointed to Corps. Joined Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Dec. 1878
				4 Ditto - - - A. E. P. Burn (Staff Corps, provisional).	To 1st Central India Horse	- June 1879
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	Mhairwarra Battalion (Late Ajmere and Mhairwarra Police Battalion.)	Ajmere	2nd Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Force. Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne's Force.	5 Ditto - - - W. J. Fairbrother, 2/11th Foot Probationer, 88th Native Infantry.	Appointed to Corps. Joined Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Dec. 1878
				6 Ditto - - - J. A. Bell, 44th Foot (on probation).	Attached to Corps, and joined Still effective on 1 July 1879.	- Jan. 1879
				7 Ditto - - - J. Lamb, 16th Foot (on probation).	Appointed to Corps, and joined Still effective on 1 July 1879. Appointed to charge of Depot to 1 July 1879.	- Mar. 1879

T. E. Gordon, Colonel,
Deputy Adjutant General.

Office of Adjutant General in India,
Simla, 10 December 1879.

M A D R A S A R M Y.

RETURN showing the Rank and Names of the BRITISH OFFICERS Serving with each Regiment of MADRAS NATIVE INFANTRY, Employed in or Moved for the AFGHAN CAMPAIGN of 1878, on the 1st day of September 1878, either in the Advanced Columns or in Support, with Names of the Officers subsequently attached to each, and the Casualties amongst them, made up to the 30th day of June 1879.

D A T E.	Name of the Regiment.	Station from which it was moved for the War.	To which Force attached.	Rank and Names of the British Regimental Officers (including Staff Corps).	If become Non-effective, give Cause.	D A T E.
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	21st Regiment, Madras Native Infantry (Roberts).	Bellary	Mooltan Field Force - - - - - Brigadier General A. C. M'Master.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i> 1 Colonel - - - W. Douglas, Staff Corps - - - 2 Lieutenant Colonel (Colonel) - - - T. L. Scott, Staff Corps - - - 3 Major - - - R. B. Middleton, Staff Corps - - - 4 Ditto - - - C. J. Watson, Staff Corps - - - 5 Lieutenant - - - G. S. Baugh, Staff Corps - - - 6 Sub-Lieutenant - - - P. G. Hoggins (94th Foot), Staff Corps (Probationer). - - - <i>Subsequently joined.</i> 7 Captain - - - W. Stainforth, General List, Infantry. - - - 8 Sub-Lieutenant - - - M. H. S. Grover (89th Foot), Staff Corps (Probationer). - - -	Retired - - - - - Privilege leave from - - - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879. - - - ditto - - - ditto. - - - ditto - - - ditto. - - - ditto - - - ditto. - - - ditto - - - ditto. Appointed to Corps, joined - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879. Rejoined from leave to study - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	24 Dec. 1878 1 June 1879
				<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i> 1 Lieutenant Colonel - - - H. F. Dakayne, Staff Corps - - - 2 Major - - - F. S. Fitzpatrick, Staff Corps - - - 3 Ditto - - - F. C. St. John, Staff Corps - - - 4 Lieutenant - - - R. H. C. Tufnell, Staff Corps - - - 5 Sub-Lieutenant - - - J. M. Clements (14th Foot), Staff Corps (Probationer). - - - <i>Subsequently joined.</i> 6 Colonel - - - T. C. Georges, Staff Corps - - - 7 Lieutenant - - - T. W. J. M. Georges (40th Foot), Staff Corps (Probationer). - - -	Furlough to Europe on medical certificate. Still effective on 1 July 1879. - - - ditto - - - ditto. - - - ditto - - - ditto. - - - ditto - - - ditto. Rejoined from privilege leave - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879. Rejoined from privilege leave - - - Still effective on 1 July 1879.	3 Feb. 1879 1 Sept. 1878 7 Sept. 1878
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	30th Regiment, Madras Native Infantry (Crewe).	French Rocks	Scinde Reserve Force - - - Brigadier General M'Master.			

RETURN showing the Rank and Names of the British Officers serving with each Regiment of Madras Native Infantry, employed in or moved for the Afghan Campaign of 1878, &c.—*contd.*

D A T E.	Name of the Regiment.	Station from which it was moved for the War.	To which Force attached.	Rank and Names of the British Regimental Officers (including Staff Corps).	If become Non-effective, give Cause.	D A T E.
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	36th Regiment, Madras Native Infantry (Nundy).	Bangalore	Rawal Pindi Field Force	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>	Attained to Colonel's allowance -	12 Sept. 1878
				1 Colonel - G. A. Fulton, Infantry		
				2 Lieutenant Colonel R. Beatty, Infantry	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				3 Major - G. Murray, Staff Corps	- - ditto - - ditto.	
				4 Ditto - F. Middlecoat, Staff Corps	Removed to general duty -	2 Dec. 1878
				5 Captain - J. Hotham, General List, Infantry.	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				6 Lieutenant - M. E. H. O. Welch, Staff Corps	Removed to 9th Madras Native Infantry	16 Nov. 1878
				7 Sub-Lieutenant - H. W. E. Georges (9th Foot), (now Lieutenant). Staff Corps (Probationer).	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				8 Colonel - T. S. Hawkes, Staff Corps	Appointed to Corps, joined -	21 Sept. 1878
					Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				9 Lieutenant - J. H. H. Ansley (14th Foot), Staff Corps (Probationer).	- - ditto - - ditto -	14 Oct. 1878
				10 Captain (now Major). A. G. Hutchins, General List, Infantry.	Appointed to Corps, joined -	16 Nov. 1878
					Appointed Officiating Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, Nagpore Force.	23 Mar. 1879

Adjutant General's Office, Fort St. George, }
15 October 1879.

A. R. Clephane, Colonel,
Deputy Adjutant General.

BOMBAY ARMY.

RETURN showing OFFICERS present with the Regiments of NATIVE CAVALRY and INFANTRY, moved on account of the AFGHAN WAR, on the 1st day of September 1878, those who subsequently Joined, and the Cause and Date, and those who remained Effective, completed up to the 30th day of June 1879.

D A T E.	Name of the Regiment.	Station from which it was moved for the War.	To which Force attached.	Rank and Names of the British Regimental Officers (including Staff Corps).	If become Non-effective, give Cause.	D A T E.
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	1st Regiment Sind Horse	Jacobabad (Sind)	Reserve Division on Lower Indus	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i> 1 Colonel - W. R. Alexander, Staff Corps - 2 Captain - A. L. M'Nair, Staff Corps - 3 Lieutenant - R. H. Daniell, Staff Corps - 4 Ditto - G. F. Francis, Staff Corps - 5 Ditto - F. G. Alexander, Staff Corps -	Retired - - - - - 1 Nov. 1878 On special duty, Sonmiani route - - - 23 Feb. 1879 Still effective on 1 July 1879. On special duty, Sonmiani route - - - 15 Mar. 1879 Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i> 6 Major - J. Phillips, Staff Corps - 7 Lieutenant - J. R. C. Domville, Staff Corps - 8 Major - R. V. Malden, Staff Corps -	Appointed to the Corps - - - - - 8 Dec. 1878 Still effective on 1 July 1879. Appointed to the Corps - - - - - 18 Dec. 1878 Still effective on 1 July 1879. Rejoined from furlough - - - - - 23 Mar. 1879 Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i> 1 Lieut. Colonel - J. H. P. Malcolmson, Staff Corps - 2 Captain - J. E. Gordon, General List - 3 Lieutenant - H. C. Hogg, Staff Corps - 4 Ditto - E. D. N. Smith, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879. Invalided sick to England - - - - - 3 May 1879 Still effective on 1 July 1879. - - - ditto - - - ditto.	
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i> 5 Lieutenant - A. M. Monteith, Staff Corps - 6 Captain - W. Reynolds, Staff Corps - 7 Ditto - P. J. Matland, Staff Corps - 8 Lieutenant - E. V. P. Monteith, Staff Corps -	Appointed to the Corps - - - - - 28 Sept. 1878 Still effective on 1 July 1879. Rejoined from furlough - - - - - 18 Dec. 1878 Killed in action - - - - - 26 Feb. 1879 Rejoined from furlough - - - - - 27 Dec. 1878 Still effective on 1 July 1879. - - - ditto - - - ditto - - - 27 Dec. 1878	
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	3rd Regiment Sind Horse	Jacobabad (Sind)	2nd Division, Kandahar Force - Lieutenant General Sir D. M. Stewart's Force.			

Return showing Officers present with the Regiments of Native Cavalry and Infantry, moved on account of the Afghan War, on the 1st day of September 1878, &c.—*continued.*

D A T E.	Name of the Regiment.	Station from which it was moved for the War.	To which Force attached.	Rank and Names of the British Regimental Officers (including Staff Corps).	If become Non-effective, give Cause.	D A T E.
BOMBAY ARMY—continued.						
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	1st Regiment Native Infantry (Grenadiers).	Ahmedabad (Guzerat).	Reserve Division on Lower Indus.	<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>		
				1 Colonel - L. M. Davis, Staff Corps -	Retired -	31 May 1879
				2 Lieut. Colonel - J. H. Drummond, Staff Corps -	Exchanged to the 22nd Native Infantry	14 Oct. 1878
				3 Major - J. Affleck, Staff Corps -	Invalided sick to the Hills -	5 Mar. 1879
				4 Captain - J. Grant, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				5 Lieutenant - C. W. Hinde, Staff Corps -	- - ditto - -	
				6 Ditto - A. Wapshare, Staff Corps -	Exchanged to the 11th Native Infantry	14 Nov. 1878
				7 Ditto - A. H. Daunt, 7th Foot (on probation).	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				8 Sub-Lieutenant - C. M. Gray, 54th Foot (on probation).	Transferred to 15th Native Infantry -	6 Dec. 1878
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				9 Lieut. Colonel - H. S. Anderson, Staff Corps -	Appointed to the Corps Still effective on 1 July 1879.	14 Oct. 1878
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	19th Regiment Native Infantry	Kurrachee (Sind).	Reserve Division on Lower Indus.	10 Lieutenant - W. C. Aslett, Staff Corps -	- - ditto - -	14 Nov. 1878
				11 Ditto - C. G. Whithy, 17th Foot (on probation).	- - ditto - -	18 April 1879
				12 Major - W. R. Trevelyan -	- - ditto - -	15 May 1879
				<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>		
				1 Colonel - W. Creagh, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				2 Major - W. Jacob, Staff Corps -	Invalided sick to England -	22 Nov. 1878
				3 Ditto - S. J. Waudby, Staff Corps -	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
				4 Lieutenant - F. Stevenson, Staff Corps -	- - ditto - -	
				5 Ditto - G. E. Walter, Staff Corps -	Sick at Head Quarters -	- June 1879
				<i>Subsequently joined.</i>		
				6 Captain - R. J. LeP. Trench, General List	Rejoined from furlough Still effective on 1 July 1879.	29 Sept. 1878
From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.				7 Lieutenant - G. D. Giles, 7th Foot (on probation).	Appointed to the Corps Still effective on 1 July 1879.	5 Dec. 1878
				8 Ditto - F. C. Stayner, 5th Foot (on probation).	- - ditto - -	10 Dec. 1878

From 1 September 1878 to 30 June 1879.	29th Regiment Native Infantry (2nd Baluch Regiment.)	Dera Ghazi Khan (Punjab.)	2nd Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, Kandahar Force. Lieutenant General Sir D. M. Stewart's Force.	Present 1 September 1878.	1	Lieut. Colonel	G. Nicholletts, Staff Corps	-	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	21 Oct. 1878
					2	Major	J. Galloway, Staff Corps	-	ditto	1 June 1879
					3	Ditto	G. C. Sartorius, Staff Corps	-	ditto	1878
					4	Lieutenant	W. A. Broome, Staff Corps	-	ditto	1878
					5	Ditto	H. E. W. Beville, Staff Corps	-	ditto	1878
							<i>Subsequently joined.</i>			
					6	Lieut. Colonel	O. V. Tanner, Staff Corps	-	Rejoined from Staff employ	11 Dec. 1878
					7	Lieutenant	J. F. M. Campbell, 70th Foot (on probation).	-	Returned to Staff employ	1879
					8	Captain	G. F. Bryant, Staff Corps	-	Rejoined from 30th Native Infantry	1878
								-	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
								-	Rejoined from furlough	1879
								-	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
							<i>Present on 1 September 1878.</i>			
					1	Colonel	W. G. Mainwaring, Staff Corps	-	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	
					2	Major	F. T. Hornfrey	-	ditto	
					3	Captain	H. F. Smith, Staff Corps	-	ditto	
					4	Lieutenant	C. F. Baugh, Staff Corps	-	ditto	
							<i>Subsequently joined.</i>			
					5	Lieutenant	J. F. M. Campbell, 70th Foot (on probation).	-	Appointed to the Corps from 29th Native Infantry.	6 Oct. 1878
					6	Captain	W. C. Harrison, Staff Corps	-	Rejoined 29th Native Infantry	11 Dec. 1878
					7	Lieut. Colonel	T. Bell, Staff Corps	-	Rejoined from furlough	12 Nov. 1878
					8	Lieutenant	C. G. Whitby, 17th Foot (on probation).	-	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	16 Nov. 1878
					9	Lieut. Colonel	W. T. Mills, Staff Corps	-	Rejoined from furlough	13 June 1879
								-	Transferred to another Corps	25 Nov. 1878
								-	Appointed to the Corps	18 April 1879
								-	Transferred to another Corps	1879
								-	Rejoined from furlough	1879
								-	Still effective on 1 July 1879.	

H. F. Brooke, Brigadier General,
Adjutant General, Bombay Army.

Adjutant General's Office, Poona, }
8 October 1879.

AFGHAN WAR (OFFICERS PRESENT
WITH NATIVE REGIMENTS).

RETURN showing OFFICERS present with Regiments of NATIVE CAVALRY and INFANTRY, moved on account of the AFGHAN WAR, on 1 September 1878; those who subsequently joined who became Non-Effective, and the Cause and Date, and those who remained Effective, completed up to 30 June 1879 (in the same Form, and in completion of Return, East Indian Army, presented on the 14th day of July).

(*Sir Henry Havelock.*)

*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
18 March 1880.*

110 4 .
MILITARY COMMISSION AT KABUL.

DESPATCH

FROM

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

INCLUDING

COPY OF REPORT OF LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C.,
DATED KABUL, 27TH JANUARY 1880,

CONTAINING

A. STATEMENT OF THE CASES TRIED BEFORE THE
MILITARY COMMISSION.


Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1880.

[C.—2523.] Price 1½d.



BOMBAY BRANCH

OF THE

Royal Asiatic Society.

CLASS

MILITARY COMMISSION AT KABUL.

Despatch from Government of India, including Copy of Report of Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts, K.C.B., V.C., dated Kabul, 27th January 1880, containing a Statement of the Cases tried before the Military Commission.

No. 41 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. Secret.

MY LORD, Fort William, 18th February 1880.
THE telegram from His Excellency the Viceroy to Your Lordship's address, No. 365 E.P., dated 24th January 1880, repeated a telegram from Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding at Kabul, furnishing a statement of the executions which had been carried out under his orders. General Roberts has now submitted a statement in which are shown, amongst other particulars, the crimes for which capital punishment was inflicted in each case. We now forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of this statement, together with a copy of the letter from Sir F. S. Roberts, No. 112, dated the 27th of January 1880, which accompanied it.

2. The following abstract shows in an abbreviated form the information contained in General Roberts' report :—

Nature of Charges.	Number executed.	Number released.
Dishonoring the bodies of the officers of the Embassy	4	—
Possessing property belonging to the Embassy	4	4
Being armed within five miles of camp	6	15
Attacking escorts in view to releasing prisoners	4	—
Murdering camp followers; participation in the attack on the Residency; inciting people to rise; carrying arms; treacherously firing on and killing wounded soldiers	69	57
Total	87	76

3. General Roberts' telegram of the 23rd of January reported that ninety-seven persons had been executed. His later and fuller report of the 27th states that sentence of death has been carried out only in eighty-seven cases. In explanation of this discrepancy it is stated by General Roberts that, when the first return was prepared, some persons who had been convicted of more than one offence were, by oversight, entered twice on the record.

We have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servants,
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES:
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.

To the Right Hon. Viscount Cranbrook,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

No. 112, dated Kabul, 27th January 1880.

From Lieut.-General Sir F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, a tabular statement showing the number of persons executed by my orders since my arrival in Kabul, and the offences for which they were punished.

2. The number given in this statement is not the same as that given in my telegram of the 23rd January. The latter was incorrect owing to the fact that some persons convicted of more than one offence were by mistake counted twice over.

3. I have also the honour to enclose, for the information of His Excellency in Council, a memorandum upon the exercise of martial law in Kabul, which will, I hope, satisfactorily explain some circumstances which have been severely commented upon in the public prints.

STATEMENT of CASES TRIED before the MILITARY COMMISSION at KABUL between 9th October and 26th December 1879.

No.	Name of Prisoner.	Tribe or Occupation.	Charge.	Sentence.
1	Walli Muhammad	Ghilzais	Attacking escort and endeavouring to effect release of prisoners on line of march between Zerghun Shahr and Zahidabad.	To be executed.
2	Gunmah			
3	Zamia			
4	Torabaz			
5	Khan Muhammad	Soldier	Fighting against British at Charasiah	Released.
6	Muhammad Akram Khan.	Afghan	Carrying arms within prescribed limits	Released, it having been shown that the prisoner was unaware of the order.
7	Abdul	Ditto	Ditto ditto	To be executed.
8	Kiraza Nazir	Mulla	Carrying arms within the prescribed limits and inciting the people to rise.	Ditto.
9 to 20	Sher Muhammad and 11 other men.	Artizans	Carrying arms within the prescribed limits	Released, it having been proved that the prisoners were unaware of the order.
21	Sultan Aziz	Afghan	Killing and wounding camp-followers	To be executed.
22	Muhammad Aslam Khan.	Kotwal of City	Dishonouring the bodies of the Embassy and inciting the people to rise.	Ditto.
23	Aghir Khan	Chokidar	Ditto ditto	Ditto.
24	Atta Muhammad	Officer of the Afghan army.	Taking an active part in the attack on the Residency.	Ditto.
25	Kabir	Ditto	Ditto ditto	Ditto.
26	Jehangir	Afghan	Fighting against the British at Charasiah	Released.
27	Abdul Karim	Colonel of Afghan Artillery.	Ditto ditto	Ditto.
28	Safudin	General in Afghan Army.	Present in Bala Hissar during attack on Residency and at fight at Charasiah.	Released, prisoner stating that he had been dismissed by the Amir from the army for offering to bring three or four regiments to stop the mutineers.
29	Samad	Afghan	No crime recorded. Brought to trial apparently by mistake.	Released.
30	Najman Shah	Soldier	Concerned in the attack on the Residency	To be executed.
31	Ghulam Jan	Officer of Afghan Artillery.	Present at the action of Charasiah	Released on finding security for good behaviour.
32	Saifudin	Official of Amir Yakub Khan.	Present at the action of Charasiah, where he was wounded.	Released at the request of the Amir and sent to the hospital for treatment.
33	Fakrudin	Mulla	Dishonouring the bodies of the Embassy and inciting the people to rise.	To be executed.
34	Mirza Muhammad	Servant of the Kotwal.	Dishonouring the bodies of the Embassy	Ditto.
35	Muhammad Akbar	Servant of Amir Yakub Khan.	Being in possession of property belonging to the Embassy.	To be executed. Amir Yakub stated that Muhammad Akbar was not his servant; that he was a man of bad character, and had robbed him.
36	Ghulam Muhammad.	Ditto	Ditto ditto	Released. Amir Yakub Khan stated that the man was his servant, that he had accompanied him to Khushi, and that he did not believe he had taken any of the property of the Embassy.
37	Kwaja Nazir	Soldier	Concerned in the attack on the Residency. Shooting one servant and wounding another of Sirdar Walli Muhammad when being made prisoner.	To be executed.
38	Sultan Muhammad	Servant	For being in possession of property belonging to the Embassy.	Released.

No.	Name of Prisoner.	Tribe or occupation.	Charge.	Sentence.
39	Shafi - -	Zemindar - -	For shooting a Kazzilbash and wounding another Kazzilbash, residents of Kabul, because they were friends of the British.	To be executed.
40	Kwaja Muhammad	Soldier - -	Concerned in the attack on the Residency	Ditto.
41	Paindur Muham-	} Zemindars - -	For carrying arms within the prescribed limits.	} Ditto.
42	mad, Futtehee			
43	and Muhammad-Moheem.			
44	Din Muhammad -	Drummer - -	Concerned in the attack on the Residency	Ditto.
45	Muhammad Husan	Sowar - -	Ditto ditto	Ditto.
46	Nur Muhammad -	Mulla - -	For carrying arms within the prescribed limits.	Released. Prisoner stating he had just come from Kohistan, and did not know of the order.
47	Said Jan - -	Zemindar - -	Ditto ditto	To be executed.
48	Barath - -	Carpenter - -	For having property in his possession belonging to the Embassy.	Released. Prisoner having proved that he had bought the property.
49	Kushan - -	Bugler, Ordal Regiment.	For taking part in the attack on the Residency.	To be executed.
50	Abdul Hakim -	Soldier, Afghan Artillery.		
51	Muhammad Rahim	Soldier, Herat Regiment.		
52	Ghulam Hussin -	Ditto - -		
53	Muhammad Khan	Ditto - -	Ditto ditto	Ditto.
54	Muhammad Sadik	Ditto - -		
55	Shamsuddin -	Ditto - -		
56	Muhammad Hashim	Ditto - -		
57	Amir Muhammad	Ditto - -		
58	Afzulah - -	Soldier, Afghan Artillery.		
59	Zandal - -	Soldier, Kabul Regiment.	Ditto ditto	Released, having proved that he was on guard on the 3rd September.
60	Nabbi - -	Kulassi, Artillery -		All released. The Commander-in-Chief Daud Shah stating that though Kulassis accompany their regiments into action, they are not a fighting element.
61	Ahmed Khan -	Ditto - -		
62	Muhammad Aman	Kulassi, Herat Regiment.	Ditto ditto	
63	Khan Muhammad	Kulassi, Magazine		
64	Saifoodin - -	Bugler, Ordal Regiment.	Ditto ditto	Released. He having proved that he proceeded to Ghazni some days before the attack on Residency.
65	Muhammad Afzal	Soldier - -		
66	Nasir - -	Ditto - -		
67	Fumma - -	Ditto - -		
68	Nuzbudeen -	Ditto - -		
69	Safat - -	Ditto - -		
70	Abdul Hakim -	Ditto - -	For taking part in the attack on the Residency, and being present at the action of Chamasiah.	To be executed.
71	Jellal - -	Ditto - -		
72	Raja Ali - -	Ditto - -		
73	Lubfulli - -	Ditto - -		
74	Muhammad Azim	Ditto - -		
75	Bairat Ali - -	Ditto - -		
76	Abdul - -	Ditto - -		
77	Zowar Ali - -	Ditto - -	Ditto ditto	Released. They having proved they were not in the attack on the Residency.
78	Sekundeen -	Ditto - -		
79	Faiz Muhammad	Ditto - -		
80	Barat - -	Ditto - -		
81	Muhammad Kadir	Ditto - -		
82	Muhammad - -	Ditto - -		
83	Kia Mudin - -	Ditto - -	Ditto ditto	To be executed.
84	Ahmed Ali - -	Ditto - -		
85	Aga Muhammad -	Ditto - -		
86	Achure - -	Ditto - -		
87	Muhammad Khan	Ditto - -		
88	Sirdar Hussin -	Ditto - -		
89	Usman - -	Ditto - -	Ditto ditto	Released. They having proved they were not in the attack on the Residency.
90	Nur Ali - -	Ditto - -		
91	Mohat Ali - -	Ditto - -		
92	Muhammad Ullah	Ditto - -		
93	Muhammad Ibrahim	Ditto - -		
94	Abdul Rehman -	Ditto - -	Ditto ditto	Released. All the prisoners having proved that they were not in Kabul on 3rd September.
95	Kairadin - -	Ditto - -		
96	Safdar - -	Ditto - -		
97	Kwaza Muhammad	Ditto - -		
98	Kaidar - -	Ditto - -		
99	Ramazan - -	Sowar - -		
100	Gulamat - -	Ditto - -	Ditto ditto	To be executed.
101	Amat Khan - -	Ditto - -		
102	Fazal Ahmed -	} Soldier - -		
103	Hashim Khan -		Ditto ditto	Ditto.
104	Agha Khan -			
105	Khair Muhammad	Ditto - -	Ditto ditto	Released. He having proved he was not in Kabul on the 3rd September.
106	Abdul Kadir -	} Ditto - -		
107	Bawadin - -		Ditto ditto	To be executed.
108	Rafar - -			
109	Kwaja Ahmed -			

No.	Name of Prisoner.	Trope or Occupation.	Charge.	Sentence.
110	Rahim -	Standard bearer -	For taking part in the attack on the Residency, and being present in the action of Charasiah.	Released, all the prisoners having proved that they were not in Kabul on 3rd September.
111	Said Sun -	Soldier -		
112	Rushit -			
113	Haidar -			
114	Abdul Wahib -	Sowar -	For having property in his possession belonging to the Embassy.	To be executed.
115	Said Meeran -	Carpenter -	For having been concerned in the attack on the Residency, and having a horse belonging to the Embassy in his possession.	Ditto.
116	Akhbar Ali -	Trumpeter -	For having been concerned in the attack on the Residency, and having property belonging to the Embassy in his possession.	Ditto.
117	Sultan -	Barber -	For having property in his possession belonging to the Embassy.	Ditto.
118	Said Khan -	Soldier -	For having been concerned in the attack on the Residency.	Ditto.
119	Nooredin -	Ditto -	For being concerned in the attack on the Residency, and being present in the action at Charasiah.	Released, all the prisoners having proved they were not present in the attack on the Residency.
120	Zeeao-din -			
121	Muhammad Isak -			
122	Gholam Jan -			
123	Khawaja Muhammad			
124	Mula Ahmed Gul			
125	Rasheed -			
126	Abad Khan -			
127	Abdul Wahab -			
128	Wazir Khan -			
129	Zaman -			
130	Taz Muhammad -			
131	Futteh Muhammad	Afghan -	For inciting the people to rise against us -	To be executed.
132	Abdul Rahim -		For carrying arms within prescribed limits and wounding the man who apprehended him.	Ditto.
133	Muhammad Hussein	Ditto -	For being concerned in the attack on the Residency, and for having property belonging to the Embassy in his possession.	Ditto.
134	Abdul Ali -	Ditto -	For being present at the Residency on the 3rd September.	Released, the prisoner having proved that he was unarmed and took no part in the attack.
135	Muhammad Azim	Artizan -	For being concerned in the attack on the Residency.	To be executed.
136	Gul Muhammad -	Soldier -	For having property belonging to the Embassy in his possession.	Ditto.
137	Manowar Shah -	Afghan -	For killing and wounding camp-followers	Ditto.
138	Manowar Shah II.	Ditto -	For being concerned in the attack on the Residency.	Ditto.
139	Abdul Munar -	Ditto -	For killing and wounding camp-followers	Ditto.
140	Gholam Muhammad	Ditto -	For being concerned in the attack on the Residency.	Ditto.
141	Abdul Kadir -	Ditto -		
142	Haheeb -			
143	Sifat -			
144	Mir Mukki -	Soldier -	For killing and mutilating wounded soldiers.	Ditto.
145	Muhammad Hussein	Afghans -		
146	Mir Gul -			
147	Jabar Khan -			
148	Shamshudin -	Afghan -	Ditto ditto	Released on account of his youth. Released, he having proved he did not take the property himself.
149	Gulgar -			
150	Faiz Muhammad -			
151	Taj Muhammad -	Servant of Amir Yakub Khan.	For having property in his possession belonging to the Embassy.	To be executed.
152	Khudadad -	Afghan -	For killing and mutilating wounded soldiers.	Ditto.
153	Khadir -	Ditto -	For killing and mutilating wounded soldiers, and for having in his possession a rifle belonging to a soldier of the 92nd Highlanders who had been murdered.	Ditto.
154	Muhammad Ali -	Butcher -	For having been armed in the precincts of the British Camp.	Released. Several Kizzilbashs testifying to his respectability.
155	Nishan -	Kulassi -	For fighting against us between 14th and 23rd December.	Released.
156	Abdul -	Ditto -		
157	Fakir Muhammad	Ditto -		
158	Muhammad Isak -	Ditto -		
159	Sher Muhammad -	Ditto -		
160	Haji -	Soldier -		
161	Rahmi -	Ditto -		
162	Ghulam Din -	Servant -		
163	Said Ali -	Bhistie -		

MEMORANDUM.

With reference to certain statements made in an article entitled "Martial Law in Kabul," which appeared in "The Fortnightly Review," dated the 1st of December 1879, and bore the signature of Mr. Frederic Harrison, I would make the following

observations regarding the proclamation of Martial Law in and around Kabul on 12th of October last :—

1. The civil government had ceased to exist, order had to be restored (for all was anarchy on my arrival here), and to suppose that this result could have been brought about in a country like Afghanistan without the adoption of measures which I maintain the circumstances fully justified, and which the result, has proved to have operated beneficially for the Afghans themselves, is to betray total ignorance of Afghan character.

Martial Law is not altogether one-sided in the advantages it confers. Here it actually protected the Afghans from themselves, by the knowledge that swift and sure but just punishment would overtake outrage or treachery.

2. My troops were placed in the heart of a hostile country and encamped within a mile of a densely populated city, whose inhabitants alone exceeded tenfold the strength of my force.

In addition, to the natural hatred which every Afghan feels towards a foreign invader, there is a strong underlying current of fanaticism which, unless promptly checked, becomes at times, and especially against a Christian enemy, uncontrollable.

Every man in Afghanistan is invariably armed, and only too ready to convert a trifling dispute into a bloody quarrel.

3. In the proclamation I distinctly stated that, for certain past offences, namely—

- (a.) Having been engaged in the attack upon the Mission ;
- (b.) Having in possession, after a certain fixed date subsequent to the proclamation, property which had belonged to the late members of the Embassy ; and
- (c.) Having borne arms against their lawful sovereign at Charasiah ;

the punishment was death, on conviction by the constituted tribunal.

I further notified that in future—

- (d.) Those proved to have mutilated our wounded ; and
- (e.) Any person found bearing arms within a radius of five miles from the city of Kabul,

would be liable on conviction to suffer a similar penalty.

4. I do not suppose that any person will be found to impugn the justice of clauses *a* and *b*, or deny that the fact of finding property which had belonged to the murdered members of the Mission in any person's possession was strong presumptive evidence that the possessor had been more or less directly concerned in the attack upon the Residency. Yet every opportunity was given to those with whom such property was found to come forward and explain, and all who did so escaped. Concealment after the proclamation was issued naturally led to the inference that no satisfactory explanation was forthcoming.

The repeated statement of the ex-Amir, when a guest and ally in our camp, that "all who fought against us at Charasiah were traitors to him," confirmed the decision at which I had arrived regarding clause *c*. Rewards were offered for the apprehension of these men, as it was known that all the regiments concerned in the attack upon the Mission took part against us at Charasiah, but in no instance were the soldiers thus brought in executed, unless proved to have taken a part in the attack upon the Residency, or to have committed other of the crimes enumerated in the proclamation.

Four hundred rupees in all was paid in rewards, but of this sum two hundred rupees was given as compensation to the family of a man in the service of Sirdar Wali Muhammad, who was killed when arresting an armed band of troops.

Clause *d* requires no defence, and I would point out as the result of the disarming clause the entire immunity which this force has enjoyed from assassination or fanatical attacks by individuals, and, further, so widely was the rule circulated, and so thoroughly well was it understood, that but few have suffered for its non-observance ; all who proved that they were ignorant of the terms of the proclamation were released.

5. I cannot allow that the terms of the proclamation were unduly severe when looked upon either as punishment for past treachery of the most infamous description, or as a possible preventive of the mutilation of the wounded and of quarrels probably ending in bloodshed.

6. A Military Commission, presided over by a general officer, and whose members were drawn from officers of standing and experience, tried every case ; and without their deliberate verdict and sentence, and without (I trust) calm and dispassionate consideration by me, not one sentence of death was awarded, confirmed, or carried into effect.

All that the accused had to urge in their defence was considered, remands were

variably granted when rebutting evidence was stated to be forthcoming, and in all cases where reasonable doubt existed, those on their trial reaped the benefit of it.

To question the good faith of the decisions of the Military Commission amounts to nothing short of casting discredit upon the honesty of the verdicts of all military courts.

7. The exigencies of my force rendered it imperative that each day numerous foraging parties should be despatched in various directions, and often to considerable distances from camp; the operation of the disarming clause enabled this duty to be carried on with much smaller guards than would otherwise have been required, and so relieved my troops of a very necessary but irksome duty.

I would further point out that the result has been that not a single case of assassination, outrage, or quarrel has occurred since our troops arrived at Kabul.

8. The establishment of martial law, instead of "meaning terrorism, slaughter, and violence, within such limits as a soldier thinks convenient," as the writer of the article in question asserts, is, as I understand it, a means of maintaining order and of preventing collisions between the troops and camp followers and the natives of the country; to those who may have to decide between us I confidently leave this point. The people have been treated well, their grievances have been inquired into, and, if possible, adjusted; for every article brought in for sale they have been liberally paid, and labour has commanded a price unheard of under Afghan rule.

9. There are other assertions made by Mr. Harrison, with a few of which I will deal. He states that "no quarter was given to anyone found firing upon us, or to prisoners taken in fight." This statement is incorrect. If reference is made to two or three straggling Goorkhas having during the engagement at Charasiah, on the 6th of October last, set fire to the clothes of four Afghan bodies in whom life was virtually extinct, this does not call for the wholesale condemnation of our troops; and if the offenders had been discovered they would undoubtedly have suffered the most severe punishment. On the other hand, it may be mentioned that on this very occasion several wounded Afghans were taken into hospital and treated side by side with our own soldiers.

"All who took up arms against us were treated as mutineers, rebels, and murderers." I trust I have shown that such was not the case.

"It is laid down on system that the troops are to enter the enemy's country * * * that they are to kill and burn, ravage and destroy, as far as may be requisite, to secure submission" * * *

This assertion is untenable in the light of the facts already stated.

One fort, near Kabul, has been destroyed as a punishment to its owners for treacherously cutting up our wounded when lying helpless on the ground on the 11th of December.

One fort in Kohistan, the property of Mir Bacha, who headed the recent rising against us—and

One fort in Maidan, whose proprietor refused to pay the customary revenue, declined to come in and tender his submission, and treacherously fired upon a small party of our troops.

None others have been interfered with, except certain villages near Sherpur cantonment, which, for purely military reasons, it was necessary to destroy. Ample compensation has invariably been paid, fresh ground granted in other localities, the families thus deprived of their homes have been provided for temporarily in the city, and every attention paid to their comfort.

10. I attach a copy of the instructions which were issued for the guidance of the Military Commission referred to.

Head-Quarters, Kabul,
27th January 1880.

(Signed)

FRED. ROBERTS, Lieut.-General,
Commanding in Eastern Afghanistan.

MEMORANDUM.

The following instructions are issued for the guidance of the Military Commission, of which Major-General T. Hills, C.B., V.C., is President:—

1. All prisoners, not belonging to the force, will be brought before the Commission.
2. All natives of the country found with arms in the city of Kabul, or within a radius of five miles, and all persons suspected of being soldiers, will be made prisoners.
3. Every soldier or civilian who took part in the massacre of the British Embassy on the 3rd of September last will be executed.

4. The cases of all other prisoners will be inquired into
of the Major-General Commanding Kabul Field Force.

(Signed) FRED. ROBERT
Camp Siah Sang, Kabul, Commanding
9th October 1879.

- NOTE.

Major-General Hills was President of the Commission
1879, when he found that his work as governor of the
the duty.

Brigadier-General D. Massy was then appointed President
Commission was dissolved, except on the 9th of
indisposition, Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C.B.,

(Signed) FRED. ROBERT
Commanding

LONDON:
J. JOHNSON and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to Her Majesty.
No. 1, Stationery Office.

AFGHANISTAN (1880) No. 1.

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO THE

AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1880.

[C. 2457.] *Price 2s. 3d.*

LIST OF PAPERS.

No.	—	From	To	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1	Telegram	Viceroy	Secretary of State	1879. 2 July	Reception of Amir at Kabul after signature of treaty of peace.	1
2	Letter	Government of India.	" "	14 July (No. 163.)	Reports on affairs in Afghanistan. Appointment of Sirdar Shere Ali Khan as Governor of Kandahar.	1
3	"	" with	" " 8 enclosures.	21 July (No. 167.)	Reports on affairs in Afghanistan. Departure of British Embassy for Kabul.	3
4	"	" with	" " 10 enclosures.	28 July (No. 169.)	Progress of the British Embassy towards Kabul.	4
5	"	" with	" " 11 enclosures.	4 Aug. (No. 173.)	Arrival of British Embassy at Kabul. Arrangements for transfer of administration of Kandahar to Afghan Governor.	7
6	"	" with	" " 6 enclosures.	11 Aug. (No. 177.)	Correspondence between General von Kauffmann and Amir Yakub Khan.	9
7	"	" with	" " 1 enclosure.	11 Aug. (No. 180.)	Arrangements at Kabul for reception of British Embassy.	12
8	"	" with	" " 3 enclosures.	11 Aug. (No. 181.)	Affairs at Herat	14
9	"	" with	" " 1 enclosure.	18 Aug. (No. 183.)	Interview between Amir Yakub Khan and Sir L. Cavagnari.	15
10	"	" with	" " 14 enclosures.	18 Aug. (No. 186.)	Affairs at Kabul and Kandahar. Arrival at Kabul of regiments from Herat.	17
11	"	" with	" " 4 enclosures.	25 Aug. (No. 188.)	Reception of British Embassy by Amir's Officials at Kasim Khel.	20
12	"	" with	" " 7 enclosures.	25 Aug. (No. 192.)	Affairs at Kabul and Kandahar.	21
12A	"	" with	" " 1 enclosure.	1 Sept. (No. 194.)	Kabul diary to 26th July	23
13	"	" with	" " 4 enclosures.	1 Sept. (No. 195.)	Affairs at Kabul and Kandahar.	24
14	"	" with	" " 6 enclosures.	1 Sept. (No. 196.)	Kabul Diaries to 16th August	25
15	Telegram	Viceroy	" "	6 Sept.	Attack on British Embassy at Kabul.	31
16	"	"	" "	6 Sept.	Same subject. Letters from Amir.	31
17	"	"	" "	6 Sept.	Same subject	31
18	"	Secretary of State	Viceroy	10 Sept.	Regret at news	31
19	"	"	"	10 Sept.	Orders for immediate advance, and occupation of Kabul.	31

No.	—	From	To	Date.	Subject.	Page.
20	Telegram	Viceroy	Secretary of State	1879. 12 Sept.	Military arrangements for advance on Kabul.	32
21	Letter	Government of India. with 35 enclosures.	" "	15 Sept. (No. 202.)	Review of circumstances attending massacre of British Embassy at Kabul.	32
22	Despatch	Secretary of State	Government of India.	18 Sept. (No. 101.)	Regret at news of massacre of the Embassy at Kabul.	48
23	Letter	Government of India. with 4 enclosures.	Secretary of State	25 Sept. (No. 203.)	Surveys of the Oxus by Russian officers.	49
23A	"	" " with 2 enclosures.	" "	25 Sept. (No. 204.)	Kabul diary to 23rd August	50
24	"	" " with 31 enclosures.	" "	25 Sept. (No. 210.)	Events in Afghanistan subsequent to massacre of the Embassy. Depositions of witnesses. Arrangements for advance.	52
25	Telegram	Secretary of State	Viceroy	27 Sept.	Inquiry respecting alleged existence of cholera among troops.	66
26	"	Viceroy	Secretary of State	29 Sept.	Reply to above	66
27	Letter	Government of India. with 50 enclosures.	Secretary of State	2 Oct. (No. 215.)	Advance of General Roberts. Arrival of Amir in the British Camp. Further depositions by witnesses of the Kabul massacre. Mutiny at Herat.	67
28	"	" " with 1 enclosure.	" "	2 Oct. (No. 216.)	Instructions to General Roberts.	96
29	"	" " with 38 enclosures.	" "	9 Oct. (No. 217.)	Summary of events. Interviews between General Roberts and the Amir's Agents. Fight at Charasiah.	99
30	Telegram	Viceroy	Secretary of State	10 Oct.	Military operations outside Kabul.	116
30A	"	"	" "	12 Oct.	Same subject	116
31	"	Secretary of State	Viceroy	14 Oct.	Congratulations at success of operations.	117
32	Letter	Government of India. with 30 enclosures.	Secretary of State	16 Oct. (No. 219.)	Summary of events. Fight at Charasiah. Occupation of Kabul. Further depositions of witnesses of the Kabul massacre.	117
33	Telegram	Secretary of State	Viceroy	22 Oct.	Instructions as to proclamation to be issued by General Roberts.	133
34	Letter	Government of India. with 22 enclosures.	Secretary of State	23 Oct. (No. 224.)	Summary of events. Occupation of Kabul. * Abdication of the Amir.	133
35	"	" " with 18 enclosures.	" "	30 Oct. (No. 226.)	Situation at Kabul consequent on Amir's abdication. Explosions in the Bala Hissar. Arrest of ministers.	142
36	"	" " with 19 enclosures.	" "	6 Nov. (No. 231.)	Summary of events. Communications established with the Khyber column.	149

No.	—	From	To	Date.	Subject.	Page.
37	Telegram	- Viceroy	- Secretary of State	1879. 12 Nov.	Proposed deportation to India of Amir Yakub Khan.	156
38	Letter	- Government of India. with	" " 15 enclosures.	13 Nov. (No. 234.)	Summary of events. Affairs at Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat. Advance of Khyber column.	156
39	Telegram	- Viceroy	- " "	17 Nov.	Alleged atrocities on wounded Afghans. Inquiry ordered.	160
40	Letter	- Government of India. with	" " 21 enclosures.	20 Nov. (No. 236.)	Summary of events at Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat. Amnesty proclamation by General Roberts.	160
41	Telegram	- Viceroy	- " "	30 Nov.	Disturbances in Wardak and Kohistan. Deportation to India of Amir's ministers.	167
42	Despatch	- Secretary of State	Government of India.	11 Dec. (No. 49.)	Reply to letters on the subject of affairs in Afghanistan. Approval of measures adopted.	168
43	Letter	- Government of India. with	Secretary of State 1 enclosure.	19 Dec. (No. 243.)	Letter addressed by Major-General Ivanoff to Sirdar Muhammad Musa Khan.	169
44	"	- " " with	" " 1 enclosure.	19 Dec. (No. 244.)	Conversation between General Roberts and Amir Yabub Khan as to relations of the late Shere Ali Khan with the British and Russian Governments.	170
45	"	- " " with	" " 1 enclosure.	19 Dec. (No. 246.)	Kabul Diary to 8th November	172
46	"	- " " with	" " 1 enclosure.	19 Dec. (No. 248.)	" to 15th November	174
47	"	- " " with	" " 2 enclosures.	19 Dec. (No. 249.)	" to 29th November	175
48	"	- " " with	" " 35 enclosures.	19 Dec. (No. 251.)	Tribal attack on General Roberts' force. Concentration in the Sherpur Cantonments. Reasons for arrest of Amir's Ministers.	179
49	Telegram	- Secretary of State	Viceroy	19 Dec.	Retention in India of military reliefs, and despatch of regiment from Cape.	190
50	"	- Viceroy	- Secretary of State	20 Dec.	Reply to the above	190
51	Letter	- Government of India. with	" " 1 enclosure.	31 Dec.	Kabul diary to 6th December	190
52	"	- " " with	" " 38 enclosures.	"	Repulse of the Tribal attack on General Roberts' force.	192

CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

Telegram, dated 2nd July 1879.

From VICEROY, Simla, to SECRETARY OF STATE, London.

AMIR well received at Kabul on his return. People reported generally satisfied with treaty. Selected officer will be deputed by Amir to Kandahar to arrange details of gradual evacuation of territory. All quiet at Kandahar and in assigned districts.

No. 2.

No. 163 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To The Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 14th July 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of telegrams containing news of current events at Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

JOHN STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

Telegram, dated 6th June 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR TAHIR KHAN, son of (Sirdar) Sharif Khan, has been appointed to the Governorship of Kelat-i-Ghilzai. He left Gandamak to day to take up his post.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

Telegram, dated 26th June 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Peiwar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

FOLLOWING news received from Kabul :—All quiet in city, troops getting their annual leave. Certain Chiefs and Sirdars were much ashamed at being shown by Amir letters they had written to the British during the late war. Asmatula Khan, Ghilzai, who was accompanying Amir to Kabul, had fled on road and gone towards Kashmir. Troops had turned out to meet Amir. Mahomed Afzul's house is being prepared for British Envoy. Shahbaz Khan had been ordered to proceed with two regiments to Kushi to meet Major Cavagnari. Wali Mahomed Khan had asked permission from Amir to visit Kurram and look after his property, but was refused.

Enclosure 3 in No. 2.

Telegram, dated 30th June 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Peiwar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

NEWS from Kabul as follows:—People generally pleased with peace. Sirdars and others who assisted or communicated with us during hostilities are frightened at treatment they may receive from Amir. Pakuk (Yakub) Khan visited Abdulla Jan's mother and reassured her. Rumoured that Ibrahim Khan and Ahmed Ali Jan will be sent to British territory. They reached Kabul on 25th June, and are in their own houses under surveillance.

Enclosure 4 in No. 2.

Telegram, dated 4th July 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

MAHOMED TAHIR KHAN arrived at Kelat-i-Ghilzai a week ago. Has sent no intimation of his arrival to General Stewart. Muhammad Aslam Khan, Tokhi, to whom the fort was made over by us, and to whom the Amir had written to come to Kabul, fled the day before Mahomed Tahir's arrival, certain assurances he required being withheld. He was unsuccessfully pursued by Mahomed Tahir's men, and two of his people made prisoners. These proceedings, though possibly justifiable, have for the present neutralised any effect produced here by Amir's Amnesty Proclamation.

Enclosure 5 in No. 2.

Telegram No. 1779 E.P., dated 5th July 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar.

Your telegram 4th July. We have ordered case of Aslam Khan, Tokhi, to be placed at once for orders before Amir at Kabul, and requested that Aslam Khan may be assured he has nothing to fear, and that he may go safely to Kabul where British Envoy will see to his treatment. Let these orders be known, and explain that no one under the amnesty need abscond.

Enclosure 6 in No. 2.

Telegram, dated 5th July 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Simla, to GENERAL ROBERTS, Peiwar.

KINDLY send the following letter to Bakhtiar Khan. *Letter begins—*

You are informed that Muhammad Aslam Khan, Tokhi Ghilzai, had friendly intercourse with the British authorities during the late war and was left as Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, when the British forces left that place. It has now been reported from Kandahar that Mahomed Tahir Khan has been appointed Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and that Aslam Khan has fled for fear of molestation on account of his intercourse with the British authorities. You are to take an early opportunity of bringing the matter to the Amir's notice and to inform His Highness that the British Government expects that he will take measures for reassuring Muhammad Aslam Khan that he has nothing to fear from the Kabul Government on account of his intercourse with the British forces. It will be better that Muhammad Aslam should be summoned to Kabul, and you are authorised to write a letter to Aslam Khan assuring him that he has nothing to fear. This letter should be written after consultation with the Amir. I expect to reach Kurram about the 14th July. *Letter ends.*

Enclosure 7 in No. 2.

Telegram, dated 8th July 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SUMMARY of news for week ending 7th. Everything has been quiet during past week. No news from Herat. Mahomed Tahir, new Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, arrived there, ten days ago. Muhammad Aslam, Chief of Ghilzai, retired to the mountains. Before his arrival news of the appointment of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan to be future Governor of Kandahar has been received with satisfaction; he was Governor for five years and was generally popular. Mir Afzal is still at Furrah, and is collecting revenue in district. Trade with India continues brisk. Heat slightly increasing. Health of troops good.

Enclosure 8 in No. 2.

Telegram, dated 11th July 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

A CARAVAN arrived to-day from Herat with news to 21st June. All quiet there. News of peace had arrived and caused general rejoicing. Six infantry and one cavalry regiment said to be leaving Herat for Kabul.

No. 3.

No. 167 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 21st July 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams, containing news from Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

JOHN STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

Telegram, dated 16th July 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Peiwar Kotal, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

LETTER from Bakhtiar Khan, dated 14th instant, reports death from cholera of brother of the Mustaufi; and also of Ataula Khan, Shahghassi. Heir-apparent has left for Lughman on account of cholera in Kabul. Arrangements are being made with the Shinwaris for protection of the road from Dakka to Haftchah.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

Telegram, dated 17th July 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

ARRIVED this morning. Leave to-morrow for Karatiga where Afghan escort under Shahghassi Khushdil Khan meets us. On 19th proceed to Kasimkhel and expect to reach Kabul on 23rd. General Roberts has arranged for a small force of all arms to escort and show honour to Embassy to Karatiga. General also accompanies it.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

Telegram, dated 15th July 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SUMMARY for week ending 14th. City and country have been generally quiet during past week. Revenue in grain and cash continues to come in. A party of 80 travellers arrived on the 11th from Herat; they report everything quiet there and on the road. Six regiments of the garrison had been ordered to Kabul. News of peace excited general rejoicing.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

Telegram, dated 16th July 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN has sent a servant on to prepare his house, and is expected to arrive in four or five days. He has no troops with him, but a regiment is accompanying his family some days behind him.

No. 4.

No. 169 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 28th July 1879.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams containing news from Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 19th July 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Kahamkhel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

NOTHING could exceed the admirable arrangements made by the Afghan officials for the reception of the Embassy. Amir has insisted upon the Embassy and escort and camp-followers being his guests during the march to Kabul. At each stage tents have been pitched for our reception. General Roberts will telegraph further news. Good-bye.

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 19th July 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to VICEROY, Simla.

KARATIGA, Saturday, 19th July. Kabul Embassy arrived here yesterday, escorted from Ali Khel by two companies of 67th Foot, two companies 72nd and 92nd Highlanders, 5th Goorkhas, four guns number 2 mountain battery, and one squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry. Khushdil Khan and Badshah Khan are encamped at Kasim Khel, two miles from this, and about halfway to crest of Shuturgurda; they will meet Major Cavagnari

this morning, and escort him to the camp pitched for him at Kasim Khel. To-morrow he will proceed to Kushi, reaching Kabul on 23rd instant. Country is perfectly quiet. Representatives of all neighbouring tribes are in our camp. I accompany Major Cavagnari to the Shuturgurdan and then return to Ali Khel.

Enclosure 3 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 20th July 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel to VICEROY, Simla.

CAVAGNARI crossed the frontier yesterday morning.

Kushdil Khan came to our camp to receive him.

Everything was done by Afghan officials to show honour to British Embassy, and reception of myself and officers was most cordial. We rode to crest of Shuturgurdan escorted by Afghan troops, and, after taking luncheon with Khushdil Khan, said good-bye to Cavagnari and party. Mahomed Umar Khan, late Governor of Herat, has died of cholera at Kabul; Sirdar Gaza Khan has been appointed Governor of Kabul.

Enclosure 4 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 20th July 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to VICEROY, Simla.

Khushdil Khan came to our camp at Kaham Khel yesterday to meet Major Cavagnari, escorted by a regiment of cavalry and some irregular infantry. As Major Cavagnari left the British camp a salute of 15 guns was fired by our mountain battery. The Embassy then proceeded to Kasim Khel, where tents were comfortably arranged for their reception. After partaking of tea and refreshment we rode to crest of Shuturgurdan escorted by the Amir's troops. On our return we found lunch prepared for 50 officers. Shortly afterwards we took leave of Major Cavagnari, and his party, also of Khushdil Khan, who, however, insisted on accompanying us some distance. Everything was done by the Afghan officials to honour the British Embassy, and the reception of myself and officers was most cordial. Amir has insisted upon the Embassy, their escort and followers, being his guests during march to Kabul. At each stage, tents have been pitched for their use as Major Cavagnari has passed through, and Kurram is all quiet.

Enclosure 5 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 21st July 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Kushi, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Arrived here this morning. Descent of Shuturgurdan and ascent of Sheenaki Pass near Dobandi very tedious for camels; rear of baggage did not reach camp till 4 P.M., though we marched at 5 A.M. We are receiving most hospitable treatment.

Enclosure 6 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 21st July 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kurram, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

THE satisfactory and cordial reception of Embassy by the Amir's officials on the Shuturgurdan has had a most beneficial effect all over Kurram. Some people doubted peace had been made, others thought it was only temporarily, and many believed that the meeting of our envoy with the Kabul authorities would be the signal for an outbreak. Some few of the local men I took with me up the Hazardarakht were so

convinced there would be a disturbance that they hesitated to go as far as Kharatiga when the time for the meeting arrived. All are satisfied now, and the large majority are I believe really glad that peace has been concluded.

Arrangements have been made for safety and despatch of letters and telegrams between Ali Khel and Kabul. Post now takes about 86 hours.

Zaman Khan, the newly-appointed Governor of Khost, passed through Kurram a few days ago.

Enclosure 7 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 22nd July 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Zarghun Shahr, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Zarghun Shahr, 21st July. Arrived this morning; easy march of seven miles over flat stony plateau. Regret to report death from cholera of Bakhtiar Khan. He will be a great loss to me. At present the only man I can suggest to replace him is Extra Assistant Commissioner Ghulam Ahmed, now at Peshawur. If appointed, he should be prepared to leave Lundikotal as soon as information is received that his escort through Jellalabad district has been arranged. But for his age, Nawab Ghulam Hussan Khan would be the best man. If he could join direct and rapidly, I would prefer him.

Enclosure 8 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 24th July 1879.

From SIR L. CAVAGNARI, Char Asiah, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

CHAR ASIAH, 23rd. Arrived this morning about four miles from Zahidabad. The valley closes in, and the road passes over low hills, but there is nothing to impede the march of troops. Shahghassi Mahomed Yusaf arrived in camp to communicate the Amir's arrangements for reception of Embassy. Certain of the principal Sirdars will come out to meet us with artillery, cavalry, and infantry. We hope to enter Kabul about 9 A.M. to-morrow.

Enclosure 9 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 22nd July 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SUMMARY for last week. Complete tranquillity in district and city. The new Governor, Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, arrives to-morrow, when that part of the province not under our direct administration will be made over to him. Travellers continue to arrive from Herat where everything (is) quiet. Six regiments of Infantry left some time since for Kabul.

Enclosure 10 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 23rd July 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN arrived this morning. He was met by General Stewart's Aide-de-Camp and an escort of cavalry under a European officer, and received at his house by a guard of honour of the 15th Sikhs under a European officer. A salute of 17 guns was fired from the cantonment. He will be visited by the Nawab and myself this afternoon, and will call on the General to-morrow morning.

No. 5.

No. 173 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 4th August 1879.

WE HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of telegrams received from our officers in Afghanistan during the past week.

2. These telegrams describe the arrival and reception of Sir L. Cavagnari at Kabul. They also report the arrival at Kandahar of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, the Afghan Governor of that province, and the arrangements under preliminary discussion, in view to the transfer of the administration to the Amir's authorities.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

JOHN STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 24th July 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

MAHOMED TAHIR KHAN, Governor of Kelat, has arrested Mullah Hasibullah, agent of Muhammad Aslam Khan, although furnished with a safe conduct by me to go to Kabul.

Enclosure 2 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 25th July 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul via Ali Khel.

Following from St. John, Kandahar.

MAHOMED TAHIR KHAN, Governor of Kelat, has arrested Mullah Hasibullah, agent of Muhammad Aslam Khan, although furnished with a safe conduct by me to go to Kabul.

Please inquire and obtain from Kabul Government early issue of necessary orders to respect our safe conduct.

Enclosure 3 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 26th July 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 24th July. Embassy entered city this morning, and received a most brilliant reception. Four miles from city Sirdars Abdullah Khan, Herati, and Mullah Shah Mahomed, with some cavalry and two elephants, met us. We proceeded on the elephants with a large escort of cavalry. Outside the city two batteries of artillery, some cavalry, and nine regiments of infantry, were drawn up in column and saluted, their bands playing British National anthem. As we entered city the heavy battery fired a salute of 17 guns. Large crowd assembled, and was most orderly and respectful. Mustaufi and Daud Shah met us at our place of residence.

In Bala Hissar at 6 p.m. I paid formal visit to Amir, and delivered Viceroy's letter. Amir inquired after Viceroy's health, and also after that of the Queen and Royal family, and expressed regret on death of Prince Imperial. Amir's demeanour was most friendly.

Enclosure 4 in No. 5.

Telegram, No. 1966EP., dated 27th July 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, via Ali Khel.

Your telegram, 24th, received. Viceroy has received with great pleasure intelligence of the brilliant reception given at Kabul to your Embassy; it is regarded as most favourable inauguration of friendly intercourse and understanding between the two Governments. Your telegram was repeated to England.

Enclosure 5 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 28th July 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Envoy, Kabul, post Ali Khel.

Following message from St. John, 27th :—

Syed Mir Hashem sent by me to Herat, where he arrived after declaration of peace, has been imprisoned by Ayub, although he has had passport from me.

Enclosure 6 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 28th July 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 26th July. Visited Amir this morning, and delivered presents. All continues satisfactory.

Enclosure 7 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 29th July 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 27th July. All well.

Enclosure 8 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 30th July 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, July 28th. Samarkandi left yesterday. This morning, accompanied by my staff, I rode to Baber's tomb, and round the environs of Kabul. Returned through one of the city bazars. People very orderly, many saluted, Mullah Shah Mahomed and some Afghan cavalry accompanied me. Visited Amir this evening.

Enclosure 9 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 31st July 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 29th. All continues well.

Enclosure 10 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 1st August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 30th July. Visited Siah Sang this morning. Received your message of 28th. Will inquire from Amir about Syed Mir Hashem.

Enclosure 11 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 29th July 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

The principal event of the week has been the entry of the new Governor, Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, which took place on the morning of the 23rd. His Excellency was met by an Aide-de-Camp of the General with an escort of cavalry, and conducted to his house in the city. Great crowds assembled to see him arrive, but no particular enthusiasm was shown. The next day His Excellency called on General Stewart, who returned the visit on the 26th; arrangements are being made for the transfer to him of authority in the city and province. The country and city are tranquil. No news of importance from Western Afghanistan.

No. 6.

No. 177 of 1879. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 11th August 1879.

WE have the honour to inclose translations of three letters received by his Highness the Amir of Afghanistan from General Von Kauffmann, Governor-General of Russian Turkestan. These letters have been transmitted in original by His Highness the Amir, through Sir Louis Cavagnari, to the Government of India.

2. Of the two earlier letters, dated 25th February 1879,* and 27th March 1879,† one is addressed to the Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan himself,

* (New Style, 9th March 1879.)

† (New Style, 8th April 1879.)

‡ (New Style, 7th May 1879.)

§ Inclosure No. 3.

the other to his son. The third letter, dated 25th April 1879,‡ was brought to Kabul by a special messenger, whose coming was announced beforehand by a letter§ from the Russian Governor at Katti Kurgan to the Amir's deputy in Afghan Turkestan. This messenger was allowed to deliver his letter at Kabul; but His Highness the Amir has given orders that in future no agents of the Russian Government shall pass the Oxus without his express permission.

3. It has been explained to us that the two letters first received from General Von Kauffmann are in reply to friendly letters of ceremony which Gholam Hyder Khan, the Amir's deputy in North Afghanistan, sent to Tashkend under instructions from Yakub Khan. The Amir's hold upon his northern provinces was at the time precarious; and, as he apprehended some adverse movement from beyond the Oxus on the part of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, he was anxious to appear to be on good terms with the Russians. We attach little importance to the formal interchange of letters written and received under these circumstances.

4. But the third letter forwarded through Katti Kurgan has apparently been spontaneously addressed to the Amir by the Governor-General at Tashkend; it reached the Amir at a date subsequent to the ratification of our Treaty with Afghanistan, and

His Highness deferred answering it until after the arrival of our Envoy at Kabul. We have now received from Sir Louis Cavagnari a copy of the reply which has been despatched to General Von Kauffmann by His Highness; and we submit it,* translated into English, for Your Lordship's information.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 6.

Translation from the Russian.

To his Highness AMIR SAHIB MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN.

WISHING you complete happiness, the following are my words:—

With deep sorrow I heard the sad news of the demise of my friend, your all-beloved just Father, the Amir Sahib, and I sincerely lament the heavy loss sustained by you and by the country of Afghanistan.

Your Highness, being the lawful heir—and having been called upon to become the ruler of the country by your late father himself, at a time of dire visitation sent by God—have now ascended the throne.

I offer you my felicitations and my most sincere wishes of every good.

As a friend of your late amiable father, I hope that you will foster the same good disposition and the same confidence towards me, as did your father, the late Amír Sahib.

I wish Your Highness wisely and justly to rule the people, who will not abandon you in these hard times, and who will be always ready to stand up for, and defend, your throne.

The envoys of your late father, the Amír Sahib:—Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, Wazír Shah Mahomed Khan, Kazi Abdul Kader, and the Kemnal-Dabir Mahomed Hassan, are returning to be at your service. I am convinced that these men who faithfully served your father, will as faithfully serve your Highness.

May God grant you wisdom, health, and the love of your people!

The Governor-General of Turkestan,
(Signed) ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
VON KAUFFMANN, 1st.

City of Tashkend.

The “25th” February* 1879=(The 16th Rabil-ul-awul 1296H.)

*(New style:
9th March).
Tr

N.B.—The Russian note at foot of the vernacular page testifies the correctness of the translation. It is signed by “Collegien Rath Nerasimof” or “Norasimof,” and is dated Tashkend, the 25th February*9.

Enclosure 2 in No. 6.

Translation from the Russian.

To the highly respected (:) The CROWN PRINCE of the Afghan Throne, SIRDAR MAHOMED MUSA KHAN; to ULÁM AIDAR KHAN; to AMÍR MAHOMED; to NÚR MAHOMED; and to KHABIBULLA.

I WISH you all constantly to enjoy the favours and the good-will of the new ruler, the Amir Sahib!

After which the following are my words:—

I cannot but tell you candidly that the news of the demise of my friend the Amír Sahib, Shir Ali Khan, has profoundly grieved me. From your letter of the 26th Rabiyl

Avvela, I learnt that you, Sirdar Mahomed Músa Khan, as being the lawful heir, have been chosen by the Váaliat—which proves the good disposition and attachment of the Afghan people towards your family and your race. To me, an old friend of your late grandfather, this news has given unspeakable joy.

I wish you all good fortune in all your good undertakings, and likewise that you may prove powerful supporters of the fortunate Amír Sahib Mahomed Yakub Khan. God grant it!

The Governor-General of Turkestan,
(Signed) ADJUTANT-GENERAL
VON KAUFFMANN, 1st.

City of Tashkend. The "27th" March* 1879.

* (New style:
8th April.)
Tr.

N.B.—The Russian note at foot of the vernacular page testifies the correctness of the translation, and is signed by "Collegien Rath Nerasimof" or "Norasimof." It is dated Tashkend, the 27th March 1879.

Enclosure 3 in No. 6.

Translation of a Letter from HAKIM WASNIHAVITCH, (?) Russian Governor of Katti Kurgan, to the Address of GENERAL GHULAM HYDER KHAN, Loc-náb, (Governor-General) of Chahar Velayet (four provinces or districts,) dated 29th* Aprii 1879=(—1296, Hijri).

* New Style, 11th May 1879.

(After Compliments.)

So long as the system of the universe continues in its working order through the instrumentality of Providence, so long may the Most Merciful and Gracious God continue you—who hold a high dignity and rank, and who do not stand in need of any praise or eulogy—on the path of prosperity, and maintain you on the "masnad" of authority, and make your days roll on agreeably to your wishes for the sake of the Chief of the Prophets and his holy posterity.

I beg to inform you that my servant, Nasir Khan, is, at this happy moment, leaving with a letter from the Governor of the province of Turkestan for his Highness the Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan, whose assistance is highly valued. It is hoped that you, out of regard for friendship, will send the man on with your own servant and cause him to be presented to the Amir with the letter, and that you will kindly inform me of the delivery of the letter and the presentation of the man to the Amir, as well as of the state of His Highness' health. This will not, of course, be more than a friend will do for a friend. May God make you happy and prosperous both in this world and the next for the sake of His Prophet and his posterity.

Enclosure 4 in No. 6.

Extract from Translation of a Report from MUNSHI BAKHTIAR KHAN to the Address of MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated 9th June 1879.

A LETTER was received by the Amir yesterday from General Ghulam Hyder Khan to the effect that he had stopped Mahomed Nasir Khan, a Russian Government Agent, whose arrival in Turkestan he had reported previously, from proceeding to Kabul until further orders. The Amir has written to the General to allow the Agent to proceed to Kabul to deliver the letter brought by him from the Governor-General of Tashkend, as previously ordered; but has given instructions that if any other person connected with the Russian Government should intimate his intention in future to visit Kabul, he (the General) must direct him to remain on the other side of the Amu pending receipt of orders from the Amir. Also, the General is to hold no communication with the Russians in future without the Amir's permission.

Enclosure 5. in No. 6.

Literal Translation of a Letter from GENERAL KAUFFMANN to AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, dated 25th* April 1879=(16th Jamadi-ul-Awal, A. H. 1296.)

* New Style, 7th May 1879.

(Translation from the Persian.)

AFTER my wishes and prayers for your Highness' safety and prosperity, I take the opportunity to write that, having bidden (a temporary) farewell to the affairs of the State entrusted to my charge,* I intend to start for the metropolis of the Russian Empire on the 15th May, corresponding to the first week of Jamadi-us-Sani. I therefore beg to intimate this my intention to your Highness, and hope that your Highness, considering me your sincere friend and staunch well-wisher, will keep me informed of every occurrence that takes place in your Highness' dominions while I am away.

* NOTE.—According to the Russian version, "on behalf of matters connected with the region entrusted to me."

I have given orders here that any letters that may be received from the Great Amir (your Highness) during my absence should be forwarded with all possible despatch to St. Petersburg. May the Most High God prolong your Highness' life and grant your Highness a great victory.

Here the seal of the General.

Here his signature in Russian.

Enclosure 6. in No. 6.

Translation of a Letter from His Highness the AMIR of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, to GENERAL KAUFFMANN, Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, dated Kabul 26th July 1879.

YOUR friendly letter, dated the 25th of April 1879, reached me by the hands of Nasir Khan, and I fully understood all the friendly and neighbourly meanings contained in it.

The state of affairs here is that peace and friendship have been established between my Government and the British Government in a way which is conducive to the advantage of both. All cause of quarrel and misunderstanding has disappeared from between the two parties, and the officers of both Governments are now pleased and happy. As Nasir Khan has been dismissed, and is about to set out to his home, I have thought proper to answer your friendly letter, and to add that if, at any time, the officers of your Government, in accordance with the rules of friendship and neighbourhood, should require to communicate with my Government, either in writing or verbally, they will no doubt consider it advisable to do so through the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, the Russian Minister in London, his Excellency the Viceroy of India, or the British Envoy at Kabul, in conformity with the treaty which has been concluded between my Government and the British Government.

No. 7.

No. 180 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 11th August 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a memorandum on the arrangements made for the reception of the British Embassy in Kabul.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 7.

MEMORANDUM on the Arrangements made for the Reception of the British Embassy in Kabul.

On Wednesday the 23rd July the Amir's master of the ceremonies, Shahgassi Mahomed Yusaf Khan, waited upon his Excellency, the Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, K.C.B., C.S.I., at his camp at Char Asiah to inform him of the arrangements made by His Highness the Amir for the reception of the Embassy next day.

On Thursday the 24th July, the Envoy and staff, escorted by the 9th Regiment of the Amir's Cavalry, marched from Char Asiah, and were met three miles outside the capital by Sirdar Abdulla Khan, son of Sirdar Sultan Ahmed Khan (Sultan Jan) of Herat and Mullah Shah Mahomed, the Foreign Minister, with 100 men of the Amir's mounted body-guard. Two elephants were also brought and were mounted by the Envoy and the Secretary to the Embassy. Order of procession was as per margin. The body-guard saluted and fell in in front, leading the procession. Half a mile nearer the city, another

One Troop, Amir's Regular Cavalry.
100 Sabres, Body-Guard.
Elephant with Envoy and Sirdar Abdulla Khan.
Elephant with Mr. Jenkyns and Shah Mahomed Khan, Foreign Secretary.
25 Sabres, Guide Cavalry.
9th Regiment of Amir's Regular Cavalry.

troop of orderly cavalry fell in in front of the body-guard. Close to the eastern gate of the Bala Hissar the troops of the Kabul garrison were drawn up in line of columns on the left of the road. On the right was a mountain battery, then nine battalions of infantry, and a horse artillery battery. On the left was a regiment of cavalry.*

* The troops saluted the Envoy presenting arms and playing "God save the Queen."

The Envoy and staff entered the Bala Hissar by the Shah Shahid Gate, and as they did so, a salute of 17 guns was fired by a heavy battery, 18-prs. Near the Amir's palace a guard of honour, consisting of a whole regiment, was drawn up and saluted the Envoy as he passed, by presenting arms.

Immediately on the arrival of his Excellency at the place of residence appointed for the Embassy, Mustaufi Habibulla (the Finance Minister) and Daud Shah (Commander-in-Chief) waited upon him to make formal inquiries after his health on the part of the Amir.

At 10 o'clock Mr. Jenkyns, accompanied by Lieutenant Hamilton, visited the Amir on the part of the Envoy, and thanked him for the honourable reception that had been given to the Embassy.

His Highness appointed 6 p.m. as a suitable hour for receiving the Envoy.

At quarter to 6 p.m. the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mullah Shah Mahomed) called at the British Embassy in order to escort the Envoy to the Amir's palace.

At 6 p.m. the Envoy, accompanied by the whole of his staff, paid a formal visit to His Highness the Amir. A guard of the Amir's Highlanders accompanied the Envoy from his residence to His Highness' palace, at the door of which a guard of honour of the same regiment was drawn up.

His Excellency introduced the members of his staff to the Amir, and, after the usual inquiries after his health, thanked His Highness for the very honourable reception, and the hospitable treatment which the British Embassy had experienced. The Envoy then delivered a letter to His Highness from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, and conveyed his Excellency the Viceroy's compliments to His Highness. The Amir expressed his pleasure at the honour, and said he indulged the hope of having a personal interview with his Excellency the Viceroy soon. His Highness also inquired after the health of Her Majesty the Queen, and the Royal Family, and of his Excellency the Viceroy. He also expressed his sorrow and condolence on the death of the Prince Imperial. After some further conversation the Envoy withdrew being escorted back by the Foreign Minister.

Sirdar Yahya Khan (Governor of Kabul) Mustaufi Habibulla (Finance Minister), and Daud Shah (Commander-in-Chief), were present at the Durbar and sat on the Amir's left. The Envoy and staff, with Sher Mahomed Khan, Kayani, (of the Kohat district) sat on His Highness' right.

(Signed) W. JENKYNs,
Secretary to Embassy.

Kabul, 24th July 1879.

No. 8.

No. 181 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 11th August 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, translations of reports received from the Meshed Agent and from Herat.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

J. STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

Translation of a Letter from the Meshed Agent to Ronald F. Thomson, Esq., dated
17th May 1879. (Extract.)

AFTER the starting of Ayub Khan's messenger for Teheran, I was told by some Heratis that the letters of which he was the bearer, although professing to be from Amir Yakub Khan, were, in reality, concocted by Ayub Khan.

The Kabul and Kandahar regiments of the Herat garrison are in a state of disaffection and disorder. The officers have no kind of authority over them; and all the Government employés at Herat are in expectation of news announcing the capture of Kabul, and the downfall of Yakub Khan, and so soon as the troops get this news, they intend robbing the peasantry and neighbourhood, and deserting for their homes.

The inhabitants of Herat have given up all industry and trade. No shops, with the exception of those of bakers, grocers, and butchers, are opened; and the natives bury all their goods because of the state of lawlessness of the place and the oppression of the authorities. From time to time, they produce such things as may be necessary, but then hide them again. The authorities also are so fearful of the stability of their tenure of office that they are mercilessly collecting a year's taxes.

All people trying to get away are stopped on the borders, and are not allowed to pass unless they know some one in authority, or are able to bribe and make presents. All the inhabitants of Herat, native and outsiders, are anxiously awaiting the advance of the English army.

Any traveller coming from Kabul is taken first before the authorities by men stationed at the gates for the purpose, where he is taught what he is to say according to the interests of those in power.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

Translation of a Letter from Herat, to Ronald F. Thomson, Esq., dated 4th May 1879.
(Extract.)

YESTERDAY two-and-a-half lakhs of Kabul rupees, that is to say, 50,000 tomans, arrived here from Turkestan. The expenses here being great, and the revenues small, this sum has been paid into the treasury of Ayub Khan.

No doubt this has been done with the knowledge of Yakub Khan.

The Sepeh Salar and Sultan Muhammad Khan are to start for Kabul to-morrow or the day after; they will be escorted by Yar Gul Khan, brother of General Fakir Ahmed Khan, and 200 horse. Some other Khans are to follow in five or six days. These have doubtless been summoned at the request of the British officials, who wish that Ayub Khan's supporters should be present at any deliberation respecting peace.

We hear from Kandahar that the English have got a firm footing there, and have been collecting supplies of all sorts. The inhabitants have much liberty, and are making a great deal of profit by their transactions. No customs dues are levied beyond one rupee for every ten Kandahar māns on each load, which is exacted without respect to the kind of goods.

We have no fresh news from Kabul, as the authorities only publish what is favourable to themselves, in the hopes of keeping the natives of the provinces together.

Enclosure 3 in No. 8.

Translation of a Letter from Herat, to Ronald F. Thomson, Esq., dated 16th May 1879.

THREE days ago, a Government courier came in from Kabul. Amir Yakub Khan had written to Sirdar Ayub Khan, telling him to send 20 batmans of manna, and also informed him that Sirdar Yahya Khan had been sent to bring the harems from Turkestan. This Sirdar is the Amir's father-in-law.

Twelve days ago, the Sepeh Salar was despatched with honour, but under the surveillance of 200 horsemen, to Kabul. He left without being in debt either to the Herat Treasury or any private individual. Sirdar Mahomed Umar Khan, the ex-Governor of Herat, was also sent to Kabul three days ago in a very ignominious manner. His private servants were all put under arrest; and it being found that he had spent a lakh of rupees out of the revenues, a bond was taken from him for the amount in Amir Yakub Khan's name and forwarded to Kabul, for the Amir either to recover the sum from him, or make him a present of it.

Two nights ago, Mustaufi Mirza Aziz, who has been the Mustaufi of Herat for the last four years, was arrested with two of his brothers, and his accounts were examined. A deficiency of 8,000 tomans was found, and the Sirdar has put him in prison until he makes good the money.

General Fakir Ahmed Khan is the absolute Minister of Sirdar Ayub Khan. Several Afghan Chiefs, like Mir Akhor Agha Jan Khan and others who accompanied the Sirdar from Meshed, have all been recently sent to Kabul by the advice of the said General.

Two Herati regiments which had deserted from Maimeneh were compelled to go back by the Herat authorities. On arriving there, the inhabitants would not allow them to enter the place, so they have gone and occupied Aul-i-Mar, a place three fursakhs distant off.

There are no signs of peace. The British authorities are paramount at Kandahar; and it is said their advance guard has come as far as Zamindawar.

To-day, a caravan consisting of about a thousand souls, Kandahari merchants, &c., left this for Kandahar. They had goods and ready cash to the amount of 10 or 12 lakhs of krans.

No. 9.

No. 183 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 18th August 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a memorandum of a personal interview, which took place on the 25th

July 1879, between Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, K.C.B., C.S.I., and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 9.

MEMORANDUM of a personal interview, which took place on the 25th of July 1879, between MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., and His Highness the AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, &c.

AFTER some conversation on ordinary topics I informed His Highness that the Government of India had received the letter despatched by General Von Kauffmann by the hand of Nasir Ali Khan of Samarkand, and which His Highness had forwarded for the advice of the British Government as to the reply that should be given to the messenger. I informed the Amir that the Russian Government would be informed that such correspondence is opposed to the pledges of non-interference in the affairs of Afghanistan which the Russian Government has frequently made, and I added that the Amir should now dismiss the messenger with a letter acknowledging the communication received from the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, and stating that in future, if the Russian authorities had anything to communicate to the Afghan Government, they should do so through the medium of the British authorities. I further stated that it was advisable that His Highness should furnish me with a copy of the reply given to the Russian messenger.

The Amir without hesitation acquiesced in what I proposed, and said that he only awaited my arrival to dismiss the messenger.

I replied that it was a very good thing that the Russian messenger should have been an eye-witness of the honourable reception given to the British Embassy, and further that the arrival of the representative of the British Government should be the signal for the departure of the emissary from the Russian authorities. His Highness promised to forward through me a reply to his Excellency the Viceroy of India's letter which I presented yesterday, and to send at the same time a copy of his reply to the Russian letter above alluded to.

I next informed His Highness that Major St. John, now on political duty at Kandahar, has been appointed Consul-General at Astrabad, and that it would be a great convenience to that officer if, instead of having to travel through India and the Persian Gulf, it could be arranged that he should proceed viâ Herat and the northern frontier of Persia.

The Amir replied that, owing to the unsettled state of the country between Girishk and Herat, he could not be certain that satisfactory arrangements could be made until his troops were again stationed at Girishk, but that if it would be a convenience to Major St. John he would direct Sirdar Sher Ali Khan at Kandahar to make arrangements to escort him to the Afghan frontier in that direction. At my request the Amir promised to write to the Governor of Kandahar to communicate with Major St. John, and if he wished to proceed to the Persian frontier viâ Seistan to make the necessary arrangements for his journey. I informed His Highness of the news telegraphed from Kandahar as to the apparent anxiety of Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan on hearing that Afghan troops were about to march in the direction of Farrah. The Amir replied that he could not understand why the Sirdar should have any apprehensions, as his letters which were of frequent occurrence were submissive and friendly.

As regards Herat matters the Amir stated that he has the most thorough confidence in his brother the Governor of that place, and added that, in consequence of his lengthy residence at Meshed, it was possible that Sirdar Ayub Khan still maintained friendly correspondence with the Governor of Khorassan, but that he (the Amir) did not approve of any further correspondence and would order its discontinuance.

I next entered into some general conversation on matters relating to Merv. The Amir stated that he was aware that the Tekke Turkomans had grave apprehensions as to the aggressive designs of Russia, and that they would have to seek an alliance with Afghanistan or Persia. He added that the Turkomans would naturally prefer the Afghans to the Persians.

Before taking leave of His Highness I remarked that I hoped no restrictions would be placed upon Sirdars and others visiting the officers of the Embassy, as I assured him that he need never fear that we would do anything to lessen his authority and influence. The Amir replied that he has never forbidden any one to visit the British officers. I answered that the people of Afghanistan would act in accordance with what they believed would please their ruler, and that if they thought he would not like such visits being paid they would not make them even though no orders were given them.

At my request His Highness promised to arrange for the safe-conduct to the British frontier (Kurram) of the baggage animals and followers who accompanied the Embassy to Kabul.

No. 10.

No. 186 of 1879. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 18th August 1879.

WE have the honour to forward a copy of further telegrams on the subject of affairs at Kabul and Candahar.

We have, &c.
(Signed)

LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated 2nd August 1879.

FROM SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 31st July. The following movements of troops ordered from Kabul Garrison:—Three infantry regiments to Herat, three to Ghazni, six to Turkestan, and a cavalry regiment to Zurmat, to collect arrears of revenue. Cholera has increased during two last days. We ride about the environs every morning. Amir has not left his residence since cholera became epidemic.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated 3rd August 1879.

SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AUGUST 1st, Kabul. All well. Violent earthquake last night.

Enclosure 3 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated 5th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AUGUST 3rd, Kabul. All well. Six regiments of infantry have arrived from Herat, others under orders to replace them.

Enclosure 4 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 7th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AUGUST 5th.—Mir Akbar Khan, Kohistani Chief, died of cholera yesterday.

Enclosure 5 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 8th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 6th August.—Alarming reports personally reached me to-day from several sources of the mutinous behaviour of the Herat regiments lately arrived here, some of the men having been seen going about the city with drawn swords, and using inflammable language against Amir and his English visitors; and I was strongly advised not to go out for a day or two.

I sent for Foreign Minister, and as he was confident that the reports were exaggerated, we went out as usual.

I do not doubt that there is disaffection among troops on account of arrears of pay, and especially about compulsory service, but the Amir and his ministers are confident that they can manage them.

Enclosure 6 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 9th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, August 7th.—State of affairs reported yesterday continuing in milder degree. Amir professing complete confidence to maintain discipline.

Enclosure 7 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 9th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, August 7th.—Some Ghilzais or Jajis have been plundering fruit merchants between Kharatiga and Shuturguridan, and yesterday they detained for some hours the Kabul mail bag. I represented this to the Amir, who has directed Foreign Minister to summon Padshah Khan and come to a proper understanding with him.

Enclosure 8 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 12th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 10th August.—Three regiments under Brigadier Zabardast Khan, Ghilzai, marched for Ghazni on 7th instant. Amir inspected them at Deh Mazang. Amir inspected to-day some of the regiments lately returned from Herat, and is about to give them some pay.

Enclosure 9 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 13th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.
KABUL, August 11th.—All well. Nothing important to report.

Enclosure 10 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 14th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

VIRULENT cholera has broken out in the regiments recently returned from Herat. Many deserted in panic, and the rest have been given leave to their homes.

Enclosure 11 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 15th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, August 13th.—All well. Foreign Minister reported by order of Amir that a Turk, calling himself Saïd Husain Pasha, and stating he was captured by the Russians in late Turkish war, arrived here three days ago from Bokhara, having travelled *viâ* Orenburg and Tashkend. He is now on his way to Bombay *viâ* Kurram. Amir gave him some expenses for his journey.

Enclosure 12 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated 5th August 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AUGUST 5th.—There has been no event of importance during the week. Sirdar Sher Ali Khan has taken charge of the out-districts, but the town and neighbourhood are not yet made over to him. The Herat road is again infested by robbers, and no more caravans have arrived.

Enclosure 13 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated 9th August 1879.

From GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

ARRANGEMENTS made for making over city to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan on 10th under satisfactory conditions.

Enclosure 14 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated 12th August 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

EVERYTHING quiet in city and neighbourhood. Charge of city was made over to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan on the evening of the 10th. Our police and sanitary arrangements

remain unchanged, and the gates are still held by our guards, but the town dues and taxes remitted by us were at once re-imposed. The sellers of shoes and caps have closed their shops in consequence. Sirdar Mahomed Yusaf Khan, re-appointed Governor of Pusht-i-Rud, and Zamindawar, arrived here from Kabul on the 7th. He visited General Stewart on the 10th, and the latter returned his visit on the 11th. He leaves for Girishk to-morrow.

No. 11.

No. 188 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 25th August 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of papers received from the Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of the Amir of Kabul and its Dependencies, regarding the reception of the British Embassy at Kasim Khel by His Highness the Amir's officials.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

J. STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

No. 2, dated 19th July 1879.

Memo. from MAJOR L. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul Embassy, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Dept.

Has the honour to forward copy of a letter addressed to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

Dated, Camp Kasim Khel, 19th July 1879.

FROM MAJOR L. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul Embassy, to His Highness the AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN.

(A. C.) I WRITE to inform your Highness that I arrived at Kasim Khel this morning.

* The title given to Khushdil Khan while Governor of Afghan Turkistan. (Sd.) L. CAVAGNARI. Khushdil Khan Loinab* came to meet me at Karatiga with an escort of cavalry and infantry. General Roberts and several officers accompanied me to Kasim Khel, and rode to see the crest of the Shuturguridan. After partaking of Khushdil Khan Loinab's hospitality, General Roberts and the other officers left Kasim Khel highly pleased at having seen the excellent arrangements your Highness' officials had made for the reception of the British Embassy. In short, nothing has been omitted by Khushdil Khan Loinab to indicate your Highness' sincere friendship to the British Government.

I hope to reach Kabul on the 24th July, when I shall have the honour of renewing with your Highness that friendly intercourse commenced at Gandamak.

The other officers of the Embassy join with me in expressing a hope that your Highness is in the enjoyment of good health.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

No. 4, dated Camp Zahidabad, 22nd July 1879.

Memo. from MAJOR L. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul Embassy, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Dept.

IN continuation of No. 2 of the 19th instant, has the honour to forward a letter received this day from His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan.

Enclosure 4 in No. 11.

Translation of a Letter from the AMIR YAKUB KHAN to MAJOR SIR L. CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., dated Kabul, 21st July 1879.

(A. C.) BE it known to my kind friend Major Cavagnari, C.S.I., who has a heart warm in affection and marked with friendliness, that at a time when my heart longed to hear the happy news of his good health, his most friendly and cordial letter, dated Saturday, the 19th July, reached me from Kasim Khel. I cast an affectionate glance over it, and learnt from its contents the account of his arrival at that place, in company with General Roberts, his aides-de-camp, and a few other officers of high rank, as well as of the attention and consideration shown to him by Loinab Khushdil Khan.

It is a source of gratification and joy that my worthy friend has reached so near his destination in a state of sound health; and, God willing, on the appointed day, viz., the 24th July, the doors of fresh happiness and pleasure and unbounded joy and delight will be set open to my heart by having a joyous interview with him. But it is a matter of great sorrow and regret that at this time when my friend is approaching my capital, Kabul, the worthy Mir Munshi Muhammad Bakhtiar Khan, who was a trustworthy and true servant to his Sublime Government and a special well-wisher of my God-granted Government, having been ill with cholera for two or three days, bade adieu to this ephemeral world, and departed to that of happiness and repose on Sunday, the 29th Rajab (20th July).

Although his death has occasioned sorrow and pain to me, and will no doubt impose the burden of grief and regret upon your mind, yet there is no remedy against the decrees of God, and we are bound to submit to His will.

No. 12.

No. 192 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 25th August 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a further collection of telegrams relating to Afghanistan affairs.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

JOHN STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 16th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, August 14th.—All well. Padshah Khan, Ghilzai, personally deputed to make arrangements for protection of Shuturgurdan road.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 17th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, August 15th.—All well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 18th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

DATED Kabul, 16th August.—All well.

Enclosure 4 in No. 12.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 19th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, August 17th.—Amir of Bokhara contemplates moving some troops towards Badakshan frontier in consequence of depredations committed on the Kabul and Darwaz frontiers. Governor of Afghan Turkestan has begged Amir not to do this, promising to put pressure on the insurgents. Sara Beg, the ex-Mir of Kulab, is said to be the instigator of these acts by the Badakshan insurgents.

Some Russians are exploring along the right bank of the Oxus.

Enclosure 5 in No. 12.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 20th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 18th August.—Amir has ordered troops to proceed to Badakshan to coerce the insurgents. Cholera here again on the increase. Herati regiments lost over a hundred men.

Enclosure 6 in No. 12.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 21st August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

REGIMENTS for Turkestan have left Deh Mazang. It is believed that many will desert.

Enclosure 7 in No. 12.

Telegram, dated 20th August 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

NOTHING of importance has occurred during the past week. Sirdar Mahomed Yusaf Khan has gone to Zamindawar, and Sirdar Sher Ali's elder son, with his brother and other Sirdars, have arrived from Herat.

No. 12A.

No. 194 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To The Right Honourable • VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, September 1, 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter from the Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul, No. 10, dated 29th July 1879, submitting his diary No. 1 for the week ending 26th July.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

J. STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 12A.

No. 10, dated 29th July 1879.

From MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.S., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

HAS the honour to submit diary for the week ending the 26th July 1879.

No 1. Diary of the British Embassy at Kabul from the 19th to 26th July 1879.

July 19th. Under arrangements made by Major-General Roberts, C.B., V.C., Commanding in Kuram, the camp of the British Embassy left Ali Khel on the 18th of July escorted by the following troops :—four guns No. 2 Mountain Battery; one squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry; 2 companies 67th Foot; 2 companies 72nd Highlanders; 2 companies 92nd Highlanders; and 4 companies 5th Goorkhas, the whole under the command of Brigadier-General Massy. The camp halted at Kharatiga, the boundary between the Jaji and Ghilzi tribes, and which, by arrangement concluded with His Highness the Amir at Gandamak, is now the limit of the British administration in Kuram. About 8.30 a.m., on the 19th, Shahghassi Khushdil Khan, Barakzai, son of the late Shahghassi Sherdil Khan, arrived at the frontier with a regiment of regular cavalry commanded by Colonel Shahrs Khan and some Ghilzi levies under Padshah Khan, the Chief of the Ahmedzai Ghilzis. Mr. Jenkyns, C.S., and Captain Conolly, Political Assistant to General Roberts, were deputed to meet Khushdil Khan and conduct him to the British camp.

At 9 o'clock a.m., the British Embassy left the camp at Kharatiga under a salute of 15 guns. A guard of honour from the 67th Foot presented arms as the Envoy left his tent.

The Afghan troops were drawn up a short distance from the frontier and saluted as the Embassy approached.

General Roberts and a number of officers of the Kuram force accompanied the Embassy.

At Kasim Khel the Afghan officials had tents prepared for the Embassy, and no trouble was spared to make everything as comfortable as possible.

After a visit to the crest of the Shutar Gardan Pass the officers returned to Kasim Khel, and there partook of the Shahghassi's hospitality. In the course of the afternoon they returned to Dre Khula.

Major Cavagnari wrote to the Amir announcing his arrival at Kasim Khel, and expressed his thanks for the arrangements that had been made for the reception of the British Embassy.

July 20th. Marched from Kasim Khel to Khusi.

July 21st. Marched from Khusi to Zarghun Shahr.

Received a letter from Kabul announcing the death from cholera of Mir Munshi Bakhtiar Khan.

July 22nd. Marched from Zarghun Shahr to Zahidabad. Major Cavagnari wrote to the Amir conveying the news received by telegram from Simla that he (Major Cavagnari) had been appointed a Knight Commander of the Bath. His Highness was also requested to appoint an official in the place of the late Mir Munshi to inform the Envoy of the arrangements made for the entry of the British Embassy into Kabul.

July 23rd. Marched from Zahidabad to Char Asiab. In the course of the forenoon, Shahghassi Muhammad Yusaf, brother of Shahghassi Khudil Khan, arrived in camp, bringing a letter from His Highness the Amir, containing congratulations to the Envoy, and informing him that the bearer of the letter would personally explain what had been arranged for the reception of the Embassy.

July 24th. Marched from Char Asiab to Kabul.

Four miles from the city, Sirdar Abdullah Khan, son of Sultan Ahmed Khan (Sultan Jan), formerly Governor of Herat, and Mullah Shah Muhammad, Minister of Foreign Affairs, met the Embassy with a troop of cavalry and two of the Amir's State elephants. Major Cavagnari and Sirdar Abdullah Khan took their places on the leading elephant. Mr. Jenkyns and the Foreign Minister followed on the second one. Lieutenant Hamilton (Queen's Own Corps of Guides) and Dr. Kelly, surgeon to the Embassy, followed on horse-back. The Guide Cavalry Escort and the Afghan Cavalry completed the procession.

Close to the city the troops of the Kabul Garrison were drawn up in column and presented arms as the Envoy passed. There were two regiments of cavalry, two batteries of artillery, and nine regiments of infantry on parade. The bands played the British National Anthem as the infantry presented arms. On an eminence south-east of the city a battery of 18-pounders was posted, and a salute of 17 guns was fired as the British Embassy entered the Shah Shahid gate of the Bala Hissar.

A guard of honour consisting of a regiment of infantry were drawn up on some open ground a short distance from the place appointed as the residency of the Embassy.

Immediately after the arrival of the Embassy, the Mastaufi (Minister of Finance) and General Daud Shah, the Commander-in-Chief, waited on the Envoy and made inquiry after his health on the part of the Amir.

At 10 o'clock a.m., Mr. Jenkyns, C.S., and Lieutenant Hamilton visited the Amir, on the part of the Envoy.

At 6 o'clock p.m., the Envoy and Staff visited His Highness the Amir, and delivered a letter from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, informing the Amir of Major Cavagnari's appointment as Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary.

July 25th. At 9 o'clock a.m., the Envoy had a private audience of the Amir.

In the afternoon Mullah Shah Muhammad and Mirza Nabbi, the Private Secretary, visited the Envoy, and presented a rough draft of the Amir's reply to the Viceroy, and also of one prepared as an answer to General Kauffmann's letter.

July 26th. At 10 o'clock a.m., the Envoy and Staff visited the Amir, and delivered some presents. In the afternoon the Foreign Minister and the Private Secretary visited the Envoy, and delivered the Amir's letter addressed to his Excellency the Viceroy, and also a copy of the reply sent to the Russian letter.

No. 13.

No. 195 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department. (Extract.)

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 1st September 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams on the subject of Afghanistan affairs.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 13.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 24th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AMIR has taken by force part of the money and ornaments amassed by the mother of Abdulla Jan.

There is friction between Amir and Daud Shah, and the latter appears to be strengthening his own faction, and if the Amir press him too severely, he will join the anti (?) Jacobins, who are gaining strength daily in consequence of Amir's want of conciliation.

Enclosure 2 in No. 13.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 25th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla

KABUL, 23rd August. All well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 13.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 26th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, August 24th. Fresh outbreak of Cholera. Embassy all well.

Enclosure 4 in No. 13.

Telegram, dated 26th August 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

NOTHING of importance has occurred during the past week except the death from cholera of Sirdars Ali Akbar and Ali Askar Khan, brothers of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan: they had recently arrived from Herat. The epidemic has almost, if not entirely, ceased in both city and cantonments. Weather still very warm. 1st Punjab Cavalry and Company Sappers here marched for Pishin.

No. 14.

No. 196 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, September 1, 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of letters from the Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, Nos. 16, 17, and 19, dated respectively the 5th, 13th, and 19th of August 1879, forwarding his diaries for the period between the 27th of July and the 16th of August 1879.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

Memo. No. 16, dated 15th August 1879.

From MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Has the honour to submit diary of the British Embassy at Kabul for the week ending the 2nd of August 1879.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

No. 2. Diary of the British Embassy at Kabul, from 27th July to 2nd August 1879.

27th July 1879.—At the request of the Envoy that some one amongst the Amir's officials should be appointed to attend at the British Embassy, the Amir told off Nazir Abdul Ghiyas for this duty.

28th July 1879.—The Envoy and staff accompanied by Mullah Shah Muhammad and Nazir Abdul Ghiyas, and escorted by a detachment of the regular cavalry under Colonel Sharo Khan (a relative of the late General Feramurz Khan, and of Kafir origin) visited the tomb of the Emperor Baber. In the afternoon the Envoy visited the Amir, and made over to him a translation of a telegram, dated the 25th July, from Major St. John, at Kandahar, reporting that Mahomed Tahir Khan, the Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, had arrested Mullah Habibullah, agent of Muhammad Aslam, Tokhi, though furnished with a safe-conduct from the Political Officer at Kandahar. The Amir stated that the matter would be inquired into.

29th July 1879.—Newsagents report that the general opinion in Kabul is that now that the British Envoy has arrived, the arrears of pay due to the troops will be paid; that compulsory enlistment will be discontinued; and that oppressive taxes on the peasantry and on the trading classes will be considerably reduced. It is stated that the Amir has kept the troops in good heart by promising them their arrears of pay after the arrival of the British Embassy.

30th July 1879.—Reported that Sirdar Yahya Khan has been trying to dissuade the Amir from visiting the frontiers of Afghanistan in company with the British Envoy, alleging that it would be derogatory to the Amir's position to do so. Daud Shah and the Mustaufi advise the Amir to adhere to his promise to visit Turkestan and Herat. It is thought probable that the Amir will, if the Envoy presses the subject, agree to depute some one to accompany any of the Embassy to visit the frontier.

Kazi Abdul Kadir, Peshawuri (Kazi Kadru) has been deported from Kabul. He was supposed to have advised the late Amir to get rid of Sirdar Yahya Khan who had accordingly to leave Afghanistan. On his return from Gandamak the Amir made the Kazi over to Sirdar Yahya Khan, and it was generally supposed that he had been secretly assassinated. It now appears that the Kazi was spared though the intercession of Kazi Mahmud Jan (another of the Peshawur Kazi Khel who fell into disgrace with the British authorities of Peshawur) who accompanied the Sirdar on his return from India, and who is now employed confidentially by Yahya Khan. This increases the suspicion that the latter is not well-disposed towards the British Government. Kazi Kadru has sent to Kabul for the females of his family. It is not certain whether he intends residing in Bonair, Swat, or Bajour, or whether he contemplates returning to Peshawur. If the latter turns out to be his course of action, it might be advisable to have him deported across the Indus, or placed under surveillance.

Munshi Anwar, for some time a news writer to the British authorities at Kandahar, arrived in Kabul a few days ago, and at an interview with the Amir, informed him that it was probable that he would be again appointed as news writer, but that he desired first to ascertain the Amir's wishes. The Amir told him that he might take the appointment. The inference is that the Munshi may try and serve two masters. It may therefore be advisable to apprise the Kandahar authorities of this matter. Three regiments of infantry have been ordered from Kabul to Herat. Three more to Ghazni, and six to Turkestan. A cavalry regiment is under orders for Zurmat to collect arrears of revenue. There will probably be some delay in the march of the above, owing to the difficulties of obtaining baggage animals.

31st July 1879.—Taj Muhammad Khan (brother of Naib Lal Muhammad Khan) recently created a general, was granted the contract of the Mint by the Mustaufi. In consequence of the large number of British rupees now in possession of the people of the country, and which eventually will be brought to the Mint to be converted into the

current coinage of Afghanistan, Ghulam Raza Khan (a former Kotwal of Kabul) offered more than double the original bid, and the Mustaufi accepted this and revoked the contract he had previously given. When Ghulam Raza's servants went to the Mint to take over charge, Taj Muhammad's retainers beat and insulted them. When this was reported to the Amir, Taj Muhammad Khan was sent for, and was disgraced and deprived of his generalship. Naib Lal Muhammad Khan is very vexed at the above treatment of his brother.

Syud Hassan, whose daughter is married to Mazullah Khan, Ghilzai, will probably be appointed Chief Kazi of Turkestan.

It is reported that a number of men have been specially told off by the Amir to watch who visit at the British Embassy, and with whom the Envoy has communication, or gives presents to.

Sirdar Yahya Khan visited the Envoy to-day.

1st August 1879.—It is reported that the Amir is pressing the sons of the late Sirdar Mahomed Umar Khan (lately died of cholera at Kabul, and formerly Governor of Herat) to pay two lacs of rupees alleged to be due by their father. The sons are quite unable to comply with this requisition.

Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan (son of Sirdar Sharif Khan) has been ordered to take three regiments and proceed to the Kohistan and Panjsher to collect arrears of revenue. The Sirdar considers the appointment beneath his rank and is consequently displeased.

The Amir desired Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan to send to Kabul the persons who accompanied him when he went into exile to Meshed. The Amir was annoyed at the Sirdar having made certain military appointments amongst the troops at Herat, and these were ordered to be cancelled, and the officers so appointed to be sent to Kabul. It is stated that the Sirdar is not inclined to send the companions of his exile to Kabul, but has directed the officers he promoted to proceed to the Amir.

The Amir's mother is said to be estranged from him on account of his forcibly depriving her of some money and ornaments she had amassed, and which she wished her other son, Sirdar Ayub Khan, to share in. She is reported to be going in a huff to Mamakhel in the Jellalabad district.

The Wakil-ud-daulet of Saighan, who has considerable influence among the tribes of that quarter, is distrustful of the Amir, and refuses to attend at Kabul.

The Mustaufi and Khudai Nazr Khan have had a dispute in connexion with the betrothal of a woman. The former is desirous of effecting a reconciliation. Khudai Nazr Khan has sent privately to know the Envoy's wishes. The Envoy informed the messenger that both parties are looked upon as friends of the British Government, and that, therefore, it would be better that they should have no differences among themselves.

2nd August 1879.—Yar Muhammad, Mohmand, with 20 sowars, arrived last night from Herat.

Thirty men of the Mangal tribe arrived here a few days ago. Object of their coming is not yet known.

In the afternoon the Amir sent Mullah Shah Muhammad and Mir Akhor Muhammad Akhtar Khan to the British Embassy with 11 horses and some trays of country produce as presents to the officers. Reported to the Foreign Secretary for orders as to the disposal of these presents.

Cholera has been slightly on the increase during the last few days. Mir Akbar Khan, Kohistani, is reported dangerously ill of this disease.

The officers of the Embassy go out every day for a ride in the environs of Kabul. The Foreign Minister and the Nazir, and some Afghan cavalry always accompany them.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

Memo. No. 17, dated 13th August 1879.

From MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Has the honour to submit diary of the British Embassy at Kabul, from the 3rd to the 9th of August 1879.

Enclosure 4 in No. 14.

No. 3. Diary of the British Embassy at Kabul from the 3rd to the 9th August 1879.
*(Extract.)

August 3rd, 1879.—The Envoy visited the Amir at 8 o'clock A.M. The interview was of a personal character and the conversation that took place was on general subjects. In the afternoon the Mustafi visited the Envoy and presented a letter received from Sirdar Sher Ali Khan from Kandahar, reporting, for the information of His Highness the Amir, his interview with General Stewart, Commanding at Kandahar.

News-reporter states that six regiments of infantry from Herat will probably reach Kabul in the course of the next two days. They are said to have been despatched from Herat with only three rupees per head for their road expenses, and that they have plundered and oppressed the villagers of the Hazara country during their march through it.

It is stated that Sirdar M. Ayub Khan has dismissed Mirza Aziz, the Mustafi of Herat, and has demanded half a lac of rupees from him. Mirza Sadik has been appointed in his place.

It is supposed that the Amir contemplates a reduction in the allowances hitherto paid to the Muhammadzai (Barakzai) Sirdars, excepting the family of Sirdars Yahya Khan and Hashim Khan, and that those of the Ghilzai and Kohistan tribes will be reduced. Up to the present Padshah Khan, Ghilzai, is outwardly favourably treated by the Amir. Asmatula Khan, Ghilzai, still hesitates to obey the Amir's summons to Kabul.

4th August 1879.—Mir Akbar Khan, the Kohistani Chief, and rival of Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani, (who has always professed to be well-disposed towards the British Government) died of cholera to-day.

5th August 1879.—The Mustafi went yesterday to the house of Khudai Nazr Khan in the Bala Hissar and made up the quarrel between them.

It is reported that the Amir contemplates giving the Khanship of the Jabbar Khel, Ghilzais, either to Rahmatullah Khan or to Bahram Khan. If this is done Asmatula Khan will create trouble. Some petty Malikhs of the Ghilzai tribe are said to have been deprived of their Malikships in consequence of their having had intercourse with the British authorities. (I have not sufficient information as to the true facts of the cases to ask the Amir for explanation about them.—L. C.)

6th August 1879.—The regiments from Herat reached the Sherpur Cantonments yesterday. To-day a number of the soldiers were reported to be moving about the city in a most disorderly manner, and creating some excitement amongst the rabble of the place. The Envoy sent for the Foreign Minister, who assured him that the troops were not out of hand, and that if a few wild spirits had been making a noise in the city, it was not a matter for any apprehension. He further stated that in a day or two the troops would be paid their arrears and be given furlough for a few months.

7th August 1879.—Some of the Ahmedzai Ghilzais have been molesting travellers between Kasim Khel and Dobandi. The mail bag from Ali Khel was detained for a few hours. The intention of the Ghilzais is to attract notice in order that some dissatisfied parties may be granted allowances. Report of this was made to the Foreign Minister who promised to arrange matters with Padshah Khan.

A deputation from the Kharoti Povindahs has visited the Amir with the view to obtaining his intercession with the British Government for the release of the prisoners who were convicted of being concerned in the raids on the Tank (Dera Ismail Khan) frontier.

The Amir has sent a conciliatory message to Asmatula Khan, Ghilzai, and has again summoned him to Kabul. The Chief fears that if he leaves his country he will not be permitted to return, and that during his absence his rivals will gain the upper hand of him.

8th August 1879.—Three regiments under the command of Brigadier Zabardast Khan, Ghilzai, left for Ghazni to-day. The Amir went to Deh Mazang to see them off and wish them God-speed.

Yesterday General Daud Shah visited the Herat regiments and attempted to conciliate them by offering them furlough, but it is stated that they were somewhat disrespectful to him, and said that they would not take leave until their arrears of pay were given them. They also demanded the release of Husain Ali Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, who is now under restraint in the Bala Hissar.

It is reported that six other regiments are coming from Herat under the command of Taj Muhammad Khan, a son of Arsala, Ghilzai.

The Envoy visited the Amir to-day.

9th August 1879.—The Mustaufi visited the Envoy this afternoon with reference to Kandahar matters. He also intimated that if the British Government were disposed to view with favour any representation on the part of the Amir in the case of the Kharotis, whom he added were subjects of the Afghan Government, His Highness would personally address the Envoy about it. He further stated that if the British Government saw no objection, Haji Ataulla would be again deputed to the Court of the Amir of Bokhara, and that copies of all correspondence between the two Courts would be submitted for the information of the British Government. The Envoy replied that after a reference to his Government the reply would be communicated to the Amir.

Enclosure 5 in No. 14.

Memo. No. 19, dated 19th August 1879.

From Major SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Has the honour to submit diary of the British Embassy at Kabul for the week ending 16th August 1879.

Enclosure 6 in No. 14.

No. 4.—Diary of the British Embassy at Kabul, from the 10th to the 16th of August 1879.

10th August 1879.—Report received that the road over the Shuturguridan is still unsafe, and that fruit sellers from Logar were obliged to return. (This has again been brought to the notice of the Foreign Minister, who has promised that the matter shall receive immediate attention). 1,000 men of the Malla Khel (nomad Ghilzais) started from Ghazni, by instigation of the Governor, to attack the Hazaras of Besud. The Hazaras heard of the move and collected to the extent of 3,000. The Malla Khel were defeated with a loss of five or six men. Two causes are assigned for the conduct of the Governor of Ghazni. 1st, the Ghilzai nomads (Kuchis) go to Nawar to graze their flocks, and of late the Hazara tribe has plundered them. 2nd, Rajab Khan, a great friend of Mir Fateh Khan, one of the Hazara Chiefs, has a son in one of the cavalry regiments serving in Kurram, and during the campaign Rajab Khan contemplated visiting the British authorities, but the Governor of Ghazni having heard of this intention imprisoned him. Mir Fateh Khan in retaliation attacked the Ghilzai herds.

Yesterday the Amir sent for the officers of the Herat regiments and told them to bring up their men to receive pay.

11th August 1879.—Yesterday two of the Herat regiments were paid. Two companies were deprived of their ammunition. It is supposed that gradually all the ammunition of these regiments will be taken away.

It is said that General Daud Shah and the Mustaufi are displeased at the Amir's interference direct in military and finance matters.

12th August 1879.—It is reported that the Amir told his Attar-bashi yesterday that he intended going upon tour about the 20th of Ramzan. (I don't place much reliance upon this report, as the Mustaufi and Foreign Minister have frequently told me that the Amir cannot leave the capital until he has settled all matters connected with Kabul and its vicinity.—L. C.)

All the ammunition of the six regiments from Herat has now been taken from them. They have received their arrears of pay. Cholera has broken out among them in great severity. Large numbers have deserted, and the remainder have been granted furlough.

13th August 1879.—Foreign Minister reported to the Envoy that a Turk, calling himself Said Husain Pasha, and stating that he had been taken prisoner by the Russians in the late Turkish war, and had been conveyed to St. Petersburg and released at the

conclusion of peace, arrived three days ago from Bokhara, and is about to proceed *via* Kurram to Bombay. The Amir gave him some money for his journey, and desired the Foreign Minister to report the matter to the British Envoy.

The Amir is said to be preparing a handsome "khillut" for the Mustaufi.

The allowances and status of Khudai Nazr Khan, Wardak, have been confirmed as they were before. No "Sannad" to this effect has yet been given him.

14th August 1879.—The Khanship of Asmatula Khan has, at last, been given to his cousin, Bahram Khan, who was yesterday presented with a dress of honour.

Asmatula Khan has gone to Kulman and refuses to come to Kabul.

Yesterday a daughter of Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan, who was betrothed to the late heir apparent died of cholera.

Two of the Kabul regiments received their pay yesterday.

The Amir is angry with Sirdar Abdulla Khan (son of Sultan Jan of Herat) on account of his conduct in some private inheritance case.

General Ghulam Hyder Khan sent a cavalry regiment and three infantry regiments from Turkestan against the Shaikh Ali tribe. The troops were beaten back twice, but finally compelled the tribesmen to retire, without being able to disperse them thoroughly. A Sowar in the cavalry regiment writes to a friend in Kabul, that General Ghulam Hyder Khan suddenly summoned back the regiments to Turkestan in consequence of the rebellion of Mir Muhammad Khan at Siripul. An engagement is said to have taken place in which General Ghulam Hyder Khan was defeated, and Syud Hasain Elbegi (an Uzbek Chief in the Amir's service) was killed. Ghulam Muhi-ud-din, son of Khwaja Nur Khan of Kabul, was wounded. Mir Muhammad Khan has 2,000 Turkoman horse in his employ. The fight took place at Bel Chiragh. (The Foreign Minister states that the rebellion of the Mir of Siripul took place immediately after the death of the late Amir, but that order was restored before he (Mullah Shah Mahummud) left Turkestan for Kabul. He further states that the Shaikh Ali Tribe has submitted, but this is not confirmed by travellers from Bamian, who assert that the road is still unsafe.)

15th August 1879.—The representatives from the Mangal tribe are still at Kabul, waiting for the return of some of their number whom the Amir sent back to bring certain influential men who had not come to Kabul.

A large number of men from the troops recently sent to Ghazni deserted on the march leaving their arms which have been sent to Kabul.

Six infantry regiments intended to relieve those in Turkestan have moved out of the Sherpur cantonments to the Chaman east of the city.

There are now 12 infantry regiments at Herat, six are Kabul regiments, and six are Herati. There are two Herati regiments quartered at Maimeneh.

16th August 1879.—The Foreign Minister by order of his Highness the Amir, brought a letter received from the Governor of Turkestan which contained the following communication from Mulla Muhammad Umr, Governor of Khumab, on the banks of the Oxus :—"On Sunday the 14th of Shaban I reached the Kilif Ferry. A Kabul caravan had arrived at the ferry. Some of the Mir of Kilif's men had come over the river to take toll from the caravan, and two or three men of Akcha had gone over to the other side. I asked them about the Russians. They said that three Russian officers with three soldiers and an interpreter had come up the river in two boats. They passed one night at Charjui, and one night at Kilif. Early on the morning of the 14th they left for the ferries of Kara-Khwan and Sherabad. It is said that they will go as far as the frontiers of Kulab. They had no steamboat with them. They brought one large boat with six boatmen from Organj, and another smaller one which worked with a screw. (?) These boats were dragged up the river with ropes. It is reported that three or four other Russians with some soldiers in two boats have left Charjui, and will reach Karki in a day or two."

A letter subsequently written was received from the Superintendent at the Chuchka ferry :—"Thirty-three Russians accompanied by some Mahomedans are coming up the other bank of the Oxus from Khiva. From the Chuchka ferry to Patta (?) we kept up this (Afghan) side, and they on the other side. They travelled in two 'Kaima' (boats?). I have sent a letter to Muhammad Hassan Khan, Zirmisher of Tashkurgan, to watch his own ferries."

(Signed) L. CAVAGNARI, Major,

Kabul, 19th August 1879.

Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul.

No. 15.

Telegram from VICEROY, 6th September 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

DURING night of 4th September information reached Ali Khel that, on morning of 3rd, British Embassy at Kabul was attacked by three revolting Afghan regiments, joined later by six others. Embassy defended itself when messengers left Kabul. To-night, letters received at Ali Khel from Amir leave no hope as to fate of Embassy. General Massey ordered to move from Ali Khel on Shuturguridan to-morrow. General Roberts from Simla will reach Peiwar in five days and take command of rapid advance on Kabul. Colonel Baker will command one brigade. General Stewart ordered to hold Kandahar and threaten Ghazni, if necessary.

No. 16.

Telegram from VICEROY, 6th September 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

Two letters from Amir received at Ali Khel. First, dated 3rd, 8 morning, says troops assembled for pay at Bala Hissar, suddenly broke out, stoned their officers, then rushed to Residency and stoned it; received volleys in return. The confusion reached height beyond control; people from city and surrounding country poured into Bala Hissar, began destroying artillery park and magazine. All troops and people attacked Residency. I, Amir, sent Daud Shah to help Envoy. He was unhorsed at Residency by stones and spears: is dying.

Then I sent Yahya Khan and my own son with Koran, also Mullahs, to troops, but no use. Disturbance continues till now, evening; confusion is beyond conception. Letter ends. Second from Amir, dated 4th says, yesterday from morning till evening, thousands assembled to destroy Embassy; much life lost both sides; at evening they set fire to Residency. All yesterday up to now, I, with five attendants, have been besieged; have no certain news of Envoy whether he and his people have been killed in quarters or seized and brought out.

Letters end. Telegram unfinished. Line interrupted. Will follow.

No. 17.

Telegram from VICEROY, 6th September 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

Following is remainder of Ameer's last letter:—

TROOPS, city, and surrounding country have thrown off yoke of allegiance. Daud Shah not expected to recover. All his attendants killed. Workshops and magazines totally gutted: in fact, my kingdom is ruined. After God I look to the Government for aid and advice; my true friendship and honesty of purpose will be clear as daylight. By this misfortune I have lost my friend the Envoy, and also my kingdom. Am terribly grieved and perplexed.

Here follows Amir's date seal. Both these letters are addressed to General Roberts.

No. 18.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE, 6th September 1879, to VICEROY.

DEEPLY grieved at news. Pray send further details immediately they are received.

No. 19.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE, 10th September 1879, to VICEROY.

THE early occupation of Kabul is a necessity, and the advance upon it should be immediate. We assume supplies and communications assured. You may rely upon support of Government for most vigorous action. In selection of officers fit for the work you will be thoroughly supported. Complete domination at Kabul the first point. Until then future arrangements cannot be settled. Let me know at once in detail the time within which Kabul may be in our hands, the amount of forces available for action, and supports on each line, health of troops, provision for transport and supplies.

Telegram from VICEROY, 12th September 1879 to SECRETARY OF STATE.

GENERAL MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS.—The force advancing on Kabul under General Roberts will consist of three batteries Artillery, one squadron British Cavalry, two and a half regiments Native Cavalry, three regiments British Infantry, four regiments Native Infantry, one company Sappers, in all about 6,500 men, divided into three brigades, one of Cavalry under General Massey, and two of Infantry under Generals Macpherson and Baker. This force takes the country from Shuturgurdan to Kabul.

The country from Shuturgurdan to Thull will be held by two batteries Artillery, two Native Cavalry, one British Infantry, five Native Infantry, or, in all, about 4,000 men, under command of General J. Gordon. General H. Gough will have charge of communications of this force.

Importance of Khyber line renders early organisation of force very urgent. It will consist of five batteries of Artillery, one and two-thirds British Cavalry, four Native Cavalry, two British Infantry, five Native Infantry, two companies Sappers, or, in all, 6,600 men, in addition to the Peshawur garrison and the troops now holding the Khyber up to Lundikotal. This force will protect road from Peshawur to Gandamak, garrison intermediate stations, and provide a movable column to hold Jagdalak and communicate with Kabul.

The reserve at Peshawur and Rawul Pindee will number about 5,000. Major General Bright will command this force; General C. Ross will command at Peshawur. General Doran thence to Basawal; General Arbuthnot thence to Jellalabad and Gandamak; and General C. Gough, the force onwards.

Above force will represent a division capable of meeting all opposition, with its headquarters at Kabul and army line to base at Peshawur. It will have a secondary line *via* the Shuturgurdan till this pass is closed, from which time General Roberts must look for maintenance to Kabul and Peshawur. Khyber column is in active organisation. Troops are now advancing to occupy Dakka, and Guides are pushing on there and onward to Basawal.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, September 15, 1879.

By the telegrams we have had the honour to despatch to you during the past week, your Lordship is already informed of the recent catastrophe at Kabul and the military measures which, in consequence of it, have been taken by this Government. We have now the honour to state in fuller detail, *firstly*, the sources of such information as has reached us up to date respecting the murderous attack upon the British Embassy at the capital of Afghanistan; and, *secondly*, the considerations which have guided us in the adoption of immediate measures for inflicting prompt retribution on the perpetrators of this national outrage, and re-establishing order at Kabul.

2. Early in the morning of Friday, the 5th instant, information reached this Government by telegraph from Captain Conolly, its Political Assistant Officer at Ali Khel, that, on the 3rd instant, the British Embassy at Kabul had been attacked by certain mutinous Afghan regiments, and that Sir Louis Cavagnari and the members of his Mission were still defending themselves against overwhelming numbers, when the messenger who brought this intelligence left Kabul at noon on that day.

3. Immediately on receipt of the above information Captain Conolly was instructed to inform the Amir by letter that the British Government would hold His Highness responsible for the personal safety of all the members of its Mission, and that the British troops would march to Kabul unless we were immediately assured of the complete safety of the Embassy. Captain Conolly was simultaneously ordered to let it be generally known upon the frontier that our troops were preparing to advance. General Stewart was at the same time instructed to stand fast at Kandahar, concentrating there all the troops previously under orders to return to India. Major St. John and party

who were about to proceed to Herat were also instructed to remain at Kandahar until further orders.

4. Late in the night of the 5th instant we received intelligence from Captain Conolly that letters had arrived at Ali Khel addressed by the Amir to General Roberts, and that the contents of these letters, as well as the statements of the messenger who brought them (an uncle of Padshah Khan, the great Ghilzai Chief) left no doubt as to the fate of the Embassy and escort. Captain Conolly's telegram added that particulars would follow immediately; and still later in the course of the same night, we received from him, by telegraph, the substance of a portion of the Amir's two above-mentioned letters. This telegram ended abruptly, with a note by the Station Officer at Kohat that the wire at Thull had broken down; and it was not till the afternoon of the following day, September the 6th, that we received the continuation of it. The Amir's letters dated respectively Wednesday, 3rd instant, 8 A.M., and Thursday, the 4th, have been since received, and translations are enclosed with this despatch. They appear to have been written in great grief and perplexity. The first letter relates hurriedly that the troops who had been assembled for pay at the Bala Hissar suddenly broke into mutiny, and assaulted the British Residency, after having stoned their officers; that they were received by the Residency with "a hail of bullets;" that the tumult was swelled by the troops from the outlying cantonments, and by the people of the city and the country around who destroyed the artillery park, magazine, and workshops; and that His Highness made three ineffectual attempts to restrain the assailants, sending first his Commander-in-Chief Daud Shah, who was beaten down by the mob and was supposed to be dying, then his son with Yahya Khan, the Governor of Kabul, and finally some Syuds and Mullahs.

5. The Amir's second letter states that the assault on the British Embassy was protracted with much loss of life on both sides from the morning till the evening of Wednesday, the 3rd instant, when the besiegers set fire to the Residency, and the Amir had been unable to discover whether the Envoy had perished or had been rescued. He goes on to declare that the catastrophe had been brought about by malcontent and seditious persons, for the disruption of his alliance with the British, and for the ruin of his Government; that he is shut up within his house with a few attendants, having totally lost authority and control over the troops and the people; and that he has used every effort in vain to suppress the disorder; that his kingdom has been brought to destruction by these events; but that after God his strong reliance is upon friendship and union with the British Government, from whom he solicits advice as to how he should act. He protests that he will maintain a firm hold on the friendship of the British Government, and that his sincerity and innocence will be made manifest. He concludes by deploring the loss of the Envoy, whereby his State is ruined.

6. On the 6th instant, Captain Conolly telegraphed that Sirkai Khan, the bearer of the Amir's first letter, had told him that Padshah Khan, who had visited the Embassy after the disaster, had seen there the dead bodies of the Envoy, staff, and escort, and added that of the latter some nine sowars were supposed to have escaped. He described the defence as very stubborn and the loss of the Kabulis as heavy. Sirkai Khan's statement (just received by post and herewith enclosed) says, however, that he and Padshah Khan did not see the bodies of the British Officers; also, that the nine sowars belonged to a party of eleven who were returning from grass-cutting, of whom two were killed.

7. Sirkai Khan states, further, that he with Padshah Khan and another were waiting at the Amir's quarters to take leave of him, being about to leave for the Shuturguridan, when the mutiny broke out, and they heard the sound of firing. The Amir sent them to some troops in the "Chaman," whom they succeeded with some difficulty in pacifying; they then returned to the Amir's quarters, where they appear to have remained, without making any attempt to protect or rescue the Embassy, until the Residency had been taken and its defenders overpowered. Sirkai Khan says that the Amir placed sentries round his own palaces, but that the soldiery were intent only upon taking the Residency; and that the only troops who did not join the attack, and were ready to assist the Amir, were the artillery, who might have fired on the assailants had they received any orders.

8. The written statements of Jellal-ud-din Khan, who arrived at Ali Khel on the night of the 4th instant, with the first intelligence of the assault on the British Embassy at Kabul, and of Mirza Niyaz Tajik of Panjsher, his servant, have reached us by post and are herewith enclosed. According to these statements three of the Amir's regiments whose pay was in arrears, and whom the above-mentioned informants state to have been

encamped in the Bala Hissar, on being offered one month's pay refused it, demanded arrears, stoned their officers, pillaged the armoury, made a rush at the palace, and finding its gates closed, went off to attack the Residency.

Jellal-ud-din and his servant also declare that General Daud Shah did his best to control the mutineers and was wounded in the attempt. Furthermore that the people of the city did not join in the affray, and that in the course of the attack on the Embassy its assailants were joined by six other regiments, some of which were also quartered in the Bala Hissar.

9. It is not yet clear whether the troops who were being paid in the Bala Hissar, had been admitted within the fort only for that purpose, or whether they were part of the fort's garrison. But according to all our information up to date, the regiments which led the attack upon the British Embassy were apparently those lately returned to Kabul from Herat. These regiments were known to be in a very mutinous condition. To quarter them permanently within the Bala Hissar would have been to render nugatory the strong security otherwise afforded by its position against revolutionary outbreaks; and it seems scarcely credible that the Amir should have disregarded so obvious a consideration. On the other hand, to admit mutinous troops within the enclosure of the Bala Hissar even for the purpose of paying them off, would *prima facie* appear to be an act of inexcusable rashness. But the information received from Sir Louis Cavagnari previous to the date of the outbreak renders such an act intelligible, as we gather from it that the Herati regiments in question had been previously deprived of their ammunition, and might therefore have been considered incapable of creating any serious disturbance.

10. The Amir's statement that "the city people of all classes" joined in the outrage is also apparently contradicted by the statements of Jellal-ud-din and his servant who say that "the city people did not join in the affray." We are not at present in a position to say which of these two statements is the more accurate.

11. On the 8th instant, Captain Conolly telegraphed that two or three regiments were reported to have marched from Kabul towards Gardez and Spega, places lying west of our Jaji border, for the purpose of inciting the Ghilzais and Mangals of those parts to rise against us, and that Padshah Khan's party were said to be greatly concerned and alarmed at what had taken place. Captain Conolly added that none of the messengers sent by him to obtain further information from Kabul had returned. And, in reply to inquiries from the Viceroy, he subsequently explained that the alarm and concern attributed in his above-mentioned telegram to Padshah Khan's party, were caused partly by horror at the atrocity of the massacre and partly by a fear that they might be involved in the punishment of it as persons whose influence might have been exerted to incite or prevent it; but that this apprehension had probably been removed by subsequent letters from him exhorting them to espouse our cause and promising rewards for service performed. On the 8th instant the Officer Commanding at Lundikotal also telegraphed reports that some of the tribes in that direction were stirring, but that these reports he had been unable to verify. Subsequent intelligence, not yet fully authenticated, mentions a movement of Kabul troops towards Jellalabad; and on 10th General Doran telegraphed from Lundikotal a report that the Amir was sending messengers to Tirah and the Shinwaris, presumably of a character hostile to our advance on the Khyber line.

12. On the 10th September Major St. John telegraphed from Kandahar that the Afghan Governor of that place had received a letter from the Amir giving an account of the attack on the Embassy and laying great stress on the energetic efforts made by him to effect its rescue. The Sirdar had also received a private letter from the Amir's Chief Munshi which concluded in these words: "In order that the Amir's letters may be fit to be shown, should you think it advisable to do so, I have inserted some words and phrases, such as are advisable at such a time."

13. On the same date Captain Conolly telegraphed the arrival at Ali Khel of a man named Emam Buksh, a native of Jullundur, formerly in the Hyderabad (Sindh) Police, and latterly in the employ of Sir Louis Cavagnari, who stated that he was in the Residency during the attack upon it, and had escaped by hiding himself till nightfall in a drain under one of the baths. This man's story, as briefly telegraphed to us, is to the effect that when the mutineers failed to storm the building they set fire to the wooden framework of the doorways below, under shelter of a verandah which runs round the house. They then surrounded it on all sides, and some of the defenders were killed, others perished in the burning building. He says that Sir Louis Cavagnari was first wounded by a sword-cut, and afterwards crushed by a portion of the building which fell in; that the British and Native Officers fought with the most determined gallantry, and

that the defence only slackened when Sir Louis fell, and ammunition began to run short. Emam Buksh says that two cannons fired some shots, but this statement is inconsistent with the evidence of Sirkai Khan, who is probably a better witness.

14. Two further telegrams subsequently received from Captain Conolly, but bearing the same date, namely, the 11th instant, contained the following information:—One of his spies just returned from Kabul stated that, so far as he could ascertain, the Amir, though he had not planned or foreseen the assault on the British Embassy, was so mistrustful of regaining the confidence of the British Government that he had now made up his mind to resist the advance of the British troops; that in this frame of mind he was actively invoking the support of his people, and had already despatched some cavalry and infantry to Zurmat and Spega; that from Gardez, a locality in the Zurmat district, news had been received of the arrival of three Afghan regiments with six guns from Ghazni, and that three more were expected to arrive shortly from Kabul; also arms for the people; and that preparations were being made there for an attack by the Spega route and in conjunction with the Machalgo Ghilzais, on the left flank of General Roberts' advance upon Kabul.

15. In the meanwhile a special messenger had arrived at Ali Khel with an unwritten message from the Amir asking our advice. To this message General Roberts has been instructed to address a written reply in conformity with the terms of our telegram to him of the 12th instant, a copy of which is herewith enclosed. The original letters addressed by the Amir to General Roberts on the 3rd and 4th September, only reached us on the 14th. The situation at Kabul must have altered materially since these letters were written; and the Amir may possibly now be disinclined, and very probably may be unable, to act in accordance with the sentiments which these letters express, in a tone which is certainly favourable to a belief in his sincerity. Nevertheless we have thought it right at once to instruct General Roberts to inform His Highness that if his assurances are sincere, and if his reliance on the friendship of our Government is genuine, he has nothing to fear personally from the advance of our troops, and that his authority will be supported and restored.

16. This is all the information received up to date by the Government of India respecting the assault on the British Embassy at Kabul and the massacre of Sir Louis Cavagnari and all the members of his Mission and escort. Before proceeding to describe and explain to your Lordship the measures that we are taking to repair and avenge this disaster, we deem it desirable to advert briefly to such portions of the communications received from Sir Louis Cavagnari from the date of his arrival at Kabul to that of the last letters received from him, as have any bearing upon the circumstances to which we owe the irreparable loss of that invaluable officer and his heroic companions.

17. In July, Sir Louis Cavagnari had received confidential information from Bakhtiar Khan, his native agent, who died at Kabul before Sir Louis arrived there, that Sirdar Yahya Khan, the Amir's father-in-law, was using his considerable influence over His Highness in a manner injurious to the Amir's popularity, and decidedly adverse to the proper fulfilment of the Treaty engagements with the British Government. Sir L. Cavagnari, on reaching Kabul, confirmed these statements so far as they regarded the hostile and disaffected conduct of Sirdar Yahya Khan. But as regards the alleged ill-treatment of the so-called English party, he wrote that although these Sirdars were not being treated by the Amir in a liberal spirit he did not consider that there had been "any actual infringement of the Amnesty Clause." The general condition of the country and administration he described as disorganised and greatly in need of remedial measures; the soldiery being dissatisfied on account of arrears of pay and a continuation of the unpopular compulsory enlistment; the peasantry still depressed by the heavy taxes imposed by the late Amir and unable to obtain redress from the petty governors and revenue farmers; and the Sirdars discontented that no reversion had yet been made to the feudal system suppressed by Sher Ali; whilst he said that all these classes were disposed to look to the British Envoy for an immediate redress of grievances which could only be gradually removed by the Amir's judicious exercise of his own authority in proportion as it became consolidated. Sir Louis Cavagnari also mentioned that some regiments said to have left Herat in a somewhat disorganised manner were expected at Kabul next day. And he added that the Amir's "demeanour and apparent desire to "make things comfortable for the Embassy left nothing to be desired;" that no restrictions were placed on the movements of the Envoy, who went about freely, and was on the most satisfactory terms with the Foreign Minister. On the 4th of August Sir Louis Cavagnari wrote that the Amir was well-intentioned, but too confident of his strength and without any good advisers, and that he was about to take an early opportunity of suggesting to His Highness the more important of the necessary reforms. On the 8th

of August, Sir Louis Cavagnari reported that three of the regiments returned to Kabul from Herat were in a very disorderly condition and clamorous for arrears of pay. On the 11th he reported that two of these regiments had been paid off and that they were gradually being deprived of all their ammunition. On the 12th he reported that the ammunition of all the six regiments from Herat had been taken from them; that they had received their arrears of pay; that large numbers had deserted, and that the remainder had been granted furlough.

18. On the 14th August he reported that two of the Kabul regiments had also received their arrears of pay; and on the 16th, 17th, and 19th he reported news of large desertions amongst the Amir's troops in various localities. In a letter, bearing the last above-mentioned date, he referred to a fracas in which some men of his escort had been slightly assaulted and to which he did not appear to attach any serious importance, his remonstrances having been promptly and satisfactorily attended to by the Amir. This letter concluded with an expression of confidence in the Amir's good disposition towards us, and in the satisfactory result of continuance in patient and friendly efforts for the general amelioration of the Afghan government and country. In reply to inquiries from the Viceroy whether the Amir was in immediate need of pecuniary assistance, the Envoy expressed his opinion that it would be undesirable to offer such assistance until His Highness became more fully alive to the necessity for those administrative reforms which he hoped His Highness would be induced to adopt. Sir Louis Cavagnari, in his subsequent letters, made frequent allusion to the friendly intercourse established between the men of his escort and those of the Amir's regiments in Kabul, with whom they had, on several occasions, joined in athletic exercises and sports. In none of his private letters, or official diaries, has Sir Louis Cavagnari at any time expressed the slightest apprehension for his personal safety or that of the members of his Mission. We received continual and increasingly satisfactory reports of the freedom with which the Envoy and his staff were in the habit of moving about the city and its environs; the demeanour of the people; and the friendly intercourse between the escort and the Afghan troops. The danger of what has actually occurred, namely, an overwhelming attack upon the Residency itself, seemed precluded by the location of the Residency within the fortifications of the Bala Hissar and close to the palace of the Amir; and here it should be remembered that the establishment of the British Residency at Kabul was determined, in the negotiations which preceded the Treaty, by the express stipulation of the Amir himself, who declared that nowhere else in Afghanistan could he answer for the Resident's safety. In his last private letter to the Viceroy, dated August 30th, Sir Louis Cavagnari wrote that the Amir showed no disposition to conciliate or treat with generosity those persons who have had communications with us during the war; that their liberal treatment would, no doubt, be greatly to the Amir's own interests; but that there could be no question as to his perfect right to withhold from them the allowances or lucrative appointments they were desirous of obtaining; that neither in person nor in property had they been subjected to molestation on account of their connexion with us; and that the Amir had "done nothing, and will do nothing opposed to the letter of the Treaty." Sir Louis added, "I have nothing whatever to complain of on the part of the Amir or his Ministers, though there are many matters I wish I could influence him about. There is no doubt that his authority is weak throughout the whole of Afghanistan. This is not to be wondered at after the years of misrule and oppression on Shere Ali Khan's part. But if he keeps straight with us he will pull through it. * * * His conduct of foreign relations is apparently all that could be desired * * * I have no doubt that when disaffected persons see that they get no encouragement from us, things will settle down; and, if Yakub Khan will only adopt a little more conciliation, and show his subjects that he is not going to use our safeguard as a means of grinding them down, all will go well." Sir Louis Cavagnari's above-mentioned confidential letter to the Viceroy concludes with the assurance that "notwithstanding all people say against him, I personally believe that Yakub Khan will turn out to be a very good ally, and that we shall be able to keep him to his engagements." The latest communications received from Sir Louis Cavagnari were chiefly in reference to the Amir's expressed desire to visit the Viceroy at Calcutta if possible at the close of the present year; and his last telegram, dated 2nd instant, that is to say the day before the attack on the Embassy, gave no indication of any threatened danger, and concluded with the words "all well."

19. We have now laid before your Lordship a brief and impartial statement of all the information respecting the circumstances of the British Embassy at Kabul, received by us, confidentially as well as officially, by private as well as by public channels, previous and subsequent to, the date of its destruction on the 3rd instant. We are not at present

in a position to verify or analyse this information, and we deem it altogether premature to draw from it any positive conclusions as regards either the past, the present, or the future, except in reference to the plain duty now before us of doing all in our power to repair the unprovoked calamity which has occurred, and punish the perpetrators of the unprecedented national crime which has been committed. It remains to report to your Lordship the steps which have been taken, and are still being taken, by us in the recognition and performance of this imperative public duty.

20. The obligation to undertake and complete this duty with the utmost possible promptitude has been imposed upon us at a time when our frontier garrisons are weakened by the periodical sickness prevalent in those localities at this season of the year, when the greater number of the troops employed in Southern Afghanistan during the late campaign were under orders to return to India, and when the undisturbed tranquillity of our new frontier, and financial considerations dictated by the continued depreciation of our currency, justified every possible retrenchment of expenditure compatible with the efficient administration of the Empire. The first intelligence of the outrage at Kabul received by us on the morning of the 5th instant, left room to hope that Sir Louis Cavagnari and the members of his Mission had not yet perished, and that if the defence of the Residency could be maintained for a short while longer the lives of its inmates might still be saved. In the course of that day two alternative plans of action were prepared and organised in the minutest detail, one of them being based on the assumption that it might be still possible to save the lives of the Envoy and his companions. The intelligence received during the night of the 5th, although imperfect, annihilated the hope which had inspired this plan, and on the morning of the 6th instant measures were decided on in reluctant recognition of the fact that our object could no longer be confined to the rescue of the Embassy.

21. General Roberts, who, being a member of the Army Commission, was at Simla on the morning of the 6th, started in the afternoon of that day for Kurram, with orders to lose no time in advancing upon Kabul in command of a force of about 6,500 men.

22. General Massey had been already instructed to re-occupy the Shuturguridan at once and commence concentration at that point of carriage and supply for the above-mentioned force. This operation was successfully completed without opposition on the evening of Thursday last, the 11th instant.

23. As stated in paragraph 3 of this despatch General Stewart had been ordered early on the 5th instant to re-occupy Kandahar, and on the 6th instant he telegraphed that the town had been re-occupied, permission to reside within the citadel and under the protection of our troops being given to the Afghan Governor, to whom the administration of Kandahar had been previously made over, but who on receipt of the information communicated to him by General Stewart had expressed anxiety to be closely associated with the British authority.

24. On the same day a force of 6,500 men in addition to the Peshawur garrison and the troops already holding the Khyber Pass up to Lundikotal was detailed for operations along that line and placed under the command of Brigadier-General C. Gough, with orders to protect the road from Peshawur to Gandamak, and provide a moveable column for holding Jagdallak and establishing communications with Kabul. At the same time measures were taken for securing an efficient reserve of 5,000 men between Peshawur and Rawal Pindiee. The Khyber and Kurram forces, as thus constituted, represent a division capable of dealing with the resistance likely to be opposed to it and having its head-quarters at Kabul with its army line base at Peshawur, and a secondary line across the Shuturguridan till that pass is closed by the first winter snowfall.

25. Many of the transport animals of the Kurram force had, during the previous months, suffered from sickness, and the remainder had to a great extent been dispersed to graze where they were not immediately available for employment beyond the Shuturguridan. To expedite the advance of the entire force under General Roberts, it was consequently necessary to collect at that point carriage and supply for 6,500 men; and this could only be done with a minimum of difficulty and delay by denuding the Peshawur Valley field force of all its available transport. The rapidity of the advance upon Kabul by the force under General Roberts will greatly depend on the assistance, or opposition, it may receive from the Ghilzai tribe, who, if willing, could largely contribute to the transport required for this force. Captain Conolly was consequently instructed to lose no time in securing the active co-operation of the two chief men of this important tribe—Padshah Khan, and his brother, Allal-ud-din Khan. On the 9th instant, he reported to us that he hoped this would be arranged; although Padshah Khan was still at Kabul and might possibly be detained there by the Amir if His

Highness were disposed to resist our advance. Every effort has been and will be made to complete within the shortest possible time the collection of transport requisite for the equipment of the entire force organised for operations along the Khyber line; and for this purpose all parts of the empire have been placed under requisition. The experience of the late campaign had convinced us of the urgent necessity of a thorough re-organisation of our Commissariat Department with special reference to the difficulties of transport and supply, and this was one of the important questions submitted by us to the Army Commission now sitting at Simla. Unfortunately, necessity has now arisen for immediate effort, on an almost unprecedented scale, in regard to the speedy collection of transport, before our receipt of the report anticipated from the Army Commission at the end of next month, and consequently before the possibility of any complete re-organisation of our Commissariat Department. In view, however, of our anticipated difficulties in collecting and organising transport for renewed and extended operations in Afghanistan, we have created a new office separated from the Military Department and placed in more immediate communication than was possible between the Commissariat branch of that department, between the Commander-in-Chief on the one hand and the head of the Civil Government on the other. This office we have placed under the direct management of Lieut.-General Sir Michael Kennedy, R.E., K.C.S.I., in whose administrative abilities we have great confidence, and who has been invested with special powers for the expeditious conduct of its business. This officer, as Comptroller General of the Commissariat, will be responsible for the supply of transport to the various columns detailed for field operations; but, on their receipt of the transport thus supplied, it will be treated as regimental equipment, for the supervision and organisation of which the responsibility will rest exclusively with the commanding officers concerned.

26. In consequence of the reports received by us on the evening of the 11th instant that Afghan troops and artillery were mustering in Zurmat to attack the left flank of General Roberts' advance upon Kabul, and that Herat regiments were advancing upon Jellalabad, whilst Dakka was being occupied by the Mohmand tribe with the support of some Afghan cavalry, we determined, on the morning of the 12th instant, to reinforce General Roberts by two squadrons of Bengal Cavalry, one regiment of British Infantry, one Mountain Battery, and three Native Infantry regiments. We also deemed it prudent, instead of pushing on the advance guard of our Khyber force with the rapidity previously considered desirable, to concentrate it at Lundikotal pending the completion of carriage for the whole force, so as to prevent all menace to our Khyber communications whilst preparations are still being made for a general advance upon that line at the earliest possible date. These decisions are now being carried out. We are not yet in a position to say whether the information on which they were promptly taken was absolutely accurate; but we have deemed it inexpedient to incur the smallest risk in our advance upon Kabul either by the Kurram or the Khyber line; and the commencement of that advance will not be delayed by the above-mentioned re-inforcement of it. We are unable to speak with any confidence as to the real disposition and desire of the Amir at the present moment. We do not as yet believe him to be guilty of any instigation or distinct foreknowledge of the murderous assault on the British Embassy; and indeed it is incredible that he should not have perceived the extreme jeopardy in which such an event must place his own interests. But it is clear that even at that time his authority was very weak, and we feel bound to assume that at the present moment he must be so powerless in the hands of the Afghan mutineers and rebels that little or nothing can be expected from his personal action or influence, whatever his disposition may be.

27. General Roberts reached Ali Khel yesterday evening, and we have reason to hope that his advanced guard under Brigadier General-Baker will reach Kushi on Tuesday the 16th instant. Kushi is about 48 miles from Kabul, and the intervening country is perfectly open. A bumper harvest in the Logar valley and surrounding Ghilzai country promises abundant local supply for our troops beyond Shuturgurda, from which the force under General Roberts will carry with it provision of its own for ten days' supply. The march from Shuturgurda to Kabul, if opposed, may last ten days. If unopposed, it will doubtless be much more rapid; but, as General Roberts will take with him all his available carriage, exclusive reliance cannot be placed on his Kurram line of communications after he has crossed the Shuturgurda, and it is possible that this line may be effectually closed by snow early in the month of November next. For this reason we fully realise the paramount importance of losing no time in the active development of the Khyber line, to which the base of the force now advancing on Kabul under General Roberts must be transferred six weeks hence. But the measures we are now taking for this purpose justify the anticipation that almost as soon as, and possibly before, General Roberts can

reach Kabul from the Shuturguridan, General Bright will be in a position to establish communications with him from Gandamak.

28. In his latest telegram of the 13th, General Roberts reports that the troops placed at his disposal should be ample for the work before them, and that they are in excellent spirits. The tribes are working well with him from Thul as far as Ali Khel; the independent Ghilzais beyond are being tampered with by emissaries from Kabul; but General Roberts hopes to forestall any serious effects. We learnt yesterday, with great relief and satisfaction, that Nawab Sir Ghulam Hussan Khan, who had been sent from Kandahar to join Sir L. Cavagnari at Kabul, had arrived safely upon the Shuturguridan.

29. Sir Robert Sandeman has telegraphed that the country round Quetta is quiet, that the good disposition of the Chiefs and people of those parts has been unaffected by the event at Kabul, and that His Highness the Khan of Khelat has offered to assist the British Government to the utmost of his power.

30. The Viceroy has already informed your Lordship by telegraph that our financial position and prospects at the present moment are fortunately such as to occasion no difficulty, and cause no anxiety, in providing for the cost of the unexpected military operations above described.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

JOHN STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 21.

STATEMENT regarding the disaster at KABUL on 3rd September 1879.

JELLAL-UL-DIN KHAN, just arrived from Kabul, says: "Yesterday about 9 a.m. sound of firing in Bala Hissar. I live in the (deceased) Mir Munshi's house in Bagh Nawab, far from the Residency. I sent three men to ascertain cause; (one has never returned), the other two, one of whom is known as Babajee (whose wife was wet-nurse to the Mir Munshi's daughter) returned to say that three regiments of infantry on duty in Kabul had, on being offered that morning one month's pay, refused it, demanded arrears, and on not getting it, attacked the Residency quarters, killing and wounding some of the escort and removing some horses (among them Sir Louis' own horse, a bay Wazeeri); after which two or three companies went to the 'Mistri Khana,' and seized some arms and ammunition (the remainder surrounding the Residency); and then a fresh attack was made on the Residency, guns being brought up to join in the attack, the Residency being defended by Sir Louis and staff and escort. The city people were ready to defend themselves and property. The attack continued and increased; and being unable to get to or afford the Residency any aid, after removing the Mir Munshi's family, I left Kabul with Babajee and galloped off towards Ali Khel and Kurram to give the news. I have travelled incessantly and without food: my knees are rubbed sore and eyes bloodshot.

(True—A. C.)

I heard before leaving that the regiments intended attacking the Amir. Six other regiments in quarters at Shahr Naw and Bala Hissar had come to the city to plunder, some returned with plunder, the rest to join the attack. I heard that Daud Shah tried to prevent the attack and was wounded. The fastening of sling of my sword is undone by the jolting at a gallop.

(True—A. C.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 21.

MIRZA NIYAZ TAJIK of Panjsher, servant of Jellal-ud-din (whose wife used to suckle the deceased Munshi's children) states that he was present at the disbursement of pay to the three regiments (without arms), which are in camp at Chaman, at the Bala Hissar. Saif-ud-din Brigadier was present; Muhammad Karim's Regiment refused to take one month's pay, demanding arrears from two months before the "Nawroz" (21st

March). A mutineer and ringleader on throwing down his pay was thrashed by the Brigadier and Colonel, on which the men rose and stoned their Colonel and rushed off to the armoury and seized the arms and made a rush at the Amir's quarters, but the gates were shut to, on which they went off, after hurling stones and clods at the Amir's doors, to the Residency; the escort turned out and fired on them, killing and wounding some 10 or 12 men, and closed the gates; by this time some of the horses of the Guide Cavalry and of the Embassy were carried off. Brisk firing was now kept up by the soldiers from below on the Residency and returned by the officers of the Embassy and the escort from their upper-story: the crowd suffering heavily, whereas their fire seemed to have no effect. The regiment brought up a gun from the "Top-khana," but having no ammunition could not use it (nor did I hear the sound of artillery firing as I was leaving Kabul). I now ran off to tell Jellal-ud-din, and we decided on coming away (as we could give no aid) to inform the English. We got away by some excuse, and rode here as hard as we could. Daud Shah, Commander-in-Chief, did his best to control the mutineers, but was shot at and knocked over with stones. The officers did not join these men, but were powerless to prevent them. The only road to the "Top-khana" lies exposed to the fire of the Residency; the only other way in which they could get ammunition would be (if) it were let down to them from the fort walls by the Kabuli sentries. The city people had not joined in the affray, but were all ready to protect themselves and property. The three regiments were joined by three from the new cantonment of Shahr Naw and three from the Bala Hissar itself, making nine in all; also by the cavalry on foot and artillery (without guns). The portion of the Bala Hissar occupied by the Residency is surrounded on the north by a hill, east by a portion of Bala Hissar itself, south by open ground, west by part of Bala Hissar containing magazine. The Amir and the Embassy are completely surrounded. A man might escape at night by letting himself down into the open country from a balcony. There is no well in the Residency or Amir's quarters; the Amir probably has enough food for three or four weeks by him: the "Sahibs" for two or three days; the Amir cannot supply the Embassy now, as it is impossible for him to reach them.

(Taken by myself.)

(Signed)

A. CONOLLY,

Captain, Political Officer.

Ali Khel, the 4th September 1879.

Enclosure 3 in No. 21.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from AMIR YAKUB KHAN to GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, dated 15th Ramazan 1296 H. (3rd September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that in accordance with the divine decree which man cannot evade by his contrivance or precaution, at 8 o'clock (a.m.) to-day, Wednesday, the 15th Ramazan (September), the troops who had been collected in the Ark (citadel) of the capital to receive their pay, having all of a sudden and unexpectedly raised an uproar and tumult, first stoned their own officers and, afterwards, all in a body ran towards the quarters of the British Envoy Plenipotentiary. On one side stones were hurled, on the other side began a hail of bullets from within the Embassy (Sarai); and thus the fire of disturbance, rebellion, and mutiny blazed up; so it could be checked or remedied by no kind of means. Then immediately all the troops at Sherpur and Chaman, outside the citadel, and the city people in successive crowds having entered the citadel to plunder the factories, the artillery, and the arsenal; and then both the soldiery and the city people hastened towards the residence of the Envoy. Meanwhile I ordered Daud Shah Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, to this Minister's assistance. No sooner had he arrived at the door of the Minister's residence than he was felled by the soldiers with stones and spears and is now in a dying state. I then sent Sirdar Yahya Khan and my own son and heir-apparent, with the Koran, the book of God, in their hands towards the troops; but this also was of no avail. Then I deputed the Syuds and the priests, one after the other in their order; but this also produced no good. Up to this moment, viz., the "*asr*" (4 o'clock), the fight is going on. It now remains to be seen what the result of this will be, and what consequences will follow this alarming and lamentable occurrence. I have written this for your information.

Enclosure 4 in No. 21.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from AMIR YAKUB KHAN to GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, of the 16th Ramazan 1296H. = (September 4, 1879).

AFTER compliments.—Be it known to you that yesterday, Wednesday, the 15th Ramazan (September 3rd) from eight in the morning until evening, thousands of people collected for a determined attack on the person of the (British) Envoy, and a fight and slaughter on both sides took place. At the “Asr” (4 o’clock) prayers they set fire to the residence of the Envoy, and I with a few (*lit.* five) of my attendants, and adherents am besieged from yesterday until this day, Thursday, the 16th. I have no certain intelligence of the Envoy’s condition. I know not whether he with his attendants has been slain or some one has rescued him from destruction. Although this event has befallen in accordance with the divine decree, still a few (*lit.* five) evil-disposed and seditious persons, who disliked and opposed the alliance and friendship between the two Governments, are the authors of this dangerous commotion, and have stirred up the populace to bring about the ruin of this State, and (*i.e.*, by) the murder of the Envoy, and having thus shed blood have brought the matters to such a pitch that the Afghan Government has been destroyed and ruined: this is for me a day of the utmost distress, as I am confined within my house, and my few attendants and adherents remain prepared to defend me and my family. All the troops and the city people, and the people of the country adjacent, have united in open revolt from my authority. I am using every effort and expedient and device in my power to suppress this outbreak; but it is to be seen with what effect.

..Daud Shah Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, whom I had sent yesterday to the assistance of the Envoy, is now lying wounded and bruised with stones, spears, and blows from the butt ends of guns, and is not expected to live. Those of his attendants who accompanied him have all been killed. The factories and the arsenal have been sacked, the soldiers and the people have plundered all at their pleasure. In short, my kingdom has by these events been destroyed, and after God my strong reliance is upon friendship and union with the British Government, which should communicate with and counsel me what it considers advisable and expedient, and what it thinks proper—in accordance with the requirements of the terms of perfect friendship and mutual understanding—for the extinguishing of this flame of tumult and crime, and for extricating me from this circle of fear and peril—so that I may act accordingly. Let this not remain hidden from the minds of those in charge of the British Government that so long as I live I will not let go my grasp of the skirt of friendship with, and attachment to the British Government. By God’s will the fact of my cordial friendship and my sincerity, and the innocence of my heart has been and will be clear and manifest as the dawn to the (British) Government. By this affair, in which I have lost my true friend the Envoy, and through which my State has been utterly damaged and broken up, I have become greatly distracted, and am in distress and confusion as to what I should do.

Enclosure 5 in No. 21.

Statement of SIRKAI KHAN, uncle of PADSHAH KHAN.

Padshah Khan, Allal-ud-din Khan, and I live in a quarter of Kabul known as the Bala-joi. Shortly after sunrise we all three went to pay our respects to the Amir; Padshah Khan wished to take leave before starting for the Shuturguridan, which he had been told to look after. While we were waiting to be received, a Munshi, who had been disbursing pay to Muhammad Karim’s Regiment at the office about 150 yards off, hurried up and passed on to the Amir’s apartments, and we heard the sound of firing from the office. The Amir called Padshah Khan, and a Jabbarkhel Chief upstairs, and sent them out with the “Koran” to quiet the troops in the Chaman (or plain), of which one regiment had mutinied at the office. Padshah Khan and I and the heir-apparent and Sirdar Yahya Khan went accordingly to the Chaman; and though we were roughly handled, we succeeded in preventing these two Regiments from joining the rest. A messenger now arrived from the Amir to say the Residency was being attacked and Daud Shah had been sent by the Amir to quell the disturbance, but had been badly stoned and speared, and was with difficulty saved by a few men. After a while we returned to the Amir’s quarters, which were almost deserted, and waited in an outer courtyard till the afternoon: all this time the firing was going on. A messenger came to us to say the Residency had been set on fire, and we saw the smoke rising and in a short time the firing which had become tremendous, ceased. We went over to the

Residency, Padshah Khan and I. There was a great crowd of men jostling each other and gutting the place. We could not get close enough to recognise any one, nor did we see the bodies of the Sahibs, but the corpses of both sides were lying thick about the place. We returned to the courtyard, and then a letter arrived from the Amir which Padshah Khan desired me to take to Kurram. I left after night-fall and came away as quick as I could, bringing a footman with me from Surkhab (Abdool Rahman, servant of the Embassy Mehmandar, caught me up at Drekhula). As I was leaving Kabul, sowars of a Kabul regiment in camp on the Chaman told me that out of 11 men,

* *Sic. in orig.* sowars and grass cutters, on return from getting grass, were met: * two killed and nine saved by the Ressaldar of the Regiment above-mentioned; they were alive when I came away: I was told they were Sikhs as well as Mahomedans. After Daud Shah was wounded the Amir placed sentries round the palace and did not show himself. The soldiery did not concern themselves about him but were intent on taking the Residency. The only troops who did not join in the affray and were ready to assist the Amir, were the Artillery who stood to their guns; had they had any officer to direct them they might have fired on the infantry and helped the Embassy. Numbers of the cavalry and infantry dispersed after the affair was over.

(Taken by myself.)

Camp Ali Khel,

The 6th September 1879.

(Signed)

A CONOLLY, Capt.

Political Officer.

Enclosure 6 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 4th September 1879.

From CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, Simla.

A MAN, who says he is in Sir Louis Cavagnari's service, has arrived in hot haste from Kabul, and solemnly states that yesterday morning the Residency was attacked by three regiments who had mutinied for their pay, they having guns and being joined by a portion of six other regiments. The Embassy and escort were defending themselves when he left Kabul about noon yesterday. I hope to receive further news.

Enclosure 7 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 5th September 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel.

YOUR telegram to General Roberts giving news from Kabul of attack on Residency. Send immediately a letter to the Amir referring to report received, and conveying message from Viceroy that British Government holds His Highness strictly responsible for personal safety of Cavagnari and whole British Mission. Add that troops will march on Kabul if not immediately assured of complete safety of Mission, and give out publicly that troops are preparing to march at once.

Enclosure 8 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 5th September 1879.

From CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel.

A SERVANT and companion of Jellal-ud-din has come in from Rokian and confirms his statement in all matters except as regards the guns being used.

Enclosure 9 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 5th September 1879.

From CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to GENERAL ROBERTS, Simla.

LETTERS from the Amir brought by Sirkhai Khan, uncle of Padshah Khan, as well as their own statements, leave no hope as to fate of Embassy and escort. Particulars follow immediately.

Enclosure 10 in No. 21. (Extract.)

Telegram, dated 6th September 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRKAI KHAN, bearer of Amir's first letter, confirms previous reports of disaster, and describes how Padshah Khan visited the spot and saw the dead bodies of Envoy, staff, and escort. Of the latter, some nine sowars are said to have been out getting grass that day and were not killed with the rest; defence was very stubborn and loss of Kabulis heavy, put down at 100, or more. Finding they could not storm the place, the mutineers set fire to the doorway below, and, when that gave way, swarmed in and up to the upper story, overwhelmed the defenders, and sacked the place.

The second letter was brought by another messenger, servant of the Embassy Mehmandar, whose story in all but a few unimportant details is the same as that first received.

I have detained the Kabul messengers pending receipt of instructions as to line of policy to follow, and what to communicate to Amir, or Padshah Khan. The former invokes our aid; the latter expresses himself, through his messenger, anxious to serve us. Once in Logar valley, where they have had a bumper harvest, we could live on the country.

I beg to cancel my application to be relieved.

Enclosure 11 in No. 21.

Telegram, No. 2376 E.P., dated 6th September 1879.

FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel.

YOUR telegram 6th. Reply to Amir at once from Viceroy that a strong British force under General Roberts will march speedily on Kabul to his relief from Shuturguridan, and that he should use all his resources to co-operate with and facilitate the advance of the troops through his country. Roberts will send detailed instructions.

Enclosure 12 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 7th September 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

My letters to Amir and Padshah Khan run as follows (they have just been despatched by Sirkai Khan, who will make all haste to relieve and acquaint the Ghilzais of what is expected of them *en route*):

To the Amir—Viceroy informs you that a strong British force under General Roberts will move speedily on Shuturguridan and Kabul. You should do all in your power to help with supplies, carriage, &c. It is (?) advisable that Padshah Khan should see to the Shuturguridan, revive the dāk, and communicate daily with General Roberts through myself.

To Padshah Khan—After consulting with the Amir, you should at once go yourself, or depute your brother, Allal-ud-din Khan, along with Sirkai Khan, to the Shuturguridan, and secure, through the Ghilzais, the safe passage of our convoys, &c., and security of roads from Karatiga to Kushi. For this you shall be paid down one year's subsidy as lately fixed by the Amir, and also receive the subsidy monthly from us for such time as you may render aid, or as shall be fixed by the British Government, together with any other honours or rewards which your services, on the approval of the British Government, may entitle you to. Use the dāk or special messengers daily to acquaint General Roberts, through me, with the true state of affairs.

Enclosure 13 in No. 21.

Telegram 2381 E.P., dated 7th September 1879.

FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel.

YOUR telegram 7th. Your letter to Amir should state particularly that the force marches on Kabul to his assistance. Add that Viceroy requests His Highness to keep

him constantly informed regarding his own personal safety, and the circumstances of his position, and affairs at Kabul.

Enclosure 14 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 7th September 1879. (Extract.)

From CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

I BELIEVE the prompt action of Government will have the best possible effect on the tribes here. I have sent for representatives, Maliks of all Jaji sections, to exhort them to show their loyalty, by preserving order, by giving all necessary assistance, and by plainly telling their neighbours beyond our frontier of the inutility and hopelessness of any hostile demonstration.

Enclosure 15 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 7th September 1879.

From CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

HAVE written to the Amir in accordance with terms of your telegram of to-day.

Enclosure 16 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 8th September 1879.

From CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla,

Two or three Regiments are said to have marched from Kabul towards Gardez and Spega which lie west of our Jaji border to incite the Ghilzais and Mangals of those parts to rise. Accounts differ as to whether they are cavalry or infantry. Padshah Khan's party said to be greatly concerned and alarmed at what has taken place. None of my messengers back from Kabul yet.

Enclosure 17 in No 21.

Telegram, dated 9th September 1879.

From CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AN Afghan, who says he constantly visited the Envoy, confirms previous accounts, highly extols the stubbornness of defence and gallantry of the British Officers, upbraids the cruelty and cowardice of the Kabulis in murdering guests and strangers, says there were 12 regiments implicated, that first a gateway leading into the Residency courtyard was burst open, and there such a resolute stand made with rifle, sword, and bayonet, that the assailants were checked; but they set fire to the house, and the defenders charging out sword in hand were all slain and the place completely wrecked: loss of Kabulis including some city people stated at 210, may be read 410. A guard of Guide Cavalry out with grass-cutters escaped, not known where. Amir, terribly perplexed, and confused at the reproach to his name, is in privacy with a few faithful Sirdars, and is sure to come personally to apologise to the Government, as the regiments had got beyond his control. Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan expected on 7th instant. Amir intends making his excuses to him. Rumour that the sepoys were taken and are still alive. Will continue to give news, for I have friends with the Amir, though I dare not venture out myself.

Enclosure 18 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 10th September 1879.

From CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

A KAHAR belonging to Embassy who was outside Residency when attack took place has escaped and arrived at Karatiga; says attack began morning, Residency fired noon, but fight continued till evening, guns taking part; believes no one escaped, hid himself and travelled by night; saw no troops on road.

Enclosure 19 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 10th September 1879. (Extract.)

From CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

EMAM BUKSH, native of Jullundur, once in Hyderabad (Sind) Police, and lately in Sir Louis Cavagnari's secret employ, was present at mutiny of troops, and throughout fight in Residency. Two guns were used, but fired only some eight shots. Says the mutineers, under shelter of a balcony which ran round the building, set fire to it, and that the defenders were partly killed, partly smothered, and burnt alive. Sir Louis was rendered senseless by a cut from behind which clove his head, and was immediately afterwards crushed by a portion of wall and building roof which fell in. Jenkyns and Hamilton were shot, and scorched or burnt to death. Doctor Kelly, being shot, lived till next morning, when the mutineers returned, butchered him and all who were alive, stripping and mutilating their bodies in the most horrible way. The Sikh Jemadar defended the Envoy most gallantly, and struck off the head of his murderer with one blow. A Sikh Duffadar ran out and slew eight men with his own hand. All behaved well, but on Sir Louis being killed they lost heart, and the defence slackened. Ammunition, too, had begun to run out. Deponent hid himself in a drain under one of the baths, and at night crept out, and took refuge with a friendly Mullah. Remained two days, and came away. Three sepoys, who had also secreted themselves, were taken away alive to the Amir the same evening. During the attack which was from all sides, one side overlooking the Residency, the Amir and his Sirdars were looking on unconcerned, and did nothing to help beyond sending his son and Mullah a little way. Daud Shah made only a show of quelling the disturbance, but did not really exert himself. He was not wounded.

Enclosure 20 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 11th September 1879.

From CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AODIN, one of two men sent from Rokian on 5th instant, has returned from Kabul, where he has a relation in one of the regiments, to say that as far as he can ascertain, the Amir had not planned or foreseen the destruction of the Embassy; but now that matters have come to that pass, he despaired of ever appeasing or regaining the confidence of the English, and that he and all under him had made up their minds to fight. He had sent out letters, too, in all directions, calling on the people to support him, and despatched a small force of cavalry and infantry to stir up Zurmat and Spegas.

Enclosure 21 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 11th September 1879.

From CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

News from Gardez, in Zurmat, as follows:—Three regiments and six guns arrived from Ghazni, and three regiments expected from Kabul also. Arms arriving from Kabul for the people. Faiz Mahomed Khan, Ghilzai, who has seen much (?) service, and was commanding the cavalry in Zurmat, is appointed Governor of that province. The country is rallying round him, and an advance was intended by the Spegas route in a few days, the intention being in conjunction with the Machalga Ghilzais to threaten or attack our flank advancing on Shuturgardan. The bodies of two sons of Allayar, a leading chief of Zurmat, who were killed in the disturbance at Kabul, had been brought to Gardez and buried amidst great excitement, the people declaring they would avenge their death.

Enclosure 22 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 12th September 1879.

From CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL news. Bulk of troops though in receipt (?) of pay demanded, and inflamed with desire to fight, are said to lack carriage and leaders.

Enclosure 23 in No. 21.

Telegram dated 14th September 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel.

SEND message to Amir that Viceroy has now received his original letters, dated 3rd, 4th September, and desires him to be assured in reply that, if he acts in accordance with his affirmation of innocence, sincerity, and strong reliance on friendship of British Government, he has nothing to fear personally, and that our troops will come to restore his authority and rescue him from his danger.

Enclosure 24 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 5th September 1879.

From VICEROY, Simla, to GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING TROOPS, Kandahar.

ALL troops at present under orders to return to India to stand fast until further orders. Please telegraph present distribution of troops and what are at Kandahar, and also transport available at Kandahar and between this and Quetta, and what reserve of supplies you have. Major St. John and party to remain at Kandahar until you hear further.

Enclosure 25 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 5th September 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar.

News received from Kabul that on 3rd September the British Embassy was attacked by revolted Afghan Regiments and overpowered. Letters leave no hope regarding fate of Mission. Your military orders go separately. Kandahar must be held and St. John retained.

Enclosure 26 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 6th September 1879.

From GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

TROOPS in movement towards Pishin recalled to Kandahar. Town re-occupied. Sirdar Sher Ali Khan has asked permission to reside in citadel inside our lines in town. Sirdar has no information as yet from Kabul, but he seems anxious to be associated closely with us, and I encouraged him in this respect.

Enclosure 27 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 7th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR SHER ALI has been informed of events at Kabul, and expressed absolute devotion to British Government, and offers to raise contingent among Durani tribes to march to Kabul with British Force, should one go from here.

Enclosure 28 in No. 21.

Tel. dated 9th September 1879. (Extract.)

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar.

Your telegram 7th. Convey to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan the acknowledgments of the British Government for his friendly and honourable assurances, and add anything suitable regarding his offer of contingent.

Enclosure 29 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 9th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

EVERYTHING quiet here. Sirdar visited General yesterday evening, and renewed assurances of devotion to British Government. He is raising the usual local contingents of horse under tribal Chiefs to support collectors in collecting revenue; this also gives pay and employment.

Two Kandahar regiments on their road from Kabul to garrison Kandahar, on evacuation, have been halted outside city. One was disarmed before leaving Kabul. The Sirdar offered them leave to go to their homes, but they made protestations of fidelity and requested to be allowed to garrison any place remote from Kandahar. They have been ordered to the Tirin district under Sirdar's son, certain suspected officers being dismissed.

Arrangements making for supply of Commissariat from Government grain(?). This will mitigate rise in prices already commencing, and put money in Sirdar's Treasury, which (is) empty.

Zamindawar people have refused to pay revenue to Governor, Muhammad Yusaf, Amir's uncle, who is unpopular, and has no armed force. Sirdar has directed him to return to Girishk, and in conjunction with us, is inviting the Zamindawar Chiefs to Kandahar.

Enclosure 30 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 10th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR has received letter from Amir, written Thursday, giving account of events of preceding day. He says that with thousands of men he strove through the day to rescue the Envoy, and lays great stress on Daud Shah's wounds, adding that all the men with him were killed. He orders the Sirdar to follow advice of representatives of British Government.

Another letter from Amir's Munshi Bashi to Sirdar says that the troops have gone to their homes, or fled; that six regiments did not share in the attack, but have lost all discipline. He concludes thus:—"In order that the Amir's letters may be fit to be shown, should you think it advisable to do so, I have inserted some words and phrases, such as are advisable at such a time."

Enclosure 31 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 11th September 1879.

From GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

PLEASE let us know as soon as possible intentions of Government with regard to retention of part or whole of force at Kandahar during the winter. The information is required with reference to arrangements for hutting and provisioning troops here and in Pishin. Early definite orders will save much trouble and expense. If it be decided to keep whole force above Passes, it is to be noted that supplies and forage are more readily procurable here than in Pishin.

Enclosure 32 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 11th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

WITH reference to General Stewart's message of to-day, I think that forces might be with advantage retained here during the winter. Sirdar wishes it, and its presence under the circumstances, is not in any way distasteful to any part of population.

Enclosure 33 in No. 21.

Telegram, No. A.-94, dated 12th September 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar.

GOVERNMENT intend retention of whole force at Kandahar during winter.

Kurrachee will be your base, and the Bolan and Sind your line of communication. All supply and transport will be now transferred to the Bombay Government and authorities, to whom you must state your wants.

Enclosure 34 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 13th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR's bi-weekly post from Kabul arrived yesterday, having left 6th. He says that the only letter from Amir was a simple one of condolence on death of a relation, and I have no reason to disbelieve his statement. None of the private letters in bag contained, as far as I can ascertain, any notice of the occurrences of the 3rd, but this excites no surprise here.

Enclosure 35 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 13th September 1879.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

I ARRIVED Quetta this morning. Country perfectly tranquil; Kabul news has not had disturbing result. I had meeting of Achakzai and Kakazai Chiefs in Khojak Pass yesterday, and explained to them what had happened. One and all declared their determination to abide by previous agreement, and to, as heretofore, faithfully serve the Government. His Highness the Khan has telegraphed to me that his life, country, and all his possessions are at the disposal of Government. I consider there is no cause whatever for anxiety in this direction.

No. 22.

To His Excellency the Right Honorable THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA in Council.

No. 101 of 1879.

MY LORD,

India Office, London, September 18, 1879.

1. HER Majesty's Government have received with profound grief and regret the intelligence conveyed by your Excellency's telegrams of the 6th inst., of the attack made on the British Embassy at Cabul by mutinous Afghan troops and the people of the city, which, as is unhappily but too certain, in spite of a desperate resistance on the part of the British Envoy, the members of his staff, and his native escort, terminated in the massacre of the entire Mission.

2. Her Majesty's Government feel that it would be premature at this moment to discuss either the immediate causes to which this deplorable event may be attributed, or the ultimate consequences which may result from it. They cannot, however, delay expressing their keen sense of the loss which the empire has sustained by the tragic and premature death of so able a public servant as Sir L. Cavagnari, and of his companions, to whom, in full confidence of the ability of the ruler of Cabul to protect them, had been entrusted the honourable but difficult duty of consolidating the friendly relations, so recently re-established, between the British and Afghan Governments. They desire also to place on record their recognition of the gallantry and devotion shown by the escort of the Corps of Guides in the almost hopeless task of the defence of the Embassy.

3. Her Majesty's Government need scarcely assure your Excellency in Council of their steady support in all measures which may be necessary to vindicate the honour of

Great Britain, and to exact redress for the murderous violence to which the members of the Mission have fallen victims.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CRANBROOK.

No. 23.

No. 203 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 25th September 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a communication from the late Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary at Kabul, and of its enclosures, regarding the movements of certain Russian officers apparently engaged in making surveys on the Oxus.

No. 25, dated 27th August 1879.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
E. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 23.

Memo. No. 25, dated 27th August 1879.

From MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

HAS the honour to forward translation of three letters received by the Governor of Afghan-Turkestan, reporting the movements of certain Russian officers engaged in making surveys on the Oxus.

Enclosure 2 in No. 23.

Translation of Letter, Pattakaisar (?) ferry, dated 16th Shaban.

THIRTY-ONE Russians have come up the river in two boats. They have been 48 days on the road. Men of the country drag the boats up by ropes. They went ashore for a very short time to eat at Chuchka, on the north side of the river, and then proceeded to Shorab (?) and Pattakaisar (?)

The wooden boat is 30 yards long and 5 yards broad. The small boat is of iron and has a deck under which I don't know what there is. The chief Russian among them has a telescope through which he looks in front and behind, and writes down the account of the country and the river.

Nobody understands what he is doing. There are 14 boxes in the iron boat. The followers of these infidels are all armed. They seem to do nothing else beside noting down the state of the country and the river.

Enclosure 3 in No. 23.

Translation of Letter, dated 21st Shaban.

In a letter dated the 14th of the present month I wrote to you that three Russian officers with three soldiers and one interpreter had come up the river in two boats, one a small one belonging to the Russians, and the other a large one which they had brought from Organj, and which was manned by six Organj boatmen, and had passed one night

in Charjui and one night in Kilif. They engaged a man in Kilif for 300 tangas whom they took with them, and questioned him about the countries on both sides of the river.

The people of the country pulled the boats up by ropes from boundary to boundary. They kept on the other side of the river, and never approached our side. The Mir of Kilif's men say that they are going to the source of the river.

I have repeated most of what I wrote in my last letter, lest you may not have received it, as you did not answer it. Yesterday, the 20th, 20 Russian sowars with eight loaded camels arrived at Ak-kum on the banks of the river and passed the night there.

It is reported that some other sowars are coming after them. I enclose a letter on the subject. I sent a man towards Sherabad, &c. When he returns he will bring a true account.

Enclosure 4 in No. 23.

Translation of Letter from a Turkoman of Kirki.

For some time I have been sick, but am now recovering, and hasten to inform you that 20 Russian sowars with eight loaded camels arrived on Saturday evening at Ak-kum. They passed the night there and moved on next day. I don't know where they will halt, nor what their errand is. Some other Russians, following them, have arrived in Kirki, with some object in view.

I have sent a man on with them who will find out what they are doing.

No. 23A.

No. 204 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 25th September 1879.

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 196, dated 1st September 1879, we have the honor to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter from the late Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, No. 24, dated 27th August 1879, transmitting his Diary for the period between the 17th and the 23rd August 1879.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 23A.

Memo. No. 24, dated 27th August 1879.

From MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

HAS the honour to submit Diary of the British Embassy at Kabul, for the week ending 23rd August 1879.

Enclosure 2 in No. 23A.

No. 5.—Diary of the British Embassy at Kabul, from the 17th to the 23rd August 1879.

17th August 1879.—The daughter of Sirdar Yahya Khan married to the Amir has been attacked by cholera, but is now reported out of danger.

The deaths which have occurred from cholera amongst the Herat regiments are variously reported to be from 120 to 365.

The Amir has reduced the allowances of the majority of the Muhammadzai (Barakzai) Sirdars on the grounds that he will not require them to keep up so many followers as the late Amir directed them to maintain. This has caused dissatisfaction, but final orders in the matter have not yet been issued.

Certain military officers of high rank have fallen under the Amir's displeasure, and have been deprived of their commands. Among the number are General Ghulam Hyder Khan, Charkhi (who commanded the troops at Ali Masjid), and Brigadier-General Taj Muhammad Khan (in consequence of the fracas which took place about the lease of the Mint, *vide* Diary of 31st July 1879). General Saifudin Khan, commanding the artillery, is said to be about to be degraded, but as long as Daud Shah has influence over the Amir it is not likely to take place, as Saifudin Khan is a personal friend of the Commander-in-Chief.

Sirdar Yahya Khan has been given the command of 1,500 irregular cavalry ("Sowar-i-Kushada"). Kazi Sultan Ali, the chief priest of the Shiahs, has died of cholera.

18th August 1879.—The Amir has given Abdul Karim Khan, the Kohistani Chief, a letter to the headmen of Nijrow, summoning them to Kabul to arrange for the payment of their arrears of revenue. Abdul Karim has been promised the Governorship of Nijrow if he succeeds in securing the submission of the people of that valley to the Amir's authority. Asmatula Khan, Ghilzai, is reported to have increased the number of his personal retainers from 200 to 500, and is about to remove his family from Kach to Kulman.

The Amir has directed the Governor of Afghan Turkestan to move troops against the rebels in Badakshan as soon as the regiments in course of relief arrive from Kabul. It is thought that the troops are not sufficiently in hand for the task of restoring order in Badakshan.

19th August 1879.—Sirdar Hashim Khan has been appointed to the Governorship of the northern portion of the Hazarajat.

Six regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and 12 mountain guns, under orders for Turkestan, have left the cantonments. Two Kandahari regiments of infantry have left Kabul for Kandahar.

The three regiments lately despatched to Ghazni mutinied on the road and wounded Brigadier-General Zabardast Khan. The mutiny is said to have originated in consequence of one of the Colonels having flogged a soldier. The Colonel was violently assaulted and severely wounded. Numbers of men deserted, leaving their rifles which were sent into Kabul.

The Amir has of late become displeased with Daud Shah, and has demanded accounts from him; but owing to the exertions of the Mustaufi a reconciliation has taken place.

Part of Kazi Kadru's family and property left Kabul last night. He is reported to be somewhere in the Safed Koh. His Kabul wives have returned to their parents: his concubines have been sold.

20th August 1879.—Yesterday one month's pay was sent out to the troops under orders for Turkestan. The troops refused to take one month's pay and demanded their full arrears of four months. A compromise was effected by the Amir, having sent another month's pay which the troops accepted: but it is thought probable that many will desert when they get a few marches out of Kabul.

21st August 1879.—Haji Ataullah, former Envoy at the Court of the Amir of Bokhara, is said to be preparing to return to his appointment. (The Foreign Minister has assured the British Envoy that Haji Ataullah will not be deputed to Bokhara until the wishes of the British Government are made known to the Amir).

Muhammud Ali Beg, the Wakil-ud-dowlat of Sighan, arrived in Kabul yesterday with 100 sowars. It is rumoured that he will be detained indefinitely at Kabul, and will not be granted his former appointment.

Sayad Muhammad, son of the late Sayad Nur Muhammad Shah, has been appointed to a civil office at Kandahar under Sirdar Sher Ali Khan.

It is reported that the Amir is pressing Sirdar Hashim Khan to deliver up certain money and valuables the mother of the late heir-apparent is supposed to have deposited with him.

The amount of money reported to have been taken from the mother of the late Abdulla Jan, by order of the Amir, is as follows:—1,60,000 tillas Bukhari (1 tilla=9 rupees Kabuli) 12,000 ratiskas (Russian 5 rouble piece (gold)=12 rupees).

To-day the Amir went on a visit of condolence to the family of Mir Akbar Khan, Kohistani, at the gardens of Ali Mardan. After the visit His Highness went to see the cantonments at Sherpur.

His Highness the Amir sent his Foreign Minister to the British Envoy to say that, in consequence of the unruly behaviour of the soldiery at Herat, he did not think it prudent that Major St. John should go there, but Sirdar Sher Ali Khan would be instructed to arrange for that officer's journey via Anar Darra to Birjand. The above was communicated to Major St. John by telegraph.

23rd August 1879.—Report received that six Companies located at Ghorī in Afghan Turkestan mutinied about their arrears of pay and arrested their commanding officer, and marched with him towards Mazar-i-Sharif with the view to demanding their pay from the Governor of the province. General Ghulam Hyder Khan, fearing that the arrival of these men would create a bad effect amongst the rest of the soldiery, sent out some pay, and thereby persuaded the mutineers to return to their post. The Turkestan soldiers, however, heard of what had been done, and are likely to follow the example set them.

The Mustaufi and Foreign Minister were informed that arrangements for laying the telegraph wire across the Shuturgurdan are in progress, and that an escort would be required from the Amir to protect the camp of the telegraph officials. The Ministers replied that on intimation being received as to the date of the arrival of the telegraph officials at the Afghan frontier, all necessary arrangements would be made for their protection and for supplies.

No. 24.

No. 210 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
or India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 25th September 1879.

WE have the honour to enclose, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, papers containing all the material information that has reached us, since the despatch of our letter of the 15th September, regarding the circumstances of the attack upon the British Embassy at Kabul, and the course of events within Afghanistan. We propose also to report briefly the progress of the measures adopted to exact retribution at Kabul, and to restore order in the country.

2. In regard to the circumstances of the attack on the Embassy, several men of the escort, who had taken part in the defence, have managed to escape into British territory, and their depositions are enclosed with this letter. There are of course various discrepancies in the details of these statements, especially in regard to the manner in which the real attack, with fire-arms, began; but all accounts seem to agree that certain unarmed regiments were drawn up in the Bala Hissar to receive their pay, that they suddenly broke out into violent mutiny, and attacked the Residency; that they were at first kept off, but they went for arms, and on their return after a short interval surrounded and besieged the Residency; reaching the roof and setting fire to the house below, until the building became untenable and the defenders were gradually overpowered. The mutineers were joined by the city mob; and there is no evidence from the accounts given by these men, that any serious attempt was made by the Amir or his people to assist or rescue the British officers. Upon this important point it is still necessary to suspend judgment, until we are in possession of more ample and authentic evidence of the Amir's actual position and behaviour at the time, and until the Amir's own explanations shall have been received. From Kandahar we are informed that the Amir has written to his uncle, Muhammad Yusaf Khan, Governor of Zamindawar, giving an account of the events of the 3rd September, differing much from that sent to the Viceroy and Sirdar Sher Ali Khan. Only two regiments, both of the Body-Guard, are said to have mutinied, and attacked the Embassy and murdered the members of the Embassy. Nothing is mentioned of any attempt at rescue, or of participation by the people, and it is expressly stated that no other injury was done, and that by evening everything was quiet. We remark that Baha-ud-din Khan, a very intelligent native officer of our cavalry, who was in Kabul at the time, and Sirdar Gholam Nakshband Khan, who though not at Kabul when the attack took place, was connected with the Embassy, are both of opinion that the Amir might have assisted our officers.

3. In regard to the origin and causes of this sudden outbreak we are still without authentic information. Taimur, a Sowar of the Guides escort, who has escaped, mentions

that the troops and the city people at first welcomed the arrival of the Envoy, imagining that he would be able at once to improve their condition; but that the temper of the soldiery altered when they were disappointed about obtaining their pay. When, therefore, the full arrears were refused to the regiments in the Bala Hissar, they immediately turned on the Residency. Private letters received at Kandahar from Kabul corroborate this account, and say that the affair was unpremeditated; although no serious attempt was made to control the mutineers. On the other hand a letter from a Kazi of Kabul to Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan is said to hint that the affair was premeditated, and that Sir L. Cavagnari had some previous warning. At Kandahar Sirdar Sher Ali has freely declared his conviction that the Amir had been in the hands of dangerous traitors.

4. Several letters have been received, during the past ten days, by General Roberts at Ali Khel from the Amir. Of the first, dated 11th September, we enclose copy; it expresses the Amir's relief and pleasure at receiving a letter addressed to him, at the Viceroy's order, by Captain Conolly, his confidence in the friendship of the Viceroy, and his intention to punish the mutineers. Subsequent letters, dated 16th September, report the mutiny of troops at Herat, and the murder of the Governor there, with other news; while His Highness' latest letter, dated the 17th instant, answered and complied with General Roberts' suggestion that confidential representatives should be sent to him from the Amir, by announcing the deputation of Mustaufi Habibulla and Wazir Sher Muhammad Khan. These representatives reached the camp at Ali Khel on the 22nd, and have had interviews with General Roberts. They presented letters from the Amir acknowledging receipt, and expressing satisfaction at the contents of letters that had been addressed to His Highness by General Roberts, and declaring his fidelity to the British alliance. The deputies also assured General Roberts verbally of the Amir's friendly disposition, and his wish to be guided by the advice of our Government.

5. In regard to the general state of affairs at Kabul, and to the disposition of the principal tribes with whom we have to deal, it is as yet not possible to form any precise opinion. There can be no doubt that emissaries from Kabul are abroad in the tribal country, with the object of inciting the tribes to take arms, and to be prepared for giving trouble to the British forces. From Peshawur it has been reported that letters from the Amir were believed to have come to the Mohmands, Afridis, and Shinwaris, directing them to assemble. On the 17th September, General Roberts heard from the Ghilzais that the Amir had called upon them to stop all roads leading from Ali Khel toward Kabul; while on the other hand, Major St. John was told at Kandahar that the tribes had been instructed not to oppose our advance; and to reserve themselves for attack on our communications hereafter. We have not yet ascertained to what extent, and with what object, the Amir himself may be in correspondence with these tribes, or whether the messages are circulating under his direct authority. It was to be expected, however, that in his present situation the Amir would be anxious to secure, in any contingency, the adherence of the more powerful tribes; while it was certain that all persons at Kabul who have reason to dread our presence there would use their utmost influence with the tribes to embarrass our advance.

6. There has been an attack, near the Shuturgurdan, on a small party of our troops escorting stores; but generally the tribes with whom our officers are in communication on the Shuturgurdan and Khyber lines have not shown themselves hostile. The Commissioner of Peshawur reports satisfactory arrangements made with the Afridis of the Khyber; and from Ali Khel we learn that the headmen of many neighbouring tribes are coming into our camp. General Stewart's reconnaissance toward Ghazni will probably engross the attention of the Southern Ghilzais and will aid in maintaining tranquillity in that direction.

7. Kandahar and the adjacent country continue quiet. The Amir's Governor, Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, is on very good terms with the British officers, and apparently desires to prove his attachment to the British Government in the existing crisis of Afghan affairs.

8. In the outlying provinces of Afghanistan the central authority of the Kabul Government appears to be weak. The Governor of Zamindawar, who is a younger brother of the late Amir, has shut himself up in his fort, and has sent into Kandahar for help. At Herat some troops mutinied on the 5th September, two days after the outbreak at Kabul, murdered Fakir Ahmed Khan, the Governor of the town, and plundered and burnt his house. Fakir Ahmed had been a devoted adherent of Yakub Khan, the present Amir; he had accompanied Sirdar Ayub Khan into Persia, returned with him, and was supposed to be his chief and most trusted officer at Herat. But a telegram from Major St. John mentions that private letters express an opinion that Ayub

himself planned the murder, apparently from jealousy of Fakir Ahmed's attachment to the Amir. The Amir has confirmed this news from Herat by letters to General Roberts, of which the last received states that the troops at Herat have been again disorderly, but have been quieted by payment. From Badakshan intelligence has been received, through Kashmir, of another local revolution, by which Mir Baba Khan has been overthrown.

9. Our military situation at the present moment may be briefly summed up as follows : in Southern Afghanistan, General Stewart concentrated the bulk of his force at Kandahar, and in addition to guarding his long line of communications had prepared a force of 2,000 men with transport and supplies, ready to move at a moment's notice. We have strengthened this force by the addition of two companies of Bombay Sappers for employment on the Bolan road, and have called up a Bombay brigade of three infantry regiments to guard the Sukkar-Multan line and frontier, and to meet the demands for escort and convoy duty. We directed a reconnaissance to be made to Kelat-i-Ghilzai; and a force of about 3,000 men under Brigadier General Hughes left yesterday morning for Kelat-i-Ghilzai. We have further under consideration the expediency of pushing this reconnaissance even up to Ghazni. On this line all operations are in full working order.

10. On the Kurram line, the supply of transport and the progress made up the valley by the reinforcing troops have now placed General Roberts in a position to advance. His line of communication is fairly well-guarded already, and is daily becoming more so. His field force is concentrated between Ali Khel and Shuturguridan. An advance will be made to-day on Dobandi or Kushi by half the force; the remaining half following a day or two afterwards, when the Shuturguridan will be held by four guns, the 3rd Sikhs, and 11th Native Infantry. The field force should therefore be fully concentrated by the 1st at Kushi, whence Kabul can be reached in four marches. Communication will be maintained with the Shuturguridan until the pass is closed by snow, or the Khyber line is open.

11. On the Khyber line, Major-General Bright, who is now at Peshawur, has organised a strong advanced brigade which is destined to move on to Jellalabad and to push a reconnaissance beyond. A portion of the Lundikotal force will move immediately upon Dakka. The sickness in the Peshawur valley and Khyber Pass, which has been unusually great, has added to the difficulty of equipping two lines at once, but matters are mending in this direction; and as all transport has now been diverted to Peshawur, there is every hope that the road to Kabul will be open *via* the Khyber before the end of next month. A cart road already exists to Gandamak, and this will be improved and continued onwards with the utmost possible expedition.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

P.S.—A telegram dated 24th September has been received from General Roberts to the effect that, General Baker occupied Kushi without resistance at 3.20 p.m. o'clock, on the 24th instant. He reports that supplies are abundant. The strength of the force he has with him in Kushi is over 2,000 men.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 14th September 1879, received 16th Sept.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

A FOLLOWER of Cavagnari, Emam Buksh, and a Kahar have arrived here. They state three of the escort were alive when they left, and had been taken to Amir. Their fate unknown. Party of sowars were out with grass-cutter; their fate also unknown. Escort reported to have behaved most gallantly, especially Sikh Jemadar of Cavalry.

Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 15th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Following is précis of letter received yesterday from Amir, dated 11th September :—
Letter begins—

I HAVE received your letter of 7th instant, and was much pleased. I fully understood what was written. Complete confidence was restored and sense of relief felt in friendship shown by Viceroy, as my prosperity found favour in his (?) sight. I am dreadfully distressed and aggrieved at recent events ; but there is no fighting against God's will. I hope to inflict such punishment on the evil-doers as will be known world-wide, and prove my sincerity. I have twice written on this subject, and third time by my confidential servant, Sher Muhammad Khan. I now write to say that, for these eight days, I have preserved self and family by the good offices of those who were friendly to me, partly by bribing, partly by hoaxing the rebels. Some of the cavalry I have dismissed ; and night and day (I) am considering how to put matters straight. Please God, the mutineers will soon meet with the punishment they deserve, and my affairs be arranged to satisfaction of British Government. Certain persons of high position in these provinces have become rebellious ; but I am watching carefully and closely every quarter. I have done all I could to ensure Nawab Gholam Hussan's safety. I trust to God for opportunity of showing my sincere friendship for British Government and recovering my good name before the world. *Letter ends.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 15th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan reached this yesterday. He arrived at Shah Kalander Kili, three marches from Kabul, before hearing of murder of Embassy. Troops at Ghazni seemed ready for mischief, Amir sent Allal-ud-din, Padshah Khan's brother, to take care of him. People of Wardak were inclined to molest him, but he managed to reach Shuturguridan with Allal-ud-din without receiving injury. His property he had to leave with a friend in Wardak. Nawab's opinion is that Amir did not plan destruction of Embassy, but for some time there was estrangement between him and Envoy, and Amir had sent ammunition to Logar and orders to Ghazni to support any insurrectionary movement or opposition to English. Nawab thinks Amir will fly to Turkestan when we advance, and proposes that he should be invited to meet us as proof of his sincerity. Nawab says, massacre calls for retribution, and country should be occupied in strength.

Enclosure 4 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 17th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

I hope I made satisfactory arrangement yesterday with Allal-ud-din Khan for security of road from Karatiga to beyond Kushi, provision of transport animals, and supplies.

Ghilzais report that Amir has called upon (them) to stop all roads leading from this towards Kabul. I am trying to get one of the Amir's letters to this effect.

Enclosure 5 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 17th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Spy from Kabul reports 12 regiments, Highlanders (?), in Kabul; three had gone previously to Ghazni. Amir has authority and has his door guarded by faithful servant. He says open jibād is to be urged, and troops assembled. Whole city shared in plunder of Embassy, and that Kabulis are much concerned at the vengeance we may take. No troops between Kabul and this; country quiet. People of Logar, excepting the Afghans, favorable to us.

Amir had killed Brigadier Abdul Karim and Abdul Karim, Kohistani (?) for refusing to march off mutinous regiment to Kohistan, there dispersing and making away with them.

Enclosure 6 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1879, received 19th.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KOTE DUFFADAR Futtah Muhammad and Sowar Akbar Shah, of Guide Cavalry, arrived last night, with Sirkai Khan, uncle of Padshah Khan, Ghilzai Chief, (who) were out together with a Sikh Sowar, also saved, and twenty-five grass-cutters, twenty-two saved by Colonel Ibrahim Khan, pensioner of British Government and in Amir's employ,—state that some disturbance was anticipated ever since arrival of regiments from Herat, and that they had warned the Embassy. They were saved by their own tribesmen, Kuzalbash (?); do not consider revolt was instigated by Amir, who was still helpless. Some Embassy servants have escaped,—Envoy's bearer, chupprassis, Peshawuri, and Kuzalbash dhobi, and baker, also a sepoy, Ghilzai, who was on furlough in Kohistan. Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani Chief, said killed by Amir, because two of the three mutinous regiments were chiefly Kohistanis: this said to have caused revolt in Kohistan.

No preparations have yet been made either for opposing us in the capital, or on the road. The three sowars, including the Sikhs, were protected by Naibs (?) Mir Muhammad Khan and Rahim Khan, Kuzalbash Sirdars Taimur Saborai Shahzada. A Sowar in the Guides and one Gholam Nubbi, formerly in the Guides, Kuzalbash and Chupprassi to Envoy, saved.

Letter will follow.

Enclosure 7 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1879, received 19th.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Letters from Amir, dated 16th September, and enclosures from Turkestan and Herat, report as follows:—Mutiny of troops and murder of Fakir Ahmed Khan, Civil Governor and Military Commandant under Ayub Khan at Herat; disaffection of three regiments ordered to march from Takhtapul and Mazar-i-Sharif to Ali Shaban in Turkestan; movements of Russian Officers under Czar's nephew, Nicholas Constantine Ozak, with one hundred and fifty men, apparently to have a look at country and meet Amir Bokhara.

Ayub's letter to Amir confirms report of disturbance in Turkestan, and begs leave to resign his position.

Amir states that he hopes very shortly to regain his power and intends expending the whole of his resources (?) and energy in maintaining his friendship with British.

The Russians gave out they intended fighting Turkomans at or near Merv.

Enclosure 8 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1879.

From BRIGADIER-GENERAL BAKER, Shuturguridan, through Ali Khel, to VICEROY, Simla.

Yesterday received letter from Head Malik of Kushi offering to come in; have summoned him here to-day. Yesterday letter arrived from Amir which has been sent to Roberts this morning. Nakshband Khan Sirdar Bahadur, in Cavagnari's employ, since arrival of troops at Jellalabad in December last, reached this; he will doubtless be of great service as regards information when the time comes; he has been resident at Kabul for 10 years, and has property there and at Jellalabad; used to go to Residency every day: he says that if Amir had chosen he might have assisted Envoy. Arsenal was not looted. Doubts Amir. All here quiet and well. Very cold.

Enclosure 9 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 20th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Daud Shah has expressed wish to serve us and asked if he may. I have replied in the affirmative.

Hastings and Mahomed Amir have gone to join Baker on Shuturguridan and open communication with people of Logar.

Arrangements being made for pushing on telegraph line towards Kushi.

Two hundred camels have just come to take our supplies to Shuturguridan.

According to Nakshband Khan, Amir might have stopped attack on Resident when troops went to their lines to fetch their arms. As, however, Nakshband has come straight from Wali Mahomed's protection, his account must be received *cum grano*.

Enclosure 10 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 20th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

LETTER just received from (Amir), dated 17th instant, acknowledging receipt of my letter of 13th instant, suggesting deputation of trustworthy Agent to meet me, and intimating that, on 19th instant, Mustaufi Habibulla and Wazir Shah Muhammad would start for my camp.

Letter further contains assurances of trust in, and friendship toward, British Government.

Enclosure 11 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 15th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

PRIVATE letters from Kabul state, three regiments only engaged in attack on Residency, that the affair was apparently unpremeditated, having arisen from disappointment of these three regiments at getting one month's pay only, and that no serious attempt at relief was made beyond preventing other troops taking part.

Enclosure 12 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 15th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

A PRIVATE letter of 8th from Kabul confirms report that three regiments only mutinied and attacked Residency. One lately arrived from Herat, one Kabuli, and one of Amir's body guard. All three have received pay and been sent to Kohistan. Kabul is said to be in the greatest confusion and excitement.

Enclosure 13 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 15th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR SHIRINDIL KHAN, a nephew of Sirdar Sher Ali, who started for Kabul about a fortnight ago to make his submission to Amir, returned to-day, having met, between Mukur and Ghazni, a courier bearing letters from Amir to his Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai.

The courier told him of the massacre of the Envoy and escort, which was caused, he said, by quarrel about a woman taken into the Residency, and was carried out with the connivance of the Amir, who was now sending orders in all directions to assemble troops and tribes for a holy war.

Six regiments had been ordered to Kabul from Herat, and six from Turkestan.

The courier himself said that he was taking letters to Mahomed Tahir Khan, Governor of Kelat (-i-Ghilzai) to raise the Southern Ghilzais.

He had also orders from the Amir to the Governors of Ghazni and Kelat (i-Ghilzai) to seize Nawab Gholam and send him to Kabul.

Enclosure 14 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 15th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR MUHAMMAD YUSAF KHAN, Governor of Zamindawar, being unable to enforce his authority and in fear of his life, has shut himself up in the fort of Sarhing, and sent to Sirdar Sher Ali for help; the latter is sending out to bring him in to Kandahar.

Enclosure 15 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 16th September 1879.

From SIR DONALD STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Disposition of Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai uncertain. Sirdar suggested yesterday that Kelat-i-Ghilzai should be brought within circle of immediate influence of Kandahar, both for local and strategic reasons; and there would be no difficulty in occupying it as proposed.

Enclosure 16 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 16th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AMIR has written to his uncle, Muhammad Yusaf Khan, (?) Governor of Zamin-dawar, giving account of event of 3rd, differing much from that sent to Viceroy and Sirdar. Only two regiments, both of body-guard, said to have mutinied, and attacked Legation, and murdered British. Nothing was mentioned of any attempt at rescue, or participation of people. Expressly states that no (?) other injury was done, and by evening everything was quiet.

Enclosure 17 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1879.

From GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

FOLLOWING force ordered for advance to Kelat-i-Ghilzai under Brigadier-General Hughes:—Wing 59th Foot, Wing 3rd Goorkhas, Wing 2nd Biluchis, 2nd Punjaub Cavalry, two guns, 8-4 Field Battery, and three guns, 11-11 Mountain Battery: a Company of Sappers, with two Companies Biluchis, will follow with reserve European stores. Major St. John might accompany force to report on disposition of tribes.

Attitude of Governor Mahomed Tahir Khan unknown, out approach of force communicated to him with request to provide supplies.

Enclosure 18 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

DAK from Kabul with dates to 11th September arrived yesterday evening. Letter from Amir to Sirdar contained only intimation that all was going on satisfactory at Kabul.

Enclosure 19 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

LETTER from Ayub Khan at Herat to Sirdar states that on the 5th September Kabul regiments mutinied, attacked house of General Fakir Ahmed Khan; killed him, plundered and burnt his house.

Enclosure 20 in No. 24.

Translation of a letter from the AMIR MUHAMMAD YAKUB KHAN, to SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, dated Thursday, the 16th Ramazan = 4th September.

ON the 15th Ramazan, the regiments which had come for their pay at 8 a.m. to the Ark suddenly rose in mutiny. First they stoned their own officers, and then with one accord ran to the residence of the Envoy. From their side stones were thrown, and from the other side a rain of shot was poured. The fire of mutiny and disturbance at once reached such a height that it became beyond remedy; and all the regiments from Shirpur and Chaman, (the cantonments) outside the Bala Hissar, and all the people of the city of every tribe invaded the Bala Hissar, and began to plunder the artillery park, the arsenal, and the factories; after which all the crowd, troops, and citizens, surrounded the Envoy's house. In the meantime I had sent Daud Shah Khan, Sipah-Salar, to the

* Bayonets fixed on sticks, a favourite weapon in Afghanistan.—O. St. J.

Envoy's help. At the door of the Envoy's house he fell under the blows of stones and *sar-naizah*,* so that he is now on the point of death. I then sent Yahya Khan and my son the Waliahd, the Koran in his hand, to the troops,

but it was of no avail. I then sent the Seyyids and Mullahs, but this equally useless. Till the time of evening prayer on Wednesday with thousands of men I defended the Envoy. On both sides there was much slaughter. At the time of evening prayer the door of the Residency was set on fire. Although it was the will of God that this should

† Probably meant to signify a "small party," not the exact number five. The idiom is a common one here.—O. St. J.

happen, yet those *five*,† intriguers, whose profession is enmity, who were displeased at the friendship of the English and Afghan Governments, were the origin of this terrible and fearful agitation of the mob, and instigated them to the ruin of this Government and the murder of

the Envoy. The result has been that much blood has been shed, and that the kingdom of Afghanistan is ruined and destroyed. My own state is very grievous. With

‡ As before "a small number," "a handful."—O. St. J.

five‡ servants and adherents, who with girded loins are guarding me and my family, I am sitting in my own *little house*.§ The troops, the townspeople, and the inhabitants of the neighbourhood with one accord have diverted

§ "Saraicheh."

the road of obedience from me, but by every means in my

power, I am trying to put an end to the business. Daud Shah Khan, whom I sent to help the Envoy, is so grievously wounded by stones, gunstocks, and bayonets, that there is no hope for him. The people who went with him are all killed. The arsenal and workshops are so completely ruined that of the latter not a brick remains in place, and everything of use to the soldiers and people has been taken away from the former. In short, my rule in consequence of this occurrence has gone to the winds; and I, after trust in the benevolence of God, have no hope but in the amity and concord of the British Government; and my opinion is this—that to extinguish this terrible conflagration

gration, and escape from this fearful and dangerous circle, the only way is to act according to the advice of the representatives of the British Government. I send you this for your information.

A letter from the Amir's Munshi-Bashi to the Sirdar adds that of the soldiers, some have gone to their homes, others have fled. The regiments in the Chaman outside the Bala Hissar, six in number, though not so guilty as the others, for they desisted from the attack on Cavagnari's house when they saw the Koran, have nevertheless spilt the water of discipline. In order that the Amir's letter may be fit to be shown, should you think it advisable to do so, I have inserted some words and phrases such as are advisable at such a time."

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Major, R.E.

Enclosure 21 in No. 24.

No. 1 dated Camp Ali Khel, 13th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B.,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, in original, the letter from the Amir brought by the special messenger mentioned in Captain Conolly's telegram to your address of the 10th instant, and to state that a reply has been sent to His Highness a copy of which is herewith enclosed.

Enclosure 22 in No. 24.

Translation of a Letter from the AMIR of Kabul, to the address of GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., dated 8th September 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that I have sent a concise written account of the events of Wednesday and Thursday,* the 15th and 16th of the current month (Ramazan), for your information, and I was on the

* Corresponding to 3rd and 4th September.

† 5th, 6th, and 7th September.

‡ 6th September.

§ 8th September.

point of writing an account of the events which occurred on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, the 17th, 18th, and 19th† idem, when a friendly letter, dated the 18th‡ Ramazan from Captain Conolly, arrived at 10 a.m., on Monday, the 20th§ idem. I have perused it and mastered its contents. Whereas it is necessary that the Officers of the illustrious British Government, who are in reality my kind and sympathising friends, should be thoroughly informed of the various and variable events of the present time, I have deputed my confidential Peshkidmat, Sher Muhammad Khan, to you that he may wait upon you and represent in detail the true state of affairs and lay before you a few words, which, for the welfare and friendship of the two Governments, I have entrusted to him, to the best of his ability.

Enclosure 23 in No. 24.

Translation of a Copy of a Letter from GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, to the AMIR, dated 13th September 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to your Highness that an order has reached me from his Excellency, the Governor-General (to the effect) that, according to the Treaty which was concluded in May of this year 1879, between the British Government and your Highness the Amir of Kabul, and which was entirely approved by your Highness, it was agreed that, conformably to your special request, an English officer should be appointed as an Envoy at the city of Kabul, and that "I (the Amir) will be responsible for his protection and honorable treatment." Whereas, in accordance with your Highness undertaking the responsibility, four British officers were sent to Kabul. After six weeks they were ruthlessly killed in the very Bala Hissar and within the Residency, and no effort was made by your Highness to protect them; but this was done by your Highness' own troops and subjects, and your helplessness and inability to carry out the treaty engagement became apparent. Moreover, it appears difficult for your Highness to establish your power even in your own capital; therefore, an English army is

advancing to Kabul for this purpose, (*viz.*) to inflict retribution upon the mutineers and murderers of the said officers, and that the terms of Treaty may be concluded (*sic*). The object of my Government in entering Afghanistan by the different routes is to strengthen and consolidate your Highness' Government on condition that your Highness loyally observe the friendship which has been concluded between the two Governments, and in no other way is it possible to strengthen your Highness' Government.

Your Highness' friendly letter of the 16th* Ramazan intimated that your friendship and sincerity are apparent, and will become apparent. But, in the meanwhile, my Government has heard that men have been sent from Kabul to stir up the people in the country. As this is contrary to the friendship above-mentioned, it appears therefore proper that your Highness should depute a confidential Agent to me, so that I should converse with him and become acquainted with your Highness' objects, as I am invested by Government with this power.

* 4th September.

Enclosure 24 in No. 24.

No. 2, dated Camp Ali Kehl, 15th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B.,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honor to forward (1), in original, a letter from His Highness the Amir to Captain Conolly received yesterday, précis of which was telegraphed to you yesterday evening; (2) copy of letter addressed to the Amir in accordance with the terms of your message of yesterday; (3) a narrative by Nawab Sir Gholam Hussan Khan, K.C.S.I.

Enclosure 25 in No. 24.

Translation of a Letter from the AMIR to CAPTAIN CONOLLY, dated 23rd Ramazan, H. 1296, (corresponding to 11th September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that your friendly letter, dated the 19th Ramazan, reached me last night, Thursday, the 23rd idem. I was gratified to hear of your good health. I have fully understood the contents of your letter. My reliance upon the perfect kindness and good-will of his Excellency the Governor-General and the other officers of the illustrious British Government, who really desire the prosperity and advancement of my Government has become stronger.

Although I exceedingly regret and deplore the occurrence of the recent event, yet there is no remedy and help against the decrees of God. It is to be hoped that the fire of this tumult and uproar will be soon extinguished, and by the great vengeance which I intend to inflict, a result will become known to the world, which will perfectly console and satisfy both our hearts, and those of our friends.

I have written and sent you an account of the events that have occurred here twice in two letters, and the third time by the hand of my Peshkhidmat, Sher Muhammad Khan; and now I am writing to you that during the last eight days I have protected myself and my family by means of friends, relatives, and a body of my trusted adherents and servants, from the mutineers and rebels, having kept some of them at a distance from me by means of money, and dismissed others, such as troopers, from the service. Both day and night I am thinking how to repair the effects of this blow. God willing, the mutineers will soon be requited for their deeds, and order and tranquillity be restored to this God-granted Government, to the satisfaction and content of the hearts of the representatives of the illustrious (British) Government.

The governors and rulers of certain provinces have also commenced to revolt. I am attentively looking to every direction, that is to say, I am seriously thinking how, by the help of God, every place where disturbance prevails may be restored to peace and tranquillity.

Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan will give you an account of the disturbed state of the country which he has seen and ascertained on the road. As soon as the intelligence of the approach of the Nawab (to Kabul) reached me on the outbreak of this disturbance I despatched Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan, and Muhammad Yusaf Khan, the guardian of my son and heir-apparent, to meet him, and after conveying my friendly sentiments

to him to relate to him verbally the present state of affairs, and to return after they had seen him pass these limits in safety.

My friend, I have this hope that, by the favor of God, as far as lies in my power and ability and strength and might, I may exhibit my perfect innocence and sincerity in my friendship and amity with the British Government, and establish my good name or friendship with the illustrious Government.

Further I will inform you of everything that takes place daily.

Enclosure 26 in No. 24.

Translation of a Copy of a Letter from GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., to the AMIR, dated Ali Khel, the 15th September 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to your Highness that I have sent your Highness' two friendly letters of the 3rd and 4th September, conveying your Highness' cordial sentiments, in original to his Excellency the Governor-General; and I have received an answer thereto to the effect that they give evidence of your Highness' sincerity. I therefore write to inform your Highness and give you good news that if your Highness, as in the past, should continue to the end friendly and sincere, your Highness may rest perfectly assured and rely on the British Government that no harm or injury (lit. anxiety) will befall your Highness. The British force is coming specially to support your Highness, and will protect your Highness from all kinds of harm and danger, and strengthen your Highness' Government.

Enclosure 27 in No. 24.

Narrative of NAWAB SIR GHOLAM HUSSAN KHAN, K.C.S.I., dated Ali Khel, 14th September 1879.

(Received with letter from SIR F. ROBERTS, No. 2, dated Ali Khel, 15th Sept. 1879).

I LEFT Kandahar on the 18th August for Kabul with eight or ten Sowars and 16 or 18 footmen (including servants), of whom some 15 or so were armed men. We were escorted by one Habbo Khan Lukozai, Durani, told off by the Governor for the purpose. I believe all parties were sorry to lose me from Kandahar except the Barakzais.

I kept out of the way of a Kabul regiment marching down the road, and the troops at Ghazni appeared to me ready for mischief. According to advice received here, I left the high road to travel by Wardak, accompanied by one Mirza Ahmad Ali Khan. I got safely as far as Shah Kalandar Kili, two marches from Kabul, and there heard of the disaster. Seeing that the Ghilzais of the place under one Muhammad Hossein Khan were hostile, I returned about a mile to Mustaufi Kila, where one Abdul Guffoor Akhoonzada, was kind to me, though a Mullah tried to raise the people against me; they stole some of my things, but those were recovered. Allal-ud-din Khan now joined me with a few sowars having been sent by the Amir. I left all my things (10 or 11 camel loads) and two horses in charge of one Haji Ata Muhammad Khan, Wardak, whom I had formerly befriended at Dera Ismail Khan on his way to Mecca, and who took them back to his own fort two stages back. I gave him a watch.

We now came away direct for the Shuturgurdan, escorted by Muhammad Afzal Khan and 60 or 70 Wardakis to the Logar border, and beyond that by Allal-ud-din Khan with a large following.

Two days after leaving Mustaufi Kila, Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan met me at Allal-ud-din Karez with some horse and foot, and gave me some information from the Amir, translation of which is attached.

Allal-ud-din Khan and myself then went on, the Wazir returning to Kabul, and reached British troops on Shuturgurdan, and were cordially received. Allal-ud-din Khan wanted to go back, but I persuaded him to come on and see what General Roberts required of him.

Enclosure 28 in No. 24.

Translation of the Proclamation issued by GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., in Command of the British Forces despatched to Afghanistan, dated Ali Khel, the 16th September 1879, corresponding to the 28th Ramazan 1296.

BE it known to all the Chiefs and the people of the country of Kabul and its Dependencies that, in accordance with the Treaty concluded in May 1879, corresponding to Jamdi-ul-Akhir 1296 Hijri, between the two great Governments, and to the terms of which His Highness the Amir expressed his assent, and agreed to the location of an Envoy of Her Imperial Majesty the Empress, a British Envoy was, at the special request of His Highness the Amir, located at the Kabul Court, and the Amir guaranteed that he should be treated honorably and protected.

Within six weeks after the said Envoy was received at and entered (Kabul) the whole Embassy was besieged and massacred in the very citadel of His Highness the Amir, who could not save or protect them from the hands of the soldiers and the people. From this the lack of power of the Amir and the weakness of his authority in his capital itself is quite apparent and manifest. For this reason the British troops are advancing for the purpose of taking a public revenge on behalf of the deceased as well as of obtaining satisfaction (lit. consolidation) of the terms entered into in the Treaty concluded. The British troops are entering Afghanistan for the purpose of strengthening the royal authority of His Highness the Amir on condition that His Highness loyally uses those powers for the maintenance of friendship and of amicable relations with the British Government. This is the only course by which the Amir's kingdom can remain intact, and (by which) also the friendly sentiments and sincerity expressed in his letter of the 4th September 1879 after the occurrence of the (said) event can be proved.

For the purpose of removing any doubt about the concord of the two Governments the Amir has been addressed to depute a confidential agent to my camp.

The British force will not punish or injure any one except the persons who have taken part or joined in the massacre of the Embassy unless they offer opposition. All the rest, the small and great, who are unconcerned (therein) may rest assured of this.

Carriage and supplies of every description should be brought into the British camp. Full price and hire shall be paid for everything that may be taken. Whereas mercy and humanity are the characteristics of this great Government, this proclamation is issued beforehand for the information of the people at large.

Enclosure 29 in No. 24.

Statement of RUSUL, Sepoy, 7th Company, Corps of Guides, of Mianrai, Yusufzai, taken 16th September 1879.

ABOUT 14 days before the attack on Residency, four sowars of the Guides were attacked in the bazaar of Kabul, but escaped. On the 14th day after this, in the early morning, some regiments, I don't know how many, were drawn up below the Bala Hissar, but inside the walls, to receive their pay. I do not know the names of the regiments, but they were unarmed. They suddenly broke into open mutiny with cries of "kill the kafirs." I was then in the Residency, in a building beside the house in which the European officers were. The troops came running up from the north, and entering our enclosure commenced to throw stones at us, and plundered our things which lay in the yard marked B. Mr. Hamilton came up and shut the gate leading from B into the road. We ascended the roofs of the houses in B. The troops attacked us with stones only, and were then unarmed. Sir L. Cavagnari ascended the roof of the Residency when a high officer of the Amir, whom I do not know, came from the parade ground and entered the arsenal, which is a good stone throw from B. The troops threw their stones away and entered the arsenal too. We had not fired upon the troops; they retired without our firing upon them; in fact Mr. Hamilton told us not to act on the offensive but keep quiet. The sowars also came inside B from C, leaving their horses in C. Then they began to fire upon us from the arsenal, and at the same time attacked their General. So I have heard, but did not see it. They fired four shots at us from the arsenal, when a shot was fired by Sir L. Cavagnari, who was on the south-western corner of the Residency, killing a man standing at the door of the arsenal. We were then on the roof.

of the Sikhs' quarters, Mr. Hamilton with us. Then the firing became general from the arsenal upon us. There is a parapet on the roof of B, but none on A. The Afghans stood at and near the door of the arsenal: the arsenal stands on high ground, higher than the Residency, and commands the roofs of A and B, clearing C. Sir L. Cavagnari fired four shots lying on his face on the roof of A, when Mr. Hamilton, who was with us, said he had been wounded, but I don't know where Sir Louis was hit up to now: none of us had fired except Sir Louis. Then we got the order to fire, and we fired. Shortly after I and a few others descended and entered A in order to prevent the small door at D being forced. I and three other sepoys sat there, two Sikhs and two Mussulmans, when a Kabuli, who was a servant of the Mission, came up and said Sir Louis Cavagnari had sent him with a letter to the Amir. We let him out by the door at D, Metab Sing Jemadar giving the order. The door at E was always open. The Afghans then broke through the wall at F, and four men came in and entered the Residency though we fired, one was shot at the courtyard. Sir Louis Cavagnari was wounded about 8 a.m. When we went to D Mr. Hamilton and Dr. Kelly also came into the Residency A. The roof of A to the north is one story higher than to the south. I don't know where Sir L. Cavagnari was. Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Jenkyns, and Dr. Kelly were all in F with us. Mr. Jenkyns and some six or eight sepoys ascended the roof of F and fired from the north-western corner on the Afghans. The troops then placed ladders on the roof of a house to the north-eastern corner of F, and ascended the roof: this was about noon, and many were killed and wounded of us then. Mehtab Sing, Karak Sing Havildar, a Duffadar and others were dead. About this time the Afghans fetched up two guns and planted them to the north-west of B; they had also made holes in the thin courtyard wall from M to N. We, when the Afghans ascended the roof of F, descended into the building. Mr. Jenkyns sheltered himself in the rooms in the west corner of the building, while Mr. Hamilton and Dr. Kelly, with some sepoys, including myself, went from the east of F to the west in the building. The Afghans entered after us, and commenced to plunder and set fire to F from below, and the Afghans began to leave the building, ascending to the roof, and descending by the ladders. About 2 p.m. the fire began to make the building untenable, and we leapt from the roof of F into a narrow wall, and thence down to the roof of the Sikhs' quarters to the roof of B. The rest left this roof of F, but I remained behind, being driven back by the flames. I saw then at the east wall of F (the roof was about to fall) a Kabuli, Dost Muhammad, an acquaintance of mine, among some men who rushed up to kill me. Dost Muhammad called out loudly in Pushtu "don't kill him, he is my ustad," he caught me in his arms and dragged me off to one side, another Afghan snatching my rifle from me. He led me off to his house in the Bala Hissar; we were all in plain clothes, for no one had time to put on uniform. I told Dost Muhammad then to run and get me news of what was happening, his house is close, and he ran up sharp to see. He told they brought up the guns close to the door of B and killed some and carried off the rest of the Sowars' horses. They blew the door of B in and fired the building. He said that when the gate was blown open, about 3 p.m., Mr. Hamilton charged out of the gate at the Afghans, and was killed in the gateway, and Dr. Kelly and Mr. Jenkyns were killed there too, charging out at the head of the sepoys who remained alive. All were killed. Some have escaped, six sowars went out on grass-cutting guard; four have been killed, and two are said to have escaped, so I hear. I did not see any corpses of European officers, nor did I go to see for fear of my life. Dost Muhammad said to me, that next morning they put all the corpses in one place, below the wall of the Bala Hissar at a waste plot of ground at T, not far from the latrines; they dug a trench and buried Europeans, Sikhs, and Mahomedans there. Next day I left Kabul to go down to Peshawur. About four kos from Kabul I came into a village, of which I don't know the name, where there were troops of the Amir. They held me back and beat me for being a "kafir," and were about to cut my throat, calling out "let us kill this Cavagnari-ite;" ("Cavagnari"), but a soldier whom I told I was a Mussulman, begged me off to a village called Sarasia, where they again were about to kill me, when I fell at the feet of a Mian, who protected me, and I spent three days there with one Shamsudin. I left on the fourth day, but was again arrested at a village three kos this side of Sarasia. The people beat me, but let me go again. Some officer of the Afghan army heard that I had escaped, and again I was arrested by his men on the road and taken back; they stripped me, but let me go. Then I came along at night in the hills. I left Jellalabad exactly 48 hours ago, travelling chiefly by night. There was no force in Jellalabad nor in Dakka, nor are any coming, as far as I know or have heard. Everybody along the road is afraid, but they are not preparing for resistance. I have heard that some Mullahs are

talking of resistance. The regiments were on pay parade in the open ground inside the Bala Hissar when they broke.

I have heard that Daud Shah is wounded, Wali Muhammad Khan fled from "Nazarband" to Kurram; and that the Amir is in great distress at what has happened.

NOTE.—The above does not differ very materially from the story of Taimur, the guide who arrived yesterday, except in details regarding the commencement and the mode of the attack. Rusul is now being cross-examined, and his further statement will follow to-morrow. This man belongs to the infantry, and may have been away from the cavalry lines when the shots were fired by the Sikhs, or Taimur may not know who fired the first shots.

None of the regiments had ammunition, which had been taken away by the Amir, even those who had arms. The regiment that began the mutiny was also disarmed.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieut.-Colonel,
Peshawur, the 17th September 1879. Commissioner.

Enclosure 30 in No. 24.

Statement of Sepoy MUHAMMAD DOST, G. Company (Q. O.) Corps of Guides, one of the survivors of the Cabul Embassy Escort, dated Murdan, 18th September 1879.

SEPOY MUHAMMAD DOST, Ghilzai, resident of Muhammad Khel, in Lughman District, Kabul, states as follows:—

I was employed to arrange for atta for the escort from the "Kuchis." Early on the morning of the 3rd September (day of attack) I went out of the Residency and brought back one load. I was told to go and get another, and when returning with it I found the Residency was surrounded by the Herati regiments, and fighting was going on. I returned to the Kuchi people. I was not in uniform. It was after 8 a.m. when I returned with atta the second time. When I first started for atta I saw the Herati regiments assembling to get pay. They had not got their rifles with them, but had side arms.

I heard that the Herati regiments were dissatisfied with only getting one month's pay instead of two, as other regiments had got the previous day. Daud Shah was sitting above watching the pay being given out. The soldiery began throwing stones at him, and he came down to where they were, when he was cut down with a tulwar and was bayoneted. He was not killed, but there was no hope for him.

The soldiers then made for the Amir's house, but were turned by his guard, and then they turned towards the Embassy and pelted the escort with stones. The Amir sent a message to Sir Louis Cavagnari to let no one get near his party. The escort fired upon the soldiers and killed nine men. Then the soldiers broke into the Amir's magazine and armed themselves with rifles.

I hid until evening in a house outside. I saw the Residency was burning. All was over about sunset.

When I first went out for atta that morning, Lieutenant Hamilton and Dr. Kelly went out for a ride with some of our Sowars and some of the Amir's as escort. I heard a man say there were two Sahibs with the Amir's cavalry, and I was in hopes they might have been my Sahibs.

I stayed in a house about three miles from Kabul for three days. I heard that the grass-cutters and the guard with them were under the protection of Amir's cavalry. Two of the grass-cutters had been killed by some people.

When I started for Murdan, I went through Lughman, and remained there three days. Asmatula Khan came down upon Charbagh and looted the place, killing six of the Amir's people.

When I got to Jellalabad I heard that a Poorbeah grass-cutter who was dumb, or pretending to be dumb, had arrived there, and was being taken care of by the Hakim.

There was no force at Jellalabad, or at Gandamak, or at Butkak.

I stayed two days at Lalpura. The fort at Dakka was occupied by 150 men of Muhammad Sadik Khan of Lalpura.

I did not go through Lundikotal, but left it on my right and went by footpaths to Ali Musjid, where I stayed a night.

I was told the Herati regiments had upwards of 200 men killed.

(Signed) R. B. CAMPBELL, Major,
Queen's Own Corps of Guides.

REMARKS by COLONEL JENKINS, C.B.

I THINK this man gives a fair account of what he saw and heard. I made a mistake in saying in my telegram that he had come out by Michni. Taimur, the first man who got down to Lundikotal is here, but has got bad fever, otherwise he might be sent to Simla to be examined. The Government has his statement, however. It seems to me that neither the Amir nor Daud Shah knew that there would be an outbreak.

I have now two men in Kabul on leave, and a third that I sent to get news when I heard of the disaster.

Enclosure 31 in No. 24.

CAPT. J. B. HUTCHINSON, Officiating Departmental Commissioner, Lahore, to
COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR, dated 18th September 1879.

I WRITE to tell you that the man Khezi has arrived at Lahore. I had a long interview with him this morning, together with his brother, Sikunder. The following is the substance of his information, which for convenience sake I will give in his own words.

"I was formerly a sowar in the Guides. I took my discharge two years ago. My family lived at Kahul. I went there. I am an Armenian Christian. Dr. Kelly was the doctor of my regiment, and I knew him well. The Herati regiments were not at Kabul when the massacre took place. They had been disbanded, and had gone away. Only those whose homes were at Kabul remained there. Three Kabuli regiments were on duty at the magazine 100 yards from the house occupied by the Embassy in the Bala Hissar. I frequently noticed these soldiers taking together in knots of 10 to 20 men. They always were talking about the Embassy, and were saying that in a day or two they should all be killed. I told Dr. Kelly what they said. He answered 'Oh! you are afraid!' but I said, 'no, I am not afraid for myself; but I am for you.' I could not make Dr. Kelly understand that there was much fear. The general people like the English. They would be only too glad if the English ruled the country, but what they fear is that they will come and then go away again, and then any one who shows them any friendliness will be killed. Several men of high standing would have liked to visit the Embassy, but were not allowed. The strictest watch was kept not to let the English fraternise with men of position and influence. I left Kabul the Saturday before the massacre. I reached Jellalabad in five days, staid there two days, and then came into Peshawur in four days. I believe the three Kabuli regiments were guilty of the massacre, and I believe the Amir knew it must take place. The Amir was very cold and distant with the Envoy lately. He showed by his face that he did not want to meet him. He got rid of him as soon as he could when he called. I believe that the Amir understood that if he did not agree to the Embassy being massacred he would himself be put out of the way. I only spoke to Dr. Kelly. I was never able to get to Major Cavagnari to speak to him."

The above was evidently all that this man could tell me, but he seemed to be well acquainted with the general feeling at Kabul, and declared that the Bazaar people and private individuals were very well inclined towards the English, but not the soldiery and officials, and he did not believe the Amir was at all on our side in reality.

No. 25.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE, 27th September 1879, to VICEROY.

REUTER reports cholera amongst troops. Is it true? Telegraph reply immediately.

No. 26.

Telegram from VICEROY, 29th September 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

Your telegram 27th. Cholera prevails generally from Rawulpindee to Jumrood only; a few cases occurred at Ali Musjid, but that place and Lundi Kotal are quite free. As troops advance beyond Jumrood they lose cholera influence.

No. 27.

No. 215 of 1879. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, October 2, 1879.

WE have the honour to forward to your Lordship, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of further papers containing detailed descriptions of the outbreak of the troops in Kabul and the attack upon the Residency. The enclosures also carry down to the present date the narrative of events attending the advance of the British forces upon the Amir's capital.

2. The most important and apparently the most trustworthy accounts of what passed on the 3rd September, and on the days immediately preceding and succeeding, are those of Timos (Taimur), of the Corps of Guides, who formed one of the Residency Guard; and of Ressaldar-Major Nakshband Khan, Sirdar Bahadur, a British pensioner, who was in Sir L. Cavagnari's employ at Kabul. These statements are now forwarded *in extenso* with this letter.

3. The postscript to our last despatch informed your Lordship that General Baker had advanced to Kushi and had encamped there with the troops under his command without any opposition. We now learn by a telegram that General Roberts arrived at the same place on the 28th ultimo with three regiments; and it is understood that his whole force, assembled yesterday at Kushi, moves forward to-day toward Kabul. The Cavalry Brigade, accompanied by General Roberts in person, advanced the day before yesterday as far as Zarghun Shahr, and was expected to reach Zahidabad, two marches from Kabul, to-day. General Roberts expresses his hope that the whole force will have arrived before the walls of the capital by Sunday, the 5th instant. Intelligence of the arrival of His Highness the Amir in General Baker's camp on the 27th September, has already been communicated to Your Lordship by telegraph. At 9 o'clock on the morning of that day General Baker received a letter from Daud Shah, the Afghan Commander-in-Chief, asking whether General Baker would receive him and the Amir's heir-apparent in camp. General Baker replied in the affirmative. An hour afterwards some special servants of the Amir arrived, inquiring whether His Highness himself, attended by 300 sowars, would be received in camp. General Baker replied that he would meet him a mile from camp. The Amir appeared at Kushi on the evening of the same day attended by his son, Sirdar Yahya Khan, Daud Shah, a suite of 45 members, including many of the most important Chiefs, and an escort of about 200 men. Shortly before this, the Mustaufi and the Wazir Shah Muhammad, who had been allowed, after several interviews, to leave General Roberts' camp, had arrived at Kushi, where they have now joined the retinue of the Amir.

4. On receipt of this news by the Government of India, General Roberts was instructed by telegram not to delay his advance, and to issue a proclamation announcing his intention to occupy Kabul. On the following day the letter of general instructions, which is forwarded to your Lordship separately by this mail, was sent to General Roberts for the guidance of his proceedings as soon as he shall have occupied the city. It was reported that the gates were closed, and that the city was in some confusion immediately after the departure of the Amir, who appears to have left without giving any public notice of his intentions; and as soon as his withdrawal became known, the people, after some fruitless appeal had been made for assistance to three regiments in Kohistan, began removing their property. Kabul was reported to be quiet on the 27th September, but we now learn that four infantry regiments have returned thither from Turkestan, which may encourage the inhabitants to resistance. Besides the persons of rank and importance who accompanied the Amir, several others, including Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan and Abdulla Khan, awaited General Roberts' arrival at Zarghun Shahr, which is 7 miles distant from Kushi, and a satisfactory interview followed. The Amir has addressed the Ghilzais and his officials forbidding opposition to the advance of our troops, and has promised assistance, transport, and supplies, which, in obedience to his orders, have been sent in.

5. Hitherto, there has been little active molestation from the tribes along either the Kurram or Khyber line of advance. There have been rumours indeed of a general rising, and a warning to this effect was received from the Amir himself before he joined the camp at Kushi. A raid by marauders upon a convoy of telegraph material was mentioned in our last despatch; and on the 27th September, General Roberts, on his

march toward the Shuturgardun was attacked by a party of Mangals and Ghilzais, whom he beat off and dispersed with loss. In this affair five sepoy of a Sikh regiment were killed, and Deputy Surgeon-General Townsend was wounded. Along the Khyber route, where at first certain circumstances seemed to point to possible opposition, the people have shown no intention, as yet, of attempting to hinder General Bright's progress. The Khan of Lalpura was informed that the Dakka fort would be required for our troops, and he returned an amicable reply. The Amir had sent orders to him, and to the Afghan officials along the Jellalabad route, that they were not to resist, but, on the contrary, to facilitate the advance of the British troops. On the 29th September, a telegram arrived from Lundikotal stating that Dakka had been occupied by the Guides without opposition, and that the Khan of Lalpura, who is devoted to the Amir's interests, had retired to Lalpura. On the 30th the road was reported to be quiet, and supplies had begun to come in. A small collection of Mohmunds who had assembled near Dakka had dispersed.

6. From Kandahar the news received is of a satisfactory character. The brigade under General Hughes, which has been detached for a reconnaissance toward Ghazni and the country of the Southern Ghilzais, left Kandahar for Kelat-i-Ghilzai on the 23rd September. Major St. John, who accompanied the force, received on the 25th September a letter from the Afghan Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai in which he expressed pleasure at the approach of the troops, and promised assistance in obtaining supplies.

7. Among the enclosures to this despatch will be found letters received from the Amir prior to his entry into the British camp at Kushi.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 22nd September 1879.

FROM GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to VICEROY, Simla.

GENERAL BAKER reports that guard escorting mails this morning between Shuturgardan and Karatiga were attacked by Ghilzais or Mangals, six men, 5th P. I., and about 20 muleteers and telegraph workmen killed, 74 mules carried off. Report received by General Baker of threatened attack on his camp. He is prepared. Allal-ud-din has sent men to Ghilzais, and hopes to keep road free from further attacks. General Baker will, however, be on the look out. 350 of 5th P. I. marched from this to-day for Karatiga escorting reserve ammunition. F-A and 12th B. C. go to-morrow.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 23rd September 1879.

FROM GENERAL DORAN, Lundikotal, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla.

HUSSEIN, Hamilton's syce, has arrived here from Kabul: he corroborates the stories of Taimur and Russul in all particulars; states that three men of the Guides, a Duffadar, and two Sowars, are safe in Chandaol and Muradkhana, suburbs of Kabul; also that the three mutinous regiments were sent to Istalif by the Amir a week after the massacre to bring three lakhs of treasure.

Simla, September 25, 1879.

Enclosure 3 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 25th September 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel.

GUIDES should reach Dakka 28th. Please request Amir to order his officials and all his subjects on route from Khyber via Jellalabad to facilitate Bright's advance. Any kind of opposition must be strictly prohibited. We have made declaration that our troops come to assist Amir and to restore authority.

Enclosure 4 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 26th September 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel.

FOLLOWING message from Lundikotal to Quartermaster-General received to-day :—
Begins.

Amir has written to his officials positively forbidding opposition to our advance.
Small collection of Mohmunds, 12 miles from Lalpura, has dispersed. Ends.

Enclosure 5 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 27th September 1879.

From GENERAL BAKER, Kushi, to VICEROY, Simla.

RECEIVED letter from Afghan Commander-in-Chief at 9 this morning, asking whether I would receive him and Amir's heir-apparent in camp. Answer sent him in affirmative. An hour afterwards Amir's special servants arrived asking whether I would receive Amir himself, attended by 300 sowars. Have sent him word to say that I will meet him a mile from camp. The Mustaufi and Wazir arrived here this morning from Ali Khel.

Enclosure 6 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 27th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Shuturguridan, to VICEROY, Simla.

The Amir, attended by his son, Sirdar Yahya Khan, Daud Shah, and suite of 45 members, with escort of about two hundred men, reached Kushi this evening. Kabul reported to be in state of disturbance, and the gates of city closed. I go to Kushi with 9th Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, and 92nd Highlanders to-morrow.

Enclosure 7 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 27th September 1879.

From MAJOR HASTINGS, Kushi, through Shuturguridan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

THERE are with the Amir, his son, Sirdar Yahya Khan, Daud Shah, Commander-in-Chief, Sirdar Ahmed Ali Jan, Haji Khanimulla Khan, Syud Ahmed, son of Fazul Mahomed of Kunar, Nesanided, (?) son of Sirdar Abdul Ghanni. Mulla Shah Mahomed and Mustaufi here in camp.

Enclosure 8 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 28th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Dobandi, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN, Habibula (?) Khan, son of the late Dost Muhammad, Abdulla Khan, son of Sultan Muhammad Khan, once Governor of Herat, and Muhammad Hakim Khan are at Zarghun Shahr waiting for me. I am now on my way to Kushi.

Enclosure 9 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 28th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kushi, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AMIR's representatives in Kabul are Sirdar Wazir Muhammad Khan, General Abdul Kerj (?) Khan, Sirdar Nur Muhammad Khan and Mirza Syud Ahmed. Amir left city, without people knowing his intention. When people found he had fled, they sent messages to the three regiments in Kohistan asking if they would help regiments; replied they could not assist at Kabul; but promised to do so in Kohistan. People are carrying off their goods from the city, and no opposition expected. Wali Muhammad and other Sirdars left city without Amir's permission. Up to noon, Saturday, all was quiet in Kabul. Amir has written Ghilzais of Spegā to desist from troubling us in the Hazar Darakht (?); he has also promised assistance, transport, supplies. I reached this to-day, and will see Amir to-morrow morning.

Enclosure 10 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 28th September 1879.

From MAJOR HASTINGS, Kushi, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR WALI MAHOMED, Hasan Khan, Mahomed Kasim (?) Khan, Habibula Khan, sons of late Dost Mahomed, Abdulla Khan, son of Sultan Mahomed Khan, once Governor of Herat, and Mahomed Hakim Khan, son of Mahomed Sharif Khan, are at Zarghun. Orders sent for them to remain there at present.

Enclosure 11 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 29th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kushi, through Shuturgurda, to VICEROY, Simla.

Reached this yesterday with 9th Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, and 92nd Highlanders. Remainder of force will arrive on 1st October, and on following day I shall advance on Kabul. Amir with Sirdars who accompanied him is in camp. Wali Muhammad Khan and other Sirdars came to-day. Weather magnificent; troops healthy; all well.

Enclosure 12 in No. 27.

Telegram; dated 30th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kushi, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

YOUR telegram of 25th, reporting advance Khyber force. Amir says, he had previously addressed Hakim of Jellalabad and Khan of Lalpura, ordering every facility to be afforded. He has now urgently repeated the offer.

Enclosure 13 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 30th September, 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kushi, through Shuturgurda, to VICEROY, Simla.

Cavalry Brigade, with two guns Horse Artillery, and two companies 72nd Highlanders, march to-day for Zarghun Shahr, accompanied by 5th Punjab Infantry, to be joined to-morrow by 23rd Pioneers with treasure and reserve ammunition. Last of Kabul Field Force left Ali Khel yesterday, will be here to-morrow. Mangals and Ghilzais who attacked us on 27th, suffered considerable loss, and are reported to have dispersed. A small party of 92nd Highlanders under Colour-Sergeant Macdonald, and of 3rd Sikhs under Jemadar Suer (?) Mahomed, a native of Kabul, did excellent service coming to close quarters with the enemy. Dismounted men of 9th Lancers and 5th Punjab Cavalry aided materially with their carbines. The Amir, and indeed all Afghans, express great astonishment at horsed guns being driven over the Shuturgurda, an extremely difficult road, which had, however, been made so good by Sappers and Pioneers under General Baker's orders, that elephants were not required. Daud Shah Khan's wounds have been dressed by Dr. Duke, who considers, were caused by bayonet or stoning, and that unconsciousness would probably result from them.

Enclosure 14 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 1st October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kushi, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Cavalry Brigade marched to Zarghun Shahr yesterday, and will be at Zahidabad to-morrow. I accompanied cavalry and met Wali Mahomed Khan and several other Sirdars, chiefly Barakzai. All professed great friendship for British Government. Supplies were forthcoming by order of Amir. Amir seems more at ease than when he first came to camp. Padshah Khan is, I think, with us; he is now with me in camp. Last of force will be here to-day, and on Sunday next the whole should be assembled in front of Kabul. Accounts are so conflicting, it is difficult to say whether there will be opposition. I am inclined to think not, but the four infantry regiments have returned from Turkestan which may induce the Kabul troops to fight.

Enclosure 15 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 27th September 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Simla.

LATEST news Kabul just given me by a servant of Sirdar Zulficar Khan, detenu in Lahore. He left Kabul day of the *Id*. Nakshband Khan had just reached his home at Kama in disguise. Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani, killed by the soldiery. Cavagnari's body recovered from ruins day before *Id*, was placed in a coffin by the Amir when informant left. The mutineers were three orderly, and not Herati regiments, and they have now been sent to Kohistan under Sirdar Wali Muhammad to collect revenue.

Family of Kazi Abdul Kadir has reached Peshawur; he has gone to Bajour.

Enclosure 16 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 27th September 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Simla.

AM in constant communication with Sadik Khan of Lalpura, who has just replied verbally that he is friendly disposed, and is awaiting orders from Kabul. He read to my messenger three letters from Amir. The first informs him of attack on Embassy, and tells him to have his tribe in readiness; second informs him of Mustaufi having gone to Kurram; third, which arrived on 24th, told him peace was made, and ordered friendly attitude to British. Amir has also written to Governor of Jellalabad not to act against us. I have informed Lalpura and Jellalabad of the advance of our troops on 28th, Dakka, 1st, Basawal, and asked for supplies and carriage. 200 Kuchi camels arrived at Peshawur yesterday. Men sent for Sangu Khel and Tirah Hindus and Afridis are sending mules. No Mohmund gathering. Plowden thinks Khyber Afridis are communicating with, and desiring to meet the Orakzai.

Enclosure 17 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 28th September 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Simla.

WARBURTON telegraphs from Lundikotal. Khan Lalpura, in reply to letter regarding evacuation of Dakka fort and movement of troops from this side, asks for two or three days' delay. Khan has evidently received no order from Kabul, telling him to help us in this movement, but merely not to interfere. Khan is devoted to Amir's interests, and will not act in opposition to them. Guides halt here this day. Sadik asks for delay to enable him to disperse 3,000 men collected there. Our messenger said none and no news of any, but Sadik has sent to the Mohmunds to collect. Am sending one more letter to Khan Lalpura. Telegram ends. In reply, have said that further communication with Sadik appears unnecessary. Advance on Dakka may be delayed to 30th.

Enclosure 18 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 28th September 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Simla.

GOVERNOR, Jellalabad, replying to my letter of the 15th September by order of the Amir, expresses great gratitude for the favour and sympathy shown to the Amir by the British Government, and says it is necessary to postpone the advance of troops until his agents with General Roberts have disposed of some points affecting the interests of both Governments. The people will appreciate this kindness to the Amir. General Gough will still advance to Basawal about 2nd.

Enclosure 19 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 29th September 1879.

From GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR SHER ALI has forwarded for perusal two letters, received 27th, from Kabul. The first from Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan who arrived at Kabul from Kandahar on the 5th September and interviewed the Amir, who stated to him that his Government had been ruined by certain wise men.

The second letter is from Roshun Dil Khan, a Kandahar Sirdar, written about 19th September. He mentions there are five persons belonging to the army who instigated the mutiny which was devised to avert an inquiry which Amir intended to make into reported thefts of large sums of money. The mutiny once commenced, the instigators were powerless to stop it.

Sirdar Sher Ali stated that the wise men and instigators of the mutiny herein referred to are Mustaufi Habibulla, Daud Shah Khan, and their adherents.

Enclosure 20 in No. 27.

No. 4, dated Camp Ali Khel, 18th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B.,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, in original and under registered cover, the letters and enclosures from the Amir, of which a précis was forwarded to you by telegram this morning.

Enclosure 21 in No. 27.

Translation of a letter from YAKUB KHAN, to GENERAL ROBERTS, dated 28th Ramazan 1296 A. H., corresponding with 16th September 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Yesterday, Monday the 27th current, a letter from Syud Jaffer Khan, an official of this Government, who was in Karshi and wrote it to the Governor of Turkestan, was received by me enclosed in one from the Naib-ul-Hukumat (Deputy Governor) of Turkestan. I have also sent the same to you, so that you may fully learn the matters contained therein.

Enclosure 22 in No. 27.

Translation of a letter from AMIR YAKUB KHAN to the address of MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, dated 28th Ramazan 1296 Hijri=(16th September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that the recent occurrence is this; that last night, Tuesday the 28th Ramazan=(16th September), couriers arrived from Herat with letters from my brother, Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, Governor of Herat. The purport of the letters is that the troops at Herat have mutinied, attacked the house of General Fakir Ahmed Khan, the Civil and Military Official of Herat, killed him, stripped, and dishonoured his family, and plundered his property. You will learn the detail of this frightful event from the three letters from Herat sent herewith

in original. But I only add that we had no trustworthy, confidential, faithful, and experienced servant like Fakir Ahmed Khan under our Government; and we had brought him up like a brother and a son. Although my brother, Muhammad Ayub

i.e. General Fakir Ahmed Khan. Khan, was called the Governor, yet the civil and military administration of Herat was entrusted to him.

At the hands of ignorant men matters have reached such a pitch that our sympathizing servant, nay in reality an obedient son, has been killed in such disgrace and dishonour. Although different and contradictory accounts of the excesses of the troops are received from Turkestan every day, yet the event of Kabul has made us forget the Turkestan disturbances, and the concurrence of Herat has served like salt that has been sprinkled on the wound of the affair at Kabul.

Yesterday, Monday, the 27th Ramazan=(15th September) a letter reached me from Turkestan which I have also sent to you with the Herat letters, so that you might thoroughly learn the true state of affairs in Herat and Turkestan.

Although the occurrence of these events has fallen hard upon me, yet in spite of all these troubles and blows, I have girded my loins with fortitude, endurance, and self-possession, and I hope that having soon through the mercy of God set right my deranged affairs and healed the wounds of my heart, I may use all my endeavours and exertions for the friendship of the illustrious Government. Please God I will fully inform you of anything that takes place hereafter. Consider me your sincere friend.

Enclosure 23 in No. 27.

Translation of a letter from SIRDAR AYUB KHAN to AMIR YAKUB KHAN without date.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—By the customary post which is leaving at this time I beg to write this short letter to inform you that on Thursday the 16th Ramazan (4th September) the Kabuli regiments having mutinied attacked General Fakir Ahmed's house, killed him, demolished his house, and dishonoured and stripped his family. I have sent you a detailed account of this occurrence by Gholam Muhammad Khan, my Peshkidmat. You will learn from (my) report the account of the event as well as of the misdemeanour of the Kandaks (troops?). Whatever orders you may think proper, please issue immediately.

Enclosure 24 in No. 27.

Translation of a letter from SIRDAR AYUB KHAN, Governor of Herat, to AMIR YAKUB KHAN, without date.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Verily it is unlawful for me to remain alive after the killing in such a manner of our faithful old servant, General Fakir Ahmed. While I am still here his body has been dragged out of his house to the city wall and cast before me. Notwithstanding that I ordered the soldiers to desist from their misdeeds; they would not listen to me. Neither did they attend to their officers, who also forbade them. It would appear that this event has occurred through the worthlessness of myself and their officers. My reputation is injured for many years to come. We have indeed lost a faithful servant in General Fakir Ahmed who at the very moment of his death exclaimed—"tender my respects to the Amir and say—'thanks be to God! I have died as a faithful servant of the God-granted kingdom, and not as a traitor.'"

Under these circumstances I conjure you by God and the soul of the late Amir to let me retire from service, as in consequence of the injury my reputation has suffered, I can no longer live in Afghanistan in company with my peers. Therefore be pleased to appoint a Governor to superintend the affairs of Herat.

Enclosure 25 in No. 27.

Translation of a letter from SIRDAR AYUB KHAN to the AMIR YAKUB KHAN, without date.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Whereas it is incumbent upon me to inform you of the events that have passed (here), I beg to state that during the early part (awal) of the holy month of Ramazan, General Fakir Ahmed Khan used to pass the nights with me, and during the days he attended to his duties and to the complaints of the people in the

* 3rd September 1879.

Durbar. On Wednesday, the 15th Ramazan,* Naib Hafizullah Khan came and stated that two sepoy of the first Ardal (?) regiment had disappeared; on a search and inquiry being made, it was found that one of them had been killed in Shewan, and I

caused the murderer, who formerly belonged to the Herat Artillery and is not now in the service, to be put in prison. On this Thursday night, the 16th Ramazan,† General Fakir Ahmed Khan was with me till dawn, when he took leave and went home. After

† 4th September 1879.

he left I went to sleep, and after an hour when I awoke, it was reported that the troops had mutinied before General Fakir Ahmed's house. I immediately rode off thither and saw that about 3 or 4,000 soldiers had mutinied and fallen on General Fakir Ahmed's house. Notwithstanding I ordered them to desist from their misdeeds, they would not listen, and every one of them said a different thing. Some said they wanted their six months' pay, and some said that General Fakir Ahmed had told the people in the country to kill the soldiers of the Kabuli regiments if they should commit any oppression or outrages in the villages; and some of them said that they had long been away from their homes, and that they misbehaved, so that they might be recalled to Kabul. In short, although the buglers sounded the assembly, they would not listen and stoned them. I called Naib Hafizullah Khan, General Taj Muhammad Khan, and the other officers, so that they should forbid them. They forbade them, but in vain. General Taj Muhammad Khan then told me that it was no use my standing in the sun, and that as they (soldiers) had demolished and plundered General Fakir Ahmed's house, and he himself had gone to Char Bagh, I had better go to the new Ark (fort) and sound the bugle of assembly, perhaps the soldiers might assemble. Accordingly I went to the new Ark and sounded the assembly, but not a single man made his appearance. When I came to the Hissar Fort, I found General Fakir Ahmed lying dead there. He had received many wounds, and his body was brought and thrown at the steps of the Hissar, and his house had been plundered and his family stripped. Naib Hafizullah Khan was going to shoot himself, and had once made up his mind to throw himself down from his balcony. General Taj Muhammad Khan was also going to kill himself, but was not let to do so. I was greatly grieved at the conduct of the troops, and returned to Char Bagh. On account of this occurrence I am unable to write. I have complained and written to you about the misdeeds of these troops, and asked you to recall them (to Kabul). You have not listened to my petition, and so it has led to this great disturbance. I again request you to recall them. Should you not do so soon, they will destroy the lives and property of the people of Herat, as they neither listened to me nor to their officers, especially the 1st and 2nd Ardal regiments. Further, you are at liberty to do as you like. Sirdar Abdulla Khan has written from Maimeneh that the Herati troops have shown signs of mutiny (be-it-i-dali). I had sent Gholam Muhammad Khan, Peshkidmat, with letters to Maimeneh, in the hope that the people there might settle down, but this produced no effect. Gholam Muhammad Khan has returned with letters from Maimeneh, which I send in original. He will represent other matters verbally. I hope you will soon dismiss the bearer with a reply.

Enclosure 26 in No. 27.

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B.,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy, English copies of (I) the letter to the Amir from his Excellency the Viceroy, (II) the proclamation issued by me to the tribes, (III) a letter from me to the Logar Maliks; also Persian copies of the letter from his Excellency the Viceroy to the Amir, and my letter to the Logar Maliks.

2. Up to the present no reply has been received from the Amir to his Excellency the Viceroy's letter. Copies of the proclamation to the tribes and my letter to the Logar Maliks have been forwarded to the Amir, with the intention of keeping him acquainted with all that is being done. Copies in English (IV) and Persian of my letter to the Amir, forwarding copies of the proclamation to the tribes, and my letter to the Logar Maliks are also herewith forwarded.

Enclosure 27 in No. 27.

No. I.

Copy of Letter to His Highness the AMIR, dated 13th September 1879, corresponding to 25th Ramazán, in accordance with Telegraphic Communications from FOREIGN SECRETARY, dated 12th September 1879.

I AM directed by his Excellency to inform you that, according to the Treaty concluded in May this year between the British and Afghan Governments, with which you expressed yourself entirely satisfied, you agreed to receive a British Resident, who, at your special request was placed at Kabul, and to be personally, safely, and honourably treated, your Highness guaranteeing this. Within six weeks of the Envoy's reception at Kabul, the whole Embassy was surrounded and murdered in your Highness' own Fort, and your Highness has failed to protect the Envoy from your Highness' own soldiers and people; from this your Highness' present powerlessness to fulfil your engagements, and the loss of your Highness' authority in your own capital, are thus clearly proved. For this reason the British army is sent to superintend retribution for the murders, and to ensure the execution of engagements made. The army enters Afghanistan to support your Highness' authority, if your Highness is ready to use it loyally for maintenance of our alliance. This is the only thing that can now preserve the integrity of your Highness' kingdom, and prove the friendship and honesty of purpose declared in your Highness' letter of the 4th September 1879. We hear emissaries have been sent from Kabul to excite the tribes against us, which is of course incompatible with our alliance. Your Highness is requested to send without delay a confidential representative to meet me, as I have full power to communicate with your Highness on the part of the British Government.

Enclosure 28 in No. 27.

No. II.

Copy of Proclamation issued by MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C.

BE it known to high and low, subjects and dependants of Kabul, and others, that by Treaty concluded in May 1879, with which Treaty His Highness the Amir expressed himself entirely satisfied, he agreed to receive a British Resident, who, at his own special request was placed at Kabul, and was to be personally safely and honourably treated. This was guaranteed by His Highness the Amir. Within six weeks of the Envoy's reception at Kabul, the whole Embassy was surrounded and murdered in the Amir's own Fort, and His Highness failed to protect the Envoy from his own soldiers and people.

His Highness the Amir's present powerlessness to fulfil his engagement and the loss of authority in his own capital are thus clearly proved. For this reason the British army is sent to exact retribution for the murders and to ensure the execution of the engagements made.

The army enters Afghanistan to support His Highness' authority, if His Highness is ready to use it loyally for the maintenance of the British alliance. This is the only way by which the integrity of His Highness' kingdom can now be preserved, and the friendship and honesty of purpose declared in His Highness' letter of 4th September. To clear up all doubt, His Highness has been requested to send without delay a confidential representative to my camp.

The army will not punish or oppress any but those concerned in the late massacre so long as no opposition is offered; all others should rest assured. Carriage and supplies of all kinds should be supplied wherever the British troops may be. Adequate payment and hire for everything received will be made. As mercy is the prerogative of sovereignty, notice is hereby given beforehand.

Enclosure 29 in No. 27.

No. III.

Copy of a Letter from MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., to certain MALIKS of Logar Valley.

FROM the proclamation already issued by me, you will have learnt the reasons for the march of the British troops to Kabul. Her Majesty's Government, by the move-

ment of troops, intends to exact retribution for the massacre of Her Embassy and to aid His Highness the Amir in restoring order.

Let all those not concerned in the massacre rest assured, provided no opposition is shown.

His Highness the Amir, in communications received by me, expresses his friendship and wishes to continue friendly relations.

As the British troops under my command will shortly enter the Logar Valley, I write to assure you, and expect that you will inform all the residents of the valley not concerned in the late hateful massacre, the purport of the proclamation, and give every assistance in providing carriage and supplies required for the troops, for which adequate hire and payment will be made.

I hope that after the above assurance all the headmen will come to meet me in my camp, where I shall be glad to see them.

Enclosure 30 in No. 27.

No. IV.

Copy of a Letter from MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., to His Highness the AMIR, dated 18th September 1879.

AFTER the usual compliments. Your Highness' letter of the 28th Ramazán, with the enclosures from Herat and Turkestan, reached me last night. I have acquainted myself with the contents. I am glad to find your Highness is in good health, but sorry to hear of the unfortunate disturbances in your Highness' dominions. Your Highness' letter in original, has been sent with enclosures to his Excellency the Viceroy. I have already informed your Highness of the wishes of his Excellency the Viceroy, the reasons for the movements of the British troops, and requested your Highness to send a confidential representative to my camp. I am awaiting a reply to that letter and the arrival of your Highness' confidential representative.

In the meantime I have sent a proclamation to the tribes and letters to some of the Logar Maliks, your Highness' subjects, to assure those not concerned in the hateful massacre, and asking them for assistance in carriage and supplies on payment. As it appears to me proper I should inform your Highness of what I have done, I enclose copies of the proclamation to the tribes and of my letter to the Logar Maliks, and hope that your Highness may also issue necessary orders for the furtherance of our plans.

Rest assured of the Government support.

Enclosure 31 in No. 27.

Dated Camp Ali Khel, 19th September 1879.

From MAJOR E. G. HASTINGS, Political Officer, Kurram Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN accordance with General Roberts' instructions I have the honour to forward:—

Statement of Ali Hasan, son of Naib Kasim, Kotwal of Kabul, Kazalbash of Chandawal, taken by Mr. Christie.

Enclosure 32 in No. 27. (Extract.)

Statement of ALI HASAN, son of Naib Kasim, Kotwal of Kabul, Kazalbash of Chandawal, dated 16th September 1879.

I was in Kabul when Sir Louis Cavagnari arrived. He was received by the Amir with every sign of respect. For three days the Envoy used to ride about the city and visit all objects of interest in the neighbourhood. He was everywhere treated with respect and invariably saluted by the Amir's troops. The Envoy used to be accompanied only by a few orderly sowars, and the Amir represented that it would be better if he confined his visits to the *chaman*, or open plain, where he would meet with fewer people and be in less danger. This warning of the Amir was known all over the city, and the Envoy listened to it. One day an Afridi orderly of the Envoy's (probably Amal Din, an old and trusted orderly of Sir L. Cavagnari) had a quarrel in the city

with two of the Amir's sepoys. The matter came to the ears of the Envoy, who rewarded his orderly, while the two sepoys were imprisoned by the Amir. This created feelings of anger in the minds of the people and the troops.

The Amir next ordered that his Sirdars and officers, with a few exceptions, were not to visit the Envoy. The exceptions were Mullah Shah Muhammad, Mustaufi Habibula, and General Daud Shah, who continued to visit the Envoy regularly.

On 3rd September (15th Ramazan), the three orderly regiments of the Amir were assembled without their arms in the Bala Hissar to receive their pay. Their chief officers were Brigadier Taj Muhammad Khan and Colonel Din Muhammad Khan. The Amir had given orders that they were to receive only one month's pay. They demanded more. Generals Daud Shah and Kharim Khan, who were distributing the pay, said, "If you want more pay go to your *shuezan* (i.e., your wife's lover) Cavagnari." On this some stones were thrown. Daud Shah ran away, and was slightly wounded with a spear. The Amir's pay office was then looted, his papers torn up, and his munshis maltreated; and the troops ran to the *chaman* or plain, where they were encamped, and, returning with their arms, proceeded direct to the Residency. They found the door of the compound—there was only one—firmly closed, and the residents employed in making loopholes. Sir Louis Cavagnari, on seeing the troops assembled, ordered all the Residency horses who were picketed outside to be shot, lest they should come into the hands of the mutineers. This was done. The mutineers then brought up a gun to fire on the door, while another was directed on the walls of the building. As soon as a breach was made, 300 sepoys of the Balkh regiments, who had been two days before recalled from leave, rushed in, and, according to some accounts, set fire to the building; others say that the residents themselves set it on fire.

Meantime, thousands of the city people had collected to share in the spoil, and more breaches had been made in the wall; the door, too, was forced open, and the crowd rushed in. The residents, harassed by the fire of troops above them, and by the fire and smoke of the burning building, took shelter all together in another place. Meantime the flames were spreading, and the roof under which the residents were sheltered fell in, and all who had escaped hitherto were buried in the ruins. This was about 2 o'clock, the affair having commenced about 8 a.m. Little or no spoil came into the hands of the attackers; all was completely burnt or ruined by the fire. The people then began to carry away their dead, of whom there were a great many, from the compound and the neighbourhood. I myself helped to carry away the body of a well-known Fakir Buzurg Shah, who had been for nearly two hours inciting the people to kill the infidels, and calling out that he was going to paradise.

When all was over at the Residency, the crowd rushed to the house of General Khisrao close by, where all the uniform for the Amir's troops was stored, and a number of swords and other weapons. These were all carried off. There was then a talk of looting the magazine in the Upper Bala Hissar where there were two other regiments. Daud Shah, who had taken refuge near here, called to these two regiments to allow no further looting. They replied that the troops and people were their brothers, and they would do nothing. The magazine, however, was not looted. The people abstained of their own accord. The people talked of attacking Yakub Khan, but the troops intervened, saying that he was their Amir and must not be touched.

After this for three days the shops remained closed, and the owners kept guard over their property. No further looting, however, occurred. Meantime, the doors of the palace were closed, and the Amir did not come outside. After three days, at the advice of his Sirdars, he took his seat in the balcony over the door, and sent his own son to the three regiments, who had first mutinied, to ask what their wishes were. They said that they only wanted three months' pay. The Amir sent their pay by the Mustaufi, and also sent two guns, saying that these three regiments might go and collect the revenue of Kohistan and take it themselves in addition to their pay. The regiments marched as far as the Chaman-i-rah-i-Khwaja Rawash, where they encamped, and, dismissing their officers, chose as their leaders men of their own tribe. They remained in camp for two days, when they returned to the city and applied for permission to return to their homes with their arms. No answer had been given when I left. After the third day the Amir called together his Sirdars, officers and chief men of the city, and said that, if they wished for a jihad, he was with them, and would do what they wished. He was obliged, for fear of his life, to say this. His wish throughout had been that the Envoy should, through fear, voluntarily leave the city, but he wished that the pressure should be put on him by the people or by independent tribes, and not by his troops.

Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani, is in Kabul; he is strongly advising the Amir to send his family to Kohistan. This he has consented to do, and all arrangements have been made. Camels have been sent for from Kohistan, but had not arrived when I left.

The residents of the Bala Hissar, where there are some 3,000 houses, have sent all their property to the city, and the city people are all busily engaged in burying their property. They are afraid to take it out of Kabul for fear of being looted.

The Amir has sent for the troops who had started for Balkh, and is recalling all soldiers from furlough.

Before this disturbance in Kabul, three regiments in Zurmat had mutinied for their pay, and expelled and wounded their commanding officer. I don't know how many regiments were concerned in the late disturbance, but there were as many people, soldiers, and others as could crowd together near the place. There was an idea that there was a vast amount of property stored in the Residency. When I left, there was a guard over the place, and the ruins were still smouldering and too hot to be disturbed. All the bodies, mutineers, and others, who have been found have been buried; but there are still a great number under the ruins.

The Amir is endeavouring, by exciting people to a jihad, to regain his influence with the people; but it is known that he has sent letters to the British authorities, and he is accordingly regarded with suspicion.

Note.—Informant appears to be speaking the truth; his confession that he was himself on the spot strengthens the belief in his story. I have not arrested him, as, if he is only one of many thousands, his punishment would be of little use, and might create distrust in the minds of the people of Kabul generally, who were all, like himself, collected in hopes of sharing in the spoil.

Enclosure 33 in No. 27.

Dated, Camp Ali Khel, 19th September 1879.

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRÉDÉRIC ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding the Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your perusal, (a) the depositions of two Guide sowars of the late Envoy's escort, who took refuge with their co-religionists, the Kazalbashes, given safe conduct from Kabul by Padshah Khan, and brought into this camp by his uncle Sirkai Khan; (b) a letter in original, brought by Sirdar Bahadur Ghulam Nakshband Khan from Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, in whose house he had taken shelter when the late outbreak took place.

Enclosure 34 in No. 27.

Statement of AKBAR SHAH, Kazalbash of Murad Khana (Kabul), B. Troop, Guide Cavalry, escaped from Kabul disaster, dated Ali Khel, 17th September 1879.

ON the day of the mutiny, I and Duffadar Futteh Muhammad Khan and a Sikh trooper Narain Sing, with 25 grass-cutters, were out for grass. Lieutenant Hamilton had come a little way with us to look for good grass, and also Dr. Kelly. They turned back after coming about $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile to the chaman, and returned to the Residency. Presently we heard sounds of firing from the Residency. We at once returned, and were met near the Embassy by a crowd who threatened and tried to capture us. We managed to get away and take refuge with Naibs Nur Muhammad and Rahim Khan, Kazalbashes, in the Murad Khana. The Sikh was secretly removed to a "dhurmsala" in the city. As soon as the mutineers discovered our whereabouts, they surrounded the quarter, and demanded we should be given up; but our fellow-tribesmen stood by us, and refused to surrender us; on which the mutineers, seeing it was useless, desisted. We remained in Kabul for 10 days, and Sirdar Yahya Khan and Padshah Khan arranged with the Kazalbash Maliks above mentioned for our safe conduct. We were accordingly made over to Sirkai Khan, Padshah Khan's uncle, to whose house we were first removed, and then came away at night. At Dobandi, we were threatened by a Malik, who obliged us to leave the high road, and we then came round by Kundao to Rasim Khel by a difficult footpath over the mountains.

As regards the defence of the Residency, the Sahibs, finding the place untenable, at last set fire to it, and retreated to a "hammám," from which Lieutenant Hamilton and a few men sallied out no less than three times, killing and wounding a number each time; at last he was shot near a gun he had tried to take. Mr. Jenkyns was killed in a doorway. The Envoy, being wounded on the forehead by a bullet when on the roof, was carried downstairs, and attended to. He dictated a letter to the Amir, which was taken by one Gholam Nabi, a Kabul chuprassie, brother of Muhammad Sharif of the Guides. The bearer got a reply promising help, but could not carry it back into the Residency, which was completely surrounded. Another (verbal) message was afterwards sent by one Taimūs, a Guide sowar (Saddozai), who, however, was thrown down over the wall, and became insensible. He was kept prisoner a day, and then released for extracting a bullet from one of the mutineers' shoulder.

I had the above account from Taimūs and Gholam Nabi.

I do not believe the Amir instigated the revolt. It was the soldiery who wanted their pay. They mutinied nearly all together, and the Amir was powerless to prevent. Yahya Khan, Barakzai, and father-in-law of the Amir's, also the heir-apparent, also the son of Shahghassi Muhammad Yusaf, were sent out with the Koran to quell the row, but could not. Had the Amir called us, Kazalbashes, out, we would have fought the mutineers and saved the Embassy. Abdul Karim Khan, General or Brigadier, of the three "ordul" regiments, incited the troops to go to the Envoy and demand redress. Another Abdul Karim, Kohistani, was killed by the Amir, because two out of the three mutinous regiments were mostly Kohistanis. This has raised the Kohistanis, who refuse to give up some of the Amir's camels out grazing with theirs, or to pay any revenue.

Twenty-two out of twenty-five grass-cutters were saved by one Ibrahim Khan, a Colonel Commanding an Afghan Cavalry Regiment, and a pensioner of the British Government, having been in service with one of the Bengal Cavalry regiments as Wurd-Major. The Cavalry did not join in the mutiny, but turned out ready to obey any orders sent. A few of the artillery served the guns, which helped to batter down the gateway of Residency.

Enclosure 35 in No. 27.

STATEMENT OF FUTTEH MUHAMMAD, son of Muhammad Jan, Pharsiwan, resident of Kabul, Kote Duffadar, 2nd Troop (Q.O.) Guide Cavalry, dated 17th September 1879.

ON the day of the massacre, he, Akbar Shah (2nd Troop), and Narain Sing (4th Troop), were on duty with the grass-cutters of the escort. The grass-cutters had had only commenced going out to cut grass from the 1st. Up to that date, grass and bhussa had been provided by the Amir.

Lieutenant Hamilton wished the grass to be cut from the *chaman* (uncultivated grazing land) near Bini Hissar, and had ridden out with him in the morning to see if it was possible. It was feared that if grass was cut near the crops, they might be damaged by the grass-cutters. Lieutenant Hamilton, after seeing the uncultivated grazing land, agreed with him that it would be better to cut the grass near the *khets*, and gave orders that it was to be done.

There were 25 grass-cutters and 4 sowars of the Amir with him.

About an hour after Lieutenant Hamilton and Dr. Kelly, who had also ridden out with Lieutenant Hamilton, had left, he heard firing, and from its continuance, began to suspect there was a fight going on. (He was not surprised, as there was a very strong feeling against both the Amir and Sir Louis Cavagnari since the arrival of the six regiments from Herat, more than a month ago. They were angry with the Amir for having allowed the Embassy to come to Kabul, and expressed it openly. He mentioned about the feeling there was to Lieutenant Hamilton and Major Cavagnari; the latter said the Amir is our friend, it does not matter.) As soon as he had satisfied himself that there was a disturbance (*bulwa*) going on, and that it appeared to be against the Residency, the top of which was covered with people, (as a rule it was closed and never used because it overlooked other houses), he told the Amir's sowars to escort the grass-cutters to a cavalry regiment not far off, and started with the two Guide sowars and two grass-cutters (one a sowar and the other Dr. Kelly's) for the city. They failed to get to the Bala Hissar, as it was surrounded, but managed to reach Sirdar Yahya

Khan's fort just outside the city. Before they reached Yahya Khan's the Amir's sowars who had been with them on the grass-cutters' guard, came up, and wanted to kill Narain Sing, the Sikh sowar. They went so far as to take his sword; but on his and Akbar Shah showing that they would not permit him to be interfered with as far as in their power lay, he was allowed to come on and his tulwar returned. There were some Kazalbashes* at Yahya Khan's who offered to give them shelter, and be responsible for their safety; so they went with them to Murad Khana (a portion of the city occupied by Pharsiwans).

* Men of their own tribe.

(Signed) E. G. H.

The night of the massacre they were joined by Gholam Nabi, an Embassy chupprassi entertained in Kabul by Sir Louis Cavagnari. He was formerly in the Guides, and is a brother of the present Wurdi-Major of the Guides, by name Muhammad Sharif Khan. He is also a Kazalbash. Akbar Shah, the other Guide sowar, is a Kazalbash Sayud. The next night they were joined by Taimus, a Shazada of the Sadozai division, a sowar in the Guides, and one of the Envoy's escort. He had been kept a prisoner by one of the mutinous regiments, but was released for extracting a bullet from a Havildar's arm. All the grass-cutters (but two) out with him were saved. A Peshawuri chupprassi, Sir Louis' bearer, his washerman and a baker escaped from the Bala Hissar. He has heard that a sepoy of the Guides, one of the escort, who was on leave in Kohistan is also alive. The sepoy is a Ghilzai by tribe. Two carbines (snider), one sword, two pouches and belts belonging to himself and Narain Sing are with Afzal Khan, Kazalbash, a Khan. He has asked Yahya Khan to get them back. He does not think the Amir was implicated in the massacre, but he failed after the outbreak to save the Sahibs; he should have called out the Kazalbashes; they were ready to respond. The sooner the army reaches Kabul, the better. No preparations to oppose a force have been made, and the Amir himself is in a state of siege. Kazalbash sentries are on all the gates. The three first mutinous regiments (Kohistanis) were sent by the Amir to Kohistan. There are nine regiments in Kabul; there were four cavalry regiments, three have been disbanded, as the Amir had no money to pay them. There are plenty of guns in Kabul (50 or more), but there are no cattle to drag them.

Gholam Nabi, chupprassi, has the letter from the Amir in reply to the Envoy's request for help.

Sirdar Wali Muhammad was in his own house in the Bala Hissar during the attack. He was sent for by the Amir after the massacre, and has since been in communication with him.

They owe their safety to Colonel Ibrahim Khan, a son of Naib Sharif's. Colonel Ibrahim Khan is a pensioner of the British Government and in the Amir's employ.

When the Embassy first came, the people were pleased, as they expected reforms of all kinds.

Taken before me, 17th September 1879.

(Signed) E. G. HASTINGS, Major,
Political Officer.

Enclosure 36 in No. 27.

Translation of a Letter from SIRDARS WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN and IBRAHIM KHAN to the address of GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., without date.

Be it known to you that the state of affairs in these quarters is such that can neither be stated nor written. Please God when the worthy Sirdar obtains the honour of waiting upon you, he will represent the true state of affairs. Usual ending.

Enclosure 37 in No. 27.

No. 7, dated Camp Ali Khel, 21st September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding the Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, the following papers:—
Depositions of Ressaldar-Major Nakshband Khan Sirdar Bahadur.

Translation of letter from Kazi Abdul Rahman to Nawab Sir Gholam Hussan Khan, K.C.S.I.

Information by Ressaldar Bahawul-din, 11th Bengal Cavalry.

Enclosure 38 in No. 27.

Deposition of RESSALDAR-MAJOR NAKSHBAND KHAN, SIRDAR BAHADUR, dated Ali Khel, 19th September 1879.

I LEFT Aoshahr, a place about one kos from the city of Kabul, at about 7.30 p.m. on the 17th day of the current month.

Some two or three days after the arrival of Sir Louis Cavagnari and the Mission, six regiments of infantry arrived from Herat; they encamped for three days at Debori, about one kos distant from Kabul; on the morning of the fourth day after their arrival, they marched in order through the principal streets of the city headed by their officers and with bands playing. While marching along they shouted out, abusing the Envoy by name, asking, "Why has he come here?" &c. They also abused all the Kazalbashis, saying, that they were not men, and that they (the Herat soldiers) would show them how to act, that they would soon put an end to Cavagnari. They then marched out of the city to their camp at Sherpur. The residents of the city said nothing to them; they appeared neither pleased at what was going on, or the reverse. I was present when this took place, and at once took the news of what was going on to the Envoy, who said, "Never fear, keep up your heart, dogs that bark don't bite." I said, "These dogs do bite, and there is real danger." The Envoy said, "They can only kill the three or four of us here, and our death will be avenged." I then went to Mr. Jenkyns and told him what I had heard and seen. He asked me whether I had been to the Envoy, and if so, what he had said about it. I told him what had passed, and Mr. Jenkyns said, "What the Envoy says is very true, the British Government will not suffer from losing the three or four of us here."

A day or two after this three Herat regiments were all paid up most of their arrears of pay, and were given forty (40) days' leave to visit their homes. At this time cholera was raging violently; about (150) one hundred and fifty men out of their number died in one day, and the men dispersed to their homes in a fright, placing their arms in the Balar Hissar; they did not even wait for their leave certificates. Up till date none of these troops have returned; in my opinion the greater part of them will not rejoin, though some of them may do so. The Commander-in-Chief (Sipah Salar) Daud Shah was present when the troops marched through the city as above mentioned, and was also abused by them. He did not reply at all. Some of my own countrymen (Jellalabad men) were serving in these regiments. On my asking them what the meaning of all this was, they answered, "Do you think soldiers would have acted thus without orders; we were ordered to act as we did by our officers, and to shout out as we marched along."

I called up a well-to-do Hindu, Hira by name; his son is a servant of Sirdar Ibrahim Khan (the elder brother of Yakub Khan). Hira knows the ins and outs of what goes on in the houses of the great men; he had been to see the Envoy twice before. I called him up and sent him to report to the Envoy; he went towards the Residency for that purpose; he came back to me, and told me that the Amir's sentry would not let him pass and stoned him. I reported this to the Envoy, who said, "It is untrue; the man lies." The next morning another man endeavoured to get speech of the Envoy: this man was also stopped by the sentry. I don't know who this man was, but I reported this also to the Envoy, and asked him, "What is the use of your being kept like a prisoner, and no one allowed to come near you!" He answered, "I will have that sentry removed." A day or two after this that sentry was removed by the Envoy's order. Lieutenant Hamilton was sent to order the sentry's removal, which was accordingly done. I heard that the Amir was very angry at the removal of that sentry. A day or two after this, the Amir asked me whether I knew what the Amir's intention was, "to travel with me to the frontier as he had engaged to do at Gandamak, or whether he intended not to go." When the Envoy asked me about the Amir's intentions as to his proposed journey with me round the frontier, I replied, "He will not go; he has made

"no preparations for it at all. If you wish to make further inquiries, call the Mustaufi 'Habibulla Khan.'" The Envoy ordered me to call him. I went to the Mustaufi who said, "I am not well to-day. I will go to-morrow; give the Sahib my salaam." I went to the Mustaufi the next day at 10 a.m. to call him as he had promised to be with the Envoy at 8 a.m. The Mustaufi went to the Amir, and stated that the Envoy had called him. The Amir gave him permission to go, but said, "Don't go alone, take 'Shah Muhammad the Wazir with you.'" They both accompanied me to the presence of the Envoy, who made the three of us sit down, and entered into conversation. He then said to them that he had heard that the Amir was not treating well the Sirdars who had accompanied him (the Envoy), that he had stopped giving them the income they were entitled to, and which the Amir's father had given them regularly, that they had nothing to live upon, and would suffer from the want of it. That the British Government would not let them be the losers, and would pay their allowances if the Amir refused to do so, and that the Amir would not be pleased at this. The Mustaufi said, "He was unaware that this was the case, that he would mention it to the Amir, and say that if this was the case it was not proper." The Envoy then asked the Mustaufi, "Whether it was the Amir's intention to travel with him as he had promised or not?" Both the Mustaufi and the Wazir said, "He cannot go this year, because the country is unsettled, but he will go next year." The Envoy said, "Very well." He then asked them, "Whether the Amir intended to go to meet the Viceroy in India?" The Mustaufi said, "Yes, he will go about December." The Envoy said to them, "Ask the Amir again about this." They said, "We will ask him." The Envoy then dismissed them, and asked me my opinion as to whether the Amir intended to go to India or not. I answered, "No; he has thrown up the idea of going on this tour with you, and he does not intend going to the Durbar." I heard shortly afterwards from a friend of mine, that he had heard from a friend of his, who was present at the time, that on the Mustaufi leaving the Envoy they went straight to the Amir and mentioned what had taken place at the interview. The Amir was very angry. The Mustaufi said "Why are you angry?" "If you do not give these men anything, and the British Government gives nothing to them either, they will suffer from actual want." The Amir then asked Daud Shah what he thought of it. Daud Shah answered, "I am a soldier. I don't understand this sort of thing. I think that the promises made with the British Government at Gandamak ought to be carried out." The Amir answered, "This country is Afghanistan; we cannot get on here without practising deceit." On this, Naib Lall Muhammad (Farash Bashi) said, "If this is true what you say that Afghanistan cannot be managed without practising deceit (fareb), then we may look upon Afghanistan as on the way to ruin; it will go out of our hands." The Amir made no reply. On hearing all this, I reported it to Cavagnari, who said, "The Amir can do as he likes." (This took place some 8 or 10 days before the 3rd of September.)

About three days after this, the Envoy said—"I will go and call on the Amir to-morrow." When I went to the Amir's Durbar the next day, I saw the Envoy sitting alone with the Amir; when he returned to the Residency, I came to speak to him. He told me that "he had a private interview with the Amir which lasted two hours." That the expression of the Amir's face was a pleased one, that it was the same expression that he had seen him wearing at Gandamak. On the 2nd September the Envoy told me that he had asked Shah Muhammad to secure a house for Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan somewhere in the Bala Hissar but away from the Residency: this Shah Muhammad had refused to do so, the Envoy asked me to look out for one for him either in the city or Kazalbash quarter, or some other place than the Residency grounds. I had selected one, and was coming towards the Residency the next morning at 7 o'clock to report having done so. On arriving at the gate of the Bala Hissar, I heard a report that Daud Shah had been killed by some men of a regiment. I went on and saw three regiments and a few bazaar people going towards the Envoy's quarters. I followed them with two of my own retainers. Some of the men of one of the regiments recognized me, and said, "Kill him, he is Cavagnari's father;" they were unarmed as a rule, some of them had side arms. Two men attacked me with sticks, one struck me on the shoulder, and another struck my horse, which reared and turned round. I found I could not go to the Envoy, so I went up a bye street to Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan's house, and leaving my horse in his stable I went inside the house, where I found Wali Muhammad who was taking his bath (Hamam). I called out to him to come out. He did so, and said, "What is the matter?" I said, "Men have gone up to kill Cavagnari." He said, "Don't stay below, go upstairs." I went upstairs, and from there, 200 yards off

through a window, I saw all these people go up to the Envoy's stables and begin stoning the syces and undoing the horses and plundering; some went on to where the Sowars' horses were and began to stone them and begin to plunder, and unfasten the horses; the Sowars armed immediately, and I then heard two or three shots evidently fired by the Sowars. I cannot tell whether any damage was done by these shots, but they all retired at once, and some two hundred of them went to the upper part of the Bala Hissar to fetch their arms, and the rest of the soldiers going out by the Shah Shahie gate of the Bala Hissar to fetch their arms from their Camp.

I heard that when the men had gone to fetch their arms, the Envoy wrote a letter to the Amir and sent it to him by a chaprassi. I heard that this letter reached the Amir, but did not hear whether he sent any reply or not. Had the Amir wished to assist the Envoy, why did he not send 100 men to guard each gate so as to prevent the return of these men with their arms?

In about half an hour's time, at 7.30 or 8 a.m., the soldiers returned with their arms and a regular fight began. Firing went on without intermission on both sides, the Afghan soldiers had capital cover and surrounded the Residency on all sides. The officers of the Afghans directed their men; they had looted the magazine of the Upper Bala Hissar and had plenty of ammunition with them. All the clothing, stores, treasury and other store-houses are near the Residency. The store-houses were looted; they attacked the treasure, but were stopped by the regiment or guard there. This regiment was I suppose about 500 strong, and remained at the treasury all day. The Amir's house is about 250 yards from that of the Envoy. Besides the regiment on duty at the treasury, I suppose there were some 2,000 followers of the Amir who had come into the Bala Hissar early that morning who were all round the Amir's house. They were all armed; none of them joined the attacking party in the morning, though some of them did so at about 2 p.m. I hear that the Amir several times said, "Some of you go to the Envoy's assistance," but whenever any did go towards where the fighting was going on, they only shouted out, "Kill, kill." This is only hearsay.

At about 9 a.m., while the fighting was going on, I myself saw the four European officers charge out at the head of some 25 of the garrison; they drove away a party that were holding some broken ground. When charged the Afghan soldiers ran like sheep before a wolf. About a quarter of an hour after this another sally was made by a party with three officers at their head—Cavagnari was not with them this time,—with the same result. A third sally was made with two British officers (Jenkyns and Hamilton) leading; a fourth sally was made with a Sikh Jemadar bravely leading. No more sallies were made after this. They all appeared to go up to the upper part of the house and fired from above. At about half-past 11 o'clock part of the building in which the Embassy was, was noticed to be on fire. I do not know who fired it. I think it probable that the defenders finding themselves so few fired part, so as to have a less space to defend. The firing went on continuously all day; perhaps it was hottest from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m., after which it slackened, and the last shots were fired at about 8.30 p.m. or 9 p.m., after which all was quiet, and every one dispersed. The next morning I heard shots being fired. I asked an old woman to whose house I had been sent for safety by Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, what this was; she sent out her son to find out, he said, "They are shooting the people found still alive in the Residency."

The whole of that day the dead bodies stripped remained in the Residency. On the next day I hear that the bodies of all Mahomedans, Hindus, and the two British officers, Hamilton and Dr. Kelly, were all thrown together into a place dug for the purpose. I hear that the body of Mr. Jenkyns was taken to the Amir. I know nothing more about it. Cavagnari's body was not found. I am of the opinion that it must have been burnt in the house. I heard that on the 4th, the soldiers found some money in the Residency. On hearing this the Amir posted sentries over the house, and on the 5th, caused the bodies to be buried, and from other money he found there, he paid each sepoy of the regiment that had guarded the treasury a present of seven rupees per man.

I asked Wali Muhammad Khan to send me to some safe place; he gave me three ponies. I dressed as a grass-cutter, and with one grass-cutter riding one pony in front and the second behind me with the other pony we got safely to Aoshahr, where I remained in hiding about nine days; when hearing that the British force was on the Shuturguridan I travelled by night and reached that place in safety and reported myself to the Brigadier-General Commanding there.

On or about the 13th or 14th September the man in whose house I was concealed came to his home and stated the following facts:—He said the Amir called up the Sirdars of every clan, the Ghilzais, Kohistanis, Kabulis, Kazalbashis, Tajiks, &c., and asked them whether they intended to join in the "Ghaza" or religious war to fight the British, and if so, he requested that he would send their families to Kohistan and Ghilzai country, or some other place out of the way; they answered; "We are not going to send away our families let the Ghilzais bring their families to Kabul, and we will then fight."

The Amir at this reply was very angry and abused Zainulabundin, the man that had collected all the Sirdars together, and had said that they would agree to fight.

Abdul Karim Khan, Safi, the most powerful man in Kohistan, and a friend of the late Envoy's, was cut into small pieces by order of the Amir about ten days ago, the Amir fearing that he would probably seize him and make him over to the British in case he wished to fly to Balkh or Kohistan.

Malik Hamid, Ghilzai, Khan Muhammad Khan, Ghilzai, Nyaz Muhammad Khan, Ghilzai, were all called by the Amir the day after Abdul Karim Khan had been killed, and said "Cavagnari made you all over to me, and I have done nothing to you; now you must swear on the Koran never to go again to the English, and you must join in a religious war against them." They agreed to do as he ordered. When I left Kabul the troops consisted of—

One cavalry regiment "Sharuk Walla," stationed at Kabul.

" " " Colonel Ghulam Hyder, stationed in Zurmat.

Seven infantry regiments, in Kabul.

Three infantry regiments, 14 guns, stationed in Ghazni.

Six infantry regiments, 24 guns, sent to Turkestan. I hear that they have been recalled, but do not know whether they have arrived.

There are a great number of guns in position in the Bala Hissar, but very few gunners.

The walls of the Bala Hissar are of no use for defence. There are some three or four places which men can scale easily.

Some 200 or 300 irregular troops, infantry, are in Kabul but no irregular cavalry.

On or about the 13th of this month three cavalry regiments asked for pay and were disbanded by the Amir after they had deposited their arms.

The Sirdars who are for the British and not for the Amir are—

Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan.

" Ibrahim Khan.

" Ahmad Ali Jan.

" Muhammad Sarwar Khan.

" " Sadik Khan.

" " Hashim Khan.

" " Karim Khan.

" Abdul Rusul Khan.

" Muhammad Hussan Khan, &c., &c., &c.

On my faith I believe that Yakub Khan stands alone, and that those Sirdars who are outwardly for him are so only through fear, and, when the British advance, will all come over to them.

I have omitted to mention one thing. Before the arrival of the six regiments from Herat (mentioned above) the Envoy, agreeably to a suggestion of mine, wished to pay Wali Muhammad Khan a visit to condole with him on the death of his mother. The Envoy said that he wished first of all to ask permission from the Amir before going. He did so, and the Amir answered "go." The Envoy then told me what he had done, and said that he intended to visit Wali Muhammad Khan on the next day, ordering me to go and prepare Wali Muhammad Khan for the visit. I went to Wali Muhammad Khan's house and told him this, and the Sirdar made every preparation to receive him and informed all the other Sirdars of the expected visit. The next day, however, the Envoy told me he had asked Ghyas, the Mehmander, whether the Amir would really like his paying this visit, and that Ghyas had answered "No, the Amir will not like your going." I then said, "I warned the Sirdar that you were coming and everyone expected that you would have paid this visit, and all the Sirdars hearing that you have put it off have begun to tremble in their hearts, saying, 'We wonder what our fate will be if the Sahib is afraid of going, or is unable to visit our chief Sirdar.'"

Enclosure 39 in No. 27.

Letter from KAZI ABDUL RAHMAN of Kabul, written on 15th September, addressed to NAWAB SIR GHOLAM HUSSAN KHAN, K.C.S.I., and brought to him by RESSALDAR BAHAWUL-DIN KHAN, II. (Q.O.), Bengal Lancers on furlough in Kabul.

I HAD communicated the state of affairs in Kabul to Major Cavagnari several times through Ressaldar Baha-wul-din Khan, and especially two days before the outbreak which I told him would take place, and he should be on the alert, but my warning was disregarded. I again beg you to tell the Sahibs that no one is prepared to fight you. I declare they are all on your side and looking for your arrival. The revolt was pre-arranged.

The Ressaldar being cross-questioned as to what the Kazi could have heard to induce him to send the Envoy a warning of intended disturbances, says: "The Kazi judged by the fact of the Amir not having fulfilled one of his promises in connexion with the Treaty, that he had no intention of acting honestly, or being really friendly, but that, on the contrary, he would sooner or later break out into open hostility. The Kazi had not, however, heard of any specific intention or arrangement for mutiny or revolt on a given day or in a preconcerted manner."

(Signed) A. CONOLLY, Captain,
Political Officer.

Ali Khel,
20th September 1879.

Enclosure 40 in No. 27.

Information given by Ressaldar BAHAWUL-DIN KHAN, 11th Bengal Cavalry.

The "Neza bazi" practice by the Envoy was most distasteful to the Amir, because his own troops used to look on and sometimes join in the sport. The spot on which it was carried on, however, was concealed by willow trees, and not actually in sight of the palace.

There were other matters at which His Highness took offence, such as accompanying the Envoy in person on the proposed tour to the northern provinces; also the military rank of Sir Louis Cavagnari, for in the Afghan army a major is of no account.

As regards his attitude on the day of the mutiny, the first thing the Envoy did was to send him an urgent message verbally by one Muhammad Karim Khan, Subadar in the 1st Punjab Cavalry, and son of Muhammad Rahim Khan, who was killed with Captain Davidson at the Crag Picquet, Umbeyla campaign. (Muhammad Karim Khan, whose house is at Bariki Barik in Logar, had come to Kabul about a land case.) On his arrival with the message from the Envoy, he was told to wait, and help would be sent, but he was kept all day, and nothing was done. Later on one Ghulam Akhi, a Chaprassi with note from Mr. Jenkyns reached the Amir, but nothing was done beyond giving him a line to say help was coming, which never came. His son was certainly sent out apparently to stop the fighting, but he went to the Chaman or quarter which the three mutinous troops had left, and where there was no one left to coerce. Daud Shah when sent out was maltreated and wounded, and I dare say he did his duty honestly, for he had lately rather sided with the Envoy and estranged himself from the Amir accordingly. The Amir had a considerable number of personal attendants, from 100 to 150, and all the officers and leaders of the troops besides officials. Had he gone out in person even a short distance, it would most probably have had the effect of checking the revolt.

Besides he might, before they broke away and joined the attack, have kept back or made active use of three regiments quartered in the Bala Hissar close to his own residence.

Allao-din of Lalpura, a trusted adviser, urged him to help the Envoy, but he would do nothing.

Saif-ud-Din Khan Brigadier offered to bring up three regiments from Sherpur to beat off the assailants, but he was desired to be silent. He showed no concern as to the treatment of the bodies both of Embassy and escort (excluding the Envoy's which was not found); they had been tossed over the wall and left in a naked, dishonoured and horribly mutilated and hacked-about condition for a day and night, after which they were thrown into a hollow and covered with earth and rubbish.

As to the defence and setting fire to the Embassy this was done by the Embassy themselves in order to render untenable that portion of the place, the roof of which was in the enemy's possession, and from which they were pouring down a hot fire of bullets. They had scrambled on to this roof from a neighbouring building which stood on one side only of the Residency.

The defenders had retreated meanwhile to another part of the Residency, and eventually to a "pucca hamam" or bath which could not be set on fire, and which they defended to the last.

Ressaldar Bahaw-ul-din Khan's sources of information are Saifu-din Khan, Allao-din of Lalpura, Mirza Nishan (the Commander-in-Chief's Secretary).

He says Padshah Khan was being closely watched, but told him (the Ressaldar) that the moment he heard of our advancing from the Shuturguridan, he would slip away and get us unlimited supplies and carriage in Logar. Sirdar Wali Muhammad also sent a verbal message by him to say that for his own sake and that of the country he hoped the British would advance rapidly.

He believes Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan to be untrustworthy, but Mustaufi Habibulla and Daud Shah to be at heart favourable to our cause. The latter has reason to suspect the Amir for having sent him out alone to face the troops (that is exactly what Allal-ud-din Khan, Ghilzai Chief, has stated in one of his interviews with Sir F. Roberts). The coldness between him and the Amir arose from his having advised His Highness on certain points, as follows:—

- (1.) Eleven months' arrear of pay had been promised the troops, but not given them.
- (2.) His Highness had promised to go on tour, but would not make any arrangement for it.
- (3.) He was treating Abdulla Jan's mother very hardly and had forced her to give up 17 lacs.
- (4.) He would not befriend those who had come in to Cavagnari.
- (5.) He did nothing to gain the support and affection of the Chiefs and people.
- (6.) Or to listen to complaints of, or see to interest of, traders and travellers and people.

Enclosure 41 in No. 27.

Translation.

Statement of ALLAL-UD-DIN, brother of PADSHAH KHAN, GHILZAI, taken at Ali Khel on the 15th of September.

ON the morning of the 3rd, after the sun had risen, I and my brother started from our residence in the town of Kabul and proceeded to the Durbar of the Amir to ask His Highness' permission to return to our home. The Amir was in his private apartment at the time, and we stopped at the gateway downstairs. Our names having been announced to the Chief, he said he would send for us after he had washed his face and hands. As usual, General Daud Shah, Mullah Shah Muhammad, Yahya Khan, and Mustaufi Habibulla were with him at the time. At this time we observed two attendants of the Amir hurriedly running towards His Highness's apartment. Shortly after General Daud Shah came down, and we asked him if everything was all right. He said it was all right, and not all right, and in a hurry went away. His orderly told us that three Orderly Regiments quarrelled on the occasion of issue of their pay, and that, having mutinied, they had proceeded to the residence of the British Plenipotentiary, Sir Louis Cavagnari. A short while after a loud cry of "Dam-i-Charyar" was heard. It was said that the mutinous troops first went to the stables to seize the (Embassy) horses; that the Chhota Sahib, Mr. Jenkyns, ordered his men to fire upon them, and by this

means killed nine of the soldiers; that the Afghan troops, being then without arms, receded and went to fetch weapons; that they got hold of some arms from the magazine, known by the name of Qulah-i-Firangi, and took away some from the lines of the other three Afghan regiments stationed in the square of the Bala Hissar fort; that these regiments also joined the mutineers, and wounded Daud Shah by bayonets and stones; that the Amir desired to go out himself, but was prevented by Mulla Shah Muhammad and the Mustaufi, who expressed their apprehension that the troops would also kill him if he went out. The Amir then sent his heir-apparent and his tutor with a copy of the Koran and Yayha Khan to dissuade the three mutinous troops from acts of violence, and to tell them that he would send away the British Envoy from his territory if they did not like his stay at the capital. He also sent them a message to the effect that, if desired, he would wage a religious war, but that they should not raise a disturbance now. I and my brother and a number of other Khans were also sent with the deputation. When we reached near the troops we asked them to forbear, but they snatched the Koran from the hands of the heir-apparent's tutor, and beat him with the stocks of guns, and continued in attacking (the Residency). Guns (banduks) were being fired incessantly from both sides. The besieged inmates of the Residency showed a staunch resistance. I have heard that when the troops first attacked the Residency, Major Cavagnari wrote a letter to the Amir, telling him that no person treats his guest in the way (he was being treated). It is said that a servant of Major Cavagnari, the resident of Barki, managed to go out of the Residency with the letter, but as the place was subsequently more closely besieged, all communication with it was cut off. The fight continued to dusk, when the Residency was seen on fire. Some say that the inmates of the place set the building on fire themselves to burn away the mutineers who had reached the roof; while others remark that the building was set on fire by the mutineers, or it caught fire from the 10 or 12 charges of artillery which had been fired. That morning Major Cavagnari had gone out for an airing, and he had not yet ungirdled his loins when the disturbance broke out. When out riding, Major Cavagnari and the troopers of his escort used to cut apples while galloping near the lines of the Afghan troops, and the men of the Amir's army thought the British officer and his followers showed them that they were great swordsmen, and thereby taunted them. The Afghans took this to heart. Besides this, a few days ago some sepoys (of the Envoy's escort) were seen at the house of a saddler, with whose wife they were on terms of intimacy; they were even pursued that day by a number of people, and the circumstance enraged the populace. Major Cavagnari was not in the habit of receiving visits from any persons or hearing reports from them, and so he could not be aware of their feelings and ill designs. The Amir was not concerned in exciting the mutiny. But it is true that after the disturbance the Chief sent three months' pay to the mutinous troops to their lines to prevent them from doing any further harm. Three or four days previous to the mutiny a Russian Envoy was at Kabul; but I am not aware whether he was there on the particular day, or whether he is now in the town or not. From the hammam (bath-room) of the Residency house the mutineers brought out three women, two of whom were the daughters of a farrier of Kabul, and they were killed on the spot. The Amir cannot at present punish the mutineers for fear of his troops and the (excited) public. The soldiers do not obey the orders of their officers. They appoint their officers themselves. The people and the army are ready to wage war under the name of Jihád. As I have come here (to the British camp), the Amir will ruin me. I shall carry out as far as I can all the orders given to me. When leaving Kasim Khel yesterday I sent my nephew, Sherdil Khan, to Kabul to inform his father, Padshah Khan, that I had proceeded to the British camp, and to request him to manage to return home. If matters are settled with the British Government, I shall render them every service. The people will probably collect together to engage in Jihád.

Enclosure 42 in No. 27.

Statement of KAJIR KHAN, SON of PAYANDA KHAN, in Service of the Kabul Embassy,
dated 10th September 1879.

I MET Major Sir L. Cavagnari, K.C.B., C.S.I., at Batti Kot during the late campaign and took service with him, bringing information as I was a Talib-ul-Ilm. I again came across Sir L. as he was proceeding to Kabul, and was asked to take service once more,

and consented, joining the Embassy six days before the massacre. There were four regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery in the Bala Hissar; the other troops were scattered about the place, owing to cholera. On the morning of the 3rd September a regiment, named Bahadur Khan's, turned out for parade with arms, then another; also a third without arms, to receive their pay. General Daud Shah rode up and was received with a salute; he then proceeded to pay regiment 3. A month's pay was handed to them, but the men demanded arrears for three; the General abused them, the soldiers replied with a volley of stones at him, and then at their officers; after this they proceeded towards the Embassy. At the commencement of the disturbance I was near the soldiers, and started at once to warn the Envoy of what had occurred, and Sir Louis ordered every preparation to be made for defence. The rioters fired shots and threw stones at the Embassy house, and were received with a volley; the cry of Ghaza was raised: all the regiments (with the exception of the officers) and the city rabble joined in. Up to one p.m. no impression was made on the Residency. The rioters then set fire to the buildings, and brought two guns to bear also. As the fire burnt the supports (wooden) of the houses, our men were now and then precipitated down and either shot or cut down. The smoke hindered the garrison greatly. It was about this time that I attempted to escape, and being secured by men of Bahadur Khan's regiment, would have been slain had I not thrown my arms round the legs of a man who was directing them, and he saved my life, keeping me a prisoner in one of the rooms. It was not till sunset that resistance ceased and all was over. At intervals men came in to report how the fight went on. In this way I heard that Amir Yakub Khan had sent his son with the Koran, and begged the soldiers to desist from attacking men who were their guests, and every claim of theirs would be satisfied, but they would not listen to the lad. After sunset the man who had saved my life told me to slip away. I did so, and took shelter in a village three kos from Kabul; the next day and night (4th September) I spent on the road; 5th, with a Ghilzai chief, who gave me shelter; 6th, Tezeen; 7th, with Azmatulla Khan at Charbagh; 8th, Girdeh; 9th, Safed dheri; 10th, Peshawur. During the six days that I was at Kabul, I mixed constantly with the people in the city, and am under the impression that the presence of the English officers was not distasteful to the residents, and that this rising was not premeditated or planned by any one.

Note.

Bahadur Khan's regiment is said to have come from Herat, and the regiment No. 3 also came from that quarter. Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan substantiates the first, and Wali Muhammad Khan, Zakka Khel, the second. Information received through Gholam Moyauddin Khan at Lundikotal from Jellalabad, says that the Herati soldiery had commenced the disturbance. Kajir Khan knows the regiment, entered here No. 3, as the "Ardal." He gives further details of the men at the Residency taking shelter in the garden, and throwing themselves into the water when on fire with their clothes burning, which shows that he was an eye-witness of the events he has related, though these details have been omitted here from his account.

At first this man expressed absolute ignorance of any Herati regiment having anything to say to this outbreak, and maintained that the regiment which began the attack was the Ardal, or orderly regiment, composed of selected men taken from all the regiments and formed into household troops.

September 14, 1879.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieut.-Col.,
Commissioner.

Enclosure 43 in No. 27.

MEMORANDUM on Information received from Kabul regarding the recent Massacre of the of the Embassy, the Attitude of the AMIR and that of some of the Tribes.

IN forwarding the information which I have selected as the most interesting, and to some extent most trustworthy of all that I have received regarding events in Kabul, and the present aspect of affairs, I would draw particular attention to the statement of Abdulla Nur, Chief of the Kuki Khel Afridis.

His history is well known to Government, and I need not repeat it; our most strenuous opponent throughout the late Kabul war, he declined positively to attend our

summons until he had received orders or permission from the Amir of Kabul. What those orders were he has briefly stated. Abdulla Nur is now in Peshawur with the Khyber deputation, and in receiving him in the presence of the whole of the Afridi tribes assembled, I told him that I remembered his services to me ten years ago, that we respected him for his adherence to the cause of the patron whose favours he had received, and that I now expected as hearty service from him as he had given to the Amir. He at once, in few words, replied that he had come in to do that service, and I, myself, believe that he will not be found faithless. Throughout my dealings with the Khyber tribes he has shown great strength; he has supported my views which have, no doubt, to some extent coincided with his own, but he has also had much to say in smoothing away difficulties and quieting the heart-burnings which naturally enough existed among the opposite faction.

I suspect that the little effect which the recent news of the disaster in Kabul has had upon the Afridis generally is greatly due to the calm attitude of Abdulla Nur.

I have said so much regarding this man because, being by far the most powerful and most respected among the Khyber Chiefs, and at the present moment working, to all appearances, heartily and honestly with us, I would obtain for his opinion as much weight as I think is due.

I believe it will be found that Amir Yakub Khan was as much taken by surprise as the Embassy, and that he was nearly in as great danger from his own mutinous troops as the Envoy, and became practically a prisoner in his own palace. No doubt he may have shown little force of character, and but little personal courage, yet he probably was deterred from running similar risks, by the treatment which General Daud Shah, the Commander-in-Chief, and his attendants, as also the Amir's own son, had received at the hands of the soldiery.

With reference to the final paragraph of the statement of Abdulla Nur I may add here that three or four men, whose opinions ought to be the most valuable, have volunteered their conviction, almost in the same words, that Sirdar Ayub Khan was the secret instigator of this revolt. I should not say so much.

We have always heard that Ayub Khan, in writing to his brother Yakub Khan protested against the alliance with the British Government. These feelings were shared by the regiments lately arrived fresh on the scene from Herat, and they are also said to have openly expostulated with the Amir through their officers. To the soldiers and to Ayub Khan the Amir is reputed to have given a firm reply, that he had been powerless to resist us, and that we had treated him with consideration and kindness.

Ayub Khan and his regiments were but indifferently informed of the progress of events which led to the execution of the Treaty between the Amir and the Government. Could they have been in personal communication, Ayub Khan would probably have arrived at the same conclusions as the Amir. There is no necessity for suspecting Russian intrigue in Herat; Ayub Khan need only have been prompted by the same national feeling which influenced more or less all Afghans, and which was only modified by personal interests.

The troops lately from Herat had been for many years away from Kabul. They are not composed of residents of Herat territory, but of a miscellaneous collection of all classes and tribes from which the Army is usually recruited. I believe it was the intention of the Amir to have sent them in relief to Turkestan. On arrival in Kabul they were mutinous about their arrears of pay, and the Amir attempted at first unsuccessfully to disarm them. Then cholera broke out among them, 250 are said to have died in one day, and some three regiments received part of their arrears of pay, gave up their arms, and were dismissed to their homes.

The remaining regiments from Herat who were in the relief for Turkestan were probably detained in Kabul to accompany the Amir and the Envoy in that direction.

So far as I am able to judge at present the outbreak was entirely due to a quarrel about pay; the "Ardal" Regiment stationed in the Bala Hissar having demanded more than the one month's pay offered to them, then maltreating and wounding Daud Shah the General, and threatening the Amir and afterwards the Embassy. I should say that although there may have been disaffection and mutinous language, yet that the outbreak and its results were unpremeditated and unforeseen.

Assad Khan, Subadar of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, at this moment sitting with me, assures me that the Afridis are one and all ready to do the Government service, and adds that his news from Kabul is that the Amir is heartbroken and refuses food. When asked the origin of this disaffection and mutiny he immediately replies that the Sirdars Ayub Khan and Abdul Rahman Khan are at the bottom of it; the same story that I have before alluded to.

Why the Amir withheld so much pay from the troops I have never heard satisfactorily explained. He is supposed to have had the money, having recovered 18 lakhs from the mother of the late heir-apparent. It may have been to prevent desertion. Food was at famine prices, and the troops are universally said to have been starving and to have plundered right and left on their way to Kabul.

It is, of course, to be expected that the people of Kabul itself will dread the advance of British troops and fear indiscriminating retaliation. So also will the army, or at all events those regiments most concerned in the late outrage. But I do not as yet anticipate that our columns will meet with opposition. If any of the Herati regiments have left Kabul unbroken, and have marched in any direction, they are thinking of their own safety. They know that they will not find this in their homes; their nominal rolls exist, and it will I believe be found that they are endeavouring to escape into quasi-independent territory. Any advancing towards Jellalabad are probably making for Kafiristan, or more probably Kunar and Bajour.

I believe that the Afridis and the Khyber arrangements are absolutely in hand. I have as yet no fear of the Mohmunds or of any opposition on this road. I disbelieve the reports of the Amir having circulated letters calling for assistance from the tribes. He has probably told them what has happened and of our certain advance, and has asked them to await any summons. The rest of the message has probably been supplied by disaffected fanatical Mullahs, by those who have gained nothing personally from the British alliance, and by the alarmists within our territory who would raise difficulties in the hopes of our appreciating their offers of service.

Nevertheless I may say that the almost universal opinion expressed by natives in and about Peshawur is that Amir Yakub Khan has, 1st., been guilty of treachery, and has deliberately planned this massacre; 2ndly, is so alarmed at the results that he has thrown himself into the arms of his soldiers, and now looks to them to defend him.

I do not believe in either theory; the property of the Amir and the persons of his servants appear to have been no more respected than the Embassy.

People who served us before along the Jellalabad road, are again offering help, but no doubt all are waiting to see what the Governor of Jellalabad and the Khan of Lalpura will do. The latter is said to be prepared for flight. If this is the case, it is because the Amir when communicating with them was doubtful of the intentions of the British Government towards himself.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Peshawur, 14th September 1879. Commissioner of Peshawur.

Enclosure 44 in No. 27.

STATEMENT OF ABDULLA NUR, Kuki Khel, dated 13th September 1879.

I REACHED Kabul the day before the arrival of Sir Louis Cavagnari, saw the Amir in Durbar, and was entrusted to the care of Shah Muhammad, who was directed to entertain me. I had one long and private interview with Amir Yakub Khan with no other persons present in the room, before I was permitted to return this way. He assured me that he had made definite arrangements with the English, and fully intended carrying them out; that for the future their friends were his friends, and their enemies his enemies. He then turned to me and said: "You, Abdulla Nur, are a true Pathan, and have clung to me, in spite of the advances of others, I now ask you to be friends with the English, serve them as you have served me. Go to them and they will treat you well I am certain, but even if they do not act as I have imagined, restrain your tribe from all hostilities with them, and I will then see what I can do for you from my own purse." I was presented with a thousand rupees and then dismissed. I believe the Amir to be friendly to the English, the reports of his having sent messengers and letters to stir up the tribes are all false. The soldiers of the Amir—some of them were opposed to the Envoy's coming to Kabul, as they considered that their "pardah" was gone. The Herati regiments have been in Herat for years, and their officers with Ayub Khan have been greatly open to Russian influences.

Enclosure 45 in No. 27.

STATEMENT OF SAYAD AZGHAM, SON OF SAYAD IMAM R. ACHINI BALA KHALIL PIRBUBAS.

WENT about one and half months ago to Kabul (without being called by the Amir) to solicit that a grant should be given him and his family, as the mowajibs enjoyed by him in Kunar and the Khalil tappah of Peshawur had been taken away from them; it had been given to them as khairat. Syud Amir is a cousin of mine, and his mother was a Mohmund woman, married to Sayad Ahmad Ali (his father), and related to the

mother of Amir Yakub Khan; through her he obtained an interview with the Amir at the "tabela*" in the Bala Hissar. Yakub Khan, hearing his request, promised to give him a grant and advised him to bring his family to Kabul. I remained about 22 days in the Bala Hissar, a house being given me for my use. There were no regiments actually stationed there, but the fort had always a guard of 800 men or thereabouts. I had no interview with Sir L. Cavagnari, or any of the officers. During my stay the Amir was summoning men to his capital who were friends of the English like Gholam Nakshband Khan and Wali Muhammad Khan, whom he desired to send towards Balkh with the Envoy, as he could not go himself. These men would only attend when the seals of the Amir and Sir Louis were on the paper, and as they interviewed the Amir they disappeared. Syud Muhammad, Badshah of Kunar, Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzai, Jabbar Khel, and Khalo Khan, Barakzai, would not attend the Amir's summons. Sir Louis asked what had become of the men summoned (name of the person unknown from whom asked), the reply he received was that the Amir had made away with them, he then became aware that the Amir's intention was evil, and would not permit any one to get near him. Twelve or 13 regiments were summoned from Herat before I reached Kabul. They were to be replaced in Herat by others. In the bazaar the people said these regiments had been summoned to fight the English. Rumours were about that any day a disturbance would take place and Cavagnari had been informed of the same. Two of the Herati regiments about a couple of days before the massacre went to the Amir and demanded four months' pay. They were sent to Daud Shah. He said, I can give you a month's pay. If you want more, go to Cavagnari. They did not go that day, but went on Wednesday, the very morning I started for Butkhak on my way to Peshawur. I left about 5 a.m., and had reached Butkhak about sunrise. When at Pishin the same day the news came of what had occurred in Kabul. I was also apprised of letters having been sent in all directions to rouse the border tribes against us. I heard the firing of guns towards Kabul. I went the next day to Tezin, then by the Karkatcha pass to Burji Sultan, then Kajja, afterwards Sultanpur, and the next day Jellalabad. I stopped there in a masjid, and was informed that the Governor had sent letters to summon the Khan of Lalpura and the Shinwaris against Asmatulla Khan who had become rebellious. On my reaching Ali Boghan I met a Mullah Wali Muhammad, who said that he had seen the body of Gholam Nakshband Khan being carried to Kama; he had been killed in the Kabul affair. I knew Wali Muhammad Mullah; he belongs to Taikal Bala. I then proceeded to Chardeh, and arrived the next day at Lalpura. I came across two Mullahs with "talibs" (students) who had letters for the Mohmunds, Bajouris, Swatis, and Bunerwals. That for the Mohmunds was delivered to Muhammad Sadik Khan in my presence, and the Mullahs having been provided with horses went on their way. Sadik Khan was ordered to collect 6,000 Mohmunds, and a similar force would be sent from Kabul. I saw no collection of men. The Lalpura families were ready to fly away to the hills. The people were glad of a religious war with us, because they had heard of Mowajibs having been taken away in Peshawur, and promises made to others to be broken afterwards. In Kabul I heard that the Amir had made peace with us because he had been forced to do so contrary to his wishes, and that he meant us no good for the future. Muhammad Hashim Khan, son of Muhammad Sherif Khan (in Balkh), Ahmed Ali Jan, and Abdulla Jan's mother are against the Amir.

THE above is a fair specimen of the sort of news circulating in Peshawur. The informant is an elderly highly respectable Sayad. He was brought to me by Arbab Tatah Khan, Khalil, who assured me that his information was thoroughly trustworthy; and I had heard of his arrival the day before from Arbab Jumma Khan, Mohmund, who professed to believe all that the informant stated.

Most of the report is untrue and invented. The informant himself was evidently embittered against the Government, which had done nothing to better his circumstances.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Peshawur, 14th September 1879. Commissioner.

Enclosure 46 in No. 27.

Statement of AHMEDJI, MULLAH, Resident of Alladand, Swat, who had gone to Kabul three months ago to collect money due to a shrine in Swat, to which informant belongs. Taken 13th September 1879.

INFORMANT left Kabul a week ago and walked to Jellalabad whence he came down the river on a raft staying over night at Lalpura on the 11th and arrived at Michni on the 12th, in Peshawur to-day, 13th. Before the attack on the Residency took place the people in Kabul had expressed sentiments hostile to the presence of a British Envoy at Kabul, and no doubt the fact that British officers were in the Bala Hissar was unpopular in the city. A short time before the attack an affray between two Kabul soldiers and a sepoy of the Guides took place in which the Kabulis were wounded. They belonged to the Bala Hissar garrison which was much exasperated by the Amir arresting the Kabulis and by the chaff of the townspeople who taunted them with having first their comrades wounded and then put in jail. Informant was not an eye-witness of the attack, but hears that the Bala Hissar garrison broke out early that morning on parade, and after firing on Daud Shah who was wounded in the side, made for the Residency. Sir L. Cavagnari was shot through the head about 9 or 10 A.M., and the Residency was set on fire and taken about 2 or 3 P.M., or later. The Bala Hissar was open during the day and troops and townspeople kept streaming in. The first regiment to break was the "Orderly Paltan." The Amir was in his own house the whole day with strong guards; he was in fear of his life. He lives about 400 paces distant from the Residency. Informant saw the flames of the burning houses that evening. Most of the bodies of the defenders were burnt in the Residency, the rest buried next day. Four men of the Guides escaped. (These were spared out of a few sepoys who took refuge in a "hammam" or bath contiguous to the Residency.) Three (of whom two are unknown and one wounded, and one being Ali Asghar of Koh Daman) are with the Amir; and one is making his way down to Peshawur. Informant saw him at Butkhak. He belongs to Gujrat or Bakshahi, a village in Yusufzai. Next day the troops told the Amir that they did not wish to kill him, but were determined to have a religious war. The second day after the attack the Amir paid the troops three months' pay; armed the city and recalled the six regiments sent some time ago to Herat. When informant passed through Jellalabad, everything was quiet. Did not hear of any troops coming. No one alarmed. The Governor there, but no troops. At Lalpura the Khan was prepared for flight if the British advanced, and had written to his tribe, the Mohmunds, to prepare for a religious war. There were no troops there or at Dakka. Much excitement in Kabul, but no plundering of the city. The Amir is powerless to control troops. No chiefs were killed by the Amir. Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan is a prisoner in his house.

THE above has been generally confirmed by the Guide who has escaped from Kabul, and the last news from Lundikotal is that there are no troops at Dakka or Jellalabad, and that none are on their way there. The attitude of the people is one of expectation, and the Mohmunds are merely holding themselves in readiness.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Peshawur, 15th September 1879. Commissioner.

Enclosure 47 in No. 27.

* GHOLAM MOHAYUDIN, on 11th September 1879.

A MAN by name Orakzai who had been sent to Jellalabad has returned. He states that many men have come to Jellalabad from Kabul and report that all the British officers of the Embassy and those who accompanied them have been killed and the Embassy house has been burnt. Though the principal part in the massacre has been

taken by Herati regiments, still almost all the people of the city joined, and other troops also connived. The mutiny is not yet over. Orakzai was searched near Jellalabad by the servants of Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan, Governor, with a view to intercepting papers to the address of the British authorities if any could be found on his person. He was again searched with the same object by the servants of Muhammad Sadik Khan at Dakka. The road this side of Jellalabad is safe, but on the other side of Jellalabad it is unsafe for traffic (on account of Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzai). Muhammad Hassan Khan, Governor of Jellalabad (who probably had been away against Asmatulla, this is conjecture), received information of the mutiny from Muhammad Sadik Khan and directed the latter to establish posts. Muhammad Sadik Khan went towards Pesh-Bolak and has appointed guards in several posts and returned to Haftchah. He has sent his agents to Mohmunds to keep themselves in readiness and to come up as soon as invited. He intends to send for some Mohmund levies and post them in the fort of Dakka. He will probably locate some troops in this fort. His brother, Muhammad Ali Khan, is at Lalpura.

Nur Muhammad who has been sent by Sikandar Shah from Lalpura states that Muhammad Sadik Khan returned to Lalpura last evening. (Sikandar Shah is a resident of Karyanah-Daudzai, but has long been in the service of Nauroz Khan, father of Muhammad Sadik Khan. He may be sending news on his own account, but it seems most probable that Sadik Khan should know what he is sending.) Akbar Khan, son of Ajun Khan (the refugee who killed the Tehsildar of Hushtnuggur years ago) came last night into the fort of Dakka with 120 sowars and foot. Muhammad Sadik Khan has received orders to recruit 500 troops for the Dakka Fort and to collect his levies, so that British troops may not advance. Mullah Khalil, resident of Fahm-Killi in Khwaizai territory, has received letters from the Amir to collect men for a religious war, and His Highness has promised to pay expenses of the war.

The Amir has summoned to Kabul Muhammad Shah Khan and Abdul Aziz Khan, sons of Sultan Muhammad Khan, and Akbar Khan, son of Nauroz Khan, and they will leave to-day or to-morrow. (This would be to clear away the opposition faction and strengthen Muhammad Sadik Khan.) Akbar Khan, son of Ajun Khan, states that the six infantry regiments who killed the Embassy are on their way to Jellalabad.

With reference to the above, there are only 50 men in the Dakka fort. Akbar Khan has long been in service in Lalpura. The Amir had summoned Muhammad Shah Khan and others to Kabul before the outbreak. Muhammad Shah Khan is protected by his aunt, the Amir's mother. If any Herati regiments came this way, it is in order to escape to Kafiristan.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Peshawur, 15th September 1879. Commissioner.

Enclosure 48 in No. 27.

Statement of Timoss (Taimur), B. Troop, Corps of Guides, Queen's Own.

Our arrival at Kabul was at first welcomed by the Amir's troops and the city people; the former were under the impression that the arrival of Sir L. Cavagnari would make a great change for the better in their affairs; they expected to receive their pay regularly and be permitted to take their discharge when it pleased them; but their views altered when they found that our Envoy could not interfere in their affairs; the respectable residents of the city on the contrary remained friendly to the end. During our stay there, regiments were coming in from Herat and Turkestan, were paid and sent off. I am a Saddozai, well acquainted with Kabul, and have many friends there. I am under the impression that the presence of the Embassy was not distasteful to the majority of the people. Matters remained thus till the 3rd September; there were two regiments inside the Bala Hissar who had been brought down from Turkestan, and had created a disturbance there; other regiments were encamped outside. The "Ardal" regiment with General Karim Khan went to the Munshi in the Bala Hissar, and asked for their pay; they demanded two months, but were informed that they were to receive only one. Karim Khan told them to appeal to Daud Shah; they went and were informed that orders had been given for them to receive merely a month's pay. The men then broke out, and another regiment joined in with them; the last went to secure their arms whilst the "Ardal" regiment started for the Embassy. On the way they stoned the

horses of the Guide escort and killed one of the syces; the Sikhs to protect their own lives fired on the mutineers. They then went away to get their arms, whilst our men collected at the Embassy, and Sir L. made every preparation for defending it. The Amir's troops secured a "morchā" in a place named "Kulla-Fi-arangi," about 80 yards from our position and commanding it completely, and opened fire; it was then about 8 a.m. The fight continued till near mid-day, when Sir L. was wounded in the forehead with a bullet; he descended the stairs without assistance and asked for the doctor. Jemadars Jewand and Mehtab Sing were also wounded about the same time. Mr. Jenkyns then asked me to write a letter to the Amir demanding assistance, which I did, and it was carried by Gholam Nabbi, brother of Ressaldar Muhammad Sherif Khan; he delivered it, but was unable to bring back an answer. A second letter was then sent by the hands of a Hindu; he was killed at once. By this time an entrance had been made into the Embassy, and in spite of our utmost efforts their men would get in and commenced firing the building. I addressed them under the orders of Mr. Jenkyns, but could not induce them to desist. A paper was then given me to hand over to their general regarding their pay. As I appeared amongst the mutineers they plundered me of everything, and after beating me soundly took me before Karim Khan; he said I am unable to stop the disturbance, and gave orders for my detention. I was placed in a room, and shortly after a wounded havildar was brought in, and on his request I extracted a bullet from his back. In the evening this man gave me some old uniform of his regiment and permitted me to depart in return for what I had done for him. The Amir was surrounded in his residence and unable either to come out or render any assistance to the Envoy's party. He sent General Daud Shah with 20 or 30 men from other regiments. The mutineers wounded Daud Shah and he had to run away, his companions were killed. Sirdar Yahya Khan and the Mustaufi Habibulla were then sent; they were forced to fly also. The troops plundered everything belonging to the Amir they could lay hands upon, and released all the prisoners in the gaol. I went and hid myself in the house of Shahzada Sharyar, who is a relation of mine, and the next morning went secretly to see what had occurred at the Embassy, disguising myself as well as I could. I found Mr. Hamilton's body lying close to a gun about 70 paces from the Embassy; the soldiers round about were discoursing that the defenders had charged out about 5 p.m. Mr. Hamilton had shot three men with his revolver and cut down two others with his sword before he fell. Mr. Jenkyns was lying 20 paces nearer to the building, and Dr. Kelly by the stairs. I did not see the Envoy's body. I went back to the city and remained hid for four or five days. Heard that the bodies of the murdered officers had been buried about 100 paces to the west of the Embassy. I went then and saw their graves. The Amir's authority was completely gone, the soldiers plundered and did as they liked. One night they were on the point of putting him to death, and took away property valued at seven lakhs from him. All the shops in the city were closed for four days; the Khans used to send their followers to protect the Amir's life and person from his soldiery. I left Kabul on the sixth day and came by Butkhak and Lughman. There I heard that Gholam Nakshband Khan had been killed, but I could not learn by whom. I came by Lalpura and Jellalabad and reached Lundikotal at 8 p.m. on 14th September, and saw no men collected on the way to resist an advance. I know that the 20 or 30 men who came with General Daud Shah were killed by the mutineers. I heard this from others, and saw the bodies lying on the ground when I went to see the Embassy, and could distinguish them to be those men in whom Daud Shah placed considerable trust and confidence; their clothing was different to that worn by the regiments that had revolted. I went first to Shahzada Sharyar's house, remained two nights with him, and then removed to Sultan Khan Peshawuri's. There I heard of many events that had taken place. It was said that Futteh Muhammad Khan, Duffadar, Akbar Shah, and Narain Sing had been sent out with the grass cutters. Hearing the disturbance these men fled to Sirdar Muhammad Sarwar Khan's place in the Morad Khani, Akbar Shah's father being in his service, and the grass cutters were entrusted to the Amir's cavalry, and sent for by Sirdar Yahya Khan where I saw three of them. I also saw Futteh Muhammad Khan, Akbar Shah and Narain Sing at the house of the Turkestan Naib, whose name I do not know. Sirdar Muhammad Sarwar Khan sent them to Sirdar Yahya Khan, and he forwarded them to the Naib, as they belonged to his religious sect (Shia). Mr. Jenkyns' horse was purchased by General Tamas Khan of Jellalabad. The fire of the Sikh troopers (at the commencement) knocked over about six of the mutineers. I only know of one gunshot striking the door of the Embassy; the gun was fired several times during the day. When I appeared with Mr. Jenkyns' letter, the soldiers, under the impression that they could at all times lay hands on me, did not attempt to kill me, but led me to General Karim

Khan who commanded the two regiments and others that were encamped outside. The idea in Kabul was that this man had a hand in the revolt, and has been turned out of his command; his men were chiefly from Logar, Wardak, and Kohistan. I started from Sultan Khan's house with the messenger of Sirdar Asuf Kahn going to Lughman. I have not heard of Shahghassi Yusuf having come towards Peshbolak.

(True Translation.)

Peshawur,
16th September 1879.

(Signed) R. WARBURTON.

Enclosure 49 in No. 27.

Statement of TAIMUR (Timoss), Sowar B. Troop, Corps of Guides, on 15th September 1879.

I was in the Bala Hissar, Kabul, on the 3rd instant: Major Sir Louis Cavagnari and the other British officers were in the bungalow. At about 8 a.m. the Turkestani "Ardal" regiment, which was in the Bala Hissar, was paraded to receive its pay. Daud Shah, the Commander-in-Chief, gave them one month's pay. They claimed two and broke.

They were paraded quite close to the Residency, and another regiment was also quartered with them.

One of soldiery shouted out "Let us destroy the Envoy first of all and after that the Amir." They rushed into the court-yard in front of the Residency and stoned some of the syces who were sitting there.

We then opened fire on them, without orders from any European. All the British officers were inside.

The Amir's men then went for their weapons and returned with them in a quarter of an hour. If in that time the British officers had so desired, they might have escaped. They then commenced to besiege the Residency, and from commanding positions made the roof of the Residency untenable. We then made shelter trenches on it and fired from the windows.

The city people came to help the soldiers at about 10 a.m. Major Sir Louis Cavagnari was wounded in the forehead about 1 p.m.; he was in a shelter trench. A man from the roof of a house shot at him and the bullet striking a brick, it, together with a piece of brick, struck Sir Louis. But he was not killed. Mr. Jenkyns came up and sent for a Munshi to write to the Amir, but the scribe was unable to write through fear.

I then wrote briefly to the Amir that we were besieged and he was to help us, and sent it by Gholam Nabbi, a Kabuli, an old Guide sowar who was in the Residency. No answer came. Gholam Nabbi afterwards told me that the Amir wrote on the letter, "If God will, I am just making arrangements."

Major Cavagnari was helped into the Residency and tended to by Dr. Kelly. Mr. Jenkyns then ordered me to send a second letter to the Amir, stating that Major Cavagnari was wounded and to hasten on assistance. This letter was sent by a Hindu whose name I don't know. He was cut to pieces in front of the Residency. I was at about 3 p.m. sent with a letter by Mr. Hamilton promising six months' pay. By that time they had managed to get on to the roof of the Residency. I went armed into the midst of the crowd, and was immediately stripped of my arms, but my life was saved by an officer. I then said I had a promise to give them six months' pay. They threw me from the roof of the Residency on to the roof of the neighbouring house. I lost my senses, was stripped of everything I had, and was taken to General Karim Khan who commanded the brigade which had mutinied. He was sitting on a bed surrounded by 50 or 60 men. I did not see him give any orders, but when I told him I had come to give six months' pay to the troops, and that he must stop their fighting, he said he was helpless in the matter and ordered me to be confined.

I know nothing of what happened after this, but I visited the place next morning.

I recollect they had begun to set fire to the Residency just as I was leaving.

A wounded havildar of the Amir's, who was brought to the house where I was imprisoned, let me escape for extracting a bullet from his back. It was then morning. Daybreak I went to the Residency, and saw first the corpse of Lieutenant Hamilton lying over a mountain gun which had been brought up. The troops who were there told me Mr. Hamilton had shot about three men with his pistol, and had cut down two more before he was shot.

He was stripped and cut into pieces but not dishonoured. About 25 feet off was the

body of Mr. Jenkyns in a similar state. I did not go into the Residency, but was told Dr. Kelly was lying killed in the Residency. Sir Louis Cavagnari was in the Residency when it fell in flames. He was in the room where the wounded were, and his body had not been discovered when I left the city. All bodies found in the Residency were so burned that they could not be recognized.

The bodies of Messrs. Hamilton, Jenkyns, and Kelly were buried about 100 yards below where they fell, and in a garden. Besides myself no other of the defenders escaped, so far as I know. Gholam Nabbi, the ex-sowar, brother of Rissaldar Muhammad Sharif Khan of the Guides, who was entrusted with the letter, is alive and in Kabul. He still has the letter with the Amir's answer on it.

The Guide sowars who were out cutting grass are now in Kabul in the Mured Khana Mahalla, but prevented from leaving the city. The grass-cutters are with Sirdar Yahya Khan in safety.

There are no troops on the road from Kabul, nor are there any in Jellalabad nor Dacca. As far as I know none are coming.

Daud Shah did his best to stop the mutiny, being sent by the Amir, but he was pulled off his horse, stoned, and wounded with a bayonet. Daud Shah was alive when I left, but his life was in danger.

In the afternoon Sirdar Yahya Khan came accompanied by Mustaufi Habibulla, but were fired on and had to retire.

NOTE.—The above taken at Lundi Kotal differs slightly from that taken at Peshawar, and contains a few additional particulars.—W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner.—19/9/79.

Enclosure 50 in No. 27.

Memorandum by W. MERK, Esq., Political Officer at Lundi Kotal, dated 16th September 1879.

Taimur, sowar of the Guides, whose first statement is forwarded, arrived here on the night of the 14th, and before his statement was taken gave a different account (during the night), viz., that he and some other sowars, including Fattah Muhammad Daffadar, escaped on the morning of the attack from some out-houses not actually included in the Residency building, which had been appropriated to sowars; he being a Peshawuri found refuge in the house of Sultan Khan (a son of the late Nazir Tarverdy Khan of Peshawur), who had accompanied Sirdar Yahya Khan to Kabul. Next morning he visited the scene of the attack and recognized the bodies of Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Jenkyns, and Dr. Kelly; all the sepoys, and in fact everybody in the Residency building, were killed. If it is true that he made this statement, and there seems reason to believe he may have done so, he is not an eye-witness, though his story is probably fairly correct and derived from eye-witnesses.

Report says that the Amir, though he could not have been averse to such a demonstration against the Residency as might have afforded him an excuse for demanding its withdrawal on a plea of being unable to protect the members of the Mission, yet neither he, nor anyone else in power, at all expected, or was prepared for what did happen. Other rumours connect Abdulla Jan's mother and her party with the occurrence.

NOTE.—I agree with Mr. Merk that there are doubts about Taimur, Guide Cavalry, having witnessed all he describes. He probably heard much from others.—W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner.—19/9/79.

No. 28.

No. 216 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, October 2, 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter which we have caused to be addressed to General Sir Frederick

Roberts, and which contains instructions for his guidance in carrying out the several objects of the expedition to Kabul.

	We have, &c.
(Signed)	LYTTON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
"	A. CLARKE.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	W. STOKES.
"	A. R. THOMPSON.

The Right Hon. Viscount Cranbrook,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Enclosure in No. 28.

No. A.-505, dated Simla, 29th September 1879.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kurram Field Force.

On the 5th September you received from the Viceroy in person at Simla instructions to return with all possible speed to your command at Ali Khel, and to move upon Kabul by the Shuturguridan Pass with the forces placed at your disposal for this purpose by the Government of India. You were invested with the chief political authority within the range of your military operations, and you were charged with the duty of signally and promptly punishing the barbarous murder of the British Envoy at the Afghan capital, and of subduing the confusion and disorganisation which have ensued in Afghanistan.

2. It would be useless, in the opinion of his Excellency, the Governor-General in Council, to endeavour to furnish you beforehand with detailed orders as to the manner in which these instructions are to be executed. Your proceedings will necessarily depend upon the state of affairs at Kabul and elsewhere, the acts and attitude of the Amir and his people, and upon various other conditions impossible at present to foresee. The Government of India desire, however, that in taking the measures necessary for the full and effective accomplishment of the objects of your expedition, you will be guided by the following general injunctions.

3. It is assumed that on your arrival at Kabul you will at once place your forces in a strong and secure position, such as will give you complete command over the Amir's capital, and reduce it entirely under your control. In order to assure your authority, and to prevent disorder, you will proceed at once to enforce the surrender of any fortified post and the disarmament of any Afghan troops remaining at Kabul, and of the whole city population. You will take early steps for the collection of the supplies which may be required for the maintenance of your force at Kabul, in the contingency of any temporary interruption of your communications with Ali Khel and Kurram, before your base of operations shall have been transferred to Peshawur, and your communications opened by Jellalabad. It is possible that the operations involved by this change of base may not be completed until some weeks after your arrival at Kabul. It is hardly necessary to remark, in reference to the provisioning of your troops, upon the expediency of looking carefully to the considerate treatment of that portion of the people of the country upon which you may be to some extent dependent for supplies.

4. With regard to the Amir Yakub Khan, your instructions are to secure his personal safety, retaining adequate control over His Highness' movements and actions. You are, moreover, to prevent the withdrawal beyond the range of your authority of any person or persons as to whom you may have reason to believe that their behaviour in connexion with the attack upon the British Residency may become a subject for future inquiry.

5. As soon as you shall have established yourself at Kabul you will institute a close and comprehensive investigation into all the causes and circumstances of the outrage which has compelled the British Government to occupy the capital of His Highness the Amir. Upon the question of the punishment, which, after due inquiry, it will be your duty to inflict as speedily as possible upon those who have abetted or participated in the perpetration of this outrage, his Excellency the Governor-General in Council desires me to commend to your careful attention the following observations.

6. I am to point out, in the first place, that for an offence of this character the Afghan nation must be held to be collectively responsible. It was a totally unprovoked and most barbarous attack by the Amir's soldiery and by the people of his capital upon the representative of an allied State, who was residing under the Amir's protection in the Amir's fortress, in very close proximity to the Amir himself; and whose personal safety and honorable treatment had been solemnly guaranteed by the ruler of Afghanistan. In the second place, I am to observe that the nature and magnitude of the outrage leave no room for doubt that it had its leaders and its instigators—that certain persons must have taken a prominent part in the attack upon the Residency, and in the murder of its inmates; while there is a strong presumption that such an outbreak must have been fomented and encouraged by persons of rank and influence. Towards this latter conclusion all our present information points, and it is corroborated by expressions used in the letters written by the Amir himself after the occurrence of the catastrophe.

7. The retribution to be exacted must accordingly be adapted to the twofold character of the offence. It must be imposed upon the Afghan nation in proportion as the offence was national and as the responsibility falls upon any particular community; while it must also involve condign punishment of those individuals who may be found guilty of any participation in the crime. In regard to the penalties to be borne by the State, by the city, or by the people generally, it would be premature in the present stage of your operations to issue to you any specific directions. The imposition of a fine upon the city of Kabul would be in accordance with justice and precedent. The military precautions required for the security of your position may necessitate the demolition of fortifications, and possibly the removal of buildings which may lie within the range of your defences, or may interfere with your control over the city. In forming your plans for works of this kind, required by military exigencies, you will have the opportunity of considering whether they can be combined with any measures compatible with justice and humanity, or leaving a memorial of the retribution exacted from the city in some manner and by some mark that will not be easily obliterated.

8. In regard to the punishment of individuals, it should be swift, stern, and impressive, without being indiscriminate or immoderate. Its infliction must not be delegated to subordinate officers of minor responsibility acting independently of your instructions or supervision; and you cannot too vigilantly maintain the discipline of the troops under your orders, or superintend their treatment of the unarmed population, so long as your orders are obeyed, and your authority is unresisted. You will deal summarily in the majority of cases with persons whose share in the murder of any one belonging to the British Embassy shall have been proved by your investigations; but while the execution of justice should be as public and striking as possible, it should be completed with all practicable expedition; since the indefinite prolongation of your proceedings might spread abroad unfounded alarm.

9. I am here to observe that it will probably be essential, not only for the protection of your own camp from annoyance, but also for the security of the well-affected population, and for the general maintenance of order, that you should assume and exercise supreme authority in Kabul, since events have unfortunately proved that the Amir has lost that authority, or that he has conspicuously failed to make use of it. Moreover, the conduct of the Amir himself in reference to the murder of the British Envoy is a matter regarding which very conflicting and ambiguous reports have reached this Government, and it will necessarily form one of the primary points to which your investigation will be directed. But, whatever may be the result of your inquiry, no action (beyond the limits already indicated in the 4th paragraph of this letter) should be taken in regard to the Amir Yakub Khan without special reference for orders to the Government of India. There may be other cases where the conduct of personages of high position at Kabul may come under examination, upon which it may be undesirable to pass any final decision without special deliberation or extended inquiry. It will be for you to judge what cases falling under this category should be reserved for the consideration of the Government of India.

10. The military and political exigencies of the situation with which you will have to deal require all possible precautions against future violence among a population of which a large section is fanatical, treacherous, and vindictive. While, however, it must be your aim to leave on the minds of all classes of the people the strongest conviction that atrocities such as those which have lately been committed will inevitably be visited by the British Government with the sternest retribution, you will spare no efforts to convince the people of Afghanistan that our desire is to treat them with justice and benevolence, to respect their religious belief, their feelings, and their customs. It cannot be doubted that a very large proportion of the agricultural and commercial classes in

Afghanistan will appreciate, as well as the people of other countries, the advantages of good government and of protection to life and property.

11. Although nothing can now be said in regard to the future internal administration of Afghanistan, the Government of India cannot ignore the possibility of being forced to exercise over that administration a closer and more direct control than has hitherto been contemplated or desired. It is, therefore, especially important that during the period of difficulty and disorganisation which must, it is feared, be passed before a better and more settled system of administration can be established, the people should learn, from the strict discipline of our army, and from the wise and upright proceedings of our military and political officers, to look to the strength and the justice of the British Government as their best guarantee for the future tranquillity of their country.

No. 29.

No. 217 of 1879. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 9th October 1879.

WE have the honour to submit a summary of the intelligence received during the past week regarding the state of affairs in Afghanistan and the progress of our military operations in that country.

2. General Roberts met the Amir at Kushi on the 29th September. He telegraphed on the 2nd October that His Highness was much alarmed for the safety of his family in the Bala Hissar, fearing that the Afghan troops might attack and plunder the Bala Hissar upon the near approach of the British troops. The Amir stated that there was but one regiment at Kabul upon which he could depend; and he and his advisers strenuously endeavoured to induce General Roberts to delay his advance. It appeared obvious that the promptitude of the movement upon the capital, and the ease with which our artillery had crossed the Shuturguridan, had taken the Amir, and indeed the Afghans generally, by surprise. General Roberts replied to the Amir that any delay was out of the question, but that all the women and children would be given time to leave the city. The Amir had apparently proceeded in some haste from Kabul to the British camp on hearing that Sirdar Wali Muhammad and other influential personages were about to join General Roberts. His Highness has accompanied the march of General Roberts' column upon Kabul.

3. On the 2nd October a telegram from Ali Khel reported that the British position on the Shuturguridan had been unsuccessfully attacked by the neighbouring tribes. Communications between Ali Khel and the Shuturguridan were interrupted during that day; but on the 3rd October news came from General Roberts giving the true version of the affair. The independent Ghilzais, who had been watching very closely the movements of the British troops, had assembled in great force on the ridge above the Shuturguridan crest. Colonel Money, who was in command there, wisely took the offensive, and attacking the Ghilzais in their position, he drove them off with a loss of 30 killed, and captured one of their standards. The number of the wounded is not known. On our side one officer and four men were wounded. This successful action is likely to have a salutary effect throughout that part of the country. On the 30th September, Lieutenant Kinloch was unfortunately murdered on the road a short distance beyond Thull, while proceeding with a single trooper to join his regiment. The circumstances of this murder and the measures which we are taking against the offenders are being reported separately.

4. General Roberts arranged to evacuate Kushi until he should be firmly in possession of the Bala Hissar, when a military postal service will be established between Kabul and the Shuturguridan Pass. He telegraphed that until this had been effected all communications between himself and the Pass, which would be held by a strongly entrenched force might be suspended for a few days, unless it were found possible to maintain a postal service or to keep up a correspondence by means of heliographic signalling. General Roberts took this course in order to avoid leaving small parties along the road while it was still insecure and because he was desirous of reaching Kabul with as strong a force as possible. The whole column reached Zarghun Shahr on the 2nd of October, and marched on to Zahidabad the following day. Here the insufficiency of transport, which General Roberts had previously reported to be the great obstacle to his progress, compelled the column to halt for one day, as it was necessary to send back

the animals to bring up the reserve ammunition and stores. On the 5th the advance was to be continued to Charasiah, which is only a short march from Kabul. The walled hill above the capital could be plainly seen from Zahidabad.

5. From the Khyber column it was reported on the 1st of the month that supplies were coming in, and that the troops beyond the Khyber Pass were healthy. General Gough with his detachment reached Basawul the next day. The country was quiet, and the Governor of Jellalabad had promised assistance. His agent had enjoined the tribes to refrain from acts of hostility. On the 4th October the Governor of Jellalabad himself came into General Gough's camp accompanied by the Khan of Lalpura, the chief of the Mohmands. They visited the General, and have been sending in supplies, with the aid of the headmen of the neighbouring tribes. A foraging party of the Guides is at Peshbolak.

6. On the 3rd October Major St. John telegraphed that General Hughes' brigade of reconnaissance, which he was accompanying, had arrived at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and would halt there for two days. The arrangements which had been made by Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, the Governor of Kandahar for supplies along the road, and for the maintenance of the post, were excellent. Letters were received from Kandahar, a distance of about 89 miles, in 36 hours. Sirdar Mahomed Tahir Khan, the Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, met the British commander outside the fort. He had collected some supplies. Grain was abundant, but fuel and forage were scarce. The country was apparently quiet, and caravans were arriving unmolested from Kabul. From Kelat-i-Ghilzai the troops advanced to Naorak, and thence pushed on to Ab-i-Tazi, the third march along the road and about 29 miles from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, as supplies were found to be insufficient at Naorak. The Amir had made no communication to the southern Ghilzais who inhabit this country except that he remained on terms of alliance with the English.

7. Several additional papers and reports received from General Roberts are also enclosed. They relate principally to the attitude of the tribes, and to the interviews held between the General and the Amir's agents, the Mustaufi Habibulla Khan, and the Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan, before the Amir entered the British camp. It will be seen that the main objects of this deputation were to declare the Amir's desire to maintain friendly and faithful relations with the British Government, and to persuade General Roberts to stay his advance on the capital. The deputies represented that the presence of the British troops at Kabul might cause confusion and disorganisation throughout the country; and they pleaded that they were anxious to obtain for the Amir some chance of restoring his own authority. Nevertheless, they agreed that since the British army would not delay its march, it should come in such force as to overawe or overpower all attempts at resistance. Some further letters which passed between the General in command and His Highness the Amir are also enclosed.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
E. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

P.S.—We have just received and transmitted to your Lordship the following telegram from General Roberts:—

"Charasiah, 6th October.—Reconnoitring parties sent out on all roads to Kabul at daybreak this morning, reported enemy were advancing in great force from direction of city. The parties had to retire, and soon afterwards the high range of hills intervening between Charasiah and Kabul were crowded with troops and city people, while parties of Ghilzais appeared on the hills running along both flanks of camp, and reports were received that the road to Zahidabad was threatened, along which General Macpherson was advancing with large convoy of stores and reserve ammunition. Warning was sent to Macpherson, and some assistance in cavalry. It was absolutely necessary to carry the heights in front before evening. General Baker was entrusted with this very difficult duty, which he completed in the most admirable manner. He sent a party under Major White, 92nd Highlanders, consisting of a wing of that regiment, three guns, G-3 R. A., 100 of 23rd Pioneers, and two squadrons 5th P. C., to advance by the right of the gorge. After an obstinate resistance, Major White succeeded in driving the enemy off the main hill, and later in the day captured 12 guns. Our loss here, three Highlanders killed, six wounded, and a man, 5th Punjab Cavalry,

killed, two wounded, and one 9th Lancer wounded. General Baker, with 72nd Highlanders, Wing 5th Goorkhas, 100 5th P. I., and remainder of 23rd Pioneers, four guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, and two Gatlings, made a turning movement to the left, and was soon hotly engaged. He reports that the advance of the troops was made to his entire satisfaction, height after height being carried in gallant style. Our loss, Captain Young, 5th Punjab Infantry, and Doctor Duncan, 23rd, Lieutenant Fergusson, 72nd, wounded; and about 70 men killed and wounded. Enemy's loss unknown, but it must have been considerable; they fled in great confusion and lost two standards. We have strong pickets posted, as large numbers of Ghilzais are still in neighbourhood; but I hope to-morrow to be able to march to within a short distance of Kabul. Amir states Bala Hissar is no longer in possession of people he can trust; his family have moved into the city. The headmen of Chardeh, a suburb of Kabul, have asked if they may pay their respects to me. Others will probably follow their example, and I am sanguine that the country will quiet down now that the people see opposition is useless, but at present there is very great excitement in the city and country generally. I received greatest assistance throughout the day from army signalling under direction of Captain Straton, 22nd regiment."

Enclosure 1 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 2nd October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kushi, through Shuturguridan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Amir is much alarmed for safety of his family in Bala Hissar, and begged me to interview him yesterday on subject of our advance. He and his advisers strongly urge delay. I said it was impossible, but that time would be given for all women and children to clear out of city. Amir fears his own troops may attack and sack Bala Hissar on hearing of our approach. He has only one regiment he can depend upon, and it is quite evident from having made no arrangements for their families that the Afghans never contemplated a British force would reach Kabul this season. Indeed, the Sirdars admit this, and don't conceal their surprise at the rapidity of our movements.

Amir hurried to our camp on hearing that Wali Muhammad and other Sirdars intended doing so; he wished to be beforehand. Amir accompanies me on line of march to-day.

Enclosure 2 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 2nd October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kushi, through Shuturguridan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

67th Foot and G.-3 reached this yesterday. The two Infantry Brigades join Cavalry Brigade at Zarghun Shahr to-day, when Kushi will be for the time abandoned. Except as regards postal service, which I hope will be maintained regularly, and possibly heliograph signalling from some hill near Kabul, we shall have no communication with the Shuturguridan for some days. As soon as I have possession of Bala Hissar, General Gough will establish military post between Kabul and Shuturguridan, but I am averse to leaving so small parties on the road at present; besides, it is desirable to reach Kabul as strong as possible. Meanwhile 3rd Sikhs, 21st Native Infantry, and 4 guns Mounted Battery are strongly entrenched on Shuturguridan, and will be provided with food and ammunition. Holding the Shuturguridan gives me great support. One fatal case of cholera in Mountain Battery yesterday.

Enclosure 3 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 3rd October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Zarghun Shahr, through Shuturguridan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Column arrived here yesterday, and marches to-day to Zahidabad; great difficulties about transport. No certain information of attitude of troops in and about Kabul, apparently want of leaders renders them powerless. The Ghilzais watched our move-

ments very closely, and yesterday morning assembled in great force on ridge above Shuturgurda. Colonel Money wisely attacked them, and drove them off with loss of 30 killed, number of wounded unknown. Our loss, Major Griffiths, 3rd Sikhs, and a sergeant of 67th, belonging to signalling party, both slightly wounded; also three men, 3rd Sikhs: this will have good effect all over the country.

Enclosure 4 in No. 29.

PROCLAMATION (by GENERAL ROBERTS) to all people of Kabul, dated Camp Zarghun Shahr, 3rd October 1879.

BE it known to all that the British army is advancing on Kabul to take possession of the city. If it be allowed to do so peacefully, well and good; if not, the city will be seized by force; therefore, all well-disposed persons, who have taken no part in the dastardly murder of the British Envoy, or in the plunder of the Residency, are warned that, if they are unable to prevent resistance being offered to the entrance of the British army, and the authority of His Highness, they should make immediate arrangements for their own safety, either by coming to the British camp, or by such other measures as may seem fit to them; and as the British Government does not make war on women and children, warning is given that all women and children should be removed from the city beyond the reach of harm. The British Government desires to treat all classes with justice, and to respect their religion, feeling, and customs, while exacting full retribution from offenders; every effort will, therefore, be made to prevent the innocent suffering with the guilty, but it is necessary that the utmost precaution should be taken against useless opposition.

After receipt of this proclamation, therefore, all persons armed in or about Kabul will be treated as enemies of the British Government, and, further, it must be distinctly understood that, if the entry of the British force is resisted, I cannot hold myself responsible for any accidental injury which may be done to the persons or property, even of well-disposed people, who may have neglected this warning.

Enclosure 5 in No. 29.

Translation of a Proclamation issued by His Highness the AMIR to all people of Kabul, without date.

It is hereby notified that the British troops are advancing to take possession of the city of Kabul, that is to say, to restore order there. If the above-mentioned troops be allowed to do so peacefully and without resistance, well and good, namely, the people will be protected and their lives and property saved, and injury will be caused to no one; if not, it will be seized by force. Therefore, all well-disposed persons, the Chiefs, the soldiers, and the followers of His Highness the Amir, who have taken no part in the dastardly murder of the British Envoy or in the plunder of the Residency are warned that, in case they are unable to prevent resistance being offered by the ignorant and rebellious people to the British army and to the authority of His Highness the Amir, they should remove themselves and their families from among those ignorant and wicked people, and make arrangements for their safety, either by coming to the British camp, or by such other measures as may seem fit to them; and as the British Government does not think it lawful to make war on women and children, warning is given that, in case a band of the ignorant and vicious people should take up arms and offer resistance to the British Government, the well-wishers and the followers of His Highness the Amir, whether soldiers or others, should remove their wives and children from the city to some safe place. The British Government desires to treat all classes of people with justice and equity, to respect their religion, feelings, and customs, at the same time it will inflict severe punishment on the offenders and mutineers. Great care will be taken that the innocent do not suffer with the guilty, but it is necessary that the people of Kabul should take utmost precaution against opposition and not enter into open hostility to the British Government. After receipt of this proclamation, therefore, all persons inside and outside the town should not carry arms, as their carrying them would make the British Government suspicious of their hostile attitude, and all persons armed will be treated as enemies of the British Government; and if the entry of the British force is resisted by the inhabitants of Kabul, the British Government cannot hold itself responsible for any accidental injury which may be done to the persons and property even of well-disposed people.

Enclosure 6 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 5th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Zahidabad, through Shuturguridan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Reached this yesterday; obliged to halt to-day to send back transport for reserve ammunition and stores. March to-morrow to Charasiah, leaving all impediments in store here. Walled hill above Kabul visible from camp. Hope to open communication by heliograph with Shuturguridan. A standard was captured from the enemy on the Shuturguridan on Thursday by a native officer of 3rd Sikhs. All well.

Enclosure 7 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 4th October 1879.

From DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, Thull, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Simla.

ARRIVED yesterday evening. Ascertained following additional particulars regarding Kinloch's death. Dr. Bellew and other officers left Thull shortly before him. He marched along with his baggage and servants accompanied by a sowar. Other party safely reached Mundoorie halting ground. Kinloch was wearing Peshawur loongee, and was not distinguishable from a cavalry sowar. Scene of offence, a ravine running down to river Kurram from interior of Zaimusht country, some 11 miles from Thull, and in portion of road for which Wattizais are responsible. One of the Zaimushts said to have been shot in leg by deceased. Offenders were Khoedad Khel from furthest settlements, one of same sections as committed both raids near Gandior. Wattizai chowkidars in nearest road towers arrested, and in custody. Road kept open in consultation with General Gordon by Khatak levies.

Enclosure 8 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 3rd October 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Simla.

GENERAL GOUGH reaches Basawul. Agent of Governor of Jellalabad in camp assisting with supplies. The Governor himself will wait on the General to-morrow. Afridis, Shinwaris all working well. Amir's Sirdars to assist have reached Lalpura.

Enclosure 9 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 4th October 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Simla.

KHAN of Lalpura and Governor of Jellalabad have both come in, and are helping with supplies.

Enclosure 10 in No. 29.

Telegram from Kandahar, dated 3rd October 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kelat-i-Ghilzai, 20th September, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

ARRIVED this morning with General Hughes' column, which halts here for two days. Arrangements made by Sirdar Sher Ali Khan for supplies on road and for post excellent. Letter coming from Kandahar in 36 hours. Sirdar Mahomed Tahir Khan met me outside the fort; has collected certain amount supplies; grain abundant, but fuel and forage scarce. He has about 500 Khasadars, mostly Wardaks; about 300 are in fort, which is left in his hands. The country apparently quiet. Caravans arriving unmolested from Kabul. Thermometer falling below freezing point at night; early and severe winter predicted.

Enclosure 11 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 4th October 1879.

FROM GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

As supplies are insufficient at Naorak, General Hughes' brigade has been permitted to go to Ab-i-Tazi, the third march from Kelat.

Amir has made no communication to the Southern Ghilzais, except that he remains on terms of alliance with English.

Enclosure 12 in No. 29.

Camp Ali Khel, 19th September 1879.

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding the Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward copies of letters of this date addressed by me to Padshah Khan and Asmatulla Khan, leading Chieftains of the Ahmedzai and Jabbarkhel Ghilzais, with the object (a) of establishing friendly relations and gaining over to our side the influence and assistance of those powerful Chiefs, which will be invaluable to both the Shuturguridan and Khyber Columns; (b) of making their personal acquaintance as soon as opportunity may offer.

The former I hope to see shortly, the latter after my arrival in Kabul, and after he has been of use, as I trust he may, to the Jellalabad Force.

Enclosure 13 in No. 29.

Translation of a Copy of a Letter from GENERAL ROBERTS to PADSHAH KHAN, Ghilzai, dated 19th September 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Your brother Allal-ud-din, with his son Bahram Khan, has arrived in Camp. I am aware of your attachment and that of your family (to the British Government). Therefore they have been treated, and will be treated with honour and respect.

Whereas we intend to proceed shortly to Kabul, *via* Logar, with a view to render friendly assistance and support to His Highness the Amir, and take revenge on the mutineers who massacred the Embassy, I hope that you, out of your devotion of long standing (to the British Government), will give me the pleasure of seeing you at Kushi at the time of the arrival of the British Camp there, and will accompany me to your own limits. By this you will do service to both Governments, and will be handsomely rewarded.

Rest assured in every respect; but do not fail to join the camp at Kushi.

Enclosure 14 in No. 29.

Translation of a Copy of a Letter from GENERAL ROBERTS to ASMATULLA KHAN, Jabbarkhel, dated 19th September 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Whereas I am well aware of your attachment to the British Government, and also know that you expressed the same to the late Major Cavagnari at Jellalabad, I consider you my friend. I am also aware that you have not waited upon the Kabul Durbar for certain reasons.

Whereas I intend proceeding shortly to Kabul, at the head of the Imperial troops, *via* Logar, I write to ask you to come and see me at Kabul as soon as you hear of my arrival there. I shall receive you honourably, and be pleased to see you. This will conduce to your welfare. I hope that you will not delay your visit after I arrive there.

Rest assured in every way, and be not afraid.

Herewith I enclose a copy of the proclamation, from which the object of the present expedition will become known to you. It is hoped that you will, out of friendship,

circulate and make known the said proclamation to the people at large, so that the tribes and the people who have not taken part in the base massacre of the Embassy may rest quite assured, and may not be afraid, as the revenge will be inflicted only on the participators in the crime.

Enclosure 15 in No. 29.

No. 9, dated Ali Khel, 24th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRED. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward in original, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, the enclosed letter to my address, from Sirdar Ahmad Ali Khan, together with covering letter from an Armenian Christian in Kabul.

18th September 1879.

AFTER many compliments, if God please, I will come myself to see and explain you all the news after some days. Believe me, Sir, Sirdar Ahmad Ali Khan is the only well-wisher of the British in this country. The well-wisher of the Christian faith, Luka or Sur-ood-din, an Armenian Christian, and a student of Revd. T. P. Hughes.

(Signed) C. M. S., Peshawur.

Enclosure 16 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR AHMAD ALI KHAN to GENERAL ROBERTS, without date.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—The death of Sir Louis Cavagnari has caused me great sorrow, but as there is no remedy against the divine decree, nothing can be done.

May the Almighty now protect you with all the well-wishes of Her Imperial Majesty's Government from all harm. I and all my friends and relatives, the well-wishers of the everlasting Government, are looking forward to the time when we can do service to that Government with devotion and zeal.

Further rest assured in every respect, and please always gratify me with the good news of the well-being of the Imperial Government as well as of your own good health.

Enclosure 17 in No. 29.

No. 12, dated Ali Khel, 25th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRED. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 9 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, a copy of my reply to Sirdar Ahmad Ali Khan.

2. I have also the honour to forward, in original, a letter received yesterday from Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, together with copy of my reply. (See ante.)

Enclosure 18 in No. 29.

Dated Ali Khel, 25th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRED. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to SIRDAR AHMAD ALI KHAN.

I HAVE received your letter, expressing your sorrow at the late occurrences in Kabul, and your readiness to serve the British Government. I am glad to have news of you and to know your feelings in this matter. It will give me pleasure to be informed from time to time of your welfare.

Enclosure 19 in No. 29.

Dated Ali Khel, 25th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRED. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to SIRDAR WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN.

Your letter has reached me safely at this place. I was glad to receive news of your welfare, and I send this reply to let you know that I shall be happy to hear from time to time that you are in good health.

Enclosure 20 in No. 29.

No. 8, dated Ali Khel, 23rd September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

- (1.) From His Highness the Amir of Kabul to General Sir F. Roberts, dated 18th September 1879.
- (2.) From His Highness the Amir of Kabul, to General Sir F. Roberts, dated 19th September 1879.
- (3.) From Sirdar Ayub Khan to His Highness the Amir.
- (4.) From His Highness the Amir to Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan, dated 19th September 1879.
- (5.) From Captain Karazin to the Governor of Afghan-Turkestan.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, the letters marginally noted.

Enclosure 21 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from AMIR YAKUB KHAN to GENERAL ROBERTS, dated 1st Shawal 1296 H.=(18th September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that your friendly letter dated the 27th Ramazan (15th September) reached me yesterday, Thursday the 29th idem (17th September). From its contents I have derived a series of fresh favour and innumerable kindnesses on the part of the noble British Government towards me, as well as their wishes for the advancement and continuance of my Government which has greatly pleased and gratified me and increased the degree of my sincere friendship and love for that powerful Government.

My Peshkhidmat Sher Muhammad Khan arrived here after I had read your friendly letter. Although he has brought no letter from you, he has made a verbal statement of the favour and kindness of the British Government towards me, and thereby opened the doors of joy and happiness to the face of my sincere heart.

As I have deputed Mirza Habibulla Khan, the Mustaufi, and Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan to you, and they, please God, will represent all the particulars and the minutiae of the event as well as my friendly sentiments towards the illustrious British Government, I think it sufficient to write the above. It is sincerely hoped that the above-mentioned officials will return with speed and happiness.

Enclosure 22 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from the AMIR to GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., dated 2nd Shawal 1296 H.=(19th September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that I have received and perused this day, Saturday the 2nd Shawal, your friendly letter dated the 29th Ramazan (17th September 1879) accompanied with two copies of proclamation to the address of the people of Kabul and Logar. From the contents of the (said) writings, viz., the friendly letter and the proclamations, I have fully understood the sentiments of friendship, kindness, sympathy and amity on the part of the officers of the illustrious British Government in regard to myself. I have deputed my most confidential agents to you. They will, please God, represent and state before you all the particulars of the case. I would,

therefore, not trouble you by writing more than this, that all that I most sincerely and cordially wish and desire is the friendship and amity of the illustrious British Government; by God's help the truth of these assertions has been and will be manifest and apparent every day.

I have informed the Mustaufi of certain internal and external matters. He will communicate them to you.

Enclosure 23 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR AYUB KHAN to the AMIR YAKUB KHAN, without date.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Previous to this I sent you a detailed account of the murder of the late General Fakir Ahmed Khan both by post of Wednesday * 4th September 1879. the (16th Ramazan)* and by the hands of my Peshkhidmat Gholam Muhammad Khan. God willing, you will receive and peruse it.

And as the customary post is now leaving for that direction, and you may perhaps wish to know what the state of affairs is, I beg to inform you that since the death of General Fakir Ahmed no untoward circumstance has happened. Let us see what will happen hereafter.

I hope you will take my petitions into your favourable consideration. As it is my duty I have represented the above.

P.S.—To-day the Kabuli Kandaks (Regiments?) laid plans for raising a revolt and committing another mischief, under the pretext of their pay being 'in arrears. But Hafiz Khan has commenced to pay them and has given one regiment their two months' pay. Consequently they are quiet at present, but what will happen hereafter remains to be seen. It being my duty, I have represented the above.

Enclosure 24 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from the AMIR to the MUSTAUFU and WAZIR SHAH MUHAMMAD, dated 2nd Shawal 1296 H.=(19th September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Thanks be to God that all is well here. I have just received a letter from Ghulam Hyder Khan, the Deputy Governor of Turkestan, dated Thursday the 23rd* Ramazan, enclosing a letter to his address from a Russian Captain. I send the same herewith in original for the information of General Roberts, so that he may know that both I and my servants acknowledge as friends no one but the illustrious British Government, and that we have and will have no hesitation or doubt in imprisoning strangers and expelling them from our country. The said Deputy Governor also reports that four Kandaks (regiments?) have left for the capital, and that they arrived at Tashkurghan on Thursday the 23rd* Ramazan.

* 11th September 1879.

Enclosure 25 in No. 29.

Literal Translation from the Russian.

Kelif, August 25th.
[New Style: September 6th.]

Worthy and Respected Ruler of Mazar-i-Sharif.

ALONG the downward course of the Amu Darya, from Termez, there is [now] being floated down a Kayuk, occupied by four Russian travellers, with whom are four Cossacks and [some] servants.

Yesterday, the 25th* instant, this Kayuk was driven against [or, close to] the left Afghan bank of the river; and when three Cossacks and four Bokhariot Kayuk-men disembarked to tow the Kayuk [walking on shore], some Afghan people attacked them, and carried them off. This happened near the ferry of Chushka Gázár.

* [This must either be the 24th August-5th September; or the letter should have been dated the 26th August-7th September.]—Tr.

By the grace of God, Russia and Bokhara are at present at peace with Afghanistan, and not at war; hence I hope that this seizure of our people has not been effected by order of the Afghan authorities.

Informing you, the Worthy and Respected Ruler of Mazar-i-Sharif, of this, I request of you to pass an order to have these three captured Russian Cossacks and four Bokhariots sent to Kelif, without doing them any harm or violence.

I hope you will comply with this, my lawful and respectful, request.

(Signed) CAPTAIN NICOLAI KARAZIN.

SIMULTANEOUSLY I am also informing his Excellency Major-General Ivanof, Governor of the Samarkand Province, of all that has taken place.

Enclosure 26 in No. 29.

No. 10, dated Ali Khel, 24th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq.; C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, notes of an interview which I had yesterday with the Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan.

Enclosure No. 27 in No. 29.

Notes of an Interview between GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS and the Amir's Agents, MUSTAUFU HABIBULLA KHAN and WAZIR SHAH MUHAMMAD KHAN, Ali Khel, 23rd September 1879.

AFTER compliments General Roberts intimated to the Agents that at their desire he had granted them a second interview. He now requested them to be good enough to speak freely all that they wished him to know.

The Mustaufi then spoke in the following sense:—The interests of England and Afghanistan are the same, and the Amir and his officials are deeply grieved at the late occurrences in Kabul. Moreover, the Amir is anxious to do whatever the British Government wishes, and most desirous that the dignity of the British Government should be maintained by any means which may seem proper to the Viceroy. But His Highness cannot conceal from himself that the mutinous troops and the people in general, ryots as well as soldiers, are in fear of an indiscriminate revenge which will fall alike upon innocent and guilty. He hopes, therefore, that measures will be taken to guard against the possibility of a general rising consequent on fear.

The Mustaufi was here reminded of the tenor of General Roberts' proclamation of 15th September. He answered that the people were too ignorant to be acted upon by a proclamation; and then went on as follows:—

Of course it is possible that no such combination may take place. The Afghans are selfish and divided against themselves. Still, lest he should be plamed if it should occur, the Amir thinks it right to express his opinion and give the British Government all the information in his power. On the whole his advice, as an earnest friend, is that the advance of a British force on Kabul should be delayed for a short time ("Panj roz"). In the interval he will endeavour to disarm the regular troops; raise new levies; and, by the aid of the latter, punish all concerned in the late abominable outrage. His idea is to get rid of Sher Ali's soldiery, always a source of danger, and keep only 15,000 men for the future. It would be very desirable to delay the advance until he could establish his power. The Amir does not mean to imply that any Afghan army, were it 50,000 strong, could resist the British. The mutinous troops have neither organisation nor leaders. But the mutinous troops are of all tribes, and if the British army destroys them, as it would undoubtedly do in case of resistance, the whole country may combine against the British and the Amir. It is for this reason that he advises delay, and that the punishment of the guilty be left to him. The Viceroy may rest assured that he will show no mercy. He will make an example which will be conspicuous in the eyes of the

world as the sun at noonday. Already every one in Kabul regards the Amir as an infidel because of the way in which he and his have thrown their lot with the British Government.

Notwithstanding all that has been said, however, things might go right if the mutinous troops would keep together and attempt a stand. But the Amir feels they will not do so. They are more likely to scatter here and there and raise the country. In that case there will be constant attacks on the communications of the force, and the gathering of supplies will be difficult. They would come chiefly from the direction of Ghazni, partly also from Logar. If the tribes rise it will be hard to collect them. Only one month remains before the setting in of winter.

Of course it is impossible to say what may happen. There may be no opposition, and the Amir is in any case ready to do what the British Government desires. But he feels it is his duty to express his strong opinion that the present season is unsuited for a forward movement.

General Roberts replied that on behalf of the Viceroy he thanked the Amir for his kind advice, which he was confident was the advice of a friend. He said the matter was important and required careful consideration and asked whether the Agents had anything more to bring forward.

The Mustaufi then spoke as follows:—The Amir's advice to delay the advance is that of a sincere friend, and it is the best he can give. But if the British army is to march on Kabul there is one thing more which I am desired to say. Let it march in such strength as to crush all hopes of mischief, and put down all rebellion throughout the country. You cannot wait for reinforcements. If you come you must come in full strength—in sufficient strength to put down all opposition. There may be no opposition, but you cannot count on this.

General Roberts replied:—The Amir's advice is of great importance and must be carefully considered. When His Highness first wrote announcing the outbreak at Kabul and asking for help the first desire of the Viceroy was to send the British forces on without delay. I was ordered to Kurram at once to lead the force here. Simultaneously the Kandahar force was ordered by telegram to return to Kandahar, which it was then leaving, and to advance towards Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and instructions were issued to collect a third force at Peshawur. All this was to help the Amir with the least possible delay. The Viceroy from the first contemplated the possibility of such a general rising as the Amir now fears, and the several armies were therefore by his Excellency's order made up to such a strength that all Afghanistan combined could not stand against them for a moment. The Kandahar troops were

* NOTE.—The Agents here seemed surprised and anxious.—H. M. D. ready in a very short time, and are now beyond Kandahar, on the road to Kabul.* The Peshawur force was rapidly collected and pushed on; and the Amir may rest assured that the British army is advancing in ample strength. I will think over the Amir's advice nevertheless, for it is important. But His Highness must remember that the late occurrences at Kabul do not affect only the English officers and the 50 or 60 men who were treacherously killed. The honour of the English Government is concerned, and so long as the bodies of these officers and men remained unburied or uncared for in Kabul, I do not believe the English people will ever be satisfied. They will require the advance of a British force, and the adequate punishment of the crime. Still the Amir's advice, which I am convinced is that of a friend, must be carefully considered, and I will think over it and give an answer later.

The Mustaufi then said:—We quite understand what has been said about the strength of the British army. Doubtless it is sufficient, and all Afghanistan could not stand against it. But the Amir asked us to mention, what I have hitherto forgotten, that there are in Turkestan 24 regiments of infantry, six of cavalry, and 56 guns. These troops were the first to show a disaffected spirit at Mazar-i-Sharif, and putting aside external enemies there are Abdul Rahman and the sons of Azim Khan waiting their chance. Herat again is doubtful, when the troops there hear what has occurred at Kabul there is no saying what they may do. If Abdul Rahman ingratiates himself with these people Herat and Turkestan will be permanently severed from the Afghan dominions. This is another reason why the advance of the British force should be delayed in order that the Amir may have time to gain over the Herat and Turkestan troops.

General Roberts replied.—All these reasons will have full consideration. The Viceroy's first order was to push on at once to help the Amir, but I am sure His Highness' advice is friendly, and that in any case he will do his utmost to co-operate with

the British Government. Therefore, every consideration will be given to what His Highness has desired you to say.

The Mustaufi.—The Viceroy may be sure the Amir will do what he pleases.

The Wazir.—When the Amir learnt from General Roberts' letter that the Viceroy had given General Roberts power to deal with the whole matter he was very pleased, knowing General Roberts' character as a soldier and his kindness of heart.

General Roberts replied that he would carefully consider the proposals brought forward, and give an answer later on. Meanwhile he must request the Agents to stay a day or two in camp until he should have thoroughly weighed the Amir's advice, which was of the utmost importance to both the British and Afghan Governments.

The interview then came to an end.

Enclosure 28 in No. 29.

No. 11, dated Ali Khel, 25th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council a copy, in Persian and English, of my reply to His Highness the Amir's letters of the 18th and 19th September.

Enclosure 29 in No. 29.

Dated Camp Ali Khel, 25th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, to His Highness the AMIR OF KABUL.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—I have received your Highness' two letters of the 18th and 19th September (1st and 2nd Shawal), delivered to me by the hands of your Highness' two confidential representatives, Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Muhammad.

I am much obliged to your Highness for sending to me two such well-known men, and of such high character, as the Mustaufi and the Wazir. They have informed me of your Highness' wishes, and I quite understand all they have told me.

It is unfortunate that the season is so late, and that winter will soon be here, but there is time yet for a British army to reach Kabul before the great cold sets in.

The Viceroy of India is much concerned that there should have been any delay in promptly acceding to your Highness' request for assistance and advice, as conveyed in your Highness' letters of the 3rd and 4th instant.

It was his Excellency's earnest wish that troops should march on Kabul at once, so as to ensure your Highness' personal safety, and aid your Highness in restoring peace and order at your capital.

Unfortunately, the want of transport and the necessity for collecting a certain amount of supplies have caused a few weeks' delay; it is, however, a source of gratification and happiness to the Viceroy to learn that your Highness' safety is not at present endangered, and his Excellency trusts your Highness will be able to keep everything quiet in your kingdom, until such time as British troops may reach Kabul.

I am glad to be able to inform your Highness that news reached me yesterday of the departure of a considerable force from Kandahar under the command of a brave and distinguished officer, and that a large body of troops, under command of General Bright, were advancing rapidly from Peshawur to Jellalabad and onwards, *via* Gandamak to Kabul.

My own force will, I hope, be in a state to march before long. As your Highness is aware, the Shuturguridan has been occupied for some days; meanwhile regiments of cavalry and infantry, and batteries of artillery have reached Kurram to replace those I am taking on with me, and to re-inforce my own column, should a necessity for more troops arise, a contingency I do not in the least expect.

The Viceroy of India, in his Excellency's anxiety for your Highness' welfare and safety, issued orders that each of the three armies now advancing on Kandahar, Kurram,

and the Khyber, should be strong enough to overcome any opposition your Highness' enemies could possibly offer. That each is strong enough there can be no doubt.

I understand that there is no one at Kelat-i-Ghilzai or Ghazni to stop the progress of the troops *en route* from Kandahar; there is no reason, therefore, why they should not reach Kabul in a very short time.

The Khyber tribes, having understood and appreciated the Treaty of peace made by your Highness with the British Government in May last, have unanimously agreed to assist the troops from Peshawur in every way, and are now eager to keep the road through the Khyber safe, and to place all their transport animals at the disposal of the British Commander, who will thus be enabled to concentrate his force rapidly at Kabul.

Through the kindness of your Highness I have experienced much less difficulty than I could have expected, and I may now reasonably hope to be with your Highness at least as soon as either the Kandahar or Khyber column.

I look forward with great pleasure to the meeting with your Highness, and trust that you will continue your kind assistance to obtain for me supplies and transport,

I have carefully considered your Highness' proposal, that you yourself should be permitted to administer just punishment to the mutinous troops and others who shared in the treacherous and cruel attack on the British Envoy and his small escort, and thus save Her Majesty's troops the trouble, hardship, and privation which must necessarily be encountered by an advance on Kabul at this season of the year.

I thank your Highness most cordially on the part of the Viceroy and Government of India for this further proof of your Highness' friendly feelings. Under ordinary circumstances such an offer would be gratefully and willingly accepted; but after what has recently occurred, I feel sure that the great British nation would not rest satisfied unless a British army marched to Kabul, and there assisted your Highness to inflict such punishment as so terrible and dastardly an act deserves.

I have forwarded your Highness' letters in original to the Viceroy; a copy of this, my reply, will be submitted by to-day's post for his Excellency's consideration. Meanwhile I have permitted Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Muhammad to take their leave, and rejoin your Highness.

It would be convenient, I think, to both your Highness and to me, and would materially assist my future communication with your Highness, if one or other of the above-named gentlemen could remain with me. Should they see no objection to this arrangement, I will request one of them to stay in my camp, pending an intimation of your Highness' approval.

Enclosure 30 in No. 29.

No. 14, dated Ali Khel, 26th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, notes of my third interview with His Highness the Amir's officials, Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan. They left camp early this morning for Kabul.

Enclosure 31 in No. 29.

Notes of an interview between MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., and the Amir's Agents, MUSTAUFİ HABİBULLA KHAN and WAZİR SHAH MUHAMMAD KHAN, dated Ali Khel, 25th September 1879.

AFTER compliments General Roberts requested the Mustaufi to take charge of a letter for His Highness the Amir. In it General Roberts said he had thanked His Highness for sending him two such distinguished officials as those now in camp, and had informed the Amir that he thoroughly understood all His Highness had charged them to say. But it was impossible for him to accept the Amir's advice in its entirety. In accordance with the Amir's first request, the Viceroy had at once prepared three armies to march on Kabul. The Peshawur and Kurram Forces were now nearly ready, and the Kandahar Force had already pushed forward. To stop the advance of these armies now was a

thing which General Roberts could not do. To begin with, the Viceroy would be much distressed if any misfortune were to happen to the Amir on account of the absence of British support; and, in the second place, the British nation would never be satisfied unless a British force advanced to Kabul and recovered the bodies of the officers and men so foully murdered. The forces therefore must advance. In the meanwhile, General Roberts trusted that the Amir would be able to guard himself, and maintain peace and security at his capital. The Mustaufi replied that the Amir had sent himself and his colleague to assure General Roberts of His Highness' fidelity to the British. * Whatever General Roberts thought best should of course be done.

General Roberts requested the Mustaufi to assure the Amir that he had carefully considered His Highness' advice. The conclusion at which he had arrived was shown in his letter to His Highness. Putting aside the question of an advance, the letter contained, he said, his thanks for the assistance of the two officials sent by His Highness, and a request that he might retain the services of one of them. If, however, they both preferred to return now, General Roberts was of course willing to afford them every facility. But he hoped one of them, or some equally trusted official, would soon be sent to his camp. The Mustaufi replied that he was hard worked as Finance Minister, while his colleague had the foreign work, besides other departments of the administration in his charge, and that he feared the absence of either would cause serious inconvenience to the Amir.

General Roberts said, that in that case he could not ask either of them to remain, but, considering the special importance of having constant and easy communication between the Amir and the British camp, he hoped some trusted servant would be sent without delay.

The Mustaufi replied, that since his departure from Kabul he had only received one letter from the Amir, and was therefore ignorant of the state of affairs in Turkestan and Herat. If, when he reached Kabul, all was quiet, the Amir would probably come in person to meet General Roberts, or send his son. If not, it would be necessary to devote all their energies to ensuring the Amir's safety. Meanwhile the Mustaufi thought it necessary that he and his colleague should return at once, and hinted at the desirability of a little delay on the part of the force in order that they might have time to reach Kabul first and make any necessary arrangements.

General Roberts said his own object was to ensure the Amir's safety, and that His Highness should be told exactly beforehand when the force was likely to reach Kabul. His Highness would then be able to make arrangements for coming himself to the British camp. But in any case, to show the people that there was no disunion between the Amir and the British Government, it was especially desirable to send over a trustworthy official.

General Roberts then asked the Agents when they would like to start, in order that a guard might be ready; and he requested them to accept rupees 2,000 each with rupees 1,000 more for their servants.

The Mustaufi and the Wazir both seemed anxious to start at once, evidently fearing that the British force would enter Kabul, almost simultaneously with themselves. It was, however, eventually arranged that they should not leave camp until the following morning, General Roberts being of opinion that they should not spend the night, except in the security of a British encampment.

The Agents then took their leave.

After dismissing the Amir's officials, General Roberts received, with their assent, a son of Padshah Khan, who had accompanied them from Kabul. He assured General Roberts that his father would join the British camp on the advance of the force from Koushi.

Enclosure 32 in No. 29.

No. 16, dated Kushi, 29th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, the papers marginally noted, and to report that I left

(1.) Letter from General Sir F. Roberts to His Highness the Amir, dated 28th September 1879.

(2.) Letter from His Highness the Amir to General Sir F. Roberts, dated 29th (28th?) September 1879.

(3.) Letter from Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan to the address of General Sir F. Roberts.

(4.) Letter containing Kabul news furnished by Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan.

(5.) Letter from Sirdar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan to General Sir F. Roberts.

Ali Khel on the 27th instant and arrived at Kushi yesterday.

2. I found His Highness the Amir in Brigadier-General Baker's camp. Early in the morning of the 27th, Major Hastings received a letter from His Highness intimating that he and some of his Sirdars were on their way to Kushi, and shortly after noon the Amir's approach was announced. His Highness was met by Major Hastings a mile from the camp, and later by Brigadier-General Baker, who went out with a squadron of cavalry to receive him. He was accompanied by his son Sirdar Muhammad Musa Khan, by Sirdar Yahya Khan, by Sirdar Ahmad Ali Khan, and by about 300 sowars, but was without tents or equipage of any kind. 200 of the sowars who had accompanied His Highness returned the same evening to Kabul. Every endeavour has been made by Brigadier-General Baker to consult the Amir's comfort, and His Highness professes himself entirely satisfied with the treatment accorded to him. But on his first arrival in the camp it appeared both to Brigadier-General Baker and to Major Hastings that he was anxious and ill at ease. He has now obtained tents and has requested leave to remove from the centre of the camp, where Brigadier-General Baker had arranged for him to stay.

3. This morning I paid a visit of ceremony to the Amir, and during the afternoon His Highness returned the visit. He was received with the customary honours. Nothing of importance passed at either interview, and I propose to defer until to-morrow any discussion with His Highness of the present state of affairs in Kabul, and the measures to be adopted for the restoration of order. I have, however, already been informed at the Amir's desire that before my arrival His Highness had issued orders to meet the wishes of Government in two matters of some urgency, namely, the arrangements to be made for facilitating the advance of the Khyber column, and the collection of supplies for the force under my command. With regard to the first point His Highness had, he says, before the receipt of any request from me, addressed the Hakim of Jellalabad and the Khan of Lalpura ordering that every assistance should be afforded to the troops advancing from the Khyber, and the orders have now been repeated. With regard to the collection of supplies for this force I am informed that His Highness yesterday offered to place at our disposal the stores of grain and other necessities which had been collected in the Khalsa villages in the neighbourhood. Some of His Highness' officials were accordingly sent out with all the transport animals available, and I hope that ample supplies will soon be forthcoming.

4. The arrangements for the protection of the road between Kushi and Ali Khel are complete. I have decided to withdraw the troops now at Karatiga, which is not in all ways a suitable position, and to replace them by a mixed garrison of Jajis and Ghilzais; the whole to be under the charge of Allal-ud-din Khan. I have every reason to hope that both this chief and his brother Padshah Khan are in earnest in their desire to preserve intact our postal and telegraphic communications, and to afford us every assistance required on that part of the line with which they are concerned. All arrangements for the road between Kushi and Kabul I propose to leave to the Amir, and I have been given to understand by His Highness' officials that he will gladly undertake the responsibility.

5. Besides His Highness the Amir and the persons who accompanied him, I expect soon to meet Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, and a number of other Sirdars, who left Kabul shortly after His Highness, and arrived yesterday at Zarghun Shahr about 10 miles from here.

Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan has a feeling of antagonism towards the Amir, and I anticipate some difficulty from the relations existing between them. I shall of course receive with caution any information supplied by the Sirdar, or others connected with him, and shall not accept without every careful examination statements to the prejudice of His Highness.

The Sirdar professes to have in his possession a letter written by the Amir to the hill tribes after the conclusion of the Treaty, calling upon them to join him in a Jehád against the English. Any evidence of this nature will receive due consideration; meanwhile I shall make no difference in my treatment of the Amir, which will be in accordance with the respect due to his rank.

6. It will be seen that one of the inclosures to this letter is a letter to my address from Sirdar Ibrahim Khan. I have lately heard that this Sirdar was yesterday arrested by the Governor of Kabul while attempting to leave the city; and that he is now in confinement.

7. The news from Kabul is conflicting, and I am unable to ascertain with any accuracy the movements of the revolted troops and the number of the armed men now in the city. But all is reported quiet, and I am generally assured that there is no prospect of resistance. I propose to march from Kushi on the 2nd of October and reach Kabul on the 5th.

Enclosure 33 in No. 29.

Translation of a Copy of a Letter from GENERAL ROBERTS to AMIR MUHAMMAD YAKUB KHAN, without date (28th September 1879?).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Information has reached me that the troops which his Excellency the Viceroy of India had ordered to march from Peshawur to Kabul, have already started. I therefore request your Highness to issue orders to your Highness' officers and subjects to the effect that they should, as far as lies in their power, facilitate the passage of the British troops which will march through the Khyber Pass to Jellalabad and onward. It is necessary that your Highness should prohibit (them from making) any kind of opposition. It also should be fully explained that the above-mentioned troops are going to assist your Highness and to consolidate your Highness' Government, otherwise it is probable that the stupid and ignorant people may make up their minds to offer opposition.

Be pleased to inform me always of your welfare.

Enclosure 34 in No. 29.

Letter from the AMIR to GENERAL ROBERTS, dated 11th Shawal 1296 A.H.=(28th September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Your friendly letter has reached me just at this moment, 8 p.m. Monday the 11th Shawal (28th September) and opened the doors of joy and happiness on the face of my heart marked with affection. I feel perfectly certain and confident that the movements of Her Imperial Majesty's victorious troops are merely for the purpose of consolidating the foundation of my kingdom and strengthening the basis of my Government.

In truth the sympathy of friends with friends is fitting and proper, and the indulgence and kindness of a great Government to a sincere and faithful friend is agreeable and pleasing. I am exceedingly gratified with, and thankful to, the representatives of the illustrious British Government for their expression of sympathy, and their support of my cause. Your friendly and wise suggestion that none of the ignorant tribes of Afghanistan should oppose the British troops, so that the officers of the British Government should be the better able to support and protect me, is very acceptable and reasonable. Before I received your letter I had sent orders repeatedly to the Governors of Jellalabad and Lalpura not to let any one oppose or resist the British troops, and stringent orders have again been issued to the Governor of Jellalabad to use his utmost endeavours and efforts in this respect. The order in question to the address of the Governor of Jellalabad will be shown to you to-morrow, and sent by an express courier.

Usual ending.

Enclosure 35 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN and 11 other SIRDARS to GENERAL ROBERTS, without date.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that on Friday last the Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan went out under the pretext of walking in, and seeing, the garden of Hissar (Bala Hissar?) and from thence he hastened towards the British camp at the time of sun-set prayer. As we were not aware of the fact we were all perplexed as to where he had gone, and so the whole family being at one with me, we all set out towards you, and are awaiting your orders as to when we may have the honour of meeting you.

To-day Sunday the 10th* (Shawal) we are halting at the village of Zarghun Shahr, and are anxious to know where we may have a joyous interview with you.

* 27th September.

Enclosure 36 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN, to MUHAMMAD HAYAT KHAN, C.S.I., dated 6th Shawal H. 1296= (23rd September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,—Should you wish to know how I am, thank God I am all right.

I have just heard that you have arrived at Ali Khel in company with General Roberts. I therefore write to ask you to let me know how you are, and that if I can do any service for you I will perform it with pleasure.

Rest assured in every respect about these parts. All the tribes about Kabul are quiet—a fact which you will learn from my report (Memorandum). The bearer of your letter gave me an account of the kindness you have shown to him. It has pleased me greatly; and I hope that in future you will also be as kind.

Thank God, all is well here.

Enclosure 37 in No. 29. (Extract.)

Memorandum of SIRDAR WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN, enclosed in a letter from him herewith sent in original.

When the Herat troops were one march from Kabul, they were instructed to raise a cry on arrival at the capital that they would wage a religious war, and that they would not allow the English officers to remain in the town. In accordance with these instructions they raised cries in the city on their arrival there. They quarrelled with the servants of Major Cavagnari in the streets of the town on one or two occasions. I reported this to the Major, and he remarked in reply that it was the habit of a rabid dog to bite, be the person bit however innocent, and that no one could touch his hair. The Sirdar Bahadur (Gholam Nakshband Khan?) is aware of this. After that, these six Herat regiments left on account of the sickness (cholera), and went to their homes, and none of them have as yet returned.

On Wednesday, the 15th of Ramazan (3rd September), three of these six regiments asked for their pay. They were offered one month's wages, but they refused to take the money, and said that they would take nothing short of three months' salary. The Amir told them that they did not perform any service or any religious act, or protect the honour of their country, and so were not entitled to three months' wages. On learning this they broke out and proceeded towards the residence of Major Cavagnari, saying that they would now engage in a religious conflict. Daud Shah came out to prevent them from their design, but was not successful in his attempts. He was insulted, and was wounded in three or four places. At this juncture, Saif-ud-din Khan (a General) presented himself before the Amir and remarked, that if His Highness gave permission he would aid and save Major Cavagnari. But he was rebuked, and was dismissed from service with the remark that he had no concern in the matter. He is now out of his office of General.

The troops and the people of Turkestan raised a disturbance against General Gholam Hyder Khan, Wardak, and plundered the bazaar, the Serai, and the shops, and fled with their families towards Khulm and Sarbagh. The six regiments sent from Kabul to retain them in Turkestan have arrived at Khulm, but these Turkestan regiments are still there. Saripul and Maimena were occupied by Mir Muhammad Khan of Saripul; and Shubarghan was taken possession of by the son of Mir Hakim Khan. Turkestan is without a chief. Gholam Hyder Khan has also come to Khulm.

The Kabuli troops at Herat raised a disturbance as they were disheartened, and their being in arrears of pay was made an excuse for their rising. They killed General Fakir Ahmed Khan, their chief, and deserted, or are deserting the town.

The greater portion of the three regiments (of the six) who had attacked Major Cavagnari, and were deputed to Kohistan after being paid three months' wages, have deserted.

The cavalry regiments of Kabul have gone to their homes, and it is only possible to re-collect them in two months.

Likewise the men of the infantry regiments and artillery men at Kabul have also gone to their homes, and there are not 1,000 soldiers in the lines.

The three regiments which had gone to Ghazni to collect revenue deserted to their homes when they heard of the massacre of the British Embassy at Kabul.

The people of Afghanistan who used to pay revenue to the Amir refuse to make any payments to the collectors, and are hopeful of the favours of the British Government.

About 2,000 Kharwars (a Kabul Kharwar= $14\frac{1}{2}$ maunds English) of grain belonging to the Amir are lying in Logar. The Amir's people intend to take it away. It would be well for the British troops to hasten their advance to Kushi to take possession of the grain.

If the British troops desire to delay their advance (to Kabul) it would at any rate be better to come to Kushi and there halt. There will be many advantages in at once marching to Kushi.

It would be well if Mullah Shah Muhammad Khan and Mirza Habibulla, Mustaufi come (to Kabul) with the British camp. But if they are given *congé* from Kushi the British authorities may do so.

Enclosure 38 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM KHAN to GENERAL ROBERTS, without date.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that about five years ago, I had friendship, with the British Government through Nawab Ata Muhammad Khan and Munshi Bakhtiar Khan, for which my father the late Amir threw me into prison at Kabul and sent me to Turkestan. On his death I returned to Kabul to do service to the (British) Government. But by the decree of God I fell ill. The friendly sentiments I entertained for the late Sir L. Cavagnari and the verbal representations which I had made to him out of my fidelity to the British Government are known to Gholam Nakshband Khan Sirdar Bahadur who may have conveyed them to you. As the decrees of God had passed, no remedy was of any avail. I hope you will consider me your well-wisher. I am waiting for an answer, and any orders that may be sent to me I shall endeavour to carry out in the service of the British Government.

No. 30.

Telegram from VICEROY, 10th October 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

Following information just received from General Roberts, dated 8th instant, outside Kabul. :—Hearing that the troops returned from Kohistan had entrenched themselves on a high hill behind Bala Hissar overlooking city, he sent General Massey, with eight squadrons of cavalry, round by north of city to watch roads leading to Bamian and Kohistan, cutting off enemy's retreat. Simultaneously, General Baker, with strong force, was instructed to attack the enemy from the high ground above Bala Hissar. At sunset Massey had reached Aliabad on Bamian road, and found in the Sherpur cantonment, which was deserted, 78 guns, including 17 Armstrongs. At the same hour Baker was about to attack enemy's position.

No. 30A.

From VICEROY, 12th October 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

FOLLOWING from Roberts, outside Kabul, 10th October :—General Baker was unable to deliver his attack on evening of 8th on account of darkness; before daylight yesterday General Macpherson joined him with 67th Foot, 28th Native Infantry, and four horse artillery guns on elephants; enemy, however, fled during the night, leaving on their very strong position 12 guns, 6 field and 6 mountain; cavalry pursued for several miles in two detachments under General Massey and Hugh Gough, but the enemy had so completely dispersed that they only overtook a few small parties; we have now in our possession 110 guns, there are some 30 more in the Bala Hissar, and a few I hear in the city. Our camp is pitched on the Sia Sang ridge, immediately overlooking and within 1,300 yards of the Bala Hissar and city. I shall make public entry into and take possession of Bala Hissar to-morrow or next day; the troops have worked splendidly, for several days we have been without tents, and rations have had to be carried for want of transports; two wounded men of 72nd and one Sapper have died, remainder of wounded doing well.

No. 31.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE, 14th October 1879, to VICEROY.

I MOST heartily congratulate you upon the success of operations against Kabul. Please telegraph to General Roberts my congratulations on the rapidity and skill with which he has led his forces and my appreciation of the courage and success with which they have achieved their objects.

No. 32.

No. 219 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To The Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, October 16, 1879.

WE have the honour to submit a summary of the intelligence received during the past week regarding the state of affairs in Afghanistan and the progress of our military operations in that country.

2. General Roberts' telegram, despatched on the evening of the 6th October, reporting very briefly his successful engagement with the enemy on the heights between Kabul and Charasiah, formed a postscript to our last despatch. From other accounts it appears that the Afghan regiments and the armed bands of the city held in large numbers a very strong position on the heights above Charasiah, which they defended with tenacity and with some military skill; while the tribal levies, principally Ghilzais from about Tezin and Hazarah, showed in force along the hills upon General Roberts' flank, watching an opportunity to embarrass his advance, and threatening the large convoy that was following under General Macpherson. It is now known that the plans for arresting the advance of our troops upon Kabul had been carefully laid, and that the Ghilzais had been instructed to act against the flanks and rear of our column, while the regular troops and the Kabul people undertook to bar its passage across the hills in front. The information received by General Roberts decided him to attack at once the force on the heights, since delay would have given the enemy time to bring up reinforcements from the city, and to fortify a position that was sufficiently formidable by nature. Moreover, there was good reason for suspecting an understanding and correspondence between the leaders of the resistance in Kabul and the Afghans who were accompanying General Roberts' camp. The attack was opened by a turning movement against the right of the enemy's position, which was executed resolutely and skilfully under a sharp fire. The Afghans fought well, but were beaten back; and when the front attack was delivered, their main body was driven with great loss from the ridge. They continued, however, to contest every point at which the ground favoured a stand, nor was it until dark that the heights were cleared, and the whole position occupied by the British troops. Twenty guns were taken in this action; and it seems certain, from subsequent information, that the regular troops opposed to us were effectively routed, while the tribes who were assembling to co-operate with them are said to have returned to their homes.

3. On the 7th the advanced portion of General Roberts' force was within two miles of the city of Kabul, and the Bala Hissar was found to have been evacuated by the Afghan troops; but three mutinous regiments from Kohistan were reported to have returned to the Sherpur cantonment, on the west side of the city. General Roberts, hearing that these troops were entrenching themselves on a high hill beyond the Bala Hissar, and immediately overlooking the city, detached on the 8th October Brigadier-General Massey with eight squadrons of cavalry to watch the roads leading from the north side of the city to Bamian and Kohistan, in order to cut off the line of retreat. At the same time Brigadier-General Baker, with a force consisting of six companies 92nd Highlanders, two companies 72nd Highlanders, a wing of the 67th Regiment, two companies 5th Goorkhas, 23rd Pioneers, four mountain guns, and two Gatlings, prepared to attack the position on the hill. By sunset on the 8th General Massey had arrived at Aliabad, on the Bamian road, having found the Sherpur cantonment deserted, and having taken possession of 78 guns, found in it. General Baker was prevented by nightfall from opening his attack on the evening of the 8th; he was joined before daylight on the 9th by General Macpherson with additional troops, but during the night the enemy evacuated their position, and took to flight, leaving 12 guns behind them. The cavalry in two detach-

ments, under Generals Massey and Hugh Gough, were sent in pursuit, but the Afghan troops had so completely dispersed that only a few small parties were overtaken. General Roberts' camp was on the 10th October pitched on the Siah Sang ridge, immediately overlooking the Bala Hissar and the city. He visited the Bala Hissar on the 11th, and made his public entry on the 12th, accompanied by the Amir. The whole of the heavy guns and howitzers presented by the British Government to the Amir have been captured, with sufficient ammunition for present purposes; so that General Roberts has been able to send back to Peshawur the heavy battery which was coming up with the Khyber column.

4. Brigadier-General Gordon telegraphs that his camp at Ali Khel was attacked on the morning of the 14th by the Mangals and some sections of other tribes from Spega and the neighbourhood. He reports that they came on very boldly, but were well met by the 29th and 8th Regiments; and that a counter-attack was delivered by his cavalry and infantry with complete success; that the assailants left many dead, while our casualties were five men slightly wounded.

5. The advanced portion of the force moving by the Khyber Pass reached Barikab on the 10th October, and General Gough has now occupied Jellalabad. Supplies were coming in slowly, and the Afghan officials showed little readiness to assist, having probably received secret encouragements to retard, if possible, the advance of our troops, but the country is generally quiet.

6. From Kandahar General Stewart reports that General Hughes' brigade had halted 14 miles in advance of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, as the country beyond could furnish no supplies. The Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, Muhammad Tahir Khan, had no real authority in his district, and the fort is now in the possession of the British troops. Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan, the governor of Zamindawar, had come to Kandahar; his unpopularity and his want of troops to support his authority had much embarrassed his administration, insomuch that Sir Donald Stewart doubted whether he could continue to maintain himself in his government. It appeared to us essential, on political as well as on military grounds, that in the present juncture of affairs at Kabul the local government at Kandahar should be encouraged and supported in preserving order in the adjacent districts, and that those districts which had been formerly administered from Kandahar should be brought within the sphere of our influence and protection whenever this might be necessary to prevent disorganisation. We have accordingly instructed General Stewart that he has full discretion to make any requisite arrangements for preserving tranquillity and for administering Zamindawar from Kandahar; that Muhammad Yusaf, if he proves incapable, need not return to his government; and that the necessary measures may, under existing circumstances, be taken without previously consulting the Amir. The latest news received at Kandahar from Herat was dated 27th September, on which date Sirdar Ayub Khan wrote to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, Governor of Kandahar, that all was well, but that he was perplexed at the news of the Kabul outbreak.

7. There is no further news of importance from the other outlying provinces of Afghanistan.

8. We forward, for your Lordship's information, some further depositions [taken by the Commissioner of Peshawur] of servants of the Kabul Embassy, who escaped from the massacre, and of others who were present in the Bala Hissar when the outbreak took place.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 32.

THIS morning Major Hastings and Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan with Kazi Muhammad Aslam, under orders from Major-General Sir Frederick Roberts V.C., K.C.B., went to see the Amir. The following is the pith of the Amir's advice and conversation:—

(1.) In my opinion the best thing is to occupy the hill commanding the Pass which leads to Kabul. The mutinous troops have lately occupied that hill, and if they were allowed to keep it in their possession for the night they are sure to fortify it, and it will be rather difficult to dislodge them from there to-morrow.

(2.) I have received a verbal message from Kabul to the effect that the mutinous regiments have plundered the magazine. My mother and wife have left the Bala Hissar and gone to the house of Sirdar Yahya Khan; and that the other members of my family will soon follow them. The Bala Hissar is actually out of my possession. I have received no information to this effect from Nazar Muhammad Khan, Governor of Kabul, or from any other officer. But any trustworthy news which I may receive from Kabul at night will at once be communicated to the General through Major Hastings.

(3.) I have been and am still the true friend of the English, and so long as I live I will remain a staunch ally of the British Government.

(4.) On account of my coming to the British Camp, all people call me an infidel (Kafir), and my private servants desert me every day. No one will obey my order or consider me the Amir.

NOTE.—The Amir appeared in a very unsettled and troubled state of mind.

(Signed) E. G. HASTINGS, Major,
Political Officer.

Charasiah, the 6th October 1879.

Enclosure 2 in No. 32.

Telegram, dated 11th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Camp through Shuturgurdan, to Foreign Secretary, Simla.

KABUL, 7th October.—Advance portion of my force is now within two miles of city and Bala Hissar. The latter which has been evacuated by Afghan troops will be occupied by some of this force to-morrow, a camp for the remainder being pitched on the ridge of hills to the east of city known as Siah Sang. The three mutinous regiments which went towards Kohistan are reported to have returned to-day and to be at Sherpur with the remainder of the Amir's army about four miles from this on the other side of the city. I shall look them up to-morrow or next day. Want of transport necessitates my halting here, as it is desirable to collect my force before taking final steps to occupy city, and rear troops cannot join me until to-morrow.

I am glad to report that 20 guns were captured in yesterday's fight, not 12 as stated in my last telegram. One of them is an English made iron 8-inch howitzer; most of the others are imitation Armstrong guns.

I am opening communications with Khyber line, and hope to arrange in few days for letters and telegrams being sent by that route. All well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 32.

Telegram, dated 10th October 1879. (Extract.)

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Camp, to Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Outside Kabul, 8th October.—General Macpherson rejoined me this evening with stores and reserve ammunition. As I am informed three regiments from Ghazni are trying to join force opposed to Baker, and as several people from the city have already joined that force, I am sending Macpherson with wing 67th, 5th Goorkhas, two mountain guns, four horse artillery guns on elephants, and 27th N. I. to be with Baker by daybreak to-morrow. If our cavalry succeed in intercepting the Afghan troops, I don't think they will be able to make another stand. Ghilzais from Tezin, Hissarak and that neighbourhood assembled in large numbers to join the force opposed to us on 6th instant, but arrived too late. Some returned to their homes, but a good many are still waiting to see result of this fresh stand made by the Afghan troops.

Enclosure 4 in No. 32.

Telegram, dated 10th October 1879.

From GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

ALL quiet so far, though tribes are reported uneasy, specially in Spega Machalgo posts. All on the alert.

Enclosure 5 in No. 32.

Telegram, dated 13th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Shuturguridan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

OUTSIDE Kabul, 11th October.—All accounts agree that troops have been completely routed. Ghilzais, Kohistanis, Logaris, and other tribes, who were assembling to fight against us, have returned to their homes. I hope there will be no great difficulty about supplies. The Sherpur Cantonment will furnish enough firewood for several months, should it not be practicable to bring in a store from the hills before winter sets in. It is nevertheless very desirable that communication should be opened *via* Gandamak and Jellalabad as soon as possible. Only two days' rum is in hand. Letters take 10 and 12 days from Simla by Ali Khel and Shuturguridan. They should come in half that time by Peshawur. The heavy battery coming up with Khyber Column might return to India. I shall not require it. The heavy guns and howitzers presented by the British Government to the Amir are complete, and there is sufficient ammunition for present purposes.

I visit Bala Hissar to-day, and make public entry to-morrow. Kazalbashis and most of the influential men of the city have come to camp and paid their respects to me. All well.

Enclosure 6 in No. 32 (Extract).

Telegram, dated 13th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Shuturguridan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

OUTSIDE Kabul, 12th October.—After carefully considering the position and information received from various people, and after giving due weight to facts and circumstances which have come under my own notice, I have decided that it is necessary to place Mustaufi, the Wazir, Yahya Khan, and his brother Zacharia Khan, under restraint, and that Military Governor must be appointed over city of Kabul.

Entry will be as public and impressive as possible. British troops will line road from camp to Bala Hissar; royal salute will be fired by horse artillery battery as Amir and I enter gateway. British standard will be hoisted over main gate. 67th Foot and 5th Goorkhas will occupy Bala Hissar and hill on which it is situated. Result will be telegraphed to-morrow, and full report of proceedings submitted by post, with copy of proclamation.

Country is fairly quiet. Proceedings of to-day will necessarily cause certain amount of excitement, but I don't anticipate trouble or great opposition. The Kazalbashis have paid their respects to me in camp, and expressed themselves well-wishers to the British. I have received friendly letters from several influential Kohistanis. Asmatulla Khan has written to say he will be here in few days.

Enclosure 7 in No. 32.

Telegram, dated 14th October 1879.

From BRIGADIER-GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

CAMP attacked at daybreak by large numbers of Mangals, Spegwals, Hassan, and Ahmed Khels. Attack very boldly made, but well met by 29th and 8th. Counter-attack delivered by cavalry detail and infantry with complete success; left many dead in our hands. Twenty-three bodies brought in; more expected. Our casualties, five slightly wounded. Further particulars will follow. Our attacking parties are returning to camp unmolested.

Enclosure 8 in No. 32.

Telegram, dated 9th October 1879. (Extract.)

From SIR DONALD STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

I HAVE exchanged visits with Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan, and received several Maliks of Zamindawar, four of whom objected to Muhammad Yusaf Khan as Governor, because, they said, he had oppressed them. I advised Muhammad Yusaf Khan to

return to Zamindawar and try to govern without giving his people just ground for complaint, and shall recommend the Maliks to obey him.

Governor of Herat has advised Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan that troops for Zamindawar cannot at present be spared from Herat. Without aid of his troops I doubt whether Muhammad Yusaf Khan can carry on the Government of Zamindawar, as he is much disliked by the people generally. Amir has been informed by wire through Roberts of state of affairs in Zamindawar and his instructions regarding Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan, requested.

Sirdar Sher Ali Khan states no mails from Kabul have arrived here during past week.

Latest news from Herat, 27th September, on which date Sirdar Ayub Khan writes to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan that all goes well in Herat, but he is perplexed at news of Kabul massacre. Travellers state Kandahar—Herat road between Washir and Kushk-i-Nakhud is unsafe for small parties.

At Kandahar, country quiet. Supplies coming in freely.

Enclosure 9 in No. 32.

Telegram dated 10th October 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar.

YOUR telegram, 9th. If Muhammad Yusaf Khan cannot carry on government of Zamindawar, you are authorised to make necessary arrangements for preserving order and administering country from Kandahar, and Yusaf need not return.

Enclosure 10 in No. 32.

Telegram dated 9th October 1879.

From Mr. RONALD THOMPSON, Teheran, to VICEROY, Simla.

FROM the Herat correspondent's letter, dated September 16th:—Nothing appears to have been then known in Herat of the Kabul outbreak. When the Kabul Regiments mutinied in Herat, Ayub Khan, it is stated, had been in total ignorance of what was going on, and he endeavoured to quell the revolt, but only arrived on the spot when General Fakir Ahmed had been killed and his house had been pillaged and razed to the ground.

Enclosure 11 in No. 32.

Cross-examination of RUSSUL, 7 Company, Corps of Guides, taken 18th September 1879.

[Original statement taken at Lundikotal, dated 16th September 1879.]

THE regiments drawn up below the Bala Hissar had no arms at first; the Sikh Sowars of the Guides did not fire first on the Amir's riotous soldiery, nor do I know of any syces having been stoned to death. The rioters rushed up and secured some nine vessels from the Mussulman members of the escort, these were lying out. The Sowars when they took shelter inside B had not fired a shot. After four shots had been fired by the Amir's regiments, one was fired by Sir L. Cavagnari; the messenger sent by our Envoy to the Amir never came back with a reply; to the best of my belief our fire killed about 300 of the enemy. The guns were dragged up and fired at the Embassy by infantry soldiers, no artillerymen were present; the firing was bad, although the distance was but 100 paces. Dost Muhammad was a Kakar, and his mother a Yusufzai woman: as he lived close to the Bala Hissar he and I became acquainted with one another: the talib who accompanied me from Kabul is named Daman, and his home is in Lughman. I was on the top of roof F when Dost Muhammad saved me. The Amir's soldiers had dark "cloth" (banati) clothing. Of the sowars who went out with the grass-cutters, I heard four had been killed near Sar-asia by troopers of the Amir's. The bodies of our officers killed were not mutilated. I did not see Sir L. wounded: imagine he never left the house and it fell on him. The city people joined in the attack. I saw two Hindus dead from our fire. Sar-asia is a cluster of villages about 3 to 4 kos from Kabul. The

people of Kabul did not like the arrival of the Embassy, but the Amir is greatly distressed at what has occurred; he was helpless to give aid, as the soldiers threatened to kill him if he interfered, and wounded his General when he came out with his koran; they stoned another General. The Amir will not oppose our advance, but his soldiers might.

Enclosure 12 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of ABDULLA, son of ABDUL MAJID, Resident of Kars, dated 22nd September 1879.

I, Mahammad Omar, and Amad are servants of the Sultan of Turkey, and were taken prisoners with 400 other followers of Osman Pasha by the Russians at the taking of Kars. We were taken to Tobolsk and fled to Kizil-Yar, from thence to Hazrat Sultan, then to Nuri-ata, and ultimately reached Bokhara, and presented ourselves before the Emir who gave us five tillahs. We then came to Balkh by Keshi, asked for help which he denied us; we then came to Tashkurgan, and the ruler of that place would not help us; we then started for Kabul, and arrived there on the 15th day of Ramazan, and two days after went with a petition to the Amir; he ordered us to present ourselves the next day. We left the Durbar at 11 a.m., a great many soldiers had come to the Amir's quarters and demanded pay from him; the Peshkhidmats said they would receive it after two or three days, the soldiers said they must have it then. The officers who came with the soldiers ordered them to kill the Amir, who hid himself. The rioters then went at the Embassy; the defenders closed the gate and guns were fired from both sides. I saw these as I was standing on a mound outside the Bala Hissar; about 400 of the mutineers were killed and 100 wounded. They then fired the Embassy, and all inside were burnt, only three that were outside managed to escape, and were captured afterwards. The rioters then plundered the treasury, and told the Amir they would give him three days' grace, and if their pay was not forthcoming they would kill him; after this period they got their three months' pay and three months' rations. They then went towards Kurram. I am unable to say whether this attack was made with the instigation of the Amir or not. We remained five or six days more in Kabul, asked for help which was not given, and we then came this way, and wish to return to our country, but have not the means of getting there. We came by Jellalabad. On our arrival there some one informed the Governor that we were Englishmen; we were secured and afterwards released, and the Hakim gave us rupees six. We got on to a raft, came down the river to Michni and then Peshawur. I saw no troops on the way, nor did anyone mention that they were coming from Kabul to Jellalabad.

NOTE.

The informants have been forwarded to Bombay to the Turkish Consul. It has been often said that the Amir was threatened openly by the troops, that they made first for the Amir's palace, but were turned by the guard, and I suspect that there is truth in this.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commissioner.

Enclosure 13 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of HOSEIN, of Hoti Murdan, Syce of the late Lieutenant HAMILTON, V.C., Guides Corps, 23rd September 1879.

On the day of the attack I went out early in the morning to get grass. Lieutenant Hamilton and Dr. Kelly also went out about the same time with us for their morning ride. Duffadar Futtah Muhammad Khan and two sowars of the Guides and four sowars of the Amir were with us as guard. About 8 or 9 a.m., while we were cutting grass about two kos distant from the Bala Hissar, we heard shots being fired.

The mounted escort rode about to find out and galloped off across the meadows. Shortly after the villagers of a village turned out armed and attacked us. We mounted our tats and galloped off towards the Bala Hissar. Five or six mounted men rode after us, but when I said I was a Mussulman, they did not kill me at the orders of their captain, but plundered me, took away the pony I rode which belonged to Mr. Hamilton. Three

cavalry regiments of the Amir were encamped upon the grass plain called the "Chaman," it has no other name, below the Bala Hissar, and they mounted about this time.

Some of them were the men who robbed me of my pony and clothes; they told me Cavagnari Sahib had been killed. Then they took me to a village some two kos distant from the Bala Hissar, called Sak, and there a captain in the cavalry, called Muhammad Hassan, brother of Muhammad Afzal, who now has Mr. Hamilton's pony in his possession, kept me concealed for three days. He had saved my life when the sowars plundered me. He concealed me because the people would have killed me. The fourth day I went to Kabul, to the Murad khani mohulla (which is the Shiah quarter, and not on good terms with the rest of the Kabul city, which is Sunni), where I had heard Futtah Muhammad, Duffadar, had found refuge with the relations of Gul Badshah and Muhammad Sherif Khan, native officers in the Guides. I am a Shiah myself, originally from Kabul. There I heard from men who had been in the attack that the three regiments (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Grenadiers?) "Grandilaw-wal" "doyam" and "Grandi Soyam," which, drawn up for their pay on the Chaman, below the Bala Hissar, broke and attacked their general, Daud Shah, who had abused them for not taking one month's pay. They attacked the Residency with stones, plundered the treasury and arsenal, and fired on the Residency. I saw Ghulam Nabi, orderly to Sir Louis Cavagnari, who was beside him, and he said that Sir Louis had been shot in the forehead while on the roof early in the morning. Immediately afterwards, Ghulam Nabi says, Sir Louis wrote a note to the Amir, and gave it to him to take to the Amir. Ghulam Nabi went off to the Amir, through the postern gate at the back of Residency, with the letter; the Amir told him verbally, "What can I do?" and sent a high Sirdar to remonstrate, but it was no use. Ghulam Nabi, who is now in Kabul with his relations in the Murad khani quarter, still has Sir Louis' note to the Amir, and something written by the Amir. Futtah Muhammad told me Taimur had escaped about 11 a.m., and had gone to Peshawur. I was told Lieutenant Hamilton and Mr. Jenkyns charged two or three times, sword in hand, and were then shot there. Dr. Kelly lay dead in the Residency; also Sir Louis lay there, but his corpse was never found. Those of Lieutenant Hamilton and Mr. Jenkyns and Dr. Kelly were recognised and buried. I don't know where. People said the Amir had privately buried them. I left Kabul 10 or 12 days ago, dressed as a fakir. Ghulam Nabi gave me the striped blanket I have. He and Futtah Muhammad are the only survivors of the escort I know of. The three regiments that attacked the Residency left for Istalif in the Kohi Daman, where there is treasure. I did not see them leave, but their baggage had gone. The Amir was in the Bala Hissar, and had sent regiments towards Kelat-i-Ghilzai and Kandahar.

None were coming this way. The country is quiet at Jellalabad. I don't know what became of Russul sepoy. I saw Lieutenant Hamilton's horse "Mushki" tied up in a meadow in front of where the mutinous regiments were encamped; also another horse belonging to a sowar. I was about five days in Kabul. I was told that the regiments first went to the Amir's residence, but he escaped into his harem. The Amir sent the regiments towards Kandahar, &c., or else dismissed them to their homes before this attack.

I know nothing about movements of troops after it. All the Chandol quarter arms itself at night, and sentries are posted all round. They are afraid of being attacked by the Sunnis. The city is quiet.

NOTE.

The informant says that it was about an hour after the firing began in the Bala Hissar that the cavalry mounted and came down upon them. Informant did not know of Russul's safety. The departure of the three mutinous "orderly" or household regiments is confirmed.

I believe this statement to be trustworthy.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commissioner.

Enclosure 14 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of ABDUR RAHIM, of Pujjuggi, Peshawur, dated 23rd September 1879.

My brother, Gul Muhammad, was Duffadar in the Guides escort at the Residency. I was there with him. On the day of the attack I had gone to the bazaar in the morning. Two regiments were on the way to parade to receive their pay from Daud Shah. Bands were playing, and people looking on.

I met the regiments, and turned back to see the sight of the parade. They objected to one month's pay, and commenced to throw stones at Daud Shah, and hit him, and with bayonets wounded him in the right side. I was looking on. They were not armed otherwise. The members of the Mission were looking on from their high house. One regiment then suddenly went off for their arms, and the other regiment fetched the guns. They fired on the Residency, and would not be stopped. About 2 p.m. Lieutenant Hamilton charged out of the gateway, sword in hand, at the guns. He cut over two men, when a number fired at once, and shot him with some Guide sepoy who were with him, and cut them to pieces. The Afghans then ran in and commenced to plunder; others set fire to the building, and threw powder bags into the Residency. About 2 p.m. Sir L. Cavagnari, then on the roof, was shot in the right eye. I heard he had sent a note to the Amir by a Kizzilbash of the Chandof quarter.

By this time the Residency fell in, and many were buried in the ruins and others killed in the "hammam," near the Residency. A sowar of the Guides rushed out at the end, crying he was a Syud, and was spared. Don't know his name. He is in Kabul.

Two Sahibs were lying dead in the courtyard, and were cut to pieces. Sir L. Cavagnari's corpse was not found. I remained a week in Kabul in a mosque, hiding. The day after this the Amir and Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan went to Shahr-i-naw, where the mutinous regiments were camped. He told them they had done badly, and ruined him. They replied, they wished for a religious war, disliked Daud Shah, and begged Muhammad Jan Topchi Bashi to be made general; also Wali Muhammad Khan to be made commander-in-chief. This was done. On the 5th day the two regiments were sent towards the Kohi Daman to get in land revenue.

The road from Gandamak to here is safe. I was searched at Butkhak, and again at Tanga.

This statement is also trustworthy. All said here has been confirmed by others. Muhammad Jan has been made commander-in-chief, and is said by some to have been one of the leaders in the attack on the Embassy. He is also said to have been the author of the death of Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani.

Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan himself has taken away the three mutinous regiments to Kohistan, the object given out being to collect the revenue.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commissioner.

Enclosure 15 in No. 32.

STATEMENT OF KHAIRULLA, SON OF GOLAB PATHAN, ANAKHEL, resident of YAR HUSSAIN.

Had a land suit. My son was in the Guides, and went with the Embassy escort to Kabul. I went after Sir L. Cavagnari, K.C.B., C.S.I. Passed four nights in Kabul with my son. On the morning of the 5th the outbreak arose, and I witnessed the result myself.

The Ardal Regiment had some words with General Daud Shah about their pay; the General wished to give them a month's pay, whilst the regiment demanded that of seven; the soldiers attacked the General with their bayonets, and struck him with stones and fists; the people rescued him. The regiment then moved towards the quarters of Sir Louis, which were at Azim Khan's place. The gates were locked, the soldiers broke the wall on the eastern side, entered, and commenced firing. Sir Louis told them to desist, and 12 months' pay would be given them. The men remained quiet for half an hour. The Khasadar Regiment with the city people then arrived, commenced firing. In this they were joined by all who were present. Major Cavagnari in a loud voice tried to stop them, but they would not heed; he himself was wounded by a shot in the forehead, and then sent a letter to the Amir by the hands of a Hindu, stating that he was at the point of death; if he could rescue the other officers, it would be a good thing for him.

No reply came to this. At last he (Major Cavagnari) ordered his men to fire, until his men were slain.

Sir Louis was placed on a cot and brought below. A short time after, the other officers and men were driven out, the building set on fire, and then the rioters killed the officers and their remaining companions.

A small portion of the day was left when all was over. My son, Hamzulla, was killed also. I was robbed of my property, and then let go. Two men, a resident of Zeyda,

and the other of either Barikab or Kattakhat were allowed to go, as they said they were "Sayads," and I corroborated their account. I do not remember their names.

I heard in Kabul that Yakub Khan's mother was proceeding to Dakka, and that Yakub Khan had sent letters to Kandahar, Herat, Maimana, to fetch all troops there, and had summoned the country people for a "Ghaza." About 180 of the rioters were killed and 30 wounded. I saw the heads of the officers (3) and one of a Sikh native officer cut by the men of the "Ardal" Regiment and taken by the Amir's dewdi, and placed on a stone outside the Bala Hissar below a bridge, a public place where every one passed by. I saw these heads the day after the fight in the morning. Major Cavagnari's was not with theirs, as his body had been burnt in the fire. I did not hear the heads had been taken before the Amir, but imagine they must have been taken.

NOTE.

This old man feels very bitterly the murder of his son, the loss of his property, including Sir Louis Cavagnari's letter, and his own danger when in Kabul; therefore too much dependence cannot be placed upon his word. He, however, stoutly maintained that the heads of the British officers had been exposed upon a bridge, and I shall not be surprised if this is found to be correct. All natives would, as a rule, deny it.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Peshawur, 23rd September 1879. Commissioner.

Enclosure 16 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of FAKIR MUHAMMAD, syce of TAIMUR SOWAR, GUIDES, Lundikotal, 25th September 1879; also of Fazldin, dhobi of the Sowars Guides Escort, dated 25th September 1879.

FAKIR MUHAMMAD.—I went out grass cutting on the day of the attack on the Residency, and hearing the noise, and being told of what was happening, fled into the city of Kabul, where I found refuge with Ghulam Mohiyudin Hakim, with whom I have come down. I did not see anything that happened.

FAZLDIN.—On the morning in question I went out early from the Bala Hissar to wash clothes, and while doing so heard the firing on the Residency, and saw the beginning of the attack from where I stood. Shortly after the mob plundered me and seized the clothes I was washing, when I fled to the city of Kabul, where I found refuge in the Murad Khani quarter, and came down with Ghulam Mohiyudin the Hakim. Five days before the attack supplies for the Residency ceased to come in.

One sepoy of the escort said that there was some coolness between the Amir and the Envoy. This they said a few days before the attack took place.

Enclosure 17 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of GHULAM MOHIYUDIN, Hakim of Peshawur, MOHALLA RAWALAN, GUZAR SARASIA, Lundikotal, 25th September 1879.

I TRAVEL about as a Hakim, chiefly as an eye-doctor, and in the course of my travels went from Peshawur to Balkh about a year and a half ago. About two months ago I left Mazar-i-Sharif near Balkh to return *via* Kabul to Peshawur. I was present in Mazar-i-Sharif when Amir Sher Ali Khan died, and I saw the corpse myself and joined in the funeral procession. When I left Balkh and Turkestan, all was quiet there, and Ghulam Hyder Khan was Governor. I recollect hearing it said in the Chandol quarter in Kabul where I was living that the troops of the Amir said among themselves, "The escort of the 'Kafir' will not leave Kabul alive." That was the day before the attack. In the attack the town mob joined, about 340 of the assailants were killed by the Residency defenders. I did not see the fight. For about three days there was anarchy in Kabul, but the city was not plundered. The Amir's arsenal was looted. The Amir has little authority in Kabul; the troops are quite out of hand. Daud Shah is only slightly wounded.

The road from Kabul is open and safe. I brought the syce and dhobi down with me from Kabul.

Enclosure 18 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of HASSANGUL, of Gujarat, YUSUFZAI, Sepoy, No. 2 Co., Guide Corps, dated Lundikotal, 25th September 1879.

MEMORANDUM.

MULLAH AHMEDJI, in his statement taken on the 14th instant at Peshawur, mentioned having met a Guide Sepoy of Gujarat, Yusufzai, at Butkhak.

Hassan Gul.—About 8 a.m. I was outside the Residency, when I heard the cry “dam-i-charyar” (the Sunni cry) from the place where Daud Shah held his durbar, and saw a cloud of dust. Presently troops came running up from that direction towards the Residency. I came into the barracks and saw Hossein, Havildar, standing at the gateway. We shut it and they began to stone us from outside. Mr. Hamilton came out of the Residency to our barracks and told us not to fire but to stand behind the parapet on the roof. We did so, and made long holes in it; 20 sepoys remained on the barrack roof, and the rest, including myself, went into the Residency itself. Just then Syud Mir, sepoy, reported that they were plundering the horses. They then commenced to fire upon us, and we received orders to fire. Sir L. Cavagnari also fired from the roof, and firing grew hot. Sir Louis fired five shots. There were two shouldaries pitched in the courtyard of the Residency, one was full of miscellaneous things, and the other held ammunition and the treasure. The first shouldari stood close to the wall of the courtyard at the rear of the Residency, and the Afghans broke a hole into the wall there and commenced firing through it. I informed Mr. Jenkyns of it; he was in the Residency then, and he sent me, Mihrdil, Sepoy, and a Sikh to the place. We struck the shouldari in order to get at the men firing through the hole, and Mihrdil was shot through the arm. I led him into the Residency, and saw Lieutenant Hamilton and Mr. Jenkyns there. I was told there that Sir Louis was wounded. On passing the room where the wounded lay I looked through the open door and saw Sir Louis lying on his back, the knees drawn up, and Dr. Kelly sitting by his head. I asked Amaldin, Sir Louis’ Afridi orderly, what it was, and Amaldin pointed to his forehead. He said nothing. I could not see what Dr. Kelly was doing. Just then the news was brought that the Afghan has reached the roof by ladders, and Lieutenant Hamilton told us to fire from the staircase leading up to the roof. Karak Sing, Havildar, was shot there beside me, also Mehtab Sing, both mortally. Lieutenant Hamilton told us to charge on to the roof. Hossein, Havildar, and I replied that we were too few to clear the roof of the Afghans. There were seven of us. The guns had been brought up by the Afghans at this time to the gateway, and they were firing with them. Lieutenant Hamilton and Mr. Jenkyns then went down to the gateway; the Afghans had got into the building, and were setting fire to it and coming down the stairs. I was then in the building, and I and other sepoys got mixed up with the crowd; we were in plain clothes. Among the crowd was Tor Khan, Subadar in the Amir’s army. I was stripped, and Tor ordered me to be shot, but the others said, “He is a Mahomedan, spare him.” Then Tor told me to put a bundle of loot on my head and to walk out by a hole in the courtyard and come with him. He took me to his house where I stayed five days. I left on the sixth day and came along here with some Syuds of Kunar. I was searched at Tanga.

Cross-examined at Peshawur, 27th September 1879.

I don’t know about any syce being killed in the stable before we fired, but we could see one of the Sikh Mounted Guides lying in the stable by his horse with his head cut open and not dead, and one of the Amir’s soldiers dead beside him. He had been defending his horse, and it was not until they carried off the horses that we had permission to fire. The Orderly Regiment that came for its pay and began the mutiny was not as a rule, armed. All men had their bayonets and knives in their belts, and a few had their rifles, and shots were fired when the stone throwing began. It was not until other shots had been fired that Sir Louis Cavagnari himself fired four shots, killing four men.

There was great feeling against us in Kabul. The regiments in the Bala Hissar spoke of us all as infidels, and we were none of us, not even Mahamedans, upon speaking terms with them; we used to go in parties of four or five into the city armed, for shopping, but could not have gone safely alone, and the Sikh and Hindus never went into the city at all. They used to go out in parties of 10 or 12 to bathe and wash their clothes. The people of the city certainly abused us, and the Envoy and officers never went out of the Bala Hissar unless followed by a troop of about 40 of the Amir’s

cavalry, beside the Guide Mounted Escort. I only saw the Envoy once in the garden walking alone, and then some of the Guides put on their uniforms and joined him. When we first reached Kabul the Envoy or the officers used to visit the Amir every day, but latterly the visits became much less frequent. When we first reached Kabul there was in the courtyard a guard of the Amir's troops, not the "Orderly" but the other regiments, and it was found that they took down the names of all people who came to visit the Envoy. When Sir Louis heard of this he made some excuse and got rid of the guard, saying it was not wanted. When I was in Tor Khan's house during the five days after the massacre of the Embassy, I heard that the day after the Amir had sent for all the native officers, brigadiers, &c., and said to them, "I am in your hands, you have taken all my property, and my family and wives and children are yours also; you can do what you like, and can make me a prisoner and hand me over to the British Government if you like," upon which the officers all said they would fight, and have "a religious war."

When Daud Shah was paying the troops their pay, they refused; he offered them only one month's pay and told them they were to go off the next day to Kohistan to get in the revenue. When they asked for more he told them to go and get it from Cavagnari Sahib. He was angry, and said this to annoy them. He was stoned and wounded in the side by a bayonet.

We were too few, and the Residency was too large for us to hold; they completely surrounded us.

The Amir's troops broke a hole in the wall so as to fire into the courtyard where the magazine was; against this wall were a number of tent poles, and through them the enemy could fire at us, whilst in returning the fire we only hit the tent poles. I was sent by Mr. Jenkyns to clear away the tent poles and the tent, which prevented us from getting a fair aim at the men who were breaking through the wall. In doing this Mehtab Sing who was with me was wounded in the arm, and I got splashed with his blood. I got him away and brought back his rifle. I pushed down all the poles and cut the tent down, then they made a hole as large as a doorway and fired through it. The officers cheered me on, calling out "Well done," "Well done." Tor Khan gave me afterwards to carry to his home, a double-barrelled rifle and a pea-rifle and some clothes, part of his plunder. A Subadar in the Amir's army ranks below a Jemadar, the reverse of our system.

We used not to complain to the Sahibs that we were abused in the streets and called Kafirs; we should have been ashamed; they would have said we were afraid; we sepoys used to talk together and say something of this kind would happen.

There were three regiments in the Bala Hissar, two Orderly regiments who also, when in uniform, wear the kilt and a third line regiment on the magazine.

It was the kilted, or Orderly Regiments, that began the outbreak and refused their pay. They had been ordered to Kohistan on the 4th. They had nothing to do with Herat. Some Herat regiments had come in perhaps 15 days previously, and they had threatened to attack the Embassy. So it was common bazaar report, and we were warned by the Sahibs not to go to the bazaar. Then a few days afterwards the Amir gave nearly all leave, only a few men in a company remained. They were two kos off in the new cantonments, and never joined in the attack at all.

There were 12 boxes of treasure. I hear we started with 21,000—one box was emptied, the rest full—all must have been plundered before the house fell. The room in which Sir L. Cavagnari was lying was full of men, Guides as well as the Amir's, all dead.

On the night of the 4th I went after dark with Guldin Mohmand of Sultanpur in Kunar, a servant of Hussain Ali Sayad, to see the bodies, which had been dragged out of the houses and thrown over the wall of the fort by the Amir's order on the 4th.

Most of them were stripped—not all—none of them had their heads cut off, but they were lying as they fell in a heap under the wall: officers and men all covered with dust and they had begun to decompose. They were all scanted (?) and most of them stripped where they were killed. (Khairulla says, he saw the heads exposed, but I think this is untrue). The Amir did send his son to the sepoys with the Koran on his head, and they took the Koran away and told him to go home. This is what I heard all the sepoys saying afterwards. The sepoys all said they would fight, but the officers one and all used to say; "You won't fight and can't resist, and the British force will come and Kabul is doomed."

I came by Butkhak, Barikao—Asmatulla Khan's country, and Lughman; troops and a mule battery can go the way I returned.

Enclosure 19 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of PIR MUHAMMAD, HALIMZAI, Resident of Kunar, dated the
27th September 1879.

I AM a servant of Sirdar Zulficar Khan and Sirdar Saleh Muhammad Khan who are in Lahore. They sent me to Kabul two months ago to solicit Major Cavagnari to get their lands released which had been confiscated by the late Amir Sher Ali Khan. I reached Kabul four days after the arrival of Major Cavagnari at that place, and submitted to the Amir the letter from the above-mentioned Sirdars (on the above subject). His Highness observed that he would make inquiry when he could go to Lahore for a meeting with the Viceroy.

The sister of these Sirdars who is married to Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, the brother of the Amir, received a similar reply from His Highness on inquiry. I was at Kabul when the Embassy was attacked at noon.

Sirdar Bahadur Ghulam Nakshband Khan was sitting with Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan in the latter's house in the Bala Hissar, when a noise was heard from the Duftar where the pay was being distributed to some regiments. The Sirdar Bahadur sent a man to bring information, the man returned quickly saying that he could not go farther as the regiments had mutinied, and were killing men. The Sirdar Bahadur went to the house of the Mustaufi, and I went to Deh-Afghanan to tell the men of the Sirdar Bahadur to conceal their property. From Deh-Afghanan I returned to the Bala Hissar to the house of Sirdar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, and the son of the Amir, about eight years old, and Sirdar Muhammad Yahya Khan, with a copy of the Koran, went and prohibited the regiments from mutinying. The regiments were firing on the Residency, and would not obey the order of Yahya Khan and of the Amir's son.

One Orderly Regiment was standing by the gateway of the Amir's house, having made up their mind to kill him if he came out, but His Highness went into the harem. The son of the Amir and Sirdar Yahya Khan returned to the Amir when their entreaties failed. The two regiments who attacked the Residency were the Amir's "Orderly" Regiments, and consisted of men of various classes and sects. I have heard from all sources that when the pay was being distributed by Colonel Karim Khan, nephew of Arsala Khan, General Muhammad Jan Khan, Wardak, gave orders to use violence.

Three regiments were standing to receive their pay; they said that the Amir had given orders for three months' pay, but Colonel Karim Khan told them that only one month's pay had been ordered, and referred them to Major Cavagnari. In the meantime General Daud Shah came from the Amir and beat a sepoy with a stick, another sepoy asked him why he beat his comrade, and a captain hurt the General with his sword. The mutinous sepoys proceeded towards the Residency, were fired at, and 25 of them were killed; then the sepoys who were unarmed went into the arsenal and brought arms and attacked the Residency. They brought two guns and fired at the Residency and demolished the upper story, then they set fire to the gateway, and went into the Residency, and attacked the Embassy after 2 p.m.

After this the mutineers plundered the bazaar in the Bala Hissar and the Amir's arsenal and other things, but the treasury was spared. The General in the upper Bala Hissar allowed the mutineers to take arms from the arsenal and joined in the mutiny. The fire burnt out in six or seven days. The Amir gave an order that the bodies should be discovered by removing the earth over them. No bodies were discovered during my stay at Kabul, excepting that of the young Sahib, who rushed over the gun, by coming three times out of the gate, and who killed two mutineers, went back by the gate, and was wounded and fell.

Major Cavagnari was wounded first of all with a bullet, and on receipt of this information the Amir sent his son, but the mutineers would not obey his order. The Amir was coming out from his house, but Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan and Sirdar Shabbaz Khan prevented him, saying that he would be killed. The Amir observed that the outbreak would lead to his disgrace, that Major Cavagnari had been wounded, and that he would save other members of the Embassy and send them away.

Formerly a Guard of the "Shahi" Regiment was placed on the gate of the Residency, but Major Cavagnari dismissed it 20 days before the occurrence. Nothing was heard of intention to mutiny before the actual outbreak; the Herati regiments of course talked loudly and asked where Cavagnari was, and why he had come. The Amir disarmed them and they went to their homes.

I left Kabul shortly after the occurrence. One day before my departure the Amir had the agent of Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani, killed, and sent three Orderly Regiments to Kohistan with General Muhammad Jan Khan to remain in that province. The

Amir began collecting men of the Herati Regiments and of other regiments to ask them if they would make the three Orderly Regiments prisoners. The next day the mutineers proceeded to the house of Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, but he came out with the Koran, read "the Kalama," and was spared. The Amir intended to collect some tribesmen and regiments to take their opinion how the massacre of the Embassy should be avenged. The three regiments who had mutinied were sent by the Amir to Turkestan to avoid further disturbance by them in Kabul. Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan was suspected by some people to have instigated the mutiny.

Enclosure 20 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of FATTEH MUHAMMAD, son of Muhammad Yar Tajak, Resident of Kohistan.
Taken on 30th September 1879.

I SERVED as a syce in the Guides Corps for 12 years and went to Kabul with Taimur, a sowar of the British Embassy. On the day of the massacre I and 24 other grass-cutters went towards the village of Bini Hissar at 6.30 a.m., with two sowars of the Amir, and two sowars and one duffadar of the Guides. At 12 o'clock a cry was heard and many people and some Bini Hissar villagers coming up with knives and sticks in their hands, they carried off our ponies, and plundered our things, and killed three or four men, sparing others who ran away. I hid myself in a maize crop, and at night came to the city, and remained two days in a shrine in the Murad khani quarter. From Kabul I returned to Peshawur *via* Jellalabad.

Enclosure 21 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of SAID MUHAMMAD, son of SAID MIRAN, age 50, taken at PESHAWUR, on 30th September 1879.

I HAVE served as a syce to Major Cavagnari, and was with him at Kabul. When Major Cavagnari went to visit the Amir I used to go with him to hold his horse outside the Durbar. His interview with the Amir generally lasted from half to one hour, but an interview held two days before the massacre took *two* hours, and I asked Ghulam Muhammad, orderly what was the reason of the long interview, and why did Major Cavagnari seem annoyed when he came out from the Durbar, and he told me that the Amir had refused to go to Turkestan and Herat, and that Major Cavagnari would go to Peshawur *via* Jellalabad. On the day of the occurrence I was sitting on a mound with some sepoys of the escort of the Residency, when a cry of "Ya Char Yar" by some regiments was heard from the direction of the Amir's Durbar. On inquiry from a Kabuli, we ascertained that some regiments had become disaffected because General Daud Shah had refused to pay their pay for more than one month, and that they had thrown stones at the General, and were coming towards the Residency. I and the sepoys went in, and the sepoys shut the door against the mutineers; the mutineers were unarmed; and they went to fetch arms while the armed regiment in the Bala Hissar who were guarding the arsenal came up and fired at the Residency. The city mob and some sepoys came into the stable and plundered the horses and other things. I had put two saddles and four swords in a room, and had closed the door and hidden myself there, but two mutineers broke the door and took away the saddles and swords, and inquired about treasury. I left the room, and finding that firing was going on, I concealed myself in an underground room until evening, and then I found that fire had been set to the Residency. I came secretly to Charikar, Nijrab, Tagab, Lughman, Jellalabad, and Peshawur. At Charikar I heard that three Infantry Regiments had been sent from Kabul towards Jellalabad, and that Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani, had been killed by order of the Amir. The regiment which first mutinied on account of a dispute about their pay was an "Orderly" Regiment, and the regiment which joined the mutineers from the Bala Hissar wore black uniform.

MEMORANDUM.

THIS syce is an Afghan, and had been seven years in the service of Sir Louis Cavagnari.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commissioner and Superintendent.

Enclosure 22 in No. 32.

Translation of Proclamation issued by the AMIR YAKUB KHAN to the Mohmand Tribe, dated 8th Shawal H. 1296 (25th September 1879).

It is hereby notified that whereas the old treaty engagements between the God-granted Government of Afghanistan and the Sublime British Government are still firm, and the same cordial friendship and concord (as before) still subsist between them; and whereas the troops of the latter Government have started only for the purpose of rendering aid and restoring order to the Government of His Highness the Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan, you should lend your friendly assistance in the best way you can to that Government, and should know that the foundation of friendship and concord (between the two Governments), which other Governments have acknowledged (lit. *madé known*) is firm, and that it has been proved to me to be sincere. It is therefore incumbent on you who are the well-wishers of the God-granted Government, to provide, to the best of your ability, the camp of the British Government with supplies and carriage, for which you will receive payment.

No one should interfere with, or oppose those, who belong to that camp, but you should restrain your hands, feet, and tongue from causing injury to their lives and property. Under any circumstances do not act contrary to the spirit of this Proclamation. Should you behave or act improperly towards the troops of the above-mentioned Government, you will certainly have to account for it.

Enclosure 23 in No. 32.

No. 15, dated Ali Khel, 26th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward in original, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General

i.—From His Highness the Amir of Kabul to Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Muhammad, dated 24th September 1879.

ii.—Ditto ditto forwarding letter from Muhammad Jan Khan.

iii.—From Muhammad Jan Khan to His Highness the Amir, dated 23rd September 1879.

iv.—From Sirdar Sher Ali Khan to His Highness the Amir, dated 16th September 1879.

in Council; the letters marginally noted, which were sent to me by the Mustaufi Habibulla Khan this morning after his departure from the camp.

Enclosure 24 in No. 32.

Translation of a Letter from the AMIR to MUSTAUFI HABIBULLA KHAN and WAZIR SHAH, MUHAMMAD KHAN, dated 6th Shawal, 1296 H.=(23rd (24th?) September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that yesterday, Tuesday (*sic*) the fifth current (22nd September) I received a letter from Muhammad Jan Khan, the "Ghat Mashr" (General?) which I send herewith, in original, so that you may read it and know to what extent the seditious and ill-disposed persons excited and are instigating disturbances. The "Ghat Mashr" (General?) has placed a certain person in confinement. The latter confesses that so and so had sent him to the Kohistan camp to tell such and such things to the troops and the people. The man is in prison and will be kept there till you arrive here safely. When you come, and he repeats the same confession in your presence, he will, please God, receive his punishment.

I hope that through God's favour the friendship between me and the British Government will neither be interrupted nor diminished; that the basis of the treaty engagements between us will become stronger than before; and that the enemies and evil-wishers of the two Governments will suffer shame and disgrace and lose their credit.

Enclosure 25 in No. 32.

Translation of a Letter from GHAT' MASHR (General?) MUHAMMAD JAN KHAN, to the AMIR, dated the 5th Shawal=(22nd (23rd?) September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—I beg to inform your Highness that yesterday Monday (*sic*) the 4th current*, a man in disguise and in appearance a beggar
 * 21st September 1879. entered my camp. By the favour of your Highness' fortune his treacherous and spy-like manner came to my notice. I called him and examined him. But he endeavoured, as much as he could, to avoid mentioning the object (of his visit) and talked nonsense. At last I prevailed upon him, partly by threats, and partly by coaxing, to state that Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan had sent him to spread a report in my camp that the Amir has invited the English of his own accord, and that he is going to make his country over to them, and to transplant the people of Kohistan to Turkestan, as well as to ascertain how the "Ghat Mashr" (General) is treating the officers, and whether he and they are united or not. Having ascertained the above, I have sent him to your Highness with Muhammad Aslam Khan, who will represent the whole circumstance from the beginning to the end.

I have applied to your Highness for some sowars as well as for a physician and a druggist. Both the sowars and the physician are required.

Enclosure 26 in No. 32.

Translation of a Letter from the AMIR, to the MUSTAUFU and WAZIR SHAH MUHAMMAD, dated 6th Shawal, 1296 H.=(23rd September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Your letters dated 5 P.M., Monday, the 4th Shawal (21st September) have reached me this morning, Wednesday the 6th
 * 23rd September 1879. idem*. I have learnt (from them) the account of the honourable reception accorded to you by the officers of the illustrious British Government as well as of your interview with General Roberts. It is sincerely hoped that through the favour of God the hearts of the representatives of the illustrious Government will be entirely satisfied with and assured of my sincerity and honesty, and that whatever may lead to the welfare of the two Governments and increase their mutual friendship, will be planned and arranged by you and the General, and that the matter will be settled according to our wish and desire:

Enclosure 27 in No. 32.

Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, Governor of Kandahar, to the AMIR, dated the 27th Ramazan=(15th (16th?) September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Your Highness' sublime letter of the 20th Ramzan (8th September) has reached me and enhanced my honour, and as it contained the news of your Highness' good health I rendered thanks to God.

The state of affairs (here) is that before the news of the disturbances in Kabul was known here, I received a letter from my brother Sirdar Muhammad Yusuf Khan bitterly complaining of the people of Pusht Rud, and stating that he considers it extremely difficult to deal with those ignorant people. As the report of the mutiny of the Kabul troops had not then been verified and was only a rumour I did not reply to him. Although he had heard from your Highness, yet when I received your Highness' royal letter, I addressed him two letters, one in the ordinary form containing the news of my welfare, and another confidentially giving an account of the affairs in Kabul. The former letter, in order to furnish him with an excuse (to leave Pusht Rud) was written to the following effect: "As Major St. John is leaving for Herat and His Highness the Amir has sent strict orders to accord him an honourable reception (on the road), you should come to Girishk to receive him and appoint the Khawanin (officials) to collect the revenue." In the other letter I wrote to him to the effect that "If you think you can deal (with the people) and remain (at the place), well and good, and should you apprehend any danger and think you cannot remain there, show the other letter to the people and come to Girishk."

Yesterday I received another letter from my brother's servant to the effect that "the people of Pusht Rud having heard of the disturbances in Kabul are about to revolt, and as I noticed the improper attitude of those people, I have by a thousand devices

"succeeded in getting to Sirhind to the Kila of Najib-ullah Khan, Ghilzai, who is a faithful servant of His Highness (the Amir). Girishk is too far. I cannot go anywhere else, and I am unable to live here with my men and horses. I am in great straits."

Having received such an account from my brother, I sent Taj Muhammad Khan and Sahib Khan, Ghilzai, yesterday, Sunday the 26th Ramazan (14th September) to bring him from Kila Najib-ullah Khan. The two above-named persons left yesterday.

Nothing else worthy of notice has taken place. Since it was necessary to acquaint your Highness with my brother's state I have done so. Further, rest assured in every respect about this place. Things are going just as I represented before.

Enclosure 28 in No. 32.

No. 250, dated Kandahar, September 29, 1879.

From MAJOR M. PROTHEROE, Extra Political Officer, Kandahar, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

I HAVE been desired by the Lieutenant-General Commanding to forward for your information translations of two letters received on the 27th instant by Sirdar Sher Ali Khan from Sirdars Muhammad Hassan Khan and Roshundil Khan, now at Kabul.

2. The letters are somewhat ambiguous, but Sirdar Sher Ali Khan's interpretations have been added in footnotes.

Enclosure 29 in No. 32.

Translation of a Letter from MUHAMMAD HASSAN KHAN to SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—I arrived at Kabul on the 5th of September, and waited on the Amir, who told me that he had made proper arrangements (for his government), though contrary to the wishes of the wise men who have brought his government to grief (meaning Mustaufi Habibulla and Daud Shah Khan). It now remained to be seen what would be the result. The Amir also narrated to me the particulars of the fight at the Residency. I replied to the Amir that it was God's will, and he may bring good out of it. My brother Roshundil has sent to you by Kasid "Poyendah" an account of the fight between Sir L. Cavagnari's escort and the mutineers. You who are the wisest men in the world well know that the action of these regiments (the mutineers) emanated from their chiefs. The Amir has received news from the English that the Treaty which had been made is still in force, and that the Cavagnari disaster will not interfere with it, as such incidents have previously occurred in other governments. The English desire to add two articles to the Treaty to strengthen it, and have requested him (the Amir) to send a confidential man with full powers. His Highness accordingly sent Mustaufi Habibulla and Shah Muhammad Khan, who started on the 1st Shawal for the English camp. English troops have passed the Shuturgardan, and halted. We are anxious to know what the two articles are. (The rest of the letter refers to the writer's private affairs.)

[Sher Ali Khan states that the "proper arrangements" referred to in this letter were an intention expressed by the Amir to his Treasurer, Lall Khan, to appoint Sirdar Sher Ali Khan as chief of the administration of Afghanistan, an intention which was subsequently set aside through the intrigues of Daud Shah and Mustaufi Habibulla, and Sirdar Sher Ali Khan was sent to Kandahar.]

Enclosure 30 in No. 32.

Translation of a Letter from ROSHUNDIL KHAN to SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN (without date).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—I acknowledge receipt of your letter on the 3rd Shawal (19th September). I have sent you an account of the murder of Cavagnari and of the talk

here by the Kasid whom you sent. I send you some more news. There are five* persons belonging to the army who are the instigators of this mutiny. Of course they are known to you, but they could

* Probably means "a few."

not control the mutiny after it had once begun. The cause of the mutiny was as follows : Ten days before this occurrence the Naibs through Sirdar Yahya Khan claimed the arrears of the accounts. The Amir agreed to the amount of their claims ; the Naibs told the Amir he had been cheated out of 15 or 20 lakhs in the accounts of the army alone. The Amir acted on this statement, and then the mutiny broke out. * *

The Amir has discharged two cavalry regiments, and has no confidence in his troops, and his army does not obey him. The English have no ill-feeling towards the Amir. * * *

[Sirdar Sher Ali Khan states that the five persons herein referred to who were the instigators of the mutiny are Daud Shah Khan and his adherents. The meaning of the passage regarding the Naibs, &c., is that Daud Shah Khan and the Mustaufi were accused by the Naibs of having misappropriated some 15 or 20 lakhs, and to avert an inquiry which the Amir intended to make, got up the disturbance which they were subsequently unable to control.]

(Signed) M. PROTHEROE, Major,
Extra Political Officer.

No. 33.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE, 22nd October 1879, to VICEROY. (Extract.)

PROCLAMATION, which must now be issued by General Roberts, should leave the future for future consideration, but you may assert present military supremacy of the British Government to this effect :—

“ I, General Roberts, on behalf of the British Government, hereby proclaim that the Amir, having by his own freewill abdicated, has left Afghanistan without a Government. In consequence of the shameful outrage upon its Envoy and suite, the British Government has been compelled to occupy by force of arms Kabul, the capital, and to take military possession of other parts of Afghanistan.

“ The British Government now commands that all Afghan authorities, Chiefs, and Sirdars, do continue their functions in maintaining order, referring to me whenever necessary.

“ The British Government desire that the people shall be treated with justice and benevolence, and that their religious feelings and customs be respected.

“ The services of such Sirdars and Chiefs as assist in preserving order will be duly recognised, but all disturbers of the peace and persons concerned in attacks upon the British authority will meet with condign punishment.

“ The British Government, after consultation with the principal Sirdars, tribal Chiefs, and others representing the interests and wishes of the various provinces and cities, will declare its will as to the future permanent arrangements to be made for the good government of the people.”

No. 34.

No. 224 of 1879 (Extract).

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, October 23, 1879.

WE have the honour to submit a summary of the intelligence received during the past week regarding the state of affairs in Afghanistan, and the progress of our military operations in that country.

2. On the 13th October General Roberts telegraphed that early on the preceding morning the Amir Yakub Khan came on foot to his tent, with two attendants, and that His Highness had declared his resolution to resign the government of Afghanistan. His Highness was treated with great courtesy by General Roberts, who begged him to think over the matter ; but at a second interview, a few hours later, the Amir said that his determination was unchanged, and General Roberts has since reported that he believes it

to be irrevocable. This important and unexpected declaration has been communicated to your Lordship for the information and orders of Her Majesty's Government; and General Roberts was at once desired to report further upon the circumstances in which the resignation, as soon as it is publicly known, will have placed him, and upon the various and complicated political considerations involved.

3. General Roberts entered the Bala Hissar on the 12th October. The Amir did not accompany him, but Sirdar Musa Khan, the eldest son of the Amir, and other principal Sirdars were in attendance; and special care was taken that the proceedings upon formal occupation of the capital and its fortress should be impressive. After reaching the Amir's garden in the Bala Hissar, General Roberts issued the proclamation, which will be found among the enclosures to this despatch. It notified to the inhabitants of Kabul the penalties which would be inflicted on the city for participation in the massacre of the British Embassy, the arrangements for repression of disorder, the restrictions as to bearing arms, which would be enforced, and the rewards which would be given for the surrender of guilty persons. General Roberts has found it necessary to detain in safe custody Mustaufi Habibulla, Wazir Shah Muhammad, Yahya Khan, and Zacharia Khan, pending a detailed inquiry into the circumstances of the attack on the Embassy. The Amir Yakub Khan is provided with quarters in the British camp on the Siah Sang hill, outside the Bala Hissar. On the 13th instant the troops marched through the city. There was no kind of opposition, and the demeanour of the inhabitants was respectful. Brigadier-General Hills has been appointed Governor of the city and surrounding district; and martial law has been proclaimed within a radius of 10 miles from the walls. The intelligence since received from Kabul is scanty, owing to interruption of communications; but we enclose a telegram reporting that explosions, causing, we regret to say, some loss of life, have taken place in the Bala Hissar; though the fire, of which the origin is not explained, was extinguished in time to save the principal magazine.

4. The tribes in the vicinity of Ali Khel and the Shuturguridan had been gathering for some time past for a combined attack upon the British posts beyond Ali Khel; and their hostile demonstrations have kept our troops continually occupied during the past week. They destroyed a portion of the telegraph line, and for some days the communications of Ali Khel with the Shuturguridan and Kabul were interrupted. A party threatened the Sirkai Kotal post, and a British detachment was consequently sent in that direction from the Shuturguridan, when the enemy delivered a very bold and obstinate attack upon the camp at the Shuturguridan, charging up to the British guns. They were driven back after five hours' severe fighting, having lost and killed and wounded some 200 men, and leaving two standards in our possession. On receiving news which convinced them that Kabul was actually in the possession of British troops, the tribes began to disperse; and on the 20th General Hugh Gough arrived at Shuturguridan from Kabul, when Colonel Money's position was completely disengaged. A successful demonstration from Kurram along the Chakmani valley dispersed the Chakmanis, Mangals, and Jajis who had assembled and threatened Ali Khel.

5. On the 17th October the advanced guard of the Khyber Column had reached Rozabad between Jellalabad and Gandamak. As soon as communications with General Roberts have been completely established by the Khyber route, the necessary measures will be taken to abandon the line by Ali Khel and the Shuturguridan Pass, which will be no longer required, and would be difficult to hold during the winter.

6. The situation at Kandahar remains unaltered. The country is perfectly tranquil; the Sirdar Sher Ali Khan continues to co-operate unreservedly with General Stewart in maintaining order throughout the province; and the adjacent districts of Kelat-i-Ghilzai and Zamindawar have now been brought under the central authority at Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 14th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Bala Hissar, through Shuturguridan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

[13th October (?)]. Early yesterday morning, Amir walked to my camp, accompanied by only two attendants, and expressed his determination to resign Amirship. He said he had intended doing so before going to Kushi, but had allowed himself to be over-persuaded. He was in very low spirits; said his life had been a miserable one; that he would rather be a grasscutter in the English Camp than Ruler of Afghanistan, and begged he might live in this camp until he could be sent to India, or London, or wherever Viceroy might desire to send him. I placed a tent at his disposal; ordered breakfast to be prepared for him; and begged him to think over the matter for two or three hours; and said that I would see him at 10 o'clock, the time appointed the previous evening for His Highness to come to my camp and accompany me to the Bala Hissar. The Amir knew nothing of the proposed proclamation, and was quite ignorant of any intentions towards the Mustaufi, the Wazir, Yahya Khan and his brother.

At 10, I had a second interview with the Amir, who stated that he had quite decided to give up the throne of Kabul; that he could not possibly accompany me to the Bala Hissar; but that he would send his eldest son; and all his Ministers would be in attendance. I again pointed out the serious step His Highness was taking; but finding his mind (?) was made up, I said I would telegraph to the Viceroy for instructions; that of course he could not be forced to remain on as Amir against his will; but that I should ask him to retain the title until I could receive a reply to this telegram.

The eldest son accompanied me to the Bala Hissar. The programme as telegraphed yesterday was strictly carried out, and the ceremony was most impressive. After reading out the proclamation, a copy of which I am telegraphing to you to-day, I dismissed all the Sirdars, and native gentlemen, except the Mustaufi, the Wazir, Yahya Khan, and Zacharia Khan. I told these four that it was necessary to detain them, until the circumstances connected with the attack on the Embassy had been thoroughly inquired into.

The Proclamation is being translated into Persian, and will be widely circulated at noon to-day. The troops will march through the city; certain positions will be held by guards (there is only one gate); and General Hills will take over military control as Governor, assisted by Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 14th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Shuturguridan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Bala Hissar, Kabul, 13th October. Following is copy of the Proclamation I issued yesterday on taking possession of Bala Hissar:—

In my Proclamation of the 3rd October, Shawal, dated, Zarghun Shahr, I informed the people of Kabul that a British army was advancing to take possession of the city, and I warned them against offering any resistance to the entry of the troops and the authority of His Highness the Amir: that warning has been disregarded. The force under my command has now reached Kabul and occupied the Bala Hissar; but its advance has been pertinaciously opposed, and the inhabitants of the city have taken a conspicuous part in the opposition offered. They have, therefore, become rebels against the Amir, and have added to the guilt already incurred by them in abetting the murder of the British Envoy and his companions. For the treacherous and cowardly crime which has brought indelible disgrace upon the Afghan people, it would be but a just and fitting reward, for such misconduct, if the city of Kabul were now totally destroyed and its very name blotted out. But the great British Government ever desires to temper justice with mercy; and I now announce to the inhabitants of Kabul that the full retribution for their offence will not be exacted, and that the city will be spared. Nevertheless, it is necessary that they should not escape all penalty, and further that the punishment inflicted should be such as will be felt and remembered. Therefore, such portions of the city buildings as now interfere with the proper military occupation of the Bala Hissar, and the safety and comfort of the British troops to be quartered in it, will be at once levelled with the ground, and, further, a heavy fine, the amount of which will

be notified hereafter, will be imposed upon the inhabitants of Kabul, to be paid according to their several capacities. I further give notice to all that, in order to provide for the restoration and maintenance of order, the city of Cabul and the surrounding country, to a distance of 10 miles, are placed under martial law. With the consent of His Highness the Amir, a Military Governor of Kabul will be appointed to administer justice and punish with a strong hand all evil-doers. The inhabitants of Kabul and neighbouring villages are hereby warned to submit to his authority. This punishment inflicted upon the whole city will not, of course, absolve from further penalties those whose individual guilt may be hereafter proved. A full and searching inquiry into the circumstances of the late outbreak will be held; and all persons connected with, or bearing a part in it, will be dealt with according to their deserts. With the view of providing effectually for the prevention of crime and disorder and the safety of all well-disposed persons in Kabul, it is hereby notified that for the future the carrying of dangerous weapons, whether swords, knives, or firearms, within the streets, or within a distance of five miles from the city gates, is forbidden. After a week from the date of this Proclamation, any person found armed within those limits will be liable to the penalty of death. Persons having in their possession any articles whatsoever which formerly belonged to members of the British Embassy are required to bring them forthwith to the British Camp. Anyone neglecting this warning will, if found hereafter in possession of any such articles, be subjected to severest penalties. Further, all persons who may have in their possession any firearms or ammunition formerly issued to or seized by the Afghan troops, are required to produce them. For every country-made rifle whether breech or muzzle-loading, the sum of Rupees 3 will be given on delivery, and for every rifle of European manufacture, Rupees 5. Anyone found hereafter in possession of any such weapons will be severely punished. Finally, I notify that I will give a reward of Rupees 50 for the surrender of any person, whether soldier or civilian, concerned in the attack on the British Embassy, or such information as may lead directly to his capture. A similar sum will be given in the case of any person who may have fought against the British troops since the 3rd September, Shawal, last, and therefore become a rebel against His Highness the Amir. If any such person so surrendered or captured be a captain or subaltern officer of the Afghan Army, the reward will be increased to Rupees 75, and if a field officer to Rupees 120.

Enclosure 3 in No. 34.

Telegram dated 14th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 13th October. Bala Hissar was occupied yesterday; very impressive sight. Amir pleaded indisposition. His eldest son accompanied me, and principal Sirdars were summoned to hear proclamation read. 67th Foot and 5th Goorkhas now occupy Lower and Upper Bala Hissar respectively. To-day troops march through city. Guards will be placed at all important points. There is only one gate. General Hills takes over office of Military Governor, assisted by Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan.

Three regiments, with 12 guns, left Ghazni a few days ago to join the Afghan troops fighting against us here; meeting the dispersed Kabul troops they fled, leaving the guns. I have sent regiment of cavalry to bring them in.

Eighty-five guns, mortars, and howitzers were found in Bala Hissar, making a total of upwards of 200 guns in our possession. Vast quantity of powder, accoutrements, arms, saddlery, musical instruments, &c., also found. Snider cartridges have apparently been made locally in great numbers. Wounded doing well.

Enclosure 4 in No. 34.

Telegram dated 16th October 1879.

From BRIGADIER-GENERAL, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Finding that Colonel Money has not communicated details of attack on Shuturgardan and Sirkai Kotal on 14th, I now report them. At 9 p.m., 13th, Colonel Money heard wire was cut and enemy intended attacking Sirkai Kotal post at 7 a.m., 14th

Despatched wing 21st and two guns under Major Collis to patrol road, at 8 a.m., heavy firing heard, and information given that 2,000 enemy attacked post and were engaged with Major Collis. At same time enemy advanced in force on camp from south. Major Collis was reinforced by two companies. A feint was made with a view of drawing troops from camp and real attack made on camp by 2,000 enemy desperately enough, twice charging up to guns. A decisive bayonet charge was made, and enemy fled leaving 40 dead and two standards. They were pursued for two miles. Enemy must have lost 200 killed and wounded. Our loss, Captain Waterfield severely wounded, two killed and 14 wounded.

Enclosure 5 in No. 34.

Telegram dated 17th October 1879.

From GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

THE sound of guns was heard yesterday afternoon in direction of Shuturguridan; has proved by intelligence received this morning to have been at Sirkai Kotal, where numbers of enemy still said to be collected on the road, especially between Karatiga and Sirkai Kotal.

There has been considerable destruction of line in that locality, both posts and wire. It has also been cut in three places between this and Karatiga, and also quite close to camp last night. In present insecure state of upper part of road, and the unsatisfactory attitude of the Jajis, I have considered it advisable to suspend further repairs here just now, as it entails constant employment of strong escorts which our numbers do not allow of. Meanwhile I am hourly expecting return of the Jaji Maliks from Kabul, which will no doubt have a quieting effect, for people are not yet reassured of their safety, false reports having been sedulously circulated as to their death or detention.

Received letter General Roberts yesterday, date 13th; says in a few days will be time to give up Shuturguridan communications and open it by Jellalabad, this being arranged to take place very shortly, and saving in time between Shuturguridan and Ali Khel being small. It appears to me, especially as we are unable to patrol road in sufficient strength and frequently, that wisest course at present is to limit telegraphic communication to Ali Khel. General Roberts has proposed to take on 3rd Sikhs and the British or No. 1 Mountain Battery, also 9th Lancers; but 1-8 Royal Artillery and 9th are engaged under General Tytler, now at Balesh Khel. If not sent on at once may be late.

Enclosure 6 in No. 34.

Telegram dated 19th October 1879.

From GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

LETTER just received from Colonel Money, dated to-day, says been surrounded by large force enemy since 15th. Column under General Gough to reach Kushi (?) to-day. General Roberts' orders were to send 3rd Sikhs and mountain guns to Kabul and return 21st here to reinforce, but if impossible to open Ali Khel road, the whole force to go on to Kabul. General Gough takes up carriage for all.

Enclosure 7 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 15th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 14th October. Infantry and cavalry marched through city yesterday. Streets were crowded. People respectful, and did not appear sullen. Three cases of cholera occurred yesterday—one in 67th, one in 92nd, and one 72nd; first two fatal. All in camp on Siah Sung. Water supply is most impure. Any amount of fruit is to be had. Cavalry found 12 guns from Ghazni abandoned 28 miles from this; six nine-pounders, six mountain, elephants were sent this morning to bring them in. Snow fell on Hindu Kush range yesterday. All well.

Enclosure 8 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 20th October 1879.

From GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

JAJI Maliks returned from interview with enemy, whom they have convinced of fall of Kabul, and inutility of fighting; they are dispersing. Letters from Shuturguridan just received, dated 19th, reporting arrival of 5th Punjab Cavalry, 5th Punjab Infantry, and four mountain guns at Kushi yesterday under General Gough to advance on Shuturguridan to-day. Two guns and two companies 5th Punjab Infantry had occupied Sirkai Kotal. Enemy dispersing; their position having been freely shelled yesterday, and sharpshooters (having) driven back scouting parties with great success. I hope to hear more to-morrow. Steps taken to keep Karatiga road open to pass on daks as well as officers and details waiting here to join regiments at Kabul. Much will depend, however, on the news I receive to-morrow.

Enclosure 9 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 20th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Basawul, to VICEROY, and to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 17th October.—Portion of the magazine in upper Bala Hissar blew up soon after noon yesterday, and constant explosions have occurred since. Nothing seems to be left but the large powder magazine, which is said to contain about 250,000 pounds. All small arms, ammunition, and other munitions of war collected by Sher Ali must have been destroyed. Captain Shafto, with two or three Khalassies, are the only people known to have been inside the enclosure at the time. They, with Goorkha guard at gate, and small party of Goorkhas, including the Subadar-Major, who were sitting near, have, I fear, been blown up. Altogether about 20 lives lost. A soldier signaller, 67th Foot, was killed in the garden below by beam falling on him. 67th and Goorkhas were moved out of Bala Hissar at once, and are now encamped with rest of force on Siah Sang range. There is no reason to suppose explosion occurred, except by accident; powder and ammunition were lying all over the place. Every precaution was taken, gate shut, guard placed, and no one admitted except on business. Endeavours are now being made to check progress of fire and save large magazine, the blowing up of which would doubtless cause considerable damage to life and property in city.

General Hugh Gough, with 5th Punjab Cavalry, 5th Punjab Infantry, and four mountain guns, leaves this to-day for Kushi to open communication, and if necessary, reinforce Shuturguridan, which was threatened with another attack yesterday. Communication between Ali Khel and Shuturguridan is interrupted, and there are rumours that Ali Khel was attacked on 13th.

I am sending letter and telegrams by Jellalabad. Two cases of cholera yesterday, one in 72nd, one in 92nd; neither fatal.

Enclosure 10 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 20th October 1879.

From GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

CAMP threatened about noon to-day by parties of enemy supposed to be preceding main body. Cavalry detachments sent out to watch them; shots exchanged. Just at this time the Jaji and Turi Maliks arrived from Kabul, having accompanied General Gough's column as far as Dobandi, and thence taken the Hazro Ghogiza route to this, avoiding Shuturguridan. Gough was to reach Shuturguridan last night or this morning; and enemy was reported to be dispersing. The Jaji Malliks, offering immediately on arrival to interview and disperse the enemy here by acquainting them with true state of affairs at Kabul, went off with this object. Result will be reported when known.

Enclosure 11 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 20th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 16th October.—Country quiet. Supplies coming in fairly. Bala Hissar and Sherpur Cantonment being cleared and prepared for occupation by our troops. Wounded doing well. Troops healthy. Post still very irregular, owing to internal feuds amongst Ghilzais, each small section wishing to have its own Chief acknowledged. Padshah Khan's authority is limited. Latest date from Simla, 3rd October; by telegraph 12th. All well.

Enclosure 12 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 20th October 1879.

From GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

News by spies from Shuturguridan that besieging force, hearing of approach of two regiments our cavalry from Kabul, and being short of food, have begun to disperse. The enemy still continues to collect in our vicinity, chiefly Chakmanies, our own subjects, and Mangals. I hope in a few days to be able to punish them, and also the Chakmanies themselves, from Kurram direction. In order to make our communications safe, I have asked General Tytler to have two guns, 1—8 R. A., and a Company 86th at Thull. This will bring up strength of Thull to 1,255 cavalry, and infantry with two guns. The road posts are also very strong. I intend to send 1—2 battery, C-4 from Kotal to Kurram on relief by two guns, 1—8 R. A., which will be more useful there. The other two guns, 1—8 R. A., will come here with such portions of 85th, 9th Lancers (as) may be advisable according to circumstances. The cavalry pursuit on 14th had a great effect.

Enclosure 13 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 21st October 1879.

From GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

LETTER from General Gough, Shuturguridan, dated 20th. He reached that day without opposition, the enemy having completely dispersed. He took up six companies, 5th Punjab Infantry, and four mountain guns.

To-day he intended sending 21st Punjab Infantry to Kushi with stores; carriage to return for more, himself remaining on Shuturguridan, and awaiting intimation from me as to possibility of opening road; to which I replied at once that I am only awaiting arrival of 4th Punjab Infantry, expected in a day or two, to forward it and details, the former returning, the latter proceeding, in accordance with General Roberts' original programme. I have suggested to Gough that the 21st might return from Kushi and come back with 5th.

The demonstration ordered to be made from Kurram up Chakmani Valley was carried out, and had the desired effect. The news of the approach of the troops spread rapidly to this neighbourhood, and the Chakmanis with Mangals thus immediately dispersed, the Ahmed and Hassan Khels Jajis alone wavering for a while, though they also have now gone.

Our left picket was fired on last night, and nearly half a mile of wire cut and carried away close to Ali Khel, the Maliks of which have been punished.

General Gough begs me to add all well.

Enclosure 14 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 15th October 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Lundikotal, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

General Gough holds Jellalabad with Hazara Battery, four guns C.-3 Artillery, five troops Bengal Cavalry, 9th Foot, and wing 24th Native Infantry. All quiet along line. Jellalabad Governor professes great readiness assist with supplies and transport, but thinks latter difficult.

Enclosure 15 in No. 34.

Telegram, No. A.-917, dated 19th October 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to SIR DONALD STEWART, Kandahar.

You can place Kelat-i-Ghilzai and subordinate districts under Kandahar authority and control administration, especially revenue collections.

Enclosure 16 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 19th October 1879. (Extract.)

From SIR D. STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR reports to-day that travellers have brought news from Kabul, dated 7th instant, to the effect that, after the massacre, Mustaufi, Daud Shah, some Ghilzai Chiefs, and mutinous regiments met in garden of Bala Hissar, and swore on Koran to resist British advance. Amir was present, and also took the oath, but it is believed under compulsion.

Sirdar proposes to at once issue proclamation declaring his allegiance to British Government, and separating from Amir; but this might be premature.

Enclosure 17 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 20th October 1879.

From SIR DONALD STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

ST. JOHN reports news from Kabul that Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, the Amir's brother, who has been under arrest, tried to escape from Kabul in a woman's clothes, but was caught and imprisoned (by?) Nazar Muhammad Khan, the late Amir's brother, who was Acting Governor.

The Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, Muhammad Tahir Khan, has applied for permission to return to Kabul; and, as he is of no use, his resignation has been accepted; and, with reference to your telegram of yesterday, I hope to be able to arrange for the Government of Kelat under a Ghilzai Chief subordinate to Kandahar.

Muhammad Yusaf Khan has resigned Governorship of Pusht-i-Rud. Arrangements will now be made for the Government of this province from Kandahar.

Enclosure 18 in No. 34.

No. 1,049 C; dated Simla, 16th October 1879.

From LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B.,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM desired to submit, for the information of the Government of India, translations of letters dated the 29th September and 1st October, from the Governor of Jellalabad to the address of the Commissioner of Peshawur and the Political Officer, Khyber.

Enclosure 19 in No. 34.

Translation of Letter dated 11th Shawal (29th September 1879) from SIRDAR MUHAMMAD HASSAN KHAN, Governor of Jellalabad, to COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur.—Received by Post on 3rd October 1879.

AFTER TITLES AND COMPLIMENTS.—I have received by hand of a Hindu of Sourji ten copies of the declaration in Persian and Pushtu, and two letters from you and have understood them. You write that British troops are about to advance *via* Dakka. As I have received no instructions from the Amir regarding the advance of British troops I must be excused (meaning I cannot allow it). Should I receive information from the

Amir in this matter well and good, otherwise the advance of troops *viâ* Dakka without the permission of the Amir will not be free from resistance and annoyance, because the tribesmen of Afghanistan are headstrong and disobedient and uncontrollable, and I fear lest by the advance of British troops disturbances will be raised and some misconduct by these tribes may take place which may tend to my disgrace and to your anger. It is necessary that the advance be postponed until I receive instructions from the Amir. I will let you know my orders, and it will look better if the troops only advance then.

Enclosure 20 in No. 34.

Translation of Letter dated 13 Shawal (1st October 1879) from SIRDAR MUHAMMAD HASSAN KHAN, Governor of Jellalabad, to CAPTAIN WARBURTON, Political Officer, Khyber.

To-day the Wednesday I have received instructions from His Highness the Amir that the friendship existing between the British Government and the Amir still firmly exists, and that he has invited British troops of his own accord. I therefore write to you, my kind friend, that as I had not hitherto received any instructions from the Amir, excuse me if any fault has been found in your reception. Now that I have received orders from the Amir, I have written to my subordinates to receive British troops with every honour, and I will myself come to Sherpur on Friday the day after to-morrow to wait on the Sahib Bahadur (meaning the General Commanding).

Enclosure 21 in No. 34.

No. 2 P., dated Camp Lundikotal, 10th October 1879.

From Major-General BRIGHT, C.B., Commanding, Jellalabad Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for information, English version of Persian letter this day addressed by me to the Governor of Jellalabad, informing him of arrival here of my head-quarters, thanking him for the courtesy and assistance shown by him, so far, to the British forces, and urging him to continue exertions for the facilitating of our advance.

Enclosure 22 in No. 34.

English version of Persian Letter, addressed from Lundikotal, by MAJOR-GENERAL BRIGHT, C.B., to MUHAMMAD HASSAN KHAN, Sahib, Governor of Jellalabad, under date October 10th, 1879.

You are aware that a British army is again advancing by the Khyber route upon Kaḥul for the purpose of supporting the Amir's authority over his rebellious troops. My head-quarters reached this place yesterday, and I take an early opportunity of informing you under my own signature of the satisfaction with which I have from time to time received accounts of the friendly spirit which you have evinced, and the assistance you have afforded, to the advanced portions of the force under my command. The friendly feelings towards the British Government which have prompted you to act in this manner are on my part cordially reciprocated, and I look forward with pleasure to a personal meeting with you at Jellalabad on the head-quarters arriving there. In the meantime further instructions should be issued from time to time to all over whom your influence extends that exertions should be used in order to supply the British camps and forces with provisions and transport, the owners of which will, according to the invariable custom of British armies, receive full prices, while at the same time meriting the favour at once of the British Government and of yourself and other constituted authorities of Afghanistan.

No. 35.

No. 226 of 1879.—(Extract.)

Government of India, Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, October 30, 1879.

WE submit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the following summary of the intelligence received during the past week regarding affairs in Afghanistan and the progress of military operations in that country.

2. We enclose copy of a letter, dated 16th* October, from Sir Frederick Roberts,

* (Received 28th October.)

reporting the measures which he has taken in execution of the instructions sent to him by the Government of India on the 29th September last, for his guidance on his arrival at Kabul. General Roberts also describes in this letter the general situation of affairs and the state of parties at the capital. It will be seen that the Amir appears to have retired altogether from participation in affairs, and that Sir Frederick Roberts considers him much broken in spirits and unfit to resume his former position or responsibilities.

3. We also enclose copy of a proclamation which General Sir Frederick Roberts has been directed to issue at Kabul; in consequence of the Amir Yakub Khan's abdication of

† See No. 33. p. 133.

his government of Afghanistan.† The proclamation was transmitted by telegram to General Roberts on the 23rd October, with orders to issue it immediately; and a copy was also sent to General Sir Donald Stewart at Kandahar. We have just heard by telegraph from Sir Frederick Roberts that he has received and was about to publish the Proclamation.

4. No complete explanation has yet reached the Government of India of the causes of the explosion in the Bala Hissar reported in paragraph 3 of our despatch, dated 23rd October. The fire was overcome on the 17th October after it had reached and scorched the wall of the principal powder magazine; and Captain Shafto's body was recovered and buried on the 18th October. There is little or no news from the outlying provinces of Afghanistan, and the country round Kabul is reported quiet except in the direction of Tezin and Hissarak where the Ghilzais are stirring. General Saifudin, who commanded the parade of Kabul troops on the 3rd September, was captured on the 21st October, and has since been tried and executed. Very large stores of English made Snider ammunition and other material of war, together with ample stocks of clothing for the troops, have been found in the Bala Hissar, and the cantonment of Sherpur is being rapidly prepared for occupation by British troops, while supplies are now coming in plentifully. Various articles of property belonging to the British Embassy, including books, horses, rifles, and money, have been recently brought in.

5. General Gough remained in position upon the Shuturgurdan, in order to keep open the road thence toward Kabul, and to superintend the passage of the convoy from Ali Khel; but he will have withdrawn by the end of this month. This line of communication will then be suspended for the winter, and a force from Kabul, co-operating with General Bright's advance from Jellalabad, will open and secure communications with Kabul on that route. Before evacuating the Hariob Valley General Gordon proposes to punish some of the tribes who have been prominently active in annoying our posts during October; and he will take measures to this effect on the arrival of General Tytler with some additional troops from Thull.

6. General Bright reached Jellalabad on the 24th October; the Guides and a mountain battery entered Gandamak on the previous day too late to save the grain and flour stored there, which has been plundered by the Ghilzais and Khugianis. A reconnaissance has pushed two miles beyond the Surkhab river on the Jagdallak road, and the country has been found quiet, though there are reports that the Ghilzais are collecting above the Pass to dispute our advance. The Amir's governor at Jellalabad has continued to exercise his functions under the political direction of the British Commandant, has assisted materially in procuring supplies, and has generally attended to the requisitions made on him. General Bright has been instructed to guarantee the Khan of Lalpura and neighbouring Chiefs from any harm in consequence of assistance they may render to the British Government, and at the same time to warn them that, while good service will be rewarded disobedience to orders will entail punishment.

7. From the Kandahar side Major St. John reported that the governor of Ghazni had officially informed the governors of Mukur and Kelat-i-Ghilzai that Yakub Khan had been reinstated in full authority, and that General Roberts had proclaimed that the British forces are merely temporary guests of the Amir and will return immediately to

India. As this fabricated story appeared to have spread over the country, and to be producing some effect, the Government of India directed General Roberts to inform the governor of Ghazni of Yakub Khan's abdication, and to warn him that he must obey the orders of the British authorities on pain of being treated as a rebel.

Sirdar Sher Ali Khan reports that the Tarin District is quiet, and that the Hazaras have agreed to pay their land revenue. Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan has resigned the governorship of Pusht-i-Rud and has been advised to return to Kabul. The Ghilzais in the neighbourhood of Kelat-i-Ghilzai are more or less in an unsettled state; though at Kelat itself everything is reported quiet, and supplies are being stored for the use of the British garrison. The Tokhi clan of the Ghilzais is content with the present régime at Kandahar; but the chief of the Hotak clan refused to visit Major St. John at Kelat-i-Ghilzai. News has just arrived from Kandahar that Sahib Jan, a Tarakhi Ghilzai, and a notorious freebooter, who had gathered a force about Mukur with the intention of attacking our camp at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, was himself attacked, defeated with loss, and killed near Shahjui on the 25th. Sahib Jan had advanced to Shahjui, where he was met by Colonel Kennedy of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and his force completely dispersed, after an action in which the British troops suffered very slightly.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 22nd October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 18th October. Fire ceased yesterday after reaching and scorching wall of main powder magazine. Captain Shafto's body recovered; will be buried to-day. Gough's party reached Charasia yesterday. No news yet from Shuturguridan or Ali Khel. No post for several days. Country round Kabul quiet. All well.

Enclosure 2 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 22nd October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 19th October. Gough will occupy Sirkai Kotal between Shuturguridan and Kushi to-day, and will then be in heliographic communication with Colonel Money. Ghilzais are occupying Hazardarakht; and as General Gordon is evidently unable to re-establish communication with Shuturguridan, and the troops there are dependent on Ali Khel for supplies, I have ordered Gough to withdraw the garrison to Kushi. This will probably be done to-morrow. Ghilzais have assembled in large numbers, so, no doubt, there will be opposition. Country round Kabul quiet but Hissarak and Tezin. Ghilzais are assembling between Khurd Kabul and Jagdallak. General Gough will be kept fully informed. General Saifudin Khan was captured by our cavalry yesterday. Private Mitchell, 72nd, wounded on 6th, died on 17th. Sherpur Cantonment being cleaned out and prepared for occupation. I have sent daily telegrams, please let me know if all have been received. All well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 20th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Peiwar Kotal, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 15th October. Amount of war material here beyond belief. Nearly 10 lakhs of English made Snider ammunition is stored in the Bala Hissar; all apparently in

perfect order. Native troops coming this way need not, therefore, bring more ammunition, with them than may be required for the road. There is also great quantity of local made Snider ammunition, which will be tested shortly. Of powder, we have found upwards of two hundred thousand pounds; a great deal was destroyed before we took possession of the Sherpur cantonment. There is any amount of lead, copper, tin, shot, shell, caps, accoutrements, and clothing for troops. Rifles have been made away with, but some are being brought back daily. Also horses, ponies, and other property belonging to the Embassy. All well.

Enclosure 4 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 25th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 22nd October. No news from Shuturguridan since evening of 19th. Enemy were then said to be dispersing.

Letters and telegrams despatched from this on 14th were destroyed by Ghilzais in Hazardarakht. Those despatched before and since will, I hope, reach destinations.

Sherpur cantonment being rapidly prepared for reception of troops. Supplies being collected fairly well. Troops healthy. All well.

Enclosure 5 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 26th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 20th October. General Hugh Gough reports that on his troops reaching Sirkai Kotal between Kushi and Shuturguridan, enemy dispersed. I hope communication will now be restored with Ali Khel. General Gordon reports that he has urged postponement of General Tytler's expedition. This seems unnecessary; we have enough troops to do all that is required between Ali Khel and this. Small explosions still continue at Upper Bala Hissar, all precautions are being taken to prevent larger powder magazine exploding. All principal men from Kohistan and intervening country have come to Kabul to pay their respects. Country all round quiet. Weather fine; nights cold. Troops healthy. All well.

Enclosure 6 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 27th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 25th October. Letter from Simla, dated 16th, and telegrams dated 21st October, reached this yesterday, also several mail bags of earlier dates, more expected to-morrow. Heliographic communication with Ali Khel was established yesterday. Telegraph lines from Kabul towards Jellalabad will be commenced on 28th. Mr. Josephs' Telegraph Department left Kushi for Kabul yesterday. Large numbers of poles are ready at hand. All well.

Enclosure 7 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 27th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 23rd October. General Hugh Gough heliographs from Shuturguridan that Ghilzais began to disperse on hearing of approach of his small force, and cleared off completely as soon as he occupied the Sirkai Kotal. Ghilzais are said to have numbered not less than eight or ten thousand. Gough had with him five hundred rifles, one squadron of cavalry, and four mountain guns, two squadrons of cavalry being kept at Kushi. Communication with Ali Khel was restored soon afterwards.

I propose now closing Shuturguridan route, sending 21st Native Infantry back to Ali Khel, and bringing on 3rd Sikhs and four guns No. 1 Mountain Battery to Kabul, and, as soon as Gough returns, sending a brigade under Macpherson towards Gandamak to open up communication with Khyber column.

Ghilzais from Tezin and Hissarak have sent messengers to know if I will receive their head men. They will probably come in soon. If not, presence of troops on that road will speedily settle matters, and it is very desirable that safe and regular communication should be established by Khyber route as soon as possible. All well.

Enclosure 8 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 28th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 24th October. All quiet on Shuturguridan and elsewhere below. All other officers detained there leave Kushi for Kabul to-day. Gough remains for convoy from Ali Khel and to keep road open to end of this month. Reconnoitring parties are out in all directions collecting supplies and obtaining information. Weather splendid, nights being cold already. Troops healthy. All well.

Enclosure 9 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 28th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 26th October. Dr. Bellew and officers detained on Shuturguridan arrived this morning. Supplies coming in plentifully. By 15th November I hope to have five months stored, except possibly forage, which, however, is being collected satisfactorily. Improvement of road towards Butkhak will be commenced to-morrow. Shelter for British portion of force nearly complete in Sherpur cantonment. Native regiments have commenced hutting themselves. All well.

Enclosure 10 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 24th October 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad.

THE Khan of Lalpura and all Chiefs should receive positive guarantee of protection by British Government from any harm in consequence of services rendered to us, and it should be made known that, while good service is rewarded, disobedience to orders will be punished.

Enclosure 11 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 22nd October 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

THE Governor of Ghazni has officially informed Governors of Mukur and Kelat that the Amir has been reinstated in full authority, and that Roberts has proclaimed by beat of drum that he and the army are only guests of four days, and will retire at once to India. This news has spread over country, and has had bad effect. Governor of Ghazni, Muhammad Saib Agha, is said to be a dangerous intriguer.

Enclosure 12 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 23rd October 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar.

MAJOR ST. JOHN's telegram, 22nd. We have told Roberts to send to Ghazni Governor notice of Amir's abdication and orders to obey Roberts' authority under pain of treatment as rebel.

Enclosure 13 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 23rd October 1879.

From SIR DONALD STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla. (Extract.)

SIRDAR Muhammad Yusaf Khan having resigned his Governorship has been advised to return to Kabul.

In reply to communications asking for his advice, Sirdar Sher Ali Khan has addressed letters to Muhammad Afzal, Hotaki Ghilzai, recommending him to wait on Major St John and afford assistance in collecting supplies at Kelati-Ghilzai. Muhammad Afzal has written to Major St. John declaring himself an adherent of Yakub Khan, and asking at the same time for pay and rank. He alleges that he cannot visit Kelat because his tribesmen are troublesome and require his presence: this is a mere excuse.

Inquiry into thefts at Mundi Hissar and Tuktapul progressing satisfactorily; thieves traced, and some of the stolen goods recovered.

I announced in Durbar on Saturday that the Barakzais would not again be allowed to molest those who had made their submission to us; the announcement afforded great satisfaction.

Sirdar reports that Tarin District is quiet, and that the Hazaras have agreed to pay up their land revenue.

Enclosure 14 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 24th October 1879.

From SIR DONALD STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR reports that two Heratis, Naib Futteh-ulla Beg, Firozkoti, and Mirza Gholam Muhammad, son of Mirza Gholam Sadik, and four Kandahari Barakzais, Muhammad Zaman Khan, General Muhammad Jan Khan, Brigadier Ahud Khan, and Dam Muhammad Khan, are at a village a few miles hence, having just arrived *via* Moraf from Kabul. I have requested Sirdar to secure them, pending receipt of a reply from Roberts, to whom I have telegraphed the above information.

Enclosure 15 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 26th October 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

RETURNED here last night. Everything quiet at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and arrangement made for bringing in Government grain for winter use of garrison. The Tokhi tribe is content with new state of affairs; but Hotaks are less so, their Chief, Muhammad Afzal, refused to come in. Saqu Khan, Chief, who was there last winter, has now returned, and it may be advisable to put him in Afzal's place, but the Hotaks have little power for mischief under any circumstances. Beyond Kelat country is in complete anarchy, but not apparently unsafe for caravans. Governor of Ghazni said to have shut himself up in his citadel. Governors placed by Amir over Taraki and Andari tribes have been plundered and forced to fly to Kabul.

Enclosure 16 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 28th October 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SAHIB JAN, Taraki Ghilzai, a notorious ruffian and freebooter, had assembled force of about thousand men of his tribe about Mukur. On 23rd, he reached General Hughes, through Tokhi Ghilzai, that he had advanced to Shahjui with avowed intention of attacking our camp at Tazi. Hughes sent out Colonel Kennedy, 2nd P. C., with force of all arms at 2 a.m. on 25th to reconnoitre towards Shahjui and followed with remainder of force in morning. Kennedy drove in enemy's pickets near Shahjui and found Sahib Jan in position with 200 horse and 700 foot, which he attacked and completely dispersed. Sahib Jan and 41 others found dead on field. Our loss one private, 39th, one 2nd Punjab Cavalry killed, Captain Sartorius, 59th, Captain Broome, two native officers and 24 men, 2nd P. C. wounded. Neither Broome nor Sartorius dangerously hurt. Affair will have excellent effect, Sahib Jan having been terror of district.

Enclosure 17 in No. 35.

No. 19, dated Bala Hissar, Kabul; 16th October 1879.

From Major-General SIR F. ROBERTS, V.C., K.C.B., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 506, dated the 29th September 1879, conveying to me, on the part of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, general instructions for my guidance on arrival at Kabul.

2. His Excellency in Council will have learnt from my telegrams that these instructions had been in great measure anticipated. I have taken possession of the Bala Hissar, and assumed supreme authority in Kabul; and I have announced in a proclamation, of which a copy is enclosed, that the city will be subjected to a heavy fine, and that all buildings which now interfere with the proper military occupation of the Bala Hissar, and the safety and comfort of the troops to be quartered in it, will be levelled with the ground. I am now making inquiries to ascertain the amount which the city is capable of paying, and the buildings whose demolition is desirable are being selected. A considerable extent of ground now covered with streets and houses will probably be cleared, and the fine will be fixed at the highest possible sum, so that I hope the punishment inflicted on the city will be severely felt now, and remembered hereafter.

3. For the thorough investigation of the causes and circumstances of the late outbreak, and the collection of all possible evidence regarding the conduct of individuals since the arrival of the British Embassy in Kabul, I have nominated a Commission consisting of the members marginally named. Their duties will be comprehensive, and will include the submission of recommendations regarding the punishment to be inflicted on all persons whom they may find guilty of participation, direct or indirect, active or passive, in the attack on the Residency, or of other connected offences calling for notice. Every such recommendation will be carefully considered by me, and his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council may rely upon my carrying out most strictly the instructions conveyed in paragraph 8 of your letter under reply.

4. It will be seen from the terms of the proclamation to which I have referred above that in one particular I have not exactly anticipated his Excellency's instructions. I have not considered it necessary or desirable to insist for the present upon the absolute disarmament of the whole city population. But I have prohibited under penalty of death the carrying of arms within the city, or within a distance of five miles from the city gates. This prohibition, backed by the occupation of the Bala Hissar, and the holding of all important points in the city itself, will, I believe, be sufficient to guard against the possibility of any disorder, and to ensure the personal safety of the officers and troops under my command. I have the honour to request that I may be informed whether the arrangement meets with the approval of his Excellency in Council.

5. The exercise of supreme authority in the city, and over the surrounding country to a distance of ten miles from the city walls, I have delegated to Major-General Hills, V.C., C.B. He will be assisted in the performance of his duties by Nawab Sir Gholam Hussan Khan, K.C.S.I., and every measure of importance which he may consider it desirable to introduce will be submitted for my sanction, and carried out under my general supervision.

6. Every effort is being made for the early collection of supplies. Some difficulty has hitherto been experienced in this matter, particularly in procuring forage for the horses and baggage animals, but the difficulty will, I believe, be overcome. I expect to obtain large stores of grain and other necessities from the Khalsa villages, the resources of which His Highness the Amir has placed unreservedly at my disposal; and I have little doubt that by prompt and liberal payments, by enforcing strict discipline among the troops, whose conduct has hitherto been unexceptionable, and by considerate treatment of the people, I shall before long be enabled to draw freely on the produce of the surrounding country.

7. My telegram of the 13th instant will have made known to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council the Amir's determination to abdicate, and his desire to leave Afghanistan for ever. It will also have informed his Excellency of the fact that I have considered it necessary to place under surveillance, pending the result of the inquiry into the circumstances of the outbreak, Sirdar Yahya Khan, Sirdar

Zakaria Khan, the Mustaufi Habibulla Khan, and the Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan. His Highness' determination, which I believe to be irrevocable, was arrived at without any knowledge of my intentions towards his father-in-law and ministers. It appears to have been prompted by the conviction of his inability to control the Afghan people, by weariness of a life of incessant trouble and intrigue, and possibly in part by the feeling that suspicion had been thrown upon his own action and motives. His Highness is now in my camp, where he wishes to remain until the instructions of his Excellency the Viceroy are received regarding his future movements. He seems much broken in spirits and wholly unfit to resume his former position and responsibilities. There is, so far as I can judge, no influential party in Kabul to which he could now look for support. The Barakzai Sirdars in general form an adverse faction of which Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan is the head. Sirdar Ahmad Ali Jan alone stands aloof from this party, and, putting aside his youth, he has, in my opinion, no political weight whatever. Sirdar Yahya Khan and his brother Sirdar Zakaria Khan are of course attached to the fortunes of the Amir, but their influence by itself is inconsiderable. Nevertheless, it is not improbable that if Yakub Khan could rouse himself to the effort he would still be able to maintain himself as Amir in the event of the retirement of our forces; but he would be weak, and unable to co-operate effectually in furthering the policy of the British Government. This question, however, is not of great importance, for, as I have remarked above, I believe his present determination to be irrevocable. It is probably unnecessary for me to add that none of two Amir's sons (*sic*) are fitted to take his place. Moreover, His Highness wishes them to accompany him in his retirement. I await the instructions of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council regarding the measures to be adopted in view of the present situation of affairs. In the meantime the Amir will remain in my camp.

8. Before closing this letter I would observe that the military resources of Afghanistan during the time of the late Amir, and the attention paid to their development, appear to me to have been much greater than was generally supposed. The troops under my command have now in one way or another taken possession of more than two hundred guns. Immense quantities of military stores have been found in Kabul and the neighbourhood, amongst them supplies of home-made Snider ammunition. The number of regular regiments at the time of the outbreak is stated by General Daud Shah at sixty of Infantry and sixteen of Cavalry, and they have certainly not increased in numbers since the death of the late Amir. Very large sums of money must have been expended in the erection of the fortifications near Kabul, in the arming and equipment of the troops, and in the accumulation of the military stores now brought to light. In every way Sher Ali seems to have endeavoured to place the nation in a state of complete preparation for war, and the Afghan army only wanted competent leaders to become a sufficiently formidable military power.

9. In conclusion, I have the honour to request that his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council will rest assured of my earnest desire to respect the religious belief, feelings, and customs of the people of Afghanistan, and to convince them of the justice and benevolence of the British Government, now that they have had unmistakable evidence of its strength. I shall use every endeavour to impress upon the military and political officers under my orders the necessity for treating the population of the country in a just and conciliatory manner; and I trust that the presence of a British army in Kabul will be found in course of time to have removed rather than embittered the feelings of vindictive hostility which are now undoubtedly entertained towards us by a considerable portion of the Afghan people.

Enclosure 18 in No. 35.

Dated Camp Ali Khel, 13th October 1879.

From BRIGADIER-GENERAL T. E. GORDON, C.S.I., Commanding Kurram Field Force,
to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

In continuation of my No. 1 of yesterday's date, and my telegram of to-day, I have the honour to report that the people who assailed camp this morning were a mixture of Mangals, Ahmad, and Hassan Khels Jajis aided by some Ghilzais and Shinwaris from across the Lakerai route, also a few Spegawal.

We had previously heard of a projected combination against us by the surrounding tribes and of even a correspondence with this object passing between Ningnabar and

the Lujja Mangals. We were also aware that the people who had for some days previously been gathering to attack us were incited thereto by the presence of many Mullahs, one of whom was taken prisoner and proved to be a Mangal resident of Bagiyar Chakmani at the upper end of the Kurram valley.

The comparative absence of fire-arms among the assailants in the early attack on our right, and the confidence with which they crept close up to our position, proved the truth of what we afterwards heard, that their superstitious belief in the Mullahs had been worked on by these unscrupulous agents who had been busy circulating stories to the effect that our troops had been utterly routed in Kabul and their camp plundered. The tribes around us had been induced to believe that we too would fall an easy prey, and the plunder of camp be their reward.

I have sent a detailed military report of the attack and defeat of the enemy by to-day's post to the Chief of the Staff.

The attitude of the surrounding villages was unsatisfactory, no intimation of the approach of the enemy being given by them, and numbers of the assailants having been sheltered by them when retreating, while the bodies of those killed by the cavalry were carried off or concealed when our troops passed on. In one of these villages two killed and wounded, residents of the place, were discovered. The houses of these men have been destroyed.

Twenty-four corpses having been recovered and brought into camp, it was given out that all would be given up on identification by their own relatives or tribesmen. An ambiguous message has since been received from the Lujja Mangals demanding compensation for their killed and threatening revenge if not given up, though they have so far refused to come in for the bodies.

I have decided that such bodies as are not thus disposed of shall be buried according to Mahomedan rites by the captured Mullah. The religious scruples of the people will not have been violated, and the proceeding will, I trust, be held to be in accordance with the conciliatory spirit which Government has lately desired should govern our dealings with the surrounding tribes.

No. 36.

No. 231 of 1879. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 6th November 1879.

IN continuation of previous despatches we have the honour to submit the following summary of the principal political intelligence relating to affairs in Afghanistan received during the past week, and of the progress of military operations in that country.

2. General Macpherson's brigade left Kabul on the 1st November for Butkhak, on the road toward Jellalabad. The position at Siah Sang was then abandoned, and the British force at Kabul has been concentrated at Sherpur. General Roberts himself joined General Macpherson and reconnoitred the Jagdallak and Khurd Kabul passes. General Macpherson's brigade has marched toward Gandamak by the Khurd Kabul pass, while General Bright's force is advancing to meet it from the opposite direction. The principal headmen of the Ghilzais are with the camps; and it is understood that after a conference held at Tezin some days ago the leading chiefs of the tribe decided not to resist the operations of our troops on the line between Gandamak and Kabul. The Khyber is, and has been for some time, entirely quiet under the arrangements recently made by the Commissioner of Peshawur with the tribes who are responsible for the pass; the Mohmands have given no trouble; and the Barakzai governor of Jellalabad is actively assisting the British officers. The telegraph line is being pushed on from both sides without interruption; so that on the whole there is good ground for anticipating that our communications between Peshawur and Kabul will be successfully opened in a few days, and will be firmly established for the winter. General H. Gough was expected to return from Kushi to Kabul about the 3rd or 4th November, marching through the Logar valley. The weather is very cold at Kabul, but the troops are reported to be in excellent health and spirits. Among the enclosures will be found a

letter from General Roberts, dated 20th October, reporting the principal occurrences at Kabul since the end of September.

3. General Gordon reports from Ali Khel that the Ahmad and Hassan Khel sections of the Jaji tribe have accepted his terms, which included the payment, within six days, of Rupees 1,000 and the delivery of hostages, four of whom had been sent into Kurram. He is now proceeding to punish other neighbouring tribes who participated in the recent attacks on our posts and in the attempts to interrupt our communications with the Shuturgurdan. The Shuturgurdan line has been finally closed; and the Hariob valley will be immediately evacuated by our troops.

4. The proclamation issued by General Roberts at Kabul, commanding all Afghan authorities to continue their functions and to preserve order in the country, was read in full Durbar at Kandahar on the 4th November. The Sirdar Sher Ali Khan was at the same time formerly invested by General Stewart with the government of the Kandahar province, including Pusht-i-Rud and Kelat-i-Ghilzai. The Sirdar has placed his nephew, Shirindil Khan, in charge of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and his brother-in-law, Sirdar Abbas Khan, in charge of Zamindawar.

We have, &c.

(Signed).

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

JOHN STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 29th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 28th October.—9th Lancers arrived at Kushi yesterday accompanied by 583 native details, 19 officers belonging to regiments, and detachments at Kabul, and with last convoy that will come from Ali Khel this season. All troops will leave Shuturgurdan to-morrow. Gough with small column will then march through Logar valley, reaching Kabul on 3rd November. On 1st November, Macpherson, with 67th Foot, 23rd and 28th N.I., two guns F.-A., with elephant equipment, No. 2 Mountain Battery, and 12th Bengal Cavalry, will march to Butkhak. On 2nd and 3rd route *via* Latabund will be reconnoitred, and about 7th or 8th November I hope Macpherson will be at Jagdallak to open communication with Khyber column. All well.

Enclosure 2 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 31st October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 29th October.—Shuturgurdan will be abandoned to-day. Letters and telegrams will henceforth be sent to Jellalabad. Country quiet. All well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 31st October 1879.

From GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AHMAD and Hassan Khel Jajis submitted yesterday to terms imposed, namely, payment in six days of Rupees 1,000 and delivery of hostages, four of whom were sent to Kurram at once. As there is nothing beyond the fulfilment of these terms to detain the force in this valley, I propose, as soon as surplus stores, baggage, &c., now in course of removal, have all gone, to withdraw from the Hariob and proceed to Chakman to obtain satisfaction for its treachery as previously explained, after which the troops will be available for the Zaimusht expedition. This should be about 15th November.

Enclosure 4 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 1st November 1879. (Extract.)

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 30th October.—Siah Sang position will be abandoned when Macpherson marches to Butkhak on 1st November. Remainder of force will then be collected at Sherpur. Gough will return from Kushi on 3rd or 4th November; and as soon as communication with Khyber column has been properly established and country round Hissarak and Tezin thoroughly examined, a small column will proceed from this towards Istaliff, and perhaps as far as Charikar.

Enclosure 5 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 2nd November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 31st October.—No particular news. All well.

Enclosure 6 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 3rd November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 1st November.—Many of the leading men are coming in from the country about the Jellalabad road. They were informed of the Amir's abdication, and received a copy of the proclamation of 28th October. This seems to have reassured them as to the possible consequences of joining us. Asmatulla Khan is expected in a day or two, and several other influential men from Tezin and the neighbourhood are now in camp. The fact of these men being with us will probably prevent any opposition being offered to the advance of Macpherson's and Charles Gough's brigade.

Enclosure 7 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 3rd November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 1st November.—Macpherson's brigade marched to-day Butkhak. I join him to-morrow to reconnoitre Latabund Pass, returning to Kabul on 3rd or 4th. Headmen from Tezin and country as far as Surkhab are now with me, and Asmatula Khan is reported to be on his way to Kabul. Communication with Khyber column will probably therefore be opened without opposition. General Bright has been informed. Privates Macready and Conn, 72nd Highlanders, died yesterday of wounds received; former on Shuturgurdan on 14th; other at Charasiab on the 6th October. Nights very cold; thick ice. Warm clothing and blankets urgently required. All well.

Enclosure 8 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 3rd November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Butkhak, 2nd November.—Telegraph wire completed to this. Just starting to reconnoitre Latabund route. All well.

Enclosure 9 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 4th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Butkhak, 3rd November.—Latabund route is fairly easy, and will probably be adopted as main line of communication. I look at Khurd Kabul route this morning, returning

to Kabul by evening. Macpherson's brigade will march towards Gandamak to-morrow by Khurd Kabul and Tezin. All well. Telegraph line finished to this.

Enclosure 10 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 1st November 1879.

From CAPTAIN WARBURTON, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

GENERAL BRIGHT, with his Political Secretary and four members of staff, left this morning for Rozabad, proceeding towards Gandamak.

Everything here very satisfactory. Governor of Jellalabad has expressed a desire to come and see me to-morrow. I will inform you duly of all he mentions at interview, and communicate to General Bright everything that he ought to know that springs up at visit.

Enclosure 11 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 1st November 1879.

From GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

LETTER from Gough, Kushi, 31st. Starting for Logar on way to Kabul; evacuating and clearance of Shuturgurda most complete. Convoy with 9th Lancers reached safely. Not a shot fired between Ali Khel and Kushi.

Enclosure 12 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 3rd November 1879.

From CAPTAIN WARBURTON, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

GOVERNOR called on me yesterday. He seemed greatly pleased with the way he has been treated at Durbar—and since we came here—and with some news he had received from Kabul. He himself continues to give every assistance through his officials. All about here the political situation continues very satisfactory.

Enclosure 13 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 4th November 1879.

From CAPTAIN WARBURTON, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

THE Governor has issued orders for all grain paid in as revenue, and remaining stored, to be handed over to Commissariat without payment, merely receiving a receipt for the same. All well here.

Enclosure 14 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 29th October 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

It is reported that the Kabuli regiments at Herat have deserted with their arms, and are making their way to their homes in the north in scattered parties *via* Zamindawar and the Arghandab.

Enclosure 15 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 30th October 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

FURTHER reports confirm desertion of Kabuli regiments from Herat, but state that the majority have gone by the Hazarah route towards Kabul.

Enclosure 16 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 30th October 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

WEEKLY summary of news. The only event of importance during the week has been the action at Shahjui, which may be expected to have good results in quieting the southern Ghilzais. The tribe of Tokhi Ghilzais, in whose land action took place, expressed themselves delighted to have got rid of Sahib Jan and his Tarakis; while Muhammad Aslam Khan, Chief of the Kotaks, the other Ghilzai tribe in Kelat, when asked to combine with Sahib Jan against the English, refused and sent intelligence to Kelat. There is no doubt that the false news of proximate withdrawal of British from Kabul, disseminated by Ghazni Governor, emboldened Sahib Jan to plan attack on British camp.

Major St. John returned from Kelat on 25th, having made arrangements for collection of revenue and supply of garrison. Captain Molloy has been appointed Political Agent at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and left for that place yesterday. The district has been placed under the Government of Candahar, from which it was separated about twenty years ago, and Sirdar Sher Ali Khan has appointed his nephew, Sirdar Shirindil Khan, Lieutenant-Governor.

Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan, former Governor of Zamindawar, leaves for Kabul to-morrow. His successor, Abbas Khan, brother-in-law of Sirdar Sher Ali, leaves for Zamindawar shortly with the Alizai chiefs, who have been here for some time and express themselves perfectly satisfied with the new arrangement.

General Hughes' return is not affected by Shahjui affair. He returns here at once with heavy guns, Goorkhas, two companies 59th, and two squadrons 2nd Punjab Cavalry, leaving two field guns, two mountain guns, two companies 59th, the Biluchis, and one squadron cavalry to garrison Kelat-i-Ghilzai, under command of Colonel Tanner.

Weather cold and cloudless. Health of troops good.

Enclosure 17 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 4th November 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

PROCLAMATION read this morning to full assembly of notables, including Mullahs and merchants. Announcement was then made that in consideration of general peaceable conduct of Duranis of Kandahar and straightforward and loyal conduct of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, British Government has been pleased to appoint him Governor of the province, including Pusht-i-Rud and Kelat-i-Ghilzai, till new arrangements alluded to in proclamation shall be made. Hope and confidence were expressed that people would show by good conduct that the good will and confidence shown in the appointment of their fellow-townsmen and representative of their old rulers are properly appreciated.

Enclosure 18 in No. 36.

No. 21, dated Kabul, 20th October 1879.

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of my letters marginally noted I have the honour to submit, for the No. 16 of 29th September 1879. information of his Excellency the Governor-General in „ 19 of 16th October „ Council, the following account of my proceedings since the end of last month.

2. After several interviews with His Highness the Amir, who seemed anxious to meet my wishes and to afford all the assistance in his power, I left Kushi on the 2nd October and marched to Zarghun Shahr, where I was met by Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan and a number of other Barakzai nobles who had accompanied him from Kabul. I thought it desirable to receive them in a friendly manner and to ignore entirely their estrangement from the Amir, of which, however, I was well aware. They were permitted to remain with my camp, space being allotted to them at some distance from His Highness'

tents. I have now made the acquaintance of several among them, and have obtained from them a considerable amount of information which would not otherwise have been easily procurable. As stated in my letter No. 19 of the 16th October, and in my telegram of the 18th, the Sirdars form a party adverse to the Amir, and Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, in particular, is at no pains to hide his feelings in the matter. I shall, however, continue to ignore their views in this respect, and shall treat them for the present as loyal subjects of His Highness.

3. On the 3rd October I left Zarghun Shahr for Zahidabad, and halting there one day pushed forward on the 5th to Char Asiab. His Excellency in Council is aware of the severe action which took place on the 6th between a portion of my force and the Afghan troops, supported by a large number of the people of Kabul. The Afghan position was carried, and the enemy defeated with heavy loss. While the action lasted, the people of the neighbouring villages ceased to bring in supplies, which during the morning had been coming in freely; and there were indications that a large number of tribesmen were collected upon the hills in our rear, ready no doubt to take advantage of any opportunity which might be afforded them by a mishap to the force. After the defeat of the Afghan troops these bands apparently dispersed, and the country people again came forward with supplies.

4. I think it desirable to mention here that some doubt has been thrown upon the conduct of His Highness the Amir in connexion with the fight at Char Asiah. It is said that Sirdar Nek Muhammad, uncle of Yakub Khan, who had been left in charge of Kabul during His Highness' absence, came out and had an interview with His Highness on the 5th; that he was directed to return at once and stir up the troops and city people to oppose us; and that the action of the 6th was fought in direct obedience to the Amir's orders. Nek Muhammad after an attempt to treat for pardon has now disappeared, and it is not easy to ascertain the truth of the story; but I have reason to believe that an interview took place, as stated, that Nek Muhammad thereupon called out the troops and city people for a holy war in the name of the Amir, and that he commanded in person during the action of the 6th. I shall do my best to obtain further evidence in the matter.

5. On the 7th October, I advanced to Bini Hissar, a couple of miles from Kabul, and on the 9th the camp was moved to the Siah Sang heights immediately overlooking the city. Three days later, as stated in my telegram of the 13th, I made my formal entry into the Bala Hissar, and announced to the people of Kabul the punishment which would be inflicted upon them for their participation in the massacre of the 3rd September, and in the opposition offered to our advance. Since then all has been quiet, and I have no reason to anticipate any further disorder.

6. In my letter of the 16th October I wrote that a Commission had been appointed to inquire into the causes and circumstances of the late outbreak, and to try all persons suspected of participation in the attack on the British Embassy or other connected offences. I have now found it necessary to relieve the Commission of a portion of their duties, the collection of evidence regarding the outbreak having proved to be a sufficient task in itself. The actual trial of accused persons has been entrusted to a second Commission, of which I have appointed Brigadier-General Massy to be President and Major Moriarty and Captain Guinness to be members. They have begun their work, and five men were hanged this morning in accordance with their recommendations.

7. His Highness the Amir remains in my camp. In my letter of the 16th instant I remarked that His Highness seemed much broken in spirit and unfit to resume his position and responsibilities. He is now more cheerful, and has been of considerable assistance to me in obtaining information and supplies. But he appears to have been crushed by his long imprisonment and to have lost all strength and energy. I have in vain tried to persuade him to leave his tent and ride with me. His answer is that all exercise has become a burden to him, and that he cares for nothing but rest and quiet. He seems to take little interest in what passes round him and even to feel no desire for the society of his children, whom he rarely sees. Altogether I consider him hopelessly incapacitated for a life of action and responsibility, and I am certain that no reliance could be placed on him for the future were he to remain here as Amir.

8. The state of political parties in Kabul I have described. There is in fact one party only, that of Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, who has succeeded in attaching to himself for the time the mass of the Barakzai Sirdars. So far as I can judge there is none else who would be able at present to make a respectable struggle for power in the event of our retirement. Nevertheless, I do not consider that Wali Muhammad is positively strong. I believe he is not popular, and I doubt whether he could maintain himself long even in Kabul unless helped from the outside; while the disorganization of the country consequent on recent events would be entirely beyond his power to overcome.

9. Little or no news reaches me from the outlying provinces. I have to-day addressed the Governor of Turkestan, informing him that I have no intentions against the troops or people in that quarter except such persons as were concerned in the attack on the British Embassy, and requesting him to carry on the Government in accordance with the Amir's instructions, and to supply me with news. But I know nothing of what is passing in the north, and am quite unable to say what line he will take. Nearer home, there is I think a fair prospect of the country becoming settled. Many of the leading men of Kohdaman and Kohistan have come into my camp and asked to see me. They seem well disposed towards us, and I believe that if the country people could only be assured of our permanent protection we should profit very greatly by their recollections of Barakzai tyranny, particularly among the Kohistanis and others whose districts lie within easy reach of the capital.

10. No direct evidence has yet been brought forward against Yahya Khan, Zakariah Khan, the Mustaufi, or the Wazir. In case none should be brought forward I should be disposed to recommend the immediate deportation of these persons to India, with the exception possibly of the Mustaufi. I cannot but feel that they are in fact to a great extent responsible for the outbreak, and that their influence will always be used against us. I think, therefore, that the absence of positive proof of their complicity should not stand in the way of their removal from Afghanistan as an act of State. The Mustaufi it might perhaps be desirable to release and employ. He is generally spoken of here as less hostile to us than any of the others, while his knowledge of the country and long experience of its administration would make him, if he could be depended upon, a very useful servant. But I am not yet convinced that he could safely be treated differently from the rest.

11. I enclose, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, copy and translation of a letter to my address from Asmatulla Khan. I have written to him and requested him to come in here, which I hope he may do. His help would be invaluable, now that an attempt is being made to open up communication with Jellalabad. The arrangements for the carriage of mails between my camp and Ali Khel have not been altogether successful, and the rapid establishment of a regular postal line between Kabul and the head of the Khyber force is most desirable. With Asmatulla Khan's sincere co-operation this could I believe be easily effected. Padshah Khan and his brother, Allal-ud-din, appear to me either to have overrated their influence with their clansmen or to have acted with questionable good faith. The Shuturguridan has been attacked by Ghilzais; the daks have been slow and irregular, owing to Ghilzai interruptions; some of the mails have, I believe, been robbed; and altogether the line of the road between this and Ali Khel has been disturbed and unsafe. I am inclined to think that Padshah Khan and his brother have not done all they could to keep things quiet.

12. The terrific explosions which occurred in the Upper Bala Hissar on the 16th instant have convinced me that large quantities of powder must have been stored underground. This may also be the case in the Lower Bala Hissar which the troops under my command were to have occupied for the winter. Under these circumstances I have decided, unless his Excellency in Council considers the measure objectionable, to destroy the Bala Hissar and move the whole force into the Sherpur cantonments under the Bamian heights. The position is a strong one, and can be made unapproachable. Moreover, I shall in this way be able to keep all the troops together, which would be impossible if the former arrangement were to hold good, for there is not sufficient room in the Bala Hissar. The total destruction of the Bala Hissar will, if his Excellency in Council sanctions my present proposal, renders unnecessary the partial destruction of the town, which was announced in my proclamation of the 12th instant. It will, I think, be preferable as a measure of national punishment, for it will be more striking to the mass of the nation, and, moreover, the weight of the blow will fall with peculiar severity on the Sirdars and other influential persons, who nearly all have houses within the Bala Hissar, while the destruction of a quarter of the town would chiefly affect the lower orders. I hope, therefore, that my proposed action will be approved.

Enclosure 19 in No. 36.

Translation of a Letter from ASMATULLA KHAN to the Address of MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C.

I RECEIVED your kind letter on the 8th of Shawal (28th September) and understood its contents, and also those of the enclosed proclamation to the people of Kabul. I informed all whom I thought fit of the contents of the proclamation.

Some time ago I went to Gandamak to Major Cavagnari. He instructed me to obey the orders of the Amir and made me over to His Highness. When Major Cavagnari returned (to India) the Amir's officials confiscated my property and gave the chiefship to my cousin (or enemy) Bahram Khan.

The oppression I suffered on your account is beyond description. They ruined and disgraced every friend and adherent of mine. On the return of Major Cavagnari to Kabul I sent my Naib to him, who informed him of my state. Major Cavagnari sent a message to me to the effect that I should recover my property by force if I could, otherwise I should go to the hills, and not come to Kabul until I heard from him. In the meantime I received the news of the murder of the Envoy, and I am still in the hills.

The letter is not dated. It was received on the 20th October 1879.

(Signed) H. M. DURAND.

No. 37.

Telegram from VICEROY, 12th November 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

We propose to bring Amir to India, whenever communications are secure.

Amir himself anxious to depart, and his removal is for several reasons, highly expedient.

No. 38.

No. 234 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 13th November 1879.

WE have the honour, in continuation of previous despatches, to submit a summary of the principal occurrences reported from Afghanistan during the past week.

2. The chief event has been the establishment of communication between General Roberts' force and the Khyber column. The junction was effected by General Macpherson's brigade which marched through the Khurd Kabul Pass on the 4th November and met the advanced guard of General Bright's forces under the command of General C. Gough at Katta Sang. General Roberts has personally examined the Chinari, Khurd Kabul, and Lataband passes, and has adopted the Lataband pass as his permanent line of communication toward Jellalabad. The country beyond Khurd Kabul is reported to be fairly open, and the road easy. The arrival in General Macpherson's camp of two leading Ghilzai Chiefs from the neighbourhood of Hissarak, has greatly facilitated the arrangements for keeping this road open and quiet. Two Kabul regiments have returned from Turkestan, and disbanded at the Bamian pass, sending in arms and tents to General Roberts at Kabul. General Hugh Gough returned to Kabul on the 4th November, bringing with him the 9th Lancers, the 3rd Sikhs, and No. 1, Mountain Battery. The troops at Kabul continue in excellent health and spirits. General Watson reports from Ali Khel that the Jirgas of the Hassan and the Ahmad Khel have paid their fine of a thousand rupees and given hostages.

The publication at Kandahar of the proclamation inclosed in our Despatch No. 226, dated 30th October 1879, and the confirmation of Sirdar Sher Ali's authority pending a final settlement of the country, has been well received by the mass of the people. Copies of the proclamation and of the order maintaining Sirdar Sher Ali Khan have been forwarded to Furrah and Herat. We have no further news regarding the reported dispersion of the troops at Herat; and from our latest intelligence, via Teheran, the place appears to be in a state of anarchy, while Ayub Khan is unable to manage his mutinous regiments. From another source, indeed, we learn that he is virtually shut up by them in the Herat citadel. The Governor of Ghazni had not yet made up his mind to tender submission to British authority; at Furrah Mir Afzul is still holding aloof; and the general impression is understood to be that the tribal Chiefs and Sirdars in that part of the country which is not yet within the effective range of our authority, will

endeavour to maintain a neutral position until it shall have been seen whether the Amir Yakub Khan is to be restored to power.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 6th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 4th November. I reconnoitred yesterday to within three or four miles of Tezin, proceeding by Chinari Pass and returning by the Khurd Kabul. Former is impracticable; latter is easy as regards road; but there is a great deal of water even now after rain, and when snow melts it would be impassable. Besides it is difficult pass to force when occupied by an enemy; it can be turned, but it is doubtful if a cart road could be made over the hill which turns it.

Macpherson will be at Khurd Kabul to-day and Tezin to-morrow, and after meeting Charles Gough will work back towards Latabund, when we can decide on best line of road to adopt. Macpherson is not likely to meet with opposition. Headmen of neighbouring Ghilzais accompanied me yesterday. Hugh Gough returns to Kabul to-day with 9th Lancers, 3rd Sikhs, and No. 1 mountain battery. All well.

Letters dated Simla, 24th, and telegram, 28th, were received here yesterday. Private Cockburn, 92nd Highlanders, who lost his leg at Charasiah, died on 1st instant.

Enclosure 2 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 7th November 1879.

From GENERAL WATSON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

HASSAN and Ahmad Khel Jirgas have paid the fine rupees one thousand and given hostages. Force leaves this to-morrow.

Enclosure 3 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 7th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

No special political news. Asmatulla Khan not yet in, but daily expected. On 2nd, I rode to Butkhak, and thence reconnoitred Latabund Pass up to the Kotal. It is fairly open so far, and can be made practicable for guns without much difficulty. On 3rd, rode through Chinari Pass to its junction with Khurd Kabul Pass and back to Butkhak by latter. Both are difficult, and the first not capable of improvement. Khurd Kabul, or Latabund, seems decidedly best for a permanent road. Saw no signs of tribesmen being out. Headmen of Khurd Kabul were with us, and Maliks of Tezin are now here going to join General Macpherson, who advances to Khurd Kabul to-day, and Tezin to-morrow. Ramsay accompanies. No news from outlying provinces. All well here.

Enclosure 4 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 7th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 5th November.—9th Lancers, 3rd Sikhs, and No. 1 Mountain Battery arrived yesterday. Macpherson's brigade marched through Khurd Kabul Pass yesterday, and

to-day goes to Padshah-i-Mina near Tezin. This route is the direct one to Katta Sang, and the Haft Kotal is avoided. All well.

Enclosure 5 in No. 38.

Telegram, No. A.-1344, dated 8th November 1879.

FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL WATSON, Ali Khel.

MACPHERSON met Gough at Katta Sang, 7th; his brigade has marched by Khurd Kabul to Tezin. Headmen of villages accompanied. No signs of tribes stirring. 9th Lancers reached Kabul, 5th.

Enclosure 6 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 11th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 8th November.—General Macpherson met General Bright's advance force at Katta Sang on 6th instant. Yesterday road on eastern side of Latabund Kotal, the point I reached on 2nd instant, was reconnoitred by Macpherson and reported easy. As further inspection of Khurd Kabul line confirms its difficulties, I have decided to make main communication by Latabund route. Construction of road and telegraph will now be pushed on rapidly.

Enclosure 7 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 11th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 8th November.—Muhammad Shah Khan and Mazula Khan, two influential Ghilzai Chiefs of Hisarak, have joined General Macpherson, and will be here to-morrow or next day. Their coming in relieves me of anxiety for safety of road about Jagdallak.

Enclosure 8 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 11th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 7th November.—Two Kabul Regiments, stationed in Turkestan, returned of their own accord few days ago, and dispersed on arriving this side of the Bamian. I sent messengers to try and make them come in here and deliver up their arms, promising they should not be in any way molested: they were not to be persuaded, but sent in nearly 500 stands of arms, upwards of 100 camels, and some tents.

Macpherson reports from Camp near Tezin, that country beyond Khurd Kabul is fairly open and road easy. All well.

Enclosure 9 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 5th November 1879.

FROM MAJOR ST. JOHN to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

PROCLAMATION sent to Herat and Furrab with copies of order entrusting government of Kandahar to Sher Ali. Have enclosed them in letters to Ayub and Mir Afzal, adding only that from these papers actual state of affairs will be seen, and kindness and moderation of British Government be displayed. Letter to Mir Afzal goes by his son, who returns to-day.

Enclosure 10 in No. 38.

Telegram dated 6th November 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

WEEKLY summary of news. We hear from Kelat-i-Ghilzai that the Tarakis gathered in considerable numbers after the action at Shahjui, expecting an advance into their country, but dispersed on becoming assured of the return of the troops to Kelat. Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan left on Sunday for Kabul, accompanied by Subadar-Major Abdullah Khan, 26th N. I., who has done excellent service here in the Political Department, and goes to join General Roberts. General Hughes is expected on the 8th. General Palliser left for India on the 3rd. Captain Molloy has arrived at Kelat-i-Ghilzai.

A recent caravan from Herat does not confirm news of dispersion of Kabuli regiments there. Muhammad Ayub Khan is practically imprisoned by them in the citadel. The result of news of Amir's abdication reaching Herat as yet unknown.

Publication of proclamation and confirmation of Sher Ali's authority until final settlement of future of country has had excellent effect here on mass of people. But the extreme fanatics are much disturbed, though they have little influence. An influential Mullah, disgusted at the apathy of his countrymen, has sold his property and gone to Mecca. Weather still very fine. Health of troops excellent.

Enclosure 11 in No. 38.

Telegram No. A-1326, dated 7th November 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar.

FOLLOWING from Teheran:—

The Herat correspondent reports, writing on the 12th ultimo, that Ayub Khan was then endeavouring to send the three Kabul regiments, who recognized and killed General Fakir Ahmed Khan, to Kabul, without arms; but that they had refused to go without the other Kabul regiments, their arms, and artillery. In (*sic*) these a conflict anticipated between the Herat and Kabul regiments. He had collected three thousand Irregular Cavalry outside the town, which is very disturbed; and he has no money, having collected and spent the year's revenue in advance. The correspondent adds that affairs are in such state that, if the English appear at Sabzewar, the troops would disperse without offering resistance. He describes Turkestan as in condition of anarchy.

Enclosure 12 in No. 38.

Telegram dated 7th November 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

A SEPOY of the 15th Sikhs was murdered on Wednesday evening by two men unknown. Sirdar has offered a thousand rupees reward for their detection; and issued proclamation warning people that such outrages may cause the English Government to repent of the lenity with which Kandahar has been treated.

On 1st November a Ghazi attempted to murder men of guard of Captain Molloy on way to Kelat, and stabbed two men, not dangerously. He was secured and made over to Governor of Kelat for execution. He is a Kakar, and was on road to join Sahib Jan when he heard of that Chief's defeat and death.

Enclosure 13 in No. 38.

No. 31, dated Kabul, 29th October 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, Persian translation of the proclamation forwarded with your telegram

of the 23rd instant. It was issued by me yesterday, and copies in Persian will be widely distributed.

2. I also forward copy and Persian translation of a proclamation issued by me to-day, in which I announce that I have assumed control of the State Treasury, the collection of revenue, and the expenditure of public money.

Enclosure 14 in No. 38.

Telegram No. E.-7, dated 28th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

PROCLAMATION, as received with your message of 23rd, will be issued to day. Further proclamation, as directed in your telegram of 24th, will be issued to-morrow.

Enclosure 15 in No. 38.

PROCLAMATION to the People of Kabul, dated 29th October 1879.

IN my proclamation of yesterday I announced that His Highness the Amir had of his own free will abdicated, and that, for the present, the Government of Afghanistan would be carried on under my supervision. I now proclaim that, in order to provide for the cost of administration, I have taken possession of the State Treasury; and that until the British Government shall declare its will as to the permanent arrangements to be made for the future good government of the country, the collection of revenue and the expenditure of public money will be regulated by me. All persons concerned are hereby informed that they must obey without dispute or delay such orders as may be issued by me in regard to the payment of taxes and other connected matters; and I give plain warning that any one resisting or obstructing the execution of such orders will be treated with the utmost severity as an enemy of the British Government.

No. 39.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 17th November 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

PRESS letter from Kabul reports atrocities by 72nd on wounded Afghans. On inquiry, Roberts reports charge refers to Goorkhas, not 72nd. Believed to have set fire to clothes of dead Afghans.

Full inquiry ordered.

No. 40.

No. 236 of 1879.

Government of India—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 20th November 1879.

WE have the honour, in continuation of former despatches, to submit a summary of information received from Afghanistan during the past week.

2. General Roberts has reported that on the 11th instant he issued a Proclamation, granting a free and complete amnesty to all persons who have fought against the British troops since 3rd September, provided that they give up any arms in their possession and return to their homes. From this amnesty are excluded all persons concerned in the attack on the Residency, or found in possession of property of the members of the Embassy, and those who, knowing the Amir's position in the British camp, instigated the troops and people of Kabul to take up arms against the British troops.

3. Sirdar Wali Muhammad has offered to undertake the charge of Afghan-Turkestan, and desires to proceed to that province with the object of bringing its administration into subordination to the central authority at Kabul; but his proposals are still under

consideration. Sirdar Shahbaz Khan has been sent by General Roberts into Kohistan. The Governor of Ghazni has arrived at Kabul, having been induced to tender his submission to the British authorities mainly, it is understood, by his inability to control the tribes in the neighbourhood of Ghazni, where some disturbances are reported to have occurred. A foraging party from General Macpherson's brigade has been attacked by a number of Safis of Tagao, at Doaba, the junction of the Panjsher and Kabul rivers, but the attacking party was successfully driven off with severe loss. General Watson reports from Kurram that the Chakmanis have submitted to the terms imposed upon them. The troops under General Gordon, which were sent against this tribe, have returned; and General Tytler moves into the Zaimusht country within a few days.

4. At Kandahar and Kelat-i-Ghilzai all is reported quiet; many Chiefs of the Taraki tribe have tendered their submission to the British officer at Kelat-i-Ghilzai. From Herat there have been reports that Sirdar Ayub Khan is levying cavalry among the tribes, but the state of affairs in that part of Afghanistan is still very little known, though it is believed that the Sirdar's situation is precarious; and there are various indications that both he and Mir Afzul (who is still holding Furrah) meditate a retreat towards Persia whenever their independent position at Herat or Furrah becomes no longer tenable.

5. We enclose copy of a letter from Sir Frederick Roberts, reporting his proceedings at Kabul.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 12th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 9th November. Yesterday General Baker with small force surrounded Indiki, a village at south end of Chardeh Valley, and from which our reconnoitring parties were fired at on 5th October. Between 40 and 50 soldiers were made prisoners and information received of whereabouts of some 60 more; 40 muskets and rifles were found, also number of swords and knives. I inflicted, in addition, heavy fine of grain on village for part it took in the opposition we experienced on 6th October.

General Macpherson reconnoitred on 7th instant to entrance of Lughman Valley, crossing Kabul river and encamping about eight miles from Katta Sang. Last three miles of march through cultivated lands of Sarobi, a very prosperous looking settlement; people civil; supplies and forage abundant; elevation of the camp 3,400 feet; climate of course much milder than that of Kabul. All well.

Enclosure 2 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 12th November 1879,

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 10th November. Macpherson reports that road on left bank of Kabul river leading towards Lughman is good so far as he has been, and that merchants met on road state it is easy to Jellalabad. This information has been sent to General Bright.

Bala Hissar is being rapidly dismantled; all guards will be withdrawn to-day, and destruction of gunpowder commenced to-morrow; sufficient being kept to blow up defences and to meet other requirements.

Letters posted at Simla on 28th October have apparently been lost *en route*. Latest date by post 31st October; by telegraph 6th November.

Major Cavagnari's watch was brought in yesterday. All well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 12th November 1879.

From GENERAL WATSON, Kurram, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

CHAKMANIS submitted to our terms. I returned to Kurram to-day, leaving General Gordon and Captain Conolly with the troops to complete arrangements.

Enclosure 4 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 12th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, eleventh November. Following is text of Proclamation which will be issued to-day:—To all whom it may concern. On the twelfth October, Shawal, a Proclamation, was issued, in which I offered a reward for the surrender of any person who had fought against the British troops since the third September, fifteenth Ramazan, and had thereby become a rebel against the Amir Yakub Khan. I have now received information which tends to show that some at least of those who shared in the opposition encountered by the British troops during their advance on Kabul were led to do so by the belief that the Amir was a prisoner in my camp, and had called upon the soldiery and people of Kabul to rise on his behalf. Such persons, although enemies to the British Government, were not rebels against their own Sovereign. And the great British Government does not seek for vengeance against enemies who no longer resist. It may be that few only of those who took up arms were thus led away by the statements of evil-minded men; but rather than punish the innocent with the guilty, I am willing to believe that all were alike deceived. On behalf of the British Government, therefore, I proclaim a free and complete amnesty to all persons who have fought against the British troops since the third September, fifteenth Ramazan; provided that they now give up any arms in their possession and return to their homes. The offer of a reward for the surrender of such persons is now withdrawn, and they will not for the future be molested in any way on account of their opposition to the British advance. But it must be clearly understood that the benefits of this amnesty do not extend to any one, whether soldier or civilian, who was concerned directly or indirectly in the attack upon the Residency, or who may hereafter be found in possession of any property belonging to members of the Embassy. To such persons no mercy will be shown. Further, I hold out no promise of pardon to those who, well knowing the Amir's position in the British camp, instigated the troops and people of Kabul to take up arms against the British troops. They have been guilty of wilful rebellion against the Amir's authority, and they will be considered and treated as rebels, wherever found.

Enclosure 5 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 13th November 1879. (Extract.)

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 11th November. Wali Muhammad has agreed to go to Turkestan; and Shahbaz Khan to Kohistan. Wali has orders not to interfere with Shahzada Hassan of Badakshan. After inquiries as to his present position, I will deal with him direct.

Dull grey sky to-day and heavy clouds upon the hills; it looks like snow.

Bala Hissar completely evacuated yesterday, pending destruction of powder. Guards replaced by native chowkidars.

Enclosure 6 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 14th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 12th November. General Macpherson reports that a Company 67th Regiment under Captain Poole, escorting foraging party to Doaba, at junction of Panjsher and

Kabul Rivers, was attacked by 700 to 1,000 Safis of Tagao. He went to assistance of Company with 150 of 67th foot, 80 of the 28th Native Infantry, four mountain guns, and a Squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry. The latter arriving first were dismounted and sent forward. The guns came into action twice with good effect. Pursuit continued for six miles. Severe loss inflicted on the enemy who fled, leaving their dead on the ground. Our casualties were three, 67th Foot, and one, 28th Native Infantry, killed. Captain Poole and four, 67th Foot, wounded. All wounded doing well. Macpherson will be at Latabund to-day, and will commence construction of road over that Kotal.

Telegraph line completed eight miles beyond Butkhak will be finished to General Macpherson's camp this evening.

Snow fell here yesterday, but has nearly disappeared. All well.

Enclosure 7 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 14th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jagdallak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 13th November. Six thousand seven hundred and twenty-nine rifles and guns have been brought in to date. Of these, seven hundred and forty-two are English Enfield, and five hundred and sixty English Snider, rifles.

Telegraph line completed to 25 miles beyond Kabul.

I am sending away with the sick and wounded all the elephants, spare bullocks, and sick transport animals to economise consumption of forage here as much as possible. Weather clear. All well.

Enclosure 8 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 14th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 12th November. Snow fell on hills all round last night, and a little fell here.

Enclosure 9 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 16th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 14th November. Convoy of sick and wounded started to-day for India. All sick left at Kabul are now comfortably housed. Quarters for British portion of force will be ready in few days; huts for natives are progressing. Two severe earthquakes yesterday. All well.

Enclosure 10 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 17th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 15th November. There will be no difficulty in making a road from Kabul to Katta Sang, 40 miles on the road towards Gandamak. It will probably be ready for wheeled traffic in a month. Beyond Katta Sang report on road has no doubt been submitted by General Bright. Post now comes in fairly regularly, letters from Simla arriving on seventh day. I am making inquiries about carrier pigeons, and suggest that Officer Commanding at Peshawur and Jellalabad do the same. They would prove useful in event of telegraph line being cut or road communication being temporarily interrupted. All well.

Enclosure 11 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 17th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jagdallak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 16th November. Governor of Ghazni reached this yesterday. Macpherson's brigade will remain at and near Butkhak, while sick and wounded are *en route* to

Jagdallak. Road to and beyond Butkhak progressing fairly well. No news of importance. Weather fine; troops healthy. All well.

Enclosure 12 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 17th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 16th November. Macpherson reports all quiet about Tezin, and the people very civil. Sirdar Shahbaz Khan has started for Kohistan as Governor, with an advance of twenty thousand for collection of forage. Muhammad Hassan Khan goes to Maisan with ten thousand for same purpose. Abdulla Khan with twenty thousand goes to Logar. I propose to abandon system of district collections and to assess each district for lump payment of bhoosa, grass, &c. Asmatulla Khan has not come in, and I doubt his doing so until he has a promise of being reinstated in all his former possessions and compensated for all loss suffered since the peace. I have now directed Warburton and Tucker to hold no further communication with him, leaving Hastings to do all that is required from this.

Enclosure 13 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 17th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SUBADAR-MAJOR ABDULLA KHAN, of the 26th Native Infantry, and Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf, a brother of the late Amir Sher Ali Khan, and recently Governor of Girikh and Zamindawar, have been sent in by General Stewart. They report the country about Ghazni very unsettled, and the whole road more or less unsafe.

Enclosure 14 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 18th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 17th November. Macpherson's brigade will return here on Thursday. On same day Baker with small force will proceed towards Maidan in direction of Ghazni to collect supplies and to settle country, reports having reached me that a Mullah is trying to create disturbance, and has collected a certain number of men between this and Ghazni. All well.

Enclosure 15 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 18th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

18th November. Telegraph line will be completed between Kabul and India on 20th. I hope sick convoy from this and convoy of treasure from Gandamak met at Seh Baba, 23 miles beyond Butkhak, yesterday. All well.

Enclosure 16 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 19th November 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

TELEGRAPHIC communication open through to Kabul to-day.

Enclosure 17 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 14th November 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

A DESERTER from Kandahar regiment stationed at Herat, which he left 23 days ago, states that Ayub was assembling tribal mounted levies, and had issued five months' pay to soldiers.

Enclosure 18 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 14th November 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

WEEKLY summary of news. General Hughes returned from Kelat-i-Ghilzai on 8th. Captain Molloy writes that everything is quiet at that place. Muhammad Afzal and Sadu Khan, rival chiefs of Hotak clan, were both with him. Many chiefs of the Taraki, Sahib Jan's tribe, had also sent in offering submission. Supplies were coming in plentifully.

On the 10th, Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan, nephew of Sirdar Sher Ali, arrived here from Kabul, where he went with Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan. He reports road unsafe for small parties. Most of the Duranis in Amir's service are on their way back to their homes at Kandahar.

His Excellency the Governor of Bombay arrived here on short visit to Sir D. Stewart on the 13th. He leaves on the 16th, *viâ* the Gwajjeh Pass.

There is no news from Herat.

Enclosure 19 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 18th November 1879.

From SIR D. STEWART Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

CHIEFS of Taraki Ghilzais from country beyond Kelat-i-Ghilzai frontier have come here to submit, and ask for service. Have referred them to Kabul, and informed Roberts.

Enclosure 20 in No. 40.

No. 34, dated Kabul, 4th November 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, a brief account of the political situation in Kabul during the last fortnight.

With regard to the Amir Yakub Khan, I have already reported by telegraph that the instructions conveyed have been carried out. On the 28th His Highness was informed that his resignation had been accepted; and the Proclamation forwarded to me by order of Her Majesty's Government was published for general information the same day. The government of the country will for the present be carried on under my immediate supervision, without the declared aid of any Afghan Chief or Sirdar. I have explained my reasons for thinking this arrangement preferable to the formation of a provisional native government, and I need not therefore state them here. I am convinced that no good could result from the introduction of any Afghan element into the administration, pending the final orders of Government as to the disposal of the country.

Yakub Khan has surrendered treasure amounting to some eight or nine lakhs of rupees in gold coin; there must be more, as I understand he quite recently took by force from Abdulla Jan's mother the sum of rupees 1,700,000. I have given him a receipt for the money, which he claims as his own property, and have informed him that

if his Excellency the Governor-General in Council holds his claim to be valid, the money will be returned to him hereafter. With this arrangement he has expressed himself satisfied. I have also informed him that I shall not be content until he has delivered up the whole of the treasure he was in possession of as Amir of Kabul.

In obedience to instructions I have assumed possession of the State Treasury, and have announced that for the future the collection of revenue and expenditure of public money will be under my control. A copy of the Proclamation in which this announcement was made I have already submitted.

I mentioned in my letter No. 21 of the 20th October that some doubt had been thrown on Yakub Khan's conduct in connexion with the fight at Charasiah. The suspicion has, to a certain extent, been strengthened by the production of a letter supposed to have been written by Yakub's uncle, Nek Muhammad Khan, in which he states that he was personally ordered by the Amir to raise a holy war against us. A copy of this letter has also been submitted for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council. It is not, however, conclusive proof of Yakub's bad faith, for there is some doubt as to its being authentic, and it was brought to me by Sirdar Wali Muhammad, whose feelings towards Yakub are openly unfriendly. I have been unable to ascertain the name of Nek Muhammad's supposed correspondent.

The city is quiet and seems likely to remain so, and I am in hopes that the country in general is settling down. Certainly the collection of supplies has become much easier. I have now nearly enough for the winter, and large quantities of grain and other necessaries are coming in daily. It is probable that the Afghan troops formerly in Kabul, have carried disaffection with them into a good many parts of the country. Some hundreds of men, armed with Enfields or Sniders, are believed to have assisted in the late attack on the British position at the Shuturgurda, and similar bodies would very likely be found elsewhere if any disturbance occurred. Further, there is no certainty as to the intentions of Ayub Khan, and the state of affairs generally in Herat and the northern provinces. But I hope to bring in and disarm a good many of the troops, who are probably holding together from fear rather than from any fixed intention of giving trouble; and I think that I shall ere long succeed in exerting some pressure on the outlying provinces. On the whole, therefore, though the situation is not without its difficulties, I feel that there is a fair prospect of tiding over the winter without disorder here or elsewhere.

The proclamation of the Amir's resignation has I believe, had a favourable effect on the tribes around Kabul. Asmatula Khan seems now resolved to come in; and many other influential men from Tezin, Khurd Kabul, and the neighbourhood have already done so. I have strong hopes that the advance of General Bright's and General Macpherson's forces will now be unopposed, and that regular communication will soon be opened with Jellalabad. As it is, I have only heard of two mail robberies on this road, though runners have been constantly passing over it for the last fortnight. In order to co-operate with the Khyber column, a brigade under the command of Brigadier-General Macpherson, V.C., C.B., marched from here for Butkhak on the 1st November. To-day General Macpherson advances to Khurd Kabul, and he will go on by the Tezin route to meet General Bright.

On the 2nd, I went out myself to Butkhak, and examined the Latabund Pass as far as the Kotal. The hills through which the road passes are fairly open, and the road itself can I think without difficulty be made practicable for guns. On the 3rd I rode through the Chinari Pass to its junction with the Khurd Kabul Pass; and back to Butkhak by the latter. The former pass, so far as I went, was difficult and not capable of improvement. The road lies for considerable distances between precipitous rocks along the bed of the stream, which has to be crossed and re-crossed incessantly, and the heights could not easily be occupied during the passage of a force. I think the Latabund or Khurd Kabul will prove decidedly the best for a permanent route.

The camp was moved on the 31st ultimo from the Siah Sang heights to the Sherpur cantonments, which I propose to occupy during the winter. The buildings inside the cantonment are not yet fit for use, but though frost has now set in at night, the days are warm, and the troops will not suffer any inconvenience from remaining a few weeks longer in the open.

Brigadier-General Gough, after relieving the force which had been surrounded and attacked on the Shuturgurda, arrived in cantonments this morning with the 9th Lancers, No. 1 Mountain Battery, 3rd Sikhs, 5th Punjab Infantry, and 5th Punjab Cavalry.

On leaving Ali Khel I purposely brought with me certain Maliks of the neighbouring tribes, with the view of sending them back later on, after our occupation of Kabul should have been completed. I took the opportunity of General Gough's

return to the Shuturgurdan to let those men re-join their people, feeling confident that their account of our successes here would have a quieting effect upon the tribes. I have since heard both from Colonel Money and from General Gordon that their arrival was in fact most opportune. They were able at once to contradict all the unfounded reports then in circulation among the ignorant tribesmen, and to vouch for the fact that a British army was in possession of the Bala Hissar. I am assured that this information had much to do with dispersing the numerous bands which had gathered round Ali Khel and the Shuturgurdan.

Major Hastings is now engaged in collecting information for a report upon the revenue system and financial condition of the country; and I hope to forward at an early date approximate statistics regarding the receipts and cost of administration.

Now that there is a fair prospect of rapid and uninterrupted communication with India, I will submit weekly Political Diaries in the usual form. It seemed useless to do this so long as our communications were slow and uncertain, but from the 8th instant diaries will be despatched regularly; and telegraphic summaries of news will also be submitted twice or thrice a week as may be necessary.

Enclosure 21 in No. 40.

No. A.-1346, dated Simla, 8th November 1879.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Expeditionary Force, Kabul.

I AM directed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated Bala Hissar, Kabul, 16th October 1879.

2. In reply, I am to inform you that His Excellency the Viceroy approves and confirms your nomination, as reported in your letter, of a Commission for the investigation of the causes and circumstances of the attack upon the British Residency at Kabul. The appointment of Major-General Hills, C.B., V.C., to exercise the chief authority in and around Kabul, is also sanctioned.

3. You have prohibited under severe penalty the carrying of arms within or in the vicinity of the city. These orders, with all the other precautions which you have found necessary for the security of your position, the prevention of disorder, and the personal safety of the British officers and soldiers under your command, are approved by His Excellency the Viceroy in Council, who desires me to add that the Government of India fully appreciate the judgment and ability with which you are executing your instructions.

4. With regard to the measures to be taken in consequence of the Amir's definite abdication, and in view to the existing situation of affairs in Afghanistan, I am to observe that you have already received and published the Proclamation ordered by Her Majesty's Government. Upon these matters, and in respect to the future movement and position of His Highness the Amir [who is to remain for the present in your Camp] you will await further instructions from the Government of India.

No. 41.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 30th November 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

ROBERTS telegraphs that the movements of a well-known Mullah are causing uneasiness in the country, especially in Wardak and Kohistan, where people are reported under some excitement. Roberts expects that departure of Ameer from Kabul for India tomorrow, 1st, may have quieting effect. His proposal to deport also Yahya Khan and Ministers, arrested 12th October, has been sanctioned as politically necessary.

No. 42.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL
(No. 49).

MY LORD,

India Office, London, 11th December 1879.

PARA. 1. I have to acknowledge the receipt of the letters of your Excellency's Government, marginally noted, reporting the particulars, received from various sources, of the attack made on the British Mission at Cabul on the 3rd September, the measures taken under the orders of your Excellency in Council to enforce redress for that murderous outrage, and the course of events in Afghanistan subsequent to the renewal of military operations.

Letter, No. 202, dated 15th Sept. 1879.	
" " 204, " 25th " "	
" " 210, " " " "	
" " 215, " 2nd Oct. "	
" " 216, " " " "	
" " 217, " 9th " "	
" " 219, " 16th " "	
" " 224, " 23rd " "	
" " 226, " 30th " "	
" " 231, " 6th Nov. "	
" " 234, " 18th " "	

2. In my despatch of the 18th September, written upon receipt of the telegraphic reports of the disaster of the 3rd idem, I reserved the expression of any opinion on the part of Her Majesty's Government as to the causes to which the catastrophe might be attributed. The further details which have since reached them in your letters under reply are so conflicting in character that they throw but little light on the question. It is clear, from the last reports and letters received from the late Sir L. Cavagnari, that, in spite of some manifestations of turbulence by certain of the Amir's regiments, that able and experienced officer was, under no apprehension in regard to the immediate future; and it is still impossible for Her Majesty's Government to arrive at any positive conclusion whether the outbreak, which had such deplorable consequences, was a mere ebullition of mutinous troops not in the first instance directed against the British Mission, whether it was the result of popular discontent at the residence of a foreign Envoy at the Court of the Amir, or whether it was the outcome of intrigue on the part of Afghan notables at Cabul or elsewhere, set on foot for their own purposes. Scarcely less obscure up to this time is the further question of the complicity of the Amir Yakub Khan, who cannot, however, even if wholly innocent of participation in the crime, be acquitted of discreditable timidity and want of resource in the presence of a grave emergency.

3. Her Majesty's Government have followed with gratification the military movements which resulted in the occupation of the city of Cabul by the force under Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts. They highly appreciate the skill with which the operations were conducted, and the cheerfulness and courage shown by all ranks in their execution in the face of a foe, not insignificant in numbers, with the advantage of strong positions, and having the sympathy probably of many thousands who would have become open allies had the success of the British arms been less rapid and decisive. It is also very satisfactory that the communication between Cabul and India by the Khyber Pass, and the military re-occupation of Candahar, should have been effected without opposition.

4. Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the measures taken by General Roberts after his arrival at Cabul for the conviction and punishment of persons concerned in the attack on the Embassy, and for the maintenance of order in the city and surrounding district. They still await information of the amount of fine intended to be levied on the inhabitants as a penalty for the part taken by them in the outbreak.

5. Her Majesty's Government will be glad to receive at an early date, the views of your Excellency in Council in regard to the re-organization of the administration of Afghanistan. The determination of the Amir Yakub Khan to retire from the position to which, by his father's appointment and the assent of the Sirdars and people, he so lately succeeded, left no alternative but to proclaim the temporary assumption by the British Government of authority throughout the country. At Candahar, under the judicious supervision of Lieutenant-General Sir D. Stewart, the native Governor, Sirdar Shere Ali Khan, to whom control over a wide district has been delegated, appears to be conducting affairs with ability and success; but elsewhere the ordinary functions of Government are necessarily in abeyance.

6. Pending further information, Her Majesty's Government will not attempt to decide the mode in which the several provinces of Afghanistan shall eventually be governed, but it seems clear that there is no chance of the establishment of one Government for the whole of the late kingdom which would give promise of permanence. They reserve their final opinion on the point until they are in possession of the views of your Excellency in Council. Her Majesty's Government fully recognise the many difficulties by which the question is surrounded, but they trust that, with the assistance of your Excel-

lency, it may be possible to frame arrangements which will reconcile the interests of the Afghan Chiefs and people with the essential condition of security to the British Empire in India.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CRANBROOK.

No. 43.

No. 243 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, the 19th December 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter No. 24, dated 24th October 1879, from the Political Assistant, Kabul Expeditionary Force, with accompanying translation of a letter from Major-General Ivanoff, Governor of Zarafshan, to the address of Muhammad Musa Khan (son of Amir Yakub Khan) and others, mentioned in the margin.

General Gholam Hyder Khan, late Deputy Governor of Afghan-Turkistan. Habibulla Khan.

Nur Muhammad Khan, son of the late Sirdar Sultan Muhammad Khan, half-brother of the late Amir Dost Muhammad Khan.

Lal Muhammad, a confidential servant of the late Amir Sher Ali Khan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 43.

No. 24, dated Kabul, 24th October 1879.

From H. M. DURAND, Esq., Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM directed to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Governor General in Council, a letter, in original, with translation, from Major-General Ivanoff, Governor of Zarafshan, to the address of His Highness the heir-apparent, Muhammad Musa Khan, and others.

Translation of a Letter from MAJOR-GENERAL IVANOFF, Governor of Zarafshan, to the Address of the Heir-apparent, MUHAMMUD MUSA KHAN, and others.

ON the 26th of Rabi-ul-Awul, at an auspicious moment, I received your letter which you sent to me, and understood its contents. I was very much pleased and at once communicated it to General Kauffmann, the Governor-General. With regard to what you wrote about the friendly relations between the Russian and Afghan Governments, and your own desire for friendship, I have the honour to state that we are also desirous of being friends. The friendship between the two Governments existed in the time of the late Amir, and I hope that it will be increased and strengthened by Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan. May God change the wars in your country to happiness; may peace reign in it; and may your Government be strengthened. I have been forwarding all your letters to the Governor-General, General Kauffman. May God keep you safe.

The Zarafshan Province, Governor Major-General Ivanoff.

Written and sealed by the General.

Written on 29th Mart (March) 1879=5th Rabi-ul-Sani 1296.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William December 19, 1879.

WE have the honour to transmit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter received from Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, reporting the substance of a conversation between himself and the ex-Amir Yakub Khan regarding the political events and transactions which preceded the negotiations between the Russian authorities at Tashkend and the late Amir Sher Ali Khan, and led to the Amir's eventual rupture with the British Government.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
H. J. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 44.

No. 50, dated Kabul, 22nd November 1879. (Extract.)

FROM LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit a brief account of an interview which took place between the Amir Yakub Khan and myself on the 22nd October. The interview was a private and informal one; but recent events have lent some interest to what passed on the occasion, and I have, therefore, thought it desirable that a report should be prepared for the information of the Governor-General in Council.

2. After some conversation upon matters of no special importance, the Amir introduced his father's name, and thus gave me the opportunity I had often wished to have of leading him on to speak naturally and unconstrainedly about Sher Ali Khan's feelings and policy during the last ten years. I was most careful to avoid any expression of my own views upon the subject in order that I might, if possible, obtain from the Amir a perfectly spontaneous and truthful account of the circumstances which led, in his opinion, to Sher Ali's estrangement from ourselves and rapprochement to Russia. In this I think I succeeded. Yakub Khan spoke readily and freely of all that had passed, and needed no question or suggestion from me to declare his conviction regarding the cause of his father's unfriendly attitude towards us during the past few years.

3. The substance of the Amir's statement was as follows:—

“In 1869 my father was fully prepared to throw in his lot with you. He had suffered many reverses before making himself secure on the throne of Afghanistan; and he had come to the conclusion that his best chance of holding what he had won lay in an alliance with the British Government. He did not receive from Lord Mayo as large a supply of arms and ammunition as he had hoped, but, nevertheless, he returned to Kabul fairly satisfied, and so he remained until the visit of Nur Muhammad Shah to India in 1873. This visit brought matters to a head. The diaries received from Nur Muhammad Shah during his stay in India, and the report which he brought back on his return, convinced my father that he could no longer hope to obtain from the British Government all the aid that he wanted; and from that time he began to turn his attention to the thoughts of a Russian alliance. You know how this ended.

“When my father received from the Government of India the letter informing him that a British Mission was about to proceed to Cabul, he read it out in Durbar. The members of the Russian Embassy were present. After the reading was finished, Colonel Stolietoff rose, saluted the Amir and asked permission to leave Kabul. If permitted, he would, he said, travel without delay to Tashkend, and report the state of affairs to

General Kauffmann, who would inform the Tsar, and thus bring pressure to bear on England. He promised to return in six weeks or two months, and urged the Amir to do everything in his power meanwhile to prevent the British Mission from reaching Kabul.

"Colonel Stolietoff never returned to Kabul. He lost no time in reaching Tashkend, where he remained for a few weeks, and he then started for Russia.

"The Afghan official, Mirza Muhammad Hassan Khan generally known as the 'Dabir-ul-Mulk,' who had travelled with Colonel Stolietoff from the Oxus to Kabul, accompanied him on his return journey to Tashkend. Here the Mirza was detained under pretence that orders would shortly be received from the Emperor, until the news of my father's flight from Kabul reached General Kaufmann. He was then permitted to leave. Two Aides-de-Camp were sent with him, one an European, the other a Native of Bokhara.

"My father was strongly urged by General Kauffmann not to leave Kabul. At the same time the members of the Embassy were ordered to return to Tashkend, the Doctor being permitted to remain with my father if his services were required.

"Throughout, the Russian Embassy was treated with great honour, and at all stations between Mazar-i-Shariff and Kabul, orders were given for the troops to turn out, and for a salute to be fired on their arrival and departure."

4. I cannot, of course, vouch for the exact words used by Yakub Khan, but I am confident that the foregoing paragraph, which is written from notes taken at the time, contains a substantially accurate record of the conversation.

5. It would be superfluous for me to advance any proof of the fact that for one reason or another, Sher Ali did during the latter part of his reign fall away from us and incline towards an alliance with Russia. But I think the closeness of the connexion between Russia and Kabul, and the extent of the Amir's hostility towards ourselves, has not hitherto been fully recognised. Yakub Khan's statements throw some light upon this question, and they are confirmed by various circumstances which have lately come to my knowledge. The prevalence of Russian coin and wares in Kabul, and the extensive military preparations made by Sher Ali of late years, appear to me to afford an instructive comment upon Yakub Khan's assertions. Our recent rupture with Sher Ali has, in fact, been the means of unmasking and checking a very serious conspiracy against the peace and security of our Indian Empire:

6. The magnitude of Sher Ali's military preparations is, in my opinion, a fact peculiar significance. I have already touched upon this point in a former letter, but I shall perhaps be excused for noticing it again. Before the outbreak of hostilities last year the Amir had raised and equipped with arms of precision 68 regiments of infantry and 16 of cavalry. The Afghan artillery amounted to near 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artizans were constantly employed in the manufacture of rifled cannon and breach-loading small arms. More than a million pounds of powder and I believe several million rounds of home-made Snider ammunition, were in the Bala Hissar at the time of the late explosion. Swords, helmets, uniforms and other articles of military equipment were stored in proportionate quantities. Finally, Sher Ali had expended upon the construction of the Sherpur Cantonments an astonishing amount of labour and money. The extent and cost of this work may be judged of from the fact that the whole of the troops under my command will find cover during the winter within the cantonment and its outlying buildings, and the bulk of them in the main line of rampart itself, which extends to a length of nearly two miles under the southern and western slopes of the Bemaru hills. Sher Ali's original design was apparently to carry the wall entirely round the hills, a distance of five miles, and the foundations were already laid for a considerable portion of this length. All these military preparations were quite unnecessary except as a provision for contemplated hostilities with ourselves, and it is difficult to understand how their entire cost could have been met from the Afghan Treasury, the gross revenue of the country amounting only to about eighty lacs of rupees per annum.

7. I have referred to the prevalence of Russian coin and wares in Kabul as evidence of the growing connection between Russia and Afghanistan. I am unable to find proof that the Tsar's coin was introduced in any other way than by the usual channels of trade. It is quite possible that the bulk of it, if not the whole, came in gradually by this means, the accumulation of foreign gold in particular being considerable in this country, where little gold is coined. Nevertheless, it seems to me a curious fact that the amount of Russian money in circulation should be so large. No less than 13,000 gold pieces were found among the Amir's treasure alone; similar coins are exceedingly common in the city bazaar; and great numbers of them are known to be in possession of the Sirdars. Of course English goods of all kinds are plentiful here—that is inevitable, particularly

with a considerable body of Hindu merchants settled in the city, but Russian goods also abound. Glass, crockery,* silks, tea, and many other things which would seem to be far more easily procurable from India than from Russian territory, are to be found in great quantities. A habit, too, seems to have been growing up among the Sirdars and others of wearing uniforms of Russian cut, Russian buttons, Russian boots, and the like. Russian goods and Russian ways seem, in fact, to have become the fashion in Afghanistan.

No. 45.

No. 246 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To The Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD

Fort William, 19th December 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* from Major-General Sir F. S. Roberts, K.C.B., V.C., submitting his Kabul Diary for the period from 1st to 8th November 1879.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

J. STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 45.

No. 39, dated Kabul, 9th November 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Depôt.

I HAVE the honour to submit Diary for the period between the 1st and 8th November, both days inclusive.

Kabul Diary, dated 1st to 8th November 1879. (Extract.)

1st November 1879.—A brigade under Brigadier-General Macpherson, V.C., C.B., marched this morning for Butkhak, to open up communications with the Khyber column. Many of the leading men about Khurd Kabul, and Tezin have come in, and arrangements have been made with them for the establishment of a regular postal service between Butkhak and Seh Baba. They have now been ordered to report themselves to General Macpherson.

Lieutenant Ramsay arrived in camp this afternoon. He has been ordered to join General Macpherson as Political Officer.

2nd November 1879.—This morning I rode out to Butkhak, and afterwards reconnoitred the Latabund Pass as far as the Kotul.

3rd November 1879.—Rode through the Chunari Pass to its junction with the Khurd Kabul, and back by the latter to Butkhak, 32 miles.

In the evening I rode back to Sherpur Cantonments, following the line of telegraph, which has now been laid as far as Butkhak. The distance as measured by the Telegraphic Department is about 15 miles.

4th November 1879.—Captain Turner, who has been in political charge of arrangements on the Ali Khel road, came into camp to-day. He brought a number of prisoners,

among whom were some Ghilzai Maliks, who had instigated the recent rising of the clans round the Shuturguridan, and some Afghan soldiers. These will be tried by the Military Commission.

5th November 1879.—The Kohistani headmen, who have been here for some time and have a good many grievances against Sher Ali and Yakub Khan, were assembled by Major Hastings this afternoon, and told that to prove their good faith they should at once gather and give up all arms formerly belonging to the Amir, a large number of which are believed to have found their way to Kohistan. For this purpose some of the headmen were dismissed, the remainder being retained as a measure of precaution. I do not think the Kohistanis will prove very tractable about the surrender of arms, which are valued by them beyond everything; but the experiment is worth a trial. Before being dismissed the headmen were informed that a Governor would shortly be appointed to the district, who would inquire into their complaints. They seemed satisfied.

Amin Khan of Hangu, who accompanied me here, was allowed to return to-day; his presence being no longer of any use.

6th November 1879.—General Macpherson reports that on the 5th he advanced to within a short distance of Tezin.

This afternoon news arrived in camp that two Turkestani regiments which were marching on Kabul, had disbanded at Kot-i-Ashen, nine miles from here, and dispersed to their homes. Four hundred and fifty stands of arms, some tents, and 110 camels, belonging to these regiments, have been brought in. They had no guns.

7th November 1879.—I have determined to appoint Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan Governor of Turkistan, which I am assured he has more chance of holding than anyone else. He was asked to-day whether he would go. I caused him to be informed that if so I would advance him a lac of rupees, which would be recoverable from the revenues of the province; that he could raise and take with him 1,000 Jezailchis and 500 horse, and that his great object must be to conciliate the troops and people, and preserve quiet in the province during the winter. The Sirdar objected to the sum offered as too small, and said that if he went he must have at least two lacs to start with, as a good deal of money would be required for the pay of his force, and for other purposes. I agreed to give the larger sum, and expect the Sirdar's final answer to-morrow. If he goes, one of his sons remains in my camp.

For Kohistan, I think Shahbaz Khan is perhaps best fitted. His mother was a Kohistani, which makes him more acceptable to the people than other Sirdars; but he is not a man of any talent, and I propose to send with him Sayud Muhammad, son of the late Nur Muhammad Shah, who will, I think, supply the deficiency.

The Kohistani headmen will be informed to-morrow of the appointment of Shahbaz Khan, and ordered to accompany him without delay.

Careful inquiries are being made regarding the manufacture of guns, rifles, ammunition, saddlery, and military equipments in general during the time of Sher Ali. Considering the very rough means at their disposal, the Amir's artisans have turned out some remarkably good work. They are now being examined.

General Bright, after meeting General Macpherson near Tezin, has marched back to Jagdalak.

The eastern side of the Latabund Pass is reported easy and open. I am sending out the Chief Engineer to make a thorough examination, and if I find no unforeseen difficulties in the way, I shall try to make the pass practicable at once before the snow sets in.

8th November 1879.—Muhammad Shah Khan and Mazulla Khan, two leading Ghilzais of Hissarak, have come in. This will, I hope, ensure the safety of the road as far as Jagdalak.

The Bala Hissar will be completely evacuated by our troops to-day or to-morrow. I am having the powder destroyed, and I think it safer to keep all troops out of the way for the present. I have made arrangements for guarding the gates and principal points by means of chowkidars.

The principal medical officer reports that the searching parties have failed to find any European bodies among those buried near the Residency. I have ordered the pits to be closed, as further search seems useless.

No. 46.

No. 248 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 19th December 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter from Lieut.-General Sir F. S. Roberts, K.C.B., V.C., commanding Kabul Field Force, No. 45, dated 19th November 1879, submitting his diary for the week ending 15th November.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

J. STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 46.

No. 45, dated Kabul, 19th November 1879.

From LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit diary for the week ending 15th November 1879.

Kabul Diary, 9th to 15th November 1879. (Extract.)

9th November 1879.—The Kohistani head men were informed to-day that Shahbaz Khan was to go to Kohistan as Governor. They seemed satisfied with the arrangement.

Letters received from Ghazni give news of disturbances there. It is said that Mullah Mushk-i-Alam has assembled a number of people with the intention of raising a holy war. Muhammad Sayad, the Governor of Ghazni, professes his willingness to come in, and assures me he is doing his best to keep matters quiet.

10th November 1879.—Abdul Jabbar, formerly a Captain of Artillery in the Afghan army, and his father, Muhammad Akram, who had been sent down to collect information by Colonel Macgregor, have brought in a report about the disturbance at Ghazni and the state of affairs in the surrounding country. Muhammad Akram speaks of large bodies of tribesmen having assembled about the town under the orders of Mushk-i-Alam, but his evidence is not altogether to be depended upon. He did not himself see any of the insurgents. The Wardak country he reports perfectly quiet, but full of disbanded soldiery. Abdul Jabbar calculates that four and a half or five complete regiments of infantry could be brought together in Wardak, all well armed, but says they have no guns.

A letter, dated the 5th, received from the Governor of Ghazni professing his willingness to come in, and his hope of dispersing the insurgents. In a second letter he announces that he has left Ghazni, and is on his way to Kabul.

Abdul Kadir, a former Governor, writes, accusing Muhammad Said of fomenting this disturbance himself.

11th November 1879.—Heavy clouds on the hills all day, and a dull grey sky. At 2 o'clock a dust storm came on which was succeeded about sunset by a slight fall of snow.

I have completed my arrangements for the safe custody of the Bala Hissar during the destruction of the powder stored in the citadel. The gates will be held, and the walls and streets patrolled, by some 60 native chowkidars under the orders of Najaf Ali Khan, head man of the Arab community in Kabul. All military guards have been withdrawn.

12th November 1879.—A proclamation was published to-day granting an amnesty to all persons who have fought against the British troops since the 3rd September. I am assured by General Daud Shah and others that this will have a quieting effect on the country and facilitate the collecting of supplies.

This morning a telegram came in from General Macpherson reporting that a small party of the 67th Foot had been attacked on the 10th near Doaba, that a force had been sent out in support, and that the enemy, who were in considerable strength, had been defeated, and pursued for several miles. The assailants were Safis of Tagoo on the left bank of the Kabul river.

I have arranged to discontinue the direct collection of forage. Each district will now be required to produce a certain amount of bhoosa, grass, &c. An influential man will be sent out to each with an advance of money, and made responsible for the collection of the whole amount assessed. This plan seems likely to prove less troublesome and more effective than the system of direct collection.

13th November 1879.—Two shocks of earthquake were felt to-day.

Some Tajiks, who have come in from Ghazni, report the disturbance quieted and the insurgents dispersed. They say the Governor has left the city and is on his way to Kabul, or professes to be so.

Sirdar Shahbaz Khan and the Kohistani head men were dismissed this afternoon. The head men were told that they must submit to the Sirdar's authority, and exhorted to give up their family feuds and live quietly. I also impressed upon them the necessity for procuring the surrender of Government arms. Muhammad Afzul Khan, son of Abdul Karim Khan, was anxious for leave to avenge his father's murder. He was told that inquiries would be made, and that in the meantime he must keep the peace.

Shahbaz Khan gets an advance of Rupees 3,000 for immediate expenditure, and Rupees 20,000 to collect forage. He will be accompanied by Mirza Habibulla Khan, son of Khan Shirin, Sayad Muhammad Shah being unwilling to go, and by any other Mirza he may name.

14th November 1879.—Lieutenant Ramsay came in from Butkhak.

Letters arrived from Lal Muhammad and other men sent by Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan to Asmatulla Khan, with the view of inducing the latter to come in. They think he will not come unless his fort and all other property formerly held by him are first restored, and compensation promised for all losses inflicted on him since the Treaty of Gandamak.

15th November 1879.—The Governor of Ghazni came in to-day.

General Macpherson reports all quiet at Tezin, and the demeanour of the tribes friendly.

Shahbaz Khan has not yet gone. He starts to-morrow morning.

Sirdar Muhammad Hussein Khan, brother of Wali Muhammad, goes to Maidan to collect supplies. He has been given rupees 10,000 advance. Sirdar Abdulla Khan, son of Sirdar Sultan Muhammad Khan, will collect supplies in Logar. I have advanced him Rupees 20,000.

The work upon the Lataband road is being pushed forward as rapidly as possible. The Chief Engineer will go out himself in a day or two to superintend.

Telegraphic communication with India will, I hope, be established in a few days. The line is now complete from here to Barikab.

The Military Commission disposed of 16 cases during the past week. 78 persons in all have now been executed upon the recommendation of the Commissioners.

No. 47.

No. 249 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 19th December 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the letters noted on the margin, from
 No. 54, dated 26th November 1879. Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts, K.C.B., V.C.,
 „ 58, „ 1st December „

Commanding Kabul Field Force, submitting his political diaries for the weeks ending 22nd and 29th November 1879, respectively.

We have &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 47.

No. 54, dated Kabul, 26th November 1879.

From LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Field Force,
to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit Kabul Diary for the week ending the 22nd instant. The despatch of the diary has been delayed until to-day by my absence from Kabul.

KABUL DIARY, 16th to 22nd November 1879.

16th November.—I have asked Dr. Bellew to make a complete inquiry into the case of Muhammad Syud, Governor of Ghazni. There are a good many people now in camp who have, or profess to have, information regarding the recent disturbances in that quarter.

17th November.—It is reported that five Kabuli regiments from Turkestan have arrived near Charikar on their way to their homes. They are said to have two guns with them, and to number about three thousand men. I have sent out General Parvez Shah Khan with orders to prevent their dispersion if possible, and to bring them in here. They are to be assured that no harm will happen to them, and I have sent them word that they will get something more than the usual reward for surrendered weapons if they march in in a body and lay down their arms. I fear they will hardly be persuaded to do so; but it is important to keep them from dispersing and carrying away their arms, if this can in any way be managed. General Daud Shah and others think it probable that all the Kabuli troops in Turkestan will come down before the winter sets in. They are receiving no pay, and seem to have no reason for remaining away from their homes.

18th November.—I have sanctioned, subject to Government approval, the establishment of a civil dispensary in Kabul. A large number of applications for treatment have already been received, and among the applicants are several ladies belonging to the families of Sirdars and other well-to-do people.

19th November.—Letter from Baz Muhammad Khan, son of Sirdar Nur Muhammad Khan, who accompanied Shahbaz Khan to Kohistan, reports that General Ghulam Hyder Khan and Nek Muhammad have crossed the Amu.

The line of telegraph has been completed from here to Jalalabad. A sowar from a cavalry regiment stationed at Ghorī, who came down with the Kabuli troops mentioned in my entry of the 17th, reports that the Turkestan road is unsafe for small parties. The troops were fired upon by villagers during their march from Ghorī and lost some men. The same Sowar also reports that Muhammad Khan, Uzbek, has seized Shihurghan and Saripul. He says the troops in Turkestan are disaffected for want of pay, and that Ghulam Hyder Khan has lost a great deal of his power.

Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan tells me he has heard the report about Shihurghan and Saripul, but attaches no importance to it.

General Parvez Shah Khan has returned, and reports that he has failed to induce the Turkestan regiments to come in with their arms. They have dispersed to their homes, leaving a gun and some tents at Charikar.

20th November.—Hassan Raza, an Afghan official in Turkestan, writes from Ghorī that Abdul Rahman is at Tashkend, and that Nek Muhammad, after being plundered

by the Ghorbandis, has gone to Mazar-i-Sharif. He says the people of Turkestan are in a disturbed state and anxiously expecting British interference.

500 men, 92nd Highlanders.
400 „ 5th Punjab Infantry.
400 „ 3rd Sikhs.
4 Mountain guns.
2 Guns G.-3.
1 Squadron, 9th Lancers.
2 Squadrons 14 B. „

21st November.—Brigadier-General Baker marched this morning for Maidan with the force marginally noted, to aid Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan in the collection of forage and to disperse any armed bodies of men who may be found in the neighbourhood.

22nd November.—I left cantonments this morning and rode out to Arghandeh to join General Baker, but found he had gone on to Maidan. It is reported that a force has been collected by Mullah Mushk-i-Alam in the Wardak country, and is advancing in this direction. I propose to go on to Maidan to-morrow.

Enclosure 2 in No. 47.

No. 58, dated Kabul, 1st December 1879

From LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit Political Diary for the week ending the 29th November 1879.

POLITICAL DIARY FROM 23RD TO 29TH NOVEMBER 1879. (Extract.)

23rd November.—I rode this morning from Urghandeh to Maidan, where I found Brigadier-General Baker encamped. He had received information that a number of men had assembled in the north of the Wardak district with the intention of crossing over into the Nirkh valley immediately to the west of Maidan. Further, Bahadur Khan, headman of the Umar Khel section of Ghilzais in that valley, had refused to come in, and the neighbouring villages were believed to be withholding their quota of bhoosa in anticipation of a disturbance. The disaffection was said to be due to the influence of Mullah Mushk-i-Alam, who is now in Wardak. I at once ordered Captain Turner to go out to Nirkh with two squadrons of cavalry, and bring in Bahadur Khan quietly, if possible, if not, by force. Near sunset this evening I received news that the cavalry had been received with a heavy fire from Bahadur Khan's village, which was found to be strongly fortified, and that the enemy had appeared in force on all sides. I had, however, no doubt that our men would be able to effect their retirement without serious difficulty, and determined, as it was getting late, to send out no reinforcements. Later in the evening the cavalry returned to camp. They have lost three horses. No other casualties.

24th November.—The camp was struck this morning at daybreak, and the whole of the tents and baggages being collected in a small fort close by, the force moved off in the direction of Nirkh. I was in hopes, from the information brought to me, that the enemy might attempt a stand in their former position, and that an example might be made. Before our arrival, however, they had deserted Bahadur Khan's fort and made off to the hills. Small bodies of them were seen, but they were far out of reach and on ground that made pursuit hopeless. Under these circumstances, I gave orders that Bahadur Khan's fort and the whole of the Umar Khel villages in its neighbourhood should be destroyed.

I rode back to Maidan, arriving about 4 o'clock. Since then a strong wind has been blowing with clouds of dust, and the cold is intense.

The country which I saw to-day is apparently rich and populous. From our camp, and from the road to Nirkh, a number of fertile valleys are to be seen studded with villages and full of cultivation. Good timber, a rarity in this country, is not altogether wanting here, and water is plentiful.

25th November.—Rode into Sherpur. The view from several points of the road was exceedingly fine, particularly about Urghandeh, where the ground is high, and the hill slopes comparatively well-wooded. The line of the Hindu Kush, which is almost entirely shut out from view at Kabul by nearer ranges of hills, was from this point clearly visible. The whole range was covered with snow.

I arrived in the afternoon and found awaiting me news that a small party of Kabul mounted police were treacherously attacked yesterday in a village near Dakir, where they

had been sent by General Hills in the hope of securing some of Nek Muhammad's property. They were set upon by the villagers, who had received them in a most friendly manner, and lost five killed and three wounded. The men were all Kabulis.

A letter from Sara Khan Beg, formerly Mir of Kulab, who is now in Turkestan, states that the country is in a very unsettled condition. Nek Muhammad is believed to have crossed the Amu, and it is reported that the Russians are urging the Amir of Bokhara to occupy Balkh. Malik Hamid, Lal Muhammad, and others, sent by Sirdar Wali Muhammad to induce Asmatulla Khan to come in, returned this morning. They report that he is holding back partly on account of the dissuasion of Mullah Muskh-i-Alam, his spiritual backer, and partly from the fear that we may again retire from the country and leave him in the lurch.

26th November.—Rumours have reached Kabul to the effect that a rising is contemplated by the Kohistanis and men of Tagao. I have not received any trustworthy information on the subject.

27th November.—Further reports of an impending disturbance in Kohistan and the neighbourhood. It is said that emissaries from Mullah Muskh-i-Alam have been at work in this part of the country, and that a holy war is being assiduously preached.

Brigadier-General Baker informs me that he to-day fell in with a small body of insurgents near the village of Beni Badam while reconnoitring with the cavalry. A few shots were exchanged.

28th November.—Brigadier-General Baker reports that he went out to-day and destroyed the village of Beni Badam, the inhabitants of which he believes were in league with the insurgents. The latter dispersed. They are said to have been Wardaks raised by Mullah Muskh-i-Alam. According to information brought in by neighbouring villagers, their leader was killed yesterday by a chance shot from one of our men.

Sirdar Fakir Muhammad Khan, a cousin of Yahya Khan's, and father-in-law of Abdur Rahman, came into Kabul to-day. He has for the last five or six years been living in Kohdaman on a small pension granted him by the Amir Sher Ali. He says that the people of Kohistan and the neighbourhood are in an excited state, and that an outbreak may be expected at any moment.

29th November.—Early this morning a letter came in from Shahbaz Khan reporting that the headmen and people of Kohistan are on the point of rising. He had sent for some of the headmen, but they refused to come in, and openly declared that they intended to raise a holy war and destroy the British force in Kabul. A reply was sent to Shahbaz Khan urging him to do all in his power to keep matters quiet, and he was furnished with letters for the most influential men of the Kohistani Maliks calling upon them to come in. It is generally believed that a considerable force is assembling in this quarter with the avowed intention of making a night attack upon our cantonments.

Sirdar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan has been sent to Kohistan, where he is believed to possess some influence, with orders to re-assure the people and bring the Maliks in if possible.

General Baker reports that all is going well in the direction of Maidan. The Wardak insurgents have completely dispersed, and have returned to their homes, in spite of the exhortations of Mullah Mushk-i-Alam. Supplies are coming in freely, and the greater portion of the amount stipulated for the district has already been produced.

A Peshawuri merchant from Tashkurghan has come in to camp. He says the country beyond the Hindu Kush is thoroughly unsettled, and that the roads between this and Ghoris are impassable for small parties. According to him Ghulam Hyder Khan is making great efforts to secure the troops who have kept together in Turkestan. He has promised them an increase of pay and regular payments. He is said to have seven regiments of infantry at Mazar-i-Sharif.

It is confidently asserted here by city bankers and others that the Kohistanis are in force at Khoga Sarai, and that a night attack upon cantonments is imminent. Muhammad Usman Khan of Tagao is said to be acting in concert.

(Signed) H. M. DURAND,

for Lieut.-General Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force.

No. 48.

No. 251 of 1879. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 19th December 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a further collection of telegrams, received from our officers in Afghanistan.

* From General Roberts, No. 37, dated 7th November 1879.

To General Roberts, No. 28C.P., dated 30th November 1879.

From General Roberts, No. 42, dated 14th November 1879.

From General Roberts, No. 44, dated 15th November 1879.

2. We further enclose copy of letters* received from Lieutenant-General Roberts, K.C.B.; V.C.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

J. STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 1st December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

GENERAL BAKER's force returns here to-day. He reports that the forage demanded from the Maidan district has all been provided, and that the neighbourhood is quiet. The Wardak people have been trying to make the Logaris join them, in view to giving trouble. They have not responded, and are daily sending in large quantities of forage. In Kohistan there is some excitement; but I am in hopes matters will quiet down, and that it will not (be) necessary to send troops there at present. Weather is very cold, and all hands are well employed in providing shelter for the winter. Convoy which started on 27th November, met up convoy at Seh Baba yesterday. General Kennedy and party expected here to-day. All well.

Enclosure 2 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 3rd December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

HELIOGRAPHIC communication has now been established between Kabul and Landi Kotal, with intermediate stations at Lataband, Jagdalak, Gandamak, Jalalabad, and Ali Boghan. Some of the headmen from Kohistan are now on their way to Kabul. The excitement there will probably cease. All well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 7th December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

KOHISTANIS are assembling and inclined to give trouble. Some men under a Mullah, named Mushk-i-Alam, have collected again near Beni-Badam; these people and the Kohistanis are too far away at present to take notice of. I am endeavouring to settle matters without proceeding to extremities. City and neighbourhood of Kabul quiet. All well.

Enclosure 4 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 7th December 1879. (Extract.)

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

AFFAIRS round Kabul less satisfactory of late. In Maidan, Sirdar Muhammad Hosain Khan has been murdered, apparently by men of Mushk-i-Alam's raising. Sirdar Abdulla Khan has been attacked by armed bands in Logar, and for a time besieged in a fort. Some Kohistani Maliks have come in; but the leading man sends excuses, and the country is reported very unquiet. Anxious as I am to avoid any further expeditions at present, I may be forced, if this movement spreads, to send the troops out again.

Enclosure 5 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 8th December 1879. (Extract.)

From GENERAL ROBERTS to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp, Gwalior.

Parade of all troops was held this morning to present distinguished conduct medals to men of 72nd Highlanders. The sight of the splendid-looking troops cannot but impress the people of Kabul, a large number of whom attended the parade. As the excitement in Maidan and Kohistan directions continued, General Macpherson will move this afternoon a short distance on direct road towards Maidan, and to-morrow General Baker will proceed to Charasia, and on Wednesday by the valley of the Kabul river to a point on the Ghazni road in rear of Maidan. As bringing up troops from the direction of Jellalabad will have a good political effect, I have ordered the Guide Corps to Kabul. They will probably only remain a few days here.

Enclosure 6 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 10th December 1879. (Extract.)

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

Baker continues his movements to-day by Valley of Kabul river towards Maidan. Macpherson has altered his course somewhat in consequence of the enemy being yesterday discovered trying to reach Kohistan from Arghandi, and this morning he occupied the Surkh Kotal, which divides Kohistan from Paghman. He will probably be engaged with the enemy this afternoon or to-morrow. Baker will then be on their line of retreat.

Enclosure 7 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 11th December 1879. (Extract.)

From GENERAL ROBERTS to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

General Macpherson occupied the Surkh Kotal yesterday morning, and prevented the enemy from Ghazni direction, joining the Kohistanis. He was just in time, for shortly after his arrival 5,000 or 6,000 Kohistanis reached near Kotal. Their advance party was met at close quarters and driven back on the main position, which was assaulted and taken in good style by 67th Foot, 3rd Sikhs, and 5th Goorkhas. Kohistanis fled, leaving six standards in our hands, and losing number of men. Our loss, Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh and one Goorkha, two, 67th Foot, four, 3rd Sikhs, all slightly wounded. Practice of Captain Morgan's battery was very effective, also dismounted practice of 14th Bengal Lancers. General Macpherson's brigade with cavalry and horse artillery under General Massy will advance to-day towards Arghandi and Maidan, and should effect a junction with General Baker.

Enclosure 8 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 11th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to VICEROY and FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

GOUGH reports from Gandamak, Ghilzai state of feeling very suspicious. Asmatulla's influence supposed cause; he believes thwarting us every way. Rumours prevail

Jagdalak may be attacked. Vague impression here that when winter becomes severe our Kabul position will be seriously threatened by hordes from direction Kohistan and Ghazni. Increased preparations and vigilance requisite.

Enclosure 9 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 12th December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to VICEROY and FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

As reported in my telegram of yesterday Macpherson's brigade advanced by Paghman Valley toward Arghandi, while the cavalry and horse artillery under Massy made for Ghazni road. Enemy appeared in very great number and quite outflanking Massy forced him to retire. Ground is much cut up by deep water-cuts, the guns upset, and had to be temporarily abandoned. Cavalry charged several times, but the numbers against them were too great. Macpherson's brigade came up soon afterwards and drove off the enemy. Meanwhile Colonel Macgregor had been enabled to recover the guns. Macpherson bivouacked for the night at Deh Mozang, which had been previously occupied by 200 of 72nd Highlanders. Large body of enemy retreated to hills south of Bala Hissar with the intention of capturing that position, and thus getting command of the city. The picquets on this point had been strengthened, enemy assaulted it repeatedly during the night, but were beaten off with loss by detachment of 67th and 72nd under command of Captain Jervis of former regiment. Macpherson is now reinforcing the position and will then drive enemy off neighbouring heights. Baker is on return march to Kabul; he engaged enemy repeatedly yesterday and inflicted great loss. He reports in high terms of work done by 5th Punjab Cavalry under Major Williams, his advance guard under Major White, 92nd Highlanders, and by a company of that regiment under Lieutenant J. Napier. The combination against us is undoubtedly very extensive. Guides arrived last night. Thinking that excitement might spread along line of communication have requested General Bright to reinforce Gandamak to admit of troops there being used as a moveable column; it is very desirable tribes should see that our communications are strongly held. At same time I don't think more troops are required from India. Wali Muhammad Hassan Khan and all other Sirdars are with me and affording every assistance. City is quiet. I entrusted command of Sherpur cantonments to General Hugh Gough during my absence, his arrangements were admirable. Our loss yesterday was 18 killed and 25 wounded. Amongst the killed Lieutenant Hardy, Royal Horse Artillery, and Lieutenants Hearsey and Ricardo, 9th Lancers, and amongst the wounded Colonel Cleland and Captain Mackenzie, 9th Lancers, former dangerously. Lieutenant Cook, 3rd Sikhs, and Forbes, 14th Bengal Lancers, both severely.

Enclosure 10 in No. 48.

* Telegram, dated 13th December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

Enemy continued collecting. Yesterday a few appeared to the north-east on lower spurs of Kohistan hills. Large number assembled in and around Benishahr, while those in neighbourhood of Indiki were considerably strengthened. Macpherson held point above Bala Hissar, but failed to dislodge enemy from high peak, where their position was of great strength and held by a large force, chiefly men of the Ardal regiments. Baker returned by evening, having engaged the enemy repeatedly during the day, with but slight loss to his own troops. Night passed quietly. This morning Baker moved out with 72nd Highlanders, Guide Infantry, Wing 3rd Sikhs, 4 guns, G-3, 4 guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, 1 Squadron 9th Lancers, and 5th Punjab Cavalry. He found the enemy in great force near Benishahr. Attacked and drove them before him until his men ultimately occupied the high peaks which the enemy were holding all yesterday, and which the 5th Goorkhas from the Bala Hissa Hill had reached a few minutes previously. Casualties yesterday: Lieutenant Ferguson, 72nd Highlanders; Major Cook, 5th Goorkhas; and Lieutenant Fasken, 3rd Sikhs, wounded; one man, 67th Foot, three of 72nd, five of 5th Goorkhas wounded, and two men of the 3rd Sikhs killed yesterday. No report of casualties yet received from General Baker. Will telegraph again shortly.

Enclosure 11 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 13th December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

The enemy have been defeated on all sides to-day. A combined attack was to have been made on our position to-night. City people had agreed to join the tribesmen who amount, at a moderate estimate, to about twenty thousand men, a large number of whom were armed with Snider rifles, and fought to the last, especially with their knives, against our cavalry on taking the initiative to-day; the very heavy loss the enemy suffered have, I hope, broken up the combination, but large bodies of the enemy are still hanging about southern end of Chardeh valley, and north-western slopes of Kohistan hills. They will be attacked to-morrow unless they disperse during night. 92nd Highlanders led the advance of General Baker's brigade under Major White. The attack on the enemy's position was most brilliantly headed by Lieutenant Forbes, who, with his Colour Sergeant Drummond, was killed in a hand-to-hand fight. The Guides Cavalry under Major Stewart were very successful and made a grand charge, as did the 9th Lancers under Captain Butson, who was killed with one Sergeant-Major and three of his men. Captain Chisholm and Lieutenant Trower, of same regiment, with eight men, are wounded. The 5th Punjab Cavalry under Major Williams distinguished themselves, Majors Hammond and Stewart both leading successful charges. Our total loss during last three days is 43 killed, of whom six are officers, and 76 wounded, of whom ten are officers. Lieutenant Forbes, 14th Bengal Lancers, reported as wounded in my telegram of 11th, was, I regret to say, killed. The troops have behaved admirably, and, notwithstanding the hard work and extreme cold at night, are in good health and famous spirits. The large proportion of killed to wounded is mainly owing to the enemy killing all wounded men who may have fallen into their hands. I am deeply indebted to Brigadier-General Baker.

Enclosure 12 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 14th December 1870.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

We have been fighting all the morning and gained great success at first, but the enemy are coming on in such numbers that I have decided to collect my force within Sherpur entrenchments giving up heights above city and Bala Hissar as it is not possible to hold such an extended position while the enemy are so numerous. Keeping up communication with the outposts would be very difficult. I have ordered Gough to push on from Gandamak as fast as he can, withdrawing Latabund detachments as he passes by, as this excitement and combination are now sure to spread along line of communication. I strongly recommend more troops being pushed up so as to admit of General Bright being able to keep open communication and to enable me to clear the country should I find it impossible to do so with my present force, which seems likely, looking to the overwhelming numbers and the great determination the enemy exhibit. Your Excellency may depend on my doing all that is possible, but I foresee that I shall not be able to do all I ought unless strongly reinforced, which should be done without delay. I have ordered Arbuthnot's brigade from Jalalabad to Kabul immediately.

Enclosure 13 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 15th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

SIRDAR MUHAMMUD HASSAN, Governor, left city secretly about three this morning presumed fled.

Enclosure 14 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 15th December 1879. (Extract.)

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

THE force is now collected in Sherpur. Our losses to-day 19 killed, including Captain Spens and Lieutenant Gaisford, 72nd Highlanders, and 88 wounded, including

Captain Gordon, 92nd Highlanders, Captain Battye, Guides Corps, and Lieutenant Egerton, 72nd Highlanders. To-morrow the force, if not attacked, will be employed in completing our defences; afterwards shall move out daily and prevent enemy from surrounding our position, but while they are in such numbers nothing is gained by capturing difficult hills, which are far from Sherpur.

Enclosure 15 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 17th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

No communication with Kabul by telegraph since 14th. On 15th General Gough reported from Jagdallak line cut on both sides of him. Is so still, but is open to Pezwan, which is within 13 miles of him.

Enclosure 16 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 17th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

I HEARD last night from Gandamak that Gough's posts were being attacked, and he had called for reinforcements. Three companies, 51st, were to go to him from Gandamak this morning. I ordered remaining wing, 45th Sikhs, and 4th Goorkhas relieved from Ali Boghan to start for Gandamak this morning. Arbuthnot and staff also go there to-day. The telegraph is still working to Pezwan, but we have no communication either with Kabul or Gough. Weather is cloudy and heliograph useless. From information received Warburton believes the attack on Gough is from the south, not by Asmatullah; but it is probably both.

Enclosure 17 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 9th December 1879.

From SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, Punjab, Lahore, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

YAKUB KHAN reached Peshawur last night. Leaves to-morrow. Reaches Meerut on morning of 14th as at present arranged. Kindly send orders regarding destination and treatment of Mustaufi and others who were at Gandamak to-day.

Enclosure 18 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 9th December 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Lahore.

YAHYA and Zakaria Khan and Wazir, not Mustaufi, should be sent to Lahore to await further orders. They should be treated as State prisoners. Otherwise well.

Enclosure 19 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 16th December 1879.

From PUNJAB, Government Lahore, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

THE three State prisoners (Yahya Khan, Zakari Khan, and Wazir,) from Kabul have reached Peshawur and leave this morning for Attock, spending night there, and following nights at Rawul Pindi and Jhelum, reaching Lahore on 19th.

Enclosure 20 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 27th November 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

WEEKLY summary of news. Everything remains profoundly tranquil in the province. The proclamation and announcement of the government of Kandahar being entrusted to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, we read at Kelat-i-Ghilzai to an assembly of Ghilzai Chiefs of the

Hotak and Tokki classes, who afterwards presented a written paper, declaring their great pleasure at the arrangement and willingness to pay revenue. Many chiefs of the Andali and Taraki clans of Ghilzais, living between Ghazni and Shahjui, have come or sent in to Kelat, professing submission and asking for service. They have been referred to Kabul. A sufficiency of supplies for the winter has been collected at Kelat-i-Ghilzai. The Hazarabs on the northern frontier, who showed symptoms of rebellion, have quieted down on receiving assurances that Sher Ali's officials are acting under orders of British Government. From the Herat side there is nothing new. The *Idi-i-Kurban* occurred on the 25th. As on a former similar occasion, the usual procession outside the city was dispensed with by the Sirdar, who, however, gave an entertainment at his house to the principal people of the town, at which he delivered an address on the justice, moderation, and religious toleration of the British Government, as exhibited both in India, and by their present treatment of the Durani nation. Weather colder, thermometer falling to 15 or lower at night. Health of troops excellent.

Enclosure 21 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 6th December 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

EVERYTHING quiet throughout Kandahar district. Rumour is current in city that Ayub Khan is marching on Kandahar with troops, but it is not generally credited on account of his known want of money. Mir Afzul's son who attempted to raise money and men in Bakwa has been expelled by the people. Yar Muhammad Khan, chief of the Augizai clan of the Barakzais, resident on the Helmund below Girishk, has come in to pay his respects to General Stewart.

Enclosure 22 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 11th December 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

WEEKLY summary of news. Rumours of Ayub Khan's having proclaimed a "ghaza" and moved to Wadubagh, a few miles out of Herat, with the intention of marching on Kandahar, have gained strength, and the townspeople are convinced of their truth. Some apprehension was at first caused and people began to lay in store of grain, but a counter rumour that Sirdar Sher Ali would march out to meet the Herat force has restored confidence. The cessation of the storage of wheat by the Commissariat, and the sale of small quantities by the Sirdar, have caused the price to fall 25 per cent. The district is tranquil.

Enclosure 23 in No. 48.

No. 37, dated Kabul, 7th November 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B. Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

It has occurred to me that the Governor-General in Council might wish to be informed in greater detail of my reasons for arresting Sirdar Yahya Khan and other leading men on the 12th October, and for keeping Yakub Khan under more strict restraint since the 28th.

2. As regards the latter point, the consequences of the Ex-Amir's escape might be very serious; and, however small the probability of his attempting flight, I think this fact would in itself have justified me in taking all necessary precautions to ensure his being safely guarded. But besides this I had some positive reasons for supposing that an attempt at flight was not altogether unlikely. Between the 12th October, when the Amir tendered his resignation, and the 28th, when he was informed that his resignation had been accepted, he was practically under no restraint. I was convinced of his desire to leave the country at once, a desire possibly strengthened by the dread of an inquiry into the circumstances of the outbreak and the opposition afterwards offered to our advance. After my interview with Yakub Khan on the 23th October, I no longer felt sure of his wishes and intentions. Certain evidence had lately been brought before the Inquiry Commission which tended to prove him guilty of culpable weakness and neglect during the attack on the Residency, and to show that he was using his influence against us while the force was advancing to Char Asiah. I

thought it most probable that he knew something of the charges brought against him; and at the same time I was confidently assured by Sirdar Wulli Muhammad Khan that an escape would be shortly attempted. Nevertheless, my first idea was to entrust the safe custody of the Ex-Amir to Nawab Sir Ghulam Hassan Khan, refraining from any measures of actual restraint; and arrangements were accordingly made for the Nawab's residence close to Yakub Khan's tent. This plan, however, I found impossible to carry out. The Nawab expressed his utter inability to guarantee the Ex-Amir's safety unless further precautions were taken; and earnestly begged that I would increase the number of sentries over Yakub Khan's quarters. Under these circumstances, I felt that any further attempt to spare the Ex-Amir's feelings in the matter would amount to neglect of the orders of Government; and effectual means were therefore taken to prevent any possibility of escape on his part.

3. As regards the arrests made on the 12th October, I had several reasons for not leaving Yahya Khan and the Amir's ministers at large. From all sides I had long been assured that they were the Amir's most trusted advisers, and possessed of great power; and that this power was being steadily used against British interests. During the advance of the force from Khushai it became clear, from the small amount of aid which reached me in the way of supplies, and from the opposition offered to our advance, that these men either were acting against us, or were generally credited with an amount of influence which they did not possess. The latter explanation I could not accept. All my information went to show that they were in fact the most influential men in the country. Yahya Khan had been Governor of Kabul, and the others had held very high posts both under Sher Ali and Yakub Khan. The Wazir Shah Muhammad had been selected to go to Tashkend on the part of Sher Ali, and was holding the office of Foreign Minister. The Mustaufi had for years been the most trusted and powerful statesman in Afghanistan. The only conclusion I could draw was that all three were against us, and I therefore thought it necessary to check at once and effectually their power of doing mischief. After their arrest, I found that Nawab Sir Ghulam Hassan Khan and others who had special opportunities of ascertaining the truth, strongly approved of the step I had taken and were of opinion that every one of the three if left at large would have proved a resolute and dangerous enemy.

4. Zakaria Khan I caused to be arrested because, although not a man of special influence, he was reported to have joined with the ladies of Yakub Khan's and Yahya Khan's families in distributing bread to the city people immediately before the Char Asiah fight, and in stirring them up to a holy war.

5. Some surprise has I believe been felt here, and perhaps elsewhere, at my having omitted to arrest General Daud Shah Khan at the same time as the ministers. In case his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council should have noted this point, I would explain that I heard nothing of importance against Daud Shah Khan; and I consider that his attempt to assist Major Cavagnari on the 3rd September entitled him to be treated with less suspicion than the others. Since their arrest he has lived close to my camp, and has been of great use to me in supplying information regarding the Afghan army, and other matters. I anticipate nothing but advantage from his remaining at large.

6. I am not aware whether any such explanation as I have given will be considered necessary. But I have thought it desirable that his Excellency the Governor-General in Council should be very fully informed of my reasons for putting the Ex-Amir and his advisers under restraint; and I hope those reasons may be regarded as sufficient to justify the measures I have adopted.

7. I would take this opportunity of expressing my confident opinion, formed after careful thought, that the explosions in the Bala Hissar on the 16th October were not premeditated. At first I was inclined to believe that they might have been due to treachery. From the time at which they occurred, their partial nature, and other circumstances, I am now fully convinced that they were in fact due to accident alone; and this conviction is, I believe, universally held.

Enclosure 24 in No. 48.

No. 28 C.P., dated Governor-General's Camp, 30th November 1879.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force.

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter No. 37, dated 7th November 1879, reporting in greater detail your reasons for arresting Sirdar Yahya Khan and other leading Afghan

Sirdars on the 12th October, and for keeping Yakub Khan, Ex-Amir, under more strict restraint since the 28th of that month.

2. In reply, I am to say that his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General approves your proceedings in putting the Ex-Amir and his Ministers under restraint.

Enclosure 25 in No. 48.

No. 42, dated Kabul, 14th November 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Two letters from Muhammad Said Agha, Governor of Ghazni, to the address of General Sir F. Roberts.
One from Abdul Kadir Khan, one of the Chiefs of the Ghazni district, to the address of General Sir F. Roberts.
One from Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan, Governor of Jelalabad, to the address of General Sir F. Roberts.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, the letters marginally noted, with abstract translations.

Enclosure 26 in No. 48.

Abstract Translation of Letter from MUHAMMUD SAID AGHA, dated 17th Zi KADA=3rd November 1879.

I HAVE received your order (letter) sent to me through the Nawab. You ordered me to come to you after making arrangements for this place, and I am ready to obey your order. You are perfectly aware of the faithlessness of the Afghans, especially of the people of Ghazni. I am not like these men, and shall not be faithless, especially to the British Government. When the British troops arrived at Khushi, three infantry regiments and a battery of artillery came to me and said they had selected me as their leader for the Ghaza. After two days I managed to disperse them with great difficulty. A few days later I received orders to send Government grain to Kabul. I loaded 84 Government camels with wheat, and was about to send them off, when the son of Mullah Mushki Alam and other Mullahs and influential men came and said they would not let the Government grain go, and that they had selected me as their leader for the Ghaza. The second day I pacified these men and sent them to their homes. I then sent the wheat to Kabul. When they were informed of this, Mullah Mushki Alam assembled some of the influential men and Chiefs, and they decided to select me as their leader. They have not come to me yet. Hence my delay. I am trying my best to calm the people. Let us see what will happen. Afterwards I will come to pay my respects to you. On account of this disturbance I have not yet published the proclamation. If you want me to leave the people as they are and come to you, please inform me, and as soon as your order reaches me I will start.

Enclosure 27 in No. 48.

Abstract Translation of Letter from MUHAMMUD SAID AGHA, Governor of Ghazni, to the Address of the GENERAL, dated 19th Zi Kada=5th November 1879.

THREE days ago I sent a letter by the hand of the servant of the Nawab to you, in which I gave an account of affairs here. You will have read and understood it. The following are the news:—

The same mutineers assembled and came yesterday to a place one koh from here. They said they wanted to read the Khutba in my name and had selected me as their leader for the Ghaza. As I knew these ignorant people well, I privately won over some of their leaders. The men who had collected them went home, and the leaders themselves came to me in the town. I have also sent letters of advice to the people of Wardak, and have won over some of the influential men by money presents. Yesterday I read and published your proclamation. The mutineers who remained here are discussing matters with me. As the people of Afghanistan are all ignorant and faithless, no trust can be placed in them. Nevertheless, I hope I shall be able to disperse them, either by means of money or otherwise. I stated before that you would not hear a single false word from me. Everything else will be explained to you verbally. Please send an order in easy and clear words which may be understood by the ignorant people

of this place, to the effect that any man of Ghazni who disobeys the order of Government, or of the Governor, or commits any misdeeds will be very severely punished.

With regard to my being summoned, I beg to say, as I said before, that I have been waiting here only for the sake of these mutineers. If you order me to come to you leaving these men in this state, I am ready to obey. I will come with my own followers only if you like; or if you wish it, I will, after quieting the people, come to you with some of the influential men.

Enclosure 28 in No. 48.

Abstract Translation of a Petition from ABDUL KADIR KHAN, of Ghazni, to GENERAL ROBERTS.

I HAVE received your letter sent by the hand of Mirza Muhammad Yusuf. As regards Khushdil Khan, I beg to state that he and his brother never entered Ghazni. He came from Wardak and passed at a distance of 10 kos from the city and going on to Karabagh which is 18 kos from here. He then sent his man to Muhammad Said, and said he had no money. The latter sent Rupees 500 for his expenses, and told him to stay where he was for some days. He did so. It is said that Muhammad Said afterwards sent him with a servant of his own to the son of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, Hazara, and asked the Sirdar to send him *viâ* Jaghari to Herat. As soon as I received your order I sent two men to find out where he was. They have not returned yet. As soon as I find where he is I will go after him and arrest him.

Two or three days ago Muhammad Said sent for Akhundzada Mushki Alam and informed him that he wanted to wage jihad and asked him to collect men. The Akhundzada has collected some Mullahs and vagabonds for this purpose and brought them to Ghazni. Muhammad Said now pays his expenses. First the expenses were being realised from the people, who were ordered to supply cooked food. When I was informed of this I assembled the Tajik Maliks and went to the city to Muhammad Said Agha and Akhundzada Mushk-i-Alam, and after a long discussion stopped them from taking the expenses from the people. I have told the people not to give a single pie to them. I have also told them (Muhammad Said and Mushki Alam) that if they did anything I would oppose them, as, I said, we were subjects to the British Government. I await your orders, and if you allow me I will settle with them. Muhammad Said has altogether wasted the Government grain. He issues Barats every day in the name of Khasadars, and also sells it.

What do you want done about the Government camels and horses which are here? Shall they be sent to Kabul or remain here?

Enclosure 29 in No. 48.

Abstract Translation of Letter from SIRDAR MUHAMMUD HASSAN KHAN, Governor of Jelalabad, to GENERAL ROBERTS, received on 10th November 1879.

I HAVE received the proclamation which you sent by the hand of Abdul Ghafur, and have understood its contents. You wrote that the Amir had abdicated, and that I was Governor as before, and that I must try my best to serve Government.

From the time that the British troops moved from Lundikotal, and the Amir sent orders to me, up till now, I have rendered service to the utmost of my power, and I am ready to do so henceforward in any way you please—at Jelalabad or elsewhere.

Enclosure 30 in No. 48.

No. 44, dated Kabul, 15th November 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq. C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy

Letter from Sultan Murad Khan, Mir of Kadaghan.

Letter from Mahomed Said Agha, Governor of Ghazni.

Letter from Abdul Kadir Khan, one of the Chiefs of Ghazni.

and Governor-General in Council, the letters marginally noted, in original, with abstract translations.

2. I also enclose with translations copies of my replies to Sultan Murad Khan and Mahomed Said Agha.

Enclosure 31 in No. 48.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from SULTAN MURAD KHAN, Mir of Kadaghan, to the Address of GENERAL ROBERTS.

I HAVE heard that you have occupied Kabul. All India has benefited by the British rule, and I also have now become a servant of the British Government. This country of Kadaghan has from one end to the other been in the possession of my family for several generations. It is now yours. So long as I live I will serve you. In former days when the great Lord Sahib came to Kabul, my grandfather made friends with him. Afterwards when the kingdom fell into the hands of Amir Dost Mahomed Khan and his sons, they became a barrier between us and India. We were reduced to submission, and our communication with the Indian Government was stopped. Now you have returned, and the road which was closed is re-opened.

The state of affairs in this part of the country is as follows:—

One Mahomed Karim Beg, my uncle, had for a long time been an exile at Aibak. Lately he went to Kabul to make arrangements about his allowance, and returning from there to Andarab joined the Andarabis, and began to do mischief. He raided the people as far as Nahrain and plundered their property. Considering the punishment of this tribe to be necessary, I arrived at Andarab on the 25th October and occupied the country. General Najm-ud-deen Khan, Colonel Ghulam Hassan Khan, five troops of cavalry, and one infantry regiment were with me. If God please, after settling the country I will return to Kunduz.

Andarab, Ghori, Khost, and other hilly tracts belong to Kadaghan. As the Amir increased the taxes on these countries and the people were unable to pay them, they were constantly raising disturbances. The Amir several times offered me the (government) of these hills, but as I saw that the taxes on the tribes were very heavy, I refused it, because I knew I should get a bad name. He (the Amir) then gave (me?) back the Uzbek country, but taking my hills, appointed his own officials to them. Nevertheless I served him and did not give up my loyalty.

When the late Amir entered Turkestan and died there, the whole country was disturbed. The Mirs of Badakshan, who were exiles at Mazar-i-Sharif, returned to their country and occupied it.

Although they (the Afghans) had occupied our hilly tracts, and the people also came and said that it was time they should be set free, and (asked me) why I would not take them over, yet I told them to wait as the Afghans might return the hills to me. The exiles of all countries have gone and occupied their native countries. I could have raised disturbances also, but I did not do so as it would have given me a bad name. Now, if the British treat me kindly, I will serve them as long as I live. I have served even those who did not show favour to me according to my services. I will serve the British to the utmost.

I have received a letter from Sayid Guhar to the effect that Nek Mahomed Khan with six or seven sowars came from Kabul to Doshi *via* Khinjan, and that he sent him with his brother to Mazar-i-Sharif. You should know this.

Enclosure 32 in No. 48.

Translation of a Letter from GENERAL ROBERTS, to SULTAN MAHOMED KHAN, Mir of Kadaghan, dated 7th November 1879.

My desire is that remaining a friend and well-wisher of the British Government, you may enjoy comfort and ease, and occupy yourself in keeping your country quiet and safe. It would be well if you sent one of your trusted agents to me, so that I might communicate my friendly sentiments to you through him.

You should devote your attention to the government and protection of your country.

Enclosure 33 in No. 48.

Translation of a Letter from MAHOMED SAID AGHA, Governor of Ghazni, to GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., received on 10th November 1879.

I HAVE before informed you that the ignorant rebels came to a distance of one mile from here, and that they wanted to enter into a discussion with me. I discussed the matter with them. It was decided that I should go alone to you and make arrangements with you about the rebels and bring reassuring letters for them. Mullah Mushk-i-Alam, Ahmad Khan, and Amin Andari agreed to this. I sent the people who had assembled to the Ghazni villages with letters, but I brought some of their leaders whom I had won over to the city, and kept all whom I considered mischievous outside. At night Abdul Kadir Khan, Ahmad Khan, and Amin Andari broke the above agreement, and early in the morning they sent a man to me and asked me to come out of the city as they had something to say to me. When I went to their place I saw that their attitude had changed. They said that they wanted to wage a ghaza; I was hiding. These ignorant faithless men tried to fire three shots at me, but the guns did not go off. When I came to the city Abdul Kadir took Mullah Mushk-i-Alam and other Mullahs to his fort. The next day Ahmad Khan, Amin Andari, and Abdul Kadir collected some 7,000 men and besieged the city. I then sent letters to some of my friends among the Sayids, the Hazaras, and the Wardaks. By the afternoon I had filled the Bala Hissar with my men. I passed the night there, and in the morning I left six Andaris as my lieutenants in the Bala Hissar, and leaving the fort I went to Siah Sang, where lives the son of Akor Shah Ali Akbar Sayid, who is a relative of mine. If God please, I will leave for your camp to-morrow, and will explain the matter to you verbally. Let us see how the rebels will treat my deputies.

P.S.—After I left the rebels were ashamed of what they had done and dispersed to their homes. When I come to you I will make good arrangements for the affairs of this country.

Enclosure 34 in No. 48.

Translation of a Letter from GENERAL ROBERTS to the address of MAHOMED AGHA, Governor of Ghazni, dated 10th November 1879.

I HAVE received your letter and understood its contents. As you have now come out of Ghazni you had better come to me and explain everything verbally. When I have heard everything I will give suitable orders.

Enclosure 35 in No. 48.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from ABDUL KADIR KHAN, one of the Chiefs of Ghazni, to the Address of GENERAL ROBERTS, dated 22nd Zil Kuda=9th November 1879.

WITH regard to the sons of Shahghassi Sherdil Khan I wrote to you that men had been sent after them to Kara Bagh and Jaghori to find out all about them. To-day my servant returned and said that Mahomed Said Agha had detained them at Kara Bagh, as he wanted to send his family also with them. A few days ago, with the help of Abdulla Khan, Hakim of Kara Bagh, and a servant of Mahomed Said, they went to Mukar. The two sons of the Shahghassi, leaving their families at Mukar, have now gone on.

I mentioned in my former letter that Mahomed Said had collected some Mullahs, Maliks, Chiefs, and vagabonds at Ghazni, and had given them barats on the Tajiks. I stopped the barats by force. As their expenses were not paid, and my force was also strong, Mahomed Said ordered that government grain and camels might be given to them. I protected the stores and appointed my men over them. I have also kept the government camels safe and did not give them up. On this account Mahomed Said, with General Mahomed Jan Khan and some Mullahs went towards Jagatu in Wardak. Some other Mullahs and the Andaris dispersed to their homes. I hope Mahomed Said and Mahomed Jan Khan's party will also disperse.

Baz Ali Khan will explain some matters verbally to you.

No. 49.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, 19th December 1879. (Extract.)

WE think that you should retain regiments which have not left India, and for which reliefs are on their way, and a good regiment from the Cape will come to India instead of home.

No. 50.

Telegram from VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 20th December 1879. (Extract.)

I SHALL be glad to retain relief regiments, and have regiment from Cape, but do not consider present needs justify application for reinforcements from England.

No. 51.

No. 254 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honorable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, December 31, 1879.

WE have the honor to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the Kabul Diary* from the 30th of November to the 6th of December, both days inclusive.

* Received with letter from Sir F. Roberts, No. 66, dated 7th December 1879.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 51.

No. 66, dated Kabul, 7th December 1879.

FROM LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honor to submit a diary for the week ending 6th December 1879.

Kabul Diary, November 30th to December 6th, 1879. (Extract.)

30th November.—A report received to-day to the effect that Usman Khan of Tagao had advanced with his followers to Deh-i-Sabz. He is said to be concerting with the Kohistanis and General Muhammad Jan, Wardak, a plan for attacking cantonments.

Sirdar Abdulla Khan writes from Logar under date the 29th, that some insurgents from Zurmat and Kharwar had arrived at Charkh and were threatening Logar. The Logar people had promised to stand by him, and to have nothing to do with the insurgents.

At the suggestion of General Daud Shah I have sent a letter to Mir Bacha Khan, the reputed leader of the malcontent party in Kohistan. I have called upon him to come in and assured him of honourable treatment if he does so.

Yakub Khan was informed this evening that his departure was fixed for to-morrow.

1st December.—At daybreak this morning the Ex-Amir left Kabul for Peshawur. He seemed in good spirits.

Brigadier-General Baker came in from Maidan.

It is said that the Kohistanis and Tagao men have fixed upon to-night for a combined attack upon our position.

2nd December.—Sirdar Shahbaz Khan writes from Charikar, under date the 1st of December, that he has assembled the Khans of Kohistan, and that they have now abandoned all intention of raising a disturbance. Mir Bacha has not obeyed his summons, but all the rest have consented to come in and pay their respects. Sirdar Ibrahim Khan writes from Balab in Kohdaman that he has distributed to the headmen the letters sent by me. Mir Bacha Khan has come in to him, and expressed his willingness to present himself at Kabul after quieting the people. Mir Bacha himself writes to me to the same effect. He says the people are much alarmed, and that they require to be reassured before he can leave them. This of course is only an excuse.

Sirdar Abdulla Khan reports that the people of Kharwar and Zurmat are assembling and threaten a disturbance. Daud Shah appears to anticipate a general outbreak of disorder in Kohistan, Wardak, Logar, and Maidan. According to his information Usman Khan, Mir Bacha, and General Faiz Muhammad have promised to throw in their lot with the insurgents.

Captain Burton heliographs from Seh Baba that Usman Khan has received letters from Mulla Mushk-i-Alam of Ghazni, inciting him to attack Lataband and Seh Baba.

I held a Durbar this afternoon for the reception of any one who wished to be presented to me or to present any petition.

Sirdar Fakir Muhammad of Khodaman attended and requested permission to return to his home, which I granted. The Bokhara Shahzada was also present, and a number of Barakzai Sirdars and city merchants. None had any special request to make. For the future I propose to hold a Durbar twice a week.

A small amount of bhoosa was brought in to-day from Kohistan.

3rd December.—Sirdar Abdulla Khan writes* that the insurgents from Zurmat and

* Letter undated. Kharwar advanced on the 1st from Charkh towards Logar, and that he went out to meet them with some Logaris. On the approach of the insurgents nearly all the Logaris deserted him, and he was forced to take refuge in a fort at the foot of the hills, where he was besieged at the time of writing.

Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan reports from Maidan that two companies of Ardal Sepoys have entered the district under the leadership of the Mullas. He says the people of Maidan are disaffected, and that he is himself helpless, having with him only twenty unarmed men.

Sirdar Ibrahim Khan came in this afternoon with some of the Kohistani headmen. Mir Bacha Khan was not of the number.

It is rumoured that General Ghulam Haidar Khan has come down from Turkistan to Charikar with eight guns.

4th December.—Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan has been murdered in Maidan. It is said that a body of insurgents entered his fort suddenly while he was writing, and cut him down.

I wrote to Sirdar Abdullah Khan to-day, telling him that if he found himself in serious danger he was to come in. If too hard pressed to make his escape he was to let me know, and measures would be taken to send him aid.

I also sent a letter to Sharbaz Khan, urging him to send in Mir Bacha and other Kohistani headmen if possible.

5th December.—This morning I rode out to Charasiah with Sir Michael Kennedy, who has come up here for a few days, and went over the scene of the late engagement.

A Hindu servant who came in from Maidan yesterday, reports that on the evening of the 3rd two or three hundred men, adherents of Mulla Mushk-i-Alam, arrived at Muhammad Azam Khan's fort, where Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan was staying, and forced their way in after firing the gate. The Sirdar told his men, about 50 in number, not to resist, as he would settle the business himself. When the insurgents got in, they called upon him to come down from the tower in which he had taken refuge. He did so, and was beginning to loose his horse when he was cut down by an Ardal Sepoy and two Ghazis. The fort was then looted, and the Sirdar's property carried off.

Shahbaz Khan writes that he has succeeded in dispersing a body of insurgents who had assembled near Charikar.

6th December.—I held a Durbar to-day, at which Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, Sirdar Hashim Khan, and many others were present. No special requests were preferred.

Sirdar Shahbaz Khan writes that a number of Kohistanis have assembled and marched towards Kabul, proclaiming a Ghaza. The factions of Sher Ali and Sarwar Khan are

fighting among themselves. The Sirdar thinks that the rising in Kohistan is likely to become serious if not speedily checked. He forwards some letters from the insurgents, calling upon him to place himself at their head. I have sent word to him that he had better come in to Kabul for a day or two.

In the afternoon I had an interview with Sirdar Wali Muhammad and Sirdar Hashim Khan, and informed them that I proposed to make some change in existing arrangements, Wali Muhammad remaining here for the present to help me in settling the country round Kabul, and Hashim Khan taking his place as Governor of Turkistan. I gave them both clearly to understand that this was only a temporary measure, and that it had not yet received the sanction of Government. Both expressed themselves satisfied. Afterwards I called in all the Kohistani headmen in camp, and warned them that unless the insurgents returned at once to their homes, or come in here and submitted, I should march a force into the district and destroy their villages. The headmen promised to do what they could to restore order.

No. 52.

No. 255 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honorable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, December 31, 1879.

WE have the honor to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further papers relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 18th December 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

LETTERS from Mushk-i-Alam of Ghazni have reached Mohmands. Mulla Khalil is in correspondence with Moghal Khan of Goshta. Gandoo and Pandili quiet, but it is possible that Khawaizai, Baizai, Kandahari, and Safi Mohmands may rise under Mulla Khalil; and Fakir Mizan Khan of Lalpura requires careful management. He has been moved to summon and deal with all Mohmand Jirgas. Nearly all Afridis are down in their winter settlement. Afridis and Shinwaris all perfectly quiet. Every hope of their remaining so.

Enclosure 2 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 18th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

TELEGRAM just received from Colonel Acton, Pezwan, thus:—*Telegram begins.* Communicated with Gough's force to-day. Convoy, four companies 24th, going to Jagdallak to-morrow. No serious opposition. Gough goes on as soon as gets supplies. Will hold Jagdallak. Convoys will go daily. *Telegram ends.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 18th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to His Excellency the VICEROY, Calcutta.

TELEGRAM come Pezwan to-day as follows:—*Here begins.* Gough went out from Jagdallak yesterday. No details of operations received. Colonel Norman left this mid-day yesterday to support Gough, taking two Hazara guns, detachment 24th, 2nd Goorkhas, detachment Sappers, and forty men 72nd, to co-operate. Colonel Acton, with two companies 51st, left this morning in further support. This leaves Gandamak held by details aggregating only one hundred and eighty-six men. *Telegram ends.* No news from Kabul. I shall keep Your Excellency fully informed.

Enclosure 4 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 19th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

TELEGRAM received last night from Colonel Acton, Pezwan:—*Here begins.* Last night Colonel Norman bivouacked, but was fired on. Two men slightly wounded. Returned to Pezwan to-night all well. Yesterday Macnaughten dispersed, with loss, body of Ghilzais. Macnaughten's casualties, two men wounded. Jagdallak fired on last night. One man severely wounded. Numbers of Ghilzais out, but seem only rabble; attack so far contemptible. *Telegram ends.* Khugiani tribes between Rozabad and Surkub seem still on our side. All depends on our display of strength.

Enclosure 5 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 20th December 1879.

From GENERAL GOUGH, Jagdallak, to PRIVATE SECRETARY TO VICEROY.

I WAS reinforced yesterday by 24th Punjab Native Infantry, and obtained some supplies. I expect convoy to-day with more. I heard to-day from Latabund, with message from General Roberts ordering me to advance on Kabul. I purpose carrying out his orders and march to-morrow with following force: 9th Foot with details; 72nd 500; 2nd and 4th Goorkhas 800; 10th Bengal Lancers 20; one company Sappers 80; H. M. Battery 4 guns: total, 1,400. To Seh Baba on 21st, Latabund 22nd, Butkhak 23rd, Kabul 24th. I purpose holding post as follows: under Colonel Norman, 24th Punjab Native Infantry; Pezwan, 45th Sikhs about 600; one company Sappers 80; 10th Bengal Lancers 50; two guns I. A.; R.H.A.; Jagdallak Kotal; two companies Sappers 200; one company 24th Punjab Native Infantry, about 80; 10th Bengal Lancers 12; Jagdallak Fort, 24th Punjab Native Infantry, 7 companies, about 520; 10th Bengal Lancers 180; two guns H. M. Battery. I shall pick up Colonel Hudson with about 700 men and two guns at Latabund, and take him on towards Kabul.

Enclosure 6 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 21st December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

GENERAL GOUGH telegraphs to-day from Jagdallak that Asmatulla's followers appear to be deserting. I myself have intelligence that Asmatulla was wounded other day during attack on one of Gough's posts.

Enclosure 7 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 21st December 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

MOGHUL KHAN of Goshta fled to hills, will combine with Mulla Khalil. Also brother of Mahmud Shah, formerly Khan of Lalpura, said to have gone towards Gandol. Dakka

fort and Lundikhana should be kept sufficiently strong to send out troops to keep open road and communications between the two places, if Mohmands should cross the river and threaten them. Meanwhile Mohmands, Afridis, Shinwaris, all absolutely quiet. Khan of Lalpura expressing himself as answerable for safety of road; no cause for anxiety as yet.

Enclosure 8 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1879. (Extract.)

From GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, Kabul, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

KABUL, 16th December.—We have been employed the last 48 hours in completing the defences of Sherpur. Enemy still occupy the hills overlooking city, but have not yet ventured into the plains. Our cavalry is constantly employed reconnoitring, and yesterday afternoon a small column of infantry cleared the close country which intervened between Sherpur and the city. Gough's brigade should be here on the 20th instant. Communication with India should then be restored, as the troops now at Latabund will remain there, and Butkhak will be re-occupied. I am waiting only for an opportunity to strike a blow. If none offers before Gough arrives I will attack the following day, as I shall be strong enough then to hold the Bala Hissar and other important positions, and also I hope to disperse the enemy. Though I was aware the excitement was widespread, I had no reason to suppose such a gathering would take place, nor apparently did any of the Sirdars, or those on whom I have been mainly depending for information. Wali Muhammad and all the influential people who joined me on first reaching Kabul are with me in Sherpur, and it is not in their interests to conceal matters from me. It is evident that a strong religious feeling is at the bottom of the movement. The Mulla Mushk-i-Alam was joined by large numbers as he came along, and no one probably could have foretold that his following would have been anything like as great as it is at the last. The city and large villages in the neighbourhood of Kabul each furnished their quota, and our force on the 14th found itself opposed to such overwhelming numbers that it was necessary to concentrate it to prevent small parties being cut off. This I was enabled to do before dark. Your Excellency must not suppose that we cannot move out of Sherpur, or that I have any anxiety about the safety of my force, and, collected as we now are, I am quite confident of being able to maintain our position, and to beat the enemy whenever I get a chance. We are fairly off for ammunition, on an average about 350 rounds per rifle, and strict orders have been issued to economise expenditure, but it is desirable that more ammunition, both for rifles and guns, should be sent up without delay. The troops are well and in good health. Our losses on 14th were more than reported in my message of that day. We had 28 killed and 99 wounded, of whom 8 have since died of their wounds.

Enclosure 9 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1879.

From GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, Kabul, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

KABUL, 17th December.—All quiet since my telegram of yesterday. Weather unfortunately cloudy, thus preventing communication by heliograph with Latabund. I have no news of Gough's brigade, but expect it here not later than 20th. There will then be no delay in clearing the enemy out of the neighbourhood of Kabul. Further reports agree as to heavy loss suffered by enemy on 13th and 14th. Asman Khan, of Tagao, and some other influential were killed. Large numbers of killed and wounded have been taken away, and, from what I hear, the total number of the enemy is less than it was. At the same time I think it better to wait for reinforcements before attacking again, and do the work thoroughly. Majority of the wounded are doing well, but some of the knife and sword wounds are very severe. There was a good deal of fighting at close quarters. All well.

Enclosure 10 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1879.

From GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, Kabul, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

KABUL, 18th December.—All quiet since my telegram of yesterday. Enemy appeared shortly before noon on Siah Sang range and heights to west of Sherpur; they were quickly dislodged with some loss. Our casualties, one Sepoy, 5th Punjab Infantry, slightly wounded, and a Goorkha accidentally shot on picquet. Weather still cloudy. No heliographic communication possible with Latabund. Latest dates from India by telegraph 13th and by letter 6th December. Wounded doing well, except Major Cook, 5th Goorkhas. The majority of the Ghilzais do not seem at present to have taken a very active part in the combination against us; and, as Gough's brigade doubtless advancing, the eastern Ghilzais will probably keep quiet until they see the result of more troops reaching Kabul. Asmatulla Khan has sent word to the enemy that he will soon join them with 5,000 men. His neighbour Osman Khan of Tagao having been killed and good many of his followers dispersed, Asmatulla may hesitate to come so far from his own country. He will, I think, if Gandamak and Jagdallak are strongly held. Of this I have no information. No news having been received from the Khyber line since 13th instant, when I got short telegram from General Gough, saying that he would advance rapidly on Kabul. I am doing all I can to break up combination against us, but nothing short of driving off the enemy by force from the neighbourhood of Kabul will have any real effect. Mahomed Jan, the Wardak General and practical leader of the enemy, has proclaimed Musa Khan, eldest son of Yakub Khan, Amir. It is reported that Yakub Khan's wife has distributed large sums of money to the enemy, and that the houses and property of Wali Muhammad and other Sirdars with me have been plundered. All well.

Enclosure 11 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1879. (Extract.)

From GENERAL ROBERTS to VICEROY.

KABUL, 19th December.—Slight skirmishes with enemy yesterday. One or two of their principal men were killed. Our loss, Lieutenant Sunderland, 72nd; a private 67th Foot, slightly wounded; one Sepoy, 5th Punjab Infantry, killed. Snow fell during the night, but it is disappearing off southern slopes of hills. Heliographic communication with Latabund for some hours to-day. Garrison there has rations up to and for 23rd. I have sent Gough peremptory orders to move on Kabul without delay. The longer city is occupied by the enemy, the more our prestige suffers. When joined by Gough's and Hudson's forces, I hope to have no difficulty in re-asserting our supremacy. Troops are hard-worked, but continue well and in famous spirits.

Enclosure 12 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

KABUL, 20th December.—Colonel Hudson heliographs from Latabund that letters and telegrams despatched from this on 18th and 19th instant have reached. I hope, therefore, that you are now in possession of all that has occurred here to date, as I sent copies of all former telegrams by the messengers of yesterday and day before. I also hope General Gough will advance without further delay. Sixty Yaboos laden with grain travelled safely last night from this to Latabund, showing that the road so far is open.

Position here is unchanged. The enemy lost several men yesterday. Our casualties were Lieutenant Montanaro, R.A., dangerously wounded, six of 67th, one 9th Lancers, one 12th Bengal Cavalry, six 3rd Sikhs, and two camp-followers, all wounded. Major Cook, 5th Goorkhas, I deeply regret to report, died yesterday of his wounds.

I hope officers will be sent to replace casualties. Four are required for artillery, two for I.-A., and one for each mountain battery. Bailward having been invalided, 9th Lancers are very short of officers, 12th and 14th Cavalry, 3rd Sikhs, 5th Punjab Infantry, and 5th Goorkhas, each require two officers. Captain Connellan and

Lieutenant Tuite, 67th, and Captain Frome, 72nd, are laid up with small-pox. No assistance can be afforded by British to Native regiments. Lieutenant Liddell has been attached temporarily to Horse Artillery battery, and Sir Charles Wolseley of the Yeomanry Cavalry to 9th Lancers. For the 12th and 14th Cavalry, trained cavalry officers should, if possible, be sent.

There are only 4 per cent. British troops sick, and including wounded a little over 6 per cent. Pneumonia is on the increase, owing to great cold and exposure; but considering everything, the force is very healthy, and the sick and wounded are well cared for. All well.

Enclosure 13 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

HUNDRED and fifty men, 8th N. I. reached Dakka to-day, setting free detachment 22nd, which came on to Basawal escorting ammunition. Head-quarters 3rd B. C. reached Barikab to-day, head-quarters, 22nd P. I., and remainder, 45th Sikhs, reached Gandamak. I have no news of Gough, and it is now cloudy, so I shall probably get none till to-morrow. I hear that the Khugianis are just awaiting the turn of events, but are quiet at present. Colonel Acton reported all quiet at Pezwan yesterday, and a convoy went on from there to Jagdallak to-day.

Enclosure 14 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 24th December 1879. (Extract).

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

CUNNINGHAM reports from Khyber that Mulla Khalil has failed to raise the Baizai, who demand that Bajouris should move first. No armed gathering of Mohmands likely for some time. Khan of Lalpura will hold the river bank. No reason to apprehend trouble in the Khyber.

Enclosure 15 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 24th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

24TH December 1879.—The political situation to the south of this amongst the Shinwaris, and to the north and eastwards continues good. Rumours of Mohmund gathering under Mulla Khalil are still heard, but they have not as yet committed any overt act of hostilities.

Colonel Tweedie left yesterday for Gandamak, and will inform me of the state of affairs there and the feelings of the Khugianis. General Gough has passed Latabund in safety, and should be in Kabul to-day. Report just received that the Jagdallak post, which is very strongly fortified, was being attacked by the Hisarak Ghilzais in force. Reinforcements are being rapidly pushed up. Little cause for anxiety.

Enclosure 16 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 24th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

TELEGRAM just in from Pezwan reporting that attack on Jagdallak had ceased, and enemy dispersed.

Enclosure 17 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 24th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

COLONEL NORMAN, P.N.I., commands at Jagdallak, and reports, further, that the attack on his post, when Major Thackeray was badly hit yesterday, was made in force, but enemy was repulsed with loss. Only one sepoy killed and one wounded. Norman says sapper carbines are of little use. He adds that there is no cause for alarm, and that the Ghilzais will keep quiet now for some time. General Arbuthnot has ordered up reinforcements from Pezwan to Jagdallak, distance of only eight miles; shall stay here two days.

Enclosure 18 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 25th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

LAST night the Dalangai post in Choragalli near Ali Boghan was attacked by a strong band of raiders, supposed to be Mandezai Shinwaris. Some cartmen, contrary to all orders, had taken shelter there for the night, instead of going on to Barikab camping ground, and would not return to Ali Boghan, although warned by the post men. Of these cartmen 15 were killed and six wounded, of whom two were post-men. The same band moved against another station at the Ziarat, close to Ali Boghan, but were driven away by the guard, assisted by the villagers who turned out on the alarm. No other disturbance reported.

Enclosure 19 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 25th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

YOUR telegram yesterday. Not certain where Sirdar Musa Khan is. All natives here and Jellalabad believe him to be in Kabul city with the enemy. But no one believes Mushk-i-Alam will at present proclaim a new Amir.

Enclosure 20 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 25th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

ATTACK on Jagdallak Kotal happened thus:—Major Thackeray had been ordered out to burn small villages two miles from post; village proved empty and was burned. As he returned, he was followed by about 3,000 Ghilzais, who attacked post from three afternoon to midnight; left no wounded behind. Asmatulla supposed to have commanded them. Thackeray's wound, bullet in elbow. Khugianis still uncertain. Ghilzais seem up in arms very generally. Our strength lies not in maintaining small posts, but in concentration of our troops until decisive movements feasible. At guerilla warfare Afghans have many advantages. Daily small convoys most harassing to our troops while inviting attack. Communications when only nominally maintained, and that at great cost, are of questionable value in country like this.

Enclosure 21 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 26th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

MUHAMMUD HASSAN KHAN, accompanied by Fez Muhammad Khan and a gathering, has proceeded towards Jagdallak with the intention of joining Asmatulla; and in all probability the two met yesterday. Asmatulla is said to have followed General Gough's force for a short way, and then turned back to his old post. Our positions in front have been well strengthened, and no attack on them yesterday reported.

Mohmands have kept quiet up to date.

Strong parties of cavalry sent out yesterday and this morning to trace the raiders who attacked the Dalangai Chowkie already reported. The wounded sufferers have been brought in here for medical treatment.

Enclosure 22 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 26th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

NORMAN signals to-day from Jagdallak that, as he yesterday returned from Pezwan, Asmatulla with 300 men tried to intercept, but beaten off with loss. Norman had three wounded. Snow fell last night Jagdallak. Norman says his men overworked and infantry reinforcement required. Norman had no news up to this morning from Gough or Kabul. Two mountain guns leave this to-morrow for Pezwan and Jagdallak, and Pezwan will send on with them to Jagdallak two companies 51st Foot. Am trying to open communication with Gough's rear through Kuch camelmen.

Enclosure 23 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 27th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

News received from Pezwan says, that in the attack of 23rd Ghilzais suffered very severely, and they are said to be getting disheartened in consequence of their want of success. News from Laghman shows that Asmutulla and Muhammad Hassan's gatherings are beginning to desert already, and are returning secretly to their homes. The raid on Dalangai post was committed by the Hassan Khels section of the Mandezai Shinwaris. The Mohmands still keep quiet, but the Khans of Goshta and Giadah are constantly fitting up to the hills, where they have sent up their families, and their attitude is unfriendly. All well.

Enclosure 24 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 27th December 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

TRIBES all quiet, although Mullas are agitating among Mohmands and Shinwaris.

Enclosure 25 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 28th December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Barrackpoor.

KABUL, 21st December.—I received report to-day, heliograph, from Latabund that Gough's brigade was to be at Seh Baba to-day, Latabund to-morrow, and here on 24th. Enemy are still very numerous, but with troops Gough is bringing I hope to be able to clear them out of Kabul. To assist in this I shall withdraw the Latabund post, if troops sufficient to hold it and Seh Baba cannot be pushed up from the rear. Communication between Kabul and Jagdallak will, I fear, be uncertain, until I can send back a couple of regiments from this. One casualty yesterday, man of 92nd wounded; Lieutenant Montanaro died yesterday of his wound. Total casualties to last night, 77 killed, including eight officers and one follower; 220 wounded, including 15 officers and four followers, and two missing; two officers and ten men have since died of their wounds. Native troops have four per cent. sick, and including wounded, between five and six per cent. Officer commanding 72nd Highlanders, asks that Lieutenants Drummond, Gore-Langton, and Campbell may be ordered to rejoin the regiment. Captain Guinness has returned temporarily from staff regimental duty. Situation unchanged. All well.

Enclosure 26 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 27th December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Barrackpore.

KABUL, 23rd December.—Desultory attacks all yesterday, one casualty, a private, 67th Foot, wounded. During the day information was received that a general attack would be made at day-break to-day, the signal being a fire lighted on Asmi heights. Large numbers of the enemy were seen occupying the more distant villages during the day and coming into the near ones as it got dark. At 6 a.m. the light appeared, and immediately afterwards attack commenced on three sides. We were all prepared. On the south and west sides, the enemy did not show much determination, but on the north-east corner of Bemaru heights some thousands collected, and evidently contemplated assaulting the position. General Hugh Gough commanded. He, with the able assistance of Colonel Jenkins, made an admirable disposition. As soon as the intention of the enemy was fully developed, I determined on a counter attack with cavalry and artillery; these issued by the gorge between the Bemaru heights, and opening fire on the enemy's flank, speedily dislodged them from the place they had taken up on the north-east corner. The cavalry pursued and cut up numbers of the enemy, who, retiring from all points, beat a hasty retreat into the city. We have now occupied some of the advanced villages, more particularly those on the Butkhak road, so as to ensure the advance of General Charles Gough's brigade to-morrow unmolested; his camp is visible about six miles to the east. I shall take the initiative either to-morrow afternoon or the following morning, and hope soon to report that Her Majesty's troops have again got possession of the Bala Hissar and city of Kabul. Our casualties to-day have been few. Numbers will be telegraphed to-morrow. I grieve to report the death of two gallant officers, Captain Dundas and Lieutenant Nugent, Royal Engineers, caused by an untimely explosion while engaged in blowing up the towers of a neighbouring village.

Enclosure 27 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 24th December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Pezwan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

KABUL, 24th December.—Our success yesterday was more complete and the enemy's loss more severe than I was aware of when despatching my telegram last evening. The Kohistanis and Logaris, also people living near Kabul, went straight to their houses after being defeated. The remainder went to the city for a few hours, but during the night they all fled. Mulla Mushk-i-Alam and General Muhammad Jan, the two leaders, went off early. Tahir Khan, son of Muhammad Sharif Khan, who has been very active against us, has, it is reported, taken away Musa Khan, eldest son of Yakub Khan, and escaped towards Wardak. Cavalry have gone in pursuit. The Bala Hissar and city will be taken possession of this afternoon, and the former will be occupied, if I can be satisfied that there is no danger to the troops from gunpowder. Yakub Khan's wife and mother, and Yahia Khan's wife, who is a daughter of the celebrated Sirdar Akbar Khan, will be brought into Sherpur to-day. They have done all in their power to keep up the excitement, and it is reported that they contemplate flight. Our losses yesterday were (not?) great, five killed, including the two Royal Engineer officers accidentally blown up, and 33 wounded, including Lieutenant Gambier, 5th Punjab Cavalry, severely, and Lieutenant Burn-Murdoch, R.E., slightly wounded.

I have telegraphed to General Bright to occupy Seh Baba by detachment of Native Infantry from Jagdallak, and to send a regiment of Native Infantry to Latabund; it is very important this should be done without delay. Butkhak will be occupied by troops from this to-morrow; in this way communication with India will be rapidly restored.

Her Majesty's gracious message has been received and published to the troops, who are much gratified.

The majority of the wounded are doing well.

General Charles Gough's brigade arrived this morning. Slight snow last night. All well.

Enclosure 28 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 28th December 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Barrackpoor.

KHYBER tribes perfectly quiet ; every prospect of their remaining so. Mulla Khalil's efforts to raise Mohmands and Bajouris are ineffectual. Reconciliation effected between Khan of Lalpura and his brother Akbar.

Enclosure 29 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 28th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Barrackpoor.

YESTERDAY the Daronta gorge was reconnoitred by a strong party from here under Colonel Limond, with a view to ascertaining the feasibility of making a road along it into the Lughman valley should the route be taken in hand later on ; the party returned to camp the same evening unmolested. Asmatulla forts and villages in Lughman were reported to be denuded of men ; the gathering with him consists mainly of Jubbar Khel Ghilzais, few of the Tajik population of that valley having joined as yet against us. The Governor of Lughman, who is son of Sirdar Yahia Khan, is stated to have kept aloof from them up to date. Mohmands and Khugianis continue quiet. General Robert's victory at Kabul, the flight of Mushk-i-Alam and Muhammad Jan, and the dispersion of Kohistanis and others, have been widely circulated here by our present Governor, Sirdar Maddad Khan, amongst surrounding tribes, and will have good effect.

Enclosure 30 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 27th December 1879.

From CAPTAIN A. CONOLLY, Peiwar Kotal, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

LETTER just in from Mirak Shah Ali Khel, to say reliable news from Dobundi that, on the 24th, 6,000 men, having prepared scaling ladders, assaulted the Sherpur entrenchments in a most determined manner ; that Padshah Khan, who was supposed to be acting under secret orders from us, first desisted and fled, on which he was followed by the rest. Our troops, issuing from the entrenchment, pursued, inflicting frightful slaughter. The ground round Sherpur lay thick with corpses. Those who escaped spread consternation far and wide. This message has been sent to General Watson, and is also repeated to you direct, as the General is at Shinak to-day, where there is no telegraph office, and considerable delay might ensue in the further transmission of this news, which is most important, if true, as I believe it to be.

Enclosure 31 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 28th December 1879.

From GENERAL WATSON, Balesh Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Barrackpoor.

Two inches of snow fell at Kuram yesterday, heavy on Peiwar Kotal. No movements of tribes reported.

Enclosure 32 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 19th December 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

THERE is nothing to relate this week. No further details regarding affairs at Herat have reached Kandahar. Mir Afzul is meeting with increased opposition from Duranis

of Farah district. His family is at Lash Juwain. That of Ghulam Muhaiuddin has crossed into Persia, where both Sirdars are preparing to follow. The news of Ayub's imprisonment has excited much grief among certain of the Barakzai ladies, who were predicting his triumphal march to Kandahar. Captain Molloy reports all quiet in Kelat-i-Ghilzai and Mukur districts. The Andari and Taraki Chiefs continue to make unasked-for professions of friendship. It has been found necessary to despatch a body of Afghan troops to the Hazara frontier beyond Tirin, where the people have refused to pay their revenues. All quiet here. Health of Europeans excellent: natives not quite so good. Weather colder, sky cloudy, and threatening rain or snow.

Enclosure 33 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 21st December 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

MOLLOY writes, on 19th, that all is quiet as far as Kukur, but chiefs of Tokhi and Hotak Ghilzais have left Kelat without permission. Rumours of approaching abandonment of country by us appear to have unsettled them more than news of actual events at Kabul.

Enclosure 34 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

SYUD MUHAMMUD SHAH, son of late Sirdar Azam, has arrived at Kelat-i-Ghilzai from Kabul, after being twice robbed on road. He reports fighting to have taken place between Hazaras and Ali Khel Ghilzais, in which latter were worsted. No other sign of disturbance among Southern Ghilzais.

Enclosure 35 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 25th December 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

WEEKLY summary of news. Christmas day. The events at Kabul have not as yet had any effect in disturbing the tranquillity of the Durani country, though the Ghilzais of Kelat are somewhat uneasy, but no open outbreak has taken place, or is expected. The events at Herat, on the contrary, have produced some excitement, but more curiosity to know what the English Government intends to do (with?) Abu Bekr, the Alizai, who murdered Colonel Morris. Mirza has been committing robberies, and orders were sent to Sahib Khan, another Alizai Chief, to arrest him. He fled, but his fort has been destroyed. The messenger from the Taimuni Char Aimak Chiefs has been sent back with letters and presents to them.

Syud Muhammad Shah, formerly collector of revenue here, returned from Kabul yesterday, having been robbed on the road. He reports country beyond Mukur in a state of complete anarchy. The Ali Khel Ghilzais are fighting with the Hazaras, and have been defeated in one action. Rain fell on the 24th, but weather has now cleared again.

Enclosure 36 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 26th* December 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

MIR AHMAD KHAN, a Popalzai of good family, with three attendants, attempted to run a muck through the cantonment this morning. The leader and two followers were cut down, the fourth escaped, but is being pursued: none of our people hurt. Two of Mir Ahmad's uncles have been conspicuous on our side from the time of our entry, and a third is the trusted adviser of Sirdar Sher Ali.

Enclosure 37 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 26th December 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

SIRDAR ABEL-ES-SALAM KHAN has just returned from Herat, which he left 12 days ago. He has letters from Muhammad Ayub not yet delivered. His account of the disturbance there is as follows:—There were three Herati regiments quartered at Maimena under command of Faizullah Khan, Ishakzai, when Ayub camped outside with the intention of marching on Kandahar. He sent for Faizullah and his three regiments and left them in the city, making over civil charge to Abdullah Khan, Nasiri. A few days afterwards Faizullah declared himself governor, shut the gates, and mutilated some 50 soldiers of the Kabuli regiments, who had returned to the city. The next day Ayub having sworn the regiments and tribal horsemen with him on the Koran, sent two Kabuli and the Kandahar regiments to attack Herat. The three Herati regiments came out to meet them, and were completely worsted with the loss of 300 men. In the fight that ensued Faizullah and the rest fled the city, was then plundered by the Kabulis, and Ayub returned to it with the rest of the troops. He has now given up his intention of moving on Kandahar, and wishes to treat with us.

Enclosure 38 in No. 52.

No. 62, dated Kabul, 3rd December 1879.

From LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, the following report regarding Mulla Mushk-i-Alam of Ghazni.

2. The Mulla's movements first attracted my attention some weeks ago, when it was reported that he had collected a force in the neighbourhood of Ghazni, and was busily inciting the Wardak people to a holy war. I was not at first disposed to attach any great importance to the news, for Mushk-i-Alam was generally spoken of as a very old man, disabled by bodily infirmity from taking an active part against us, and possessing little power over the chiefs and people. But there can be no doubt, from all that has lately come to my knowledge, that the Mulla's reputation as a religious teacher has gained for him some influence in various parts of the country, and the course of events during the last few months has enabled him, in spite of his age and reputed infirmities, to bring this influence to bear with considerable effect. By coming forward as the champion of a holy war, he has succeeded in collecting bodies of armed men in Wardak and the neighbourhood, and the preaching of his emissaries has caused some uneasiness in Kohistan, Tagao, and Logar. For some days past it has been confidently reported in Kabul that Usman Khan, a leading Malik of Tagao, was concerting with the Kohistanis an attack upon the British position at Sherpur. Of course any such attempt could only end in the discomfiture of the attacking force, but the fact of its being generally spoken of as possible, and even probable, shows the Mulla's exhortations, coming at a time when the natural reaction of feeling against us as foreigners was setting in, have done harm in this part of the country. Further, it is almost certain that the continued reluctance of Asmatulla Khan to leave the hills has been due in great measure to Mushk-i-Alam, who is his peer or spiritual guide.

3. The excitement seems at present to be subsiding. The Wardak insurgents are said to have completely dispersed. On the 27th November a number of them tried to surprise a small party of General Baker's cavalry at the village of Beni Badam, but were repulsed with the loss of their leader, after exchanging a few shots, and this seems to have thoroughly disheartened the rest.

An attempt made to intimidate the Logaris into refusing supplies has wholly failed, and they are bringing in bhoosa freely. The Tagao men have not assembled or have assembled at a distance in insignificant numbers.

Finally, it is evident that the Kohistanis are shrinking from any open act of aggression.

Their leading Maliks have been in communication with Sirdar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, whom I sent out to reassure the people, and I have reason to believe that the

most influential among them will come in to pay their respects before many days are over.

4. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that a certain amount of uneasiness and latent discontent, due in great measure to the intrigues of Mushk-i-Alam, prevails in the country round Kabul; and I shall watch most carefully for any symptoms of its increase. The Mulla himself I shall do my best to secure. This will of course be difficult, but it is possible that during the winter I may be able to effect his capture and surrender.

LONDON :
Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

AFGHANISTAN (1880) No. 2.

P A P E R S

RELATING TO THE

ADVANCE OF AYOOB KHAN ON KANDAHAR.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1880.




LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1880.

[C.—2690.] *Price 3d.*

LIST OF PAPERS.

No.	—	From	To	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1	Telegram - -	Viceroy -	Sec. of State	1880. 27 June	Advance of Ayooob Khan, Proposed military measures.	3
2	" - -	"	"	1 July	Arrival of Ayooob Khan at Farrah. Consequent orders.	3
3	Letter; with 9 enclosures.	Govt. of India	"	6 " (No. 154)	Telegraphic news reports	3
4	Diary of military events.	—	—	6 July	Advance of force under General Burrows.	5
5	Letter; with 5 enclosures.	Govt. of India	Sec. of State	13 " (No. 157)	Telegraphic news reports	6
6	Letter; with 10 enclosures.	"	"	20 July (No. 162)	" " " Mutiny of the Wali's troops.	7
7	Letter; with 9 enclosures.	"	"	27 July (No. 169)	Telegraphic news reports	10
8	Telegram - -	Governor of Bombay.	"	28 July	Defeat of General Burrows	12
9	" - -	Viceroy -	"	" "	" " "	12
10	Letter; with 23 enclosures.	Govt. of India	"	3 Aug. (No. 175)	Summary of events preceding the defeat of General Burrows.	13



P A P E R S.

No. 1.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 27th June 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

TELEGRAM from Thomson at Teheran says, Ayub Khan marching against Kandahar with large force. I think we should leave Shere Ali to defend himself beyond the Helmund, but it seems to me, after communicating with Stewart, that it would be inconsistent with security of our military position at Kandahar to allow hostile forces to cross that river. I propose, therefore, to instruct Primrose, if Ayub reaches Furrah, to advance towards Girishk with sufficient force to prevent passage of Helmund. This would necessitate moving up reinforcement from Phayre's reserve. No troops would be moved until necessity actually arose.

No. 2.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 1st July 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

AYUB's advance guard reported to have arrived at Furrah. Orders sent to Primrose and Phayre in accordance with my telegram of the 27th.

No. 3.

No. 154 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 6, 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

JOHN STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

WHITLEY STOKES.

JAMES GIBBS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LETTERS from Herat of 5th instant report that Ayub had some time before sent 1,200 letters to Kabul, addressed to different chiefs and officers, announcing his approach with a powerful army. Informant reports Ayub more than ever in the hands of the Kabulis, and personally unwilling to make any move; also expresses disbelief that any move will be made, and predicts that if it does, the Herati and Kabuli troops are sure to quarrel before they have gone far.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SEVERAL caravans have arrived from Herat in last few days with news up to 5th. Some preparations were being made for the intended march, and six regiments were at Rozabad. The Governor of Meshed was preventing the exportation of gun caps to Afghanistan. The harvest at Herat has been very fine.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

NINTH June is day on which regular troops known to have camped outside Herat. Actual start probably some days later. Nevertheless I recommend despatch of brigade to Maiwand as quickly as possible, if only to confirm fidelity of Wali's troops, overawe Zemindawar tribes, and establish confidence here. Am asking General Primrose to make preparatory arrangements in anticipation of orders.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LETTER from Wali's nephew in Washir, dated 26th, states intelligence reached him that Luinab with advance guard of horsemen had left Herat some days before Ayub, who was then probably at Subzawar. Luinab supposed to have reached Furrah.

Enclosure 5 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

WALI sends second letter from his nephew in Washir, giving intelligence that Luinab has arrived in Furrah with 800 Sowars, and is collecting Furrah levies. Travellers, who have arrived from Herat in 12 days, say that when they left, Ayub Khan was at Rozabagh with regulars.

In answer to letter of mine about report of desertions written some days ago, Wali writes that 50 or 60 men had returned to their homes when ordered to Washir, that a few of his men were mutinous, but the majority quite trustworthy.

His monthly disbursements for pay amount to one lakh six thousand rupees.

Enclosure 6 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, No. 2122 E.P., dated 1st July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar.

YOUR telegrams, 27th and 30th. Orders are issuing for brigade to Maiwand. Your political instructions are that no hostile troops must cross Helmund, and Wali must be supported, if necessary, in maintaining order this side river. Beyond Helmund he must rely on his own resources.

Enclosure 7 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

WALI writes on afternoon of 29th, that messengers from Furrah state Luinab with 1,000 horse arrived there about the 23rd, and was collecting supplies for army which was at Kushkaba, 16 miles north of Furrah. Ayub was with army. Kabul troops had their families with them. Wali calculated Ayub arrived Furrah six days ago, inquires anxiously whether force will move to his support, and asks orders regarding his advancing forces in Washir.

Second letter written night of 29th states messengers from Bakwa report Luinab at Khor Malik, 21 miles, and his advance guard at Chargaz 50 miles, this side Furrah and four marches from Kandahar frontier.

I am writing to Wali not to risk collision with Ayub's regular troops in Washir, but in absence of (orders?) not giving him definite assurance of active support from here. But I strongly urge immediate advance of brigade.

It is possible that Ayub may delay on frontier; but he may be at Girishk in 10 days or less.

Enclosure 8 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

NOTHING of importance has occurred during the week in Kandahar territory; but the menaced invasion from Herat is causing much excitement in the city and neighbourhood.

Ayub Khan appears to have left the city finally about the 18th, and to have reached Furrah, where he was at the date of the latest advice, about the 24th. He has with him 2,500 horse, including 900 regulars, 10 regiments of infantry, varying from 350 to 500 men each, and six batteries of artillery, including at least one mule battery. He is said to be well provided with ammunition, except caps, of which a supply expected from Meshed had been seized by the Persian authorities at the frontier. A party of 1,000 cavalry under the Luinab, Khushdil Khan, are four or five days' march in frontier, and at date of latest report were in Bakwa.

Before leaving Herat the Ulema assembled in a mosque and invested Ayub with title of Amir. He has also had money coined in his name.

The Wali is at Girishk with main body of his forces, two regiments of infantry, four guns, and 1,500 horse being in Washir under his nephew, Roshndil Khan.

The weather is much cooler.

Enclosure 9 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Two regiments cavalry and a battery Horse Artillery marched this morning for the Helmund. There is no news from the Herat direction.

No. 4.

MILITARY DIARY OF EVENTS FOR PERIOD FROM 3RD TO 6TH JULY 1880. (Extract.)

3rd July.—Instructions have been issued for the advance of a brigade from Kandahar to Girishk, but it is not to cross the Helmund. Also for a brigade of the Reserve Division to be pushed forward from Karachi to Kandahar.

5th July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports as follows from Kandahar on the 4th:—

“Five hundred sabres 3rd Cavalry and 3rd Sind Horse, E-B Royal Horse Artillery

“ 40 Sappers and two companies infantry, left to-day for Helmund, under command of General Nuttall. Six companies 66th, and 1st and 30th Native Infantry, leave to-morrow under General Burrows' commanding column.”

6th July.—The following message has been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Kandahar, dated the 5th :—

“ Your telegram of 3rd July. My telegram of yesterday to you will have informed you of the departure of cavalry and artillery for Helmund near Girishk. The infantry, 66th Regiment (six companies), 1st Grenadiers, and 30th Native Infantry, left this morning, the whole under command of Brigadier-General Burrows. A month's supplies have been forwarded with the troops. Lieutenant-Colonel St. John accompanies the force.

No. 5.

No. 157 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 13, 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 154, dated the 6th July 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
WHITLEY STOKES.
JAMES GIBBS.
C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5.

TELEGRAM, dated 8th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KHUSK-I-NAKHU, 43 miles from Kandahar, July 7th :—Cavalry brigade arrived here this morning. All well. Some difficulty about supplies at last halting place, but abundance here. General Burrows with infantry nine miles in rear.

Wali writes yesterday from Girishk that enemy's cavalry had reached bank of Khashrud, and that remainder were in Bakwa. Doubtful whether he means remainder of cavalry or regular troops, probably the former.

Enclosure 2 in No. 5.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

9TH JULY 1880.—Mir Karez, 23 miles from Helmund, July 8th :—Cavalry brigade arrived here this morning. All well. Have arranged to break march to-morrow at Oograkh, about 14 miles from here. Infantry brigade at Kushk-i-Nakhud to-day. All well.

Wali sends letter from Washir of 6th, giving intelligence that Ayub arrived at Farah on 30th, with entire force. The families of Kabul regiments reached Farah three days previously; and Muhammad Omar Khan, Nurzai, has undertaken to protect them. The Lulab has collected a depôt of provisions at Dilaram, and his cavalry patrol daily up to the Khash river.

Enclosure 3 in No. 5.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Choghak, six miles from Helmund, July 9th:—Cavalry brigade arrived here this morning, after 18 miles march over rather heavy ground. Ample supplies sent by Wali from Girishk. Heat much increased. Nothing fresh from Herat direction.

Enclosure 4 in No. 5.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE received information from fairly reliable sources to the effect that Ayub's march on the Helmund is not so much with the object of fighting with Sher Ali as to keep the country in a state of anarchy, and make its administration and collection of revenue as difficult as possible. Ayub will, if he can, avoid fighting with the British troops. Sirdar Abdulla Khan, Nassar, is with Ayub Khan, and is said to have been mainly instrumental in adjusting the differences existing between the Herat and Kabuli troops, which formerly prevented the march of Ayub's army. Dissensions still exist. One of Wali Sher Ali's regiments is said to have deserted.

Enclosure 5 in No. 5.

TELEGRAM, dated 10th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

THE march of the Herat army under Ayub Khan towards the Helmund has caused much excitement in country, but the impression seems to be that Ayub Khan does not intend to oppose the British, but merely Wali Sher Ali. Four railway coolies were killed near Hari gorge by, it is supposed, the relations of the six Marri reported last week as having been killed by the Sind Horse near Thall. The Marri Chiefs have promised Mr. Duke, Political Officer, to surrender the murderers.

No. 6.

No. 162 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 20, 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 157, dated 13th July 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed)

RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
WHITLEY STOKES.
JAMES GIBBS.
C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 12th July 1880.

From Lieutenant Muir, Kandahar, to FOREIGN UNDER, Simla.

News confirmed that Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan and Habibulla, son of Sirdar Khairulla Khan, have deserted from Wali's force and gone to Naozad. They had accompanied advanced force to Washir. Nothing further is known of their intentions. They had no following. Wali has written to his son here to confiscate their property.

Enclosure 2 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 13th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla

CAMP, bank of Helmund, opposite Girishk, July 10th.—Arrived here this morning. All well. No news from Farah. Three days ago Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, cousin of the Wali, attempted to excite the Wali's troops in Washir to mutiny and join Ayub. On their refusal he quitted the camp with some 80 horsemen, and has gone to Naszad, 40 miles to north-west of this. Wali has sent Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan after him.

Enclosure 3 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 13th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP near Girishk, 11th July.—General Burrows with infantry brigade arrived this morning. All well. The Helmund is fordable everywhere, and presents no obstacle to passage of an army. Forage and wood in any quantity about the river. Other supplies are being furnished in abundance by Wali. Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan marched for Naozad yesterday evening with a strong body of cavalry. Trustworthy news has arrived that Ayub's main body was at Saki in Bakwa on 6th, and that Luinab was to turn off from that place with the cavalry into Zamindawar. A spy, however, states that Luinab's main body was two days ago at Dilaram, and that his advance guard of 100 men had arrived in Washir. The advanced column of Wali's troops is about 20 miles north-east of this.

Enclosure 4 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 14th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, July 12th.—An intercepted letter from Luinab shows that he was at Washir on the 10th, and that Ayub was not far in rear. Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, failing to persuade the Naozad people to rise, has gone to Washir. A son of Sirdar Ghulam Muhiuddin Khan deserted the Wali's advanced guard yesterday with 20 men to join the Sartip.

Enclosure 5 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, July 14th, 9.30 a.m.—All arrangements having been made by Wali for crossing to our side river and his baggage packed, Kabul regiment, mutinied, seized guns and Wali's baggage, and drove his cavalry across river. Rest of infantry joined them, and they are now moving along west bank. Cavalry are going in pursuit.

Enclosure 6 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, July 14th.—Cavalry, horse artillery, and eight companies infantry pursued mutineers, who were marching along west bank of river for several miles, and captured all their six guns which came into action to cover retreat, but after a few rounds from horse artillery were abandoned. Majority of infantry had previously dispersed, but a few desperate men held some enclosures and had to be dislodged by infantry. Mutineers' loss not great; may have amounted to 40 or 50; our loss one man, 66th, killed, and two wounded, with some horses. Captured guns and waggons brought in to our camp.

Ayub's army is to-day at Bibanak, three marches distant. Seven deserters from Ayub's regular cavalry arrived here. They left army at Washir, and state Sartip Nur Muhammad has replaced Luinab in command of advanced cavalry, having declared to Ayub that Luinab was in correspondence with Wali. They also declare that Nur Muhammad has advised Ayub to remain in Zamindawar with regulars, while he raised the country with the tribal cavalry.

Enclosure 7 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, 14th, 9.30 a.m.—Ayub Khan is probably at Lar, two marches distant.

Enclosure 8 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 17th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP MIRKAREZ, July 16th.—Loss and discomfiture of mutineers greater than at first reported. Forty-six bodies were found and buried by villagers, among them colonel of artillery and a captain of Kabul regiment, in which most casualties took place. Part of this regiment marched westward yesterday, but all the others dispersed to their homes on evening of 14th. I found that all the flour and ghee collected by Wali for our use in his camp and the fort had been plundered and carried off. This left force entirely dependent on foraging, from which little was to be expected in neighbourhood of Girishk. The river offering in its present condition no obstacle in any place to the passage of troops, the Wali's army having ceased to exist, and reports reaching me from different quarters that Ayub's intention was to cross river further north, if at all, General Burrows determined rightly, in my opinion, to fall back on Kushk-i-Nakhud, where several roads from Helmund to Kandahar meet, where supplies are abundant and communication with Kandahar easy. Accordingly entire force marched last night 23 miles to this place, and goes on to Kushk-i-Nakhud, eight miles further, to-morrow. The Wali is with us, part of his cavalry has dispersed; part is at Kushk-i-Nakhud with his nephews and other Sirdars.

Post from Kandahar interrupted for one day and bags lost, but is now coming in regularly. Captured guns brought with us, but three waggons with their ammunition destroyed for want of carriage.

Enclosure 9 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 19th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUD, July 17th.—Force arrived here this morning. All well. Principal Sirdars and Chiefs are here, with about 500 horses. The Alizais of Zamindawar accompanied them, but asked and obtained leave to return to their homes to protect their families and property.

Many of the mutineers have been seized and disarmed, while passing through this on the way to their homes.

As far as can be ascertained the country about here is quiet.

No news of Ayub's force.

Enclosure 10 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 19th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP, Kushki-i-Nakhud, July 18th.—All quiet in this vicinity *en route* to Kandahar, whence post and single messenger's pass constantly without trouble. All accounts tend to show that mutineers, with few exceptions, have returned to their homes, many without arms. Two hundred of Ayub's cavalry reached Girishk yesterday and sent back word of its evacuation to main body then at Mahmudabad, some 16 or 20 miles distant. A servant of Wali's taken off by mutineers to camp of advanced cavalry, states that story of Luinab having been disgraced is untrue, and that he was apparently preparing to cross the river above Girishk. The camp here moves two miles nearer Girishk to-morrow. Supplies are plentiful; immense quantities of grain lying unthrashed in fields round camp, but wood is scarce.

No. 7.

No. 169 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 27, 1880.

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 162, dated 20th July 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

JOHN STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

WHITLEY STOKES.

JAMES GIBBS.

C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 20th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushki-i-Nakhud, July 19th.—This morning General Burrows shifted his camp three miles back towards Girishk. Fifteen hundred or two thousand of Ayub's sowars arrived at Girishk yesterday. Main body still at Mahmudabad. Considerable numbers of ghazis have passed along by roads to join Ayub, Abubekr, Alizai, who murdered Colonel Moore's Munshi last year, and headed the force at Colonel Malcolmson's engagement here, is said to have brought a number of men from Zamindawar. In our neighbourhood all quiet. Cavalry patrols regularly for ten miles in every direction.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st July 1880.

From Lieutenant MUIR, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GENERAL BROOKE and Major Adam, Assistant Quartermaster-General, escorted by four sowars, were fired at by two men this morning in the Kotal-i-murch, a steep pass

leading into the Arghandab valley, about five miles distant from cantonments. One of the sowar's horses was killed. Parties of cavalry and infantry were immediately sent out to surround the hills, and it is hoped that the men may be caught.

Shortly afterwards a report, probably caused by our troops being seen leaving cantonments, spread among the town people that the enemy were approaching, and a panic ensued. Order was quickly restored, and all is quiet and as usual.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushki-Nakhud, July 20th.—No symptoms of advance by Ayub, whose cavalry have not yet crossed the river. The country in this vicinity quiet, except about the Arghandeh, where Achakzai nomads are committing depredation.

Enclosure 4 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushk-i-Nakhud, July 21st, 9 a.m.—Enemy's main body reached Helmund about 12 miles above Girishk yesterday, and sent back camels to bring up baggage and stores left behind at last stage for want of carriage. A considerable number of tribal sowars, mutineers, and ghazis had joined them. It is stated to be Ayub's intention to attack us here, moving by Sangbar road. Luinab with a large number of cavalry is reported to have moved down the Helmund with intention of crossing to Arghandab and attacking our camp; but this requires confirmation.

Enclosure 5 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 23rd July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushk-i-Nakhud, July 22nd.—Spies report that Ayub's troops have crossed the Helmund at Haidarabad. A party of his cavalry came yesterday to Sangbar, 14 miles from here, but returned again. A small party of ghazis, who have collected there, state that they expected 4,000 horsemen to arrive to-day, and the main body to-morrow. Few supplies being available at Sangbar, Ayub cannot halt there beyond a day. Being apprehensive of a night attack by the enemy's numerous cavalry, General Burrows has shifted his camp to a new position, in which the stores, sick, and baggage animals are in an enclosure. Report raises number of ghazis and men, who have joined Ayub, to 4,000.

Enclosure 6 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUD, July 23rd, 9 a.m.—Intelligence brought last night that Luinab with 400 sowars was moving on Maiwand to collect provisions. Main body of enemy was yesterday still at Haidarabad on this side river. Cavalry reconnaissance going towards Sangbar met about 400 enemy's sowars moving towards Maiwand. A demonstration of cavalry and artillery made them retreat by the road they had come. They state that regular troops will remain in reserve pushing forward cavalry and ghazis. Neither will attempt to move by main road, but keep along foot of hills. Herati regiments reported to be very uneasy at being taken so far from home.

Enclosure 7 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th July 1880.

From Lieutenant MUIR, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

In and around the city all is quiet. A few shots were fired from outside last night at the Shikarpur Gate, where a guard of our troops is stationed. No one was hurt. The Arghastan, Kadanai, and Derawat districts are slightly disturbed. The rest quiet. No more reports of gatherings. Most of the malcontents having probably left to join Ayub, no further news of Abu Said's sons, who were reported trying to raise a gathering in Kadanai.

On the 14th, Muhammad Aslam with a body of sowars attacked a fort near Kelat-i-Ghilzai, occupied by Sirdar's men collecting revenue. He was repulsed. By latest accounts he was near Shahjui, with a following of about 40 men. District otherwise quiet.

Enclosure 8 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUD, 24th.—Retirement of enemy's cavalry this morning complete. None have passed us.

Enclosure 9 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 25th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUD, July 24th.—Reconnoitring parties sent out to Sangbar and Maiwand this morning saw no signs of the enemy. The cavalry driven back yesterday was commanded by the Luinab and fell back from Sangbar to the Helmund. Last night a body of 450 cavalry crossed the hills to the north three days ago, and came down to the Arghandab valley in our rear. It is believed to have been sent by the Sartip to bring away his family hidden in the villages there. A Populzai Khan of Khakrez has brought in letter from Ayub, calling on him to join his army, and reports that Habibulla Khan, Barakzai, has passed up the valley trying to make the people rise. He has as yet had little success, though there is much excitement throughout the country. Much mischief is caused by false reports that the Wali is a prisoner in our camp. Fifty sowars of the Sind Horse arrived here from Kandahar on the 21st, and found road quiet.

No. 8.

TELEGRAM FROM GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY, 28th July 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

PRIMROSE telegraphs to-day from Kandahar:—Terrible disaster. General Burrows' force annihilated. We are going into citadel. General Phayre telegraphed to collect what forces he can, and march on Kandahar. Posts are being concentrated at Chaman. Message ends. I have telegraphed Simla. We can send another brigade if necessary.

No. 9.

TELEGRAM FROM VICEROY, 28th July 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

GENERAL BURROWS has been seriously defeated by Ayub Khan. Primrose has vacated cantonments at Kandahar and retired to citadel. We are pushing forward reinforcements already on their way, as quickly as possible, and sending large additional reinforcements from India. It may be necessary to anticipate despatch of troops from England intended for this season's reliefs.

No. 10.

No. 175 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

TO THE RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, August 3, 1880.

IN forwarding, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of further telegrams regarding the state of affairs in Afghanistan, in continuation of those forwarded with our Despatch, No. 169, dated 27th July 1880, we have the honour to summarize, as follows, the information which they contain regarding the reverse sustained by the force under command of Brigadier-General Burrows.

2. On the 12th July news reached Colonel St. John, the Political Officer with General Burrows' force, that the advanced portion of Ayub Khan's army was at Washir, and that Ayub Khan himself was not far in rear. The British brigade was then encamped on the Helmund opposite Girishk, the troops of the Wali of Kandahar being on the further bank of the river. On the 13th, it appeared that the infantry in the service of the Wali was in such an unsatisfactory state and so untrustworthy, that General Burrows and Colonel St. John deliberated on the question of disarming them. But the next morning, before any steps could be taken, the Wali's infantry deserted in a body, taking with them a battery of artillery. The mutineers were pursued by a portion of General Burrows' brigade and dispersed, the guns and baggage being recovered. At this time [14th July], Sirdar Ayub Khan's army was reported to be three marches distant from Girishk.

3. As the mutinous troops had plundered the stores of supplies collected at Girishk by Sher Ali Khan, and as reports had reached Colonel St. John that it was Ayub Khan's intention, if he crossed the river Helmund at all, to do so at a point to the north of Girishk, General Burrows determined on the 15th July to retire to Kushk-i-Nakhud, a distance of 30 miles from Girishk and 45 miles from Kandahar, where several roads from the Helmund to Kandahar converge, and where supplies were plentiful. This retirement was effected on the 17th. On the 18th all was reported quiet in the vicinity of Kushk-i-Nakhud, and it was believed that the majority of the mutinous troops had dispersed to their homes. The advanced portion of Ayub's cavalry had reached Girishk the day before. On the 19th, General Burrows shifted his camp three miles nearer Girishk, and on the 22nd he again moved it to a new position, in which he was able to place his sick, stores, and baggage, in an enclosure, being apprehensive of a night attack by the enemy.

4. On the 21st it had been reported that Ayub Khan's force had reached Haidarabad on the Helmund, 12 miles above Girishk, and that the intention was to advance by way of Sangbar. On the 22nd, our cavalry appear to have come in sight of that of the enemy, who retired without coming into action, a demonstration with cavalry and artillery having sufficed to cause them to fall back. On the 25th Ayub Khan with his entire force was known to be at Haidarabad, while his cavalry occasionally occupied Sangbar, and it was reported to be his intention to advance on the 25th by Sangbar and Maiwand, and to endeavour to pass by General Burrows' force into the Arghandab valley above Kandahar. This news was received by us on the 27th July.

5. On the morning of the 28th we received a telegram from Lieutenant Muir, Assistant Political Officer at Kandahar, announcing the total defeat and dispersion of General Burrows' force, with heavy loss in officers and men, and reporting that, in consequence, General Primrose had vacated the cantonment at Kandahar, moving all his troops into the citadel. This intelligence was gradually supplemented, during the 28th and 29th, by telegrams from Sir R. Sandeman at Quetta, who reported that telegraphic communication was broken down before noon on the 28th, between the Chaman Post, west of the Khojak Pass, and Kandahar; the last message received in Quetta intimating that the disaster, though severe, was not so complete as General Primrose had at first believed. The report that the whole of General Burrows' force had been annihilated, which was transmitted to England, and which is inconsistent even with the few details contained in the first account of the affair received at Kandahar, seems to have been founded upon a telegram sent direct by General Primrose to the Bombay Government. Nevertheless, the account of the action

received this morning from Colonel St. John by a telegram, dated Kandahar 29th, leaves no doubt that the British force encountered an enemy, greatly superior in numbers, well posted, and of formidable strength in artillery and cavalry, that our force was defeated, and that it fell back in great disorder on Kandahar, suffering heavy loss during the retreat, mainly through the exhaustion of the troops. At Kandahar General Primrose was reported to be making preparations against an attack by fortifying himself in the citadel, where provisions and ammunition are said to be plentiful.

6. We are taking all possible measures for speedily pushing forward reinforcements to the relief of the troops now in Kandahar. As the first step towards the attainment of this object, all the troops at Quetta, in Pishin, and on the railway line between Sibi and Quetta are being concentrated in Pishin, the railway works being temporarily abandoned, until the advance of reinforcements from India make it again possible to arrange suitably for their protection. Troops are also being forwarded from India as rapidly as possible, and a strong division, now under formation at Kabul, will be ready in a few days to march for Kandahar *via* Ghazni.

7. In Kabul and its neighbourhood all is reported quiet, and the necessary arrangements are now being made with Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, the newly-recognised Amir of Kabul.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
WHITLEY STOKES.
JAMES GIBBS.
C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

No. 394, dated Camp Kushk-i-Nakhud, 17th July 1880. (Extract.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. C. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit for the information of Government a detailed account of the events of the last few days, with the leading incidents of which my daily telegrams will have kept you informed.

2. The advanced column under Brigadier-General Nuttall, with which I marched, reached Girishk on Saturday morning the 10th, and the main body under Brigadier-General Burrows the following day. The total force then consisted of one battery Royal Horse Artillery, two regiments of Cavalry, one company of Sappers, six companies of British Infantry, and two regiments of Native Infantry.

3. Our camp was pitched in comparatively low ground on the left bank of the Helmund almost immediately opposite the fort of Girishk, from which it was separated, first by the river itself, fordable at the present time at intervals of half a mile at most, and secondly by a belt of grass and jungle over a mile in width. A bridged road leads from the ford to the fort. The camp of his Highness the Wali was pitched about a mile below the fort, partly on the high sloping banks of the river's bed, and partly in the low land below. His force then consisted of three regiments of infantry, numbering about 1,300 men, two six-pounder smooth-bore guns, and about 1,000 tribal cavalry. The remainder of his force was in advance under his nephew Sirdar Roshdil Khan at Karezat, 20 to 25 miles distant, and consisted of 800 infantry, the remaining four guns of his battery, and about 1,500 tribal cavalry.

4. In the evening of the day of our arrival the Wali visited me, and gave me details of what I had heard by message from him in the morning, that his cousin Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan had deserted the advanced camp at Karezat with his own sowars, 50 in number, after an ineffectual attempt to induce the rest of the troops to accompany him to Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan's camp, then in Washir. The Wali then told me that in spite of this evidence of fidelity on the part of the troops, he felt by no means confident in their loyalty. He was anxious for us to cross and camp on the west bank of the river, but I did not then think right to tell him definitely that the General in command had most stringent orders not to do so, hoping that Brigadier-General

Burrows, who would arrive the next morning, would bring permission to act on his own discretion.

5. No such permission having been received, I told the Wali the next evening that under no circumstances should we cross the river. He was much depressed, and said that in that case it would be impossible for him to do anything to oppose Ayub's advance, and that he would concentrate all his troops at Girishk. To this I agreed, considering that if their fidelity was doubtful, it would be better to have the whole of them within reach than to leave a large proportion in a place where there would be no obstacle to their going over to the enemy.

6. The next day (Monday the 12th), I did not see the Wali, but finding from various sources that the disaffection among his troops was far more serious than he had led me to believe, and seeing that he was unwilling that I should go to his camp, I sent for his confidential Secretary, who confirmed the information. By him I sent a message to the Wali asking him whether it would not be better to disarm the whole or part of his regular troops, or, if he was unable to do so himself, to authorise us to take measures for the purpose. To this he eagerly assented, and he appointed the next morning to meet and talk the matter over.

7. At sunrise the next morning I met his Highness on the west bank of the river, and rode with him to the fort and across again to our camp, where he spent a considerable time in discussing the situation with General Burrows and myself. He freely admitted the untrustworthiness of his men, placing the blame mainly on the Sartip and on a certain Sardaru Khan, the principal officer of his army, who was known to have received many communications from Ayub Khan, some of which he had made over to the Wali. "But the only really disaffected corps," he declared, "was the Kabir regiment, about 450 strong, which had been sent to him last September from Kabul, where it had been stationed for 10 years." If this regiment was disarmed there would be no cause to fear the others, but he himself could not disarm it without our assistance. This the very stringent orders received by General Burrows prevented his doing as long as the Wali's force remained on the right bank, and his Highness therefore offered, on receipt of a written request from me, which he could show his officers, to bring the whole of his force to the left bank the next morning. Later on, General Burrows, as reported by telegram, determined to cross the river to disarm the Wali's troops should the step appear necessary. The next morning, while our own camp was being shifted to a better position a mile and a half up stream, I watched the Wali's encampment from the opposite heights. The tents were struck about six, and half-an-hour later the Wali's cousin, Sirdar Dilawar Khan, came across to fix a site for the new camp. Everything was, he said, proceeding satisfactorily, but a quarter of an hour later news was brought me that the troops had mutinied, seized the guns and baggage and driven the Wali and the whole of his cavalry and principal officers across the river. Riding back to the ford I met the Wali with a large number of horsemen; he said that after striking the tents and packing the baggage, the Kabir regiment had marched up to the high bank where the guns were, had seized them, forced the gunners to join them, and driven him and all but a few sowars who joined the mutineers out of the camp. The Wali added that many of the sowars who had accompanied him were untrustworthy, and begged me to fall back in the Kandahar direction at once. I told him that this would be quite unnecessary with our strong force, and that we would first punish the mutineers, and recover the guns. After some delay, mainly caused by uncertainty whether the mutineers intended to hold a position about the fort or move off

Battery, Horse Artillery.
2nd Regiment of Cavalry.
Company Sappers.
Four companies, 66th Regiment.
Four companies, Jacob's Rifles.

towards Herat, and of the attitude of the Wali's sowars, the troops, as per margin, moved across the river by a ford directly in front of our new camp, two miles above Girishk, at 9.30 a.m., the mutineers being then seen streaming along the opposite bank two miles distant. After the troops had crossed the ford I rode on to the advanced guard, which brought the mutineers to bay a few minutes before 11 a.m. at a distance of four miles from the camp. Half-an-hour later they moved to a second position a mile further on, and opened fire with the 6-pounder guns on the cavalry. This they kept up at intervals till the Horse Artillery, whose passage was much delayed by irrigation channels and rough ground, came into action at half-past 12.

8. On the brief engagement that ensued it is not my province to enlarge: suffice to say that at 2 p.m. all firing had ceased and I returned to camp five miles off by a different road and ford to that by which I had come. I mention this to show the feebleness of the obstacle which the Helmund in a season like the present offers to military operations. During my stay of five days I crossed it in nine different places with a guide, in a distance of five miles.

9. On my return I found the Wali with a few servants in our camp; he informed me that the majority of his sowars were still with him, though a few had, he found, joined the mutineers, and a few more fled to Kandahar. Most of those that had remained had sent their baggage in the same direction. Before leaving camp, I had asked that a party with camels should be sent to bring across the atta, grain, and ghee stored for us by the Wali in the fort; this had been done, but the atta and ghee had disappeared, though large quantities of raw grain remained.

10. The next morning after consultation with the Wali as to the possibility of feeding the troops at Girishk, I reluctantly came to the conclusion to recommend General Burrows to fall back on Kushk-i-Nakhud, whither the Wali had sent the whole of his sowars the night before.

11. The position of Kushk-i-Nakhud offers many advantages. Should the enemy cross at Girishk and follow the road we came, he would have to meet us either in an entrenched position here, or on ground of our own choosing, covering the first water-course on this side of the desert which separates us from Girishk. Should he take the northern road, he would have to meet us at Maiwand, 10 miles off, or, if he keeps to the river line, the Arghandab is less than that distance to the south. In fact, we are half way between the mountains to the north and the sandy desert to the south, at the point where these approach each other most nearly.

12. Should Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, however, carry out what is, according to some reports, his intention of moving to Tirin and Darawut, and stirring up the country from there, the situation would be entirely changed, and the presence of so large a force here useless.

13. In conclusion, I have the honour to make a few remarks with reference to the effect on the country of this so far successful invasion. It is well known to you, that for many months Ayub Khan and his partisans have used every effort to inflame the religious and patriotic feelings of the chiefs and people against us and our *protégé*, Sher Ali Khan. These had apparently little or no effect at the time and as long as the possibility of an invasion from Herat seemed more than remote, particularly after the failure of the first attempt. But the actual presence on the frontier of an army of their own fellow tribesmen, under a prince of their recent ruling family, the memory of whose oppression a year and a half of prosperity has sufficed to obliterate from the minds of this fickle people, has, I have reason to suspect, created a more powerful and general feeling in Ayub's favour than one who had only known Kandahar a year ago would believe possible; and it is far from improbable that, unless Ayub Khan's army be defeated and dispersed at once, something very like a general rising may take place. That this could attain the formidable dimensions which have been reached in Kabul, the unwarlike character of the modern Durani and the physical features of the country forbid, but it may cause considerable trouble and annoyance and involve somewhat extended operations.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 25th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUD, July 24th.—If enemy moves up Helmund, General Burrows proposes sending back superfluous baggage and sick to Kandahar and moving up Khakrez valley, opening up fresh line of communications.

Enclosure 3 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GENERAL Phayre has received information from the Kandahar Road commandant corroborating what I previously told him that Ayub's cavalry meditate an attack in the Gulistan direction on our communication. The general is sending there to-morrow from Quetta a small column consisting of 450 infantry, 2 guns, and a few cavalry.

The 24th Native Regiment is at Darwaza, and hopes to reach Quetta to-morrow or next day.

Enclosure 4 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUD, July 25th.—Ayub, with his entire force, is still about Haidarabad. His cavalry outposts occasionally occupying Sangbar, near which two men of Sind Horse on outpost duty were surprised and killed. This morning spies report that he intends moving on the 28th by both roads through Sangbar and through Maiwand. His object being to get past us into the Arghandab valley above Kandahar.

Enclosure 5 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th June 1880.

From Lieutenant MUIR, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

TOTAL defeat and dispersion of General Burrows' force. Heavy loss in both officers and men. General Primrose has vacated cantonments and brought all his troops into citadel. Officers and men returning in small parties. Wali has arrived. Colonel St. John safe.

Enclosure 6 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

News of this morning from Kandahar. General Phayre and I have consulted together, and these are our views: That our line of communication with India for troops must be the Bolan Pass. The question we beg to refer to Government is what is to be done under present circumstances with the railway line under construction. We consider that the force from Thal-Chotiali to Quetta should be concentrated in Pishin with the least possible delay, and we recommend that the protection of the railway line and Thal-Chotiali should, if possible, be taken by Punjab troops. The Bombay troops, in which we include the whole of General Phayre's division, ought to be concentrated here at once.

General Primrose has telegraphed that he is abandoning Kandahar cantonments and will defend himself in citadel. He has directed General Phayre to march on Kandahar as soon as he can collect army. Primrose says Ayub's army is strong in artillery, which numbers 35 guns well served. We trust as much artillery as can be spared will be sent from India, also Europeans and horses to equip the guns at Quetta. We are quite aware of the very bad political effect the abandonment of the railway line and Thal-Chotiali by the present garrison must have upon the country, unless troops from the Punjab can be sent to relieve them, but state of country and strength of tribes, in our opinion, leave no alternative.

Primrose telegraphed two of our guns had been taken by enemy, who pursued our retreating troops for three miles.

Enclosure 7 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, No. 2511 E.F., dated 28th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

VICEROY entirely approves the measures proposed by yourself and General Phayre, and decides that the forces employed for protection of railway line must be at once withdrawn as proposed. We are sending reinforcements from Bengal, and will re-occupy railway line when possible, but present exigencies necessitate pushing forward all available forces toward Kandahar. Viceroy relies on you to use all exertions to co-operate with Phayre in relieving posts and pushing forward reinforcements.

Enclosure 8 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram to-day just received. General Phayre has issued the necessary orders for the troops now protecting railway line to concentrate on Pishin. Movement commences from Thul-Chotiali, and I hope the order for the march will reach Thul-Chotiali on the third day from this. I have directed political officers to heartily co-operate with commanding officers in carrying out General's orders, and to arrange as best they can with the head men of villages to take care of all stores, telegraph line, &c. left behind, until reoccupation of country by our troops. I am in constant communication with General Phayre, who is strenuously exerting himself to push forward all available forces towards Kandahar. His Excellency the Viceroy may rely on myself and officers using our best exertions to aid General Phayre.

Enclosure 9 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th June 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

BEFORE telegraphic communication ceased at 11 o'clock this morning, the following news was received from General Primrose:—Following officers belonging to General Burrows' force had safely reached Kandahar:—Doctor Burrows, Eaton, Harvey, Mainwaring, Geoghegan, Oliver, Griffiths, Whitecot, Dane. Small parties of Burrows' force constantly arriving. Enemy appear only to have pursued for three or four miles. Extent of our losses not yet ascertained, but feared to be very severe. Two guns lost. Jacob's Rifles lost, Smith, Justice, and Coles killed; in Bombay Grenadiers, Anderson severely wounded, Haslet killed. Of R.H.A., Osborne killed, Blackwood wounded. In 3rd Cavalry, Mayne and Reid wounded. In 66th, Roberts killed, Lynch wounded. Enemy very strong in guns; believed to have 35, which they work well. General Primrose mentions that he has sent out General Brooke to bring in stragglers.

Enclosure 10 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

COMMUNICATION with Kandahar stopped at 11 this morning. I will inform General Phayre of your instructions.

Enclosure 11 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, No. 2521 E.P., dated 28th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

We hear wire cut towards Kandahar. Please use every endeavour to collect and send me early intelligence of passing events there.

Enclosure 12 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, No. 2,524 E.P., dated 28th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

Do you know what day and time and where action was fought; also whether Burrows attacked or enemy attacked him.

Enclosure 13 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

HIS Highness the Khan has sent me the following message in reply to telegrams informing him of substance of what had happened, and asking him to assist us with camels:—*Begins.* Thanks for your three telegrams. I am certain that the enemy will get their due reward soon. I am glad to afford help. My head and my all belongs to the British. I shall never draw back. One hundred and fifty camels, and one hundred horses are ready at Mustang just now; inform me and I shall happily send them to you immediately.

Musa Khan left this three days ago for Quetta with 100 camels. Whatever grain or money is required by the British I am ready to supply. I am certain you will always keep me informed of what is going on for the future. *Ends.*

Enclosure 14 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE this morning again visited General Phayre, and have recorded a memorandum of our deliberations which will be posted to-day. After carefully reviewing the situation we are again forced to the conclusion that, unless other troops can at once occupy the railway line of works, it must be abandoned. I telegraph this to show Government that the abandonment of the line and valuable plant is imperatively necessary, though we have come to this decision most unwillingly.

Enclosure 15 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram, dated this morning, asks where and when Burrows' action was fought, and whether he attacked. I regret I cannot give any information in addition to what I telegraphed yesterday. Primrose at the time wire was cut did not know the extent of the defeat. The last words that I understood he sent were to the effect that disaster was not so great as at first believed, but very severe; enemy only pursued for three or four miles; two of our guns taken, the others expected in; Brooke sent out to bring in stragglers; intended to abandon cantonments and occupy citadel; his only fear was scarcity of water.

Enclosure 16 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, No. 2531 E.P., dated 29th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

VICEROY entirely approves your decision to abandon railway line temporarily. Two strong brigades are being sent up and reinforcements coming from England at once. Send all particulars of Burrows' action as early as possible.

Enclosure 17 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, No. 2534 E.P., dated 29th July 1880

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

YOUR telegram 29th. Please convey at once to his Highness the Khan of Kelat, Viceroy's cordial acknowledgments of the friendship and loyalty toward the British Government attested by his prompt and valuable offer of co-operation.

Enclosure 18 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram of last evening expressing anxiety for news from Kandahar. Within a few hours of the receipt of the news about Burrows, I had sent off reliable men to Kandahar for information last night. The news from Chaman fort was that the Mel Abdul Rahman and Dubrai post, retreating from the line of communication on Chaman, had arrived at Gatai. Fighting was going on, but they were holding their own. Assistance is to be sent this morning from Chaman to help them in. They number 180 infantry and 70 cavalry. The country between Kandahar and Khojak Pass is in a state of insurrection, the difficulty therefore of communicating with Kandahar is very great. I have sent six letters to St. John and Major Westmacott yesterday at Chaman, despatched to him by messenger, with telegram from me. The country people say that the fight between the British and Ayub's army was severe and both sides lost heavily. I will again despatch letters; but even if my messengers succeed in reaching St. John, an answer to my first letters on account of distance must take, counting from date of despatch, 10 days.

The Kakars and Aitchakzais are reported collecting; but in a few days, I trust, we will be strong enough to hold the country from Quetta to Chaman post.

Enclosure 19 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

From Chaman I hear that Major Westmacott went out this morning with 50 sabres, Poona Horse, to assist Major Jacob retreating with road outpost detachments on Chaman. A skirmish took place near Gatai, but I understand there were no casualties on our side. Major Westmacott and Jacob are bringing their men safely into Chaman.

Enclosure 20 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

My telegram this morning. The detachments named therein have arrived at Chaman. No casualties.

Enclosure 21 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 31st July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

WE have received no direct news from our army at Kandahar. Native sources do not describe Burrows' defeat as crushing. They say that British cavalry and guns were induced to follow the enemies' cavalry, who pretended to fly and led them into a complete ambushade. Ayub's army then delivered its attack, and our troops suffered very severely in officers and men. A battle was then fought, resulting in our retirement on Kandahar, but Ayub's army suffered much. This news, I am sorry to say, requires confirmation. I send it because received from several sources.

Enclosure 22 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE received the following news from a fairly reliable source :—Ayub Khan's army did not follow up British retreat to Kandahar. Burrows' force has arrived at Kandahar, and our whole army is now in the citadel. When messenger left Ayub was encamped where action was fought. This intelligence seems to corroborate news sent you yesterday that Burrows' defeat was not so crushing as at first believed by Primrose, and that Ayub Khan's army had suffered so much that they were vacillating regarding their further course of action.

Enclosure 23 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, No. 2571 E.P., dated 1st August 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

HER Majesty the Queen has expressed her satisfaction at the news of the Khan of Kelat's loyal offers of assistance. Please inform Khan.

Enclosure 24 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd August 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.


29th. Arrived here yesterday afternoon with General Burrows and Nuttall and remnant of force. Telegraph has been interrupted ever since my arrival. No chance of restoration, so send this by messenger to Chaman. Burrows marched from Kushk-i-Nakhud on morning, 27th, having heard from me that Ayub's advanced guard had occupied Maiwand, about three miles from the latter place. Enemy's cavalry appeared advancing from direction of Haidrabad, their camp on Helmund ten miles above Girishk. Artillery and cavalry engaged them at 9 A.M., so shortly afterwards whole force of enemy appeared and formed line of battle—, seven regiments, regulars in centre, three others in reserve; about 2,000 cavalry on right; 400 mounted men and 2,000 Ghazis and irregular infantry on left; other cavalry and irregulars in reserve; five or six batteries of guns, including one of breechloaders, distributed at intervals. Estimated total force 12,000. Ground slightly undulating, enemy being best posted. Till one P.M., action confined to artillery fire, which so well sustained and directed by enemy that our superior quality armament failed to compensate for inferior number of guns. After development of rifle fire, our breechloaders told; but vigorous advance of cavalry against our left, and Ghazis along the front caused native infantry to fall back in confusion on 66th abandoning two guns. Formation being lost, infantry retreated slowly; and, in spite of gallant efforts of General Burrows to rally them, were cut off from cavalry and artillery. This was at 3 P.M., and followers and baggage were streaming away towards Kandahar. After severe fighting in enclosed ground, General Burrows succeeded in extricating infantry and brought them into line of retreat. Unfortunately no efforts would turn fugitives from main road, waterless at this season. Thus majority casualties appear to have occurred from thirst and exhaustion. Enemy's pursuit continued to ten miles from Kandahar, but was not vigorous. Cavalry, artillery, and a few infantry reached banks of Argandab, 40 miles from scene of action, at 7 A.M.; many not having tasted water since previous morning.

Nearly all ammunition lost, with 400 Martini, 700 Sniders, and 2 nine-pounder guns. Estimated loss, killed and missing,—66th, 400; Grenadiers, 350; Jacob's Rifles, 350; Artillery, 40; Sappers, 21; Cavalry, 60. Officers killed, or missing,—Major Blackwood, Osborne, MacLaine, Artillery; Henn, Engineers. Galbraith, McMath, Garratt, Cullen, Roberts, Rayner, Honywood, Barr, Chute, 66th; Owen, 3rd Cavalry; Hinde, Whitby, Grenadiers; Smith, Justice, Cole, Jacob's Rifles. Wounded,—Fowell, Artillery; Lynch, Preston 66th; Anderson, Grant, Grenadiers; Iredell, Jacob's Rifles.

Preparations being now made for siege. Durani inhabitants expelled. Provisions and ammunition plentiful. Wali was present during action, and is now with us, assisting actively. Of course, whole country will rise.

L O N D O N :
Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

AFGHANISTAN (1880) No. 3.



P A P E R S

RELATING TO THE

ADVANCE OF AYUB KHAN ON KANDAHAR.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1880.




L O N D O N :

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1880.

[C.—2736.] Price 1s. 10d.



LIST OF PAPERS.

No.	—	From.	To.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1	Telegram -	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State	1880. 27 June	Advance of Ayub Khan. Measures proposed.	3
2	" -	" - -	"	30 "	Requesting reply to the above	3
3	" -	Secretary of State	Viceroy - -	"	Approving proposals	3
4	" -	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State	1 July	Despatch of instructions to Generals Primrose and Phayre.	3
5	Military Diary of Events during the week ending the 3rd July 1880					3
6	Letter - - with	Government of India. 8 enclosures.	Secretary of State	6 July (No. 154.)	Movements of Ayub Khan. Strength of his force.	4
7	Military Diary of Events during the week ending the 10th July 1880					6
8	Letter - - with	Government of India. 4 enclosures.	Secretary of State	13 July (No. 157.)	Advance of General Burrows to the Helmund.	8
9	Military Diary of Events during the week ending the 17th July 1880					9
10	Letter - - with	Government of India. 8 enclosures.	Secretary of State	20 July (No. 162.)	Mutiny of the Wali's troops. Retirement of General Burrows to Khushk-i- Nakhud.	12
11	Military Diary of Events during the week ending the 24th July 1880					14
12	Letter - - with	Government of India. 9 enclosures.	Secretary of State	27 July (No. 169.)	Passage of the Helmund by Ayub's army. Cavalry re- connaissance.	18
13	Telegram -	Governor of Bombay.	"	28 July	Reported annihilation of General Burrow's force.	21
14	" -	Viceroy - -	"	" "	Serious defeat of General Burrows. Consequent mili- tary measures.	21
14A	" -	Secretary of State	Viceroy -	" "	Suggested despatch of force from Kabul or Kurram to Kandahar.	21
15	Military Diary of Events during the week ending the 31st July 1880					21
15A	Telegram -	Viceroy -	Secretary of State	3 Aug.	Despatch of force from Kabul to Kandahar.	24
16	Letter - - with	Government of India. 24 enclosures.	"	" " (No. 175.)	Summary of information con- nected with the defeat of General Burrows. Report by Colonel St. John of the mutiny of the Wali's troops.	24
17	Military Diary of Events during the week ending the 7th August 1880					33
18	Letter - - with	Government of India. 17 enclosures.	Secretary of State	10 Aug. (No. 179.)	Affairs in the Bolan Pass and neighbourhood. Reports from Kandahar.	36

No.	—	From.	To.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1880.						
19		Military Diary of Events during the week ending the 14th August 1880 - - -				40
20	Letter - -	Government of India.	Secretary of State	17 Aug. (No. 185.)	Narrative of events and circumstances which preceded and attended the march of Ayub Khan to Kandahar.	44
21	" - with	" 20 enclosures.	"	17 Aug. (No. 186.)	Evacuation of the railway line. News from Kandahar to 11th August.	47
22		Military Diary of Events during the week ending the 21st August 1880 - - -				52
23	Letter - - with	Government of India. 4 enclosures.	Secretary of State	24 Aug. (No. 363.)	Military despatches relative to the mutiny of the Wali's troops.	56
24	" - - with	" 7 enclosures.	"	24 Aug. (No. 194.)	Affairs at Kelat-i-Ghizai. Reports from Kandahar.	59
25	" - - with	" 2 enclosures.	"	24 Aug. (No. 196.)	Attempts to communicate with Kandahar.	62
26		Military Diary of Events during the week ending the 28th August 1880 - - -				64
27	Letter - - with	Government of India. 24 enclosures.	Secretary of State	31 Aug. (No. 201.)	Sortie from Kandahar. Movements of Sir F. Roberts. Mutiny of troops of Khan of Khelat. Retirement of Ayub Khan.	66
28		Military Diary of Events during the week ending the 4th September 1880 - - -				73
29	Telegram -	Secretary of State	Sir F. Roberts -	4 Sept.	Congratulations on victory over Ayub Khan.	77
30	Letter - - with	Government of India. 23 enclosures.	Secretary of State	7 " (No. 205.)	March of Sir F. Roberts; arrival of his force at Kandahar, and defeat of Ayub Khan.	77
31	Telegram -	Secretary of State	Viceroy - -	7 Sept.	Congratulations of the Queen to the Commander-in-Chief on success of the measures for the relief of Kandahar.	85
32		Military Diary of Events during the week ending the 11th September 1880 - - -				85
33	Letter - - with	Government of India. 8 enclosures.	Secretary of State	14 Sept. (No. 209.)	Movements of the Kabul-Kandahar field force.	87
33A	Telegram -	Governor, Bombay	"	19 Sept.	Explanation of telegram from General Primrose.	90
34	Letter - - with	Government of India. 3 enclosures.	"	28 Sept. (No. 213.)	Correspondence between Ayub Khan and Sir F. Roberts.	90
35	" - - with	" 7 enclosures.	"	5 Oct. (No. 434.)	Military despatches relative to the defeat of General Burrows at Maiwand.	91
36	" - - with	" 7 enclosures.	"	12 Oct. (No. 219.)	Review of events connected with Ayub Khan's invasion of Kandahar.	107
37	" - - with	" 7 enclosures.	"	12 Oct. (No. 439.)	Despatches from General Primrose relative to the siege of Kandahar.	112

LIST OF PAPERS.

V

No.		From.	To.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
38	Letter - - with	Government of India. 4 enclosures.	Secretary of State	1880. 12 Oct. (No. 442.)	Despatch of Sir F. Roberts, describing the march of his force from Kabul to Kandahar, and the defeat of Ayub Khan.	125
39	Despatch -	Secretary of State	Government of India.	15 Oct. (No. 43.)	Appreciation by Her Majesty's Government of the services of Sir F. Roberts and his force, and of Sir D. Stewart.	141
40	Letter - - with	Government of India. 1 enclosure.	Secretary of State	19 Oct. (No. 223)	Diary of the Kandahar Residency from 1st to 28th July 1880.	141
41	" - - with	" 4 enclosures.	"	26 Oct. (No. 460)	Operations of Brig.-General Brooke, on the 28th July 1880.	152
42	" - - with	" 3 enclosures.	"	2 Nov. (No. 473.)	Conduct of the 66th Foot in the action at Maiwand.	155
43	" - - with	" 4 enclosures.	"	2 Nov. (No. 474.)	Operations of the 1st September near Kandahar; proceedings of troops under the command of General Primrose.	157
44	" - - with	" 6 enclosures.	"	9 Nov. (No. 485.)	Burial of the dead on the field of Maiwand.	160

P A P E R S.

No. 1.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 27th June 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

TELEGRAM from Thomson at Teheran says, Ayub Khan marching against Kandahar with large force. I think we should leave Shere Ali to defend himself beyond the Helmund, but it seems to me, after communicating with Stewart, that it would be inconsistent with security of our military position at Kandahar to allow hostile forces to cross that river. I propose, therefore, to instruct Primrose, if Ayub reaches Furrah, to advance towards Girishk with sufficient force to prevent passage of Helmund. This would necessitate moving up reinforcement from Phayre's reserve. No troops would be moved until necessity actually arose.

No. 2.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 30th June 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

My telegram of 27th. Early answer requested.

No. 3.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 30th June 1880, to VICEROY.

Yours, 27th and 30th. Instructions to Primrose approved.

No. 4.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 1st July 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

AYUB's advance guard reported to have arrived at Furrah. Orders sent to Primrose and Phayre in accordance with my telegram of the 27th.

No. 5.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DURING THE WEEK ENDING THE 3RD JULY 1880. (Extract.)

28th June.—The following reports, dated the 26th, have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Kandahar:—

I.—“On evening of 24th a Ghazi attacked a party of officers near Baba Wali. He was at once killed by a soldier of 66th Regiment. No one wounded.”

II.—“Two men of the 5th Native Infantry and three followers killed near Harnai some few days ago. As doubts have arisen as to how they met their death, General Phayre is causing inquiry to be made. Report will be furnished soon as details received from him.”

1st July.—The following reports, dated 30th June, have been received from Kandahar from Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

I.—“The following intelligence just received from Political Resident:—“Letter from Wali's nephew in Washir, dated 26th, states intelligence reached him that Luinab with advanced guard of horsemen had left Herat some days before Ayub, who was then probably at Sabzawan. Luinab supposed to have reached Farrah.””

II. "The following further intelligence received from Political Resident :—' Wali sends second letter from his nephew in Washir, giving intelligence that Luinab has arrived in Farrah with 800 sowars, and is collecting levies there. Travellers who have arrived from Herat in twelve days say that when they left Ayub was at Rozabad with regulars.'"

2nd July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports that the health of the troops under his command at Kandahar is "fair."

3rd July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose telegraphs as follows from Kandahar on the 1st :—

"The Political Resident furnishes the following intelligence this day :—' Wali writes on afternoon of 29th that messengers from Farrah state Luinab with 1,000 horsemen arrived there about 23rd June, and was collecting supplies for army which was at Kush Kaba, sixteen miles north Farrah. Ayub was with army. Kabuli troops had their families with them. Wali calculates Ayub arrived Farrah six days ago. Enquires anxiously whether force will move to his support, and asks orders regarding his advanced force at Washir. Second letter, written evening of 29th, states messengers from Bakwa report Luinab at Khormalik, twenty-one miles, and his advanced guard at Chahigez, fifty miles this side Farrah and four marches from Kandahar frontier.' Political Resident strongly urges immediate advance of brigade."

Instructions have been issued for the advance of a brigade from Kandahar to Girishk, but it is not to cross the Helmand. Also for a brigade of the Reserve Division to be pushed forward from Karachi to Kandahar.

No. 6.

No. 154 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 6, 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LETTERS from Herat of 5th instant report that Ayub had some time before sent 1,200 letters to Kabul, addressed to different chiefs and officers, announcing his approach with a powerful army. Informant reports Ayub more than ever in the hands of the Kabulis, and personally unwilling to make any move; also expresses disbelief that any move will be made, and predicts that if it does, the Herati and Kabuli troops are sure to quarrel before they have gone far.

Enclosure 2 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SEVERAL caravans have arrived from Herat in last few days with news up to 5th. Some preparations were being made for the intended march, and six regiments were at

Rozabad. The Governor of Meshed was preventing the exportation of gun caps to Afghanistan. The harvest at Herat has been very fine.

Enclosure 3 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

NINTH June is day on which regular troops known to have camped outside Herat. Actual start probably some days later. Nevertheless I recommend despatch of brigade to Maiwand as quickly as possible, if only to confirm fidelity of Wali's troops, overawe Zemindawar tribes, and establish confidence here. Am asking General Primrose to make preparatory arrangements in anticipation of orders.

Enclosure 4 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th June 1880. (Extract.)

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

In answer to letter of mine about report of desertions written some days ago, Wali writes that 50 or 60 men had returned to their homes when ordered to Washir, that a few of his men were mutinous, but the majority quite trustworthy.

His monthly disbursements for pay amount to one lakh six thousand rupees.

Enclosure 5 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, No. 2122 E.P., dated 1st July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar.

YOUR telegrams, 27th and 30th. Orders are issuing for brigade to Maiwand. Your political instructions are that no hostile troops must cross Helmund, and Wali must be supported, if necessary, in maintaining order this side river. Beyond Helmund he must rely on his own resources.

Enclosure 6 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

WALI writes on afternoon of 29th, that messengers from Furrah state Luinab with 1,000 horse arrived there about the 23rd, and was collecting supplies for army which was at Kushkaba, 16 miles north of Furrah. Ayub was with army. Kabul troops had their families with them. Wali calculated Ayub arrived Furrah six days ago, inquires anxiously whether force will move to his support, and asks orders regarding his advancing forces in Washir.

Second letter written night of 29th states messengers from Bakwa report Luinab at Khor Malik, 21 miles, and his advance guard at Chargaz 50 miles, this side Furrah and four marches from Kandahar frontier.

I am writing to Wali not to risk collision with Ayub's regular troops in Washir, but in absence of orders not giving him definite assurance of active support from here. But I strongly urge immediate advance of brigade.

It is possible that Ayub may delay on frontier; but he may be at Girishk in 10 days or less.

Enclosure 7 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Nothing of importance has occurred during the week in Kandahar territory; but the menaced invasion from Herat is causing much excitement in the city and neighbourhood.

Ayub Khan appears to have left the city finally about the 18th, and to have reached Furreh, where he was at the date of the latest advice, about the 24th. He has with him 2,500 horse, including 900 regulars, 10 regiments of infantry, varying from 350 to 500 men each, and six batteries of artillery, including at least one mule battery. He is said to be well provided with ammunition, except caps, of which a supply expected from Meshed had been seized by the Persian authorities at the frontier. A party of 1,000 cavalry under the Luinab, Khushdil Khan, are four or five days' march in frontier, and at date of latest report were in Bakwa.

Before leaving Herat the Ulemas assembled in a mosque and invested Ayub with title of Amir. He has also had money coined in his name.

The Wali is at Girishk with main body of his forces, two regiments of infantry, four guns, and 1,500 horse being in Washir under his nephew, Roshndil Khan.

The weather is much cooler.

Enclosure 8 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Two regiments cavalry and a battery Horse Artillery marched this morning for the Helmund. There is no news from the Herat direction.

No. 7.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA FOR THE WEEK ENDING THE 10TH JULY 1880. (Extract.)

5th July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports as follows from Kandahar on the 4th :—

“Five hundred sabres 3rd Cavalry and 3rd Sind Horse, E-B Royal Horse Artillery, 40 Sappers and two companies infantry, left to-day for Helmund, under command of General Nuttall. Six companies 66th, and 1st and 30th Native Infantry, leave to-morrow under General Burrows' commanding column.”

6th July.—The following message, dated Poona, the 5th, has been received from the Governor of Bombay :—

“General Phayre telegraphs to Commander-in-Chief here as follows :—‘Kach, July 4th. I have just heard that telegraphic communication with Kandahar interrupted near Takht-i-pul. Four hundred Pathan sepoys of Khan of Khelat's State troops have deserted. Sibi Railway interrupted by floods at unbridged *nallahs*; Traffic Superintendent says it cannot be restored within ten days.’ *Message ends.*”

6th July.—The following message has been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Kandahar, dated the 5th :—

“Your telegram of 3rd July. My telegram of yesterday to you will have informed you of the departure of cavalry and artillery for Helmund near Girishk. The infantry, 66th Regiment (six companies), 1st Grenadiers, and 30th Native Infantry, left this morning, the whole under command of Brigadier-General Burrows. A month's supplies have been forwarded with the troops. Lieutenant-Colonel St. John accompanies the force.

As regards reinforcement from the Reserve Division, I have, in accordance with your instructions, requested the General Commanding at once to forward up two Native infantry regiments in the first place, to be followed as soon as possible by battery of artillery, 15th Foot and 1st Madras Cavalry, the three latter to proceed direct to Kandahar. The Native Infantry regiments were to replace two others ordered from line of communications to Kandahar. The head-quarters and wing 4th Native Infantry

are now on the march from Quetta. Since these orders were issued, the telegram sent yesterday regarding break in railway line was forwarded to you. This morning I received the following telegram from General Phayre:—*Message begins*, Following received from General Wood,—‘*Telegram begins*, Jacobabad, 3rd July. Engineer-in-Chief reports breaks in line from heavy floods; transport of troops impracticable; have postponed move of 24th.’ *Telegram ends*. I have asked where breaks are and on what line. Will report further.—*Message ends*. Under these circumstances, it appears therefore to me for the present impracticable to bring any forces or reinforcements from the Reserve Division.”

II.—Dated the 6th.—Your telegram of 5th July. My telegram of yesterday will have informed you of all details of scheme. Head-quarters and wing, 4th Native Infantry, left Quetta for Kandahar on 3rd, and are to-day at Kila Abdulla. No further intelligence to-day as regards railway, but General Phayre reports he will endeavour to get 9th and 24th Native Infantry moved without delay.”

7th July.—General Phayre telegraphs from Kach on the 6th July:—

“I am doing all I can to push on the troops of the reserve. The breach in the railway line is about three miles. Colonel Lindsay will be here to-morrow; after consulting him will report again. I hope to get two Native regiments across in two or three days, and the Artillery and 15th Foot soon afterwards. The Bolan route is in good order and passable for all arms. Colonel Smith, R.H.A., and Dr. Bruce have just travelled by it from this to Sibi. The Sibi-Harnai line was closed for 10 days, owing to the Nari being in flood, but just now open. But if we get the usual heavy rains at the end of this month and in August, it will be again closed between Spintangi, Chotiali, and Harnai. The Marris and Pathan tribes have been giving a great deal of trouble lately. As regards the transport, the Director is collecting what we require at Nari. In order to preserve the health and efficiency of Europeans, I propose to push the men on in carts by double marches from Sibi to Dozan, one hundred at a time. Nothing will interfere with the progress of the troops as soon as transport is collected, if the railway stands and the Nari at Sibi is not flooded. The first 250 carts should arrive Sibi on 8th. I shall be here to-morrow, but go to Quetta on 8th to push on arrangements in in Bolan.

The following reports have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Kandahar:—

I.—Dated the 6th. “On 1st July Colonel Tanner, commanding at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, hearing that Mahomed Aslam had brought a gathering of about 200 horsemen within striking distance of Khelat, marched to Sir-i-Asp, 10 miles off, with 200 of the Biluch Regiment and squadron of Sind Horse, against him. Mahomed Aslam retired, and our infantry could not get up to him. Sind Horse pursued, charged and killed 14. Loss on our side one sowar slightly wounded. Enemy dispersed in all directions.”

II.—Dated the 7th. “Lieutenant-Colonel St. John writes advanced brigade under General Nuttall reached Karez-i-Ak morning 6th, all right. He had no news from the Wali that day.”

8th July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose telegraphs as follows from Kandahar on the 7th:—

“Following message received yesterday evening from General Phayre:—*Message begins*, ‘Kach, 6th July. Damage to railway appears between 91st and 93rd miles, so that the break is three miles long. General Wood is, however, trying to arrange for passage of two Native regiments at once.’ *Message ends*.”

9th July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports from Kandahar on the 8th:—

“Lieutenant-Colonel St. John reports our advanced party arrived Khúsh-i-Nakhúd morning 7th, and marched to Mir Karez to-day. Last news is Ayúb’s cavalry have reached the Khash Rúd; whether he has left Farráh is doubtful.”

10th July.—Sir Robert Sandeman telegraphs from Quetta on the 7th, as follows :—

“I have received information, from fairly reliable sources, to the effect that Ayúb's march on the Helmand is not so much with the object of fighting with Sher Ali as to keep the country in a state of anarchy, and make its administration and collection of revenue as difficult as possible. Ayúb will, if he can, avoid fighting with the British troops. Sardar Abdúlla Khan Nassar is with Ayúb Khan, and is said to have been mainly instrumental in adjusting the differences existing between the Herat and Kabuli troops, which formerly prevented the march of Ayúb's army. Dissensions still exist. One of Wali Sher Ali's regiments is said to have deserted.”

The Governor of Bombay telegraphs as follows on the 9th :—

“The 2-11th embark on Sunday in fast steamer for Karachi. Commander-in-Chief, on report of medical authorities, proposes to forward 2-11th instead of 2-15th, in consequence of epidemic fever in latter; but one or other will be ready to move as soon as line is clear. Most undesirable to have block of troops at Sibi or elsewhere.”

No. 8.

No. 157 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 13, 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 154, dated the 6th July 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
„ F. P. HAINES.
„ JOHN STRACHEY.
„ E. B. JOHNSON.
„ WHITLEY STOKES.
„ JAMES GIBBS.
„ C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

TELEGRAM, dated 8th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KHUSK-I-NAKHUD, 43 miles from Kandahar, July 7th :—Cavalry brigade arrived here this morning. All well. Some difficulty about supplies at last halting place, but abundance here. General Burrows with infantry nine miles in rear.

Wali writes yesterday from Girishk that enemy's cavalry had reached bank of Khashrud, and that remainder were in Bakwa. Doubtful whether he means remainder of cavalry or regular troops, probably the former.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

9TH JULY 1880.—Mir Karez, 23 miles from Helmund, July 8th :—Cavalry brigade arrived here this morning. All well. Have arranged to break march to-morrow at Oograkh, about 14 miles from here. Infantry brigade at Kushk-i-Nakhud to-day. All well.

Wali sends letter from Washir of 6th, giving intelligence that Ayub arrived at Farah on 30th with entire force. The families of Kabul regiments reached Farah three days

previously; and Muhammad Omar Khan, Nurzai, has undertaken to protect them. The Luinab has collected a depôt of provisions at Dilaram, and his cavalry patrol daily up to the Khash river.

Enclosure 3 in No. 8.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Choghak, six miles from Helmund, July 9th:—Cavalry brigade arrived here this morning, after 18 miles march over rather heavy ground. Ample supplies sent by Wali from Girishk. Heat much increased. Nothing fresh from Herat direction.

Enclosure 4 in No. 8.

TELEGRAM, dated 10th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

THE march of the Herat army under Ayub Khan towards the Helmund has caused much excitement in country, but the impression seems to be that Ayub Khan does not intend to oppose the British, but merely Wali Sher Ali. Four railway coolies were killed near Hari gorge by, it is supposed, the relations of the six Marri reported last week as having been killed by the Sind Horse near Thall. The Marri Chiefs have promised Mr. Duke, Political Officer, to surrender the murderers.

No. 9.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, FOR THE WEEK ENDING THE 17TH JULY 1880. (Extract.)

12th July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports as follows from Kandahar on the 10th:—

“Following telegram received yesterday evening from General Phayre:—*Message begins*,—‘Quetta, 9th July. The Kasmore *band* burst yesterday, and as it is possible that the line may be flooded between Shikarpur and the desert. General Wood, in consultation with Chief Engineer of Railways, is pushing 24th and 9th Native Infantry across the Nari bank, where there are about 250 carts for their transport by Bolan to Quetta. Intelligence received last night that road from Sibi to Harnai impassable, and at Spintangi there is a lake thirty feet deep, sixty yards long; consequently 24th cannot go by that route, as I had intended.’ *Message ends*.”

The Brigadier-General commanding at Jacobabad telegraphs as follows:—

I.—On the 10th. “Your telegram. Flood subsided. Through communication will be restored to Sibi on 17th. Line temporarily repaired, and I have ordered 9th and 24th Native Infantry to proceed immediately, as, owing to breach in Kasmore *band*, big floods are imminent, which might otherwise delay troops till September. Troops now proceeding by hand-shunt waggons over temporary repaired portions of line.”

II.—On the 10th. “Engineer hopes to repair breach, and prevent floods from Kasmore.”

III.—On the 11th. “All danger from Kasmore breach over.”

13th July.—The following messages, dated the 12th, have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Kandahar:—

I.—“The week has passed very quietly, without any alarm. No news of Ayub Khan’s movements received from Colonel St. John. I have heard here, from the Assistant Political, that the Sartip of Kokeran and Sirdar Habibulla Khan have fled from the Wali’s camp to a place called Naozad in Zamindawar. The Wali has sent in

orders to confiscate property of these Sirdars at Kokeran and in Terin. Family of Sartíp fled from Kokeran two days ago; their present whereabouts unknown. A son of the Sartíp made a prisoner here by Wali's son. Head quarters 4th Native Infantry, with 270 men, arrive here to-morrow."

II.—The following telegram, dated Quetta, 11th July, received from General Phayre:—*Message begins*, 'Report received last night that Surgeon Easton and Lieutenant Slater, Royal Engineers, whilst returning from Chapar to Kach with escort of 2nd Sind Horse, were fired on about midway. Lieutenant Slater's horse killed, Dr. Easton's wounded in two places; no further harm done. Captain H. Wylie at Kach. Am expecting further particulars.' *Message ends*. I will telegraph these to you so soon as received.

14th July.—Major-General Phayre telegraph from Quetta on the 13th July as follows:—

"Your telegram of 9th, conveying approval of Government for pile bridge across Nari Ford at Sibi, and branch rail to Pir Chauki. Please let me know to whom I am to apply for aid in crossing the ford. Part of 9th Native Infantry will arrive there this evening, and 24th Native Infantry was to have been brought to the river bank to-morrow, but the Nari came down in flood yesterday, and move of 24th has been temporarily countermanded. Unless some means are devised of crossing the men over the ford, the Kandahar reinforcements will be checked, as it is most inadvisable to collect Native troops at Nari bank if that river is impassable."

The following reports have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Kandahar:

I.—Dated the 13th. "I now have to report that the cavalry and artillery arrived on the bank of the Helmand on the 10th, and the remainder of brigade on the 11th; troops in capital health. The Wali has established a daily post between Girishk and Kandahar. The Superintendent of Telegraphs is expected here 15th, with materials for telegraph line; he will commence laying it as soon as practicable. Head quarters and 270 all ranks, 4th Native Infantry, arrived here to-day; other detachments *en route*. Three companies, 9th Native Infantry, arrived yesterday at Nari, and 24th Native Infantry at Jacobabad for line of communication."

II.—Dated the 13th. "Lieutenant-Colonel St. John reports Ayúb left Farráh; advance guard of his cavalry in Washir. Wali's forces at Girishk and Sádat Kila; he has sent strong body of cavalry to Naozád after the Sartíp. It is said that Lúináb with part of cavalry has left direct road and is moving northwards, probably with the object of raising Zamindawar and getting food."

III.—Dated the 14th. "In continuation of my telegram this morning, St. John writes that an intercepted letter shows Lúináb to have been in Washir on Saturday. Letter says Ayub close behind; they were not then aware of a force having left Kandahar, nor any of our troops being at Girishk."

The following messages have been received from Colonel St. John:—

I.—"Camp, bank of the Helmand, opposite Girishk, July 10th.—Arrived here this morning. All well. No news from Farráh. Three days ago Sartíp Nur Mahomed Khan, cousin of the Wali, attempted to excite the Wali's troops in Washir to mutiny and join Ayúb. On their refusal, he quitted the camp with some 80 horsemen, and has gone to Naozád, 40 miles to north-west of this. Wali has sent Sirdar Gul Mahomed Khan after him."

II.—"Camp, near Girishk, 11th July. General Burrows with infantry brigade arrived this morning. All well. The Helmand is fordable everywhere, and presents no obstacle to passage of an army. Forage and wood in any quantity about the river. Other supplies are being furnished in abundance by Wali. Sirdar Gúl Mahomed Khan marched for Naozád yesterday evening with strong body of cavalry. Trustworthy news has arrived that Ayúb's main body was at Saki in Bakwa on 6th, and that Lúináb was to turn off from that place with the cavalry into Zamindawar. A spy, however, states that Lúináb's main body was two days ago at Dilaram, and that his advance guard of a hundred men had arrived in Washir. The advance column of Wali's troops is about 20 miles north-east of this."

III.—“Girishk, the 13th.—Wali's regular infantry is utterly untrustworthy, having been corrupted by regiment brought by him from Kabul. I am taking measures, in concert with Wali and General Burrows, to minimise (by disarming a ———? or depriving of ammunition) the danger of this disaffection of force in our vicinity; but in face of orders forbidding passage of river, this is no easy matter. I beg that General Burrows may be authorized to use his discretion about crossing river.”

IV.—Dated Girishk, the 13th.—“My telegram to-day. As Ayúb Khan may appear before Girishk on Friday, General Burrows has decided to cross the river to disarm Wali's infantry without waiting for orders, should such a step appear imperatively necessary. If possible he will await authority.”

General Phayre telegraphs from Quetta as follows, on the 14th July:—

I.—“Transport, &c., will be ready at Nari bank for the move of the Europeans, to take place as follows:—

On 20th instant, Head Quarters wing, 11th Foot, will commence moving by 100 a day from Karachi. Next in succession the remaining wing of that regiment will move at 100 men a day from Hyderabad; after this F-2nd Royal Artillery will move in similar way.”

II.—“Your telegram to General Wood, Jacobabad, of this date. Three companies, 9th Native Infantry, crossed Nari ford on night of 12th instant, and marched on Quetta. Yesterday morning a flood was reported, and move of 24th Native Infantry was stopped; but as the water was reported to be rapidly going down it was ordered to move on. I have just received following, of this day, from Major Colvin, Assistant Quarter-master General, who, with Captain Watlin, left Quetta on 11th to arrange camps in Bolan. *Message begins.*—‘Sibi, 11 a.m., 14th. Road to Kirta good; thence to Pir Chauki very fair; from Chauki on, very heavy,—wants attention.’ *Message ends.* Superintending Engineer sent down party of labourers from this on 10th to clear ford between Kirta and Pir Chauki and repair bad *nullah* at Muskaff to which Major Colvin refers. We should, I think, avail ourselves of present break in weather to push up troops as fast as possible. In August the heavy floods may be expected to commence.”

The following reports have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

I.—Dated the 14th.—“Agent Governor-General, Biluchistan, wired yesterday that Kasmore band almost closed; no apprehension of flood reaching railway.”

II.—Dated the 15th.—“Letter received this day from Colonel St. John. No date to it, but presumed 12th July. Ayúb reached Farráh on 1st July, and his advanced cavalry left on 8th. He has 2,500 effective and 1,000 disaffected infantry, 800 regular cavalry, and 1,000 tribal cavalry, with 30 guns. Wali's troops shaky; one regiment all but openly mutinous, rest tainted; they have no ammunition, and St. John told Wali to take measures to put it out of reach. One other Sirdar deserted with his immediate followers, but failed to persuade others to follow him.”

16th July.—The following reports, dated Kandahar the 15th instant, have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

I.—Head quarters 9th crossed the Nari river yesterday morning, with all baggage.”

II.—“Your telegram 14th July. The Wali's troops are encamped on the right bank of the river.* They are in a state of mutiny, and it has been decided to disarm them. All supplies are drawn from the right bank. The fort also on right bank. Should Ayúb's army advance to Girishk, if troops cannot cross, the fort must be abandoned, and supplies of grain would be unobtainable.”

III.—“On the Wali ordering his force to retire from their camp at Kandanak to Girishk, his infantry deserted in a body except officers, taking arms and some ammunition. Cavalry stuck to Wali, and treasury is safe. Wali came across to St. John's camp yesterday. Above news came by sowar sent by Wali to his son here; no news of above from St. John or General Burrows, their latest date being 13. Have requested General Phayre to hasten up 28th and remainder of 4th; on arrival of former purpose sending it to Kúshk-i-Nakhúd. After writing above, following news received by second sowar from Wali,—the Wali's guns and the whole of our† ammunition for guns and small arms were carried off.”

IV.—Information received from Wali that his mutinous troops were followed up by a force despatched by General Burrows. The enemy were overtaken, totally

* The Helmand.

† i.e., given by us to the Wali for his use.

dispersed, 200 killed; gun and baggage taken. I have received no confirmation from General Burrows or Colonel St. John, but I think the information may be relied upon."

The following telegram, dated Simla the 15th July, has been addressed by the Commander-in-Chief to Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

"15th July.—Wali's troops having deserted, the situation has completely changed. General Burrows must act according to his own judgment, reporting fully. He must act with caution on account of distance of support."

Sir Robert Sandeman telegraphs as follows from Quetta this day:—

"Telegram from General Primrose states Wali's infantry and guns with ammunition have deserted. General has ordered 28th Regiment from line of communication to Kandahar to ensure peace. I recommend Thal-Chotiali garrison, which is immediately equipped, being relieved by troops from Punjab, to enable it to act as moveable column along Harnai-Chaman line of communication."

17th July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports as follows from Kandahar on the 16th:—

I.—"Following movements reported along the line yesterday:—Head Quarters 9th Native Infantry arrived at Pir Chauki; 24th Native Infantry crossed Nari: detachment 4th Native Infantry arrived Quetta; one company 10th Native Infantry marched for Gulistan; detachment 230 men of 16th Native Infantry marched from Chapar to relieve 28th at Chaman."

II.—Information received from General Burrows of the mutiny of Wali's infantry and their deserting him, taking with them artillery and baggage. He went in pursuit with E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, five companies 66th Foot, three companies Jacob's Rifles, and 400 cavalry. Guns and baggage recovered and brought back to camp about 8 p.m. Enemy's loss computed 40 killed; our loss three men 66th wounded, and several horses killed. Full particulars to Adjutant-General on receipt. No certain news of Ayub's movements.

Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta under date the 16th:—

"The 9th and 24th Native Infantry are now marching up Bolan, and I am trying to push the Madras cavalry to Kandahar as quickly as possible without interfering with the transport of European troops. Colonel Lindsay has placed an Engineer to construct raft for crossing Nari ford, in anticipation of construction of pile bridge."

No. 10.

No. 162 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 20, 1880.

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 157, dated 13th July 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

"

F. P. HAINES.

"

JOHN STRACHEY.

"

E. B. JOHNSON.

"

WHITLEY STOKES.

"

JAMES GIBBS.

"

C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 12th July 1880.

From Lieutenant MUIR, Kandahar, to FOREIGN UNDER, Simla.

News confirmed that Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan and Habibulla, son of Sirdar Khairulla Khan, have deserted from Wali's force and gone to Naozad. They had accompanied advanced force to Washir. Nothing further is known of their intentions. They had no following. Wali has written to his son here to confiscate their property.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 14th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, July 12th.—An intercepted letter from Luinab shows that he was at Washir on the 10th, and that Ayub was not far in rear. Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, failing to persuade the Naozad people to rise, has gone to Washir. A son of Sirdar Ghulam Muhiuddin Khan deserted the Wali's advanced guard yesterday with 20 men to join the Sartip.

Enclosure 3 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, July 14th, 9.30 a.m.—All arrangements having been made by Wali for crossing to our side river and his baggage packed, Kabul regiment mutinied, seized guns and Wali's baggage, and drove his cavalry across river. Rest of infantry joined them, and they are now moving along west bank. Cavalry are going in pursuit.

Enclosure 4 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, July 14th.—Cavalry, horse artillery, and eight companies infantry pursued mutineers, who were marching along west bank of river for several miles, and captured all their six guns which came into action to cover retreat, but after a few rounds from horse artillery were abandoned. Majority of infantry had previously dispersed, but a few desperate men held some enclosures and had to be dislodged by infantry. Mutineers' loss not great; may have amounted to 40 or 50; our loss one man, 66th, killed, and two wounded, with some horses. Captured guns and waggons brought in to our camp.

Ayub's army is to-day at Bibanak, three marches distant. Seven deserters from Ayub's regular cavalry arrived here. They left army at Washir, and state Sartip Nur Muhammad has replaced Luinab in command of advanced cavalry, having declared to Ayub that Luinab was in correspondence with Wali. They also declare that Nur Muhammad has advised Ayub to remain in Zamindawar with regulars, while he raised the country with the tribal cavalry.

Enclosure 5 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, 14th, 9.30 a.m.—Ayub Khan is probably at Lar, two marches distant.

Enclosure 6 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 17th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP MIRKAREZ, July 16th.—Loss and discomfiture of mutineers greater than at first reported. Forty-six bodies were found and buried by villagers, among them colonel of artillery and a captain of Kabul regiment, in which most casualties took place. Part of this regiment marched westward yesterday, but all the others dispersed to their homes on evening of 14th. I found that all the flour and ghee collected by Wali for our use in his camp and the fort had been plundered and carried off. This left force entirely dependent on foraging, from which little was to be expected in neighbourhood of Girishk. The river offering in its present condition no obstacle in any place to the passage of troops, the Wali's army having ceased to exist, and reports reaching me from different quarters that Ayub's intention was to cross river further north, if at all, General Burrows determined rightly, in my opinion, to fall back on Kushk-i-Nakhud, where several roads from Helmund to Kandahar meet, where supplies are abundant and communication with Kandahar easy. Accordingly entire force marched last night 23 miles to this place, and goes on to Kushk-i-Nakhud, eight miles further, to-morrow. The Wali is with us, part of his cavalry has dispersed; part is at Kushk-i-Nakhud with his nephews and other Sirdars.

Post from Kandahar interrupted for one day and bags lost, but is now coming in regularly. Captured guns brought with us, but three waggons with their ammunition destroyed for want of carriage.

Enclosure 7 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 19th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUD, July 17th.—Force arrived here this morning. All well. Principal Sirdars and Chiefs are here, with about 500 horses. The Alizais of Zamindawar accompanied them, but asked and obtained leave to return to their homes to protect their families and property.

Many of the mutineers have been seized and disarmed, while passing through this on the way to their homes.

As far as can be ascertained the country about here is quiet.

No news of Ayub's force.

Enclosure 8 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 19th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP, Kushki-i-Nakhud, July 18th.—All quiet in this vicinity *en route* to Kandahar, whence post and single messengers pass constantly without trouble. All accounts tend to show that mutineers, with few exceptions, have returned to their homes, many without arms. Two hundred of Ayub's cavalry reached Girishk yesterday and sent back word of its evacuation to main body then at Mahmudabad, some 16 or 20 miles distant. A servant of Wali's taken off by mutineers to camp of advanced cavalry, states that story of Luinab having been disgraced is untrue, and that he was apparently preparing to cross the river above Girishk. The camp here moves two miles nearer Girishk to-morrow. Supplies are plentiful; immense quantities of grain lying unthrashed in fields round camp, but wood is scarce.

No. 11.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA FOR THE WEEK ENDING THE 24TH JULY 1880. (Extract.)

17th July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports as follows from Kandahar on the 16th:—

I.—“Following movements reported along the line yesterday:—Head Quarters 9th Native Infantry arrived at Pir Chauki; 24th Native Infantry crossed Nari; detachment

4th Native Infantry arrived Quetta; one company 10th Native Infantry marched for Gulistán; detachment 230 men of 16th Native Infantry marched from Chapar to relieve 28th at Chaman."

II.—"Information received from General Burrows of the mutiny of Wali's infantry and their deserting him, taking with them artillery and baggage. He went in pursuit with E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, five companies 66th Foot, three companies Jacob's Rifles, and 400 cavalry. Guns and baggage recovered and brought back to camp about 8 p.m. Enemy's loss computed 40 killed; our loss three men 66th wounded, and several horses killed. Full particulars to Adjutant-General on receipt. No certain news of Ayúb's movements.

Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta under date the 16th:—

"The 9th and 24th Native Infantry are now marching up Bolan, and I am trying to push the Madras Cavalry to Kandahar as quickly as possible without interfering with the transport of European troops. Colonel Lindsay has placed an Engineer to construct raft for crossing Nari ford in anticipation of construction of pile bridge.

18th July.—Extract from the diary of the Kandahar Residency, under date the 26th June 1880.

"Letters, the last dated 5th instant, arrived from an agent in Herat that Ayúb Khan, with all the regular troops, was encamped outside the city. The writer did not think it probable that he would be able to march, and felt sure that if they did, the Heratis and Kabulis would fall out on the road. He gives the detail of Ayúb Khan's army as follows:—

Kabulis.—Five infantry regiments, three batteries of artillery, three regiments of cavalry, (each about 300 men).

Kandaharis.—One regiment of infantry of 480 men, and one battery of artillery.

Heratis.—Four regiments of infantry of 360 men each, with one field and one mule battery.) This includes one regiment and one battery at Farraháh).

"Four thousand tribal horsemen had been ordered to assemble, but there were no signs of their doing so.

"The carriage required was estimated at 1,200 camels, of which 700 were ready."

19th July.—The following telegrams have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose, from Kandahar:—

I.—Dated the 17th.—"General Burrows reports that he has moved his force back from Helmand to Kúshk-i-Nakhúd, there to wait events or orders. This move was necessitated by there being no supplies for troops, nor grain for horses; the little there was on right bank was carried off or destroyed by mutineers. This point is of most strategic importance, having several roads converging on it. As the river Helmand is fordable, Ayúb could cross anywhere. I am of opinion General Burrows has acted judiciously in the matter."

II.—Dated the 18th.—"All quiet here, but there is an uneasy feeling in country around and along the line towards Chaman. Precautionary measures, however, have been taken, and the successive march of detachments now on move towards Kandahar will have the necessary reassuring effect."

III.—Dated the 18th.—"No letters or reports have been received to-day from General Burrows or Colonel St. John."

20th July.—General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 19th:—

"The European artillery and infantry, which were to have commenced moving tomorrow, have been put off until 23rd instant, owing to difficulty of getting their commissariat stores across break in railway."

The following reports, dated the 19th, have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Kandahar:—

I.—"Yesterday a gházi attacked a man, 4th Native Infantry, in city bazar; ghazi was felled and bayoneted, since dead. At 2.30 a.m. this morning a patrol was fired at from behind a wall close to cantonment bazar; one native officer slightly, one sowar mortally wounded, one horse killed, one wounded. The men who fired supposed to be some of Wali's mutinous infantry returned from Girishk. Wing 28th Native Infantry and detachment 4th Native Infantry left Chaman last night for Kandahar."

II.—“Your telegram 18th.—Taking into consideration that the Helmand is now fordable everywhere, it presents no obstacle to the advance of Ayúb at any point he chooses to cross it. Khúshk-i-Nakhúd is an important position, covering roads leading from the Helmand to Kandahar. Whilst remaining on the Helmand forage and grain could hardly be obtained, whereas they are plentiful at Khúshk-i-Nakhúd. Between the latter place and Girishk there is a desert, 25 miles broad. General Burrows, at Khúshk-i-Nakhúd, is within fair supportable distance from Kandahar. The presence of a force there has the effect of keeping the people quiet. At present I am unable to obtain any definite intelligence of Ayúb's movements; an impression is abroad that he will not meet our troops in the open, but that, if he crosses the river at all, he will do so to the north of Girishk, and perhaps make for Ghazni, for political reasons. As regards Kandahar, great uneasiness prevails in the city; large numbers of the families are leaving daily, fearing the approach of Ayúb. There are of course a number of disaffected men in and about Kandahar ready for a disturbance if they get a chance. I keep the city constantly patrolled, and have placed three 40-pounders of 5-11th in the citadel, which has had the effect of quieting the minds of the peaceably disposed.

“Units of reinforcements will probably arrive here,—detachment 4th Native Infantry on 24th; details 28th Native Infantry on 25th, 26th, and 27th; last detachment 4th Native Infantry on 28th; 9th and 24th Native Infantry are now in Bolan, and will be in position probably 24th and 30th July. The 11th Foot come up Bolan in cart carriage, beginning by companies, on 20th, and doing double stages to Dozan; one wing will be concentrated at Quetta on 1st August, leave Quetta 3rd, and reach Kandahar about 15th; two more companies will leave three days later, and last two form escort to F-2nd Royal Artillery. Information about Madras Cavalry not yet received from General Phayre. Will wire to-morrow.”

III.—“Advanced guard of Ayúb Khan appears to have reached Girishk. Nothing certain known about Ayúb himself to-day.”

21st July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports as follows from Kandahar on the 20th:—

I.—“Following telegram received from General Phayre. *Message begins*, ‘Quetta, 19th July. Have just heard from Karachi that European infantry cannot move until 23rd, owing to delay in getting their commissariat stores across break in railways.’—*Message ends*.”

II.—“General Phayre has ordered Madras Cavalry to move at once; they will take posts furnished by the Poona Horse, which will be concentrated here.”

It has been ascertained that the Wali's mutinous infantry succeeded in carrying off with them 1,700 out of 2,000 muskets that had been given to the Wali by the British Government.

Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 21st instant.

Report from Sibi that Nari in high flood since yesterday evening. Arrangements for raft and wire ropes will be completed this evening; horses must swim across. Fresh break of fifty feet said to have occurred in railway twenty-four miles south of Sibi. The 9th and 24th Native Infantry are marching steadily up Bolan.”

22nd July.—Major-General Phayre telegraphs from Quetta on the 21st instant:—

“Agent, Governor-General, has just sent following to Foreign, Simla:—‘I have received fairly trustworthy information that Ayúb Khan meditates a night attack on General Burrows' camp with a combined body of cavalry and *gházis*; also on our communications in the Gúlistan, from Shoráwák. There is much excitement amongst the tribes. *Múllahs* of influence are moving about preaching *jehád*. The movement in Ayúb's favor is more extended and determined than, I think, believed at Kandahar. *Message ends*.”

The Brigadier-General commanding at Jacobabad telegraphs as follows:—

I.—On the 21st. “Another slight break in railway from hill floods, but will be repaired by to-morrow.”

II.—On the 22nd. “The whole of the Madras Cavalry, as follows: 10 European officers, 16 Native officers, 389 rank and file, 601 followers, 407 horses, leave for Sibi to-night in three trains.”

The following telegrams, dated the 21st, have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose, from Kandahar:

I.—“General Phayre reports Nari in high flood yesterday evening. Arrangements have been made to pass over Madras Cavalry, but delay may occur, owing to fresh break of fifty feet in railway line.”

II.—“Information from General Burrows, dated 19th. He has shifted his camp to a very eligible spot, three miles nearer Girishk. He reports 2,100 Ayúb's cavalry have arrived at Girishk, he (Ayúb) himself being at Mahmúdabad, 17 miles in rear, with his infantry and guns. It is reported that he intends to move either to the north of Girishk or the south of the Arghasán Valley, but this is merely surmise. He (General Burrows) has utilized the guns taken from the Wali by manning them from E.-B. and 66th regiment. I am sending out to-night, by forced marches, 12 of the Wali's artillery horses and harness, &c., to complete this battery as far as practicable, under an escort of 50 sabres, 3rd Sind Horse, whom I have directed to remain as a temporary arrangement with General Burrow, as he wished his cavalry increased.”

III.—General Burrows, under date 20th, writes:—“Situation remains unchanged. Travellers who have passed Ayúb's camp say things are not going on smoothly there, and that in all probability there will be a split before they reached the Helmand. General Burrows ready for them. Troops healthy and in excellent spirits.”

IV.—“News just received from Colonel St. John and General Burrows that Ayúb with his regulars, reached the Helmand on 20th. He has sent back his carriage for baggage, left a day's march in rear. Tribal sowars and some *gházis* have joined him. His intention stated to be to move *viâ* Sangbúr and Mir Karéz and attack General Burrows. At Sangbúr there are 200 *gházis*, with two standards. Spy states Lúinab with cavalry had moved down river, intending to skirt desert and attack.”

V.—“Three companies, 9th Native Infantry, arrived at Quetta this evening. Two hundred rifles of 10th and fifty sabres 2nd Sind Horse marched to-day on Kach, to accompany Captain Wylie to Kawás to collect revenue.”

VI.—“General Brooke and Major Adams, returning from the Argandab Valley, were shot at by men in hills at the Kotal-i-Múrchá this morning; one horse of escort shot dead. Parties sent out to capture the men unsuccessful up to 4 p.m.”

23rd July.—The following letter (No. 435-K, dated Kandahar, 8th July) has been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

“With reference to my telegram of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the Political Officer at Harnái having ascertained that the men implicated in killing the followers belonged to Lekeram near Babian, parties were sent out from the detachments of the 5th Native Light Infantry at Sínári and Spene Kach, with fifteen sabres of the 2nd Sind Horse, under Captain Lucas, to exact retribution, and accompanied by the Political Officer.

“The *Malik's* house was burnt down, one Pathan shot, nine made prisoners, and a large number of cattle, sheep, and goats brought in, together with the wives and children of those who bolted, without any loss on our side.”

The following telegram has been received from General Primrose, dated the 22nd July 1880:—

“General Phayre has sent me copy of a telegram forwarded by Agent, Governor General, to Foreign, extract from which is as follows:—‘In the Gulistan direction from Shorawak there is much excitement amongst the tribes. *Múllahs* of influence are moving about preaching *jehad*. The movement in Ayúb's favour is more extended and determined than is, I think, believed at Kandahar.’”

“With reference to above and present state of affairs, I would strongly recommend for consideration of Commander-in-Chief that General Phayre should concentrate a brigade or flying column, according to his judgment or further political news, either at Chaman or Killa Abdúla, as he may decide; the troops to be taken from the line between Sibi and Gwal, but on no account should the regiments under orders for Kandahar be interfered with, as the chief line of communication is the Bolan and *viâ* Quetta.”

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has sent the following reply to Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

“Yours of to-day. Chief concurs that troops under orders for Kandahar should not be interfered with. Arrange with Agent, Governor General, and General Phayre, regarding concentration of flying column at Chaman or Kila Abdúlla, if found necessary; no reference here needed. It has been ascertained, however, that there are considerable quantities of railway plant and stores between Sibi and Harnái; these must not be left unprotected.”

The following messages, dated the 22nd, have also been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose:—

I.—“Madras Cavalry leave Jacobabad this evening; all ready for them at Nari. First detachment European Infantry leave Karachi to-morrow. First detachment 9th Native Infantry arrive here to-morrow. All through Bolan.”

II.—“Letter from General Burrows, dated evening of 21st. No further news.”

The health of the 68th Foot having deteriorated to such an extent as to unfit it for field service if called upon, the 70th Foot (now at Sabáthú and Umballa) has been substituted for it on the rolls of the Bengal Reserve Division.

24th July.—The following messages have this day been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose, from Kandahar:—

I.—Dated the 23rd. “Report received from General Burrows, dated 22nd. No further news regarding Ayúb. Our force at Khúshk-i-Nakhúd well entrenched and defended against any night attack. Supplies plentiful, except wood, which is very scarce.”

“A detachment, 4th Native Infantry, escorting ammunition, arrives here to-morrow, and 200 rifles, 28th Native Infantry, the day after.”

II.—Dated the 23rd. “Report just received from Colonel St. John. Spies state that Ayúb has crossed the Helmand at Háidarabad. Party of his cavalry came yesterday to Sangbúr and returned again. Small party of *gházis* collected there; stated that they expected 5,000 horsemen to arrive to-day and main body to-morrow. Few supplies at Sangbúr, so Ayúb cannot halt there more than one day. Report raises number of men who have joined Ayúb to 4,000.

III.—Dated the 24th. “On morning of 23rd, our cavalry patrol, proceeding in the direction of Sangbúr, came upon the enemy’s advanced parties. Lieutenant Monteith, 3rd Sind Horse, who was in command, sent in word to camp, and dismounting some of his men, checked the enemy, who retired out of range. Brigadier-General Nuttall, with 180 sabres, 3rd Light Cavalry, and two guns, E.-B., Royal Horse Artillery, now came up, and a reconnaissance reported 600 sowars marching parallel with a body of infantry, three miles beyond our advanced post. General Nuttall advanced with 160 sabres and two guns for about three miles, the enemy retiring. When he got within 1,800 yards of the cavalry, our men opened on them, and they bolted faster than ever, making for cover. General Nuttall pursued until he was six miles from camp, when he gave up the chase. Some horses of the enemy were killed, and men carried off wounded. No infantry were seen.”

No. 12.

No. 169 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 27, 1880.

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 162, dated 20th July 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty’s Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
 ” F. P. HAINES.
 ” JOHN STRACHEY.
 ” E. B. JOHNSON.
 ” WHITLEY STOKES.
 ” JAMES GIBBS.
 ” C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 20th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushk-i-Nakhud, July 19th.—This morning General Burrows shifted his camp three miles back towards Girishk. Fifteen hundred or two thousand of Ayub's sowars arrived at Girishk yesterday. Main body still at Mahmudabad. Considerable numbers of ghazis have passed along by roads to join Ayub, Abubekr, Alizai, who murdered Colonel Moore's Munshi last year, and headed the force at Colonel Malcolmson's engagement here, is said to have brought a number of men from Zamindawar. In our neighbourhood all quiet. Cavalry patrols regularly for ten miles in every direction.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st July 1880.

From Lieutenant MUIR, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GENERAL BROOKE and Major Adam, Assistant Quartermaster-General, escorted by four sowars, were fired at by two men this morning in the Kotal-i-murch, a steep pass leading into the Arghandab valley, about five miles distant from cantonments. One of the sowar's horses was killed. Parties of cavalry and infantry were immediately sent out to surround the hills, and it is hoped that the men may be caught.

Shortly afterwards a report, probably caused by our troops being seen leaving cantonments, spread among the town people that the enemy were approaching, and a panic ensued. Order was quickly restored, and all is quiet and as usual.

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushki-Nakhud, July 20th.—No symptoms of advance by Ayub, whose cavalry have not yet crossed the river. The country in this vicinity quiet, except about the Arghandeh, where Achakzai nomads are committing depredation.

Enclosure 4 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushk-i-Nakhud, July 21st, 9 a.m.—Enemy's main body reached Helmund about 12 miles above Girishk yesterday, and sent back camels to bring up baggage and stores left behind at last stage for want of carriage. A considerable number of tribal sowars, mutineers, and ghazis had joined them. It is stated to be Ayub's intention to attack us here, moving by Sangbar road. Luinab with a large number of cavalry is reported to have moved down the Helmund with intention of crossing to Arghandab and attacking our camp; but this requires confirmation.

Enclosure 5 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 23rd July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushk-i-Nakhud, July 22nd.—Spies report that Ayub's troops have crossed the Helmund at Haidarabad. A party of his cavalry came yesterday to Sangbar, 14 miles from here, but returned again. A small party of ghazis, who have collected there, state that they expected 4,000 horsemen to arrive to-day, and the main body to-morrow. Few supplies being available at Sangbar, Ayub cannot halt there beyond a day. Being apprehensive of a night attack by the enemy's numerous cavalry, General Burrows has

shifted his camp to a new position, in which the stores, sick, and baggage animals are in an enclosure. Report raises number of ghazis and men, who have joined Ayub, to 4,000.

Enclosure 6 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUJ, July 23rd, 9 a.m.—Intelligence brought last night that Luinab with 400 sowars was moving on Maiwand to collect provisions. Main body of enemy was yesterday still at Haidarabad on this side river. Cavalry reconnaissance going towards Sangbar met about 400 enemy's sowars moving towards Maiwand. A demonstration of cavalry and artillery made them retreat by the road they had come. They state that regular troops will remain in reserve pushing forward cavalry and ghazis. Neither will attempt to move by main road, but keep along foot of hills. Herati regiments reported to be very uneasy at being taken so far from home.

Enclosure 7 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th July 1880.

From Lieutenant MUIR, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

IN and around the city all is quiet. A few shots were fired from outside last night at the Shikarpur Gate, where a guard of our troops is stationed. No one was hurt. The Arghastan, Kadanai, and Derawat districts are slightly disturbed. The rest quiet. No more reports of gatherings, most of the malcontents having probably left to join Ayub. No further news of Abu Said's sons, who were reported trying to raise a gathering in Kadanai.

On the 14th, Muhammad Aslam with a body of sowars attacked a fort near Kelat-i-Ghilzai, occupied by Sirdar's men collecting revenue. He was repulsed. By latest accounts he was near Shahjui, with a following of about 40 men. District otherwise quiet.

Enclosure 8 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUJ, 24th.—Retirement of enemy's cavalry this morning complete. None have passed us.

Enclosure 9 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 25th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUJ, July 24th.—Reconnoitring parties sent out to Sangbar and Maiwand this morning saw no signs of the enemy. The cavalry driven back yesterday was commanded by the Luinab and fell back from Sangbar to the Helmund. Last night a body of 450 cavalry crossed the hills to the north three days ago, and came down to the Arghandab valley in our rear. It is believed to have been sent by the Sartip to bring away his family hidden in the villages there. A Populzai Khan of Khakrez has brought in letter from Ayub, calling on him to join his army, and reports that Habibulla Khan, Barakzai, has passed up the valley trying to make the people rise. He has as yet had little success, though there is much excitement throughout the country. Much mischief is caused by false reports that the Wali is a prisoner in our camp. Fifty sowars of the Sind Horse arrived here from Kandahar on the 21st, and found road quiet.

No. 13.

TELEGRAM from GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY, 28th July 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

PRIMROSE telegraphs to-day from Kandahar :—Terrible disaster. General Burrows' force annihilated. We are going into citadel. General Phayre telegraphed to collect what forces he can, and march on Kandahar. Posts are being concentrated at Chaman. Message ends. I have telegraphed Simla. We can send another brigade if necessary.

No. 14.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 28th July 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

GENERAL BURROWS has been seriously defeated by Ayub Khan. Primrose has vacated cantonments at Kandahar and retired to citadel. We are pushing forward reinforcements already on their way, as quickly as possible, and sending large additional reinforcements from India. It may be necessary to anticipate despatch of troops from England intended for this season's reliefs.

No. 14A.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 28th July 1880, to VICEROY.

In event of reinforcements at Kandahar being urgently required, cannot Stewart spare force now with Roberts or Watson.

No. 15.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DURING THE WEEK ENDING THE 31ST JULY 1880. (Extract.)

26th July.—The following messages have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Candahar :—

I.—Dated the 24th.—“Report received this morning from General Burrows that a cavalry reconnoitring patrol towards Sangbúr sighted 600 enemy's cavalry yesterday morning. Patrol kept them in check; was reinforced by 180 sabres and two guns; opened fire at 1,800 yards; killed two horses of enemy, who bolted and could not be caught up. News of this had spread in the city. Madras cavalry crossed Nari last night, and march to-night to Pir Chauki. Thirty sabres Poona Horse from Khúshdil Khan arrived Chaman to-day *en route* to Kandahar.”

II.—Dated the 24th.—“The guard on the ramparts over the Shikárpúr gate was fired at from outside by eight or nine men concealed behind wall of a garden. The fire was returned by the guard, and the men disappeared. The Superintendent of Telegraphs finds it impossible to lay line at present to Khúshk-i-Nakhúd, as no labourers will work outside the city walls.”

III.—Dated the 25th.—“Information received this evening that Ayúb's cavalry fell back last night to Helmand. Report received to the effect that 150 cavalry crossed into the Argandáb three days ago; believed to have been sent to take back Sartíp's family, hidden in village there. Efforts appear to be made by Habibúlla Khan, Barakzái, to raise people in Kakrez, without much success. There is much excitement throughout the country.”

IV.—Dated the 25th.—“General Burrows reports that in the event of enemy moving up north, he purposes sending back superfluous baggage and sick to Kandahar, and moving up Kakrez Valley, opening up fresh line of communication.”

Brigadier-General Wood reports from Jacobabad on the 26th :—

“One hundred men, 2-11th Regiment, passed through last night for Sibi.”

27th July.—The following reports, dated Kandahar the 26th, have been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose :—

I.—“General Phayre writes :—*Message begins*, ‘First detachment 11th Foot expect to arrive Nari bank this morning; remainder are *en route* in succession; will reach Nari Bank at 4 a.m. daily. Transport officer had gone himself to Múskaff to assist Madras Cavalry. Weather much cooler there.’—*Message ends*.”

II.—Your telegram 21st July. General Burrows states that should the enemy advance direct on Maiwand or on Khúshk-i-Nakhúd, he is prepared to attack him,

should he attempt to reach Maiwand *via* Malwand, he would intercept him by Gúrmá Valley. Should Ayúb's force try to avoid him by taking road to Nish *via* Melwand and Ghorak, he proposes to move by Maiwand in Kakrez. To do this he will reduce his baggage and send back some sick reported unfit, and I will assist him in every way to lighten his column and make it more moveable."

III.—"General Phayre reports that, owing to information received of an intended attack, he proposes to move head-quarters 9th (250) strong and two mountain guns to Gúlistán as nucleus of a moveable column. Last night at Kandahar some men outside the city walls fired a volley at the sentry on the rampart and then bolted; no one hurt."

28th July.—General Phayre telegraphs from Quetta on the 27th:—

"Two mountain guns and head-quarters 9th (373 all ranks), left last night for Gúlistán to form nucleus of flying column, and will arrive on 30th instant. As 24th arrive here to-morrow morning, I can use part of them to support Pishin, if necessary. I can manage to collect 250 cavalry from Quetta and outposts."

The following telegram has been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose, dated Kandahar the 27th:—

"General Burrows' force completely defeated. We take refuge in citadel. Thirty sowars have escaped."

General Phayre telegraphs from Quetta on the 28th that the telegraph beyond Chaman is stopped.

Consequent on the disaster to Brigadier-General Burrows' brigade near Khúshk-i-Nakhúd on the 26th instant, the following corps have been warned for immediate service in Southern Afghanistan:—

H-1st Royal Artillery	-	-	Mooltan.
8th Bengal Cavalry	-	-	Mooltan.
2nd Battalion 2nd Foot	-	-	Bareilly.
63rd Foot	-	-	Umballa.
3rd Bengal Native Infantry	-	-	Dinapore.
4th " " "	-	-	Ferozepore.
14th " " "	-	-	Umballa.
38th " " "	-	-	Meerut.

The Bombay Government having, however, intimated that they can spare M-1st Royal Artillery, the 2nd Battalion 15th Foot, and two regiments of Native infantry, it is probable that the 2nd Foot and the 14th and 38th Native infantry will not be required to move.

The Commander-in-Chief has intimated that A-C, Royal Horse Artillery, is also available if required for active service in the field.

The following message, dated Quetta the 28th, has been received from Sir Robert Sandeman:—

"Before the telegraphic communication ceased at 11 o'clock this morning, the following news was received from General Primrose:—Following officers belonging to General Burrows' force had safely reached Kandahar: Dr. Burroughs, Eaton, Harvey, Mainwaring, Geoghegan, Oliver, Griffith, Whittuck, Dane. Small parties of Burrows' force constantly arriving. Enemy appear only to have pursued for three or four miles. Extent of our losses not yet ascertained, but feared to be very severe. Two guns lost. Jacob's Rifles lost Smith, Justice, and Cole killed. In Bombay Grenadiers, Anderson severely wounded, Aslett killed. Of Royal Horse Artillery, Osborne killed, Blackwood wounded. In 3rd Cavalry, Mayne and Reid wounded. In 66th, Roberts killed, Lynch wounded. Enemy very strong in guns; believed to have 35, which they work well. General Primrose mentions that he has sent out General Brooke to bring in stragglers."

The following are the officers referred to in the preceding message:—

Killed.

Lieutenant E. G. Osborne	-	-	E-B, Royal Horse Artillery.
Captain W. Roberts	-	-	66th Foot.

Lieutenant W. C. Aslett	-	-	1st Bombay Native Infantry.
Captain H. F. Smith	-	-	} 30th Bombay Native Infantry.
Lieutenant D. Cole	-	-	
Lieutenant W. N. Justice	-	-	

Wounded.

Major G. F. Blackwood	-	-	E-B, Horse Artillery.
Captain M. Mayne	-	-	} 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry.
Lieutenant J. H. E. Reid	-	-	
2nd-Lieutenant H. Lynch	-	-	66th Foot.
Lieutenant-Colonel H. S. Anderson	-	-	1st Bombay Native Infantry.

Escaped unhurt.

Surgeon-Major C. H. Harvey, M.D.	-	-	E-B., Royal Horse Artillery.
Lieutenant T. P. Geoghegan	-	-	3rd Bombay Light Cavalry.
Surgeon G. E. Burroughs	-	-	3rd Sind Horse.
Major C. V. Oliver	-	-	66th Foot.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Griffith	-	-	} 1st Bombay Native Infantry.
Lieutenant F. Whittuck	-	-	
Surgeon A. H. C. Dane	-	-	} 16th Bombay Native Infantry.
Surgeon J. B. Eaton, M.B.	-	-	
Colonel W. G. Mainwaring	-	-	30th Bombay Native Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. St. John, Royal Engineers, the Political Officer, is also reported to have escaped.

30th July.—General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 28th :—

“ I have seven Native infantry regiments on line of communication. Three of these will be required,—one for Sibi and Bolan, one for Quetta, one for line of posts to Chaman. This leaves four regiments for field column. In addition I have 2-11th Foot and F-2nd Royal Artillery, coming up from Sind. If in addition to these you send me one European infantry regiment and a field battery in succession to F-2nd, I think I shall have enough infantry and artillery to advance with. As regards cavalry, I ought to have at least nine squadrons, which I think I can make up from that on the line of communication, including Madras Cavalry. It would take at least fifteen days to form and equip this force here, and in Pishin, and within that time I hope to have sufficient transport. But certain movements of the enemy reported to be now taking place against Chaman may oblige me to push troops to the Kojak. I have Major Westmacott there, giving me information; and Agent Governor General also sent out men. I commence withdrawal of troops from railway line by retiring the Thal-Chotiali force on Harnái, whence it will march on Pishin, making over station to *maliks* and collecting the troops now posted along that line. Simultaneously with the advance from Harnái the Political Officer and Officer Commanding at Sibi will return to each post and settle with the *maliks* about stores, materials, &c., left behind between Spin Tangi and Nari mouth. The posts of the 23rd Native Infantry thus withdrawn take up the line of communication from Sibi to Siriáb by Bolán. In answer to your question about F-2nd, I do not think there is any necessity for altering the present arrangement. But H-1st should bring everything. I would recommend Colonel James, of 10th Bombay Native Infantry, now in command at Quetta, for the command of the line of communications. With regard to Native infantry and cavalry named in your telegram, I will communicate with you hereafter.

The following reply, dated Simla the 29th July, has been sent to Major-General Phayre by the Quarter Master General :—

“ Yours 28th Chief considers very satisfactory and assuring. Carry out original arrangement about F-2nd, and H-1st will be sent with equipment complete. Let me know as soon as possible when you will be ready for it. 63rd to be at Sukkur in detachments. There will perhaps be some modification in troops from this side, as Bombay can furnish some more. Do you wish for a British cavalry regiment ? ”

31st July.—The following arrangements for the provision of troops for service on the Kandahar line have been approved :—

To proceed from the Bengal Presidency :—

H-1st Royal Artillery.
8th Bengal Cavalry.
63rd Foot.

3rd Native Infantry.
 4th
 To be detailed from Bombay :—
 M-1st Royal Artillery.
 15th Foot.
 ———Native Infantry.

The 3rd Bombay Native Infantry, belonging to the Reserve Division, being in a weakly state, the 8th will be substituted for it. The 78th Highlanders and the 15th Bombay Native Infantry will be sent to Sind immediately to replace corps pushed forward from that province to the Kandahar line.

No. 5-8th Royal Artillery is to be sent from Kirkee to Kandahar *via* Allahabad and Lahore, in order that the sea passage to Karachi, which is considered dangerous at this season, may be avoided. It is possible, however, that this arrangement may yet have to be altered, cholera having appeared at Allahabad.

The following messages, dated Quetta, the 30th, have been received from Major-General Phayre:

I. *Quetta, 30th July.*—Your telegram of last night, ending with question about British cavalry. The cavalry work between Chaman and Kandahar, for nearly eighty miles, will be severe. The enemy, it is said, has some Turcoman cavalry with him. The great difficulty with us now is want of forage, no rain to speak of having fallen since end of 1878. I was about to apply for the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Gonne, 17th Lancers at Mhow, as brigadier of cavalry. Of course I should like to have his regiment also; and if we get rain shortly, the forage difficulty may be overcome. It is clear that with regard to cavalry and artillery, Ayúb Khan's force is far superior to any we have yet encountered, and I want to be strong in both."

II.—"Following report just received from Sibi:—*Begins*—'Your telegram. Sowars will be posted at once to bring in news if flood in Bolan occurs. General Wood arrived this morning. Morning cool. The 11th Regiment men look in splendid order and spirits.'—*Telegram ends.* First detachment 11th is at Dozan this morning; second detachment and Madras Cavalry at Mach."

III.—"On the morning of the 28th General Primrose ordered the Abdul Rehman, Mel Karez, Dabrai and Gatai posts to fall back on Chaman. The march has been accomplished safely under command of Major Jacob, 19th Native Infantry; and 96 sabres, Poona Horse, 25 sappers under Lieutenant D'Aguilar, R.E., and 190 rifles of the 19th Native Infantry have reached Chaman. They were attacked twice *en route* by villagers and killed several of the enemy. Particulars will be ascertained."

The 15th Hussars have been placed under orders to proceed immediately on service towards Kandahar.

No. 15a.

TELEGRAM FROM VICEROY, 3rd August 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

In consequence of telegrams received this morning, a powerful force of all arms under command of Sir Frederick Roberts has been ordered to march on Kandahar from Kabul.

No. 16.

No. 175 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

TO THE RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, August 3, 1880.

In forwarding, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of further telegrams regarding the state of affairs in Afghanistan, in continuation of those forwarded with our Despatch, No. 169, dated 27th July 1880, we have the honour to summarize, as follows, the information which they contain regarding the reverse sustained by the force under command of Brigadier-General Burrows.

2. On the 12th July news reached Colonel St. John, the Political Officer with General Burrows' force, that the advanced portion of Ayub Khan's army was at Washir, and that Ayub Khan himself was not far in rear. The British brigade was then encamped on the Helmund opposite Girishk, the troops of the Wali of Kandahar being on the further bank of the river. On the 13th, it appeared that the infantry in the service of the Wali was in such an unsatisfactory state and so untrustworthy, that General Burrows and Colonel St. John deliberated on the question of disarming them. But the next morning, before any steps could be taken, the Wali's infantry deserted in a body, taking with them a battery of artillery. The mutineers were pursued by a portion of General Burrows' brigade and dispersed, the guns and baggage being recovered. At this time [14th July], Sirdar Ayub Khan's army was reported to be three marches distant from Girishk.

3. As the mutinous troops had plundered the stores of supplies collected at Girishk by Sher Ali Khan, and as reports had reached Colonel St. John that it was Ayub Khan's intention, if he crossed the river Helmund at all, to do so at a point to the north of Girishk, General Burrows determined on the 15th July to retire to Kushk-i-Nakhud, a distance of 30 miles from Girishk and 45 miles from Kandahar, where several roads from the Helmund to Kandahar converge, and where supplies were plentiful. This retirement was effected on the 17th. On the 18th all was reported quiet in the vicinity of Kushk-i-Nakhud, and it was believed that the majority of the mutinous troops had dispersed to their homes. The advanced portion of Ayub's cavalry had reached Girishk the day before. On the 19th, General Burrows shifted his camp three miles nearer Girishk, and on the 22nd he again moved it to a new position, in which he was able to place his sick, stores, and baggage, in an enclosure, being apprehensive of a night attack by the enemy.

4. On the 21st it had been reported that Ayub Khan's force had reached Haidarabad on the Helmund, 12 miles above Girishk, and that the intention was to advance by way of Sangbar. On the 22nd, our cavalry appear to have come in sight of that of the enemy, who retired without coming into action, a demonstration with cavalry and artillery having sufficed to cause them to fall back. On the 25th Ayub Khan with his entire force was known to be at Haidarabad, while his cavalry occasionally occupied Sangbar, and it was reported to be his intention to advance on the 25th by Sangbar and Maiwand, and to endeavour to pass by General Burrows' force into the Arghandab valley above Kandahar. This news was received by us on the 27th July.

5. On the morning of the 28th we received a telegram from Lieutenant Muir, Assistant Political Officer at Kandahar, announcing the total defeat and dispersion of General Burrows' force, with heavy loss in officers and men, and reporting that, in consequence, General Primrose had vacated the cantonment at Kandahar, moving all his troops into the citadel. This intelligence was gradually supplemented, during the 28th and 29th, by telegrams from Sir R. Sandeman at Quetta, who reported that telegraphic communication was broken down before noon on the 28th, between the Chaman Post, west of the Khojak Pass, and Kandahar; the last message received in Quetta intimating that the disaster, though severe, was not so complete as General Primrose had at first believed. The report that the whole of General Burrows' force had been annihilated, which was transmitted to England, and which is inconsistent even with the few details contained in the first account of the affair received at Kandahar, seems to have been founded upon a telegram sent direct by General Primrose to the Bombay Government. Nevertheless, the account of the action received this morning from Colonel St. John by a telegram, dated Kandahar 29th, leaves no doubt that the British force encountered an enemy greatly superior in numbers, well posted, and of formidable strength in artillery and cavalry, that our force was defeated, and that it fell back in great disorder on Kandahar, suffering heavy loss during the retreat, mainly through the exhaustion of the troops. At Kandahar General Primrose was reported to be making preparations against an attack by fortifying himself in the citadel, where provisions and ammunition are said to be plentiful.

6. We are taking all possible measures for speedily pushing forward reinforcements to the relief of the troops now in Kandahar. As the first step towards the attainment of this object, all the troops at Quetta, in Pishin, and on the railway line between Sibi and Quetta are being concentrated in Pishin, the railway works being temporarily abandoned, until the advance of reinforcements from India make it again possible to arrange suitably for their protection. Troops are also being forwarded from India as rapidly as possible, and a strong division, now under formation at Kabul, will be ready in a few days to march for Kandahar *via* Ghazni.

7. In Kabul and its neighbourhood all is reported quiet, and the necessary arrange-

ments are now being made with Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, the newly-recognised Amir of Kabul.

We have, &c.
 (Signed) RIPON.
 " F. P. HAINES.
 " JOHN STRACHEY.
 " E. B. JOHNSON.
 " WHITLEY STOKES.
 " JAMES GIBBS.
 " C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 16.

No. 394, dated Camp Kushk-i-Nakhud, 17th July 1880. (Extract.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. C. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to
 A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit for the information of Government a detailed account of the events of the last few days, with the leading incidents of which my daily telegrams will have kept you informed.

2. The advanced column under Brigadier-General Nuttall, with which I marched, reached Girishk on Saturday morning the 10th, and the main body under Brigadier-General Burrows the following day. The total force then consisted of one battery Royal Horse Artillery, two regiments of Cavalry, one company of Sappers, six companies of British Infantry, and two regiments of Native Infantry.

3. Our camp was pitched in comparatively low ground on the left bank of the Helmund almost immediately opposite the fort of Girishk, from which it was separated, first by the river itself, fordable at the present time at intervals of half a mile at most, and secondly by a belt of grass and jungle over a mile in width. A bridged road leads from the ford to the fort. The camp of his Highness the Wali was pitched about a mile below the fort, partly on the high sloping banks of the river's bed, and partly in the low land below. His force then consisted of three regiments of infantry, numbering about 1,300 men, two six-pounder smooth-bore guns, and about 1,000 tribal cavalry. The remainder of his force was in advance under his nephew Sirdar Roshndil Khan at Karezat, 20 to 25 miles distant, and consisted of 800 infantry, the remaining four guns of his battery, and about 1,500 tribal cavalry.

4. In the evening of the day of our arrival the Wali visited me, and gave me details of what I had heard by message from him in the morning, that his cousin Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan had deserted the advanced camp at Karezat with his own sowars, 50 in number, after an ineffectual attempt to induce the rest of the troops to accompany him to Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan's camp, then in Washir. The Wali then told me that in spite of this evidence of fidelity on the part of the troops, he felt by no means confident in their loyalty. He was anxious for us to cross and camp on the west bank of the river, but I did not then think right to tell him definitely that the General in command had most stringent orders not to do so, hoping that Brigadier-General Burrows, who would arrive the next morning, would bring permission to act on his own discretion.

5. No such permission having been received, I told the Wali the next evening that under no circumstances should we cross the river. He was much depressed, and said that in that case it would be impossible for him to do anything to oppose Ayub's advance, and that he would concentrate all his troops at Girishk. To this I agreed, considering that if their fidelity was doubtful, it would be better to have the whole of them within reach than to leave a large proportion in a place where there would be no obstacle to their going over to the enemy.

6. The next day (Monday the 12th), I did not see the Wali, but finding from various sources that the disaffection among his troops was far more serious than he had led me to believe, and seeing that he was unwilling that I should go to his camp, I sent for his confidential Secretary, who confirmed the information. By him I sent a message to the Wali asking him whether it would not be better to disarm the whole or part of his regular troops, or, if he was unable to do so himself, to authorise us to take measures for the purpose. To this he eagerly assented, and he appointed the next morning to meet and talk the matter over.

7. At sunrise the next morning I met his Highness on the west bank of the river, and rode with him to the fort and across again to our camp, where he spent a considerable time in discussing the situation with General Burrows and myself. He freely admitted the untrustworthiness of his men, placing the blame mainly on the Sartip and on a certain Sardaru Khan, the principal officer of his army, who was known to have received many communications from Ayub Khan, some of which he had made over to the Wali. "But the only really disaffected corps," he declared, "was the Kabir regiment, about 450 strong, which had been sent to him last September from Kabul, where it had been stationed for 10 years." If this regiment was disarmed there would be no cause to fear the others, but he himself could not disarm it without our assistance. This the very stringent orders received by General Burrows prevented his doing as long as the Wali's force remained on the right bank, and his Highness therefore offered, on receipt of a written request from me, which he could show his officers, to bring the whole of his force to the left bank the next morning. Later on, General Burrows, as reported by telegram, determined to cross the river to disarm the Wali's troops should the step appear necessary. The next morning, while our own camp was being shifted to a better position a mile and a half up stream, I watched the Wali's encampment from the opposite heights. The tents were struck about six, and half-an-hour later the Wali's cousin, Sirdar Dilawar Khan, came across to fix a site for the new camp. Everything was, he said, proceeding satisfactorily, but a quarter of an hour later news was brought me that the troops had mutinied, seized the guns and baggage and driven the Wali and the whole of his cavalry and principal officers across the river. Riding back to the ford I met the Wali with a large number of horsemen; he said that after striking the tents and packing the baggage, the Kabir regiment had marched up to the high bank where the guns were, had seized them, forced the gunners to join them, and driven him and all but a few sowars who joined the mutineers out of the camp. The Wali added that many of the sowars who had accompanied him were untrustworthy, and begged me to fall back in the Kandahar direction at once. I told him that this would be quite unnecessary with our strong force, and that we would first punish the mutineers, and recover the guns. After some delay, mainly caused by uncertainty whether the mutineers intended to hold a position about the fort or move off

Battery, Horse Artillery.
2nd Regiment of Cavalry.
Company Sappers.
Four companies, 66th Regiment.
Four companies, Jacob's Rifles.

towards Herat, and of the attitude of the Wali's sowars, the troops, as per margin, moved across the river by a ford directly in front of our new camp, two miles above Girishk, at 9.30 a.m., the mutineers being then seen streaming along the opposite bank two miles distant. After the troops had crossed the ford I rode on to the advanced guard, which brought the mutineers to bay a few minutes before 11 a.m. at a distance of four miles from the camp. Half-an-hour later they moved to a second position a mile further on, and opened fire with the 6-pounder guns on the cavalry. This they kept up at intervals till the Horse Artillery, whose passage was much delayed by irrigation channels and rough ground, came into action at half-past 12.

8. On the brief engagement that ensued it is not my province to enlarge: suffice to say that at 2 p.m. all firing had ceased and I returned to camp five miles off by a different road and ford to that by which I had come. I mention this to show the feebleness of the obstacle which the Helmund in a season like the present offers to military operations. During my stay of five days I crossed it in nine different places with a guide, in a distance of five miles.

9. On my return I found the Wali with a few servants in our camp; he informed me that the majority of his sowars were still with him, though a few had, he found, joined the mutineers, and a few more fled to Kandahar. Most of those that had remained had sent their baggage in the same direction. Before leaving camp, I had asked that a party with camels should be sent to bring across the atta, grain, and ghee stored for us by the Wali in the fort; this had been done, but the atta and ghee had disappeared, though large quantities of raw grain remained.

10. The next morning after consultation with the Wali as to the possibility of feeding the troops at Girishk, I reluctantly came to the conclusion to recommend General Burrows to fall back on Kushk-i-Nakhud, whither the Wali had sent the whole of his sowars the night before.

11. The position of Kushk-i-Nakhud offers many advantages. Should the enemy cross at Girishk and follow the road we came, he would have to meet us either in an entrenched position here, or on ground of our own choosing, covering the first water-course on this side of the desert which separates us from Girishk. Should he take the northern road, he would have to meet us at Maiwand, 10 miles off, or, if he keeps to the river line, the Arghandab is less than that distance to the south. In fact, we are half

way between the mountains to the north and the sandy desert to the south, at the point where these approach each other most nearly.

12. Should Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, however, carry out what is, according to some reports, his intention of moving to Tirin and Darawut, and stirring up the country from there, the situation would be entirely changed, and the presence of so large a force here useless.

13. In conclusion, I have the honour to make a few remarks with reference to the effect on the country of this so far successful invasion. It is well known to you, that for many months Ayub Khan and his partisans have used every effort to inflame the religious and patriotic feelings of the chiefs and people against us and our *protégé*, Sher Ali Khan. These had apparently little or no effect at the time and as long as the possibility of an invasion from Herat seemed more than remote, particularly after the failure of the first attempt. But the actual presence on the frontier of an army of their own fellow tribesmen, under a prince of their recent ruling family, the memory of whose oppression a year and a half of prosperity has sufficed to obliterate from the minds of this fickle people, has, I have reason to suspect, created a more powerful and general feeling in Ayub's favour than one who had only known Kandahar a year ago would believe possible; and it is far from improbable that, unless Ayub Khan's army be defeated and dispersed at once, something very like a general rising may take place. That this could attain the formidable dimensions which have been reached in Kabul, the unwarlike character of the modern Durani and the physical features of the country forbid, but it may cause considerable trouble and annoyance and involve somewhat extended operations.

Enclosure 2 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 25th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUJ, July 24th.—If enemy moves up Helmund, General Burrows proposes sending back superfluous baggage and sick to Kandahar and moving up Khakrez valley, opening up fresh line of communications.

Enclosure 3 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GENERAL Phayre has received information from the Kandahar Road commandant corroborating what I previously told him that Ayub's cavalry meditate an attack in the Gulistan direction on our communication. The general is sending there to-morrow from Quetta a small column consisting of 450 infantry, 2 guns, and a few cavalry.

The 24th Native Regiment is at Darwaza, and hopes to reach Quetta to-morrow or next day.

Enclosure 4 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUJ, July 25th.—Ayub, with his entire force, is still about Haidarabad. His cavalry outposts occasionally occupying Sangbar, near which two men of Sind Horse on outpost duty were surprised and killed. This morning spies report that he intends moving on the 28th by both roads through Sangbar and through Maiwand. His object being to get past us into the Arghandab valley above Kandahar.

Enclosure 5 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th June 1880.

From Lieutenant MUIR, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

TOTAL defeat and dispersion of General Burrows' force. Heavy loss in both officers and men. General Primrose has vacated cantonments and brought all his troops into citadel. Officers and men returning in small parties. Wali has arrived. Colonel St. John safe.

Enclosure 6 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

News of this morning from Kandahar. General Phayre and I have consulted together, and these are our views: That our line of communication with India for troops must be the Bolan Pass. The question we beg to refer to Government is what is to be done under present circumstances with the railway line under construction. We consider that the force from Thal-Chotiali to Quetta should be concentrated in Pishin with the least possible delay, and we recommend that the protection of the railway line and Thal-Chotiali should, if possible, be taken by Punjab troops. The Bombay troops, in which we include the whole of General Phayre's division, ought to be concentrated here at once.

General Primrose has telegraphed that he is abandoning Kandahar cantonments and will defend himself in citadel. He has directed General Phayre to march on Kandahar as soon as he can collect army. Primrose says Ayub's army is strong in artillery, which numbers 35 guns well served. We trust as much artillery as can be spared will be sent from India, also Europeans and horses to equip the guns at Quetta. We are quite aware of the very bad political effect the abandonment of the railway line and Thal-Chotiali by the present garrison must have upon the country, unless troops from the Punjab can be sent to relieve them, but state of country and strength of tribes, in our opinion, leave no alternative.

Primrose telegraphed two of our guns had been taken by enemy, who pursued our retreating troops for three miles.

Enclosure 7 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, No. 2511 E.P., dated 28th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

VICEROY entirely approves the measures proposed by yourself and General Phayre, and decides that the forces employed for protection of railway line must be at once withdrawn as proposed. We are sending reinforcements from Bengal, and will re-occupy railway line when possible, but present exigencies necessitate pushing forward all available forces toward Kandahar. Viceroy relies on you to use all exertions to co-operate with Phayre in relieving posts and pushing forward reinforcements.

Enclosure 8 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram to-day just received. General Phayre has issued the necessary orders for the troops now protecting railway line to concentrate on Pishin. Movement commences from Thul-Chotiali, and I hope the order for the march will reach Thul-Chotiali on the third day from this. I have directed political officers to heartily co-operate with commanding officers in carrying out General's orders, and to arrange as best they can with the head men of villages to take care of all stores, telegraph line, &c. left behind, until reoccupation of country by our troops. I am in constant communication with General Phayre, who is strenuously exerting himself to push forward all available forces towards Kandahar. His Excellency the Viceroy may rely on myself and officers using our best exertions to aid General Phayre.

Enclosure 9 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th June 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

BEFORE telegraphic communication ceased at 11 o'clock this morning, the following news was received from General Primrose:—Following officers belonging to General Burrows' force had safely reached Kandahar:—Doctor Burrows, Eaton, Harvey, Mainwaring, Geoghegan, Oliver, Griffiths, Whitecot, Dane. Small parties of Burrows' force constantly arriving. Enemy appear only to have pursued for three or four miles. Extent of our losses not yet ascertained, but feared to be very severe. Two guns lost. Jacob's Rifles lost, Smith, Justice, and Coles killed; in Bombay Grenadiers, Anderson severely wounded, Haslet killed. Of R.H.A., Osborne killed, Blackwood wounded. In 3rd Cavalry, Mayne and Reid wounded. In 66th, Roberts killed, Lynch wounded. Enemy very strong in guns; believed to have 35, which they work well. General Primrose mentions that he has sent out General Brooke to bring in stragglers.

Enclosure 10 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

COMMUNICATION with Kandahar stopped at 11 this morning. I will inform General Phayre of your instructions.

Enclosure 11 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, No. 2521 E.P., dated 28th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

WE hear wire cut towards Kandahar. Please use every endeavour to collect and send me early intelligence of passing events there.

Enclosure 12 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, No. 2,524 E.P., dated 28th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

Do you know what day and time and where action was fought; also whether Burrows attacked or enemy attacked him.

Enclosure 13 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

HIS Highness the Khan has sent me the following message in reply to telegrams informing him of substance of what had happened, and asking him to assist us with camels:—*Begins.* Thanks for your three telegrams. I am certain that the enemy will get their due reward soon. I am glad to afford help. My head and my all belongs to the British. I shall never draw back. One hundred and fifty camels, and one hundred horses are ready at Mustung just now; inform me and I shall happily send them to you immediately.

Musa Khan left this three days ago for Quetta with 100 camels. Whatever grain or money is required by the British I am ready to supply. I am certain you will always keep me informed of what is going on for the future. *Ends.*

Enclosure 14 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE this morning again visited General Phayre, and have recorded a memorandum of our deliberations which will be posted to-day. After carefully reviewing the situation we are again forced to the conclusion that, unless other troops can at once occupy the railway line of works, it must be abandoned. I telegraph this to show Government that the abandonment of the line and valuable plant is imperatively necessary, though we have come to this decision most unwillingly.

Enclosure 15 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram, dated this morning, asks where and when Burrows' action was fought, and whether he attacked. I regret I cannot give any information in addition to what I telegraphed yesterday. Primrose at the time wire was cut did not know the extent of the defeat. The last words that I understood he sent were to the effect that disaster was not so great as at first believed, but very severe; enemy only pursued for three or four miles; two of our guns taken, the others expected in; Brooke sent out to bring in stragglers; intended to abandon cantonments and occupy citadel; his only fear was scarcity of water.

Enclosure 16 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, No. 2531 E.P., dated 29th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

VICEROY entirely approves your decision to abandon railway line temporarily. Two strong brigades are being sent up and reinforcements, coming from England at once. Send all particulars of Burrows' action as early as possible.

Enclosure 17 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, No. 2534 E.P., dated 29th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

YOUR telegram 29th. Please convey at once to his Highness the Khan of Kelat, Viceroy's cordial acknowledgments of the friendship and loyalty toward the British Government attested by his prompt and valuable offer of co-operation.

Enclosure 18 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram of last evening expressing anxiety for news from Kandahar. Within a few hours of the receipt of the news about Burrows, I had sent off reliable men to Kandahar for information last night. The news from Chaman fort was that the Mel Abdul Rahman and Dubrai post, retreating from the line of communication on Chaman, had arrived at Gatai. Fighting was going on, but they were holding their own. Assistance is to be sent this morning from Chaman to help them in. They number 180 infantry and 70 cavalry. The country between Kandahar and Khojak Pass is in a state of insurrection, the difficulty therefore of communicating with Kandahar is very great. I have sent six letters to St. John and Major Westmacott yesterday at Chaman, despatched to him by messenger, with telegram from me. The country people say that the fight between the British and Ayub's army was severe and both sides lost heavily. I will again despatch letters; but even if my messengers succeed in reaching St. John, an

answer to my first letters on account of distance must take, counting from date of despatch, 10 days.

The Kakars and Aitchakzais are reported collecting; but in a few days, I trust, we will be strong enough to hold the country from Quetta to Chaman post.

Enclosure 19 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

From Chaman I hear that Major Westmacott went out this morning with 50 sabres, Poona Horse, to assist Major Jacob retreating with road outpost detachments on Chaman. A skirmish took place near Gatai, but I understand there were no casualties on our side. Major Westmacott and Jacob are bringing their men safely into Chaman.

Enclosure 20 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

My telegram this morning. The detachments named therein have arrived at Chaman. No casualties.

Enclosure 21 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 31st July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

We have received no direct news from our army at Kandahar. Native sources do not describe Burrows' defeat as crushing. They say that British cavalry and guns were induced to follow the enemies' cavalry, who pretended to fly and led them into a complete ambushade. Ayub's army then delivered its attack, and our troops suffered very severely in officers and men. A battle was then fought, resulting in our retirement on Kandahar, but Ayub's army suffered much. This news, I am sorry to say, requires confirmation. I send it because received from several sources.

Enclosure 22 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE received the following news from a fairly reliable source:—Ayub Khan's army did not follow up British retreat to Kandahar. Burrows' force has arrived at Kandahar, and our whole army is now in the citadel. When messenger left Ayub was encamped where action was fought. This intelligence seems to corroborate news sent you yesterday that Burrows' defeat was not so crushing as at first believed by Primrose, and that Ayub Khan's army had suffered so much that they were vacillating regarding their further course of action.

Enclosure 23 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, No. 2571 E.P., dated 1st August 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

HER Majesty the Queen has expressed her satisfaction at the news of the Khan of Kelat's loyal offers of assistance. Please inform Khan.

Enclosure 24 in No. 16.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd August 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

29th. Arrived here yesterday afternoon with General Burrows and Nuttall and remnant of force. Telegraph has been interrupted ever since my arrival. No chance of restoration, so send this by messenger to Chaman. Burrows marched from Kushk-i-Nakhud on morning, 27th, having heard from me that Ayub's advanced guard had occupied Maiwand, about three miles from the latter place. Enemy's cavalry appeared advancing from direction of Haidrabad, their camp on Helmund ten miles above Girishk. Artillery and cavalry engaged them at 9 A.M., so shortly afterwards whole force of enemy appeared and formed line of battle—, seven regiments, regulars in centre, three others in reserve; about 2,000 cavalry on right; 400 mounted men and 2,000 Ghazis and irregular infantry on left; other cavalry and irregulars in reserve; five or six batteries of guns, including one of breechloaders, distributed at intervals. Estimated total force 12,000. Ground slightly undulating, enemy being best posted. Till one P.M., action confined to artillery fire, which so well sustained and directed by enemy that our superior quality armament failed to compensate for inferior number of guns. After development of rifle fire, our breechloaders told; but vigorous advance of cavalry against our left, and Ghazis along the front caused native infantry to fall back in confusion on 66th abandoning two guns. Formation being lost, infantry retreated slowly; and, in spite of gallant efforts of General Burrows to rally them, were cut off from cavalry and artillery. This was at 3 P.M., and followers and baggage were streaming away towards Kandahar. After severe fighting in enclosed ground, General Burrows succeeded in extricating infantry and brought them into line of retreat. Unfortunately no efforts would turn fugitives from main road, waterless at this season. Thus majority casualties appear to have occurred from thirst and exhaustion. Enemy's pursuit continued to ten miles from Kandahar, but was not vigorous. Cavalry, artillery, and a few infantry reached banks of Argandab, 40 miles from scene of action, at 7 A.M.; many not having tasted water since previous morning.

Nearly all ammunition lost, with 400 Martini, 700 Sniders, and 2 nine-pounder guns. Estimated loss, killed and missing,—66th, 400; Grenadiers, 350; Jacob's Rifles, 350; Artillery, 40; Sappers, 21; Cavalry, 60. Officers killed, or missing,—Major Blackwood, Osborne, MacLaine, Artillery; Henn, Engineers. Galbraith, McMath, Garratt, Cullen, Roberts, Rayner, Honeywood, Barr, Chute, 66th; Owen, 3rd Cavalry; Hinde, Whitby, Grenadiers; Smith, Justice, Cole, Jacob's Rifles. Wounded,—Fowell, Artillery; Lynch, Preston 66th; Anderson, Grant, Grenadiers; Iredell, Jacob's Rifles.

Preparations being now made for siege. Durani inhabitants expelled. Provisions and ammunition plentiful. Wali was present during action, and is now with us, assisting actively. Of course, whole country will rise.

No. 17.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, DURING THE WEEK ENDING 7TH AUGUST 1880. (Extract.)

2nd August.—Major-General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 1st:—

“Have given orders to occupy crest of Kojak with 25 sappers, two mountain guns, and head-quarters and 300 rifles 9th Native Infantry, who will entrench themselves there. Thus I hope to secure road and telegraph between Chaman and Killa Abdulla, where the wire has been cut since last evening. Colonel Sibthorpe wires from Kila Abdulla this morning a vague native report of two generals and a force in retreat; that one of the generals was badly wounded. This I conclude to be the first news of General Burrows' and General Brookes' (? Nuttall's) retiring force approaching Kandahar. Both Sir Robert Sandeman and I have sent several letters by independent means to General Primrose; the distance is very great and we cannot expect any reply for some days; but directly the troops from the railway line begin to reach Pishin, we shall be in a better position to make further efforts to obtain reliable information. I need scarcely assure his Excellency that no effort shall be wanting on my part to aid General Primrose with least possible delay.

Brigadier-General H. H. A. Wood reports from Jacobabad on the 2nd, that half of F-2nd Royal Artillery passed through that place for Sibi on the night of the 1st.

3rd August.—Major-General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 3rd :—

“ Your telegram last evening about military reports received ; will be attended to. Yesterday’s Kandahar news has had a most exciting effect on tribes. I have occupied crest at Kojak. Detachment sent there drove off about 150 men who had seized head of pass, killing a few of them. Am pushing all available men to front, including Engineer officers and sappers, to secure the Kojak position and outposts connected with it.”

The Government of India have this day directed Sir Donald Stewart to prepare a strong division to march on Kandahar from Kabul, under the command of Sir Frederick Roberts. This force will proceed, of course, *viâ* Khelat-i-Ghilzai, a threatened attack on which post has been rumoured.

4th August.—Sir Donald Stewart telegraphs from Kabul on the 3rd, that the following force has been detailed to be in readiness for special service under the command of Sir Frederick Roberts :—

INFANTRY DIVISION	<i>1st Brigade.</i>		Under Major-General Ross.
	92nd Foot.	23rd Pioneers.	
	2nd Goorkhas.	24th Native Infantry.	
	<i>2nd Brigade.</i>		
	72nd Foot.	2nd Sikhs.	
	5th Goorkhas.	3rd „	
	<i>3rd Brigade.</i>		
	60th Rifles.	15th Sikhs.	
	4th Goorkhas.	25th Native Infantry.	
	<i>Cavalry Brigade.</i>		
9th Lancers.		3rd Punjab Cavalry.	
3rd Bengal Cavalry.		Central India Horse.	
<i>Artillery.</i>			
6th Battery 8th Brigade.		No. 2 Mountain Battery.	
11th Battery 9th Brigade.			

This force is intended for a movement on Kandahar in aid of Lieutenant-General Primrose.

6th August.—The following message, dated Kandahar, the 27th July, has only now been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose.

“ General Burrows, under date evening 25th, reports situation unchanged. Two Sind horsemen shot while patrolling near Sangbûr. At Kandahar, I hear that Habíbûlla has been to Kakrez, and has tried to raise the people without success. He was at Taznee on Sunday, and then proposed crossing into the Argandâb. The second detachment 11th Foot left Sibi last night. Five men of 1st detachment struck down by sunstroke at Nari ; are all doing well. Head-quarters 9th and the mountain guns left Quetta for Gulistan this morning.”

Major-General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 4th :—

“ I beg to submit the following outline of the military situation, as it is at present, for his Excellency’s information :—

“ Chaman, at the northern foot of Kojak, is now our advanced post, with a garrison of 50 sabres, two mountain guns, and 400 Native Infantry. It is connected with our main position on the heights of that pass by a defile five miles long. Since we drove out the 150 Atchakzáis from their position on the heights on the 30th ultimo, they have collected more men, and a good deal of brisk skirmish has been going on in the defile and adjacent heights for the last three days, with a loss to the enemy of 20 to 30 killed, whilst our own loss has been trifling. They are now constructing *sangas* at certain

points, from which they will be driven in a day or two on the arrival of more infantry under Colonel James. I have ordered Colonel Lindsay, Lieutenant Whiteford, and other engineer officers now arriving at Kila Abdulla to arrange for the entrenchment of such commanding points as it may be necessary to hold for offensive and defensive purposes. Colonel James, with one company 11th Foot and a wing of 10th Native Infantry, will reach Gulistan to-morrow, and assume command of the troops between Chaman and Sigghi, whose movements he will direct in communication with me. The head-quarters wing 11th Foot will be placed in the Gulistan fort until we are ready to advance; the remaining wing, with F-2nd, will be pushed forward to the same point when ready. The troops from Thal-Chotiali and railway line ought to reach Pishin within a week.

"Yesterday a body of two or three hundred Kakars from beyond Toba attacked a convoy of empty carts near Dina Karez. The havildar, 10th Native Infantry, in command lost three killed and three wounded of his party, but killed six of the enemy and secured his convoy. Detachments of Biluch Guides and Native Infantry have been sent after these Kakars by Sir Robert Sandeman and myself.

"The above shows that the Pathan tribes of the Kojak and adjacent country are determined to molest our communications between Chaman and the Ghazaband Pass, and that they must be secured by strong detachments. The cavalry will be massed towards Khush-Dil-Khan, where forage is said to be plentiful.

"I this morning received a letter from Major Adam, Assistant Quartermaster General, Kandahar, dated the 29th. After the force had withdrawn into the citadel, he says that the entry of General Burrows' force into camp had to be covered against the attack of villagers as far as Singiri. After all had got into the citadel, the *kacha* buildings of the cantonment were fired by natives. He details the force now in the citadel of Kandahar as follows: Guns, C.-2nd Royal Artillery, heavy battery of four 40-prs. and two mortars; about 120 of 66th Foot, 271 of 1st Grenadiers, 300 of Jacob's Rifles, 500 of 7th Foot, 4th, 28th, and half of 19th Native Infantry; also 40 of 3rd Cavalry, 200 Sind Horse, 200 Poona Horse. He mentions that a great number of townspeople have been turned out; that they have *bhusa* for animals for 20 days; supplies for men for over two months. His chief anxiety is water, because the season has been a dreadfully dry one; consequently whole country is parched up. After searching for wells, he says he has found hundreds, but water very low indeed in them. His description of Ayub's force and its attack is much the same as that already reported. The 66th Foot is said to have fought splendidly, and lost 400 out of 520 men present, and 10 officers killed. Some of Ayub's cavalry reached Kandahar on the 29th, but none of his footmen. They hope to have a chance of defeating some of his forces outside; and, just as he wrote, Colonel Phillips, Poona Horse, had cut up some men when reconnoitering outside the walls. He says that one good downpour of rain would give them their great want—water; but if rain fails they must go out and fight for it. He says, in conclusion, that he will try and send another messenger in a day or two, when he has succeeded in getting news of Ayub's force, its disposition, &c."

7th August.—Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 6th:—

"Officer Commanding Chaman reports he sent a gun and company native infantry to clear defile between Chaman and Kojak position they drove enemy with loss out of *sangas*. Simultaneously Lieutenant-Colonel Sibthorpe from top of pass sent a party to dislodge another gathering of enemy from their *sangas*, with loss of five killed. On our side Major Morse and one sepoy slightly wounded. Since these operations a convoy has passed unmolested. Colonel Lindsay reports that telegraph wire in defile has been cut to bits, and from other information of this morning it appears that wire between Chaman and Kandahar has been carried away on camels. Regarding Kojak position, Colonel Lindsay says that it is quite defensible; that no tribal gathering can touch it, but that he will extend and improve it. Now that native infantry are closing up and working parties available, communication with Chaman by heliograph will be opened directly instruments, on way there with Sappers, arrive."

Brigadier-General Wood telegraphs from Jacobabad on the 7th:—

- I. "One hundred men 2-15th Foot passed through last night for Sibi."
- II. "Half wing 2nd Cavalry left last night for Sibi."

No. 18.

No. 179 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.To The RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, August 10, 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 175, dated 3rd August 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) R. P. HAINES.
" F. P. HAINES.
" JOHN STRACHEY.
" E. B. JOHNSON.
" WHITLEY STOKES.
" JAMES GIBBS.
" C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

My telegram of this morning. My informant also states that the inhabitants of the villages round Kandahar and the city itself have fled to the hills. I also know from the conversation which passed between Primrose and Phayre at the Telegraph Office on the morning of 28th that Primrose intended turning all Afghans out of the city. I think these circumstances may account for the fact that St. John has not been able to communicate with me.

The crest of the Kliojak Pass was occupied by the 9th Native Infantry and two guns this morning. Telegraphic communication between Chaman and Killa Abdulla is still interrupted, but expected to be restored very shortly.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd August 1880.

From COLONEL ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

28th. Defeat of our force most complete, mainly attributable to unsteadiness of infantry. Cavalry and artillery covered retreat to certain extent, but infantry could not be rallied. Estimated loss killed and missing, 66th, 400; Grenadiers, 350; Jacob's Rifles, 300; Artillery, 40; Sappers and Miners, 21; Cavalry, 50. Situation here matter for grave anxiety. Relief from Quetta difficult on account of want of water on the road for large force. Might not division of army be sent from Kabul? Would meet with little opposition, tribes being unprepared.

Enclosure 3 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

It is reported that Syud Khan, Nurzai, and Shah Muhammad Sahibzada, Kakar, were the leaders of the attack on the Dubrai Kadui and Mel Manda post, between Chaman and Kandahar. They are said to have been joined by some 2,000 tribesmen from Toba. Nur Muhammad Khan, Governor of Kadui under Wali Sher Ali, is reported to have fled. Ayub Khan is stated to have sent Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan with two cavalry regiments and a number of Herati and Turcoman horsemen to Kakran, to prevent the people taking supplies into Kandahar. Ayub Khan himself is said to have marched from Kushk-i-Nakhud to Mir Karez, the head-quarters of Umr Khan, Sahibzada. It

is rumoured that he has detailed two guns for the purpose of attacking Chaman. Yesterday ten Poona Horse were attacked in Khojak pass by party of Aitchakzai robbers; a fight ensued and resulted in the killing of seven Aitchakzais, without loss on our side. Last night a few shots were fired into post at Killa Abdulla. From Shorawak the news is that men are assembling under Pir Muhammed Khan, Barechi, with the object of attacking our posts at Segi and Dinar Karez in Pishin, at the request of Abu Syud Khan and Shah Muhammed Sahibzada. Pir Muhammad is believed to have sent a party to Kelat to endeavour to purchase ammunition from Sibi. Rai Hittu Ram reports that, on 25th July, Marri carried off from near Thalli a number of sheep and camels belonging to Brahuīs. In retaliation, Brahuīs have since raided from same neighbourhood 15 camels belonging to Mir Hazur, Chief of the Ghazni Marri. Rai Hittu Ram insisted on Brahuīs surrendering their plunder, and camels are now in his possession at Sibi. The Marri Chief, Sirdar Mehrulla Khan, is said to discountenance Marri raids, and to have left Kahan for the purpose of putting a stop to them.

Enclosure 4 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

My news telegram of to-day. Rai Hittu Ram reports favourable settlement of Marri—Brahui raiding, and has arranged for mutual restitution of stolen property.

Enclosure 5 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I THINK that every exertion should be made to send troops to Kandahar. I have been informed attack in force is meditated on Kelat through Shorawak, with object of seizing Khan's treasure, said to amount to 30 lakhs. Could not troops be sent from Kabul to create diversion from that direction? Situation very serious.

Enclosure 6 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 3rd August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

News received of a meditated attack on Kelat, *via* Shorawak. Brahui Sirdars express themselves ready and anxious to assist His Highness the Khan, if anything of the kind is attempted. The Brahui clans are strong enough to defeat any invasion of His Highness' kingdom, unless undertaken by regular organized army.

The occupation of the Khojak Pass has been accomplished without much opposition. The tribes lost 12 men, our loss *nil*. Sirdar Mehrulla Khan, Marri, has sent his eldest son to Sibi, accompanied by several of his principal headmen, and has expressed his desire to keep his tribe in order and prevent raiding. In this he is believed to be sincere.

Regiment of Madras Cavalry arrived at Quetta this morning; also 2nd detachment of 2-11 Foot, 1st detachment of same regiment, with detachment 10th Native Infantry, marched early this morning for the Khojak Pass, which is being strongly held by our troops. No further news from Kandahar.

Enclosure 7 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, No. 2616 E. P., dated 3rd August 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

YOURS, 2nd, regarding meditated attack on Kelat. We are sending strong division from Kabul, but report whether you consider any special measures necessary for security of Khan, whom it is essential to protect effectually.

Enclosure 8 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, No. 2637 E. P., dated 4th August 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

PLEASE endeavour to let St. John know that his telegrams, 28th, 29th, have reached us, that we are most anxious for more news, and glad he is safe; also that very strong division under Roberts marches at once from Kabul. Send special messenger to communicate with Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and obtain news. Your exertions at this time are much appreciated here and in England.

Enclosure 9 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th August 1880, 15h. 20m. Received 5th, 1 p.m.

From Agent, Governor-General, Quetta, to Foreign, Simla.

No further definite news from Kandahar. The main body of Ayub's army is reported to have been four days ago on march to the west of Kandahar.

A convoy returning from Killa Abdulla to Quetta was attacked before daylight yesterday morning near Dinar Carez by a large number of tribesman. A Havildar of 10th Native Infantry, commanding escort, showed much skill in successfully resisting attack. A Naik, two sepahis, and three cartmen were killed, also five of the enemy. Captain Mosley, with 60 Biluch Guides and 100 infantry, marched from Quetta last night to Guzaband Pass to hunt up the marauders.

This morning there was a skirmish near Chaman; about two of the enemy were killed. On our side three men were wounded and five horses killed. The tribes have erected strong sangars at the entrance to Khojak Pass on south side. Major Westmacott was attacked this morning on his way to Chaman from Killa Abdulla, but beat off his assailants with loss of only two horses.

Field Telegraph Office has been opened at Gulistan Karez, and telegraphic communication with Killa Abdulla still continues.

Colonel James is on his way to the Khojak Pass with 200 of the 10th Native Infantry and 100 of the 2-11 Regiment. He will command line of communication with Quetta. Major Blowers from Kowas with 200 rifles, 10th Native Infantry and 50 Sabres, 2nd Sind Horse, reached Killa Abdulla this morning, and marches at once for crest of the Khojak Pass. Lieutenant Whiteford, R.E., with Sappers and Miners, accompanies Blowers to fortify the heights.

The Thull-Chotiali garrison has reached Spin-Tangi, and is expected at Hurnai tomorrow. A 3rd detachment of the 2-11 Regiment arrived here this morning. 2,500 transport bullocks have safely reached Sibi from Sangan through the Marri Hills.

Enclosure 10 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LETTER from Kandahar from Quartermaster General to Phayre gives strength British force as follows:—Eight guns Royal Horse Artillery, four forty-pounder-guns and two mortars; 120 66th Regiment Europeans, 300 Jacob's Rifles, 270 Grenadiers, 600 7th Regiment, Fusilier, whole of 4th and 28th Regiments, Native Infantry, and half of 19th Regiment Native Infantry; 900 Cavalry, native. Ample supplies for two months; forage for twenty days. Many wells contain little water, which is the principal difficulty, but good showers would remedy this.

Ayub's army consists of ten Regiments, some thousands Ghazis, and 35 guns. Troops admirably handled. Burrows was outnumbered and surrounded. 66th European Regiment behaved splendidly, but conduct of Jacob's regiment of Rifles described as very bad.

Enclosure 11 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

BRAHUI Sirdars' messengers, who were despatched to obtain news of Ayub Khan's movements, have returned, and state that up to 1st August army was at Sangbar, the leaders were in perplexity, not knowing whether to advance or remain where they were. Ayub's loss very heavy. Messengers say he had no hope of successfully attacking Kandahar. I give this news as received. Doubtless there is truth in it.

Enclosure 12 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 5th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LIEUTENANT JENNINGS telegraphed yesterday from Spin-Tangi that the Thull-Chotiali garrison marched from Thull-Chotiali without any opposition whatever from the people. On the contrary, they maintained a friendly attitude to the end, and aided the march of the force with bullock carriage.

Enclosure 13 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 5th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

It is reported on good authority that, on 1st instant, Ayub was at Sanjiri, one march north-west of Kandahar. His army is stated to have suffered much in Burrows' engagement, and to doubt its power to attack Kandahar. Large numbers of Ghazis are collecting round Kandahar.

Henry Wylie arrived at Killa Abdulla this morning. Yesterday he reported from Gulistan that there does not yet appear to be any regular rising of the tribes in the neighbourhood of the Khojak Pass, and the attacks on convoys have been committed by gangs of thieves. The news from Shorawak is more satisfactory. Some supplies are still coming thence to Gulistan. General Phayre has heard from Chaman that the post has been made strong enough to resist any tribal attack, though not tenable against artillery fire. Colonel Lindsay has also reached Killa Abdulla, and has gone to mark out position on crest of Khojak which is now occupied by 300 of 9th Native Infantry, and 200 of 10th Native Infantry, and two mountain guns. At Gulistan there are 200 of the 2-11th Regiment, the head-quarters of which arrived here this morning.

The Madras Cavalry marched early this morning for Khusdil Khan from Sharig. The Officer Commanding telegraphs that owing to reported gathering of Wanechis and Kakars, he withdrew two small posts at Nassak and Shor near Poongi. The Nassak party was attacked by eighty Pathans, one of our sowars and two or three of the enemy were killed. The Pathans fled on reinforcements coming up. A few other Pathans attacked a convoy near Spin-Tangi, but were beaten off with a loss of eight killed. Lieutenant Tobin received the thanks of the General for his good management.

Enclosure 14 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 5th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram, dated the 3rd. His Highness the Khan has to-day replied as follows :—
Begins. Many thanks for your kind offer of assistance. Certainly I will ask you for help should I require it. Kabul, Kandahar, Pishin, and Quetta, are all Sulh-dád (?), belong to British Government. I do not fear. The Pathans are my enemies, because they know I am a true ally of the British. By God's help I shall look to my affairs properly. I have sent my men to fetch news from those places. I shall inform you as soon as I receive any news. I hope you will, for the future, also keep me informed of all news. *Ends.*

I am keeping a good look-out, and, should any further measures be necessary will at once telegraph.

Enclosure 15 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

ALL going on well. Excitement among the tribes seems to have partially subsided. There has been some little skirmishing in Khojak Pass between Killa Abdulla and Chaman. Major Morse, 9th Bombay Native Infantry very slightly wounded. Enemy easily driven out of Sangars by shots from one mountain gun.

The Aitchakzai levies still remain at their posts.

No further news from Kandahar.

Enclosure 16 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th August 1880.

From COLONEL ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Kandahar, 3rd August. Beyond slight skirmishes between country people and troops covering working parties nothing has occurred last three days. Ayub reported to intend reaching Kokaran to-morrow or next day. No news from Chaman or Kelat-i-Ghilzai since we shut ourselves up in city. Preparations for defence proceeding satisfactorily, all buildings outside walls being demolished. With very few exceptions entire Pathan population has left or been expelled city. Wounded officers doing well. Colours of both 66th and Grenadiers lost. Accurate loss not yet ascertained, but estimate given in former telegram not far wrong. About 1,100 out of 2,800 killed and missing.

Enclosure 17 in No. 18.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th August 1880, 16h. 7m. Received 8th, 10 a.m.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YESTERDAY a telegram, dated 3rd August, was received through Killa Abdulla from St. John, reporting all well at Kandahar. Ayub's army had not marched Kokaran, and no troops had been detached against Kelat-i-Ghilzai, or Pishin.

A large tribal gathering exists about Takht-i-pul. St. John's messengers were obliged to pass through Registan. The Rhoghani pass in the Amran Mountains is said to be held by 200 tribesmen. The messengers also stated that Ayub's loss in action on 27th was extremely heavy.

Some Pathan Maliks in the Lora Valley who showed signs of disaffection have been seized by Mr. Ingle, escorted by party of the Madras Cavalry and brought to Quetta.

Captain Henry Wylie reports bodies of Badozai robbers from Shorawak in Lora Tangi.

On night of 6th, 26 contract camels conveying Commissariat stores were carried off with their loads by Aitchakzais from Kuchali on Hurnai line.

Mr. Duke, Political Officer, reports that the Marris are giving some trouble to the troops evacuating the railway line. First Detachment 2-15th Regiment arrived at Nari bank this morning.

Rain was threatening in the plains. Bridge over Nari river commenced.

No. 19.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DURING THE WEEK ENDING THE 14TH AUGUST 1880. (Extract.)

8th August.—The 63rd Foot, proceeding on service to Kandahar, will probably leave as follows :—

						Men.
On the 12th	-	-	-	-	-	200
„ 13th	-	-	-	-	-	200
„ 14th	-	-	-	-	-	198
„ 15th	-	-	-	-	-	197
„ 16th	-	-	-	-	-	101
Total	-	-	-	-	-	896

The several detachments will be looked through to the Nari bank. They will reach Sukkur on the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th August.

9th August.—The following messages have been received from Sir Donald Stewart from Kabul :—

I. Dated the 7th.—“March to Kandahar force deferred to Monday, and the rest of force to Wednesday, owing to non-arrival of sick carriage.”

II. Dated the 9th.—The following is a detail of the force proceeding to Kandahar under Sir Frederick Roberts :—

	EUROPEANS.		NATIVES.	
	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned officers and men.
Staff - - -	79	—	—	—
No. 6-8th Royal Artillery -	6	95	—	139
No. 11-9th „ „ -	6	95	—	139
No. 2 Mountain Battery -	5	—	—	140
9th Lancers -	19	318	—	—
3rd Bengal Cavalry -	7	—	—	394
3rd Punjaub „ -	9	—	—	408
Central India Horse -	11	—	—	495
60th Foot -	21	616	—	—
72nd „ -	23	787	—	—
92nd „ -	19	651	—	—
15th Bengal Native Infantry -	10	—	—	650
23rd „ „ -	8	—	—	701
24th „ „ -	7	—	—	575
25th „ „ -	8	—	—	629
2nd Goorkha Regiment -	7	—	—	501
4th „ „ -	7	—	—	637
5th „ „ -	8	—	—	561
2nd Sikh Infantry -	7	—	—	612
3rd „ „ -	7	—	—	570
Total -	274	2,562	—	7,151
9,987				

Brigadier-General Wood telegraphs as follows from Jacobabad :—

I. On the 8th.—“One hundred men, 2-15th, passed through last night for Sibi. Also remaining half wing 2nd Light Cavalry left for Sibi.”

II. On the 9th.—“One hundred men, 2-15th Foot, and one squadron 8th Bengal Cavalry, passed through for Sibi last night.”

The following messages have been received from Major-General Phayre, from Quetta :—

I. Dated the 8th.—“Tribes have been threatening communication between Ghazaband and Kojak for last day or two, but each post is being placed in a defensive state, and they are checked for the present. Maliks of refractory villages have been seized. Madras cavalry reached Khúshdil Khan in time to prevent strong attack there. Headquarters wing 11th Foot gone to Gúlistán escorting large convoy. Left wing now here and with F-2nd, which will arrive to-morrow, will shortly proceed to Gúlistán. All reported quiet on Kojak position and Daman. Reports this morning from Sibi state first detachment 15th Foot left for Bolan last evening. Nari in high flood. Raft wire across has slackened so as to be useless. Large boat expected to-day from Sukkur, by which guns and infantry will be crossed. Bolan also said to be in flood. First party 15th will therefore halt at Pir-Chauki until fords passable. Large tribal gatherings on hills at Takht-i-Pul, said to amount to 2,000; occupation of Kojak and concentration of troops there has prevented this body from joining other tribes in harassing our Pishin communi-

cations. Messenger with letters from Kandahar avoided them by skirting desert to westward. As already reported, Ayub's forces were not to reach Kandahar until 5th."

II. Dated the 8th.—"Following received by Sir Robert Sandeman from Mr. Duke, Assistant Agent, Governor General, Nari. Begins—"We have reached this place. The sick and wounded are within two miles; will have to be brought in on camels and bullocks, owing to state of roads. The whole of the Quothnand (?) at Imeris (?) are up; have broken away entirely from chiefs. * * * * rode under fire with us, and believe did their best. We were compelled to abandon all our baggage and treasure in passes between Kúcháli and Gandakindaff. Five European * * * * cut up. The loss of followers and coolies very heavy. Estimated ten sepoy killed and wounded. Will report particulars later."—Ends.

III. Dated the 9th.—"It was in the Kuchali and Gandakindaff defile, within their own territory, that the Marris attacked Lieutenant Tobin's retiring force, referred to in yesterday's telegram. The defile is four miles long and very narrow in parts, being enclosed between lofty precipices. The road crosses the river several times. This part of the line, namely, between Spintangi, Kuchali, Gandakindaff, &c., is not mentioned in paragraphs 20, 29, 37 of Sir Richard Temple's minute, dated 25th of November 1879, and the Marris are extremely discontented at our occupation of it.

"Last night Officer Commanding at Sibi reported Lieutenant Tobin's arrival as follows; *Begins*—"Lieutenant Tobin and party arrived here. Tobin badly wounded in left elbow; nine or ten men killed and few wounded. Tents, kits, and baggage of party wholly abandoned. Men have nothing but what they stand in. Gatacre and his detachment also arrived: has brought in all his baggage, &c., except one tent lost in river."

Captain Shephêrd telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 9th:—

"Major Peter wires,—'Attacked by Marris on march Sibi side Kuchali. Six clerks and 20 coolies killed; baggage and treasure lost.' Have called for report, and on receipt will forward details."

The Deputy Quartermaster General, Bombay, telegraphs from Sukkur on the 9th:—
"Last squadron 8th Bengal Cavalry left yesterday for Jacobabad."

10th August.—The following message, dated Quetta the 9th, has been received from Major-General Phayre:—

"In consequence of what has occurred between Spintangi and Nari Gorge, Sir Robert Sandeman and I consider that Sibi and its vicinity should be held as follows: At *Nari Gorge*, 50 sabres and 100 rifles; *Gulo-ki-Sher*, 50 sabres and 50 rifles; *Thalli*, 50 sabres and 100 rifles; at *Sibi*, one troop cavalry and 200 Native infantry. For the present we must use the 8th Bengal Cavalry and 23rd Bombay Native Infantry for these posts. The 4th Bengal Native Infantry will, on arrival at Sibi, relieve the 23rd Native Infantry at the above post, and will also take those in the Bolan up to Siriab."

Brigadier General Wood reports as follows from Jacobabad on the 10th:—

"One hundred men, 2-15th Foot, and 8th Bombay Native Infantry passed through for Sibi last night. Also one troop 8th Bengal Cavalry left for Sibi."

11th August.—Major-General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 10th:—

I. "Your telegram of last evening. I will make my estimate of transport to-day, and give an approximate idea of force and date of March. I fear I shall have to take on some carts to save time. A very cheering letter come from Adam, just received, dated 5th; all in capital spirits, and only want some guns to take offensive. Ayub got hurt in trying to stop a fight between Kabuli and Herati regiments. This Marri rising between Sibi and Kuchali is going on, taking away troops I require for front. I reported yesterday the steps taken to check it; further information shows tribe to be unmanageable."

II. "The following is my programme of movement for the relief of Kandahar. By 24th instant I shall have collected at Quetta and in Pishin for above service exclusively,

European artillery, 310 and 12 guns ; Native Artillery, 186 men and six mountain guns ; also a rocket party ; cavalry, European 410, Native, 950 ; Sappers and Miners, 200 ; infantry, European, 1,350, Native, 3,000. As far as Chaman there is no difficulty about transport, there being a fair cart-road. It is on the 80 miles of road from that to Kandahar that difficulty exists. In order therefore to reduce transport I shall march as light as possible with the above force, leaving behind as many grass-cutters and superfluous followers as possible to follow with the reserve. Executive Commissariat Officer calculated that ten days' rations for above force can be carried on 800 camels, including German horse-biscuits. All heavy kits and most of tents will be left at Kojak in charge of a small party of each corps, ready to be brought on to Kandahar as soon as information from me, by heliograph or other means, reaches Chaman. If all goes right, the whole of the above force should be collected at Chaman on 29th instant, whence I shall endeavour to reach Kandahar in four marches, arriving there about the 2nd September.

"Recent occurrences require alteration of force for line of communication originally submitted, which will be as follows :—

Sibi and Bolan.—4th Bengal Native Infantry and three troops 8th Bengal Cavalry ; if more infantry should be required at Sibi in consequence of yesterday's information, an extra Native infantry regiment would have to be sent there until the Marris quiet down ; at all events the three troops Bengal Native Cavalry and 4th Bengal Native Infantry, should be relieved as soon as possible, as they are required for the front. For *Quetta Station*, 23rd Native Infantry and one squadron Madras Cavalry.

"Next, with regard to the communication between Quetta and Chaman, I have been obliged, in consequence of the state of the country, to occupy fortified posts as follows, a measure which has had the desired effect of securing our communications :

Mehtarzai, 25 sabres ; crest of *Ghazaband pass*, 30 rifles and 26 sabres ; *Sighi*, 75 rifles and 25 sabres ; *Gulistan*, 100 rifles and 25 sabres ; *Kila Abdulla*, 150 rifles and 25 sabres ; *Khushtil Khan*, 150 rifles and 150 sabres ; *Kojak position*, 500 rifles, three 9-pr. guns from Quetta Arsenal (? manned) by detachment from 14-9th Royal Artillery, and 25 sappers ; *Chaman*, 230 rifles and 40 sabres ; on north-east at *Kach*, 300 rifles. Thus, for the Pishin line of communications two strong Native Infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment are required, instead of one Native Infantry as before estimated. These can be held by the 24th Native Infantry, 3rd Bengal Native Infantry and 1st Madras Cavalry. Lastly, for the reserve there remain H-1st and A-4th Royal Artillery and three troops 8th Bengal Cavalry and 63rd Foot and two Bombay regiments ; and as I take only ten days' supplies with me from Chaman, a reserve force, with 20 days' supplies and baggage left behind, ought to be ready to march from Chaman 2nd September at latest."

Brigadier-General Wood telegraphs as follows from Jacobabad on the 11th :—

"One hundred men 2-15th Foot and half-battery D-B, Royal Horse Artillery, passed through last night for Sibi."

The following telegram, dated 11th, has been addressed by the Quartermaster-General in India to Major-General Phayre :—

"Following telegram, dated 10th, received from Quartermaster-General, Bombay : *Begins*—'The 78th Highlanders embarked at Bombay yesterday, the 15th Native Infantry will embark on 12th, and the 13th Native Infantry about 17th. All will wait orders from General Phayre at Karachi.'—*Ends*. The 78th will remain for the present at Karachi."

12th August.—Brigadier-General Wood telegraphs as follows from Jacobabad :—

I. *On the 10th.*—"Your telegram yesterday. Three troops 8th Bengal Cavalry ordered to Sibi by General Phayre for protection of railway."

II. *On the 12th.*—"One hundred men 2-15th, and half battery D-B, passed through for Sibi last night."

Major-General R. Phayre telegraphs from Quetta on the 12th :—

"Messenger arrived at Chaman from Khelat-i-Ghilzai with the following letter from Colonel Tanner, dated Sunday, 8th August :—*Begins*—'As I cannot get news from Kandahar (the last received here was dated 25th July), I send the bearer with this

'note, he promises to return on eighth day or earlier. Please write all news of what has happened at Kandahar, and regarding its relief. We heard that Kandahar force is shut up, but do not know anything for certain. Here we are all right at present, but the people about will rise *en masse* if they hear of a reverse at Kandahar. I am very well off for supplies, so am in no danger at present.'

13th August.—Major-General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 12th:—
 "Your telegram yesterday. Sir Robert Sandeman and I have several times endeavoured to communicate with Primrose, but messengers cannot obtain entrance. I have now received letter from Adam, explaining how messenger can be admitted, and have informed Sir Robt. Sandeman, and hope to succeed."

Brigadier-General Wood reports from Jacobabad on the 13th:—
 "One hundred men 2-15th and first detachment 15th Hussars passed through Sibi last night."

14th August.—Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 13th:—

"Your telegram of this day. I have made arrangements for fifteen days' supplies for the whole force at Kandahar, including Roberts, to follow me within four days of my departure from Chaman, escorted by 3rd Brigade. With this brigade military posts will be established and the telegraph lines re-laid. Sir Robert Sandeman and I had a meeting this morning with several officers, and the whole plan has been arranged. Copy of these proceedings by post. We should do the above work from both ends, *viz.*, from Chaman and Kandahar after my arrival there. I have no doubt that ten days' supplies will be ample under these circumstances; to take more with my force would hamper my movements in the face of a powerful enemy. Even travelling light, as I intend to do, I shall have at least 2,000 camels or their equivalent. To-day I informed Chief, Bombay, fully on this subject, in reply to a reference from him. I can assure His Excellency I am not running any risk."

Brigadier-General Wood telegraphs from Jacobabad on the 13th:—
 "One squadron 15th Hussars passed through for Sibi this afternoon."

No. 20.

No. 185 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

TO THE RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, HER MAJESTY'S
 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, August 17, 1880.

IN continuation of our letter, dated 3rd August,* we have the honour to submit, for your Lordship's information, a connected account of the events and circumstances, so far as they have come to our knowledge, which preceded and attended the march of Sirdar Ayub Khan from Herat to Kandahar, up to the time when his army appeared upon the Helmund. It will be remembered that this account is based upon intelligence received at different times from various quarters, much of it being necessarily unauthenticated; and that we are still imperfectly informed of the motives and objects of the Sirdar in attacking Kandahar.

2. In September 1879, two Kabul regiments at Herat broke out into mutiny, and murdered General Fakir Ahmed Khan, who was commanding the army there under Sirdar Ayub Khan. This occurred two days after the outbreak at Kabul against the British Embassy; but the news of this latter event, and of the march on Kabul of a British force, must have reached Herat soon afterwards, and from that time all the Kabuli regiments, which are mainly composed of men from the North-Eastern tribes, appear to have been anxious to leave Herat for their own country. The best and easiest route from Herat toward Kabul and Eastern Afghanistan is by Kanahar; the Kabuli soldiery, whom Ayub Khan could not pay, and whose excesses soon exhausted

Herat, where they lived at free quarters, had every incentive to regain their homes and to rejoin their clans. Ayub Khan tried at first to disarm and disband them; but they refused to leave Herat except as an organized body, with their artillery. So early as in November 1879, reports were received at Kandahar that the Kabul regiments were pressing Ayub Khan to lead them against Kandahar, that they were quite beyond the Sirdar's control, that they had seized all the revenues collected, and that the standards were already set up outside the city for their march. Ayub Khan himself telegraphed to the Persian Minister on the 24th November, announcing that, since Yakub Khan appeared to have made terms with the English, he (Ayub Khan) had proclaimed the *Jehad*, and was moving off that day to Kandahar with his whole force to attack the English there. The Sirdar appears to have brought into Herat, in November, some regiments from Maimenah. Between these regiments [generally called afterwards the Herati troops] and the local levies on one side, and the Kabuli troops on the other side, there soon broke out disputes and fighting. Ayub Khan actually marched out of Herat with all his forces early in December, but an opposite faction seized the city, and closed the gates on him; whereupon a battle ensued between the Kabuli and the Herati regiments, ending in the defeat of the latter party. This affair probably stopped the march of the Kabuli troops; and it also induced Ayub Khan to abandon for the time his projected expedition against Kandahar, which he was supposed to have undertaken mainly under compulsion of the mutinous regiments.

3. At the beginning of January 1880, it was reported through Teheran that the Kabuli and Herati parties in the army had become reconciled, from fear lest Persia should take advantage of their disputes to seize Herat. Ayub Khan's chief advisers were Sirdar Khushdil Khan (usually called the Luinab) and other military commandants, most of whom are connected with Kandahar; and these were probably the real planners and leaders of the expedition, for all our intelligence supported the belief that the Sirdar himself was at this time entirely in the hands of the army, while it was suggested that the dissensions among the troops had been fomented by him with the object of breaking their power. The Kandahar reports of January contained frequent references to military disturbances, and to the loss of power by Ayub, who was apparently endeavouring to get help from Persia and other quarters. Nevertheless, during January and February rumours of Ayub's advance were prevalent, intermixed, however, with stories of fresh quarrelling among the regiments, of the discomfiture of the Kabulis, and of their partial dispersion.

4. The arrival at Herat of a Persian Commissioner created much speculation early in March; but throughout the month the rumours were conflicting; while the constant repetition of the news that a *Jehad* had been proclaimed and the march of the troops about to begin, rather weakened than strengthened the force of these warnings. It was evident that the Kabuli regiments were anxious to return to their own country, and that intrigues for the purpose of raising disturbance were rife in Furreh and Zamindawar; but Ayub seemed to be steadily losing authority over the troops and the country. Letters received from Herat at Kandahar in April said that he was a prisoner in the hands of his troops, and that his administration was in great confusion. On the whole, therefore, although there could be little doubt that the Kabuli troops were likely soon to abandon Herat, the general impression was that the Heratis would not join them, and that no organized expedition, regularly led and equipped, was to be expected; nor did the Wali Sher Ali Khan appear to have any apprehension that a formidable invasion of South Afghanistan was impending. He had brought the western districts up to the Khash river under his authority, and his levies occupied Washir.

5. During the month of May the reports of Ayub's movements and intentions continued to be uncertain and inconsistent. At Kandahar it was first said that he intended to leave on the 11th, afterwards on the 26th, and that the Kabuli and Herati troops were reconciled. But in reply to a reference to Teheran, information was received that dissensions still continued, that Ayub's arrangements had fallen through, that the Kabuli troops were on bad terms with the Herati troops, and that they intended returning toward Kabul by Turkistan, with or without Ayub Khan's permission. The presence of Ayub's troops in Furreh was to some extent accounted for by a report, from Meshed, that, owing to some apprehension of the approach of Sher Ali Khan's troops, a detachment would be sent there from Herat to protect the place. Affairs at Herat were generally described, by a letter dated 13th May, to be in a state of disorder and discontent; while Ayub's preparations for departure were supposed to be dictated by a desire to escape from his own troops. On the 29th May, a report reached Kandahar from Herat that Ayub Khan had encamped at Rozabagh outside the city; and that a body of horsemen had started on the Kandahar road; but on the 4th June came intelligence that the march was again postponed, owing to the internal quarrels of

the troops. This was corroborated by further reports which reached Kandahar on the 12th June; and in the meantime it was reported that the intelligence of the defeat inflicted on the tribes by Sir Donald Stewart near Ghazni had produced a profound impression on the Kabuli soldiers, increasing their anxiety to return to their homes. Up to the 17th June, the messengers from Herat reported at Kandahar that no attempt had been made at an advance, beyond planting the standards outside the gate; and at Kandahar the expectation of Ayub's coming was said to be subsiding.

6. On the 21st June, however, the Wali of Kandahar, who had been at Girishk since June 1st, sent word to Colonel St. John that he had received authentic news of the regular infantry having gone into camp outside Herat, and that the Luinab was reported to be intending a movement on Zamindawar, with 2,000 horsemen. The news was at once communicated to Teheran with inquiry for intelligence through Meshed. On the 25th, Mr. Ronald Thomson telegraphed that a special messenger had reached Meshed with a letter, dated 18th June, from Herat, announcing that Ayub Khan had left Herat for Kandahar on the 9th June. The strength of his force was variously estimated; it was known to be strong in artillery and cavalry, with 10 regiments of regular infantry. On the 30th June, a letter was received by Colonel St. John from the Wali, reporting that the Luinab with Cavalry had arrived in Furrah.

7. Upon the receipt of Mr. Thomson's telegram of the 25th, the question of the measures to be taken in consequence of the intelligence that Ayub Khan's army was actually moving toward Kandahar, was at once considered. After consulting Sir D. Stewart, and Colonel St. John, with whom General Primrose concurred, we determined that a British force should advance to the Helmund, and that reinforcements should be pushed up to Kandahar as quickly as possible from the line of communication and from reserves collected in Sind. The necessary orders were issued as soon as possible, and a brigade under General Burrows marched for the Helmund. In the opinion of all those best qualified to advise upon the situation, it was essential, upon political and still more upon military grounds, that Ayub Khan's advance should be checked by a demonstration toward the Helmund. The advance of the Herat army directly threatened our military position at Kandahar, which had been declared to be the point upon which his movement was directed; and the consequences of our troops remaining in cantonments there while Ayub crossed the river and gradually approached the capital, might have been seriously disadvantageous in various ways. The Alizai chiefs of Zamindawar had been reported to have joined the Wali's camp at Girishk; and Colonel St. John considered that the despatch of a brigade to Maiwand would help to confirm the fidelity of the Wali's troops, to overawe the Zamindawar tribes, and to maintain confidence at Kandahar. There was every probability that Ayub Khan's force, if allowed to draw near without interruption, would gather Ghazis and other recruits from the armed and disaffected population of the districts, and that his foraging parties would create disturbances throughout the whole province, and along our line of communications. For these and other reasons it appeared unadvisable to await the enemy at Kandahar, while if Sirdar Ayub Khan, avoiding the city, had moved without interruption from the Helmund straight upon Kelat-i-Ghilzai (where we have a garrison) and Ghazni, the effect upon our military reputation, and upon the political situation generally in Afghanistan, would have been exceedingly damaging. It was thought probable at Kandahar that the appearance of a British brigade on the Helmund would check the progress of Ayub Khan, that the Herati troops might hold back, and that the Kabuli regiments, whose main object was to reach their homes might break up and leave his standard.

8. We have already, in our despatch of the 3rd August, reported to your Lordship the course of events, so far as they were known to us, that followed the arrival of General Burrows' brigade upon the Helmund. We have as yet received no information whatever from General Primrose of the circumstances under which General Burrows engaged the enemy on the 27th, of his defeat, or of the present situation of the British troops in Kandahar and Kelat-i-Ghilzai. The occasional communications from Kandahar, and the scanty intelligence from other sources, that from time to time reach Sir R. Sandeman and General Phayre at Quetta, are regularly transmitted to your Lordship by telegraph.

We have, &c.

(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

No. 21.

No. 186 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT. HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, August 17, 1880.

In continuation of our despatch, No. 179, dated the 10th August 1880, we have the honour to forward for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

"

F. P. HAINES.

"

JOHN STRACHEY.

"

E. B. JOHNSON.

"

WHITLEY STOKES.

"

JAMES GIBBS.

"

C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 12th August 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Zurgun Shahr, 10th August.

WE are getting on well. Sun is hot between ten and four. Troops are healthy and in grand spirits.

It seems likely that we shall meet with opposition in neighbourhood of Ghazni, where I hope to be on 15th August.

Enclosure 2 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 14th August 1880.

From VICEROY, Simla, to General Sir D. M. STEWART.

In view of questions in House of Commons, Secretary of State is anxious for answer as to supplies for Roberts' force. I should therefore be glad of a reply to mine of 12th as soon as you can send one.

Enclosure 3 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 14th August 1880.

From General Sir D. M. STEWART, Seh Baba, to VICEROY, Simla.

YOUR Excellency's telegram, 12th. There is no ground for alarm about supplies on the road. Sheep, grain, and forage plentiful at this season. Roberts has all European supplies for a month. There probably will be a difficulty in regard to tea, sugar, and rum at Kandahar; but the troops can do very well without these for a time, though every effort should be made to push them on from Sind.

Enclosure 4 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 8th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING from Captain Henry Wylie: *Begins*—Spy, who left Pishin on 1st, has returned with news of everything being right at Kandahar up to 5th. Ayub had reached

Kokaran, but had made no advance towards Kelat-i-Ghilzai, or Pishin, nor attack on city. Particulars by special sowar.—*Ends.*

Enclosure 5 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th August 1880.

From COLONEL ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 6th. Ayub arrived Kokaran, six miles from city. Preparations for defence complete. Provisions, except forage, for thirty-five days. Our losses exaggerated in previous reports; do not exceed one thousand killed and missing, of which 400 Europeans and twenty-one officers.

Here had no communication from Kelat, or Chaman, since 28th. Wali in city with relations and families. All the Afghan's, except a few merchants, turned out.

Enclosure 6 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

A TRUSTWORTHY agent sent to Kandahar returned, and reports impossibility of obtaining access to city, entrances to which are strictly guarded by our troops, who prevent ingress. Three of my letters to St. John have been intercepted by enemy, who have also seized other messengers, men, and women, trying to enter and leave Kandahar with letters. Every village and road is watched to prevent letter passing.

On the 5th, Ayub's regular troops are said to have reached Chunni, about seven miles from Kandahar. The villagers are suffering much oppression from Ayub's regular and irregular forces.

It is stated that twelve British soldiers who lost their way in the retreat after Burrow's action, were captured by ghazis the following day, between Maiwand and Kandahar and taken to Ayub. Some Syuds, who sheltered the fugitives at Maiwand, have been killed and made prisoners by Ayub. Hadji Sirbuland Khan, Aitchakzai, and his son, Ghulam Nabi, are also said to be in confinement. Ayub's whole force, including ghazis and tribesmen, is now estimated at 20,000. Great want of discipline prevails.

Enclosure 7 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM dated 9th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

EVACUATION of railway line by troops completed. Would have been altogether successfully carried out, but for apparent disregard by Major Peters, R.E., of my own, and General Phayre's instructions. This morning Mr. Duke telegraphs from Sibi that Major Peters, at Sharig, although repeatedly warned, delayed despatching his carts until almost the last day. When carts arrived at Spin-Tangi, they were found to be accompanied by 1,000 coolies, and to contain, among other things, one and half lakhs treasure. According to instructions, all stores it was intended to remove and not leave for safe custody with Maliks should have been made over to the troops under Colonel Roome proceeding to Pishin. For some reason not yet known, this treasure was instead allowed to come down with much other heavy baggage and coolies, through the worst portion of the Pathan and Marri hills with the last convoy for Sibi. Escort consisted of about 180 sepahis, of whom a large proportion were sick, under Lieutenant Tobin, who had previously been badly wounded. With the report of our defeat at Kandahar was circulated a report that 10 lakhs of treasure were being carried down. All the Pathan and Marri robbers united for the sake of plunder and attacked the carts in the pass between Kuchali and Gundakin Duff. The progress of the carts was delayed by a heavy fall of rain and the flooding of the Nari River. In spite of the utmost efforts, 180 carts and all the treasure and baggage had to be abandoned. Four European subordinates, 12 sepahis, and 20 coolies were killed, and four sepahis wounded.

Mr. Duke accompanied the convoy and with him were three Marri Chiefs, who, he says, exerted themselves to the utmost to help, but had no control over the robbers, a number of whom are said to have been killed. I greatly regret what has occurred, and have telegraphed to Mr. Duke to submit a written report without delay.

Enclosure 8 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, No. 2719 E. P., dated 9th August 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

IMPORTANT to inform Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison, through St. John, or direct of Roberts' march. He left Kabul yesterday, and will push on as rapidly as possible.

Enclosure 9 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, No. 2741 E. P., dated 10th August 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

YOUR telegram, 9th. Evacuation of railway. Please report by letter fully circumstances of attack and loss of treasure and lives, showing orders issued and on whom responsibility lay for miscarriage of arrangements.

Enclosure 10 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 10th August 1880. 14h. 41m.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GENERAL Phayre received to-day a letter from Major Adam, Quartermaster-General, Kandahar, dated 5th August. The garrison have water, food, and ammunition in abundance. Their defences have been strengthened; buildings outside city walls destroyed; guns mounted, and every preparation made to resist attack. Spirit of troops good, and one or two successful skirmishes with villages have taken place. Communication with outside world most difficult. Herati and Kabuli troops are said to have quarrelled over booty captured after Burrows' defeat, and Ayub is reported to have been wounded in quelling disturbance.

From Khojak all reported quiet. Heliographic communication established between crest of Khojak and Killa Abdulla. The last detachment of troops and convoy leaving Marri hills was attacked by Marri and Pathan robbers in a difficult pass and a large quantity of treasure and baggage was lost.

A gathering of Kakars near Barshor in the direction of Ghazni has broken up, attributed to the arrival of the Madras Cavalry at Khushdil Khan Killa in Pishin.

Enclosure 11 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 10th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram, 9th. Letter despatched to Kelat-i-Ghilzai.

Enclosure 12 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LIEUTENANT JENNINGS, Political Officer with Thull-Chotiali troops, telegraphed last night their safe arrival at Durgai. All well; expected to reach Kach Amadan tomorrow, and march for Kojak on 13th.

Enclosure 13 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

THE gatherings in Toba and Shorawak have dispersed. All quiet in the Khojak Pass.

A report that Sartip Nur Muhammad was on his way to attack Chaman with two guns proves to be untrue.

Colonel Roome, 5th Bombay Native Infantry, with the Thal-Chotiali and Hurnai forces under his command, has arrived at North Chappar without encountering any opposition. Three nine-pounder guns drawn by bullocks, escorted by a detachment of the 2-11th Regiment, leave this evening for the Khojak.

Enclosure 14 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 12th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LETTER from Colonel Commanding at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, dated 8th August, received at Chaman, reports all well there, and supplies plentiful. Colonel Tanner says he has received no authentic news from Kandahar since 25th July, but rumours of garrison being shut up in city had reached him.

Henry Wylie reports all quiet in the neighbourhood of the Khojak pass and Khushdil Khan Killa in Pishin. Native information states that much perturbation exists among the Kabuli soldiery in Ayub's army, who have heard of Amir Abdul Rahman having ascended the throne. No attack on Kandahar has yet been reported.

Enclosure 15 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 13th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

TELEGRAPHIC communication between Killa Abdulla and Chaman restored.

Enclosure 16 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 13th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

NEWS of the 9th from Kandahar states that Ayub Khan is intriguing with the Aitchakzais in the neighbourhood of Toda and Chaman, through the sons of one of their chief sirdars, named Fateh Khan. Ayub has promised to assist the Aitchakzais with guns and regular troops, for the purpose of attacking our line of communications.

In Ayub's camp it is said to be debated whether they should endeavour to undermine the city walls, or to attack by escalade. Ayub is reported to have decided in favour of an escalade and to be making the necessary preparations. It is also reported that Ayub has endeavoured, without success, to mediate with the Kandahar garrison and to obtain the release of his brother, Yakub Khan.

From Pishin information has been received of an attack on a village by some Kakozaïs, resulting in the death of four policemen. A large party of Zhobites are reported to have passed through the Kowas Valley last night. Their intended destination and object have not yet been ascertained.

The first detachment of the 15th Regiment arrives to-morrow.

Enclosure 17 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 15th August 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 11th. All well. Defences and demolitions complete. Enemy throwing up siege works at present insignificant. He has about 37 guns, of which six 12-pounder Armstrongs, 4,000 or 5,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and varying number of Ghazis, perhaps averaging 5,000. Provisions, except fresh meat and forage, abundant. News from Kelat to 4th. All well there and quiet.

Rumours have reached tribes of advance from Kabul, no general rising appears to have taken place yet, except immediately round Kandahar. Wounded officers doing well; one or more officers said to be captives in Ayub's hands. Have written to ask him.

Enclosure 18 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 15th August 1880.

From SIR R. SANDEMAN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

THE following from Wylie giving Kandahar news to 11th: *Begins*—My kossid, sent on 7th, just returned with news from St. John to 11th, giving details of action of 27th, and state of Kandahar. Our losses on 27th were in officers same as before stated, only add Captain Harris, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General wounded, and that Colonel Iredell's wound is dangerous. Men killed: Artillery, 18; sappers, 23; 66th, 282; Grenadiers, 365; Jacob's Rifles, 250; Sind Horse, 10; 3rd Cavalry, about 20.

On the 11th Ayub was still three miles from Kandahar, and had made no attack on it, though his guns threw occasional shells into city. His Herat troops had deserted, and his strength was believed to be 4,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and a miscellaneous heap of Ghazis. Has no guns better than home-made 12-pounder Armstrongs.

My kossid says country people are making trenches and approaches towards Shikarpur Gate, and he warned St. John of this. Says the city defences have been placed in as good a state for defence as possible, and everything cleared round the town for some distance, and the position ought to be impregnable. Garrison has plenty of provisions, except fresh meat and forage.

Enclosure 19 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

THE military post at Kach Amadan was attacked at 4 a.m. this morning by Kakar Pathans, who were beaten off with the loss of 80 killed. Our troops pursued the Kakars for two miles. Particulars not received, as the wire was cut. When message given them was being transmitted, we had been warned of probable attack on post, and General Phayre last night had sent a detachment of troops from Quetta to bring away

the sick. Telegram from Chaman last night stated that letters had arrived there from Colonel Tanner from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, dated 12th August, in reply to letters from me. My letter was the first intimation Colonel Tanner had received of the march of Roberts' force. Country was quiet, quiet in fort, supplies abundant. Tanner says he will be able to help Roberts' force with supplies. More particulars on receipt of letter which is coming from Chaman by special messenger. Tanner mentions that communications with Kandahar very difficult.

Enclosure 20 in No. 21.

TELEGRAM, 2809 E.P., dated 6th August 1880.

From, FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

St. JOHN's telegram, 11th, says one or more officers reported captives with Ayub. If this is true, will money promised or paid assist their protection or release? Whatever you or St. John may think fit may be spent. Tell St. John secretly.

No. 22.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DURING THE WEEK ENDING THE 21ST AUGUST 1880. (Extract.)

15th August.—Consequent on Major-General Phayre having made a demand for extra troops for service on the Pishin line of communication, the 3rd Hyderabad Cavalry and the 38th Bengal Native Infantry, two of the corps held in reserve, have been ordered to proceed at one to Sibi.

16th August.—The following telegram, dated the 14th, has been received from the Officer commanding at Jacobabad:—

"One squadron, 15th Hussars, passed through for Sibi this morning."

The Deputy Quartermaster-General at Sukkur reports, on the 14th, that the second squadron of the 15th Hussars left that place for Sibi that day.

General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta:—

I. *On the 15th.*—The following received from Colonel St. John, through Chaman and Kila Abdulla:—Begins: "Kandahar, 11th. All well. Defence and demolitions complete. Enemy throwing up siege works; at present insignificant. He has about 37 guns, of which six are 12-pounder Armstrongs, four or five thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and varying number of ghazis, perhaps averaging five thousand. Provisions, except fresh meat and forage, abundant. News from Kelat to 4th; all well there and Quetta. No general rising appears to have taken place yet, except immediately around Kandahar. Wounded Officers doing well."—Ends. Following from Brigadier-General James, commanding in Kojak:—Begins: "Westmacott says country people report that heavy firing was heard from Kandahar on night of 12th; also report of a force coming this way; nothing definite."—Ends. Captain H. Wylie adds:—Begins: "My kossid sent on 7th has just returned with news from St. John to 11th, giving details of action of 27th and state of Kandahar. Our losses on 27th, were in Officers same as before stated, only add Captain Harris, 66th Foot, wounded, and Major Iredell's wound dangerous. Men killed,—Artillery, 18; Sappers, 23; 66th, 282; Grenadiers, 365; Jacob's Rifles, 250; Sind Horse, 10; 3rd Cavalry, about 20. On the 11th, Ayub still three miles from Kan-

"dahar, and had made no attack, though his guns threw an occasional shell into city. His Herat troops had deserted; his strength was believed to be two thousand cavalry and four thousand infantry, and a miscellaneous heap of ghazis. Has no guns better than home-made 12-pdr. Armstrong. Kossid says country people are making trenches and approaches towards Shikarpore gate, and he warned St. John of this. St. John says city defects have been placed in good state of defence as possible, and everything cleared round town for some distance, and position ought to be impregnable. Garrison has plenty provisions, except fresh meat and forage. St. John's letter is being copied, and will be forwarded by express. Kossid says no troops have advanced from Kandahar towards Pishin. Sarbaland is still with St. John, but not trusted with important work, as spy says our Officers do everything themselves. Country people around city suffering much from want of attack. St. John now knows of Robert's advance."—Ends.

II. *On the 16th.*—Head-quarters, wing, 16th Native Infantry, attacked in Kach post at 4 a.m. to-day, by combined tribes of Kakars. Enemy driven off with loss of 80 killed. Loss on our side slight. Just as Colonel Pierce* was about to telegraph particulars wire was cut. Am sending out a few cavalry, with Biluch guides from Sir Robert Sandeman, through Sarakula Pass, to warn a detachment of 100 Native Infantry which left this for Kach last night to bring in sick.

17th August.—The 3rd Bengal Native Infantry left Dinapore on the evening of the 15th, *en route* to Sibi.

The last squadron of the 15th Hussars and a wing of the 4th Bengal Native Infantry left Sukkur on the 16th, *en route* for Sibi.

Brigadier-General Wood reports as follows from Jacobabad on the 16th:—

"Half battery, 15/9th, passed through for Sibi last night; also one squadron, 8th Bengal Cavalry, strength 81 sabres, left for Nari bank by order of General Phayre."

General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 16th:—

I. Reply received at Chaman from Colonel Tanner. Two letters despatched a short time ago. His letter is dated 12th instant. All well there. He is delighted at receiving intelligence of the Kabul column. Says the tribes around there are all quiet, although Ayub has sent to call upon them to rise. He finds communication with Kandahar as difficult as we do. Referring to my telegram this morning, Colonel Pierce appears to have pursued the enemy for two miles from Kach. We shall restore telegraphic communication with Kach as soon as possible.

II. In consequence of attitude of Marris, I have already alienated more troops for Sibi and Bolan than has ever been the case; consequently, I am crippling my advance force. Notwithstanding this, Sir Robert Sandeman is asking me for more troops. These I cannot possibly give without stopping advance on Kandahar. I have advised Sir Robert Sandeman to represent the case to Government, and to make a requisition for what he considers necessary in consequence of hostility of Marris. All that is now going on in that part could be managed by tribal levies better than by troops under present circumstances. I have reminded Sir Robert Sandeman that there is a stream of troops passing up the Bolan, and will be for the next month. Intelligence just received here that the Shorawak tribes are collecting to attack Quetta and Kelat.

18th August.—Brigadier-General Wood telegraphs from Jacobabad on the 18th:—

"Two hundred men, 63rd Foot, and remaining wing, 4th Bengal Native Infantry, passed through for Sibi last night."

Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 13th:—

"I shall require the 78th Highlanders in reserve at Pishin. I am arranging with Major Colvin, Sukkur, regarding train arrangements, so as not to interfere with movements of Bengal troops."

* Colonel T. W. W. Pierce, 16th Bombay Native Infantry.

19th August.—The following corps will take part in the advance on Kandahar, under Major-General Phayre, C.B., early next month.

<i>Artillery.</i>	<i>Infantry.</i>
D/B, Royal Horse Artillery.	11th Foot.
F/2nd, Royal Artillery.	15th „
No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery.	63rd „
<i>Cavalry.</i>	5th Bombay Native Infantry.
15th Hussars.	8th „ „ „
1st Madras Light Cavalry.	9th „ „ „
2nd Bombay Light Cavalry.	10th „ „ „
Detachment of Poona Horse.	16th „ „ „
2nd Sind Horse.	19th „ „ „
	23rd „ „ „
	24th „ „ „
	27th „ „ „
<i>Sappers and Miners.</i>	
3rd, 4th, and 5th Companies, Bombay Sappers and Miners,	

The whole of the above troops will be concentrated at Chaman by the 29th instant, with the exception of the following, which will not reach that place until the dates expressed opposite to them :—

D/B, Royal Horse Artillery	-	30th August.
15th Hussars	-	5th September.
63rd Foot	-	3rd „
9th Bombay Native Infantry	-	3rd „
23rd „ „ „	-	5th „

The following telegram has been received from Major-General Phayre, dated Quetta the 17th :—

“In consequence of reliable information regarding investment of Kandahar by Ayub and commencement of siege works, received last evening, have resolved taking with advance force two 25-pounder guns in Quetta Arsenal, which I can man and provide draught for. Enemy has four 12-pounder Armstrongs; therefore, knowing ground as I do, and strong position he has taken up on east and south sides in villages of Deh Kwaja and Deh Khati, I feel necessity of having with me guns of superior calibre to his.”

Brigadier-General Wood telegraphs as follows from Jacobabad on the 19th :—

- I. Two hundred men, 63rd, passed through Sibi last night.
- II. The 15th Bombay Native Infantry passed through Sibi last night.

The 38th Bengal Native Infantry having been declared unfit to proceed immediately on service, owing to its consisting largely of recruits, who are unfit to take their places in the ranks, the 17th Bengal Native Infantry has been nominated to take its place, and will proceed from Morar to the Pishin line of communications.

Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 14th :—

“Distribution of forces ordered for relief of Kandahar and details of staff published in this day's Division Orders :—General Phayre, Commanding; Major Cunningham, Assistant Adjutant-General, sick, Captain Cooke-Collis officiating; Major Jopp, Assistant Quartermaster-General; Major Heyland, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General; Captain Phayre, Aide-de-Camp; Lieutenant Fitzroy Somerset, Extra Aide-de-Camp; Major Swinhoe, Assistant Commissary-General; Major Wooldridge, Director of Transport; Deputy Surgeon-General Bruce, Principal Medical Officer. Artillery Brigade,—Colonel Smith, Commanding; Captain Blaksley, Adjutant: Troops,—D/B, Royal Horse Artillery; F/2nd, Royal Artillery; No. 2 Mountain Battery. Cavalry Brigade,—General Wilkinson, Commanding; Major Morris, Brigade Major; Captain Muir, Orderly Officer: Troops,—15th Hussars, 1st Madras Cavalry, 2nd Bombay Light Cavalry, 2nd Sind Horse, and 198 sabres, Poona Horse. Engineer Force,—Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, Commanding Royal Engineer; Lieutenant Whiteford, Adjutant: Troops,—Three companies Sappers and Miners. Engineer Officers for duty,—Lieutenant Selby, in charge of signalling; Lieutenants Fuller,

Davidson, Hickson, Assistant Field Engineers; Lieutenants O'Sullivan, Robinson Neville, Coles, Slater, Assistant Field Engineers. Attached to Sappers,—Captain Joseph, Bombay Staff Corps, Assistant Field Engineer. 1st Infantry Brigade,—General James, Commanding; Captain Cooke-Collis, Brigade-Major; Major Sanders, Commissariat Officer; Lieutenant-Colonel Barras, Transport Officer: Troops,—2/11th Foot, and 8th and 10th, and 400 rifles of 16th and 19th Bombay Native Infantry. 2nd Infantry Brigade,—General Brown, Commanding; Major Stock, Brigade-Major; Major Fagan, Commissariat Officer; Lieutenant Mackenzie, Transport Officer: Troops,—2/15th Foot, and 5th, 24th, and 27th Bombay Native Infantry. 3rd Infantry Brigade,—General Wood, Commanding, sick, General Walker officiating; Captain Andrews, Brigade-Major; Lieutenant Wood, Orderly Officer: Troops,—63rd Foot, and 9th and 23rd Bombay Native Infantry. Line of communication from Sibi to Chaman,—General Henderson; Captain Watling, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General; Brigade-Major, vacant. Sibi and outposts,—One regiment Native Infantry; three troops Cavalry. Bolan post,—Half regiment Native Infantry. From Quetta to Chaman, including Kach and Kushdil Khan,—Two regiments Native Infantry; two squadrons Cavalry. Quetta garrison and reserve troops, staff vacant: Troops,—A/4th, H/1st, 5/8th, 14/9th Royal Artillery, one squadron Cavalry, and one and half regiments Native Infantry.

20th August.—Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 19th:—

I. Intelligence by Shahan kossid, through Sir Robert Sandeman, states that at Modga, a place inhabited by Panazais, Badzais, and Mehtarzais, there was a tribal gathering whose intention was to attack Kach. Shah Jehan, of Zhob; and Faizu are, he states, at Abadeon with 8,000 men, consisting of Panazais, Dammahs, Zumatans, Sharans, Sharanzais, Mehtarzais, and Adinzais. The leaders give out that they intend to attack Kach first, then the Bolan, and finally Quetta. Informant came from Kach through the Sarakula pass, and on this side the Machbauzi; saw bodies of armed men who had taken up different positions.

II. By reports received last night from Colonel Pierce, the combined tribes from Zhob, Chappar, Toba, &c., instead of retiring to their homes after their defeat, have collected in greater force on the heights around Kach, and fire on parties attempting to leave it. In addition to the sick and wounded of Colonel Pierce's force, there are the sick from Chappar, Thal-Chotiali, &c., amounting in all to 150 men, who must be brought to Quetta. Colonel Pierce also reports that his supply of forage has ceased, and that his grain for transport cattle is finished. Under these circumstances, I have been obliged to order two mountain guns, three troops of Cavalry, and a regiment of Native Infantry of my advance force from Pishin to Kach, *via* Ghurki defile. I proposed to Sir Robert Sandeman to evacuate the post altogether, as Chappar, Sharigh, Harnai, &c., have been; but he so strongly deprecated the measure on political grounds until some effort has been made to pacify the tribes, that I consented to await the report of Captain H. Wyllie, who will accompany the above field column and endeavour to arrange for a month's supply of *bhūsa* and barley being stored in the fortified storeyard.

“If Captain Wyllie succeeds, the garrison of 300 men would remain, and the sick and wounded only be brought into Quetta. These isolated posts, so far from the line of communication, are most objectionable in a military point of view, as they alienate men and animals that cannot well be spared. The importance of Kach as an influential centre cannot be doubted. Sir Robert Sandeman thinks that a garrison of 300 Native Infantry would be sufficient under present circumstances. However, I think that Kach itself should be held by two mountain guns and 400 rifles, and that a fortified post of 50 rifles should be established in the Sarakula Pass, half way between Quetta and Kach. The distance to Kach by this pass is 28 miles; round by Kuchlak and Ghurki defile it is 44 miles. I have ordered the field column to do its work as quickly as possible, in order that, if possible, my advance may not be delayed beyond the date named.

III. The following intelligence just received from Gulistan that a large body of Barakzais are collected at Argantai, beyond the Spintaga. This rumour was brought by an Achakzai, who disappeared immediately after. From another quarter the following intelligence received by Sir Robert Sandeman,—that Ayub Khan had detailed 60 horsemen and two guns to go with inhabitants of Argistan-Kadani and the Achakzais to Murgha, to the aid of Gholam Hyder Khan; that the guns and sowars had crossed the Zakird Kotal on their way to Murgha; also that two infantry regi-

ments, 600 strong each, three cavalry regiments of 200 sabres each, with a few guns had been detailed for Shorawak, but had not yet started from Kandahar ; also reported that Ayub Khan was erecting fortified enclosures at five different places.

The Officer commanding at Jacobabad telegraphs that 200 men of the 63rd Foot passed through for Sibi on the 18th, and 200 more on the 19th. The third party of the same regiment left Sukkur on the 19th.

21st August.—The Deputy Quartermaster-General, Sukkur, reports, that the fourth party of the 63rd left that place on the 20th for Sibi.

Major-General Phayre reports as follows from Quetta on the 21st :—

“ Tribal gathering around Kach has dispersed. Convoy of sick, &c. arrived here this morning ; no enemy seen. Field column from Pishin arrives there to-morrow, and having settled local questions, returns to Kojak. Hope there will be no more trouble on that flank from Sibi-Chaman. I leave for front this afternoon. From to-morrow please address Killa Abdula.”

No. 23.

No. 363 of 1880.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

WE have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's

* G. G. O. No. 480, dated the 20th August 1880, and documents published therewith.

Government, the papers noted in the margin,* relating to an action fought on the right bank of the Helmand river, near Girishk, on the 14th ultimo, between the force under the command of

Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows and the mutinous infantry of His Highness the Wali of Kandahar.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" J. STRACHEY.
" E. B. JOHNSON.
" W. STOKES.
" J. GIBBS.
" C. U. AITCHISON.

Simla, the 24th August 1880.

Enclosure 1 in No. 23.

GENERAL ORDER.

Military Department.

Simla, the 20th August 1880.

Field Operations.

No. 480.—Under the orders of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, the following correspondence and Despatch are published for general information.

Enclosure 2 in No. 23.

From Colonel ALLEN JOHNSON, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India. (No. 7893 K., Kabul Field Operations, dated Simla, 20th August 1880.)

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 4342 A., dated the 13th August 1880, forwarding a despatch relating to an engagement between the troops under the command of Brigadier-General Burrows and the mutinous infantry of His Highness the Wali of Kandahar.

2. In reply, I am directed to state that the Governor General in Council awaits the promised report from Brigadier-General Burrows, and meanwhile the despatch forwarded with your letter under reply will be published in the "Gazette of India" for general information.

Enclosure 3 in No. 23.

From Major-General G. R. GREAVES, C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department. (No. 4342 A., "Kabul," dated Simla, 13th August 1880.)

I AM directed by the Commander-in-Chief to submit to Government Lieutenant-General J. M. Primrose's Despatch, No. 1, dated the 23rd July 1880, reporting an engagement on the 14th idem, six miles from Girishk, on the Herat road, between the troops under the command of Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows and the mutinous infantry of His Highness the Wali of Kandahar's forces.

2. Brigadier-General Burrows' report of the action has been called for, and when received will be forwarded.

3. As far as can be judged from the despatch now submitted, it appears to His Excellency that the operations, which resulted in the capture of the guns in the hands of the mutineers, were well carried out.

Enclosure 4 in No. 23.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. PRIMROSE, C.S.I., Commanding the Kandahar Field Force, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India. (No. 1, dated Kandahar, the 23rd July 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to report that early on the morning of the 14th instant the infantry regiments of His Highness the Wali of Kandahar (numbering two thousand), who were stationed at Girishk, on the right bank of the Helmand, with the object of opposing the advance of Ayub Khan on Kandahar, mutinied, and, taking with them a battery of artillery, moved off on the Herat road, apparently with the intention of joining Ayub Khan, whose troops were reported to be within two marches of Girishk on that date.

2. The Wali's cavalry, two thousand five hundred strong, accompanied him across the river; but Brigadier-General Burrows reports that the majority were completely out of hand, and went off at once in the direction of Kandahar.

Corps.	Officers.	Sabres.	Rank and File.
E/B, Royal Horse Artillery -	—	—	—
No. 2 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners -	1	—	45
3rd Sind Horse -	4	207	—
3rd Light Cavalry -	6	300	—
Six companies, 66th Foot -	20	—	518
1st Bombay N.I. (Grenadiers) -	8	—	603
30th Bombay, N.I. (Jacob's Rifles) -	8	—	592

3. The force as per margin, under the command of Brigadier-General Burrows, which had been sent out from Kandahar to support the Wali, was then encamped on the left bank of the river.

4. On its being reported that the infantry had mutinied, and were marching off with the guns, Brigadier-General Burrows ordered troops, as per margin,* to cross the Helmand and pursue, leaving two companies of the 66th Regiment, the 1st Grenadiers, and five companies of the 30th Regiment, Native Infantry, to guard the camp.

* E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.
 No. 2 Company, Sappers and Miners.
 3rd Sind Horse } 410 sabres.
 3rd Light Cavalry }
 Four Companies, 66th Regiment.
 Three companies, Jacob's Rifles.

5. The cavalry and horse artillery under Brigadier-General T. Nuttall pushed on at once to feel for the enemy, and hold him in check until the infantry could be brought up.

6. The ground being much cut up by numerous wide and deep canals, difficulty was experienced in getting the artillery along; and Brigadier-General Nuttall, fearing that the enemy might make good his retreat, sent the 3rd Sind Horse, under Colonel J. H. P. Malcomson, rapidly to the front, leaving the 3rd Light Cavalry with the guns.

7. They came upon the mutinous troops about six miles from camp, formed up in a strong position on a rocky ridge, their left rising on the left bank of the Helmand, which was here steep and precipitous. Here they held them for three-quarters of an hour, being unable to charge in consequence of the cramped and enclosed nature of the ground.

8. Before the guns and infantry could get up, the enemy moved off in a direction parallel to the river, but, being followed and threatened by the cavalry, came into position again, and opened fire on them with his artillery.

9. In the meantime four guns of E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, were brought into action, and in the course of half an hour the enemy's guns were silenced and abandoned by their gunners.

10. The cavalry at once charged to seize them, but, on reaching the guns, were received by a heavy musketry fire from a body of infantry who had taken up a position on the reverse slope of the hill from which the guns were firing.

11. They were in consequence slightly withdrawn behind the crest of the hill, and some dismounted men, being formed under cover of the wagons, returned the fire of the enemy until the infantry and guns arrived.

12. On this the enemy immediately retreated, under our artillery and infantry fire, into the valley below, dispersing in all directions, and leaving sixty dead on the field.

13. Brigadier-General Burrows reports that the country was dotted over with villages and intersected by water-courses and walls, rendering pursuit almost hopeless. Moreover, he had a long and difficult march back with the captured guns, the horses of which had been carried off by the enemy, and he was anxious to recross the river by daylight.

14. He therefore recalled his infantry, and sent the cavalry on to secure the baggage, &c., which the enemy were taking off.

15. Brigadier-General Nuttall states that he followed the retreating troops closely, hoping to engage them in some favourable spot; but they at once quitted the bank of the river, leaving the whole of their baggage, ammunition, &c., and retreated through country over which it was impossible for cavalry to act.

16. He therefore abandoned the pursuit, and secured the baggage which the enemy had left behind, consisting of 53 camels, a quantity of small arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and supplies.

17. The battery captured consists of four 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, two 12-pounder howitzers, and three ammunition wagons; but, being unable to move the wagons, they were destroyed, the guns and howitzers being brought safely into camp.

Brigadier-General Burrows reports that the behaviour of all ranks left nothing to be desired, and particularly brings to notice the fact that the men of the 66th Regiment dragged the captured guns over three miles of difficult country until teams could be obtained for them.

18. Our casualties were as follows :—

Corps.	British Troops.									Native Troops.											
	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Killed.				Wounded.				Missing.			
	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Savars and Sepoys.	Horses.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Savars and Sepoys.	Horses.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Savars and Sepoys.	Horses.
66th Foot	—	—	—	—	—	4*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3rd Sind Horse	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	1
3rd Light Cavalry	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	2

* One since dead.

19. Brigadier-General Burrows informs me that he received every assistance from his Brigade-Major, Captain W. H. M'Math, 66th Regiment; from his Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, Captain T. Harris, 66th Regiment; and from Captain J. R. Slade, Royal Horse Artillery, his Orderly Officer, to whose untiring energy he is indebted for the guns being brought on intact with their carriages into camp.

The cavalry under Brigadier-General Nuttall was well handled; and the determined energy with which the artillery was brought up to the front reflects the highest credit on Major G. F. Blackwood, commanding E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.

20. Brigadier-General Nuttall states his thanks are particularly due to Colonel J. H. P. Malcolmson, C.B., commanding the 3rd Sind Horse; Major A. P. Currie, commanding the 3rd Light Cavalry; Major G. C. Hogg, Poona Horse, Cavalry Brigade Major; Lieutenant J. Monteith, 2nd Sind Horse, Orderly Officer; and Lieutenant G. S. Jones, Royal Artillery (on transport duty), who accompanied Brigadier-General Nuttall as galloper.

21. A sketch by Brevet-Major E. P. Leach, Royal Engineers, illustrating the day's operations is attached.

No. 24.

No. 194 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 24th August 1880.

IN continuation of our Secret Despatch, No. 186, dated 17th August 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

JOHN STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

WHITLEY STOKES.

JAMES GIBBS.

C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

REPLIES to letters received last night from Kelat-i-Ghilzai through Chaman, dated 12th August. All well there, and Political Officer will be able to assist Roberts' force with supplies. Some of local Chiefs friendly, and helping to bring in provisions. Letters intercepted from Sartip Nur Muhammad's son, inciting tribes to rise, but no attack on garrison made or anticipated. Communication from Kelat-i-Ghilzai with Kandahar extremely difficult, but road to Chaman comparatively open.

At 4 this morning, outpost at Kach Amadan was attacked by large number of Panizais and Zhobites. Enemy were beaten off and pursued two miles, leaving 80 dead bodies on ground. On our side, no one killed, few sepoy wounded. Telegraphic communications with Kach Amadan interrupted after the fight.

Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

TELEGRAM, dated 18th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

NEWS from Kandahar of the 12th shows that Ayub Khan has taken up strong position in the immediate vicinity of Kandahar. His army is divided into three divisions, composed respectively of Herati, Kabuli, and Kandahari troops. The last is commanded by Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan. Occasionally a few shots are thrown into the city, but up to the present little harm has been caused by enemy's fire. Several messengers, attempting to convey written messages into and out of the city, have been captured by Ayub's people.

Ayub Khan is reported to have sent one infantry regiment and four guns to Shorawak. An attempt to raise the Aitchakzais against us has been partially unsuccessful.

Further news from Kach Amadan shows that only 48 dead bodies were found outside entrenchments; other dead bodies and wounded men were seen in numbers carried away. The principal leaders in the attack were Shah Jehan, and Syfulla Khan of Zhob, and Faiz Muhammad Khan, Panizai Kakar, the principal instigator in the murder of late Major Showers.

Enclosure 3 in No. 24.

TELEGRAM, dated 18th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING from His Highness the Khan, repeated for information :—

Begins: Thanks for your telegram about Kach Amadan and Kandahar. I often told you that these Pathans and Brahuists are first to be punished, and afterwards kindness must be shown. If done otherwise, the result will be what Panizais have done now.

My Havaladar, Shirdad, of my artillery, went to Sherod and returned yesterday, states that Kandahar city is safe. Ayub Khan is outside empty handed. All animals in the city have been removed outside by British officials. Up to date Ayub has done nothing. Am certain he can do nothing. I shall, in future, inform you what news I get from Kandahar. I hope you will do the same, should you hear of any. Ends.

Enclosure 4 in No. 24.

TELEGRAM, dated 18th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

INFORMATION received to-day that Ayub's guns and troops from Shorawak have not yet started, but that a son of Sartip Nur Muhammad, and a brother of the Aitchakzai

Sirdar, Fateh Khan, have sent messengers to announce their approach and for the Baretchis to join them.

Mehrulla Khan, Chief of the Marri clan, has sent letters, expressing his regret at the plundering of the railway convoys on the Hurnai line, and saying that it was the work of a noted robber, named Piara, and that, with the aid of the British Government, he will punish him and his gang.

The Khan telegraphs that Azad Khan, of Kharan, has sent his son with 100 sowars to join Ayub at Kandahar. The correctness of this intelligence is, however, somewhat doubtful.

Enclosure 5 in No. 24.

TELEGRAM, dated 19th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LATEST news from Kandahar states that ten Tokhi sowars had arrived from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and informed Muhammad Ayub Khan that it was impossible for the tribesmen to attack Kelat-i-Ghilzai without guns, and they begged he would aid them with a few. Muhammad Ayub Khan had not given any definite reply when the messenger left Kandahar.

It is stated that Muhammad Ayub Khan has detailed two guns and 60 sowars to assist Sirdar Ghulam Hassan Khan, Aitchakzai. The guns and sowars are said to have crossed the Jakir Kotal last Friday, on their way to Murghi Chaman. 600 cavalry and 1,200 infantry, under Sirdar Ahmed Khan, are reported to have been directed to proceed to Sherawak, but have not yet started. Muhammad Ayub Khan is fortifying his position near Kandahar.

A reconnoitring party from Kach Amadan reports that there is still a very large gathering of Zhobites and Pathan tribesmen under Shah Jehan in the surrounding hills. Colonel Roome has been ordered to proceed with two mountain guns from Assad Khan in Pishin to disperse them. Captain H. Wylie, political officer, accompanies the force. This may delay General Phayre's advance on Kandahar; but unless the gathering is dispersed, there will be no safety for our line of communication in Pishin, and supplies for Roberts' and Phayre's united forces cannot be forwarded from Gulistan.

Captain Lucas, of the Sind Horse, telegraphed that a large body of Baretchi Pathans are reported to have collected on the Kandahar side of the Gwaja Pass beyond Spin-Tangi.

Enclosure 6 in No. 24.

TELEGRAM, dated 20th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

No further news from the garrison in Kandahar, but it is reported that some differences have arisen between Ayub Khan and the tribesmen round Kandahar. The latter are impatient that Ayub should assault the city before the British armies advance to its relief, but Ayub is unwilling to risk the lives of his regular troops.

Emissaries from Abdul Rahman are stated to have arrived in Ayub's camp, with the object of alienating from him his Kabuli troops.

It is further stated that some of Ayub's Herati troops have deserted, but this requires confirmation.

The Baretchi Pathans in Shorawak are said to meditate an attack on Mushki, and the inhabitants are removing their property into the fort.

General Phayre and staff start to-morrow for the Kojak. General Phayre hopes to advance from Chaman on the 31st. A squadron of the 15th Hussars arrived this morning. There is much difficulty in getting letters conveyed to Kandahar on account of the sharp look-out kept by the Ghazis round the city.

Enclosure 7 in No. 24.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FROM Kandahar it is reported that a sortie was lately made by the garrison, in which 40 of Ayub's Herati troops were killed. Our loss not known. Tribal gatherings in the neighbourhood of Toba and Murghi Chaman, to the north of the Kojak Pass, are reported with the object of attacking our line of communication in Pishin, after the advance of General Phayre's army.

A large convoy of sick and wounded arrived this morning from our post at Kach Amadan. To enable it to start, the tribal gathering surrounding the outpost had to be dispersed. In the village of Amadan, a quantity of telegraph wire and a complete soldier's kit were found. The village was burned.

No. 25.

No. 196 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, the 24th August 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers noted in the margin,* on the subject of the difficulty experienced in communicating with the British garrison at Kandahar, and containing some particulars reported by one Syad Paind Shah regarding the engagement of the 27th July at Maiwand and the subsequent movements of Sirdar Ayub Khan

* From Agent, Governor General, Biluchistan, Nos. 1050 and 1051 A.G.G., dated 10th August 1880.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

" F. P. HAINES.

" J. STRACHEY.

" E. B. JOHNSON.

" W. STOKES.

" J. GIBBS.

" C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 25.

Substance of a Statement made by Sirdar FAIZ MUHAMMAD, Durani, to Captain CURZON WYLLIE, Assistant Agent, Governor General, on the 9th August 1880.

ABOUT eight days ago I sent a sowar with Sir Robert Sandeman's letter to Colonel St. John at Kandahar. The sowar has returned, and states that on his arrival at Chaman he found the road between Kandahar and Chaman quite unsafe, and in consequence he was unable himself to go beyond Chaman. He, however, succeeded in finding an Aitchakzai Syad at Chaman, whom he sent on with the letter to Kandahar, having promised the man a reward of Rs. 30 for its safe delivery. The Aitchakzai Syad concealed the letter by sewing it inside one of his shoes, but on arrival at Zakir, near Kandahar, he was seized by Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, and, after careful search, the letter was discovered. Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan sent the man to Ayub Khan, who ordered him to be put to death. Fortunately, a Syad of Herat prevailed on Ayub Khan to spare his life and allow him to return to his home. The Aitchakzai messenger was thus enabled to escape back to Chaman, but without

delivering the letter to Colonel St. John. The same messenger also carried a letter for Colonel St. John from the Officer commanding at Chaman; this was likewise seized. Ayub Khan arrived at Kandahar five days ago, but no fight has yet taken place between his force and the British. Ayub Khan is preparing ladders to escalate the city wall.

Enclosure 2 in No. 25.

No. 1051, A.G.G., dated Quetta, 10th August 1880.

From Major Sir Robert SANDEMAN, K.C.S.I., Agent, Governor General, Biluchistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

THE accompanying translation of a letter from Sirdar Syad Paind Shah, late Governor of Pishin, is forwarded for the information of the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Translation of a letter from Syad Paind Shah, late Governor of Pishin, to Major Sir Robert Sandeman, dated 7th August 1880.

The three letters for Colonel St. John I sent by three different messengers; my son, Muhammad Akbar, also accompanied the messengers. My son arrived near Kandahar on Monday, and himself took the letters towards the city for delivery. When he reached the Shikarpuri gate he found that some British infantry had come out to destroy the walls in front of the gate, and that the horses of the garrison had been sent to graze on the Chaman. The tribesmen attacked and compelled the British infantry and horses to retire into the city, and again closed the gate. My son three or four times wandered round the city wall, but could find no way of getting into the city. He tried to get over the wall, but failed, as the British soldiers prepared to fire at him. My son was therefore obliged to return to the village of Zarrak on this side of the Zakar hills, and here he succeeded in finding a native of the place to send with the three letters to the city. Until Tuesday my son heard no tidings of his messenger, so on Wednesday he went himself to find out where he was. On arrival at Zakir he heard that the man had been taken prisoner by Ayub Khan's people, and that the letters had been seized; he also heard that two women and ten or fifteen other men had been captured with letters they were carrying to or from Kandahar. The tribesmen had collected in force, and had surrounded the town, and in every village and on every road tribesmen were stationed to seize messengers and prevent letters reaching the British Officers in Kandahar.

At 10 o'clock on Thursday Ayub Khan and his regular army arrived at Chumni. His troops occupied the ground between Chumni and Goshkhana. The tribesmen of Herat, Jaldak, Maruf, and Registan have entered the outskirts of the city. The inhabitants of the neighbouring villages are suffering great oppression at the hands of the regular and tribal forces, as it is the nature of the Pathans to be cruel. No justice is done to the people by Ayub Khan. In fact, he dare not ask any explanation from his followers.

The particulars of the Khushk-i-Nakhud fight are as follows:—

The Herati troops first attacked the British force, but were repulsed. Then the Kabuli and Kandahari regiments attacked, and two whole Kandahari regiments, which were under the command of Muhammad Kabir and Muhammad Anwar, were destroyed, including their two commanders. Ayub Khan has made Khushdil, son of Shahgasi Sherdil Khan, a prisoner, because of the defeat of the Herati force, of which he was the commandant. After the British defeat at Khushk-i-Nakhud, 12 British soldiers missed their way, and arrived at Maiwand, where the sons of Syad Salaam carefully sheltered them, and sent them on the next day towards Kandahar. On the road these 12 men were seized and taken to Ayub Khan, who made them prisoners. Ayub Khan has put one son of Syad Salaam to death, and made prisoners of two of his other sons, who were in the village of Kotwal. He has also destroyed their homes, because they gave refuge to the 12 British fugitives. Ayub Khan has made Sirbiland Khan, Atchakzai, and his son, Ghulam Nabi, prisoners.

Sirdar Sher Ali (the Wali), his son, and nephew are with the British officers in the Kandahar citadel. All the Afghans have been turned out of the city, but their pro-

perty is permitted to remain there. Only Parsiwans and Hindus are allowed to live in the town. The inhabitants of Mel, Kabat, and Kadni, as well as the Ashaizais, Kakozais, and Alazais are collected near Chaman intending to attack it.

My son left Kandahar at 2 o'clock on Thursday, *i.e.*, four hours after Ayub Khan had reached Chunni, and he arrived here yesterday.

No. 26.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, DURING THE WEEK ENDING THE 28TH AUGUST 1880. (Extract.)

23rd August.—The Deputy Quartermaster-General, Sukkur, reports that 5/8th, Royal Artillery, with two guns for E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, and the last party of the 63rd Foot, left that place on the 21st for Sibi, followed on the 22nd by H/1st, Royal Artillery, and a detachment of signallers.

The following reports have been received from the Officer commanding at Jacobabad:—

I. Dated the 22nd.—“5/8th, Royal Artillery, division for E/B, and details of 63rd and 4th Bengal Native Infantry, passed through for Sibi last night.”

II. Dated the 23rd.—“H/1st, Royal Artillery, 40 military signallers and the 13th Bombay Native Infantry passed through for Sibi last night.”

24th August.—The Deputy Quartermaster-General at Sukkur telegraphs as follows on the 24th:—

“Last half A/4th, Royal Artillery, left to-day. Programme here finished, except 17th Native Infantry a week hence. The 78th commence move to-day from Karachi.”

25th August.—The Officer commanding at Jacobabad reports that the remaining half of A/4th, Royal Artillery, passed through that place for Sibi on the 24th.

The following messages have been received from Major-General Phayre, from Kila Abdulla:—

I. Dated the 24th.—“I have just received the following from General Henderson, Quetta:—Message begins: ‘Officer commanding Jacobabad telegraphs as follows,—‘Officer commanding Pulaji outpost reports gathering of 1,500 Marris at Much, about sixteen miles east of Mittri. Officer commanding Lehri outpost reports number of marauders collecting daily in the village, and also a large gathering of Marris at Kahan. Have reported this to political authorities. More troops urgently required here. I have telegraphed this message to Deputy Quartermaster-General, Sukkur, and Quartermaster-General, Poona. Major Colvin telegraphed me a very strong regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, reaches Sibi to-morrow. Please instruct me.’ Message ends. I have communicated this to Sir Robert Sandeman. I have replied to General Henderson that he is on no account to interfere with destination of troops for Kandahar force here, and that troops for Jacobabad should be settled under your orders.

II. On the 24th.—“Obliged to open out to the front and right flank from Chaman to get water-supply for Gatai, forage and grain for cavalry, and to re-establish the telegraph line and fortify posts, which I learn from spies have not been so much damaged as at first reported. Two field columns leave Chaman, 26th instant, to effect this. Right column (two mountain guns, one company Sappers, two regiments Native cavalry, 300 rifles Beluch Battalion) proceeds to Murgha, Chaman, Akbar Khan, and that vicinity. Left column (two mountain guns, one company Sappers, 230 rifles, 16th Native Infantry) to Gatai. Colonel Lindsay, with his Engineer Officers, and Major Westmacott accompany right column, and, after arranging for Gatai, will reconnoitre onwards. I hope to be able to draw supplies from the Mirzai villages, Kalani Valley, on to our old fortified posts, which will be restored as quickly

as I can get Native infantry to the front to garrison them. The transport cattle from Sighi to Kojak get no grain and only 30 lbs. forage."

III. Dated the 24th.—"Following cipher letter just received from General Primrose. Begins: 'Kandahar, 21st August. No news received from you since your cipher of 30th July. On 16th we attacked village Deh Khwaja, and got through it, but, finding it strongly occupied and reinforced by contingent from villages, had to retire to fortress. Our losses were General Brooke, who commanded assault; Cruickshank, Royal Engineers; Trench and Stayner, 19th Native Infantry; Wood and Marsh, 7th Fusiliers; Newport, 28th; and Rev. Gordon, killed. Vandeleur and Conolly, 7th; Wood, Transport; Nimmo, 28th; Shewell, Commissariat; and Malcolmson, Sind Horse, wounded; all latter doing well. Enemy's loss heavy. Our cavalry made two charges, and cut up good many. Supply bhusa running short; everything else ample. Ayub's main position faces east, and is between high hills on west and Arghandab, covered by canals in front. Some regular infantry in villages east and south of city, supported by large contingents of ghazis; Durani cavalry picquets on Mandi Hissar and Kushab roads; on picquet hill, two Armstrong 12-pounders; head-quarters garden, one of our captured guns; in front Shikarpur gate, one 12-pounder howitzer; Deh-Khwaja, one 6-pounder. Ayub making indefinite overtures Walida Bibi Howa.' I learn from another source that General Brooke was killed while trying to carry off Cruickshank when wounded."

The officers referred to in the preceding message are:—

Killed.

Brigadier-General Henry Francis Brooke, *h.p.* 109th Foot.
 Captain George Macdonald Cruickshank, Royal Engineers.
 Second Lieutenant Frederick Phillip Forster Wood, 7th Fusiliers.
 Second Lieutenant Everard Swaine Marsh, 7th Fusiliers.
 Major Richard John Le Poer Trench, General List, Bombay Infantry; Wing Commander, 19th Bombay Native Infantry.
 Lieutenant Francis Charles Stayner, Bombay Staff Corps; Wing Officer and Officiating Adjutant, 19th Bombay Native Infantry.
 Major and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel William Henry Newport, Bombay Staff Corps; Second in Command, 28th Bombay Native Infantry.
 The Reverend Mr. G. M. Gordon was not in the service; he belonged to the Church Missionary Society.

Wounded.

Major and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Mark Shewell, Bombay Staff Corps; Principal Commissariat Officer in Southern Afghanistan.
 Colonel John Henry Porter Malcolmson, C.B., Bombay Staff Corps; Commandant, Sind Horse.
 Lieutenant Hastings St. Leger Wood, 15th Foot, Transport Officer.
 Major Thomas Burton Vandeleur, 7th Fusiliers.
 Captain William Conolly, 7th Fusiliers.
 Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Rose Nimmo, Bombay Staff Corps; Commandant, 28th Bombay Native Infantry.

26th August.—The following message has been received in the Foreign Department from Captain Martelli, Assistant Agent, Governor General, Jacobabad:—

"No truth in reports of Marri raids in Sibi and Kachi plain. Marris are collecting in large numbers at Kahan; reason not known; but it is generally believed that Chiefs are endeavouring to make amends for raids on convoy. Native officer in command of outpost at Lehri reports rumours of small gatherings of Marris and Mach; but this has not been corroborated."

With reference to the above and to the previous reports of raids, the Bombay Government have been informed that if they think it desirable they may add another regiment of Native Infantry to the garrison of Sind.

27th August.—The Officer commanding Jacobabad telegraphs on the 27th:—

"205 men, 78th Highlanders, passed through for Sibi last night."

Major-General Phayre reports from Chaman on the 26th:—

"Received to-day, under date 23rd instant, from General Primrose, duplicate of letter of 21st, and several telegrams of officers of garrison to their friends, all of which

have been despatched. The want of grain and forage throughout Pishin is most serious; the usual water springs have partly dried up in consequence of continued drought. Column for Aktar Khan leave Chaman this evening. I hope thereby to feed Cavalry Brigade and stock Gatal with grain and forage, and after that Dabrai also."

28th August.—Sir Robert Sandeman telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 26th:—

"No further news from Kandahar, but, as far as is known, no more fighting has taken place since the sortie on the 16th.

"A partial rising of the Khan's troops occurred last night at Khelat. The mutineers did little damage, and went off, numbering about 144, it is believed, taking the Chappar Ziarat road to Shorawak, to join the army of Ayub Khan at Kandahar. Have arranged with General Phayre to detach 400 of Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders, now *en route* from Sibi, to remain at Khelat for a time and restore confidence through the country. Mr. Duke accompanies as Political Officer.

"General Phayre now leaving for Chaman. Captain Curzon Wyllie left Quetta this morning for Kandahar."

General Phayre reports as follows from Chaman on the 27th:—

"In consequence of the reported mutiny of the troops of His Highness the Khan of Khelat, I have, at Agent Governor General's urgent request, directed half battalion, 78th Highlanders, to proceed to Khelat from Darwaza, under arrangements made by Sir Robert Sandeman, in communication with General Henderson, it being highly probable that these troops (about one thousand strong) will excite Shorawak Pathans to attack Gulistan and that part of our communication. I have ordered a company of 2/15th Foot to garrison Gulistan Fort, and another company Kila Abdulla Fort, both of these places being threatened by tribal attacks for some time past."

The Officer commanding Jacobabad reports on the 28th:—

"200 men, 78th, passed through for Sibi last night."

The following telegram, dated the 24th, has been addressed by the Punjab Government to Sir Robert Sandeman:—

"Commissioner, Derajat, telegraphs 20th, that Marris, after plundering Katchi and Sibi, assembled at Vitakri and decided to plunder Katchi again in force, for which purpose they left on 17th. Commissioner fears they may corrupt Bugtis and other tribes. Telegram of 24th reports Marris moving about restlessly in direction of Sind, Katchi, and Bolan. One report mentioned their retirement to hilly country. Precautions have been taken along Dera Ghazi border."

No. 27.

No. 201 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 31st August 1880.

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 194, dated 24th August 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord Marquis,

Your Lordship's most obedient and humble servants,

(Signed)

RIPON.

" F. P. HAINES.

" JOHN STRACHEY.

" E. B. JOHNSON.

" WHITLEY STOKES.

" JAMES GIBBS.

" C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 23rd August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

THE news of the desertion of Ayub's Herati troops is not confirmed. The Khan has received a second letter from Ayub, which he is sending to the Agent, Governor General.

From Gulistan report received that some of Ayub's sowars are in Shorawak trying to stir up the people. Sirdar Hyder Khan, Aitchakzai, is said to be at Dangar Kach near the Bogra Pass, on the north side of the Amran range, with four of Ayub's guns.

All quiet at Kach Amadan and in the Marri country.

The 15th Hussars have arrived, and march towards the Kojak Pass to-morrow.

The Agent, Governor General, leaves Quetta for Chaman on the 25th. General Phayre hopes to advance from Chaman on the 30th.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th August 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 21st. Sortie took place, 16th, against village on east face of city; has secured us from further molestation on that side, but loss very heavy. Brigadier-General Brooke, Captain Cruickshank, R.E., Colonel Newport, 28th, Major Trench and Lieutenant Stayner, 19th, Lieutenants Marsh and Wood, Fusiliers, and Rev. Mr. Gordon, killed. Wounded,—Colonel Nimmo, 28th, Major Vandeleur, 7th, and Lieutenant Wood, Transport, all severely; Colonels Malcolmson and Shewell. Casualties among men about 180. Lieutenant Maclaine, R.H.A., reported missing after Maiwand, prisoner in Ayub's hands, but well treated. Enemy throws a few shells into city occasionally, and keeps up fire on ramparts from sharpshooters with captured rifles, but does little harm. Investment entirely trusted to Kandahari troops and ghazis, Kabulis being encamped round Ayub, three miles off on Herat road. Ayub has about 5,000 regular infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 37 guns; number of ghazis uncertain and fluctuating, may amount to 10,000, of whom one third have fire arms. Meat and firewood scarce in city; other things plentiful; weather cooler; general health good.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th August 1880.

From Sir ROBERT SANDEMAN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

A letter from Colonel Tanner to my address was received this morning by Officer, Chaman. Telegraphed to him to open it and wire its contents, which was done. They are as follows:—

Contents begin:—Dated Kelat-i-Ghilzai, 20th August. My dear Sandeman. Just one line to say I have heard from General Roberts to-day, he is four marches off, and will be here on the 24th. I received your letter dated 10th, and replied to it the same day. We are all well, and collecting supplies for Roberts, and on the road towards Kandahar. We are well off for supplies here. Roberts expects to be near Kandahar on the 29th. Ends.

Enclosure 3 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

ALL quiet in Pishin, Quetta, and Bolan Pass.

Letter from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, dated 20th, reports that Roberts was expected there on 24th. All well with him and at Kelat-i-Ghilzai. Supplies being collected abundantly. From Chaman it is stated that 100 of Ayub's sowars have been foraging in the direction

of Abdul Rahman. A force with six guns sent by Ayub across Zakurd Kotal to Abdulla Karez, with the object of attacking Chaman, had been recalled by Ayub, owing to a sortie having been made by the Kandahar garrison.

Enclosure 4 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YESTERDAY, at noon, I received a telegram from His Highness the Khan, asking eagerly for news from Kandahar, and saying that some of his Pathan sepoy had returned from leave that day and spread a report that the English had again been defeated before Kandahar, and Muhammad Ayub Khan had either taken, or was about to take, the city. I sent a reassuring reply to the Khan, who again telegraphed that there was much excitement in Kelat.

About 11 last night Mr. Dempster reported to me that the Khan's guard at the Telegraph Office had advised the signaller to fly, as the Khan's troops had broken into open mutiny, and firing was going on in Kelat. A munshi of the Khan with 14 sowars shortly afterwards arrived at the Telegraph Office, and the signaller was able to remain.

I sent a message to the Khan to say that if he required help in troops to let me know at once, and I would apply to the British Government for them.

This morning the Khan has sent me the following message:—

Begins: Your telegram offering me assistance of British troops. As soon as I require them, I shall certainly ask you. As soon as mutineers heard news of Kandahar they came and asked me to rise and fight against English; if not, that they would rise against me. I, being a sincere ally of the British Government, gave them a decided reply that I would not. Some of these sepoy were from the Nurwai and some from the Shanawazi regiments, and amount in all to about two hundred men. They mutinied last night about 10 o'clock, broke open the jail, and carried away 30 prisoners, taking the Chapar Zairat road. No other damage done. If they do any mischief on the road to-day, I will inform you. I have my other troops ready and have sent my Brahui sowas after the mutineers. Am expecting return of these sowars. The mutinous sepoy are residents of the British district of Pishin and of Kandahar. If you can send a force to intercept them, I shall be glad. Message ends.

I have warned the Brahui tribes of what has occurred, and any stragglers will be seized, but the mutineers will certainly make for Shorawak, *via* Mungrocher, and thence to Kandahar.

I have informed General Phayre, and recommended a wing of the 78th Highlanders being sent to Kelat for a time to restore confidence to the country. Major Reynolds would accompany the troops. There is good barrack accommodation at a considerable distance from the town. I am certain the Khan would be glad were this arrangement carried out. The troops could be easily fed at Kelat.

Enclosure 5 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING from Extra Assistant Commissioner, Rai Hittu Ram, dated Sibi, 25th:—

Message begins: Dooroo Langhani's nephew, arrived with Sirdar Mihrulla Khan Marri's share of spoil, taken from railway convoy on 8th, informs that about 300 Marri are assembling opposite Thalli with intention of attacking that place and Mall to-morrow. If permitted, I can collect double their number of Khajaks and Pannis, and proceed to Mall and Thalli for three days to prevent this, and cause them to disperse. And messenger also informs that Sirdar Mihrulla Khan is going to Katmundai. Can I go and meet him at Thalli? If proposed arrangements for collecting Khajaks and Pannis are sanctioned, I shall have to feed them as long as they are out with me. Message ends.

I have replied as follows:—

Message begins: Clear the line. Your telegram, dated this evening, informing me of intended raid by Marris on Thalli and Mall. I entirely approve of your proposals and sanction them. Collect Khajaks and Pammis and go at once to Thalli and Mall. I sanction your feeding the tribes. Report early the result of your proceedings. I am glad the Sirdar of the Marris is to meet you. Help him in every way, and give him my salaams. Message ends.

Enclosure 6 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th August 1880.

From Lieutenant-Colonel ST. JOHN, Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR. No communication from Government has reached us since 28th, and only one from Wylie, Pishin, dated 6th. Kelat all well; and surrounding country clear on 12th. Ghazis reported diminishing in numbers. No Ghilzais have joined, and few Chiefs of rank from outlying districts. Ayub has sent to Herat for ammunition, which may arrive 12 to 15 days hence. Meat and firewood scarce in city. Other necessities plentiful.

Enclosure 7 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

INFORMATION received late last night from the chief Sirdar of the Marris that the sections of the clan, who plundered the railway convoy, are again meditating mischief, and intended making a raid in the direction of Thalli or Mall. The Chief at same time sent to Sibi the portion of the plunder set aside for him as Chief of the clan, taken from the railway convoy. Rai Hittu Ram started with a tribal gathering of the Sibi clans to meet the Marris, and, if possible, disperse them. Sirdar Mihrulla and Rai Hittu Ram hoped to meet at Thalli. A troop of cavalry has also gone to Mall from Sibi.

No further news from Kandahar, but, as far as is known, no more fighting has taken place since the sortie on the 16th.

A partial rising of the Khan's troops occurred last night at Kelat. The mutineers did little damage and went off, numbering about 144, it is believed, taking the Chappar Ziarat road to Shorawak to join the army of Ayub Khan at Kandahar. Have arranged with General Phayre to detach 400 of Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders now *en route* from Sibi to remain at Kelat for a time and restore confidence through the country. Mr. Duke accompanies as political officer.

General Phayre now leaving for Chaman. Captain Curzon Wyllie left Quetta this morning for Kandahar.

Enclosure 8 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th August 1880.

From ASSISTANT AGENT, Governor General, Jacobabad, to FOREIGN, Simla.

MARRIS are gathering at Sherinal near Thalli, with the object, it is believed, of making a raid. It is not yet ascertained what direction they intend taking.

Enclosure 9 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE received information that Ayub Khan has withdrawn his army from the positions taken up in front of Kandahar, and has retired to Singiri, eight miles east of Kandahar. Roberts arrived at Kelat-i-Ghilzai on the 24th. I have received letters

from Colonel Tanner and Captain Yate, dated Kelat-i-Ghilzai, the 19th. They go to you to-day in original. The troops sent to Kach Amadan with Captain Henry Wylie have returned to the Kojak after settling that part of the country. All quiet there again. Shah Jahan has returned with his people to Khob.

Enclosure 10 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram asking my opinion of nature of Marri gathering at Kahan. I believe council of Chiefs assembled at Kahan at Sirdar Mihrulla's request, who asked their assistance to aid him to force raiders to return plundered railway property. What reply the Chiefs gave Sirdar Mihrulla I do not know for certain, but will ascertain shortly. The Sirdar has sent into Sibi 37 railway transport bullocks, and is believed now to be on his way to meet Rai Hittu Ram at Thalli. I will telegraph further news shortly. I think it would save Government much possible anxiety were the news telegraphed direct as hitherto about Marri movements from Quetta, as I am nearer to the Marris than any other officer, and directly in communication with the Sirdar. I do not think the clan as a body contemplate going against the Government. It is only the sections to which the robbers belong who plundered the railway convoy who are giving trouble.

Enclosure 11 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

INFORMATION received of arrival of General Roberts at Kelat-i-Ghilzai on morning, 24th. Ayub has consequently raised siege of Kandahar, and retired eight miles from city, occupying position at Sangiri on Herat and Zamindawar roads. He is said to be short of ammunition, and to have sent for more to Herat, but it cannot arrive for 15 or 16 days. His troops have abandoned Mandi Hissar, and all the country south and east and north-east of Kandahar, as well as Kojak line.

General Phayre reached Chaman this morning, and General Wilkinson with cavalry brigade arrived Killa Abdulla.

All quiet at Kelat. Khan is arranging carriage for wing, 78th, from Dasht.

Captain Henry Wylie reports tribal gathering on Pishin frontier and at Kach Amadan reduced to 300 robbers.

Enclosure 12 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, No. 2942 E.P., dated 28th August 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor General, Quetta.

YOURS 26th. Please telegraph to Khan of Kelat that Viceroy is gratified to learn that the mutiny of a portion of Khan's troops had no serious consequences, and that Khan may be assured of the readiness of the Government to afford him assistance and support. Have British troops been actually detached to Kelat?

Enclosure 13 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

COLLECTION of Aitchakzais and other bad characters still reported at Toba, acting under orders of Sultan Khan and Muhammad Hassan, brother and son of Sirdar Fattah Khan. Their intention is to attack line of communication between Chaman

and Quetta; and Shorawak people, who have been joined by Khan's mutinous sepoys, are reported to be similarly inclined. Taking into consideration that General Roberts is now close on Kandahar, I have asked General Phayre before marching from Chaman to place a moveable column at my disposal for employment in Pishin, and to secure the country between this and Chaman against local disturbances. Information has been received from Mungocher that the Kelat mutineers have looted the villages of Chappar Ziarat and Goruk, and Naib Abdul Latif, with two guns and 500 men, was in pursuit of the rebels.

Enclosure 19 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram regarding despatch of British troops to Kelat. No troops available as yet; 500 are under orders to go to Kelat, and march from Siriah.

Enclosure 20 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th August 1880.

From General ROBERTS to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla.

KELAT-I-GHILZAI, 23rd August. Clear the line. The force under my command arrived here this morning. Authorities at Kandahar having stated, on the 17th instant, that they have abundant supplies, and can make forage last until 1st September, I halt to-morrow to rest troops, and more especially the transport animals and camp-followers. The force left Ghazni on the 16th, and has marched 126 miles during the last eight days. The troops are in good health and spirits. From this purpose moving by regular stages so that the men may arrive fresh at Kandahar. I hope to be in heliographic communication with Kandahar from Robat, distant 20 miles, on the 29th. If General Phayre reaches Taktipul I should also hope to communicate with him, and arrange a combined movement on Kandahar. I am taking the Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison with me, making the fort over to Muhammad Sadik Khan, a Tokhi chief, who had charge of the place when we arrived in 1879. The present Governor, Sirdar Shirindil Khan, refuses to remain. We have met with no opposition during the march, and have been able to make satisfactory arrangements for supplies, especially forage which at this season is plentiful. The cavalry horses and artillery mules are in excellent order. Our casualties to date are, 1 soldier, 72nd Highlanders; 1 sepoy, 23rd Pioneers; 1, 2nd Sikhs; 2 sepoys, 3rd Sikhs; dead—1 sepoy, 4th Goorkhas; 2 sepoys, 24th Punjab Native Infantry; duffadar, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, missing; 6 camp followers dead, 5 missing. The missing men have, I fear, been murdered. I telegraphed from Ghazni on 13th, and from Oba Karez on the 18th August.

Enclosure 21 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th August 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kelat-i-Ghilzai, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KELAT-I-GHILZAI, 24th August. The force under my command halts here to-day, and continues march to-morrow, reaching Robat, 20 miles from Kandahar on the 29th.

Latest date from General Phayre is 12th August. I am sending messengers to him daily now, and keeping him fully informed of our movements.

From Kandahar a letter has been received from Officer commanding here, written by Major Adam, Assistant Quartermaster-General, on the 17th instant. It states, yesterday morning, hoping to pull down the loop-holed walls facing the Kabul and Bar Duranee gates, we made a sortie with 300 cavalry and 800 infantry, furnished by 7th Fusiliers, 19th and 28th Native Infantry. The result was not satisfactory. The village was found to be strongly held and honeycombed with loopholes. Our infantry managed to push through, but could not effect a hold, though the supports of the

enemy got a good slating from our cavalry and our infantry and artillery fire. We had to get back to the walls under a heavy fire from their loopholes, and our losses, in Officers more especially, were pretty heavy. Wood, Marsh, 7th Fusiliers; Trench and Stainer, 19th; Newport, 28th, with Padre Gordon, General Brooke, and Cruickshank of the Engineers, were killed; Vandeleur, 7th Fusiliers, severely, Nimmo, 28th, severely, Shewell, Commissariat, slightly, Conolly, 7th Fusiliers, slightly, Malcolmson, slightly wounded. The enemy must, however, have seen that we still have some fighting power in us, and we hear that the regular regiments under Ayub would not turn out to reinforce, so that an effect has been produced, and the *morale* of the troops here is still good. A letter from Colonel St. John, of same date, states that 200 soldiers were killed and wounded during the sortie.

I have sent General Phayre an estimate of our daily requirements in food, and have urged him to have sufficient quantity of tea, sugar, and rum, &c., pushed on to Kandahar, unless he is satisfied that there is enough there already. Grain must be procured locally, but I fear there will be considerable difficulty in doing this within any reasonable distance of Kandahar, as I understand that Ayub Khan's army has requisitioned that part of the country freely.

Boots will shortly be required by most of the British and by Native soldiers of this force. I hope that several thousand pairs will be sent to Kandahar without delay; also shoes for the 92nd Highlanders, and great coats for that regiment. They have only 100 left fit to be worn; these used for night duties.

Enclosure 22 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th August 1880.

From Major HASTINGS, Jaldak, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

DATED Jaldak, 25th August. Reached Kelat-i-Ghilzai on 23rd August; halted there for one day, and marched towards Kandahar to-day, taking the Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison with us. Muhammad Sadik Khan, one of the Tokhi Chiefs has been left in charge of the fort. Have heard that Muhammad Aslam intends attacking Muhammad Sadik. No opposition up to present. Country quiet.

Many people openly recognize Abdul Rahman as Amir, but they are anxiously watching events at Kandahar. Opinions are divided as to what Ayub will do. I believe he will be compelled to fight.

You will have heard about the late sortie from Kandahar, in which so many were killed and wounded. Object of sortie not yet known.

Jawar plentiful, but I do not know what we shall do for supplies and forage on our arrival at Kandahar, as everything is said to have been taken by Ayub's army.

Letter sent to-day to Kandahar by hand of messenger who has managed to get in twice before. Letters sent every day since our arrival at Kelat-i-Ghilzai to Chaman.

Enclosure 23 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th August 1880.

From Captain H. WYLIE, Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING just received from St. John,—Message begins:—

Kandahar, 25th. Ayub Khan has completely abandoned investment and withdrawn his whole force to a position on the Argandab, due north of city. News of the approach of Kabul force known to have reached his camp, where it is reported that it was yesterday at Tirandaz.

Nothing heard of Quetta force since Wylie's letter of 6th, but enemy's cavalry on Quetta road appear to have returned.

Lieutenant MacLaine still a prisoner in Ayub's camp. Continued efforts being made to obtain his release.

This morning I visited village, scene of action of 16th with Taj Muhammad Sistani horse, and found 40 bodies of our men. Colonel Newport and Captain Cruickshank recognized. All will be buried this afternoon. Wounded doing very well. Message ends.

Enclosure 24 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th August 1880.

From Captain H. WYLIE, Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING from St. John,—Message begins :—

Kandahar, 26th. Yesterday afternoon a working party buried bodies of officers and men killed on 16th. General Brooke, Colonel Newport, and Captain Cruickshank among them. Major Vandeleur, 7th Fusiliers, died of wounds received on 16th.

A report is current outside city that Musa Khan is in Ayub's camp, but I do not believe it. Reports of an action, near Chaman, are reaching us, but no news of advance of reinforcements from that direction.

Kabul force said to have been yesterday at Khel-i-Akhoond, but this is improbable. I do not expect them before 31st. Latest news from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, 12th; from Chaman, 6th.

From Ayub's camp it is reported that he wished to retreat to Girisk, but was prevented by Kabuli troops.

A foraging party brought in large quantity of fodder yesterday. Message ends.

No. 28.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, DURING THE WEEK ENDING THE 4TH SEPTEMBER 1880. (Extract.)

29th August.—Brigadier-General Henderson telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 29th :—

“ Report from Sibi this morning that Marris, about 600 strong, came out of hills in direction of Mal. Cavalry at Mal drove them back, and the troops from Thalli met them and killed four men, capturing four mares and recovering part of the cattle they had looted from Mal.”

30th August.—Brigadier-General Henderson reports as follows from Quetta :—

I. On the 29th.—“ The Officer commanding at Kach reports another gathering of Zhob people within forty miles. I propose to send two mountain guns to Kach when I have infantry available to escort them. Telegraph communication with General Phayre interrupted to-day between Gulistan and Kila Abdulla.”

II. On the 30th.—“ Siege of Kandahar reported raised; Ayub fifteen miles off in Argandab valley; Roberts reported close. Above news dated 26th instant.”

Major-General Phayre reports as follows from Chaman on the 30th :—

“ Letter of 26th just received from Kandahar. Ayub had withdrawn from investment of city to bank of Argandab at Baba-Wali. All well, and looking for General Roberts and my forces. Most urgently advocates re-establishing of posts and establishment of a transport train. Both of these very important measures am carrying out as far as the great difficulties I have to encounter from want of forage and grain and from desertion of transport followers will admit of. Gatai post already re-established, and Dabrai will be so to-morrow; and then I shall be able to clear Takht-i-Pul Kotal. A number of private letters received and forwarded.”

31st August.—Colonel St. John telegraphs as follows from Kandahar (through Chaman) on the 26th :—

“ Siege being practically raised, country quieting down, and Ayub Khan's force reduced to regulars and a small number of ghazis, is it worth while, in face of certain difficulties of supplies, that Phayre should bring more than a brigade of all arms with him?”

The following telegram, dated Quetta, the 28th, has been received from Sir Robert Sandeman:—

“The following telegram I have to-day sent to General Phayre to Chaman:— Begins,—‘I desire to continue my telegram of yesterday, recommending that a moveable column for Pishin should be formed as soon as it can be managed. To-day I have received fresh news confirming information already received that there is a considerable collection of Achakzais and bad characters on Toba, acting together under the orders of Sultan Khan. Their plan is to take the field directly your troops have advanced from Chaman towards Kandahar. They intend to attack our lines of communication between Kojak and Quetta, and the villages in Pishin which have aided us with supplies. It is also reported that the Shorawak people have similar intentions, and that 150 of the Khan’s mutinous sepoys have gone there. I earnestly bring the matter to your notice, and trust you will secure the safety of Pishin by placing a moveable column at my disposal to protect the country before you march for Kandahar. It will be a very serious matter if any of the Brahui convoys are attacked when conveying food to Kila Abdulla. Further, Wylie informs me that the state of the transport animals is bad, owing to the paucity of grain and forage, which are being supplied from Pishin to date wholly by political officers. He is very anxious that no opportunity for raiding in Pishin should be given; and has brought this matter urgently to my notice.’—Ends.

“I repeat the foregoing to Government of India for information, because I understand Phayre is moving his entire force on Kandahar; and surely, owing to the rapid advance of Roberts, the necessity for this no longer exists. It will increase the supply difficulty greatly, that is to say, if the supply of food to the entire Kandahar army, as I understand is the case, is dependent on the safety of the lines of communication from Sibi to Quetta, and thence to Chaman through the Kojak Pass.”

The Officer commanding at Jacobabad telegraphs on the 29th:—

“200 men 78th, one European Officer and 33 Native gunners of No. 1 Mountain Battery, with two 9-pounder guns and eight drivers of 5/8th Royal Artillery, passed through Sibi last night.”

The following telegrams, dated the 30th, have been received from Major-General Phayre, from Chaman:—

I. “Just received letter from Roberts, dated Khelat-i-Ghilzai, 24th, having crossed my letter to him of 29th. Khelat-i-Ghilzai garrison had joined him. He left for Kandahar by ordinary marches on 25th; to-day he is at Robat, and will try and communicate with me by heliograph to top of Kojak; to-morrow he will be at Momand and attack any force opposing his entry into Kandahar on 31st. By this time he has, I hope, learnt my position, and famine-stricken state of country through which I have to march. His march most successful in every way; has supplies to 8th September. My advanced troops at Aktar Khan and Gatai doing best to collect forage and grain. Had to blow down towers of Abas Saïad’s, for he was preventing that group of villages helping us; this should cause grain and forage to flow into Dabrai and Gatai. Have ordered field column to Shah Passang and Dari river route, so as to secure as plentiful a supply of wood, water, and forage as possible. My advanced force forms at Gatai on 30th; we shall then push on as fast as weakly state of transport animals will admit. Estimate of daily requirements Roberts’ force and Khelat-i-Ghilzai garrison (Europeans 3,200, Natives 9,000, horses 2,300, transport—1,590 mules, ponies 5,926, camels 400, donkeys 400),—meat 5,000 lbs., bread stuff 49 maunds, vegetables 4,000 lbs., rice 900 lbs., salt 33 lbs., sugar 600 lbs., tea 150 lbs., rum 80 gallons, atta 320 maunds, dhall 51½ maunds, ghee 19¼ maunds, salt 8½ maunds, grain 800 maunds.”

II. “Your telegram of yesterday about moveable column for Pishin. Before receipt of Sir Robert Sandeman’s telegram I had issued orders for column for Pishin under General Walker, who is also appointed to command posts between Sighi and Chaman. Gulistan and Kila Abdulla being strongly held by detachments of mountain guns, European detachment and Native Infantry with Cavalry. But I submit for His Excellency’s consideration that the intelligence received from General Roberts yesterday and that given by Primrose to-day, that Ayub Khan had withdrawn his force to the Argandab, four or five miles north-west of Kandahar, and that the whole country from this to Kandahar and around that city for a radius of fifteen or twenty

miles has been denuded of all supplies, renders it matter for immediate and serious consideration whether, under the circumstances, I should advance more of my troops from Chaman towards Kandahar than will be sufficient to re-establish and stock with provisions the posts *en route*, re-establish the telegraph and clear Takt-i-Púl Kotal of the tribal gatherings which still appear to be hovering about it. One brigade of Infantry, with some Native Cavalry, mountain guns and the field batteries will, I think, be sufficient for this, setting free the 15th Hussars and wing of 2/15th Foot for Shorawak, agreeably to Sir Robert Sandeman's earnest request that a force should be sent there to allay existing excitement, not only in Shorawak itself, but also in Khan of Khelat's adjacent territory. I am informed by Captain H. Wylie, Chief Political Officer with my force, that plentiful supplies of grain and forage can be had for these troops in Shorawak, and should His Excellency approve the measure, our scanty resources on the line of communication will be at once relieved and a political object of the highest importance gained. Moreover, the Hussars will be in a good climate, ready to advance or return to India at the proper time, as the course of events may appear to dictate. I have most of ten days' supplies for force already at Gatai; the rest follow to-night. To-morrow I shall occupy Dabrai, after that clear Takt-i-Púl Kotal and re-establish Abdul Rahman post, and thence open communication by the shortest line with Kandahar. In this way I can stock the road with supplies, economise men and food, and do the utmost possible to assist the large force at Kandahar. The German horse-biscuit, on which I mainly depended for use from this to Kandahar, I have just learned was left at Sibi for some days, in spite of special instructions personally given to have it forwarded by *dak* on arrival."

III. "In continuation of my first telegram this morning, the following passage in the Kandahar letter was omitted by mistake,—Colonel Shewell can supply both 'forces, yours and General Roberts', for a month or six weeks, but forage must be 'sent up the line, and also the reserve reports (?) which are at Quetta.' With reference to this, my reports from Gatai outposts are that very little forage or grain is procurable there; the whole route has already been foraged by Ayub's troops. Regarding supplying General Roberts' force for a month, the opinion of the Deputy Commissary-General may alter when he sees the list of daily consumption, that (?) forage. Perhaps he includes Quetta reserve, which I am trying to take up."

Sir Robert Sandeman telegraphs as follows from Quetta, on the 30th August:—

"The following clear the line message received from St. John this morning, dated Kandahar, 26th August 1880:—

"'Siege being practically raised, country quieting down, and Ayub Khan's force reduced to regulars and a small number of Ghazis, is it worth while, in face of certain difficulties of supplies, that Phayre should bring more than a brigade of all arms with him.' Ends.

"I entirely concur with St. John. Troops are required to garrison Pishin as formerly during Stewart's occupation at Kandahar, when country would quickly settle down."

1st September.—The following reports have been received from Sir Frederick Roberts:—

I. Dated Shahr-i-Safa, 27th August.—"Reached Shahr-i-Safa to-day, 27th August. Received letter from Colonel St. John. He writes:—Begins: 'The rumours of the approach of your force have been sufficient to relieve the city from investment. On Monday night the villages on the east and south were abandoned by their mixed garrisons of ghazis and regulars. Yesterday morning Ayub struck his camp and marched to a position on the Argandab, between Baba-Wahi and Shikh Chila, due north of the city, and separated from it by a range of rocky hills. He has about 4,000 infantry, regulars; six 12-pounders, and two 9-pounders, rifled; four 6-pounder smooth bore batteries, and one 4-pounder battery; 2,000 sowars, and, perhaps, twice that number of ghazis, of whom a third have firearms. The Kizilbashis and Kohistanis in his camp (about 1,200 infantry and 300 cavalry) offered to meet and join us directly we make a show of attack; they are at last aware of Abdul Rahman's succession, but I think Ayub will remain unmolested until arrival of Kabul force. He will, I expect, strike away north into Khakrez, on which line a vigorous pursuit should give us his guns. Maclaine, Royal Horse Artillery, is still a prisoner; I am

making every effort to obtain his release, but I am not very hopeful of success. This morning, the 25th, I went to the field of the sortie of the 16th, and found the bodies of the poor fellows who fell there, some 40 in number; they will be buried this afternoon. All the wounded are doing well. No signs or tidings of Phayre.—Ends. General H. Gough with two regiments of cavalry is at Robat; they are in heliographic communication with Kandahar. General Primrose heliographs that Ayub Khan has entrenched his camp at Baba-Wali. The force marches for Robat to-morrow, 17 miles distant from Kandahar.

II. Dated Robat, the 29th August.—“Force marched here yesterday, and halts to-day, proceeding to-morrow towards Kandahar by two easy stages. This is desirable on account of the increased heat, to give the sick some rest and enable the men and transport animals to reach Kandahar in good form. Sick rate still continues to be moderate; detailed report will be made from Kandahar. Colonel St. John and Major Adam, Assistant Quartermaster-General, joined me here yesterday, bringing useful information. They return this evening to Kandahar, accompanied by Major Badcock, Deputy Commissary-General, and Colonel Low, Chief Director of Transport, who will arrange for the supply of the force. Yesterday I received a letter from General Phayre, dated Kila Abdulla, the 24th; he expected to leave that place on the 30th, and provided he encounters no greater difficulties than he has hitherto met with, should not delay until matters are definitely settled with Ayub Khan. We are still fortunate about supplies, and will be able to assist the Kandahar garrison with sheep.”

The following messages have been received from Sir Robert Sandeman from Quetta :—

I. Dated the 29th August.—“General Robert reached Kelat-i-Ghilzai, 23rd. Message now in transmission from General Roberts to Viceroy, which gives the news. All well. Tribes very unsettled still. Marris made raid on Mal, but were driven back into their hills with loss of four killed. No particulars received yet.”

II. Dated the 30th August.—“Following from Commissioner in Sind :—Begins : ‘Good deal of excitement prevailing here, from rumours of gathering beyond frontier in Las Beyla direction. As far as I am aware these are entirely without foundation, but I shall be glad to know whether you have any information on the subject.’—Ends. Have replied as follows :—Begins : ‘The rumours have not reached this. Were any thing wrong his Highness the Jam would be certain to report it. His Highness is quite strong enough to keep his country quiet. I believe the people to be well disposed to the English.’—Ends.”

III. Dated the 31st.—“Rai Hittu Ram reports that the Marris killed three of the Mal villagers when they made the raid on the 28th; but that the troops came up with raiders, and they were severely punished, and almost all the plundered cattle recovered. Captain Martelli is at Sibi. I have telegraphed to him for particulars, as it is said 30 raiders were killed. Rai Hittu Ram further reports that Sirdar Mihrulla Khan is again sick, and quite unequal to controlling his tribe at the present time, as they have quite broken loose from all restraints.”

Major-General Phayre telegraphs as follows from Chaman :—

I. On the 30th August.—“Messenger who brought General Primrose’s telegrams of 26th from Kandahar this morning states situation was as follows :—Ayub, with 13,000 troops, was in position on right bank of Argandab, opposite Baba-Wali; this number is irrespective of ghazis, &c., but he will only fight if attacked by considerably inferior number. Ahmad Khan, son of Sartip, with 400 Kandahar horse and 150 foot, was at Tukt-i-Pul three days ago, and prevented messenger’s passage, who then came through Barganah Pass, which he found occupied by bands of ghazis, who detained him two days and robbed him of cash. Messenger reports that enemy’s loss was very heavy in sortie when General Brooke was killed.”

II. On the 31st August.—“I leave to-night for Gatai.”

4th September.—The Officer commanding at Jacobabad reports that the remainder of the 78th Highlanders passed through that place on the night of the 3rd, *en route* to Sibi.

Brigadier-General Henderson telegraphs as follows from Quetta on the 4th :—
 “News received of the defeat of Ayub Khan and capture of 27 guns.”

No. 29.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th September 1880.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to Lieutenant-General Sir F. ROBERTS.

I CONGRATULATE you and your brave force on the great success of the 1st.
 I have announced all known details in House of Commons, who have received news with great satisfaction.

No. 30.

No. 205 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
 of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, the 7th September 1880.

WE have the honour to enclose, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of telegrams received during the past week reporting the arrival at Kandahar from Kabul of Sir Frederick Roberts' division, and the total defeat, by the troops under his command, of the Afghan forces under Sirdar Ayub Khan.

2. In forwarding these papers to your Lordship, we desire to record our high appreciation of the admirable manner in which Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts has performed the important duty entrusted to him. The march of his force from Kabul to Kandahar, a distance of 327 miles by the route which he followed, was accomplished in 23 days, and the division under his command arrived at its destination in excellent health and unimpaired vigour. On the following day [1st September] the enemy was attacked and Sir F. Roberts' skilful dispositions, carried out in the most gallant style by his troops, secured, with comparatively little loss on our side, the complete overthrow and dispersion of Ayub Khan's army and the capture of his guns. We trust that your Lordship will agree with us in thinking that the services thus rendered to the country by Sir F. Roberts and his army have been of the most distinguished kind.

3. We must also express our sense of the obligations which we owe to Lieutenant-General Sir D. M. Stewart for the great energy and zeal with which he organized Sir F. Roberts' force and despatched it fully equipped in every way for the arduous task which lay before it.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) RIPON.
 „ F. P. HAINES.
 „ JOHN STRACHEY.
 „ E. B. JOHNSON.
 „ WHITLEY STOKES.
 „ JAMES GIBBS.
 „ C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 31st August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LETTER received from General Roberts, dated Kelat-i-Ghilzai, 24th, states he was leaving for Kandahar on 25th by ordinary marches, taking on Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison with him, and would try and communicate by heliograph from Robat on 29th, enters Kandahar to-day, has supplies to 8th September.

General Phayre's advanced force collecting forage and grain at Aktarkhan and Gatai.

Messenger from Kandahar states that Ayub, with 15,000 troops, is on right bank of Arghandab, opposite Baba Wali. He has besides them ghazis, &c., but will only fight if attacked by greatly inferior numbers. Ahmed Khan, son of Sartip, with 400 Kandahar horse and 150 foot, was at Takht-i-Pul four days ago and prevented messenger passing, who then came by Roghani Pass, which was occupied by ghazis. They detained him two days and robbed him of cash. He reports enemy's loss in sortie very heavy; and that Colonel St. John had invited inhabitants of Kandahar to return to city. The son of Sirdar Azad Khan of Kharan is with Ayub.

Enclosure 2 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 31st August 1880.

From Major HASTINGS, Robat, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

August 29th. Reached Robat yesterday, halt here to-day, go to Mohmund, eight miles ahead, to-morrow, and Kandahar following day. General intends attacking Ayub the next day, who, according to information from Kandahar, intends fighting.

Musa Jan and party will have reached Ayub's camp, and he may be compelled to fight.

A letter to General from Ayub received yesterday. He excuses himself for fighting, says it was forced on him, asks for friendly advice. The reply sent is to effect that he must give up his prisoners, and submit unconditionally to British Government. The original letter and the reply will be submitted.

General has had a sharp attack of fever, but hopes he will be well day after to-morrow.

The sight of our force will have a good effect on the Kandahar garrison. General Phayre, in a letter received yesterday, holds out no hopes of being here for the next eleven days.

Some supplies procurable, but the villages have to be visited to get them.

St. John has been out here. He returns to Kandahar to-day.

Enclosure 3 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 31st August 1880.

From Lieutenant-Colonel ST. JOHN, Robat, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

ROBAT, 28th. Came out here yesterday afternoon at General Roberts' request to meet him. Two regiments Cavalry, under General Gough, arrived here yesterday, after 22 miles march, and main body with General Roberts this morning. This early arrival of the Kabul army quite unexpected, as we considered it impossible for them to cover distance before 1st September. Sick are one day's march in rear.

Sirdar Hashim Khan and Ahmed Ali Khan have arrived in Ayub's camp with Abdulla Jan's mother, and Musa Jan expected to-day.

Herati troops signified their intention of retreating to Khakrez, but have been dissuaded, and sworn on Koran to fight. Ayub has written long apologetic letter to Roberts, asking for advice and friendly settlement. I return to Kandahar to-morrow.

Enclosure 4 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st September 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

COLONEL St. John and Major Adam from Kandahar met General Roberts at Robat on 28th. They returned to Kandahar on 29th. General Roberts' army was expected to arrive Kandahar yesterday, the 29th.

Ayub Khan's army still in position on right bank Arghandab. He has been joined by Sirdars Hashim Khan and Ahmad Ali Khan, with Abdulla Jan's mother. Musa Jan was expected in Ayub's camp on 31st. Kazzilbashs and Kohistanis in Ayub's army are inclined to desert, as they have heard of Abdul Rahman's recognition by British Government as Amir of Kabul.

General Phayre marched last night for Kandahar, taking with him the whole force collected at Chaman, as he expects opposition at Takht-i-Pul.

Ayub Khan has been endeavouring to negotiate terms.

Enclosure 5 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st September 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE received news from Ayub's camp as follows:—Sartip Nur Muhammad advised Ayub Khan to retreat to Girishk, but Sirdar Abdulla Khan strongly urged Ayub not to desert his friends, which advice he decided to follow.

Musa Jan, Hashim Khan, and other Sirdars have, it is said, 15,000 followers with them, chiefly Ghilzai tribesmen, and they also had begged Ayub not to leave Kandahar, saying, if he did so, their cause was lost.

Ayub is said to have sent back his family from Farah to Herat.

Sirdar Sultan Khan, brother (?) of Fattah Khan, Aitchakzai, with a tribal following, is at Takht-i-Pul.

There seems no doubt but that Sirdar Azad Khan of Kharan's son is with Ayub Khan.

Enclosure 6 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Mohmund, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

30th August. Force arrived here to-day; marches to Kandahar to-morrow.

General Primrose heliographs a letter from Ayub's camp, brings information that mother of late heir-apparent, Abdulla Jan, with other ladies, have been sent to Zamin-dawar. Arrival of the young Musa Jan in Ayub's camp is confirmed. Hashim Khan is also there. The position is being strengthened specially on the Pir Paimal side, where two guns have been placed with two regiments. From former information I learn that the Baba Wali Kotal is occupied by three regiments and two guns. The Kotal-i-Murcha is held by the Kabul regiments, and Ayub's own camp is at Mazra, where it is said the majority of his guns are parked.

I propose to encamp the infantry to west of Kandahar, immediately under the walls, cavalry under the walls to south. Should I hear that Ayub contemplates flight, I shall attack without delay. If, on the contrary, he intends to resist, I shall take my own time. The country he is occupying is from description and map extremely difficult and easily defensible, and each separate advance will require careful study and reconnaissance to prevent unnecessary loss of life.

Enclosure 7 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd September 1880.

From Major HASTINGS, Mohmund, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

30th August. Reached Mohmund, seven miles from Kandahar, which is in sight. Ayub still holds the position he took up, and there is every probability of an engagement. Generalis better.

Enclosure 8 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd September, 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 31st August. The force under my command arrived here this morning without opposition.

Enemy are said to be in considerable strength at Mazra; but the ridge of hills which divides Kandahar from the Arghandab completely covers their position; and at present I have only been able to ascertain that the Baba Wali Kotal and one or two other points on this ridge are held in great strength; and that the enemy are busily engaged in defensive works. Reconnaissances are now being conducted, and I shall soon I hope be sufficiently acquainted with affairs generally to enable me to arrange for an attack.

The Kandahar garrison are in good health. The horses and transport animals appear to be in good condition. Major Vandeleur has died of his wounds. The remainder of the wounded, both officers and men, are generally doing well.

Troops from Kabul are in famous health and spirits. The assurance of the safety of this garrison enabled comparatively short marches to be made from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, which much benefited both men and animals. The cavalry horses and artillery mules are in excellent condition, and the transport animals are, as a rule, in very fair order. General Primrose has arranged for the sick of force from Kabul being accommodated inside the city. Many of the cases are sore feet. None are serious.

To-morrow the telegraph line towards India will commence to be reconstructed; and as General Phayre is probably on this side of the Khojak to-day, through communication should soon be restored.

Enclosure 9 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Dated 30th. I returned last night from General Roberts' camp at Robot, where it halted yesterday. It is encamped to-day at Mohmund, ten miles from Kandahar, and will march here to-morrow.

Report of Musa Jan's arrival in Ayub's camp confirmed. Mother of Abdulla Jan and all other women have been sent to Zamindawar. Ayub's troops continue entrenching themselves in new position behind Baba Wali Pass. Weather still very hot.

Enclosure 10 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

31st August. General Roberts arrived to-day. Ayub still in force, and apparently intends fighting. Abdulla Jan's mother and other ladies sent to Zamindawar.

Enclosure 11 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 3rd September 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

TELEGRAPH communication with Chaman restored. Roberts arrived Kandahar, 31st, is reconnoitring Ayub's position, which is a strong one, and which he is entrenching. Phayre arrived 1st September at Muhammad Ameen, 26 miles from Chaman, 4 miles south of Dubrai; halted on 2nd to allow transport to rest. Cavalry brigade under Wilkinson was to have advanced to Takht-i-Púl on 2nd. Phayre expected to arrive Kandahar with whole force on 5th. Telegraph wire and poles left Quetta for Chaman some days ago for repair of wire from Chaman towards Kandahar. Curzon Wyllie with Wilkinson's force hoped to push on to Kandahar for Takht-i-Púl with despatches. Aitchakzais of Arambi giving much trouble, carried off caravan of 28 camels laden with flour on night of 1st.

Enclosure 12 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 3rd September 1880.

From Sir R. SANDEMAN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GENERAL Phayre telegraphs through Chaman. Message begins. Roberts attacked, dispersed Ayub's force, captured 27 guns. Kabulis retreated up Arghandab. Message ends.

Enclosure 13 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 1st September, 6 p.m. Ayub Khan's army was to-day defeated and completely dispersed with, I hope comparatively slight loss on our side. His camp was captured, the two lost guns of E/B, R.H.A., were recovered, and several wheeled guns of various calibre fell to the splendid infantry of this force. The cavalry are still in pursuit. Our casualties are—Captain Straton, 22nd Regiment, killed; 72nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, Captain Frome, killed, Captain Murray and Lieutenant Monro wounded, 7 men killed, 18 wounded; 92nd Highlanders, Lieutenant Menzies and Donald Stewart wounded, 11 men killed and 39 wounded; Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, 2nd Goorkhas, and Major Slater, 2nd Sikhs, wounded.

It is at present impossible to ascertain casualties amongst Native troops, but I have no reason to believe they are excessive. Full details will be telegraphed to-morrow.

The quite recently murdered remains of Lieutenant MacLaine, R.A., were found on the arrival of the British troops in Ayub Khan's camp.

Ayub Khan is supposed to have fled towards Herat.

Enclosure 14 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 1st September, 6 p.m. General Roberts attacked and carried Ayub Khan's position this morning about noon. Ayub fled, abandoning tents, standards, baggage, and at least 17 guns, including breech-loaders and Horse Artillery guns lost at Maiwand. General Gough with cavalry still pursuing. Our losses comparatively slight, but include Colonel Brownlow and Captain Frome, 72nd, and Captain Straton, Army Signalling Department, killed. Lieutenant MacLaine's body discovered close to Ayub's camp with throat cut, still warm. By account of other prisoners he was murdered by guard after Ayub's departure on approach of our troops. Column marches to-morrow to occupy two first halting places on Chaman road.

Enclosure 15-in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 2nd. Cavalry under General Gough killed about three hundred fugitives of Ayub's army, and Bombay Cavalry, under General Nuthall, one hundred more. Twenty-seven guns captured. A large number of Ayub's cavalry, Kazilbashes and Tajiks, who took no part in action, sent in this morning placing themselves at our disposal; have been recommended to make the best of their way to Kabul, and place their services at disposal of Amir.

Ayub is believed to have fled to Khakrez. Hashim and his brother have gone to a village they own in Zamindawar. Musa Jan's whereabouts unknown, but he probably went off with the women some days ago. Kabuli infantry, which seem to have fled without fighting, has retired up Arghandab valley. Heratis made straight for Helmund.

Sir F. Roberts has withdrawn city from military jurisdiction, and placed Major Protheroe at my disposal for its management. The Afghan inhabitants will be invited to return from to-morrow. Great scarcity of flour and ghee, but other supplies will be forthcoming without difficulty. The cavalry go to Kokaran to-morrow to facilitate collection and distribution. Major Euan Smith accompanies force going to meet General Phayre to-morrow, and will be deputed to make all arrangements with tribes on line of communication.

Colonel Shewell died last night of wounds received in sortie of 16th.

Enclosure 16 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 2nd September. The report of the reconnaissance carried out by General Hugh Gough and Colonel Chapman on the 31st August afforded me all necessary information regarding enemy's position. I found it was quite practicable to turn his right, and thus place myself to the rear of the Baba Wali range, where Ayub Khan's main camp was. I decided on doing so, and commenced to attack shortly after nine yesterday morning. To cover my design I made preparations for a direct attack upon the Baba Wali Kotal. This feint was entrusted to the troops of the Kandahar garrison under Lieutenant-General Primrose, who also arranged to occupy my advanced positions of the previous day. At the same time the Cavalry brigade under Brigadier-General Hugh Gough advanced upon our left, and, without difficulty, reached the Arghandab, when it was well placed for pursuit, should the enemy break either towards Girishk or Khakrez. The attack was made by the 1st and 2nd Brigades, under Brigadier-Generals Macpherson and Baker respectively, with the 3rd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Macgregor, in support, the whole of the Infantry being under the command of Major-General J. Ross. An elevated village within 1,200 yards of our position was strongly held by the enemy, and had first to be taken. This was done, in the most gallant manner, by the 92nd Highlanders and the 2nd Goorkhas covered by the fire of C/2 R.A. and the new screw gun battery. The two brigades then advanced through orchards and enclosures fighting steadily, the left of the 2nd Brigade being brought gradually round until the village of Pir Paimal was reached. At this point, the enemy were in great force, and fought most resolutely, but nothing could resist the determined advance of the British troops. Shortly after this, the reverse slope of the Baba Wali Kotal was reached, and the standing camp of Ayub then at Mazra, became visible. All the enemy's attempts to stem the torrent were fruitless. By 12 noon, the camp was in our possession with 27 pieces of ordnance, which include our own guns lost on the 27th July.

The casualties in addition to those yesterday reported include three Officers of Cavalry, slightly wounded, viz., Major Willock, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant Baker, 3rd P. C., Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain, Central India Horse. The 92nd Highlanders had 51 wounded, 3 of whom have since died. The 72nd had 17 wounded, 1 of whom has since died. Amongst the Natives 11 killed, 72 wounded. Total wounded of casualties, about 210. The Cavalry brigade marches to-morrow to

Kokaran, where it will be well placed, and this will facilitate supplies being brought into the city. The 19th Bombay N. I., with 3rd Bombay Cavalry, march to-morrow to open up communication with General Phayre, to whom I am writing, requesting him not to push on too many troops, but to utilize his transport as much as possible in the conveyance of stores and supplies.

Enclosure 17 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th September 1880.

From Agent, GOVERNOR GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

NEWS received last night of complete defeat by General Roberts of Ayub Khan's army, capture of his camp, and recovery of our two lost guns, also capture of 27 guns of various sizes. Ayub's loss severe. British loss believed not to be excessive. The quite recently murdered remains of Lieutenant Maclaine were found on the arrival of the British troops in Ayub's camp. British cavalry in the pursuit that followed are said to have killed 500 fugitives.

Gathering in Marri hills reported to have dispersed. Their loss in late raid on Mall nine killed and several wounded. Aitchakzais still giving trouble.

Enclosure 18 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 5th September 1880.

FROM AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FROM information furnished by General Gough and Colonel Chapman, General Roberts decided to turn Ayub's right and get in rear of his camp. General Primrose feigned direct attack with Kandahar garrison, Cavalry under Gough being placed so as to pursue in event of enemy's flight towards Khakrez. 1st and 2nd Brigades under Macpherson and Baker, supported by Macgregor and 3rd Brigade, then attacked a village strongly held by the enemy. 92nd and 2nd Goorkhas, covered by C/2nd, Royal Artillery, and screw guns, carried this most gallantly, and reaching Pir Paimal, which was resolutely defended by a large force, continued their irresistible advance till they occupied Ayub's camp. Total casualties about 210, including 72nd, Colonel Brownlow, Captain Frome, and seven men killed; Captain Murray, Lieutenant Munro, and 17 men wounded, one since dead; 92nd, Lieutenant Menzies, Donald Stewart, and five men wounded, three since dead, 11 men killed; Colonel Battye, 2nd Goorkhas, Major Slater, 2nd Sikhs, Willock, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, Baker, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, and Neville Chamberlain, Central India Horse, wounded; Captain Straton, 22nd Foot, killed. Natives, 11 killed and 72 wounded. 19th Native Infantry, and 3rd Bombay moved to open communication with General Phayre.

Political Officer, Sibi, reports Marri gatherings dispersed. Alarm of attack on Sibi gorge unfounded. The Marri Vakeel Shaban Khan arrived at Sibi with message from Sirdar Mihrulla Khan.

Enclosure 19 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 3rd September. Cavalry brigade marched this morning for Kokaran with a large number of sick transport animals.

The sick and wounded of this force are all comfortably housed in buildings; and the British portion of the force have sufficient barrack accommodation to save them from the sun during the day. The wounded, with a few exceptions, are doing well. Two of the 72nd, and three of the 92nd, have died. The casualties on the 31st August and 1st September amounted to 248. The wounded includes two Officers, not hitherto mentioned, viz., Lieutenant-Colonel Rowcroft, 4th Goorkhas, and Lieutenant Chesney, 23rd Pioneers, both slightly wounded.

The total number of artillery pieces captured was 32. This includes our own two guns, but not the six given to the Wali. These latter, I am told by some Afghan

artillerymen, who have given themselves up as prisoners to-day, we shall find lying on the Girishk road. These same prisoners state that Ayub Khan had only 31 guns with him, and that his flight was so precipitate, he could get none away.

Enclosure 20 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GENERAL Phayre reached Abdul Rahman last evening. Officers belonging to his staff rode in here this morning. His troops will remain in convenient locality near their present whereabouts to avoid too great pressure on the Kandahar supplies.

A telegraph office was opened last night at Mundi Hissar.

The wounded are doing well.

Enclosure 21 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 3rd September. The whole of Ayub's guns found and brought into citadel. Ayub fled to Khakrez without stopping, and left yesterday morning for Gurak. He is probably in Zamindawar to-day. Hashim Khan and the other Sirdars and Chiefs, with the exception of the two Ghilzai Generals, Hafizullah and Taz Muhammad, went with him to Khakrez. He had no baggage and no troops, but the Herati horse; is said to have announced his intention of going straight to Herat.

City gates have been opened, and peaceable Afghan inhabitants invited to return.

General Gough, with cavalry, has gone to Kokaran. A regiment of infantry and one of cavalry have marched to open communication with General Phayre. Major Euan Smith telegraphs from Mundi Hissar, first stage, that all is quiet there.

Enclosure 22 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 4th. Nothing more heard of fugitives, except that Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan fled with Ayub to Khakrez. I estimate the enemy's loss on the 1st at about one thousand.

People are gradually returning to city, of administration of which Major Protheroe has taken charge, as a temporary measure.

Enclosure 23 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th September 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

THE following particulars of General Roberts' victory over Ayub Khan have been received from several sources. A successful reconnaissance of enemy's position was made on 31st August by General Gough, accompanied by Colonel Chapman, Chief of Staff. They were able to ascertain clearly the enemy's position, which was found to be as follows:—Their camp was pitched behind the Baba Wali range on the Arghandab, and extended to the village of Pir Paimal. They also held the two passes, called Baba Wali and Murcha, leading from Kandahar to the Arghandab. This position was strongly held with guns, and, before our troops could gain it, they had to pass through dry canals, gardens, orchards, and some detached villages. Roberts determined to make a feigned attack in front on Baba Wali with the heavy guns and Bombay troops under Primrose, his real attack being entrusted to Kabul Army, and directed against the village of Pir Paimal, which, once in his possession, would enable him to take the whole of Ayub's position in flank, roll up his line, and give him possession of his guns. The cavalry under Gough with horse artillery was on the left, acting independently. The attack was commenced at 9.30 a.m. The heavy guns shelled Baba Wali and silenced the batteries. C/2 R.A.

and screw guns shelled the nearest village, which was then carried by a rush of the 92nd Highlanders, 2nd Goorkhas, and the rest of the 1st Brigade. Baker's Brigade then joined the 1st Brigade, and the advance was made towards Pir Paimal. Severe fighting took place on this advance in the gardens, canals, and orchards, but Pir Paimal was, after a short time, without check as gallantly taken as the first village. Two small camps of the enemy then came in sight, but they were easily captured. The result of the capture, together with that of the two villages, and the arrival of the British force on the flank of Ayub's position, was a panic, which quickly spread to the main camp, and the enemy commenced flying in all directions, abandoning their guns. Our cavalry under Gough and Nuttall at once went in pursuit, and followed the flying enemy for fifteen miles, killing, it is said, 500 of the fugitives. Some of the victorious British troops bivouacked in Ayub Khan's standing camp, which was taken, together with large supplies of our ammunition. The rest of the troops returned to Kandahar over the Baba Wali Kotal, Ayub's standards and stores of all kinds were taken, and he himself fled with a small party of Herat horse to Khakrez, and did not draw rein till it was reached. He is supposed next day to have continued his flight without baggage or troops towards Zamindawar and Herat, his army being completely dispersed. The whole of his guns have been captured and taken into Kandahar.

General Phayre and his troops ordered from Killa Abdul Rahman to garrison, Kandahar.

No. 31.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th September 1880.

FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO VICEROY.

THE Government desire to express to Commander-in-Chief great satisfaction of the Queen at success of measures taken for relief at Kandahar.

No. 32.

DIARY OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AS REPORTED TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DURING THE WEEK ENDING THE 11TH SEPTEMBER 1880. (Extract.)

6th September.—The following is a complete list of the Officers killed and wounded at the battle of Mazra, on the 1st instant:—

Killed.

Captain Edward Straton	-	22nd Foot, Superintendent of Army Signalling.
Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Brownlow, C.B.	-	72nd Highlanders.
Captain St. John Thomas Frome	-	72nd Highlanders.

Wounded.

Major George Woodward Willock	-	3rd Bengal Cavalry.
Lieutenant Louis Samuel Hyde Baker	-	3rd Punjab Cavalry.
Lieutenant Neville Francis FitzGerald Chamberlain	-	2nd Central India Horse.
Captain Robert Hunter Murray	-	72nd Highlanders.
Lieutenant Seymour Charles Hale Monro	-	72nd Highlanders.
Lieutenant Stewart Alexander Menzies	-	92nd Highlanders.
2nd Lieutenant Donald William Stewart	-	92nd Highlanders.
Lieutenant Duncan Chesney	-	23rd Pioneers.
Major and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Battye	-	2nd Goorkhas.
Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Frederick Rowcroft	-	4th Goorkhas.
Major James Barry Slater	-	2nd Sikh Infantry.

*“ Quetta, 5th September.—*Kindly reply to my telegrams dated 31st August and 3rd September, recommending that two small columns be sent to Kawas and Shorawak to open up sources of local supply formerly available. Kindly inform me at as early a date as possible the garrison that is to be maintained at Pishin and Quetta during winter. We have had little or no rain for two summers, and if early winter sets in, which is probable, arrangements ought now to be made by commissariat to store forage and firewood for winter consumption. The Principal Commissariat Officer, Kandahar,* has died of his wounds, and the Commissariat Officer in Pishin has died from pneumonia. No time should be lost in bringing up supplies, and deciding amount required for winter. Bráhúis will not carry supplies at any price after snow falls, as the intense cold on Dasht plain kills men and animals.”

Brigadier-General Henderson telegraphs the following information regarding the action at Mazra :—

*“ Quetta, 5th September.—*The following information regarding attack on Ayub has been received :—A reconnaissance having been carried out, General Roberts decided to attack, and, finding it practicable to turn Ayub's right, arrangements were made to do so. General Primrose, with the Kandahar garrison, was detailed to make a direct attack on the Baba-Wali Kotal, at the same time the Cavalry Brigade, under General Hugh Gough, advanced on the left, and took up a good position to pursue. Two brigades, under Generals Macpherson and Baker, made the flank attack, supported by 3rd Brigade under General MacGregor, the whole infantry under General Ross. A village on a hill, within 1,200 yards of our position, had to be taken; the 92nd and 2nd Goorkhas, covered by the fire of C/2nd Royal Artillery and screw-guns, gallantly stormed and took it. The advance brigades fought their way steadily through orchards and enclosures. The enemy was in great force and fought desperately, but could not stand the steady advance of the British troops. The enemy strove in vain. By 12 noon his camp was in our hands, with 28 guns, including the two lost on 27th July; six guns more had previously fallen into our hands. Standards, standing camp, and all their équipage were taken. The body of MacLaine was found in a tent, still warm, with his throat cut, murdered by his guards before they retreated. Casualties in cavalry among Officers—two killed,† one wounded; wounded officer—Lieutenant Chamberlain, slightly; 92nd Highlanders—51 wounded, three of which died since; 72nd Foot—17 wounded, one since dead.”

THE Deputy Quartermaster-General, Sakkar, telegraphs that the 17th Bengal Native Infantry left for Sibi on the 5th.

THE Officer Commanding at Jacobabad telegraphs as follows :—

*“ Jacobabad, 5th September.—*Eighty-three men, drafts for 7th, 2/11th, and 2/15th Foot passed through for Sibi last night.”

*8th September.—*The following message has been received from Sir Frederick Roberts :—

*“ Kandahar, 5th September.—*The following are the names of British soldiers killed in action on the 1st September, or who have since died of their wounds :—

“ 92nd Highlanders.

“ Killed.—Colour-Sergeant Richard Fraser, Corporal Lewin Friendship, Privates Alexander Easton, Thomas Kerr, John McKenzie, Robert McKenzie, William Reid, Neil Ross, James Scott, John Strachan, William Wilson.

“ Died of wounds.—Privates William Henderson, Peter Hoey, James Wilson.

“ 72nd Highlanders.

“ Killed.—Lance Sergeant William Cameron, Lance Corporals Josiah McIlvenna and William Gannon, Privates Mill Erskine, Alexander Hodge, James McQueen, James McGowan.

“ Died of wounds.—Privates James Baggin, George Haseltine.”

* Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Shewell, Bombay Staff Corps.

† This was a mistake; no Officers of cavalry were killed.

The following reports have been received from Sir Frederick Roberts:—

“ *Kandahar, 5th September.*—Mail bags received this morning, bringing letters from England of 21st July and Indian newspapers to 20th August. A royal salute will be fired here at sunrise to-morrow, in honour of the victory over the Afghan army; orders issued for similar salutes to be fired at all stations and camps in the command where artillery may be present. After careful inquiry I have ascertained that the enemy suffered very severely on the 1st September; it was to be expected they would, as they made one or two most determined stands after our troops got quite close up to them. A small column will start in a few days for Singiri, and thence on to Khushk-i-Nakhud, for the purpose of burying our dead, and also to open out that part of the district for supplies. I am also desirous of clearing troops out of the city, which will be overcrowded now that inhabitants are allowed to return. Telegraph here is open to Abdul Rahman, 25 miles.”

“ *Kandahar, 6th September.*—General Phayre arrived this morning, having found at Karez-i-Zarak, about twelve miles south of Kandahar, a convenient site for the encampment of his horse artillery and cavalry, with ample forage and supplies. The infantry brigade of his force will be advanced to the same neighbourhood during the next few days. The weather is unusually hot. The wounded are, however, doing well, and the troops are, generally, fairly healthy.”

Brigadier-General Walker reports as follows:—

“ *Kila Abdulla, 7th September.*—Composition of General Phayre’s force that he took on from Chaman:—Brigadiers-General Brown, Wilkinson, and James, with staff; D/B Horse Artillery, F/2nd Royal Artillery, 15th Hussars, two squadrons Madras Cavalry, two squadrons 2nd Bombay Cavalry, 2/11th Regiment, two companies 63rd Regiment, 1st Biluchis, 5th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Bombay Native Infantry, three companies Sappers, and No. 2 Field Hospital.”

Brigadier-General Henderson telegraphs as follows:—

“ *Quetta, 7th September.*—Latest news from Kandahar, no further news of fugitives. Sartip reported to have fled to Khakrez with Ayub. Estimated loss of enemy on 1st, 1,000 men. People gradually returning to city, the civil administration of which has been placed under Protheroe. General Phayre at Kandahar with his troops.”

No. 33.

No. 209 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To The RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty’s
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 14th September 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty’s Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Southern Afghanistan.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord Marquis,

Your Lordship’s most obedient and humble Servants,

(Signed)

RIPON.

” F. P. HAINES.

” JOHN STRACHEY.

” D. M. STEWART.

” WHITLEY STOKES.

” JAMES GIBBS.

” C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 8th September 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE received hearty congratulations from the Khan of Kelat on Roberts' victory.

Enclosure 2 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 7th September. The third brigade Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, under command of Brigadier-General Macgregor, together with the Central India Horse, will march to-morrow for Killa Abdulla, and there await the orders of Government regarding withdrawal to India. The movement is made to ease off the pressure regarding supplies experienced in consequence of the assembling of so large a force in the neighbourhood of Kandahar. I accompany the brigade party to obtain change of air, and to be as soon as possible in direct telegraphic communication with India, as some days must elapse before through communication is restored.

On the 9th instant, Brigadier-General Daubeney's brigade, consisting of C/2, R.A., 7th Fusiliers, 4th N.I., 2nd Biluchis, Sind Horse, and Poona Horse, will march for Kushk-i-Nakhud, for the purpose of burying the remaining of our dead, opening up communications, and endeavouring to get supplies from the outlying district. Latest telegram from India dated Simla, 3rd.

Enclosure 3 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 10th September 1880.

From AGENT, Governor General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

MOKADDAM Nehal Khan, Chief of the Loharani Marris, whose tribe occupy the country adjacent to the Shum and Peelawa plains, situated on the Punjab frontier, has sent a messenger with a letter addressed to me to say that he and his section of the tribe were in no way concerned in the robbery of the convoy and raid on Mall; that they are servants of the British Government, and will obey any orders sent them. The letter was written and despatched prior to General Roberts' victory.

Enclosure 4 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 10th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Abdul Rahman, through Killa Abdulla, to FOREIGN, Simla.

ABDUL Rahman, 9th. Proceeded yesterday with the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Division, to Mundi Hissar, and this morning visited the cavalry brigade under Brigadier-General Wilkinson, at Karez-i-Zarak. On the line of march I met Brigadier-General Brown's brigade, and a portion of Brigadier-General James's brigade, proceeding to join General Phayre's cavalry brigade.

Supplies and forage are coming in slowly along the line of communication.

I propose to remain at Killa Abdulla a few days for rest and change of air, and have asked Sir Robert Sandeman to meet me there to discuss the all-important questions of transport and supplies between Sibi and Kandahar.

A convoy of carts reached Kandahar yesterday, and another convoy is here to-day, but the road requires improvement to make it easy for carts' traffic. No telegram was despatched yesterday.

Enclosure 5 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 9th. Ayub Khan and the other fugitive Sirdars have passed Zamin-dawar some days ago. It is believed that Hashim Khan and his mother, the Wali's sister, will remain there; that Ayub will attempt to enter Herat; and that the mother of Abdulla Jan will go on to her father, Nur Afzul, at Meshed.

A column, consisting of two regiments of cavalry, three infantry, and one battery, leaves for Kushk-i-Nakhud to-morrow, to recover the five guns abandoned on the road, and bury the dead. Lieutenant Muir accompanies it as Political Officer.

General Macgregor, with 60th Rifles, 4th Goorkhas, and 25th, marched to-day for Pishin. The 15th N. I. and 23rd Pioneers follow to-morrow.

General Roberts, with Colonel Chapman, Major Hastings, and Captain Ridgeway, leave this afternoon for Pishin.

Major White and Captain Carew left this morning for Sibi.

Enclosure 6 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th September 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR, 9th September. The Wali's sister, who was in Ayub's camp with the mother of the Waliahad, writes to him from Zamindawar that the latter lady with Hashim Khan's mother and Musa Jan have gone to Herat. Ayub himself had preceded them, accompanied by only 200 or 300 Herati Sowars. The Herat infantry was scattered over the country.

All the prominent Chiefs of Ayub's army, except General Taj Muhammad Khan and the Sartip, were with him. Of the Sartip nothing is known, but Taj Muhammad has gone towards Kabul. Of Ayub's 39 guns 29 are now in the citadel; the remaining one, a mountain gun, is believed to have been taken by the Kabuli troops.

Reports of a serious insurrection at Herat are current, and it is said that Abdul Wahab Khan, son of Mir Afzal, left by Ayub as Governor, has been murdered.

Enclosure 7 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 12th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Mel Karez, through Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

MEL KAREZ, 12th. 3rd Brigade, 3rd Division, marched to Mel Karez this morning, meeting No. 3 Companies, Sappers and Miners, *en route* to Kandahar. The difficulties regarding supplies and forage along the line are great, but local Officers are hopeful that they may obtain a sufficiency for ordinary demands. Everything is being done to re-assure the people, who are bringing in supplies in small quantities. Telegraphic communication between Kandahar and Gatai was established yesterday evening. Only 18 miles to complete through communication with India.

Enclosure 8 in No. 33.

TELEGRAM, dated 12th September 1880.

From General ROBERTS, Chaman, to FOREIGN, Simla.

DUBRAI, 12th September. The 3rd Brigade marched to Dubrai this morning. Storms have been prevalent; heavy in the Bolan; telegraphic communication being interrupted for two days; weather everywhere cooler; wounded at Kandahar doing well.

I will report fully upon transport and supply arrangements on reaching Killa Abdulla, where Sir Robert Sandeman is to meet me.

No. 33 A.

TELEGRAM from GOVERNOR, BOMBAY, 19th September 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

General Primrose telegraphs that the word "annihilate" was telegraphed without his knowledge by Assistant Quartermaster-General, and while responsible he declares that he was not aware of the term used till Roberts' arrival.

No. 34.

No. 213 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 28th September 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter from Major E. G. Hastings, Chief Political Officer with Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, dated the 3rd September 1880, enclosing a letter from Sardar Muhammad Ayub Khan, in which he asks the advice of Sir F. Roberts, and also the reply of the latter, recommending the Sardar to submit unconditionally to the British Government.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) RIPON.
 " F. P. HAINES.
 " J. STRACHEY.
 " W. STOKES.
 " J. GIBBS.
 " D. M. STEWART.
 " C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 34.

From Major E. G. HASTINGS, Chief Political Officer with General Sir F. Roberts' Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (Dated Kandahar, 3rd September 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council,—

- (1.) Letter in original from Sardar Muhammad Ayub Khan to General Sir F. Roberts, with translation;
- (2.) Copy of a letter from Sir F. Roberts to Sardar Muhammad Ayub Khan, with translation.

Enclosure 2 in No. 34.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from SARDAR MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN to General Sir F. ROBERTS, dated Friday, 19th Ramazan 1297.

AFTER compliments.—May this letter find you in perfect health and strength. After which be it known to you I have at all times regarded the English Government with friendship, and still continue so to regard it. I have not altered in this. Before this time you despatched to me from Kabul several letters by the hand of Sardar Abdur Salam Khan, but these were seized in Kandahar, and were not allowed to be forwarded to me. They kept your letters and sent on others of their own. I too on several occasions made known my friendship (*i.e.*, wrote letters), but received no fitting reply until such time as the news reached me that Sardar Sher Ali Khan was marching on Herat and had arrived at Girishk. I marched and came to Farah. I there received news that troops had been sent to Washir. I left Farah, and when I reached Washir, the army of Sardar Sher Ali Khan retired, and at Girishk they all dispersed. After that I was informed that the English had halted at Kushk-i-Nakhud. On the receipt of this news I thought it well that my troops should not take the road by Kushk-i-Nakhud, but should proceed by that of Maiwand, and I hoped that the

English might show me friendship. Early in the morning, when my troops were marching by Maiwand, in pursuance of my orders, in the neighbourhood of Maiwand, the English army came and began to fight. What was pre-ordained came to pass. I have given you the particulars, and this is the real truth. On no account will I relinquish the friendship of the English Government. If the Government have been informed in any other sense, the real truth is what I have written. I now write to you in this friendly manner that you may write and tell me in a friendly way what you think is the best course for me to pursue, and these affairs may be settled in an amicable manner.

Enclosure 3 in No. 34.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from General Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS K.C.B., C.I.E., V.C., to SARDAR MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN, dated 29th August 1880.

AFTER compliments.—In answer to your letter asking my advice, I can only recommend you to send in the prisoners in your power to Kandahar, and submit yourself unconditionally to the British Government.

No. 35.

No. 434 of 1880.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 5th October 1880.

WE have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the papers noted in the margin,* relating to the defeat at Maiwand, on the 27th July last, of the brigade under the command of Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows.

* G. G. O., No. 551, dated the 27th September 1880, and documents published therewith.

2. We propose to address your Lordship in Council a letter in full detail regarding the whole of the proceedings at Ghiriskh, Maiwand, and Kandahar, up to the date of the arrival of Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" J. STRACHEY.
" W. STOKES.
" J. GIBBS.
" C. U. AITCHISON.
" D. M. STEWART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 35.

GENERAL ORDER.

Military Department.

Simla, 27th September 1880.

Field Operations.

No. 551.—The Governor General in Council directs that the following correspondence and Despatches, concerning the action of Maiwand on the 27th July 1880, shall be published for general information in the "Gazette of India Extraordinary."

Enclosure 2 in No. 35.

From Colonel ALLEN JOHNSON, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India. (No. 8453 K., Field Operations, Kabul, dated Simla, 27th September 1880.)

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter, No. 5351 K., "Kabul," dated the 25th September 1880, forwarding a Despatch from Lieutenant-General Primrose, C.S.I.,

giving cover to Brigadier-General Burrows' and Brigadier-General Nuttall's accounts of the operations which took place under the direction of the former Officer on the 27th July last.

2. The Governor General in Council concurs with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as to the meagre and unsatisfactory character of the accounts furnished, which, notwithstanding the time that has elapsed since the date of the occurrence to which they refer, still leave the Government of India in ignorance as to the true facts of the case and the exact circumstances to which the reverse sustained by Her Majesty's arms is to be attributed.

3. The Governor General in Council, however, understands that a full report of the situation, drawn out by Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, after his arrival at Kandahar, is now on its way to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and as doubtless this will throw much light on what these Despatches leave in obscurity, the Government of India will await the arrival of the report before deciding on any further course of action in connection with the operations of the 27th July 1880.

4. It is not, however, necessary to wait for further information to enable the Governor General in Council to express his hearty concurrence in the high tribute paid by the Commander-in-Chief to the admirable behaviour of the Officers and men of the E/B Battery of Royal Horse Artillery.

Notwithstanding its loss of guns, and that the result of the day was disastrous, the E/B Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, may look back on the action of Maiwand as one in which they nobly maintained the credit of their distinguished regiment.

5. The Government of India entertained no doubt of the good conduct of Her Majesty's 66th Foot, but it is still a satisfaction to have obtained the voluntary testimony of the enemy to the devoted courage with which the colours of the regiment were defended to the last against overwhelming odds.

6. The Governor General in Council has much satisfaction in receiving the names of those Officers whose services are specially brought to notice by His Excellency.

7. The names of those of the British troops who were killed and who have since died of their wounds have been telegraphed to the Secretary of State. The complete lists of casualties, both British and Native, will be published, together with the Despatches and this correspondence, in the "Gazette of India."

8. It is, I am to add, needless to give expression to the deep grief the Government of India feel in reading this sad roll of the losses sustained by the force employed under Brigadier-General Burrows.

Enclosure 3 in No. 35.

From Major-General G. R. GREAVES, O.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department. (No. 5351 K., "Kabul," dated the 25th September 1880.)

I HAVE the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to transmit, for the information of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, the accompanying Despatch from Lieutenant-General Primrose, C.S.I., giving cover to Brigadier-General Burrows' and Brigadier-General Nuttall's accounts of the operations which took place under the direction of the former Officer on the 27th July last.

2. Circumstances have delayed the receipt of these Despatches, and even now they contain but isolated and bare statements of the sad events of the day, almost entirely failing to convey to us information as to how they were brought about.

3. Before proceeding to a general review of the operations, and in order to make the reports now submitted clear, it is necessary to annex the following copies of telegrams :—

I. From the Quartermaster-General in India to General Primrose, Kandahar, dated 9th July 1880 :—

"Yours, 8th. Under the circumstances, you can order up any troops from the line of communication you and General Phayre consider can be safely spared to reinforce Kandahar."

II. From the Commander-in-Chief in India [Quartermaster-General] to General Primrose, Kandahar, dated 15th July 1880 :—

“Wali’s troops having deserted, the situation has completely changed. General Burrows must act according to his own judgment, reporting fully. He must act with caution, on account of distance of support.”

These telegrams refer to paragraphs 3 and 10 of General Primrose’s Despatch.

4. In paragraph 2 of Brigadier-General Burrows’ report, a reference is made to certain instructions received, and copies of correspondence from the Assistant Quartermaster-General, Kandahar Force, thereon, are attached.

The two telegrams there given only form a small portion of the correspondence between the Army Head Quarters and General Primrose, and it becomes, therefore, requisite to give copies of the telegrams which passed on the subject of Brigadier-General Burrows’ movements, from the date of his return to Khushk-i-Nakhud from the Helmand, up to the day of the action at Maiwand. These telegrams are annexed.

5. It should be stated that up to this time the intelligence regarding Ayub’s strength is contained in the following copy of a telegram from General Primrose to the Quartermaster-General in India, dated Kandahar, 14th July 1880 :—

“Letter received this day from Colonel St. John. No date to it, but presumed 12th July. Ayub reached Farrah on 1st July, and his advanced cavalry left on 8th. He has 2,500 effective and 1,000 disaffected infantry, 800 regular cavalry, and 1,000 tribal cavalry, with 30 guns. Wali’s troops shaky. One regiment all but openly mutinous; rest tainted. They have no ammunition, and St. John told Wali to take measures to put it out of reach. One other Sirdar deserted with his immediate followers, but failed to persuade others to follow him.”

6. Brigadier-General Burrows has not informed us what military measures he took for ascertaining the strength and disposition of Ayub’s army after it had crossed the Helmand, whilst it is evident that the information on which he broke up from Khushk-i-Nakhud, and marched with the intention of anticipating Ayub at Maiwand, was either incorrect or reached him too late.

It appears to Sir Frederick Haines that had he been aware that Ayub could possibly have presented himself at Maiwand in such force as that ascribed to him, General Burrows would have considered himself hardly strong enough to attack him, but would rather have contented himself with retiring towards his base at Kandahar, keeping a close touch on the enemy with his cavalry, and would certainly have taken steps to rid himself of the enormous amount of stores and baggage with which he was encumbered on the day of the action.

It appears that the only reinforcement sent to him from Kandahar consisted of 50 sabres, 3rd Sind Horse, but it will be observed in paragraph 8 of his Despatch that General Primrose had troops at Kandahar on the 23rd July from which to support him, and that he had arranged to do so, to the extent of 230 men of the 4th Native Infantry, but for some reason or other, not explained, this reinforcement was not sent.

7. Defective information was but a prelude to what followed. The apparently wholly unauthorized commencement of the action on the left by two guns of E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant H. Maclaine, escorted by a troop of Sind Horse under Lieutenant A. M. Monteith, committed General Burrows to an action on ground not deliberately chosen by him, and with an enemy entirely unrecognised. This was highly prejudicial to his chance of success, for the position thus hurriedly taken up was in perfectly open ground, with both flanks *en l’air* in the face of vastly superior numbers.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief firmly believes that had the Native Infantry stood their ground and stemmed the rush of the ghazis, a victory might have been achieved, but when the line gave way from the left and the 66th Regiment was thus thrown into confusion, there was but one chance, and that was a cavalry charge, but the cavalry failed to charge, and a rout was inevitable.

8. There can be no doubt that General Burrows was vastly overmatched as to numbers, and that he had to fight a desperate battle under most unfavourable circumstances.

The unsteadiness of the two companies of the 30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) early in the day, must at once have destroyed all confidence in that corps, but it is evident that up to the moment of yielding on the left of the line, the conduct of the troops, with the above exception, had been excellent.

It is His Excellency's pleasing duty to bring to the notice of the Governor General in Council the admirable behaviour of the Officers and men of E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, who fought most gallantly and suffered severely.

The guns which commenced the action were those apparently which were lost eventually. The gallant young Officer who commanded them is not here to justify or explain his movement, for he met a tragic end at Mazra, after a month's imprisonment in Ayub's camp, and this must be a lasting disgrace attaching to Ayub's name.

The detachment of the 66th under Lieutenant G. de la M. Faunce, which manned the smooth-bore battery, is also reported to have behaved extremely well; and an incident, not known to General Burrows when he wrote his despatch, is worthy of record here, as a lasting tribute to the undaunted gallantry of the Officers and men of the 66th Regiment from the mouth of the enemy.

General Roberts, under date 16th September, telegraphs as follows:—

“Colonel St. John reports from Kandahar as follows:—From the accounts of one of Ayub's officers present at the action of Maiwand, it appears that a stand was made by remnant of the 66th Regiment round the colours, in an enclosure; informant estimated their number at 100, and states that they were surrounded by the whole army, and that when all but 11 were killed, these made a desperate charge, and perished fighting bravely to the last man.”

This stubborn defence may have delayed the pursuit, as well as checked the desire to pursue.

9. The Artillery maintained their military formation and *morale* during the retreat

But, though the Cavalry appear to have kept together, the General had lost all confidence in them, apparently with reason, and from this cause was unable to halt at Hauz-i-Madat.

Had this been done, no doubt many valuable lives, and some stores and transport animals, might have been saved, while some appearance of military formation might have been restored.

The retreat was thus continued without a break to Kandahar, notwithstanding that the pursuit, never vigorous, was not pressed beyond the third or fourth mile from the field. This restless flight must have increased the tale of loss and suffering at every step.

It is to be noted that amongst the casualties in the Cavalry, no Native Officer is mentioned as either killed or wounded.

On the morning of the 28th July the leading fugitives reached Kandahar. Their report of the complete annihilation of General Burrows' brigade was accepted as fact, and so reported to the world.

It is satisfactory to know that, unfortunate as were the events of the day, together with their results, they fell far short of the description first given of them. His Excellency the Governor General in Council is aware that on this report the cantonments were precipitately abandoned, and refuge taken in the citadel.

Ayub did not, however, fully invest Kandahar until the 6th August.

10. To return to the events of the 27th. It is worthy of remark that General Burrows makes no mention of efforts on the part of Officers to steady their men, nor are the Commanding Officers or other of the corps engaged mentioned with approval; but the casualty rolls, taken in connection with the undoubted heavy losses of the enemy, are a sufficient proof of the gallantry and devotion of those who fell.

11. Of the survivors, the Commander-in-Chief desires to bring to the notice of Government the Officers named by Brigadier-Generals Burrows and Nuttall, viz.:—

Captain J. R. Slade, R.H.A.
Major E. P. Leach, V.C., R.E.
Major G. C. Hogg, Brigade Major.
Lieutenant J. Monteith, 2nd Sind Horse.

12. The casualty rolls have already been submitted to Government with my No. 5327 A., of the 24th instant.

Returns of ordnance and of arms and accoutrements lost or enclosed, also a return of ammunition expended.

TELEGRAMS referred to in the Adjutant-General's Letter forwarding the Maiwand Despatches, paragraph 4.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 17th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 17th July. General Burrows reports that he has moved his force back from Helmand to Khushk-i-Nakhud, there to await events or orders. This move was necessitated by there being no supplies for the troops nor grain for horses. The little there was on the right bank was carried off or destroyed by mutineers. This point is of most strategic importance, having several roads converging on it. As the river Helmand is fordable, Ayub could cross anywhere. I am of opinion that General Burrows has acted judiciously in the matter.

TELEGRAM from QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, No. 4978, dated 17th July 1880.

SIMLA, 17th July. Chief wishes to know what General Burrows' views and intentions now are. Please tell him to report daily everything that goes on, for the information of Viceroy. Yours of 16th, giving information from General Burrows about pursuit and dispersion of Wali's mutinous troops and recovery of guns, very satisfactory.

TELEGRAM from QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, No. 4995, dated 17th July 1880.

SIMLA, 17th July. Yours 17th. Chief considers General Burrows acted judiciously in retiring on Khushk-i-Nakhud under the circumstances.

TELEGRAM from QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, No. 4997, dated 18th July 1880.

SIMLA, 18th July. Do you consider Khushk-i-Nakhud the most favourable position for covering Kandahar, and striking a blow at Ayub, should he cross the Helmand? Favour the Commander-in-Chief with a full expression of your views, both as regards the city and Ayub's probable movements. Reply in cipher. Also give dates on which you calculate that the different units of the reinforcements can reach Kandahar.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 19th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 19th July. Advanced guard of Ayub appears to have reached Girishk. Nothing certain known about Ayub himself to-day.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, No. 384 K., dated 19th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 19th July. Your telegram, 18th. Taking into consideration that the Helmand is now fordable everywhere, it presents no obstacle to the advance of Ayub at any point he chooses to cross it. Khushk-i-Nakhud is an important position covering roads leading from the Helmand to Kandahar. Whilst remaining on the Helmand, forage and grain could hardly be obtained, whereas they are plentiful at Khushk-i-Nakhud. Between the latter place and Girishk there is a desert 25 miles broad. General Burrows at Khushk-i-Nakhud is within fair supportable distance from

Kandahar. The presence of a force there has the effect of keeping the people quiet. At present, I am unable to obtain any definite intelligence of Ayub's movements; an impression is abroad that he will not meet our troops in the open, but that if he crosses the river at all, he will do so to the north of Girishk, and perhaps make for Ghazni, for political reasons. As regards Kandahar great uneasiness prevails in the city; large numbers of the families are leaving daily, fearing the approach of Ayub. There are of course a number of disaffected men in and about Kandahar ready for a disturbance if they get a chance. I keep the city constantly patrolled, and have placed three 40-pounders of 5/11th in the citadel, which has had the effect of quieting the minds of those peaceably disposed.

Units of reinforcements will probably arrive here—

Detachment, 4th Native Infantry, on 24th.

Detachments, 28th Native Infantry, on 25th, 26th, and 27th.

Last detachment, 4th Native Infantry, on 28th.

9th and 24th Native Infantry are now in Bolan, and will be in position probably 24th and 30th July; 11th Foot come up Bolan in cart carriage, beginning by companies on 20th, and doing double stages to Dozan. One wing will be concentrated at Quetta on 1st August, leave Quetta 3rd, and reach Kandahar about 15th; two more companies will leave three days later, and last two form escorts to F/2nd, Royal Artillery. Information about Madras Cavalry not yet received from General Phayre. Will wire this to-morrow.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 21st July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 21st July. Precedence. Information from General Burrows, dated 19th. He has shifted his camp to a very eligible spot, three miles nearer Girishk. He reports 2,100 Ayub's cavalry have arrived at Girishk, he himself being at Mahmúdabad, 17 miles in rear, with his infantry and guns. It is reported that he intends to move either to the north of Girishk or the south by the Argasan Valley, but this is merely surmise. He has utilized the guns taken from the Wali by manning them from men of E/B and 66th Regiment. I am sending out to-night by forced marches 12 of the Wali's artillery horses, and harness, &c., to complete this battery as far as practicable, under an escort of 50 sabres, 3rd Sind Horse, whom I have directed to remain, as a temporary arrangement, with General Burrows, as he wished his cavalry increased.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 21st July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 21st July. General Burrows, under date 20th, writes:—Situation remains unchanged; travellers who have passed Ayub's camp say things are not going on smoothly there, and that in all probability there will be a split before they reach the Helmand. General Burrows ready for them. Troops healthy and in excellent spirits.

TELEGRAM from COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (Quartermaster-General), Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, No. 5109, dated 21st July 1880.

SIMLA, 21st July. You have not answered Chief's question relative to suitability of Burrows' position for striking a blow at Ayub. It is of the utmost importance that Ayub should not be allowed to slip past Kandahar towards Ghazni without being attacked. As your reinforcements arrive, to what extent can you strengthen General Burrows? What are that Officer's views and intentions, and what steps are taken by Intelligence Department to obtain information of Ayub's movements? The Argandab road should also be observed.

You must keep Chief more fully and early informed of situation, as reports of Ayub's and Burrows' moves are received by Foreign long before yours.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 21st July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 21st July. News just received from Colonel St. John and General Burrows, that Ayub, with his regulars, reached the Helmand 20th. He has sent back his carriage for baggage, left a day's march in rear. Tribal sowars and some ghazis have joined him. His intention stated to be to move *via* Sungboor and Mir Karez and attack General Burrows. At Sungboor there are 200 ghazis with two standards. Spy states Luinab, with cavalry, had moved down river, intending to skirt desert and attack.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 22nd July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 22nd July. Letter from General Burrows, dated evening of 21st; no further news.

TELEGRAM from COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (Quartermaster-General), Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, No. 5181, dated 22nd July 1880.

SIMLA, 22nd July. My telegram of yesterday, and yours of last night. You will understand that you have full liberty to attack Ayub, if you consider you are strong enough to do so. Government consider it of the greatest political importance that his force should be dispersed, and prevented by all possible means from passing on to Ghazni.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, No. 413 K., dated 23rd July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 23rd July. Your telegram. I am almost entirely dependent for intelligence on the Political Department. I have spies out, and obtained some information from sources in the town.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 23rd July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 23rd July. Report received from General Burrows, dated 22nd. No further news regarding Ayub. Our force at Khushk-i-Nakhud well entrenched and defended against any night attack. Supplies plentiful, except wood which is very scarce. A detachment, 4th Native Infantry, escorting ammunition, arrives here to-morrow, and 200 rifles, 28th Native Infantry, the day after.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 23rd July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 23rd July. Report just received from Colonel St. John. Spies state Ayub has crossed Helmand at Haidarabad. Party of his cavalry came yesterday to Sungboor and returned again. Small party of Ghazis collected there; stated they expected 5,000 horsemen to arrive to-day, and main body to-morrow. Few supplies at Sungboor, so Ayub cannot halt there more than one day. Report raises number of men who have joined Ayub to 4,000.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India, dated 24th July 1880, and received on the same date.

ON morning of 23rd our cavalry patrol, proceeding in the direction of Sungboor, came upon the enemy's advanced parties. Lieutenant Monteith, 3rd Sind Horse, who was in command, sent in word to camp, and, dismounting some of his men, checked

the enemy, who retired out of range. Brigadier-General Nuttall, with 180 sabres, 3rd Light Cavalry, and two guns, E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, now came up, and a reconnaissance reported 600 sowars, marching parallel with a body of infantry, three miles beyond our advanced post. General Nuttall advanced 160 sabres and two guns for about three miles, the enemy retiring. When he got within 1,800 yards of the cavalry our men opened on them, and they bolted faster than ever, making for cover. General Nuttall pursued until he was six miles from camp, when he gave up the chase. Some horses of the enemy were killed, and men carried off wounded. No infantry were seen.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, No. 422 K., dated 25th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 25th July. General Burrows reports, that in the event of enemy moving up north, he purposes sending back superfluous baggage and sick to Kandahar, and moving up Kakrez Valley, opening up fresh line of communication.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 25th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 25th July. Information received this evening that Ayub's cavalry fell back last night to Helmand. Report received to the effect that 150 cavalry crossed into the Argandab three days ago; believed to have been sent to take back Surteep's family hidden in village there. Efforts appear to be made by Habeeboolla Khan, Barakzai, to raise people in Kakrez, without much success. There is much excitement throughout the country.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, No. 430 K., dated 26th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 26th July. Your telegram, 21st July. General Burrows states that should the enemy advance direct on Maiwand or on Khushk-i-Nakhud, he is prepared to attack him; should he attempt to reach Maiwand *via* Melmand, he would intercept him by Garmao Valley; should Ayub's force try to avoid him by taking road to Nish *via* Melmand and Ghorak, he proposes to move by Maiwand into Kakrez. To do this he will reduce his baggage and send back some sick reported unfit, and I will assist him in every way to lighten his column and make it more moveable.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 27th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 27th July. General Burrows, under date evening 25th, reports situation unchanged. Two Sind horsemen shot when patrolling near Sungboor. At Kandahar I hear, on best authority, that Habeeboolla has been to Kakrez and has tried to raise the people without success. He was at Soznee on Sunday, and then proposed crossing into the Argandab. The second detachment, 11th Foot, left Sibi last night. Five men of first detachment, struck down by sunstroke at Nari, are all doing well. Headquarters 9th and two mountain guns left Quetta for Gulistan this morning.

TELEGRAM from General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, dated 28th July 1880.

KANDAHAR, 27th July. General Burrows' force completely defeated; we take refuge in citadel; thirty sowars have escaped.

Enclosure 4 in No. 35.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. PRIMROSE, C.S.I., commanding the Kandahar Force, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL IN INDIA. (Dated Kandahar, 6th September 1880.)

IN forwarding the accompanying despatches from Generals Burrows and Nuttall, relative to the action of Maiwand, I have the honour to submit the following observations for the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

2. On the 27th June the Political Resident reported to me that Ayub Khan had left Herat with infantry, cavalry, and 30 guns. He at the same time strongly urged that active support should be given to the Wali of Kandahar, then at Girishk. After considering the matter, I decided on recommending that a brigade of infantry, a cavalry regiment, and a battery of horse artillery should be sent to the Helmand.

To strengthen the garrison to be left here, the 4th Native Infantry were ordered to be concentrated at Quetta, and a wing of the 2nd Beluchis to march from Kelat-i-Ghilzai to Kandahar, with the concurrence of the Political Resident.

3. On the 1st July the orders of Government were received through the Quartermaster-General, sanctioning an advance on Girishk, but that the Helmand was on no account to be crossed. The Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison and line of communications were not to be weakened, and troops from the reserve were to be pushed forward at once, as the Commander-in-Chief considered the force proposed to be left at Kandahar weak in all arms.

4. On the 2nd July I received intelligence that Government intended Kandahar being reinforced by the 15th Foot, a battery of artillery, one Native cavalry and two Native infantry regiments.

5. I was fully aware that immense difficulties would present themselves in pushing forward these corps, and that it would take some time before they could reach me; but as Ayub's advance would, I considered, have a disturbing effect on Kandahar and the country, I thought it advisable that the force approved of by Government should move to Girishk in accordance with their orders.

6. Accordingly it marched on the 3rd July, and I was then left at Kandahar with the following garrison:—Squadron of Poona Horse, details of 3rd Light Cavalry, 3rd Sind Horse, four guns of C/2nd Royal Artillery, 5/11th Royal Artillery (Heavy Battery), 7th Fusileers, and a wing of the 19th Regiment Native Infantry,—*vide* return attached. This of course was a very weak garrison; but the 4th Native Infantry, followed by the 28th Native Infantry, were moving up along the line, and I trusted to this becoming known, as also that other troops were coming, to prevent anything disturbing the ordinary state of affairs here.

7. On the 13th July the head-quarters of the 4th Native Infantry arrived here, and between that date and the 28th July, the remainder of the regiment and the 28th Regiment Native Infantry joined at Kandahar.

8. It will thus be seen that I had no means of strengthening General Burrows except by sending him some details of the 1st Regiment, N.I., and 30th N.I., left behind or joined at Kandahar from escort or other duties, and by 50 sabres of the 3rd Sind Horse under Lieutenant Monteith, who took out horses, &c., to equip the smooth-bore battery which had been rescued from the Wali's troops. On the 23rd July, however, by which time the 4th N.I. were nearly complete, and some of the 28th had arrived, I arranged to send some 230 rank and file of the former regiment, with a convoy of commissariat stores, and that some 130 of these should remain with General Burrows, the others returning as escort to a convoy of his sick.

9. Before this could be carried out, General Burrows had moved from Khushk-i-Nakhud, and the battle of Maiwand was fought.

10. I had, however, in the meantime, kept General Burrows fully informed of the instructions received from the Commander-in-Chief, notably the Quartermaster-General's telegram dated 15th July, to the effect that he must act according to his own judgment, and also the one dated 21st July, saying that Ayub should not be allowed to slip past Kandahar towards Ghazni without being attacked.

11. Acting on this judgment, and on information which turned out to be inaccurate, he advanced from Khushk-i-Nakhud on Maiwand, and there found himself in contact with overwhelming numbers.

12. General Burrows' report attached enters into the details of the action.

13. The further details regarding the movements of General Burrows' force and intelligence will be submitted in a separate report to the Quartermaster-General.

RETURN referred to in para. 6 of the foregoing Despatch.

	Effective.			Sick.			Total.	Followers.	Horses.	Mules.	Bullocks.	Elephants.
	Europeans.		Natives.	Europeans.		Natives.						
	Officers.	Warrant, N.C. Officers and Men.	Warrant, N.C. Officers.	Officers.	Warrant, N.C. Officers and Men.	Warrant, N.C. Officers and Men.						
Head-quarters Staff	5	—	—	—	—	—	5	22	12	—	—	—
1st Brigade Staff	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	2	1	—	—	—
2nd Brigade Staff	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	7	5	—	—	—
R.E. Staff	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	6	4	—	—	—
R.A. Staff	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	8	—	—	—	—
Medical Staff	6	10	—	2	1	—	19	90	6	1	5	—
Political Department	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	2	—	—	—
Ecclesiastical Department	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
Commissariat Department	8	11	—	—	—	—	19	1,887	19	2	84	—
Ordnance Department	1	6	31	—	1	3	42	22	—	—	—	—
Transport Department	5	3	38	—	—	—	46	450	21	—	105	—
E/B, R.H.A.	—	10	1	—	9	1	21	38	12	—	3	—
C/2nd, R.A.	5	109	10	—	25	2	151	224	90	—	20	—
5/11th, R.A.	3	87	—	—	3	—	93	283	11	—	374	—
Poona Horse	5	—	190	—	—	17	212	231	209	—	—	—
3rd Sind Horse	1	—	178	—	—	—	179	212	232	—	—	—
3rd Light Cavalry	1	—	83	—	—	26	110	111	113	—	—	—
No. 2 Company, Sappers and Miners.	—	3	30	—	1	5	39	12	—	—	—	—
2/7th Foot*	18	588	—	6	73	—	685	264	10	—	16	—
66th Foot†	—	—	—	1	90	—	91	3	—	—	—	—
1st Regiment N.I.	—	—	91	—	—	16	107	1	—	—	—	—
4th " " "	—	—	6	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—
19th‡	6	—	524	—	—	51	581	138	6	—	6	—
29th " " "	—	—	2	—	—	6	8	—	—	—	—	—
30th " " "	—	—	28	—	—	12	40	3	—	—	—	—
Total	71	827	1,272	11	203	139	2,463	4,016	753	3	613	—

* Includes men attached from the Bengal Army.

† 66th Regiment. Includes clerks and a few men employed departmentally.

‡ 19th Regiment N.I. Includes men attached from the Bengal Army.

(Signed) F. J. S. ADAM, Major,
Assistant Quartermaster-General, Kandahar Force.

Enclosure 5 in No. 35.

From Brigadier-General G. R. S. BURROWS to the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Kandahar Force. (Dated Kandahar, 30th August 1880.)

I have the honour to report that, on the 26th ultimo, whilst encamped at Khushk-i-Nakhud, I received information that 2,000 of the enemy's cavalry and a large number of ghazis had arrived at Garmao and Maiwand, and that it was Ayub Khan's intention to follow with the main body of his army immediately.

2. A sketch is attached to this report, showing the positions of Maiwand and Khushk-i-Nakhud, from which it will be

* *Vide* correspondence from the Assistant Quartermaster-General, Kandahar Force, attached.

Ayub Khan from passing on to Ghazni, it was incumbent on me to intercept him either at Maiwand or Khushk-i-Nakhud.

3. Hitherto I had found it impossible to obtain any reliable information regarding Ayub Khan's intended movements, for although, when the expedition set out, it was understood that we were to operate in a friendly country, and in concert with a loyal army, the actual circumstances were the reverse of this. The Wali's army had gone over to the enemy; the Wali himself was a refugee in my camp. *Whatever little*

political influence there may previously have been in the country was at an end, and every man's hand was against us.

4. In the absence of intelligence beyond such as my cavalry patrols brought in, and from which I knew that the enemy's advanced post was at Sungboor, twelve miles in my front, on the Khushk-i-Nakhud road, I considered it advisable to await events in the position I had taken up at the latter place.

5. On learning, however, that the enemy was making for Maiwand, I determined to move on that place at once.

6. The force, strength as per margin, marched at 6.30 a.m. on the 27th July, encumbered by an enormous quantity of ordnance and commissariat stores and baggage. This was unavoidable, as the hostile state of the country rendered it impossible to leave anything behind in safety, and I could not divide my already too weak force.

E/B, Royal Horse Artillery,—	
Officers	5
Non-commissioned Officers, rank and file	141
Horses	191
Six 9-pdr. M.L.R. guns.	
Smooth-bore Battery of,—	
6-pdrs. taken from the Wali's mutinous army, and manned by 1 Officer and 42 men, 66th Foot.	
66th Foot,—	
Officers	19
Non-commissioned Officers, rank and file	497
3rd Light Cavalry,—	
Officers	6
Native Officers	13
Non-commissioned Officers, rank and file	297
Horses	306
3rd Sind Horse,—	
Officers	5
Native Officers	8
Non-commissioned Officers, rank and file	247
Horses	252
Sappers and Miners,—	
Officer	1
European Non-commissioned Officers	2
Native Officer	1
Non-commissioned Officers, rank and file	41
1st Native Infantry (Grenadiers),—	
Officers	7
Native Officers	15
Non-commissioned Officers, rank and file	626
30th N. I. (Jacob's rifles),—	
Officers	8
Native Officers	14
Non-commissioned Officers, rank and file	603
Of these numbers, 34 Europeans and 50 Natives were in hospital.	

7. After proceeding about eight miles, large masses of troops were discovered, about four miles distant, moving in a diagonal direction across our right front, and it was evident that a collision with Ayub Khan's army must take place before we reached our destination.

8. Advancing on a village which lay about a mile in my front, I placed my baggage there, and on the higher ground beyond I deployed my infantry into line with guns in the centre, and the cavalry on the left, covering the movement with two horse artillery guns and a troop of cavalry.

9. It was difficult, on account of the haze and dust, to estimate the number of the enemy, but, judging by the extent of country covered, I believe I am within the mark when I set down his strength at 25,000 men.

10. At 11.45 a.m., the fight commenced by the advanced guns under Lieutenant H. Maclaine coming into action on our left, followed by two horse artillery guns and the smooth-bore battery in our centre. The remaining two 9-pounders were also brought up from the rear guard.

11. In about half an hour, the enemy began to reply from their right, gradually extending along their front, and concentrating the fire of thirty guns on our position.

12. The infantry were ordered to lie down, and the wing of Jacob's Rifles, which had been in reserve, was brought up on the flanks, which were threatened on the right by ghazis, and on the left by the enemy's regular cavalry.

13. In this position we remained for nearly three hours, our artillery making excellent practice, the cavalry holding the enemy's cavalry in check, and the infantry keeping up a steady fire on the ghazis on our right.

14. A large body of the enemy's regular infantry were on our left front, and about the middle of the day they advanced in line, but well delivered volleys checked them, and they did not come on again.

15. Between 2 and 3 o'clock, the fire of the enemy's guns slackened, and swarms of ghazis advanced rapidly towards our centre.

16. Up to this time, the casualties amongst the infantry had not been heavy, and as the men were firing steadily and the guns were sweeping the ground with case shot, I felt confident as to the result.

17. But our fire failed to check the ghazis; they came on in overwhelming numbers and making good their rush, they seized the two most advanced horse artillery guns.

18. With the exception of two companies of Jacob's Rifles, which had caused me great anxiety by their unsteadiness early in the day, the conduct of the troops had been splendid up to this point; but now, at the critical moment, when a firm resistance might have achieved a victory, the infantry gave way, and commencing from the left, rolled up, like a wave, to the right. After vainly endeavouring to rally them, I went for the cavalry. (I was obliged to go myself, having no Staff Officer left).

19. The 3rd Light Cavalry and the 3rd Sind Horse were retiring slowly on our left, and I called upon them to charge across the front and so give the infantry an opportunity of reforming; but the terrible artillery fire to which they had been exposed, and from which they had suffered so severely, had so shaken them that General Nuttall was unable to give effect to my order.

20. All was now over, and I returned to the infantry to do what might be done to save them from complete annihilation.

21. After retreating across the nullah, and through the gardens near the village, a small walled enclosure was reached, and in this about 150 men of different corps, with several Officers, made a stand and checked the enemy for a time; but, seeing that we were rapidly being outflanked, and that our line of retreat would presently be cut off, I gave the order to retire.

22. A wide open plain lay before us, and, with discipline utterly gone and the men all scattered, the prospect was discouraging; but we succeeded in making our way without much loss for a distance of three miles, when we joined the guns and cavalry in rear of the baggage, which was by this time stretching for miles over the country towards Kandahar.

23. Small parties of the enemy continued to hover in our rear, but no vigorous pursuit was made.

24. After daylight, we were fired on from every village we passed, until we reached Kokeran, when we met a small force under General Brooke, which cleared the way for us into Kandahar.

25. Of the four horse artillery 9-pounder guns and six smooth-bore guns with which we left the field, the whole of the former and one of the latter were brought safely into Kandahar; the five other smooth-bore guns had, one by one, to be abandoned during the retreat, the horses being unable to bring them on.

26. Of the conduct of the troops, generally, I have already spoken, but I wish to bring the artillery to special notice; their behaviour was admirable; exposed to a heavy fire, they served their guns coolly and steadily as on parade, and when the guns were rushed, they fought the ghazis with hand-spikes, sponge-rods, &c.

27. In explanation of the unfortunate loss of the two horse artillery guns, the Officer commanding the battery has reported that Lieutenant Maclaine, who was in charge of them, waited to fire another round of case after the order to limber up and retire had been given, and the delay was fatal.

28. The detachment of the 66th Regiment, under Lieutenant G. De la M. Faunce, which manned the smooth-bore battery, also behaved extremely well.

29. On Major Blackwood being wounded during the action, Captain J. R. Slade, R.H.A., took command of E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.

30. I beg to bring the conduct of this Officer to very special notice. Captain Slade was not only conspicuous for his gallantry during the day, but throughout the long and trying retreat of forty miles, he worked with unflagging energy, encouraging his men and tending the wounded Officers and men who crowded his guns.

31. I was indebted to Major E. P. Leach, V.C., R.E., for valuable assistance during the retreat.

32. The casualty returns have already been forwarded to you.

Documents referred to in paragraph 2 of the foregoing Despatch.

Memo. from Major F. J. S. ADAM, Assistant Quartermaster-General, Kandahar Force, to Brigadier-General G. R. S. BURROWS, commanding the Girishk Column. (No. 473 K., dated 22nd July 1880.)

The following telegram, received from the Quartermaster-General in India, is forwarded to Brigadier-General Burrows, commanding the Girishk Column, for information and guidance. It is requested that a copy may be furnished to the Political Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

From QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar. (Dated Simla, 22nd July 1880.)

Simla, 22nd. My telegram of yesterday and yours of last night. You will understand that you have full liberty to attack Ayub if you consider you are strong enough to do so. Government considers it of the greatest political importance that his force should be dispersed, and prevented, by all possible means, from passing on to Ghazni.

From Major F. J. S. ADAM, Assistant Quartermaster-General, Kandahar Force, to Brigadier-General G. S. R. BURROWS, commanding the Girishk Column, (No. 470 K., dated 22nd July 1880.)

I HAVE the honour, by direction of the Lieutenant-General commanding, to forward you a copy of a telegram received last night from the Commander-in-Chief in India:—

TELEGRAM from the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar. Dated Simla, 21st July 1880.

“Simla, 21st July. You have not answered Chief’s question relative to suitability of Burrows’ position for striking a blow at Ayub. It is of the utmost importance that Ayub should not be allowed to slip past Kandahar towards Ghazni without being attacked. As your reinforcements arrive, to what extent can you strengthen General Burrows? What are that Officer’s views and intentions, and what steps are taken by Intelligence Department to obtain information of Ayub’s movements? The Argandab road should also be observed. You must keep Chief more fully and early informed of situation, as reports of Ayub’s and Burrows’ moves are received by Foreign long before yours.”

2. General Primrose desires you will at once report what plans you have resolved on in the event of Ayub’s main body crossing the Helmand at Girishk, and what you would propose in the event of his moving north and covering himself in your direction with cavalry. He would also much like to know if you are solely dependant for information on what is supplied you by the Political Resident, and if any steps have been taken by you to send out spies in the direction of Girishk, Maiwand, and south towards Killa-i-Biet and the desert.

3. General Primrose desires me also to thank you for the letter received last night relative to an attack which it was reported would be made on the camp by Ayub’s cavalry, but as this may not have taken place, he would be obliged by your furnishing, as soon as possible, the information called for by the Commander-in-Chief.

Enclosure 6 in No. 35.

From Brigadier-General T. NUTTALL, commanding the Cavalry Brigade, to the Brigade-Major, 1st Brigade, Kandahar Field Force. (Dated Kandahar, 3rd August 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to report the operations of the Cavalry brigade under my command in the action fought in the vicinity of Maiwand on the 27th July 1880.

2. On the morning of that day, agreeably to orders, by 5.30 the camp was struck, baggage packed, and the brigade, strength as per margin, mounted at 6 o’clock and marched from Khushk-i-Nakhud on Maiwand about 6.30. My dispositions were as follows. The advanced guard was

E/B., R.H.A., 6 guns.
3rd Light Cavalry, 260 sabres.
3rd Sind Horse, 200 sabres.

composed of a troop under the command of Lieutenant T. P. Geoghegan, 3rd Light Cavalry; in rear of the advanced guard, at about half a mile interval, followed the remainder of the 3rd Light Cavalry, with four guns of E/B, R.H.A.; the rear guard was brought up by Colonel Malcolmson, C.B., which consisted of 96 sabres, 3rd Sind Horse, which regiment also provided parties of a troop to the left flank under Lieutenant A. M. Monteith, with another party of 50 sabres, under Lieutenant E. D. N. Smith, to the right, to protect the baggage, which marched on this flank.

3. About 10 a.m., the enemy's cavalry were seen on our left front at some distance, crossing our front, and moving in the Maiwand direction, and on the nearer approach of our columns, the greater portion of them inclined in a northerly direction towards the Gurmao Valley, their advanced parties standing fast to watch our movements.

A village stood on our left front, and Lieutenant Geoghegan, with two guns, E/B, under Major Blackwood, were directed to clear it if occupied.

It being found unoccupied, Lieutenant Geoghegan was directed to stand fast in front of the village, and there await the arrival of the baggage, which was ordered to be collected there. In the meantime the two guns of E/B, R. H. A., under Major Blackwood, moved on to the edge of a rather difficult broad nullah, that ran in front of the village. It was at this place that both Major Blackwood and myself halted to reconnoitre the enemy's position, when we noticed that Lieutenant MacLaine, who had been left with the other two guns, had crossed the nullah some little way to our left, and, having been joined by Lieutenant Monteith with a troop of the 3rd Sind Horse, was advancing rapidly towards the enemy.

Mounted orderlies were despatched to recall him, but before they reached he had halted and had come into action. On noting Lieutenant MacLaine's unauthorized movement, I at once, with Major Blackwood's two guns, crossed the nullah, and with the remainder of the 3rd Cavalry moved rapidly to the front. In the meantime, orders were sent to bring up the two guns of E/B, R. H. A., then detached with the rear guard. After advancing some little distance the enemy's position and forces were distinctly seen drawn up towards Gurmao, covering some miles. Their cavalry, infantry, and the ghazis appeared in countless numbers, and Major Blackwood at once brought his guns into action. As I considered Lieutenant MacLaine's guns were still rather isolated, I sent orders for him to move down and take up another position nearer the main body.

The guns now advanced two or three times, when they halted and awaited the advance of the Infantry brigade and the battery of smooth-bore guns. It was observed that large bodies of foot-men and mounted men were making towards us from the Maiwand direction, and on the guns opening on them, large numbers of foot-men streamed away along our right flank. The position now of the Cavalry brigade was as follows:—two guns, R.H.A., on the right, supported by 130 sabres of the 3rd Light Cavalry, under Major A. P. Currie, who, with Captain M. Mayne, also watched the right flank, and two guns E/B, R.H.A., under Lieutenant MacLaine, on the extreme left, supported by a troop, 3rd Sind Horse; and in rear, echelloned outside the guns, but with left thrown back, was a troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry under Lieutenant J. H. E. Reid, formed thus to watch a large body of the enemy's cavalry, who had formed with the evident intention of turning our left flank.

A number of cavalry, regular and irregular, were now seen moving along on our left flank towards the baggage and the rear, with which were Colonel Malcolmson, C.B., and Lieutenant Geoghegan, the former with 96 sabres, 3rd Sind Horse, and the latter with 50 sabres, 3rd Light Cavalry. Their cavalry had now completely enveloped our flank, and were threatening the rear. Fifty sabres of the Sind Horse, under Lieutenant Smith, who had originally been detached as right flanking party, joined and were now placed to watch the left flank.

Our guns opened fire about 10.50, and for half an hour no reply was made by the artillery of the enemy. However, about 11.15, the enemy replied and opened from their batteries with a well directed fire. It will be observed that the necessities of the situation precluded my forming any reserve cavalry which could be kept out of range of the artillery, the whole available force amounting to 460 sabres, and these were fully occupied as above detailed. The configuration of the ground about was a level plain, which rendered it quite impossible to get any cover either for the guns and cavalry, which were exposed thus for three hours to a raking, well directed and concentrated fire from five batteries.

4. Firing in the direction of the rear now told that our rear was engaged. The action had proceeded some little time, when more masses of cavalry appeared on our

left flank, and to meet this movement, I placed all the cavalry that could be spared on the left flank. As the enemy, however, did not appear anxious to close with us, at my request General Burrows sent two smooth-bore guns, under Captain Slade, to this flank, who opened a well-directed fire on the masses assembled. After this the two guns under Captain Slade were moved to their former position in the front. Several demonstrations were now made from this flank by my cavalry against the enemy's cavalry, who kept firing at long ranges at us, but they only retired firing. Our men were, however, ordered every now and then to fire dismounted.

It was about this time (12.30) that the enemy succeeded in establishing a battery towards our right flank. During all this time, and till about 2 o'clock, our cavalry were losing heavily in horses and men, although I did all I could, by changing position and moving them, opening out, &c., to lessen the effect of the artillery fire.

5. Nothing could have been steadier or finer than the conduct of all ranks of the cavalry during the very severe and trying artillery cannonade to which they were exposed for about three hours, playing a passive part as escorts to the guns, and protecting the flanks from the enemy's cavalry, which literally swarmed round our left flank.

The guns of the E/B, R.H.A., under their officers, and those of the smooth-bore battery under Captain Slade, were most admirably and steadily served, and nothing could equal, and certainly never excel, the gallant, cool and collected bearing of Officers and men during the action.

6. At about 2.20 o'clock, it was evident that the immense superiority of the enemy in numbers had began to tell with effect, for not only had the enemy swarmed round us on the left flank, and the artillery were plying us with a well-directed and destructive fire, not only from the front but from a flank, but the ghazis, who had led the van of the enemy's attack from the first, were advancing in overwhelming numbers in spite of our artillery and infantry fire, and were supported by a long line of infantry a short distance behind, and threatened to outflank the infantry. Captain Slade had

* To bring up more ammunition. withdrawn some of the guns and had moved to G.B. the rear.* About 2.30, I now perceived the infantry were in a confused state, falling back, and as their fire was slackening, I ordered the cavalry to form line, and by a charge stem the rush of ghazis on the infantry; but I bitterly regret to have to record that, although I was most ably seconded by the Officers, only portions of the 3rd Light Cavalry and 3rd Sind Horse formed up, and we charged, but the men bearing away to the right and rear, the charge was not delivered home, and was of but little effect.

All subsequent attempts made at this time by myself and the Officers to induce the men to rally and face the enemy failed.

The men seemed totally demoralized by the combined effects of the very heavy artillery fire which had, during the action, killed and wounded 149 of the horses, and about 14 per cent. of the men engaged in the front, the retreating infantry and the swarms of *ghazis* that*

There was now nothing left but to fall back on the rear guard, which had advanced a short way towards us, but it was not till we reached the four guns, Royal Horse Artillery, brought out of action by Captain Slade, that the men, through the exertions of the Officers, Staff, and myself, were formed up facing the enemy. Here I halted, but could see no sign of any formed body of infantry retiring; but a long stream of scattered infantry could be seen stretching away for about two miles on our right as

No cavalry came near me. I was in the rear of the retreating infantry with three or four other Officers. we stood facing the enemy. I, however, sent my Orderly Officer, Lieutenant Monteith, to see if he could rally any stragglers, or see any Officers, but

G. B. after some little time, he returned with the report that the men he had met were quite disorganized and out of hand, and were making to the rear.

In the meantime, it was reported that General Burrows was amongst the slain.

I was determined, if possible, to save the guns, &c.

7. The enemy's guns had now got the range again, and commenced playing on us.

I saw no cavalry between myself and the column of baggage. There may have been a few irregular horsemen. Captain Slade, with his guns, now retired, and I covered the retreat with the cavalry, Captain Slade two or three times coming into action, and firing one or a couple of rounds. A large number

G. B.

* Sic in original.

of cavalry were to be seen on our left flank, about a mile off, making evidently for our rear.

8. After proceeding some distance the enemy's guns ceased playing on us, and I then threw out a troop of the Sind Horse to cover the retreat, which was well and ably conducted by Lieutenant Monteith.

9. After proceeding some little way, information was brought that the rearguard was hard pressed; and leaving a troop with the guns, I returned with the 3rd Light Cavalry and 3rd Sind Horse to reinforce Lieutenant Monteith, but found all was going on well. After we had placed some tired-out and wounded men on camels and horses, we retired, agreeably to instructions, on Ata Karez, which was the nearest place where water was obtainable on the road.

10. I joined General Burrows with the rearguard about 2 o'clock in the morning at Hauz-i-Madat. After a halt of half an hour there, General Burrows gave the order to advance. I threw out a troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry as a rear guard, which was well commanded by Lieutenant Geoghegan. After daylight we had to fight our way to Kokeran, where a small brigade under General Brooke, which had been sent to our aid, met us.

11. It is now my painful duty to record the death of the Officers of the Cavalry Brigade who lost their lives during the action. Major Blackwood, commanding E/B., R. H. A., was wounded early in the action, returned to his duty after his wound had been dressed, and resumed command of the battery till he was again wounded, and subsequently killed. Lieutenant Osborne remained with his guns to the last moment, and was then cut down.

Lieutenant MacLaine was slightly wounded during the action, and lost his life subsequently during the retreat. In the 3rd Cavalry I regret to record the death of Lieutenant W. C. Owen, who was killed when charging the enemy.

12. I have now the great satisfaction of bringing to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the names of the following Officers who did special good service on this day:—

Captain J. R. Slade, who commanded the E/B Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, whilst Major Blackwood was having his wounds dressed.

Major G. C. Hogg, my Brigade Major, and Lieutenant J. Monteith, 2nd Sind Horse, my Orderly Officer, rendered me most effective and efficient service.

The list of killed and wounded in my brigade has been submitted direct to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Kandahar Field Force.

P.S.—I had one Orderly, 3rd Cavalry, shot dead, and another Orderly, Sind Horse, had his horse shot down during the action.

LIST OF CASUALTIES:

3rd Light Cavalry :—

	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
European Officers	1	2	3
Rank and file	26	18	44
Horses	58	42	100

3rd Sind Horse :—

European Officers	0		
Rank and file	14	5	19
Horses	40	9	49

(Signed) T. NUTTALL, Brigadier-General,
Commanding Cavalry Brigade.

Enclosure 7 in No. 35.

RETURN showing the Number of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Men, Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the action at Mainwand, on the 27th July 1880.

Corps.	Europeans.									Horses.									Followers.		Horses.	
	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Total.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Total.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Total.	Native Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Total.	Native Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Total.	Native Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Total.				
Staff	1	—	1	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ordnance Department . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—
Commissariat Department .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	19	—	—	—
No. 2 Field Hospital . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	—	—
E/B, Royal Horse Artillery	2	12	14	1	12	13	1*	6	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	107	—	100	9
No 2 Company Sappers and Miners.	1	2	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	15	1	6	7	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—
3rd Sind Horse.	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	14	14	—	5	5	—	—	—	—	24	3	39	17
3rd Light Cavalry . . .	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	26	26	—	18	18	—	—	—	—	46	1	58	42
66th Foot	10	276†	286	2	30	32	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	43	—	—	—
1st Grenadiers Native Infantry.	2	—	2	2	—	2	—	—	—	8	356	364	4	55	59	—	—	—	48	3	4	—
30th Regiment Native Infantry.	3	—	3	1	—	1	—	—	—	3	232	235	4	25	29	—	—	—	20	—	—	—
	20	290	310	8	42	50	1	6	7	11	643	654	9	109	118	—	—	—	331	7	201	63

* Prisoner in Ayub's Camp.

† Includes one Corporal, 59th Regiment.

(Signed) C. J. BURNETT, Major,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Kandahar Force.
J. M. PRIMROSE, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding Kandahar Force.

Kandahar, 3rd August 1880.

No. 36.

No. 219 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 12th October 1880.

OUR Despatches of the 3rd and 17th August, and of the 7th September, will have made known to your Lordship the general outline of the events connected with Sirdar Ayub Khan's invasion of the province of Kandahar; but we propose now to enter into somewhat fuller detail with regard to these transactions, from the time when authentic news of Ayub Khan's actual advance towards Kandahar first reached us down to the defeat and dispersion of his army by the forces under Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts. It will be in your Lordship's recollection that, on the 18th June, we were informed that no attempt at an advance from Herat, beyond the pitching of the standards outside the gate, an event which had occurred often before, had been made by Ayub Khan, and that it seemed probable that nothing would be done by him. But on the 22nd we received intelligence that the Wali of Kandahar had heard from Herat that an attack was really contemplated, and that 2,000 horsemen were about to be despatched under the command of the Luinab to Zamindawar; and in sending this report Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, our Resident at Kandahar, stated that, under these circumstances, he recommended the advance of a brigade to Maiwand. Immediately upon the receipt of this information, a telegram was despatched to Mr. Thompson, Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran, to ask what news he could furnish of the military movements and state of affairs at Herat, it having been found that the most accurate intelligence of what was going on in that quarter was generally obtained from the Agent at Meshed. On the 26th a reply was received

from Mr. Thomson, confirming the rumour of Ayub Khan's advance against Kandahar, and giving an account of the strength and composition of his army, which was communicated on the same day to Colonel St. John. On the 27th, General Primrose telegraphed to the Quartermaster-General, to say that he had arranged, pending orders from the Commander-in-Chief, that a brigade, with a battery of Horse Artillery, and a regiment of Native Cavalry, should move on Girishk, and that he was of opinion that active support to the Wali, who was then at Girishk, would be more efficacious than if the whole force remained at Kandahar. No time was lost after Mr. Thomson's telegram reached us in considering what measures it would be advisable to take. The advance of a hostile army upon Kandahar threatened our military position in Southern Afghanistan, and it would have been impossible, in our judgment, to have remained quietly in our cantonments while Ayub Khan advanced across the Helmund, occupying the territory of our ally, and gathering strength at every step, in consequence of our apparent supineness. As he approached Kandahar the disaffected portion of the population would have joined him from every side, and if the authority of the Wali had been then overthrown, he might fairly have attributed it to our refusal to give him the support for which he asked. As we have already informed your Lordship in our letter of the 17th August, those best qualified to advise upon the situation recommended that Ayub Khan's advance should be met by a demonstration towards the Helmund, and, under these circumstances, we came unanimously to the conclusion, that, if the intelligence of the march of the Herat army should be confirmed, a British force ought to advance to the Helmund, and that reinforcements should be sent forward to Kandahar as soon as possible. But though we were ourselves convinced of the advisability of the measures above described, we felt it our duty to obtain your Lordship's sanction to them before any orders upon the subject were issued by us; and, in order to be prepared to act at once, if the necessity should arise, a telegram, informing your of our proposed action, was despatched by the Viceroy on the evening of the 27th June, and your approval was received by us on the 1st July.

2. On the 30th June we were informed by Colonel St. John that the Luinab was supposed to have reached Farah, and, therefore, as soon as your Lordship's message of the 1st July reached us, the proposals contained in General Primrose's telegram of the 27th were at once sanctioned by us, and orders were simultaneously issued to move up reinforcements from the rear to the extent of a brigade, consisting of a British Infantry and two Native Infantry regiments, with a battery of Artillery and a regiment of Native Cavalry. General Primrose had suggested that the garrison at Kandahar should be strengthened by moving up one regiment of Native Infantry from Quetta, to be replaced on the line of communication by another from the reserve division in Sind, and by bringing a wing of the 2nd Biluchis from Kelat-i-Ghilzai; but Sir F. Haines considered that these proposals would not sufficiently meet the occasion, and his views being fully approved, the larger force detailed above was at once ordered to commence its march to Kandahar. It is due to the Commander-in-Chief to place on record that, in the latter end of May, His Excellency considering that Kandahar was weakly held, recommended that the Bombay Reserve Division should be mobilized as soon as possible after it should be known for a certainty that Ayub Khan contemplated a move on Kandahar; and although, as your Lordship will have learnt from the 5th and 6th paragraphs of our letter of the 17th of August, it was not until the receipt of Mr. Thomson's telegram of the 25th of June that we were in possession of certain intelligence of the Sirdar's movements, the Military Department had already, in consequence of the Commander-in-Chief's suggestion, been in communication with the Bombay Government, by whom the arrangements for the transport of the Reserve Division were made, with a view to be prepared for immediate action, if the necessity should arise.

3. In issuing instructions to General Primrose with reference to the advance of a brigade to the Helmund, we deemed it advisable to direct that the troops should not cross that river. Both military and political reasons led us to desire to confine our operations to the Kandahar side of the Helmund. General Burrows, when he arrived at the destination thus assigned to him, was already at a considerable distance from his supports, and, if he had been allowed at the outset to enlarge the sphere of his operations, any indiscretion on the part of the Wali, who was commanding his own forces, might have drawn him on still further from his base, and diverted him from the principal object of his movement, which was to secure our position at Kandahar. We were also anxious on political grounds not to interfere directly in Zamindawar,

where the Wali's authority was not fully recognized, and where the presence of our troops might have involved us in very undesirable complications.

4. General Burrows reached the Helmund on the 11th July. On the 15th we received intimation that the Wali's infantry were not to be trusted, and that the General had consequently decided to cross the river and disarm them without waiting for orders. The Commander-in-Chief, therefore, immediately telegraphed to General Primrose that, in the altered situation of affairs, General Burrows must act according to his own discretion, reporting fully and observing caution, on account of his distance from his supports. Full discretion was thus given upon all points to the General Officer upon the spot, who had already very properly understood the restriction of his operations to the left bank of the Helmund contained in our original instructions as not precluding him from crossing the river when the Wali's troops had broken out into mutiny; and that restriction, having been removed altogether on the 15th July, exercised no influence whatever upon subsequent events. In the meanwhile General Burrows, having crossed the Helmund, had defeated the mutineers, and recovered the Wali's guns, and on the evening of the 15th he determined to fall back to Khushk-i-Nakhud with a view to greater facility of supply and easier communication with Kandahar. He reached that position on the 17th, and two days afterwards he shifted his camp three miles nearer to Girishk for the purpose of occupying what he considered to be a better military position. General Primrose, in answer to direct questions from the Commander-in-Chief, described the position of Khushk-i-Nakhud as an important one covering the roads leading from the Helmund to Kandahar, and as within fair supportable distance of that city.

5. Whilst these movements were going on, the reinforcements were being pushed up to Kandahar as rapidly as possible, in spite of the delays occasioned by the railway between Jacobabad and Sibi having been broken by floods on several occasions. The first detachment, consisting of the Head Quarters and 270 of the 4th Bombay Native Infantry, reached General Primrose on the 13th July, and others followed in as quick succession as was practicable up to the time when communications with Kandahar were interrupted in consequence of General Burrows' defeat. We consider that much praise is due to General Phayre and Sir R. Sandeman for their exertions in despatching these reinforcements under circumstances of considerable difficulty, owing to the frequent interruption of the railway communications, and to other causes.

6. After General Burrows' retirement from the Helmund, the advance of Ayub Khan's army was slow, and rumours were rife of dissensions in his camp. On the 19th, General Primrose reported that the impression abroad was that Ayub would not meet our troops in the open, but that if he crossed the Helmund at all he would do so to the north of Girishk, and perhaps make for Ghazni for political reasons; and on 21st, he informed the Quartermaster-General that General Burrows was ready for them (the enemy), and that his troops were healthy and in excellent spirits. As we have already pointed out to your Lordship, in our letter of the 17th August, the effect upon our military reputation, and upon the political situation generally in Afghanistan, if Ayub Khan had moved without interruption straight upon Ghazni, would have been very damaging, and the political reasons for desiring to prevent him from doing so are so obvious that we need not enter upon them in detail. But, at the same time, it was clear that political considerations of a general kind must be subordinated under the circumstances to the requirements of the military situation on the spot, and the Commander-in-Chief, therefore, while drawing General Primrose's attention, in his telegram of the 22nd July, to the importance of preventing Ayub Khan from slipping past our forces and passing on to Ghazni, was careful to avoid giving any positive orders to that Officer, and in intimating to him that he was at full liberty to attack the enemy, His Excellency made his doing so strictly dependent upon his being satisfied that he was strong enough for the purpose. In thus subordinating political to military considerations, His Excellency acted in entire accordance with the views of the Government of India.

7. On the 25th, the Quartermaster-General was informed by General Primrose that, in the event of the enemy moving up to the north, General Burrows proposed to send back his superfluous baggage and sick to Kandahar, and to move up the Kakrez Valley, opening up a fresh line of communication. It is much to be regretted that this intention to send the baggage and sick to the rear was not carried into effect. On the 27th July, General Burrows left Khushk-i-Nakhud, and having unexpectedly, as it appears, encountered Ayub Khan's whole army in the neighbourhood of Maiwand,

he sustained the defeat with respect to which we have addressed your Lordship in the Military Department.

8. Immediately upon the receipt of the news of the loss of the battle of Maiwand, General Primrose abandoned the cantonments at Kandahar and retired into the city, having first despatched a telegram to the Quartermaster-General, which was received on the 28th July. After that date communication with Kandahar became very difficult, and up to the 23rd August neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the Government of India received any intelligence from General Primrose, except that which was conveyed in two letters addressed by him to General Phayre on the 11th and 21st August respectively, and forwarded to the military authorities here; and it was not until the 6th September that any reports were sent in giving an account of the battle of Maiwand, or of the events which followed it. We were aware that your Lordship was most naturally anxious for information with respect to these occurrences, and that you especially desired to be furnished with the names of the Non-commissioned Officers and privates who had fallen at Maiwand and during the investment of Kandahar, but it was out of our power to relieve your anxiety or that of the public upon these points until the middle of September, when the reports above mentioned reached the Commander-in-Chief. The garrison of Kandahar during the investment consisted of a total force of 5,068 men of all ranks. We have addressed your Lordship in the Military Department on the subject of the sortie of the 16th August, and we need not now allude to it further.

9. As soon as the news of the loss of the battle of Maiwand reached us, we lost no time in making every preparation in our power to relieve Kandahar. Orders were issued immediately for the despatch of large additional reinforcements from India by the Sibi Railway and the Bolan and Khojak Passes; but, as we were aware that a considerable time must elapse before a sufficient force could be collected under General Phayre's command to enable him to advance with safety through a hostile country, we also determined to order the despatch of a powerful division from Kabul to Kandahar, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts. This division was able to move out of Kabul on the 8th August, and to commence its march on the following day. The circumstances of the country through which it had to pass were at the time peculiarly favourable for such an expedition; the harvest had only recently been got in, so that supplies were likely to be plentiful, and the Indian corn, which would afford both grain and forage for the animals, was still upon the ground; while the information received from our Political Officers at Kabul before Sir F. Roberts commenced his march gave us good reason to hope that, at all events as far as Ghazni, he would meet with no opposition. This hope was more than realized, and on the 23rd August General Roberts reached Kelat-i-Ghilzai totally unopposed, and found there fresh supplies, which had already been laid in, in anticipation of his arrival, by the foresight and energy of Colonel Tanner, who was in command of the garrison of that place. On the following day Ayub Khan broke up the investment of Kandahar, and retired to the Arghandab valley. General Roberts arrived at Kandahar on the 31st, and on the 1st September he attacked and completely defeated the enemy, capturing his guns and dispersing his army. We have already, in our letter of the 7th September, conveyed to your Lordship our high appreciation of the great services which have been rendered on this occasion to their Sovereign and to their country by Sir F. Roberts and the troops under his command.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) RIPON.
 „ F. P. HAINES.
 „ JOHN STRACHEY.
 „ WHITLEY STOKES.
 „ JAMES GIBBS.
 „ D. M. STEWART.
 „ C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 36.

TELEGRAM, dated 17th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

From Herat there is no news of importance. The son of Khan Agha, Jamshidi, is said to have come to Herat with 500 horsemen, but all other attempts at raising

the tribes have failed. No attempt at an advance had been made 15 days ago beyond the pitching of standards outside the gate reported last week. It seems probable that nothing will be done. In the meantime the excitement occasioned here by the menaced attack seems dying away.

The Wali is still at Girishk, where he has summoned the Chiefs of the Alizais to meet him. He continues to receive promises of support from most of the influential Chiefs on the Herat side, and his policy of moving out to meet the threatened attack seems to have had good effect.

At Kelat-i-Ghilzai all is quiet.

Enclosure 2 in No. 36.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st June 1880.

From Lieutenant-Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

WALI writes from Girishk that authentic news, 12 days Herat, informs that regular infantry had encamped outside city. Intention is that 2,000 horsemen, under command of Luinab, should advance to Zamindawar in expectation of Alizais joining them in attacking Wali's forces. Should Alizais keep promise and attack succeed, Ayub will follow with regular troops; but, if rising failed, Herat horsemen will return. Wali has ordered Alizai Chiefs to come to Girishk, and they promise to do so, but put it off from day to day. He has sent 1,000 horsemen to Washir, but does not consider himself strong enough to take more decided measures, unless supported by us to extent of advancing brigade towards Girishk, which he earnestly requests.

I am writing to him that we do not wish to move troops in this very hot weather except positively necessary, and that he ought, with assistance given him in money and arms, to be able to be put down threatened rising in Zamindawar, but supported from Herat in no more formidable manner than he describes.

At the same time I am inclined to think that should it be desired to keep affairs in Southern and Western Afghanistan in *statu quo* for the present, advance of brigade to Maiwand, together with prohibition to Wali of crossing his present frontier, would be advisable. An outbreak in Herat border, however slight, and however it turned out, may lead to complications.

Enclosure 3 in No. 36.

TELEGRAM, dated 25th June 1880.

From MR. RONALD THOMPSON, Teheran, to VICEROY, Simla.

I HAVE received the following telegram from the Meshed Agent, dated yesterday:— Begins. Special messenger from Herat correspondent, with letter, dated 18th June, arrived last night, and brought intelligence that Ayub Khan has marched for Kandahar with 10 regiments of infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 30 guns, and blank mule-loads of ammunition; the tribes were to join him on the road; he left Herat on the 9th of June; his force consists of 5 Kabul, 1 Kandahar, and 4 Herat regiments of infantry, 1,400 horsemen from the Herat tribes, 1,600 regular cavalry, Ends.

Enclosure 4 in No. 36.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th June 1880.

From General PRIMROSE, Kandahar, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla.

WITH reference to telegram from Foreign to Political Resident, regarding Ayub Khan's move towards Kandahar, I have arranged, pending reference and orders, that a brigade, with Battery Horse Artillery and a regiment of Native Cavalry, shall move on Girishk. I am of opinion that active support to the Wali, who is now at Girishk, will be more efficacious than if the whole force remained at Kandahar. To strengthen garrison here on departure of the brigade, I propose moving up 4th Native Infantry from Quetta, to be replaced on line of communication by a regiment from reserve

division, and have ordered a wing Biluchis from Kelat-i-Ghilzai to Kandahar; the latter move is with concurrence of Political Resident.

Enclosure 6 in No. 36.

TELEGRAM, No. 4503½, dated 1st July 1880.

From QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla, to General PRIMROSE, Kandahar.

1st JULY. Government have decided that an advance is to be made on Girishk, but the Helmund is on no account to be crossed. Report as to fordability. The force you proposed in your telegram of 27th is to be employed, you should therefore take promptest measures to reinforce Kandahar without weakening Kelat-i-Ghilzai. The necessary troops from the reserve should be pushed forward at once, and garrisons on line when relieved moved up. Commander-in-Chief considers the force you propose to leave at Kandahar weak in all arms. What information have you regarding state of road from Jacobabad upwards? Will it delay troops?

Repeated to General Phayre.

Enclosure 7 in No. 36.

TELEGRAM, dated 17th August 1880.

From General PHAYRE, Quetta, to ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Simla.

I HAVE just received the following letter from General Primrose, dated Kandahar, 11th August. Letter begins. Yours of 30th received to-day. Position of enemy,—small body three miles west of city near picket hill; there are one or two Armstrong guns, 2,000 yards off in hill west of city, and one or two yesterday opposite Shikarpur Gate; they have our range, but have done little damage. Rumour of an attack on south side at Shikarpur Gate. Firing kept up morning and evening from villages three sides of city; only a few shots. Our defences nearly completed, and much clearance made outside walls. Our casualties up to date trifling. Dr. Trafford, Fusiliers, slightly wounded; Private Orton, Fusiliers, killed; two men, Fusiliers, slightly wounded; Jemadar Matula Sing, 30th N. I., killed; and several Natives wounded, and several followers wounded. All wounded and sick previously reported doing well. Good supply water as yet from wells in city. About 45 days' supplies, except bhoosa, of which 10 days' in hand, but daily collections made in town sufficient for current wants. Up to date, strength of garrison is,—Effective: Europeans, 1,243; Native soldiers, 3,386. Sick: Europeans, 157; sick Natives, 225.

No. 37.

No. 439 of 1880.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary,
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 12th October 1880.

WE have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's

* G. G. O., No. 566, dated the 8th October 1880, and documents published therewith.

Sketch illustrating the attack on the village of Deh Khojah.

Government, the papers noted in the margin,* relating to the siege of Kandahar by Sirdar Mahomed Ayub Khan, of Herat, and the sortie from that place on the 16th August last.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" J. STRACHEY.
" W. STOKES.
" J. GIBBS.
" C. U. AITCHISON.
" D. M. STEWART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 37.

GENERAL ORDER.

Military Department.

Simla, the 8th October 1880.

Field Operations.

No. 566.—His Excellency the Governor General in Council directs the publication, for general information, of the following correspondence and Despatches relating to the siege of Kandahar, and the sortie from that place on the 16th August last.

Enclosure 2 in No. 37.

From Colonel ALLEN JOHNSON, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India. (No. 8535 K., Kabul Field Operations, dated Simla, 2nd October 1880.)

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter, No. 5418 A., dated the 29th September 1880, forwarding Despatches from Lieutenant-General Primrose, C.S.I., reporting the arrangements made for the protection of the citadel and city of Kandahar during their investment by Ayub Khan, and the sortie made by the garrison on the 16th August 1880.

2. These Despatches will be published for general information. Meanwhile, I am to state, for the Commander-in-Chief's information, that His Excellency's remarks on the several points they contain are concurred in by the Government of India.

3. The Government of India, I am to state, deplore the great loss of life on the occasion of the sortie; but the Government of India desire to place on record their deep sense of the loss sustained by the army in Brigadier-General Brooke, whose death was marked by so conspicuous an instance of self-devoted courage.

Enclosure 3 in No. 37.

From Major-General G. R. GREAVES, C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department. (No. 5418 A., Kabul, dated Simla, 29th September 1880.)

I have the honour, by direction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, the accompanying Despatches from Lieutenant-General Primrose, C.S.I., commanding at Kandahar, reporting the arrangements made for the protection of the citadel and city of Kandahar during the investment by Ayub Khan, and the sortie made by the garrison on the 16th August last.

2. The siege arrangements appear to have been good, but do not call for any remarks from His Excellency.

3. Sir Frederick Haines, however, thinks that the abandonment of the cantonment was too precipitate, considering the force which General Primrose had under his command on the 28th July, and must have tended to confirm the demoralization of the troops caused by the imperfect information then received of the events at Maiwand.

4. In regard to the sortie, the Commander-in-Chief regrets to be under the necessity for saying that the reasons assigned for it are not satisfactory to him. The details of the operation appear to have been well and successfully carried out up to the time of the withdrawal of the troops and cavalry from the south side of the village of Deh Khoja into the city by the Kabul gate. From this point, however, General Primrose's narrative is confusing, though it is clear that, from the fact of the dead, among whom was a Brigadier-General, having been left on the field, the troops in returning to the city must have been closely followed up by the enemy.

5. In regard to the effect produced on the enemy by this sortie, His Excellency considers that, even were the results such as Lieutenant-General Primrose reports them to have been, they were too dearly bought with the loss of so many valuable Officers and men.

Brigadier-General Brooke, who fell on this occasion while endeavouring to save the life of a wounded comrade, was an Officer of the highest promise, and one whose death is greatly to be deplored.

6. I am to add that General Primrose has been called upon for a copy of any instructions which he may have issued to Brigadier-General Brooke for his advance towards Sinjuri on the 28th July, and of any report which that Officer may have rendered on his return to Kandahar.

7. The casualty returns were forwarded with my letter, No. 5327 A., dated 24th September, and the sketches will be sent hereafter.

Enclosure 4 in No. 37.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. PRIMROSE, C.S.I., commanding the Kandahar Force, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India. (No. 3, dated Kandahar, 30th August 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to report that, on the morning of the 28th July, at about 1 a.m., I received intelligence of the action near Maiwand.

2. In consultation with Brigadier-General Brooke, I decided on moving into the citadel during the day, and at once ordered the heavy battery, sick, and baggage to be taken there, directing Brigadier-General Brooke to proceed along the Kokeran road with a small force of all arms, in the direction of Sinjuri, with a view of helping in the men and followers of Brigadier-General Burrows' column and protecting them from the villagers, who were then firing on them, and holding the cantonments in the meantime with the 4th Native Infantry and a portion of the 28th Native Infantry, with two guns of C/2nd Royal Artillery.

3. I myself proceeded to the city, and ordered all the gates to be seized and strongly held.

4. It was utterly impossible for me to remain in the cantonments, which are quite indefensible (except with a very large force), and from which the water supply could be diverted at any moment, and in fact had already been cut off for some days.

5. My ordnance and commissariat stores were in the citadel, and I therefore decided on taking possession of the whole town.

6. It thus became of paramount importance to occupy the city with the least possible delay, as it had become evident that the whole of the Pathan population in and around Kandahar were inimical to us, and were only waiting for any success of Ayub Khan's to rise.

7. This conviction had forced itself upon me as events developed themselves at Girishk, and clearly seeing that the Wali had neither influence nor power in the country, I made up my mind to seize and occupy Kandahar.

8. Could I have expected the slightest assistance from the representative of the Wali, I would have held on to the cantonments, at all events for some time; but there was no disguising the fact that a settled Government had ceased to exist, and that unless the most stringent measures were at once taken, the city would be in a state of anarchy.

9. Having seen to the immediate security of the place, I returned to cantonments, as heavy firing was reported in the direction of Sinjuri. This turned out to be Brigadier-General Brooke's force engaging the villagers, who fired upon him directly he quitted the lines.

10. On my re-entering the city, I met the Wali, who requested a confidential interview with me.

11. I at once accorded it (Colonel St. John had not then arrived), and he strongly advised my retiring from Kandahar, unless my force was very strong, as the country was in a blaze, Ayub Khan's army was very large, and his guns overpowering.

12. I informed him that my force was not large, but that I had not the slightest intention of leaving Kandahar, as, in the first place, it was my duty to remain, and secondly, the true interests of my country were now centered in the city.

13. He then most strongly urged upon me the necessity of turning the Pathans and other disaffected people out of the city, and, as I fully agreed with him on this point, I told him I would see that it was done.

14. Shortly before dusk on the evening of the 28th, Brigadier-General Brooke having returned and reported he could see no signs of any more men coming in, I withdrew all my force from the cantonments, and told them off to the city walls, as below :—

15. To the Shikarpore Gate front,—400 men, under the command of Brigadier-General Brooke, with Major R. J. Le P. Trench, 19th Native Infantry, commanding the gate.

Length of this front, 1,300 yards.

16. To the Herat Gate front,—500 men under the command of Brigadier-General Burrows, with Colonel S. De B. Edwardes, 2nd Native Infantry, commanding the Herat Gate, and Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Griffith, 1st Native Infantry, the Tôp-khana Gate.

Length of this front, 1,987 yards.

17. To the Eedgah Gate front,—400 men, at first under my own personal command, with Lieutenant-Colonel T. R. Nimmo, 28th Native Infantry, to command the gate; but later on Brigadier-General Burrows was transferred to the charge of this front, and Colonel Edwardes, 2nd Native Infantry, posted to the Herat front.

Length of this front, 1,178 yards.

18. To the Kabul Gate front,—500 men, under Brigadier-General Nuttall, with Colonel W. Bannerman, 4th Native Infantry, in command of the Kabul Gate, and Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, 30th Native Infantry, in command of the Bah Durani Gate.

Length of this front, 1,700 yards.

19. Colonel C. T. Heathcote, 19th Native Infantry, had the command and supervision of the Tôp-khana square.

20. A reserve of 200 men were located in the Char-sû, for distribution to posts as required, under the command of the Field Officer of the day, and a second reserve of 100 men in the Tôp-khana square, to replace men drawn from the first service.

21. A body of marksmen were told off to the bastions and other good positions for long range shooting, and, under the command of Major F. G. F. Moore,* 7th Fusiliers, did excellent service during the siege.

22. The remainder of the men available for duty were held in reserve in the citadel.

23. The total strength of my garrison was as under, including the head-quarters of the 28th Native Infantry, which marched in on the morning of the 28th, and those troops who came in from Maiwand, as to the numbers of which I could obtain no reliable information until late in the afternoon of the 28th :—

Regiments and Batteries.	Officers.	Effective.	Sick.	Horses.	Guns.	8-inch Mortars.	Bullocks.
		Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.				
E/B, Royal Horse Artillery -	4	115	19	123	4	—	—
C/2nd Royal Artillery -	5	101	14	81	4	—	—
5/11th ditto -	4	90	1	12	4	2	373
Poona Horse -	5	213	11	226	—	—	—
3rd Sind Horse -	5	358	9	396	—	—	—
3rd Light Cavalry -	6	354	29	355	—	—	—
No. 2 Company, Sappers and Miners.	1	59	7	7	—	—	—
7th Fusiliers -	24	620	45	10	—	—	—
66th Regiment -	12	241	70	7	—	—	—
1st Native Infantry -	6	273	72	7	—	—	—
4th ditto -	7	533	21	8	—	—	—
19th ditto -	6	586	27	6	—	—	—
28th ditto -	7	671	36	7	—	—	—
30th ditto -	5	319	77	6	—	—	—
Total	97	4,533	438	1,244	12	2	373

* Paymaster.

The baggage animals consisted of 1,021 camels, 135 bullocks, 602 ponies, and 68 mules.

24. The length of walls to be manned was 6,165 yards, not including the interior defences of the citadel.

25. The final distribution of artillery on the walls was as follows :—

Ordnance.	Position.	Officer in Charge.	Officer Com. manding Force.
9-pdr. M.L.R. gun, C/2nd -	N.-E. Bastion -	-	} Major P. H. Greig.
9-pdr. M.L.R. gun C/2nd, R. A. -	Durani Gate -	Lieut. H. L. Gardiner, R. A. -	
9-pdr. ditto, ditto -	Kabul Gate -	-	
40-pdr. B.L.R. gun, 5/11th -	S.-E. Bastion -	Lieut. W. A. Plant, R. A. -	} Captain G. M. B. Hornsby.
6-pdr. S.B. gun -	Shikarpore Gate -	-	
40-pdr. B.L.R. gun, 5/11th -	S.-W. Bastion -	Lieut. A. Bell-Irving, R. A. -	
9-pdr. M.L.R. gun, E/B, R. H. A. -	S.-W. Bastion -	-	} Capt. J. R. Slade.
9-pdr. ditto, E/B, R.H.A. -	Herat Gate -	Lieut. G. S. Jones, R. A. -	
9-pdr. ditto, C/2nd, R.A. -	Tóp-khana Gate -	Lieut. G. B. Smith, R. A. -	
40-pdr. B.L.R. gun, 5/11th -	N.-W. Bastion -	Lieut. T. F. T. Fowle, R. A. -	
9-pdr. M.L.R. gun, E/B, R.H.A. -	N.-W. Bastion -	-	
9-pdr. ditto, ditto -	Eedgah Gate.	-	
40-pdr. B.L.R. gun, 5/11th, R.A. -	S.-W. Bastion of Citadel.	-	

26. The skeleton map of Kandahar attached shows disposition and distribution of troops, &c.

27. The question of posts along the line had also received my careful consideration and I had resolved, in any case of emergency, to bring the Mandi Hissar detachment into Kandahar, and to order those of Abdul Rahman, Mel-Karez, Dabrai, and Gatai to fall back on Chaman, where, with the men already in garrison at that place, they would form a strong post (strength as per margin*) capable of holding their own against any force likely to be brought against them before help could arrive from Quetta.

* No 2 Mountain Battery.
Poona Horse, 106 sabres.
19th Native Infantry, 195 men.
Head quarters and 4 Companies, 27th
Native Infantry.
Sappers and Miners, 26 men.

28. Chaman (a strategic point of the greatest value) would thus form an important connecting link between Quetta and Kandahar, and become an intermediate base for the concentration of troops marching in relief.

29. Under ordinary circumstances, the above posts, which had been strengthened, could easily have withstood any sudden attack made by the villagers around, but it was hopeless to suppose they could hold out against artillery fire and a regularly organized system of attack.

30. Communication would have been cut off between them, and they must have fallen one after another.

31. I therefore telegraphed to Abdul Rahman, ordering the garrison to retire at once on Chaman, picking up the other garrisons as they fell back, and I am firmly of opinion that it was solely in consequence of the promptness of their withdrawal that they were enabled to reach Chaman without serious loss. The Mandi Hissar post arrived here on the afternoon of the 28th.

32. On the movement of troops to co-operate with the army of Sher Ali on the Helmund, I had directed the Commissariat Department to lay in at once a full month's supply of *bhusa* and grain for all the animals of the force, but such was the scarcity of carriage that, on the 28th of July, only a thirteen days' supply was in hand.

33. Daily search, however, was made in the city, and, by reducing the *bhusa* ration, I found I had enough to last for more than a month.

34. All other food supplies were plentiful, both for men and animals.

35. The wells in the city had been previously inspected and reported upon, and, though all reports agreed that there was a well in nearly every house, they mostly stated that they would run dry if heavily drawn upon.

This latter statement I am happy to say has proved unfounded, and there is still an abundant supply of water within the city walls.

36. An increased provost establishment was organized for the purpose of putting a stop to looting and keeping order in the town, and I am happy to say that, considering the number of followers and the great temptations to which they were exposed, the complaints that reached me under this head were almost *nil*, and in nearly every case the culprit was caught and severely punished.

37. Regiments, corps, and departments had various wells in the city allotted for their use, and a constant supply of water was always kept on the city walls.

38. Medical arrangements as under, in case of an attack, were made by Deputy Surgeon-General J. O'Nial:—

“ Surgeon-Major J. F. Keith, M.D., will have charge of the Eedgah Gate and the North Front.

“ Surgeon A. H. C. Dane will have charge of the Töp-khana Gate and North-west bastion. He will communicate by his right with

“ Surgeon-Major Keith, and by his left with

“ Surgeon-Major B. T. Giraud, M.D., who will have charge of the Herat Gate and south-west bastion, communicating by his left with

“ Surgeon-Major J. Arnott, M.D., who will have charge of the Shikarpore Gate and south front, communicating by his left with

“ Surgeon E. W. Kellsall, who will have charge of the Kabul Gate and south-east bastion. He will communicate by his left with

“ Surgeon K. R. Kirtikar, who will have charge of the Durani Gate and north-east bastion, and will communicate by his left with Surgeon-Major Keith.

“ The above are to be quite independent of, and are not to be in any way interfered with, by regimental arrangements.

“ Each Medical Officer will put permanently at his gate two *dandies* or *doolies*. He will find some fixed place for them, in which they are always to remain, and he will take steps to ensure that this place is known by the Officer in command.

“ On the ‘ Assembly ’ being sounded, he will proceed at once with six additional *dandies* or *doolies*, and the necessary surgical material, to his post, and will report himself to the Officer commanding at the time.

“ Medical Officers will take care that their dooley-bearers are well acquainted with the route from their respective posts to the European and Native base hospitals, and will take precautions against their crowding or in any way obstructing the communications.

“ Each Medical Officer will render assistance to all wounded or sick men of whatever branch of the service within his area.

“ Surgical operations involving any delay are not to be performed at these posts.

“ Assistance is to be limited as to what is absolutely necessary to the men's transfer to the base hospital.

“ Surgeon-Major C. H. Harvey, M.D., will have charge of the Reserve in the Char-sú.

“ Surgeon J. McNamara will join No. 2 field hospital.

“ Surgeon T. E. Worgan will join the Native base hospital.

“ The Officers of the base and field hospitals will have everything necessary for the treatment of the wounded always in immediate readiness.”

39. Signal stations were established at the four angles of the city walls, and all the gates and the Char-sú placed in telegraphic communication with one another and with head-quarters.

40. My next care and consideration was to improve and strengthen the existing fortifications, both inside and out.

41. Numerous walls and houses which had been built up to the city gate had to be destroyed and cleared away, and trees cut down to allow of a good fire, and to prevent the enemy using them as cover.

Free and easy communication along the entire length of the city walls, both on the ramparts above and the roadway below, had to be arranged for.

Platforms for mounting guns in important positions on the walls were constructed and repaired, ramps made up to them, traverses erected, and other works undertaken, the details of which are all enumerated in the Diary of the Siege.

42. A wire entanglement made with telegraph wire was constructed all round the walls, *abatis* placed in front of all the entrances and weak portions of the wall, and the gates themselves secured from fire by a covering of iron fastened on outside.

43. The curtains, which were badly loop-holed, and were much too high for a man to fire over, had to be cut down in places between the towers to allow of a direct fire on the country around.

44. The ranges of all the noticeable objects around the city were taken, and range tables posted up in each bastion and gate.

45. Though every available man was employed on work all day, assisted by hired labour, it was not until the 13th August that the Commanding Royal Engineer reported he had no further need of military labour.

46. Our covering parties were daily engaged with the enemy, and on the 12th August inflicted severe loss upon them, killing amongst others the Governor of Farrah.

47. Early on the morning of the 8th August, the enemy opened artillery fire on the citadel from Picket Hill, and shortly afterwards on the city from guns in Deh Khojah and Deh Kuttee; and though this fire was sustained regularly for many days, it did little or no harm, as the men and animals were placed under cover of existing high and substantial walls in the citadel, at right angles to the artillery line of fire.

48. Appended is a complete detailed list of killed and wounded during the whole siege. The casualties at Deh Khojah were forwarded separately, but are included.

49. All details relating to the siege will be found embodied in a diary now under preparation.

50. The behaviour of the troops during the whole siege was excellent, as the almost entire absence of crime proves; and though Officers and men were often for days at a time on continued duty without relief, such was their vigilance that only on one occasion was the garrison turned out by a false alarm.

51. I wish here to record my high appreciation of the bearing of all ranks, who for days, under a burning sun, worked most willingly and cheerfully, mounting guard on completion of their day's work with as much alacrity as if they had been on ordinary garrison duty.

52. I would especially bring to the favourable notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the names of the following Officers who, during the siege, rendered me great assistance in the performance of their various duties :—

Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows, commanding the 1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General T. Nuttall, commanding the Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General A. G. Daubeny, 7th Fusiliers, who assumed temporary command of the 2nd Infantry Brigade on the 16th August.

Colonel W. French, commanding the Royal Artillery.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hills, commanding Royal Engineer.

Major P. H. Greig, commanding C/2nd Royal Artillery.

Captain G. M. B. Hornsby, commanding 5/11th Royal Artillery.

Captain J. R. Slade, commanding E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.

Major F. Beauchamp, 7th Royal Fusiliers.

Captain J. Quarry, 66th Regiment.

Colonel W. Bannerman, commanding the 4th Rifles, Native Infantry.

Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, commanding the 30th Regiment, Native Infantry.

Colonel C. T. Heathcote, commanding the 19th Native Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. D'U. La Touche, commanding the Poona Horse.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Griffith, 1st Native Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel T. R. Nimmo, commanding the 28th Native Infantry.

Major F. C. Singleton, 28th Native Infantry.

Captain and Brevet Major E. P. Leach, V.C., R.E., who did duty as Brigade Major, Royal Engineers, and as Field Engineer throughout the siege.

Lieutenant G. T. Jones and Lieutenant E. A. Waller, Royal Engineers.

Captain Mosely Mayne, 3rd Light Cavalry.

Captain F. C. Keyser, 7th Fusiliers, Superintendent of Army Signalling.

Colonel S. De B. Edwardes, Director of Transport.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Shewell, Deputy Commissary-General, who, ably assisted by Major E. S. Walcott, kept the garrison well supplied with provisions during the whole siege.

Deputy Surgeon-General J. O'Nial.

Surgeon-Major B. T. Giraud, M.D., Army Medical Department.

Surgeon-Major J. Arnott, M.D., Indian Medical Department.

Veterinary Surgeon W. B. Spooner, who, in addition to his duties with the Transport Department, did duty on the walls.

Captain W. Law, Royal Artillery, Brigade Major, 1st Infantry Brigade.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. F. Beville, Deputy Judge Advocate, and who also performed the duties of Provost Marshal.

Major F. J. Caldecott, Royal Artillery, Commissary of Ordnance, who was always ready to do any work.

Lieutenant E. V. P. Monteith, 3rd Sind Horse.

Mr. C. L. Griesbach, Geological Survey of India, who did duty with the 66th Regiment.

To Father T. Jackson I am deeply indebted for his constant care and attention to the sick and wounded; as also to the Rev. A. G. Cane, M.A.

My thanks are specially due to Major C. J. Burnett, my Assistant Adjutant-General, for the manner in which he performed his arduous duties, and who at all times was prepared and volunteered to proceed to any post of danger.

To Major F. J. S. Adam, my Assistant Quartermaster-General, my special thanks are due for the zeal and ability with which he carried on the important duties appertaining to his position.

My Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant E. O. F. Hamilton, 2nd Queen's, deserves my thanks for the satisfactory way in which he always performed his duties.

My special thanks are due to Mr. R. Boteler, Telegraph Superintendent, who, in addition to performing duty with the 19th Native Infantry, acted as an Assistant Field Engineer, doing excellent work. I trust his name may be brought to the favourable notice of Government.

My thanks are also due to Mr. H. T. Pinhey, of the Government of India Telegraph Department.

Note.—From information received, I estimate the strength of the enemy around Kandahar during the siege at from 25,000 to 30,000 men, with 32 guns.

Enclosure 5 in No. 37.

NUMERICAL RETURN of Killed and Wounded of the Kandahar Force during the Siege of Kandahar, from the 28th July to the 31st August 1880.

Corps.	Killed.						Wounded.						Total.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Sergeants, Duffadars, and Havildars.	Drummers and Buglers.	Rank and File.	Followers.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Sergeants, Duffadars, and Havildars.	Drummers and Buglers.	Rank and File.	Followers.	
Staff	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
E/B, Royal Horse Artillery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
C/2nd Royal Artillery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
No. 5/11th Royal Artillery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
No. 2 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3rd Bombay Light Cavalry	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	2	5
Poona Horse	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	3
3rd Sind Horse	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2*	—	2
7th Fusiliers	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	1	3*	2	8
66th Foot	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1†	—	1
1st Bombay Native Infantry	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	1†	3
4th ditto, ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1†	2
19th ditto, ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8†	1	9
28th ditto, ditto	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	4
30th ditto, ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	1	4
Transport Department	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1†	1
Total	—	—	—	—	4	—	1	1	1	1	25	11	44
Grand total	4						40						44

* One man since dead.

† Since dead.

‡ Two men since dead.

Enclosure 6 in No. 37.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. PRIMROSE, C.S.I., commanding the Kandahar Force,
to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India. (No. 2, dated Kandahar, the 26th August
1880.)

I HAVE the honour to report that the enemy, having clearly shown his intention of making a complete and careful investment of Kandahar, by occupying and fortifying the adjacent villages, which are all enclosed by high mud walls, under cover of which batteries could easily have been constructed and unmasked, when required, at the shortest notice, without any one being either aware of the number of guns or their distribution to villages, and in the absence of reliable information regarding the dispositions of the enemy, whose movements were all carried out at night, it became absolutely necessary to make a sortie to cause the enemy to show his hand.

2. Before resorting to this measure, I, on two occasions, carefully searched the villages to the south and east of the city by artillery and mortar fire, but without any apparent result, a few villagers only quitting the villages after the fire had ceased.

3. I, therefore, on the 15th August, determined to bombard one village heavily, and then to put some infantry through it.

4. The village I selected was that of Deh Khojah, situated to the east of the city, exactly opposite the Bar Durani and Kabul Gates, and running almost parallel to the city wall, distant from the former gate 600 yards, and from the latter 950 yards.

5. In making the selection the following points influenced me:—

I. The village was isolated from the main body of the enemy's regular troops, who were encamped beyond Abasabad, some four miles to the west of the city, with Kandahar between them and Deh Khojah, and therefore out of supporting distance.

II. The only supports available for the village would have to come from the south, and pass over ground on which my cavalry could act with effect.

III. The village lies on the regular road from Mandi Hissar to Kandahar, and I was most desirous to clear and keep this road open for the advance of General Phayre, as the Kushab road was studded with villages which, if held in succession by the enemy, could only have been forced at immense cost.

IV. Artillery had been fired from this village completely screened, and I was very anxious to ascertain what number of guns the enemy had in position there, where they were in battery, and what was the calibre of the guns. This information was most necessary, as all reports from Maiwand agreed that Ayub Khan had with him thirty guns, including two batteries of 12-pounder Armstrongs. Up to date he had only unmasked two Armstrong guns, and it was therefore a matter of vital importance to prevent his establishing an overpowering artillery fire within one thousand yards of the walls.

V. I wished to confine the enemy's artillery to positions perpendicular to the shorter faces of the city walls, as batteries placed opposite the east and west fronts would take these faces respectively in reverse.

VI. The disarrangement of the enemy's dispositions to the east would practically limit his attack to the west and south fronts, as the ground to the north is open and devoid of cover.

6. On the afternoon of the 15th August, I ordered the infantry force, as per

* 4 companies, 7th Fusiliers.

4 companies, 19th Native Infantry.

4 companies, 28th Native Infantry.

A party of Sappers, to be told off by the Commanding Royal Engineers.

† 3rd Light Cavalry, 100 sabres.

Poona Horse, 100 „

3rd Sind Horse, 100 „

‡ One 40-pounder.

Two 9-pounders.

Two 8-inch mortars.

margin,* under the command of Brigadier-General Brooke, to attack the village early on the morning of the 16th, to force their way through it, obtain all the information they could, and, if possible, to destroy any works the enemy might have constructed under cover of the walls.

The cavalry (strength as noted†) under the command of Brigadier-General Nuttall, to co-operate with the infantry, and to keep the ground clear to the south and east of Deh Khojah.

Artillery, as per margin,‡ to keep up a rapid fire from the walls on the village before the attack, and to cover the advance of the infantry.

7. The cavalry were ordered to leave by the Eedgah Gate at 4.30 a.m., and to trot round out of musketry fire to the east of the village, and there await the result of the attack.

The artillery were ordered to open fire at 4.45 a.m., and infantry to leave by the Kabul Gate at 5 a.m.

8. Brigadier-General Brooke made his own dispositions for carrying out the attack, which were as follows:—

“ 1. The force will be divided into three columns as follows,—

“ 1st. Under Lieutenant-Colonel Daubeny, will consist of—

2 companies, 7th Fusiliers. 2 companies, 19th Native Infantry.

“ 2nd. Under Lieutenant-Colonel Nimmo—

1 company, 7th Fusiliers. 3 companies, 28th Native Infantry.

“ 3rd. Under Colonel Heathcote—

1 company, 7th Fusiliers. 2 companies, 19th Native Infantry.

1 company, 28th Native Infantry.

“ II. To each column will be attached an Engineer Officer, with a proportion of Sappers, with tools and powder bags.

“ III. A Medical Officer and sick carriage will accompany each column. The reserve ammunition will remain within the Kabul Gate.

“ Arrangements for carrying an ample supply of water are to be made by all Commanding Officers.

“ IV. The following will be the duties assigned to each column:—

“ The first column will, on leaving the Kabul Gate, take the road to the right, and, after proceeding 150 yards along it, advance towards the south of the village, the advance being covered by skirmishers, and the details carried out as may seem best to Colonel Daubeny, with reference to the features of the ground and the resistance offered. The object of this column is to seize a good position at the south of the village from which to advance to the north of the village, driving out all the enemy who may be met there.

“ The second column will conform to, and follow the movements of, the first, but, on reaching the village, will seize a position on the right of that taken up by the first column. Both columns will make their advance in as open order as possible.

“ The third column will remain within the Kabul Gate awaiting orders. The duty assigned to them will probably be to enter the village at the main entrance and seize the enclosure on the left of the entrance, where the gun embrasure is, and clear that part of the village. The other instructions will be issued to the commanders of the 1st and 2nd columns by the Brigadier-General on their reaching the south of the village. The cavalry brigade, under Brigadier-General Nuttall, is under orders to co-operate, and will be on the east and south of the village.”

9. As previously arranged, the cavalry quitted the Bedgah Gate at 4.30 a.m., and trotted round into the position assigned, a few shots being fired at them, but at very long ranges, and doing no damage.

10. The guns opened fire at 4.45 a.m., and at 5 a.m. the first two parties of infantry debouched from the Kabul Gate, making for the south of the village, which they entered under a heavy fire of musketry at 5.30 a.m.

11. At this moment numbers of ghazis were seen making their way to Deh Khojah, across the open ground to the south of the village.

12. They were at once charged by a troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant Geoghegan, and driven back with heavy loss into broken ground, where further pursuit was hopeless.

13. The cavalry now formed up to the south of Deh Khojah, waiting for another opportunity to charge, and the infantry were steadily making their way through the village, beating down all opposition.

14. Once more the ghazis in large numbers tried to cross from the south to the support of Deh Khojah, but Major Trench, 19th Regiment Native Infantry, met them with three well-directed volleys, which turned them, and Brigadier-General Nuttall, seizing the opportunity, charged again with the 3rd Light Cavalry and Poona Horse, dispersing and cutting up many of the enemy, who again took shelter in the nullahs and open ground.

15. The enemy's fire in the village had now nearly ceased.

16. On re-forming after this charge, Brigadier-General Nuttall received a note from

Brigadier-General Brooke, asking him to cover the retirement of the infantry from the south of the village into the Kabul Gate.

17. In consequence of this request, the cavalry were withdrawn, and entered the city by the Kabul Gate, and it was in carrying out this movement that they suffered most of the loss sustained throughout the day, as they were exposed to infantry fire from the village (which recommenced as they were being withdrawn) in cramped ground, which prevented their being in open formation.

18. My intention had been that the cavalry should have remained out to the last in the open plain, well out of musketry fire, charging whenever opportunity should offer, and returning the same way they went out after the infantry had passed through the village.

19. The cavalry and infantry at the south end of the village being withdrawn allowed the enemy's reinforcements to move up from the south, and the fighting in the middle of the village became general and very heavy.

20. Notwithstanding the determined resistance of the enemy, who fought, under cover of their walls, with the greatest obstinacy, the infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Daubeney and Lieutenant-Colonel Nimmo, forced their way through the village, debouching at about 7 am. from the northern end, whilst the party under the command of Colonel Heathcote held their ground near the centre of the village until ordered to withdraw.

21. At 7.15 am., the firing had entirely ceased and the enemy were seen streaming away from Deh Khojah, carrying some of their dead with them. Their loss has been reported as very heavy, several chiefs of note having been killed, and one of the two guns in the village destroyed.

22. Whilst the fighting was going on in Deh Khojah, the enemy opened artillery fire on the city from Picket Hill, and from a gun in position about 1,200 yards from the west face of the city wall. He also attempted to form up his infantry in the old cantonments under cover of this fire; but such was the steadiness and accuracy with which our guns were served, that he was unable to do so, and within an hour his artillery fire was silenced, and one gun on Picket Hill dismounted.

23. No words of mine can express my appreciation of the cool and gallant behaviour of all ranks.

24. Brigadier-General Brooke was killed whilst attempting to save the life of Captain Cruickshank, R.E., and by his death the service and the country have suffered a heavy loss.

25. Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Newport, 28th Native Infantry; Major R. J. Le P. Trench, 19th Native Infantry; Captain G. M. Cruickshank, R.E.; Lieutenant F. C. Stayner, 19th Native Infantry; and Second Lieutenant F. P. F. Wood, 7th Fusiliers, all died whilst leading their men in the most forward manner; and Second Lieutenant E. S. Marsh, 7th Fusiliers, was killed in helping to bring in Lieutenant Wood, who was then severely wounded.

26. The Reverend G. M. Gordon, Church Missionary Society, who was also mortally wounded whilst attending the men under a heavy fire; and I take this opportunity of paying my small tribute of admiration to a man who, by his kindness and gentleness, had endeared himself to the whole force, and in the end died administering to their wants.

27. The sketch appended will show the movements executed. Attached is a list of our killed and wounded.

28. Whilst deeply regretting the loss of so many gallant Officers and men, it would be difficult to over-estimate the effect produced on the men of the garrison and on the enemy by this affair.

29. The spirits and *morale* of the troops under my command, which had been considerably damped and shaken by the result of the action at Maiwand on the 27th July, and the continued confinement within the city walls, were raised, and confidence in their superiority over the enemy restored.

30. They were convinced that even when holding a strong position and in vastly superior numbers, the enemy could not withstand their attack, and the dread of the word "ghazi" was dispelled.

31. On the other hand, the overweening confidence of the enemy received a shock from which it never recovered.

32. The villagers and ghazis, who had been carefully instructed that there were only some eight hundred British troops in Kandahar, and the remainder were followers dressed up as soldiers, had it conclusively proved to them that this was a fallacy.

33. The feeling of security which had hitherto marked all their movements gave place to feelings of insecurity and doubt, and they refused to remain any longer distributed about in the surrounding villages, streaming back to their camp by thousands, numbers having been reported as having gone off to their homes.

34. Hardly a shot was fired by the enemy after the 16th; and, on the 24th, I received intelligence that Ayub Khan had shifted his camp into the Arghandab Valley, where he was entrenching himself, and that the majority of the local contingent had dispersed.

35. On the morning of the 25th, I reconnoitred the whole of the enemy's position about Picket Hill, the cantonments, and Deh Khojah, and found the guns gone and the villages perfectly empty and abandoned; and I am now supplying myself with *bhusa* and grain from them.

36. The same afternoon I caused all the dead, whose bodies had not been brought in on the 16th, to be collected and buried.

37. Brigadier-General Nuttall brings to favourable notice the following Officers:—

Lieutenant-Colonel C. D'U. La Touche, commanding the Poona Horse.

Captain Mosley Mayne, commanding the detachment of the 3rd Light Cavalry.

Lieutenant T. P. Geoghegan, 3rd Light Cavalry.

Major G. C. Hogg, Poona Horse, Brigade Major; and

Lieutenant John Monteith, 2nd Sind Horse, his Orderly Officer.

38. I would myself wish to bring forward the names of Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Daubeny, 7th Royal Fusiliers, who gallantly led the assaulting party right through the village;

Lieutenant-Colonel T. R. Nimmo, 28th Regiment, Native Infantry, who commanded the support, and was severely wounded; and

Colonel C. T. Heathcote, 19th Native Infantry, whose coolness under a heavy fire inspired his men with the greatest confidence.

39. My thanks are also due to Brigadier-General T. Nuttall and Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows; to Colonel W. French, commanding the Royal Artillery; Major P. H. Greig, commanding C/2nd, Royal Artillery; Captain J. R. Slade, commanding E/B, Royal Horse Artillery; to Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Shewell, Deputy Commissary General, who attached himself to my Staff; to Deputy Surgeon General J. O'Nial, whose arrangements for the sick and wounded were all that could be desired; to Surgeon-Major B. T. Giraud, M.D., Army Medical Department, doing duty with the 7th Fusiliers, whose great attention to the wounded on the field has frequently elicited my admiration; to Surgeon-Major J. Arnott, M.D., and Surgeon E. W. Kelsall.

I cannot overvalue the services rendered on the 16th, and on many other occasions, by Father T. Jackson, who was always in the foremost of the fight, attending upon and offering every assistance to the wounded, both European and Native.

40. I would wish also to bring to notice the gallant conduct of Lieutenant W. St. L. Chase, 28th Regiment, Native Infantry, who, under a heavy fire, carried a wounded man (Private Murray, 7th Fusiliers*) from the front into a place of safety; also of Private Ashford, 7th Fusiliers, who accompanied and remained with Lieutenant Chase. I purpose making a further recommendation on the part of this Officer and private.

41. My best thanks are due to Major C. J. Burnett, my Assistant Adjutant-General, and to Major F. J. S. Adam, my Assistant Quartermaster-General, who possess my entire confidence, and in their arduous duties have rendered me the greatest possible assistance.

Lieutenant E. O. F. Hamilton, 2nd Queen's, my Aide-de-Camp, has invariably performed his duties much to my satisfaction.

* No man of this name is included in the casualty rolls; probably Private W. Massey is meant.

Enclosure 7 in No. 37.

NUMERICAL RETURN of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, Men, and Followers who were killed, wounded, and missing in the storming of the Deh Khojah Village on the 16th August 1880.

Corps.	Europeans.						Natives.						Followers.		Horses.		Remarks.	
	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Killed.			Wounded.			Killed.		Wounded.
	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Total.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Total.	Native Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Total.	Native Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.				
Staff - - -	3*	-	3	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-			-	-	-	-
Poona Horse - -	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	1	4	4	-	-	-	1	9	16	
3rd Sind Horse - -	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	6	2	2	-	-	-	-	15	7	
3rd Light Cavalry - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3	12	-	-	-	-	13	12	
No. 2 Company, Sappers and Miners.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6†	1	6	7	-	-	-	1	3	-	† 1—Hospital Assistant.
2/7th Royal Fusiliers - -	2	22	24	2	28	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4	-	-	
59th Regiment, attached to 2/7th Regiment.	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1st Grenadiers, Native Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	
4th Native Infantry, Rifles -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	
19th Regiment Native Infantry	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	20	1	24	25	-	-	-	1	-	-	
28th Regiment Native Infantry	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	30	-	22	22	-	-	-	1	-	-	
Total - -	8	24	32	6	30	36	-	66	5	67	72	-	-	7	9	37	35	

Reconciliation:—

Killed -	8 European Officers	1 Native Officer	90 Non-commissioned Officers and men	106
Wounded	7 followers	6 European Officers	5 Native Officers	223
	97 Non-commissioned Officers and men	9 followers		117

(Signed)

C. J. BURNETT, Major,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Kandahar Force.

J. M. PRIMROSE, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding Kandahar Force.

No. 38.

No. 442 of 1880.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 12th October 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of your Lordship in Council, the accompanying copy of a Despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts, G.C.B., C.I.E., V.C., together with the remarks thereon of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, reporting the march of the Kabul-Kandahar force to the relief of Lieutenant-General Primrose, and the victorious action fought on the 1st September 1880 against the force under Sirdar Mahomed Ayub Khan.

2. The clear and comprehensive account given by Sir Frederick Roberts, and the appreciative commentary on it by His Excellency Sir Frederick Haines, render any further detailed remarks on the operations unnecessary.

3. We have, it will be observed, already published a General Order expressing the deep appreciation by this Government of the valuable services rendered to the State by Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts and his army, and we now desire to request that your Lordship in Council will submit these Despatches to the Queen for Her Majesty's most gracious recognition.

	We have, &c.,
(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	J. STRACHEY.
"	W. STOKES.
"	J. GIBBS.
"	D. M. STEWART.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 38.

No. 582.

Simla, 12th October 1880.

The Viceroy and Governor General in Council, having received from the Commander-in-Chief in India the accompanying Despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts, G.C.B., C.I.E., V.C., reporting the march of the force under his command from Kabul to Kandahar, and the successful engagement with the Afghans under Sirdar Mahomed Ayub Khan on the 1st September 1880, desires that it shall be published in the "Gazette of India" for general information.

2. Sir Frederick Roberts has achieved what the Commander-in-Chief in India justly describes as one of the most complete and successful operations of recent times.

3. The Government of India appreciate the foresight which governed the preparation of the force at Kabul, the energy which conducted it to Kandahar, and the skill through which its operations were fitly crowned by the total defeat of the enemy against whom its movements had from the first been directed.

4. These operations, in their inception and their execution, will remain an enduring record, no less of the courage and devotion of the troops than of the skill of the Officers, on whose services the Queen-Empress can rely for the security and honour of Her Indian Empire.

5. The high soldierly spirit which animated this force throughout its ranks had been conspicuous in every arm of the service during all the operations of the war in Northern Afghanistan and on Sir Donald Stewart's march from Kandahar, and formed the ample justification of the Government of India in sanctioning an enterprise that could not have been prudently entrusted to a leader less able, or to troops less efficient, than Sir Frederick Roberts and the soldiers so worthy of his leading.

6. Even had the march thus undertaken and carried out served merely to raise the investment of Kandahar, it would have been a military achievement of which any country might be proud. All the more, therefore, is Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick

Roberts to be congratulated on the opportunity afforded him of showing, in the defeat of Ayub Khan, that the enterprise and endurance of himself and his troops were perfected by a consummate skill and devoted gallantry, adequate not merely to the battle of Kandahar but to any eventuality of war which they might be called on to meet.

7. The Government of India deplore the loss of those Officers and men who fell in the gallant performance of their duty; at the same time it is incumbent on them to record their recognition of the strategical skill displayed in the dispositions, through which it arose that the loss was so light in comparison with the difficulties to be overcome and the important results which were attained.

8. The Government of India will not now make more than a general reference to the individual services rendered in all ranks in this, the fitting close of a war in which so much distinguished service has been rendered. They desire, however, to add to the high and deserved commendation these services have received from Sir Frederick Roberts and the Commander-in-Chief in India an expression of their own deep appreciation of their value; and it will be their most pleasing duty to submit to the Queen-Empress the names of those thus distinguished, for Her Majesty's most gracious consideration.

9. Meanwhile, the Governor General in Council tenders to Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts and the Kabul-Kandahar force the cordial congratulations and thanks of the Government of India.

ALLEN JOHNSON, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 2 in No. 38.

From Major-General G. R. GREAVES, C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department. (No. 5585 A., dated Simla, 7th October 1880.)

I am directed to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, the accompanying Despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, G.C.B., C.I.E., V.C., reporting the march of the force under his command from Kabul to Kandahar, and the successful engagement with the Afghans under Sirdar Mahomed Ayub Khan on the 1st September last.

2. The events reported are so ably and so clearly described by Sir Frederick Roberts, as to require no word in explanation. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief cannot, however, refrain from expressing the pride with which he presents this despatch to Government, recording as it does one of the most complete and successful military operations of recent times.

3. In the last days of July, when the enemy under Ayub Khan had, after the unfortunate events at Maiwand, acquired a prestige and strength which some thought to be irresistible, the Commander-in-Chief felt that unless his proposal to despatch a division from Kabul met with the fullest support from the Officer selected to command it, it would have been impossible to carry out the intention.

It is therefore most gratifying to His Excellency to find that Sir Frederick Roberts was so strong an advocate for the measure.

4. The promptitude with which this force was organized and prepared to advance reflects the greatest credit on all concerned, and the Commander-in-Chief would here desire to record his appreciation of the admirable spirit displayed by Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, then in supreme command in Kabul, in depriving himself of the flower of his force in order to make up a division for Sir Frederick Roberts. On the skilful and successful manner in which Sir Donald Stewart brought the remainder of his troops to India, it will be His Excellency's pleasing duty to address the Government hereafter.

5. Sir Frederick Roberts has referred to the fact that no wheeled artillery accompanied his force, and as regards this I am to say that, notwithstanding the reports which had been received of Ayub Khan's artillery and of the manner in which it had been served, Sir Frederick Haines, after some doubts on the matter, fully concurred in the wisdom of the view urged by Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts that no wheeled carriage of any kind should accompany the force.

6. The march from Kabul to Kandahar has been criticised as a most rash military operation, with no base in case of ill fortune, scant supplies, and a hostile population

along the whole route. It would be out of place to point to success in justification of undue rashness, but it is right to state here that, after a full consideration of all these circumstances, those who knew best felt satisfied that such troops, with such a commander, could cope successfully with any obstacles which might present themselves, and the results have fully borne out this feeling.

7. In alluding to the troops, Sir Frederick Haines would invite the attention of Government to Sir Frederick Roberts' report regarding their discipline and behaviour on the line of march; neither fatigue, privations, nor the murder of their straggling comrades shook their discipline or *morale*, nor induced reprisals.

8. The report touches lightly on this superb march from Kabul to Kandahar,—a feat which will take its place amongst the most brilliant records of military history. It stands out as a proof of the wonderful power of endurance possessed by our troops, both British and Native, and of the admirable spirit which animates the men of all ranks and races of which our army is composed; whilst the mutual confidence which has been engendered by sharing together so many dangers in the field and so many hardships on the march, must prove a bond of union between the British and Native soldiers, which cannot fail to be a source of strength to the Government.

9. The Commander-in-Chief must here express his regret that, after the admirable efforts made by the troops under Major-General Phayre to reach Kandahar in time to assist in the overthrow of Ayub Khan, they should not have succeeded in doing so, and Sir Frederick Haines shares with these troops and their able Commander the disappointment which all have felt in regard to this. The troops under General Phayre had to toil through Sind and the Bolan at the very hottest time of the year. Floods and the difficulty in procuring forage and supplies were serious obstacles to be overcome, causing great delay in the advance. The attitude of the Marris and other tribes created anxiety regarding the safety of the line of communications, by which alone supplies could be furnished for the garrison of Kandahar and the Kabul-Kandahar Force; further delay was caused by this. It is solely due to the ability and energy of the Commander, and the spirit and discipline of the troops, that they were so far forward on the 1st September.

10. In regard to the action at Kandahar and to the reconnaissance of the 31st August which preceded it, His Excellency is only desirous of bringing prominently to the notice of Government the quick military appreciation of the situation by Sir Frederick Roberts, and the excellent dispositions made by him. The admirable manner in which his orders were carried out, and the gallantry of the troops, are shown by his report.

11. It may be said that it was a misfortune that the enemy did not suffer more in the pursuit, but a pursuit of Afghans is notoriously a difficult operation; and this will be readily understood when it is considered how easily they, under such circumstances, merge into the population, and casting away for the moment their arms, assume the rôle of peaceful inhabitants.

12. The Kandahar force rendered good service in the engagement of the 1st September; but as no report has been received on the subject from Lieutenant-General Primrose, His Excellency is not in possession of the details beyond what are gathered from Sir Frederick Roberts' despatch.

13. Sir Frederick Haines laments the death of such gallant soldiers as Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, Captains Frome and Straton, and Sergeant Cameron. To Lieutenant MacLaine's murder His Excellency has already alluded in my letter of the 25th ultimo. In such men the army has experienced a serious loss.

14. The Officers who are mentioned by Sir Frederick Roberts are commended to the favourable notice of Government, but their names will be more specially brought forward hereafter in the general recommendations for rewards for service in Afghanistan.

Enclosure 3 in No. 38.

From Lieutenant-General Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS, G.C.B., V.C., C.I.E., Royal Artillery, commanding the Southern Afghanistan Field Force, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India, Army Head Quarters, Simla. (No. 88, dated Camp, Quetta, 26th September 1880.)

Before detailing the operations on the 31st August and the 1st September, which resulted in the defeat of the Afghan army assembled at Kandahar, under the command

of Sirdar Mahomed Ayub Khan, it may be desirable to give a short account of the march from Kabul, a distance of 318 miles, which was accomplished in 23 days, including two halts.

The strength of the force, placed at my disposal at Kabul by Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, G.C.B., consisted of—

- 3 Brigades of Infantry.
- 1 Brigade of Cavalry.
- 3 Batteries of mountain guns.

Major-General J. Ross, C.B., commanded the Infantry Division, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades of which were commanded respectively by—

Brigadier-General H. T. Macpherson, C.B., V.C.

Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C.B.

Brigadier-General C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.B.I., C.I.E.

Brigadier-General Hugh H. Gough, C.B., V.C., commanded the Cavalry Brigade.

Colonel Alured C. Johnson commanded the artillery; Colonel Æ. Perkins, C.B., held the position of Commanding Royal Engineer, and Deputy Surgeon-General J. Hanbury that of Principal Medical Officer.

In the detail of the forces* it will be noted that the strength in artillery was not in proportion to the strength of the other branches. But there were strong reasons which made it desirable that the artillery with the column should consist only of mountain batteries. The whole question was one of grave importance, and it was not without due consideration decided that the force should proceed to Kandahar unaccompanied by wheeled artillery.

The object was to reach Kandahar in the shortest possible time; and it was not improbable that the main road would have to be left, should the Afghan army at Kandahar endeavour to make its way towards Ghazni and Kabul by the valleys of the Argandab or the Arghastan.

The nature of the ground throughout Afghanistan is such that artillery can never be safely employed with cavalry alone, unsupported by infantry. Nor is rapidity of movement so much required of artillery in countries like Afghanistan, as the power of being able to operate over the most difficult ground without causing delay to the rest of the troops.

It was not forgotten, moreover, that on arrival at Kandahar the column would be augmented by a battery of 40-pounders, a battery of field artillery, and four guns of horse artillery.

It is unquestionable that, had either horse or field artillery accompanied the force, the march could not have been performed with the same rapidity.

Before leaving Kabul, everything that was possible was done to lighten baggage. Ten British soldiers were told off to each mountain battery tent, usually intended to hold six, and 50 to a sepoy's tent of two *pāls*, 34 lbs. of kit only being allowed for each man.

To each Native soldier 20 lbs. of baggage was allowed, inclusive of camp equipage.

Each Officer was allowed one mule, and one mule was allowed to every eight Officers for mess.

* DETAIL OF FORCE.

1st Infantry Brigade.

	British.	Native.
92nd Highlanders - - - -	651	—
23rd Pioneers - - - -	—	701
24th Punjab Native Infantry - - -	—	575
2nd Goorkhas - - - -	—	501
Total - - - -	651	1,777

2nd Infantry Brigade.

	British.	Native.
72nd Highlanders - - - -	787	—
2nd Sikh Infantry - - - -	—	612
3rd Sikh Infantry - - - -	—	570
5th Goorkhas - - - -	—	561
Total - - - -	787	1,743

3rd Infantry Brigade.

	British.	Native.
2/60th Rifles - - - -	616	—
15th Sikhs - - - -	—	650
25th Punjab Native Infantry - - -	—	629
4th Goorkhas - - - -	—	637
Total - - - -	616	1,916

Cavalry Brigade.

	British.	Native.
9th Queen's Royal Lancers - - -	318	—
3rd Bengal Cavalry - - - -	—	304
3rd Punjab Cavalry - - - -	—	408
Central India Horse - - - -	—	495
Total - - - -	318	1,297

Artillery Division.

	British.	Native.	Guns.
6/8th Royal Artillery, screw guns -	95	139	6
11/9th Royal Artillery - - - -	95	139	6
No. 2 Mountain Battery - - - -	—	140	6
Total - - - -	190	418	18

TOTAL OF FORCE.

British Troops - - - -	2,562
Native - - - -	7,151
British Officers - - - -	273
Guns - - - -	18
Cavalry horses - - - -	1,779
Artillery mules - - - -	450

The amount of supplies which it was determined to take with the force was as follows:—

- 30 days' tea, sugar, rum, and salt for Europeans.
- 8 days' rum for Natives drinking spirits.
- 5 days' flour for Europeans.
- 5 days' rations for Native troops.
- 1 day's grain, carried by cavalry horses and transport animals in addition to the ordinary load.

For the above, and for the carriage of foot-sore* soldiers and followers, it was

- * European soldiers were allowed 2 per cent. of ponies.
- Native soldiers were allowed $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
- Native followers were allowed $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

found that the numbers of transport animals required, inclusive of 10 per cent. spare, were:—

- 1,589 yaboos (large Kabul ponies).
- 1,244 Indian ponies.
- 4,510 mules.
- 912 donkeys.

In addition to these, there were purchased on the line of march:—

- 35 yaboos.
- 1 mule.
- 208 donkeys.
- 171 camels.

The casualties were:—

- 410 yaboos.
- 106 Indian ponies.
- 217 mules.

The numbers of Native followers were:—

Doolie bearers	-	2,192
Followers in the Transport and other Departments	-	4,698
Private followers and syces of Native Cavalry regiments	-	1,244
Total	-	8,134

The desertion of the whole of the Afghan drivers belonging to the Transport, shortly after leaving Kabul, and of the Hazara drivers directly their own country was reached, threw exceptionally heavy work upon the troops.

† Captain A. T. S. A. Rind, Bengal Staff Corps.

Lieut. C. M. FitzGerald, Bengal Staff Corps.

Lieut. H. M. P. Hawkes, Bengal Staff Corps.

Lieut. H. F. Lyons-Montgomery, Bengal Staff Corps.

‡ Captain W. A. Wynter, 33rd Foot.

Captain G. H. Elliot, Bengal Staff Corps.

Captain C. R. Macgregor, Bengal Staff Corps.

Lieut. L. E. B. Booth, 33rd Foot.

Lieut. H. J. Elverson, 2nd Foot.

Lieut. R. B. W. Fisher, 10th Hussars.

Lieut. R. H. F. W. Wilson, 10th Hussars.

C. G. Robertson, 8th Foot.

As regards supplies, the greatest difficulty would have been experienced but for the admirable arrangements made by Major A. R. Badcock and the Officers of the Commissariat Department,† and by Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Low and the Officers of the Transport Department.‡

Sufficient praise cannot be bestowed upon all these Officers. They never spared themselves; and often, after the longest march, and with the prospect of having to start off again at a very early hour the following morning, had to work on until a late hour in the night.

In the collection of supplies the Commissariat and Transport Departments were materially aided by Major E. G. G. Hastings and his staff of Political Officers.

Fortunately for the welfare of the cavalry horses and transport animals, a fair amount of green Indian corn was almost everywhere procurable. Barley was very scarce; but the Indian corn proved to be so nutritious that the large majority of the horses, ponies, and mules reached Kandahar in excellent health and condition.

The reserve of flour had on several occasions to be indented upon; but, by replenishing whenever supplies were to be obtained, we arrived at Kandahar with still about three days' flour in hand.

The force appointed for the relief of Kandahar moved into camp by brigades on the 8th August in the vicinity of Kabul, the 2nd Infantry and the Cavalry Brigade proceeding respectively to Indiki and Charasia. The 1st and 3rd Infantry Brigades encamped at Beni Hissar.

The following morning the march commenced. The route lay through the fertile Logar Valley, that line being chosen instead of the usual road by Maidan on account of the facilities it offered for collecting supplies.

On the 15th August Ghazni was reached,—a distance of 98 miles having been marched in seven days.

At Ghazni, I was met by the Governor, and received from him the keys of the city gates.

I placed my own guards and sentries in and around Ghazni, deeming it best for the preservation of order, for the prevention of collisions between the troops and people, and for the execution of our demand for supplies.

The fort was visited by numbers of Officers and men, but no disturbance occurred, and before the break of the following day the force was many miles on its way towards Khelat-i-Ghilzai.

No news having reached me from either the latter place or Kandahar, I determined to push on with all possible speed.

I may here mention that I frequently despatched messengers while on the road, with telegrams reporting our progress. I am led to think that none of these messengers ever reached their destination, except those sent from Khelat-i-Ghilzai, and from between that place and Kandahar.

On the 20th August, shortly after reaching Panjak, I received a letter from Colonel Tanner, 29th Bombay Native Infantry, commanding at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, written on the 18th, to the effect that all was well with his garrison; that the neighbourhood of Khelat-i-Ghilzai was quiet, and that General Phayre, writing from Quetta on the 12th August, had stated that he hoped to be in Kandahar on the 2nd September at the latest.

The following day, at Shahjui, Captain Straton was able to open heliographic communication with Khelat-i-Ghilzai. By this means I heard of the sortie which had been made from Kandahar on the 16th August, and at the same time I received reassuring news as to the staying power of the garrison,—that they were in no straits for supplies for troops and followers, that they were all in good health and spirits, and that they had forage sufficient to hold out for a longer period than it would take the force under my command to reach Kandahar.

I decided, therefore, to push on to Khelat-i-Ghilzai, and there give the troops a well-earned rest of one day.

We arrived at Khelat-i-Ghilzai on the 23rd August, having marched from Ghazni, a distance of 134 miles, in eight days. This gives an average daily rate of $16\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

Colonel Tanner had everything in good order at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, and had been enabled to collect a fair amount of supplies.

Being of opinion that it would be inconvenient to keep open communication with Khelat-i-Ghilzai for some time to come, and seeing no immediate advantage in continuing its occupation, I determined to withdraw the garrison and take it with me to Kandahar.

All the necessary arrangements for this purpose were made during the day the force halted,—the 24th August; and the charge of the fort was handed over to Mahomed Sadik Khan, a Toki Ghilzai, who had had possession of it when the British troops under Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart reached Khelat-i-Ghilzai in January 1879.

On the 26th August, at Tirandaz, I received news from Lieutenant-General Primrose, C.S.I., commanding at Kandahar, that, on the 23rd, Sirdar Ayub Khan had abandoned the villages to the east and west of Kandahar; and that, on the 24th, he had struck his camp and had taken up a position in the Argandab Valley between Baba Wali and Mazra, due north of the city,—thus practically giving up the investment of Kandahar.

Being anxious to open up heliographic communication with General Primrose, and, if possible, with General Phayre, I ordered two regiments of cavalry, under Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, to march the following morning (27th August) to Robat, a distance of 34 miles, the remainder of the force moving about half way.

Shortly after arrival at Robat, Brigadier-General Gough was met by Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, the Resident, and Major Adam, Assistant Quartermaster-General at Kandahar. From the information brought by these Officers, and from what I heard from other sources, I was led to believe that Ayub Khan intended to make a stand, and was strengthening his position, which was said to extend from Gandizian to Kotal-i-Murcha.

Upon receipt of this news I determined to halt for one day at Robat, and to divide the remaining distance to Kandahar, 19 miles, into two short marches.

Soldiers, followers, and transport animals were much fagged by the long and continuous marching, and somewhat exhausted by the now daily increasing heat. I was, moreover, desirous of bringing the troops into Kandahar in as fresh a state as possible, and fit for any work that might be required of them.

During the halt at Robat, on the 29th, I received a letter from Major-General Phayre, C.B., dated Kila Abdulla, the 24th August, stating that he had hoped his division would be assembled there on the 28th, and be able to march for Kandahar on the 30th.

I felt at once that this precluded the possibility of General Phayre's arrival at Kandahar in time to co-operate with me. I much regretted this, as I was well aware of the strenuous exertions he had made to relieve the beleaguered garrison, and the privations and hardships which he and his troops had undergone to effect this object.

On the 31st August the force reached Kandahar, having marched from Khelat-i-Ghilzai (88 miles) in seven days, including the halt at Robat.

The position I determined to take up was to the west of the city, with my right on the cantonments, and my left touching Old Kandahar.

Such a position covered the city, gave me command of a good and ample supply of water, and placed me within striking distance of Ayub Khan's camp.

Not knowing what opposition might be expected once we advanced beyond the city, arrangements were made, in communication with Lieutenant-General Primrose, for giving the troops their breakfast outside the Shikarpore Gate, and for watering and feeding the transport animals.

At 10 a.m. the 1st and 3rd Brigades moved off from under the city walls, and took up the position as shown in the plan attached, viz., Picquet Hill, Karez Hill, and the north-eastern spur of the hill over Old Kandahar.

This movement was accomplished without opposition.

The Cavalry and the 2nd Brigade of Infantry were at this time on baggage and rear-guards.

From such a cursory examination of the ground as I was able to make on arrival in the morning, I was quite satisfied that any attempt to carry the Baba Wali Kotal by a direct attack would be attended with very severe loss. I determined, therefore, if possible, to turn it.

To enable me to decide how best this operation could be carried out, it was necessary to ascertain the strength and precise extent of the position occupied by the enemy. I was anxious to obtain this information without delay, and I therefore ordered

* 3rd Bengal Cavalry.

15th Sikhs.

Two guns of 11/9th Royal Artillery.

a small column* under the command of Brigadier-General Hugh Gough to start at once and make

as complete a reconnaissance as possible.

Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman, Deputy-Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, was directed to accompany the party and to assist Brigadier-General Gough with his great local knowledge and experience.

The reconnaissance started at 1 p.m. from our left near Old Kandahar, and proceeded towards the high ground immediately above the village of Gandizan. Here the infantry and guns halted, while the cavalry advanced some two or two and a half miles, avoiding the numerous orchards and enclosures, and coming out in front of Pir Paimal village, where it was found the enemy were strongly entrenched.

As soon as the enemy's fire along this line had been drawn, the 3rd Bengal Cavalry fell back, admirably handled by their Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. D. Mackenzie.

In the meantime the guns were brought into action, partly to test the range, and also to check the enemy, who were now observed to be passing rapidly into the gardens near Gandizan.

A retirement of the infantry and artillery of the reconnaissance to within our piquets was then ordered.

The instant our troops commenced to fall back, the enemy advanced in great strength and pressed the infantry. They eventually assembled in such large numbers, and endeavoured so persistently to follow, that the whole of the troops of the 3rd Brigade, and part of those of the 1st, were ordered under arms.

The retirement was conducted with great steadiness by the 15th Sikhs, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. Hennessy. At the end of the day our casualties numbered only 10.

The reconnaissance of the 31st August having afforded me all the information I required, I decided on attacking the enemy the following morning.

Orders were accordingly issued for the troops to breakfast at 7 a.m., and for one day's cooked rations to be carried by all ranks.

Brigades were to be in position by 8 a.m., tents being previously struck, and, with the kits, stored in a walled enclosure.

The plan of operations was explained by me personally to the Officers commanding divisions and brigades at 6 a.m.

This plan, briefly, was to threaten the enemy's left (the Baba Wali Kotal) and to attack in force by the village of Pir Paimal.

The whole of the infantry of the Kabul-Kandahar Force, upon whom devolved the duty of carrying the enemy's position, were formed up in rear of the low hills which covered the front of our camp, the right being at Picquet Hill, and the left resting on Chilzina, while the cavalry, under the command of Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, was held in readiness, in rear of the left, to operate by Gandizan towards the bed of the Argandab river, so as to threaten the rear of Ayub Khan's camp, and endanger his line of retreat towards Girishk and Kakrez. E/B Royal Royal Horse Artillery (four guns), two companies of the 2/7th Fusiliers, and four companies of the 28th Bombay Native Infantry, were placed at the disposal of Brigadier-General Gough to take up a position near Gandizan, and, when opportunity offered, to support his advance.

Guards for the protection of the city having been detailed, as shown in the accompanying return, marked No. 9, the remaining troops under Lieutenant-General Primrose's command were ordered to be distributed as follows:—

Brigadier-General Daubeney's brigade to hold the ground from which the Kabul force would advance to the attack.

The remnant of Brigadier-General Burrows' brigade, with No. 5/11th Royal Artillery and the cavalry of the Bombay force under Brigadier-General Nuttall, to take up a position north of the cantonment, from which the 40-pounders might be brought to bear directly on the Baba Wali Pass; the cavalry being instructed to watch the pass called Kotal-i-Murcha, and to cover the city.

It was clear, from a very early hour in the morning, that an offensive movement was contemplated by the enemy. The villages of Gandizan and Gandhi Mullah Sahibdad were held in strength; and desultory fire was brought to bear upon our front from the orchards connecting these two villages, while an ill-directed shell fire was opened from the Baba Wali Kotal, which was held in force during the greater part of the day's operation.

At 9 30 a.m. fire was opened from the 40-pdrs. upon the Baba Wali pass.

Shortly afterwards the brigades of the Kabul-Kandahar force were ordered to the attack, the 1st Brigade being on the right, the 2nd on the left, and the 3rd in reserve. Two batteries of artillery, viz., C/2nd and 6/8th,—the latter being the new pattern jointed guns,—had meanwhile been placed in position to cover the advance of the infantry, and commenced shelling the village of Gandhi Mullah Sahibdad.

The instructions given by Major-General Ross to Brigadier-General Macpherson were to make his first attack on that village, after which he was to clear the enemy from the enclosures which lay between the village and the low spur of the hill short of Pir Paimal. He further ordered Brigadier-General Baker to advance in a westerly direction, keeping touch with the 1st Brigade on his right, and clearing the gardens and orchards in his immediate front.

The attack upon the village of Gandhi Mullah Sahibdad was made by the 2nd Goorkhas and the 92nd Highlanders, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel A. Battye and Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Parker respectively, the remaining two regiments of the 1st Infantry Brigade being in support. The village was carried in the most dashing style, Goorkhas and Highlanders vieing with each other in the rapidity of their advance. The enemy withdrew sullenly and leisurely, a good number remaining to the last in the village to receive a bayonet charge.

On this occasion the following Officers and men were brought to notice as having behaved with distinguished gallantry:—

Major G. S. White,	92nd Highlanders.
Private John Dennis	"
Drummer James Roddick	"
Lieutenant H. S. Wheatley,	2nd Goorkhas.
Sepoy Mangal Jaisi	"
" Wazir Sing Nargarkoti	"
" Makkareah Rana	"
" Bisram Thápá	"
" Maniram Lohar	"

During the advance of the 1st Brigade on the village of Gandi Mullah Sahibdad, the 2nd Brigade had been threading its way through the lanes and walled enclosures which lay in the line of its attack. The resistance it encountered was most stubborn, the enemy being well protected by high walls, which they had carefully loopholed. The loss suffered in clearing these enclosures was necessarily severe. Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, C.B., Captain Frome, and Lance Sergeant Cameron (a grand specimen of a Highland soldier) being amongst those who fell.

Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow met his death while gallantly leading his regiment, the 72nd Highlanders, and in him the army has experienced a great loss. He had on many occasions highly distinguished himself as a leader,—at the Peiwar Kotal, during the operations around Kabul at the latter end of 1879, and notably on the 14th December, when he won the admiration of the whole force by his brilliant conduct in the attack and capture of the Asmai Heights.

Of the regiments of this (the 2nd) Brigade, the 72nd Highlanders and the 2nd Sikhs had the chief share of the fighting. They were the two leading battalions, and frequently had to fix bayonets to carry positions or to check the determined rushes of enemy. Brigadier-General Baker speaks in high terms of the gallant behaviour of these two regiments, and notices especially the manner in which a charge of the enemy was repulsed by the 2nd Sikhs under the able and immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Boswell, who was well supported by Majors H. M. Pratt, J. B. Slater, and F. E. Hastings.

The following Native Commissioned Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and soldiers are brought forward as having been very conspicuous during this part of the action:—

Colour Sergeant G. Jacobs,	72nd Highlanders.
Colour Sergeant R. Lauder	„ „
Lance Corporal J. Gordon	„ „
Subadar-Major Gurbáj Sing,	2nd Sikhs.
Jemadar Alla Sing	„
Naick Dír Sing	„
Sepoy Hakim	„
„ Jai Sing	„
„ Partab Sing	„
„ Bír Sing	„

After severe fighting, both brigades emerged at the point of the hill near Pir Paimal; and bringing their left shoulders forward, they pressed on and swept the enemy through the closely wooded gardens and orchards which cover the western slopes of the hill.

The village of Pir Paimal was in our possession soon after noon.

When I heard from Major-General Ross of the success of the troops under his command, I determined to support his further advance by the 3rd Brigade, which had been drawn up in front of the village of Abasabad, with the double object of being a reserve to the 1st and 2nd Brigades, and of meeting a possible counter-attack by the enemy from the Baba Wali pass.

The capture of Pir Paimal, however, brought our troops in rear of that pass; and, feeling that nothing had now to be feared from the enemy's left, I pushed on with the 3rd Brigade to join Major-General Ross.

That Officer, seeing the advantage gained, and knowing that he could rely upon the courage and eagerness of his troops, had very wisely determined to press forward without waiting for reinforcements.

The position to which the enemy retired, after the capture of Pir Paimal, was an entrenched camp to the south-west of the Baba Wali Kotal, commanding an open piece of ground.

This entrenchment they were evidently prepared to hold with their usual determination; reinforcements were being rapidly pushed up from their reserves, while the guns on the Baba Wali Kotal were turned round, so as to increase the heavy fire of artillery which was brought to bear upon our troops.

It became necessary to take this position at once by storm.

Recognizing this with true soldierly instinct, Major G. S. White, who was leading the advance companies of Her Majesty's 92nd Highlanders, called upon his men for just one charge more "to close the business."

The battery of screw guns, under Brevet-Major J. C. Robinson, had been shelling the enemy with a well directed fire; under cover of which, and supported by a portion of the 2nd Goorkhas and the 23rd Pioneers, the Highlanders, responding with alacrity

to their leader's call, dashed forward and drove the enemy from their entrenchments at the point of the bayonet.

The gallant and ever foremost Major White was the first to reach the enemy's guns; being closely followed by Sepoy Inderbir Lama, who, placing his rifle upon one of the guns, exclaimed that it was captured in the name of the 2nd (Prince of Wales' Own) Goorkhas.

While the 1st Brigade was advancing towards the enemy's last position, a portion of the 2nd Brigade, viz., a half battalion of the 3rd Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. N. Money, charged a body of the enemy on the extreme left, and captured three guns.

The enemy were now completely routed; but, owing to the nature of the ground, it was impossible for Major-General Ross, who was commanding in the front line, to realize the extent of the victory he had won.

He, therefore, expecting the enemy to take up a fresh position further on, and to continue their resistance, ordered the 1st and 2nd Brigades to halt and replenish their ammunition.

When this had been done, and the troops had advanced about a mile, Major-General Ross found himself in sight of the whole of Ayub Khan's camp standing deserted, and apparently as it had been left in the morning, when the Afghans moved to the attack.

With his camp, Ayub Khan lost all his artillery, numbering 32 pieces, including the two guns of E/B., Royal Horse Artillery, which had been taken by his troops at Maiwand on the 27th July.

During this part of the engagement, the following Officers and men were especially remarked for their gallantry and forwardness:—

Major G. S. White,	92nd Highlanders.
Lieutenant C. W. H. Douglas	„
Corporal William McGillvray	„
Private Peter Grieve	„
„ John McIntosh	„
„ D. Grey	„
Major S. E. Beecher,	2nd Goorkhas.
Havildar Gopal Borah	„
Sepoy Inderbir Lama	„
„ Tikaram Kwas	„

Further pursuit with infantry being hopeless, the two brigades were halted on the far side of the village of Mazra, where they were shortly afterwards joined by the 3rd Brigade, under Brigadier-General McGregor.

I had, meanwhile, ordered the cavalry of the Bombay force, under Brigadier-General Nuttall, to advance over the Baba Wali Kotal, and pursue the enemy up the left bank of the Argandab.

The operations of the cavalry under Brigadier-General Hugh Gough were continued throughout the day, the brigade crossing the Argandab and pushing beyond the line of the enemy's retreat towards Kakrez.

During this movement none of the regular troops were encountered, but some 350 of the fugitive ghazis and irregulars were killed.

With the exception of the 1st Brigade, which halted at Mazra for the night, all the troops returned to Kandahar before dark.

Shortly before the final advance, Major-General Ross, wishing to inform me by heliograph that he had succeeded in turning the enemy's position, directed Captain Straton, 22nd Foot, Superintendent of Army Signalling, to proceed with a company of the 24th Punjab Native Infantry to the Baba Wali Kotal. This gallant Officer had only gone a short distance when a ghazi, springing out of a ravine close to him, shot him dead. In Captain Straton Her Majesty's service has lost a most accomplished, intelligent Officer, under whose management army signalling, as applied to field service, reached a pitch of perfection probably never before attained. His energy knew no difficulties, and his enthusiasm was beyond praise. He had won the highest opinions from all with whom his duties had brought him in contact, and his death was very deeply felt throughout the whole force.

On the capture of Ayub Khan's camp, the body of Lieutenant Maclaine, Royal Horse Artillery, was discovered, lying outside what had been his own, and close to Ayub Khan's, tent. It was evident that he was quite recently murdered, the act, I believe, of the guard placed over him by Ayub Khan. This incident I record with deep sorrow at the melancholy fate of a brave young Officer, whose short career had had been so full of promise.

I have requested Lieutenant-General Primrose to furnish a report regarding the part taken by the troops under his command in the engagement of the 1st September. I beg to acknowledge the assistance that the Lieutenant-General and the Officers under his command afforded me. The presence of these troops released the whole of the Kabul-Kandahar Force for the turning movement by Pir Paimal, and contributed materially to the success of the day.

I annex the following returns:—

- No. 1. Numerical Return of Casualties at Kandahar on the 31st August and the 1st September 1880, together with a Nominal Roll of British Officers killed and wounded.
- No. 2. Nominal Roll of Native Officers, British Non-commissioned Officers, and followers of the Infantry Division, Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, killed and wounded on the 31st August and the 1st September 1880.
- No. 3. Nominal Roll of killed and wounded, Cavalry Brigade, Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, on the 1st September 1880.
- No. 4. Return of actual number present of the Infantry Division, Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, at the action of the 1st September 1880.
- No. 5. Return of actual number present of the Cavalry Brigade, Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, at the action of the 1st September 1880.
- No. 6. Return of gun and rifle ammunition expended by the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, on the 31st August and the 1st September 1880.
- No. 7. Numerical return of casualties in the Bombay-Kandahar Field Force, on the 1st September 1880.
- No. 8. Return of ammunition expended by the Bombay-Kandahar Field Force, on the 1st September 1880.
- No. 9. Number of Officers and men of the Bombay-Kandahar Field Force, who were on duty in the citadel and city on the 1st September 1880.
- No. 10. Number of the Bombay-Kandahar Field Force under arms on the 1st September 1880.
- No. 11. Return of ordnance captured on the 1st September 1880.

I also attach four plans illustrative of the country over which the battle was fought,—

- No. 1. Gives the dispositions of the Kabul-Kandahar brigades at several important stages.
- No. 2. Shows the position taken up by the Bombay-Kandahar Field Force, as the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force were breaking ground for the attack.
- No. 3. Has the position of the whole force engaged, together with that of the enemy, and of the ground covered by our cavalry.
- No. 4. Is a pen and ink sketch of the battle field taken from the hill over Gandizan.

It will be seen that our casualties amounted to—

Killed, of all ranks	-	-	-	40
Wounded, of all ranks	-	-	-	228
Total, killed and wounded				268

It is difficult to estimate the loss of the enemy, but it must have been considerable, for upwards of 600 bodies were buried by us between Kandahar and the village of Pir Paimal alone. Probably 1,200 killed would not be an over-estimate.

The number of the enemy against us has been calculated at :—

Regular infantry	-	-	-	-	4,000
Cavalry	-	-	-	-	800
Ghazis	-	-	-	-	5,000
Irregular cavalry	-	-	-	-	3,000

Having briefly described the march from Kabul to Kandahar, and having given the chief incidents of the operations around Kandahar on the 31st August and 1st September, I am desirous of bringing to the special notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Government of India the conduct and bearing of the troops under my command.

The rapidity with which the march was accomplished,—taking into consideration the strength of the force, the variations of climate, and the difficult nature of the country traversed,—is the best testimony I can produce to the efficiency, discipline, and spirit of the troops.

Their conduct, under circumstances often of the most testing nature, cannot be expressed in terms too strong or too full. They all seemed to be animated with but one desire, that, cost what it might in personal risk, fatigue, or discomfort, they would effect the speedy release of their beleaguered fellow-soldiers in the city of Kandahar.

The unflagging energy and perseverance of the troops seemed to reach the full height when they knew they were about to put forth their irresistible strength against a hitherto successful enemy.

Notwithstanding the provocation caused by the cruel murder of any stragglers (soldiers as well as followers) who fell into the hands of the Afghans following in the wake of our column, not one act infringing the rules of civilized warfare was committed by our troops. The persons and property of the Natives were respected, and full compensation for supplies was everywhere given.

In short, the inhabitants of the districts we passed through could not have been treated with greater consideration, nor with a lighter hand; and the conduct of the troops will ever remain as memorable as the results which they achieved.

Where all did their duty so willingly and effectually, there may seem little room for the selection of individuals for prominent notice. I cannot, however, refrain from recording the names of some Officers whose exceptional services, I consider, entitle them to the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Major-General J. Ross, C.B., commanding the Infantry Division and second in command, afforded me every assistance during the march from Kabul and the operations at Kandahar. By the able manner in which he conducted the attack on the Afghan position, on the 1st September, he has given a fresh proof of his many soldierly qualities, and of his fitness for command.

Major-General Ross speaks in high terms of the following Officers of his Staff:—

Major G. de C. Morton, Assistant Adjutant-General.	
Major R. G. Kennedy, Assistant Quartermaster-General.	
Officiating Deputy Surgeon-General J. Ekin, M.B.	
Captain J. D. Mansel, Rifle Brigade, A.D.C.	
Lieutenant A. Davidson, 2/60th Rifles,	} Orderly Officers.
Lieutenant the Hon. M. G. Talbot, R.E.,	
Lieutenant F. B. Longe, R.E.,	

I am greatly indebted to—

Brigadier-General H. T. Macpherson, C.B., V.C., commanding the 1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C.B., commanding the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., commanding the 3rd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General Hugh H. Gough, C.B., V.C., commanding the Cavalry Brigade.

With such able and experienced Officers in command of brigades, success was a certainty. Throughout the long and trying march from Kabul they maintained the strictest discipline, and brought their troops to Kandahar in the highest state of efficiency.

I desire to bring to the special notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the valuable services of these distinguished Officers.

Brigadier-General Macpherson reports favourably of the following Officers, who served under his command:—

Major J. C. Robinson, R.A., commanding No. 6/8th Royal Artillery.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Parker, commanding the 92nd Highlanders.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Battye, commanding the 2nd (P. W. O.) Goorkhas.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. Collett, commanding the 23rd Pioneers.

Colonel F. B. Norman, commanding the 24th Punjab Native Infantry.

Captain R. E. C. Jarvis, 67th Foot, Brigade Major, "for the intelligent manner in which he carried out the duties of his appointment."

Captain A. D. M'Gregor, 92nd Highlanders, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, "for his intelligence and untiring energy."

Captain R. P. Tickell, R.E., Field Engineer, "for his valuable services during the march from Kabul, and usefulness during the action of the 1st September."

Lieutenant E. S. E. Childers, R.E., Orderly Officer.

Brigadier-General Macpherson records that the devotion of the Medical Officers of the brigade in attending to the wounded in the field under fire was most admirable.

He mentions,—

Surgeon-Major S. B. Roe, M.B., 92nd Highlanders.
 Surgeon-Major W. Finden, 2nd (P. W. O.) Goorkhas.
 Surgeon E. H. Fenn, No. 6/8th Royal Artillery.
 Surgeon H. J. Linton, 24th Punjab Native Infantry.
 Surgeon H. Hamilton, M.D., 23rd Pioneers.

Brigadier-General T. D. Baker would wish to mention specially the names of the following Officers:—

Major G. Swinley, R.A., commanding No. 2 Mountain Battery.
 Major C. M. Stockwell, commanding the 72nd Highlanders.
 Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Boswell, commanding the 2nd Sikhs.
 Lieutenant-Colonel A. FitzHugh, commanding the 5th Goorkhas.
 Colonel O. V. Tanner, commanding the 29th Bombay Native Infantry.
 Captain W. C. Farwell, General List, Infantry, Brigade Major.
 Lieutenant F. T. N. Spratt, R.E., Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
 Captain W. G. Nicholson, R.E., Field Engineer.
 Captain M. N. G. Kane, 72nd Highlanders, Orderly Officer.
 Surgeon-Major G. W. M'Nalty, M.D.

Surgeon-Major C. A. Atkins, "for the manner in which he attended the wants of the wounded in the fighting line."

Brigadier-General MacGregor desires to record his appreciation of the support and assistance he received from—

Major J. M. Douglas, R.A., commanding No. 11/9th Royal Artillery.
 Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Collins, commanding the 2nd Battalion, 60th Royal Rifles.
 Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. Hennessy, commanding the 15th Sikhs.
 Colonel J. W. Hoggan, commanding the 25th Punjab Native Infantry.
 Lieutenant-Colonel F. F. Rowcroft, commanding the 4th Goorkhas.

Captain R. Chalmer, 2/60th Rifles, Brigade Major, who proved himself a most zealous Officer.

Captain A. Gaselee, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, who aided much by his knowledge of the country.

Captain M. C. Brackenbury, R.E., Field Engineer, an excellent and energetic Officer.

Captain H. M'L. Hutchinson, 14th Foot, Orderly Officer, who rendered every assistance in his power.

He further brings forward the following regimental Officers:—

Captain A. E. Duthy, R.A., 11/9th Royal Artillery.	
Major W. G. Byron,	} 2/60th Rifles.
Captain J. N. Blackwood-Price,	
" H. S. Marsham,	} 15th Sikhs.
Major D. W. Inglis,	
Captain H. A. Abbott,	} 25th Punjab Native Infantry.
Captain W. V. Ellis,	
Lieutenant C. H. H. Beley,	} 4th Goorkhas.
Major E. P. Mainwaring,	
Captain C. A. Mercer,	
Surgeon-Major G. C. Chesnaye,	
Surgeon-Major E. C. Markey.	

Brigadier-General Hugh Gough states that his thanks are specially due to,—

Major J. A. Tillard, R.H.A., commanding E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.
 Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Bushman, commanding the 9th (Queen's Royal) Lancers.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. D. Mackenzie, commanding the 3rd Bengal Cavalry.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Martin, commanding the Central India Horse.

Major A. Vivian, commanding the 3rd Punjab Cavalry.

Captain J. P. Brabazon, 10th Hussars, Brigade Major.

Major B. A. Combe, 10th Hussars, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Captain C. F. Call, R.E., Field Engineer.

Captain H. Burnley, 6th Dragoon Guards, } Orderly Officers.

Lieutenant M. O. Little, 9th Lancers,

Surgeon-Major R. Lewer.

I beg to acknowledge with thanks the aid I have received throughout from Colonel Alured C. Johnson, R.H.A., commanding the Royal Artillery, and Colonel Æ. Perkins, C.B., R.E., Commanding Royal Engineer. Officers commanding batteries, whose names are brought forward by the Officer commanding the Royal Artillery, have already been mentioned by the Brigadier-Generals commanding the brigades to which their batteries were attached, with the exception of Major P. H. Greig, R.A., commanding C/2nd Royal Artillery, whose services on the 1st September Colonel Johnson desires to acknowledge, and Major T. Graham, commanding No. 6/8th Royal Artillery, who shared the arduous march from Kabul, but was unfortunately prevented by sickness from commanding his battery during the operations at Kandahar.

He mentions also,—

Captain H. Pison, R.H.A., Adjutant, Royal Artillery, and Lieutenant R. A. Bannatine, R.A., Orderly Officer, both of whom afforded him every assistance.

Colonel Perkins speaks favourably of the assistance he received from Lieutenant T. P. Cather, R.E., Adjutant, Royal Engineers.

I trust I may be permitted here to record my opinion of the excellent services performed by the following regimental Officers who have been with me throughout all, or the greater part of, the campaign in Afghanistan, and are still serving under my command :—

Royal Artillery.

Lieutenant E. A. Smith.

9th (Queen's Royal) Lancers.

Captain H. W. Apperley.		Captain B. Gough.
Captain J. A. H. Stewart-Mackenzie.		Lieutenant E. B. M'Innis.

72nd Highlanders.

Major C. W. N. Guinness.		Captain R. H. Murray.
Captain Garnett.		Lieutenant R. L. Milne.
Captain M. N. G. Kane.		Lieutenant S. C. H. Monro.

92nd Highlanders.

Major G. S. White.		Captain the Hon. J. Scott Napier.
Captain L. C. Singleton.		Captain C. W. H. Douglas.
Captain R. F. Darvall.		Lieutenant W. H. Dick Cunyngham.

3rd Bengal Cavalry.

Lieutenant-Colonel B. Cracroft.		Major G. W. Willock.
---------------------------------	--	----------------------

3rd Punjab Cavalry.

Major W. C. Anderson.		Major J. D. Macpherson.
Captain C. C. Egerton.		

Central India Horse.

Major H. M. Buller.		Major J. Colledge.
Major M. G. Gerard.		

2nd Goorkhas.

Major S. E. Beecher.		Lieutenant H. S. Wheatley.
----------------------	--	----------------------------

23rd Pioneers.

Captain H. Paterson.		Captain S. V. Gordon.
----------------------	--	-----------------------

24th Punjab Native Infantry.

Captain E. Stedman.

2nd Sikh Infantry.

Major H. M. Pratt.		Major J. B. Slater.
Major F. E. Hastings.		

3rd Sikh Infantry.

Major C. J. Griffiths.

Major W. B. Aislabie.

5th Goorkhas.

Major J. M. Sym.

Captain E. Molloy.

Lieutenant A. R. Martin.

Lieutenant C. C. Chenevix-Trench.

Lieutenant C. C. St. E. Lucas.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Chapman, R.A., who has held the important post of Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, has afforded me throughout the most valuable and material assistance. His services in Afghanistan are well known to the Commander-in-Chief in India; I am glad, however, to have this opportunity of bringing the name of this excellent Staff Officer prominently before His Excellency.

Deputy Surgeon-General J. Hanbury, M.B., proved himself to be an efficient administrative Medical Officer, and carried on the duties of his responsible office to my entire satisfaction.

To Major A. R. Badcock, Deputy Commissary-General, the entire force is deeply indebted. The manner in which he, and the Officers under his orders, overcame difficulties of no ordinary nature, and the manner in which they exerted themselves to procure the daily supply, are deserving of particular mention. The administrative talent possessed by Major Badcock is of the highest order, and I cannot recommend his services too strongly for recognition by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Government of India.

Major Badcock speaks in the highest terms of all the Officers of the Commissariat Department with the force, but he brings forward especially the name of Captain A. T. S. A. Rind, Bengal Staff Corps.

The valuable services performed by Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Low, Bengal Cavalry, Chief Director of Transport, and the Officers of his Department, can scarcely be considered apart from those of the Commissariat Department.

I would wish here to record my high sense of the admirable work accomplished by Lieutenant-Colonel Low and his able staff of assistants. The mobility of the force depended upon the efficiency of the transport, and it is mainly due to the untiring energy of these Officers that the troops were able to perform such long and continuous marches, and to reach their destination with the transport animals in such excellent condition. Lieutenant-Colonel Low brings to special notice Captain W. A. Wynter, 33rd Foot, and Lieutenant L. E. P. Booth, 33rd Foot.

Major C. A. Gorham, R.A., Deputy Judge-Advocate General, has carried on his duties entirely to my satisfaction.

Major C. Cowie, R.A., Commissary of Ordnance, had a difficult and arduous task to perform, his successful accomplishment of which deserves my acknowledgment. My thanks are also due to Lieutenant W. G. Small, 59th Foot, in charge of the field treasure chest.

The Reverend J. W. Adams, B.A., Chaplain, Church of England, the Reverend G. W. Manson, B.D., and the Reverend Alexander Ferrier, M.A., the Presbyterian Chaplains, and the Very Reverend Father G. Browne, were throughout most attentive to their duties.

Major E. G. B. Hastings, Chief Political Officer, and the following Officers of the Political Staff:—

Captain J. W. Ridgeway,

Major C. B. Euan Smith, C.S.I.,

Major M. Protheroe,

have rendered me every assistance, and have spared themselves no trouble nor exposure in their endeavours to gain information, and to procure supplies for the force.

It affords me much pleasure to bring forward the names of the Officers serving on my personal staff, who have at all times been unremitting in the performance of their duties.

Major G. T. Pretymann, R.A., has, in addition to his duties as Aide-de-Camp, held the position of Commandant of Field Force head-quarters.

Lieutenant J. Sherston, Rifle Brigade, Aide-de-Camp.

Captain R. Pole-Carew, Coldstream Guards, } Orderly Officers.

Captain the Hon. W. C. Rowley, R.A., }

Surgeon J. F. Williamson, M.B.

Enclosure 4 in No. 38.

NUMERICAL RETURN of CASUALTIES in the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force and the Kandahar Field Force in the operations of the 31st August and 1st September, 1880, near Kandahar.

Remarks.	Killed.						Wounded.						Total.	Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Sergeants, Duffadars and Havildars.	Drummers and Buglers.	Rank and File.	Followers.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Sergeants, Duffadars, and Havildars.	Drummers and Buglers.	Rank and File.	Followers.		
Staff -	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1 horse wounded.
C/2nd Royal Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	1 horse killed.
No. 6/8th Royal Artillery.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	6	4 mules killed; 1 horse and 2 mules wounded.
No. 5/11th Royal Artillery.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
No. 2 Punjab Mountain Battery.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 mule wounded.
9th Lancers -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
3rd Bengal Cavalry -	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1*	-	2	* Since dead. Two horses killed, 1 wounded.
3rd Punjab Cavalry -	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	4	-	7	3 horses killed, 9 wounded.
Central India Horse	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	4	-	6	
3rd Bombay Cavalry	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	1 horse killed, 3 wounded.
3rd Sind Horse -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	8 horses killed, 1 wounded.
7th Fusiliers -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
60th Rifles -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	
72nd Highlanders -	2	-	-	-	7	-	2	-	1	-	19†	2	33	† 4 men since dead.
92nd Highlanders -	-	-	1	-	10	-	2	-	7	-	62‡	2	84	‡ 8 men since dead. One horse and 1 mule killed; 2 mules wounded.
15th Bengal Native Infantry.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1§	-	3	-	6	§ Since dead.
23rd ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	1	1	10	2	17	2 mules killed.
24th ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	10	1	13	
25th ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	2	
2nd Goorkha Regiment.	-	-	-	-	8	-	1	1	-	1	20	2	33	2 men since dead. One horse wounded.
4th ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	4	-	7	
5th ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	2¶	5	¶ Both since dead.
2nd Sikh Infantry	-	-	-	-	3	-	1	-	1	-	2**	2	29	** 1 man since dead.
3rd ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	5	-	6	
4th Bombay Native Infantry.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
28th ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
29th ditto, ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	
Commissariat Department.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1††	1	†† Since dead.
Total -	3	1	1	-	35	-	11	4	16	2	177	18		
Grand total -	40						228						268	{ 16 horses and 7 mules killed; 17 horses and 5 mules wounded.

No. 39.

No. 43 of 1880.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR
GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

India Office, London,
15th October 1880.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of Letter of Your Excellency's Government, No. 205, dated the 7th September, with accompanying papers, reporting the arrival at Kandahar of the force which marched from Kabul under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, and the defeat of the army of Sirdar Ayub Khan.

2. Immediately upon receipt, by telegraph, of the news of these events, I had the satisfaction of communicating to Sir F. Roberts and to the Commander-in-Chief in India the congratulations of Her Majesty the Queen and the Government upon the complete success by which the operations of the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force had been crowned. Her Majesty's Government desire now to place upon record their entire concurrence in the sentiments upon this subject, which are expressed by Your Excellency in Council in your letter under notice. They have the highest appreciation of the very distinguished service which Sir F. Roberts and his troops, both European and Native, have rendered to the country; and they are extremely sensible of the obligations which they owe to Lieutenant-General Sir D. Stewart for the zeal and energy displayed by him in the organization and equipment of the force, to which was entrusted a task as arduous as it was honourable, and fraught with political and military issues of the first importance.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 40.

No. 223 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 19th October 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the diary of the Political Resident, Southern Afghanistan, for the period from 1st to 28th July 1880.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" J. STRACHEY.
" W. STOKES.
" J. GIBBS.
" D. M. STEWART.
" C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure in No. 40.

DIARY OF THE KANDAHAR RESIDENCY FROM 1ST JULY TO 28TH JULY 1880.

(Extract).

1st July.—Wali writes from Girishk that messengers have arrived from Farah, stating that when they left Ayub Khan was said to be at Khushkeha, 16 miles to the north. They went to that place, and found him there with all his force, intending to go to Farah the next day. This was about the 24th. Those men of the Kabuli regi-

ments who had married in Herat had brought their wives with them. A second messenger stated that the Luinab, Khushdil Khan, with a large number of sowars, had reached Khurmalik, and that his advanced guard was at Chah-i-Gaz. The Wali asked for orders about his troops in Washir. I wrote, recommending him to order Roshndil Khan to withdraw in presence of the regulars, but to hold his ground against cavalry alone.

The Wali's letter also contains a pressing request for money, and recommends, in case of the major part of the force moving out to Girishk, that the remainder of the troops should be concentrated in the citadel.

It having come to my knowledge that the severity with which Sirdar Nur Ali Khan is treating the families of the men who deserted last week from Girishk is exciting much bad feeling, I wrote telling him of it, bringing to his notice at the same time that the superintendents of canals are said to be making large sums by the sale of the water to people not entitled to it.

Wrote to the Wali, telling him that orders had come for the despatch of a force to Girishk.

2nd July.—Wali writes that Ayub had arrived at Farah, and is coming on to Kharmalik at once. The Luinab had reached Bakwa.

A letter from a Herat agent who is in Ayub's camp reached me. He says that they were to start on the 19th June. Sowars to the number of 3,500 had been paraded for inspection. Only nine percussion caps per man were available, a supply promised from Meshed having been stopped by the Persian Government. The Khutba had been read in the mosques, and coin had been struck in the name of Ayub Khan.

It is rumoured in the city that talibs are taking away arms packed in bales of merchandise for the Garmsir with the intention of joining Ayub, and the disaffected are plucking up their spirits at the news of Ayub's advance.

Sirdars Nur Ali Khan and Muhammad Husain Khan called on me to discuss arrangements for supplies for troops on the march to Girishk.

Note.—He did not actually desert for some days after this.

(Sd.) O. St. J.

3rd July 1880. A rumour is current that Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan has deserted the Wali, and gone with his sowars to Ayub's camp.

4th July.—The Wali writes that he cannot hope to oppose Ayub with his small number of comparatively raw troops, and that if a force is not sent to his assistance, he will have to fall back on Kandahar on which the whole country will fall into a state of disorder, which it will be difficult to repress.

The Wali's Mirza writes secretly to Mirza Hassan Ali Khan that, if the Wali does not receive support from us on the Helmund, both his own troops and the Zamindawar levies are likely to desert him. Wrote informing the Wali that the cavalry and artillery are to-day leaving Kandahar, to be followed by the infantry to-morrow.

E/B, R.H.A., the whole of the Q. O. Light Cavalry, and the greater part of the 3rd Sind Horse, marched to Kohkaran to-day, with two companies of infantry and half a company of sappers.

A further loan of a lac of rupees to the Wali having been sanctioned by the Government of India, it was paid over, at his request, to Sirdar Nur Ali Khan.

5th July.—Marched to Ashukan, 14 miles, and found the artillery and cavalry there. Mirza Hasan Ali Khan accompanies me, Lieutenant Muir remaining in Kandahar.

The infantry brigade, consisting of Her Majesty's 66th Foot, the 1st and 30th Bombay Native Infantry, under Brigadier-General Burrows, marched this morning to Kohkaran.

The Wali writes that he has recalled his infantry from from Washir to a place named Bacharabia, midway between Washir and Girishk. The cavalry remains at Washir.

Ayub's advanced guard is at Bakwa. He has written to the Washir and Zamin-dawar Chiefs, some of whom have sent his letters to the Wali, while others have not.

A messenger sent to Herat has returned through Taiwara. He accompanied Ayub's army as far as the Araskund. It consists, he says, of ten infantry regiments, thirty-six guns, and sixteen or seventeen hundred cavalry. A battery of artillery had pre-

ceded him to Farah. The ammunition was in the exclusive charge of the Kabul troops, who had their families to the number of seven or eight hundred with them. The officers in command were Hafizulla Khan, Taj Muhammad Khan, and Abdulla Khan, Nasiri. Sirdar Abdul Wahab Khan, son of Mir Afzal Khan, has been left in charge of Herat. General Muhammad Jan holds the city gates, and the Aimak Chiefs, Fathulla Beg, Firuzkahi, Yalantush Khan, son of Khan Agha, Jamshidi, and Muhammad Khan, Begler Begi, the citadel.

6th July.—Marched to Karez i-Ata, 19 miles. Before marching, a gunner of the artillery committed suicide with his carbine. There was some difficulty about obtaining supplies, principally wood.

7th July.—To Khushk-i-Nakhud, eight miles. Wali writes that the enemy's sowars have reached the Khash river, 18 miles from Washir. Supplies of all sorts plentiful.

8th July.—Khushk-i-Nakhud to Miskarez eight miles. To break the long march to Girishk, 24 miles, the Wali has arranged for supplies at Choghrak, six miles on this side. There is no village here, but water can be turned into an old canal from the Helmund by stopping the irrigation channels further up.

A correspondent from Washir writes on the 6th that a messenger from Farah states that when he left Ayub had been there for a week. That he has with him ten regiments of infantry, 5,000 sowars, and 30 guns. His daily consumption is 67 kharwars of grain. Muhammad Umar Khan, Nurzai, has undertaken the safe custody of the families of the Kabul regiments during their advance on Kandahar.

9th July.—Miskarez to Choghrak, 18 miles. Provisions plentifully supplied by the Wali, with fowls, eggs, and fruits for the officers.

10th July.—Choghrak to the bank of the Helmund opposite Girishk, five miles. Sirdars Muhammad Hassan Khan and Gul Muhammad Khan crossed the river to meet me. They brought information of the desertion of Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, his son, Shir Muhammad Khan, and his nephew, Habibulla Khan, with their sowars, some 70 in number. An attempt made by them to induce the regular infantry and others to join them was unsuccessful. They went to Naozad, and proclaimed "Ghaza," on which some talibs and others joined them.

Mirza Hasan Ali Khan went over to the Wali's camp, and returned in the afternoon with the following news:—

The Wali has written to Sirdar Nur Ali Khan in Kandahar to confiscate all the Sartip's property, and is sending Gul Muhammad Khan with one thousand sowars to seize him.

A. B. writes to the Wali not to believe the stories current about the quarrels between the Kabuli and Herati troops. The fact of their having reached Farah without fighting is sufficient to show that they can be unanimous on occasion. He advises him, therefore, to strengthen himself in every way. C. D. has sent a message to the Wali to the same effect. E. F. writes that it is hopeless for the Wali to expect to possess himself of Herat alone, there being traitors among his people, who are the real cause of Ayub's advance; and that if the English assist him with a force, there will be no difficulty in the matter. He adds that whatever is done should be done quickly.

Intelligence arrived that Ayub's sowars who were collecting supplies on the Khash, had returned to Bakwa on hearing that an English force had left Kandahar.

The Wali's sowars in Washir fell back on Sadat Kalah, 18 miles from Girishk, being unable to get provisions.

The Wali came over to see me in the evening, but the news he had to give had been already communicated through Mirza Hassan Ali Khan. He said that now a British force had arrived he looked to us for orders.

The letter from the Governor of Bombay to him, accompanying presents in return for those given to Sir Richard Temple, was presented to him.

11th July.—Information was received from Ayub's camp that he arrived at Dilaram (on the bank of the Khash) on the 9th, and would reach Washir to-day. Some of the Maliks of the latter district had gone to meet him.

A second messenger brought the news that his advanced guard of 100 sowars had reached Washir.

General Burrows arrived with the infantry brigade.

Rode out in the morning with a party of cavalry to the south of our camp, and found the river fordable nearly everywhere, except just below the numerous rapids.

In the evening met the Wali by appointment on the other side of the river, and communicated to him the orders we had received not to cross it. He said that in that case it was useless his remaining alone on the other side now that Ayub Khan had got so far, and that he would concentrate his men at Girishk as soon as possible. Had he perfect confidence in his troops, he would attempt to hold his own, or, indeed, would have held the frontier, but at present he trusted entirely to our support. He was evidently in very low spirits.

12th July.—My conversation with the Wali the previous evening having left an impression on my mind that the disaffection in his camp was more than reported, I sent a man in my service, formerly in the Kabul army, to the camp, to see what was going on. He returned with the news that the Wali's sepoy, particularly those of the Kabir regiment, were openly declaring their intention of joining Ayub Khan as soon as he came near enough. I therefore sent for Mirza Ali Akbar, the Wali's confidential Secretary, who confirmed the truth of the report. I therefore told him to return, and tell the Wali that I had discovered that his troops were ready to mutiny at a moment's notice, and that the only thing left to do was to disarm them before they had an opportunity of doing so. I also asked him to meet me the next morning early, to talk over the situation.

Intelligence was brought that Sirdar Ghulam Dastgir Khan (son of Sirdar Ghulam Muhaieddin Khan) had deserted the advanced cavalry with 20 sowars. Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan pursued him, but made no real attempt to capture him. His baggage, however, was taken, and among it was found a letter from Luinab Khushdil Khan to Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, dated 10th July, to the effect that he (the Luinab) had arrived at Washir with a thousand sowars and a collection of Ghazis. He, therefore, urged the Sartip to lose no time in joining the troops of Islam.

Mirza Ali Khan, sent some weeks ago to Herat to bring news, reached the camp. He had fallen in with Ayub's army at Sabzwar, and accompanied it to Farah, which he left eight days ago. He states that Ayub's army consists of nine regiments of regular infantry and three of cavalry, the latter of 260 men each. The infantry regiments are 600 strong. This is nominal strength.

He has about 1,000 tribal cavalry and 36 guns, six of which were to be left at Farah. One battery has breech-loaders made at Kabul.

While at Farah the Herati irregular cavalry and the three Herat regiments conspired to take Ayub prisoner and return with him to Herat, but Naib Hafizulla Khan, the General, discovered it, and sent off the irregular cavalry to the front with the Luinab. With them he travelled as far as Saki, where he left them and came on to Girishk. The Herati infantry was not trusted with ammunition. Ayub's army was very short of carriage. Some of the ammunition had to be left at Sabzwar, and camels were sent back from Farah to bring it on. Information had been brought to the Luinab by some deserters from the Wali's army, that his troops had dispersed, and that English troops were coming from Kandahar.

A correspondent in Ayub's army sends a letter from * * * * * Herat to Naib Hafizullah Khan, informing them that Faizu, the leader of the mutiny of the Herat troops last year, had been attempting to raise disturbances. But his son and cousin had been caught and blown away from guns, some others hanged in the Char-su, and some infantry soldiers punished and imprisoned. These measures effectually quieted the city.

Rode out with General Burrows to inspect site for new camp in a better position further up the river.

13th July.—Rode across the river and met the Wali, who returned with me to our camp. I repeated what I had told him the day before, namely, that General Burrows had the strictest orders not to cross the river, but only to prevent Ayub Khan doing so. General Burrows came to my tent, and joined the conversation, and after some time it was agreed, on the Wali's proposition, that he should bring his troops to our side, where it would be easy to disarm them. He asked me to write to him, requesting

him to bring his men to our side, that he might show the letter to his officers. This I did.

During this and the previous day I made unsuccessful efforts to get a strong party sent with a sufficiency of camels to bring the stores collected by the Wali across the river.

In the evening a sowar of the 3rd Sind Horse, who had lagged behind a foraging party, was murdered in a village across the river.

14th July.—At daylight our camp began to move to its new ground, a mile to the north, a very strong rearguard remaining on the old position. At the same time I went with a squadron of the 3rd Light Cavalry to watch the Wali's camp from the heights opposite it. Nothing stirred till sunrise, when the tents were struck and camels loaded. About half-past six Sirdar Dilawar Khan came across to select ground for the new camp, and reported all quiet. I had gone down with him to the river valley, when Mirza Hasan Ali Khan rode up with the report that the Wali's troops had mutinied, seized the guns, and driven him and his cavalry across the river. Riding back I met the Wali, who repeated the same story, and begged that we might fall back on Kandahar at once as all the country would rise. I told him that we must first take the guns and punish the mutineers. Near the old camp I met General Burrows, who had heard the news, and begged him to cross and attack the mutineers at once. After some time it was decided to do so, and four companies of infantry were sent across the ford to hold the farther bank thickly wooded. At the same time General Nuttall was ordered to take the cavalry and artillery across and attack the mutineers, who were now in full sight formed up in rear of the fort. A portion of the Wali's sowars with a quantity of baggage were by this time moving off along the Kandahar, and a Staff Officer seeing this declared that they were moving to attack our rear. This caused all previous orders to be countermanded, while the mutineers, after plundering the fort, moved leisurely along the opposite bank of the river, some three miles off. It was not till the head of this column of baggage had passed our camp that definite orders for pursuit were given, and the horse artillery, the greater part of the cavalry, and eight companies of infantry crossed the river opposite the new camp. Half an hour later the cavalry came in sight of the mutineers, when they formed up in a single line on the high bank. After waiting in this position for some time they fell back a mile, and took up a new one with the guns on their left next the river. From this they opened a harmless artillery fire on the cavalry. Half an hour later the horse artillery came into action, after experiencing much difficulty and delay in crossing the water cuts and jungle. Before long the mutineers' guns were abandoned, but the day was so hazy that the fact was not discovered for some ten minutes or more, when the cavalry rode up to them, and were received with musketry fire from the fields below which caused them to fall back for a time. Our guns and infantry coming up soon put the few mutineers that remained to flight, and the cavalry pursued them for some distance. Some 50 may have been killed, including three artillerymen found dead at the guns, which were brought back to our camp four miles distant.

On returning I found the Wali at my tents, his own having been lost. He had, like myself, indeed, considered it impossible that we should catch the mutineers, and it can only have been the badness of the road along the river bank for the guns that enabled us to do so. Had they gone by the direct route towards Farah we could not have caught them up.

The Wali suggested that he should send his sowars, under his nephew, Muhammad Hassan Khan, to Kushk-i-Nakhud to collect supplies, and keep open communications, and they accordingly started at once.

Seven deserters from Ayub's regular cavalry came in. They declared that the whole army was on the point of mutinying; but that, of course, the news of the mutiny of the Wali's men would keep them together.

15th July.—Received news that two hundred of Ayub's sowars had reached Mahmudabad. At 5 p.m. the force marched to Miskarez. The Wali accompanied us.

16th July.—Received a letter from the Walidah, Bibi Hawa, asking leave to write to Ayub Khan and Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, with the object of arranging a peace. I replied that, as she was well known to be our friend, any communication from her

would be looked on as coming from us, and that as I had no power to promise anything either to Ayub Khan or the Sartip, it would be better if she refrained from writing.

17th July.—Marched at daybreak to Kushk-i-Nakhud, and after some discussion halted not far from our previous halting place, known as the Takia. Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan and the rest of the Wali's relations, with their sowars, are camped in the gardens close by. Taj Muhammad Khan, Sistani, with 70 horse of his own tribe is with them. A report sent from Kandahar stated that Sadu Khan and the son of Muhammad Afzal Khan, Hotakis, had passed through on their way to Kelat-i-Ghilzai. On sending to ascertain the truth of this, it was found that Muhammad Afzal's son had left this morning only, while Sadu Khan was still in camp with the rest of the Wali's sowars.

18th July.—Rode to Maiwand with Major Leach, R.E., and a squadron of cavalry. Found everything quiet, and arranged for supply of atta from the mills, of which there are eight.

A spy from Girishk states that two hundred sowars arrived there on 17th, and sent back to Ayub to inform him that we had left the Helmund. A writer in the Wali's service taken off by the mutineers on the 14th to Kalah-i-Gaz, about 10 miles above Girishk, states that the Luinab and the son of Sartip Nur Muhammad are there with a large body of sowars. The Wali sent the greater part of his sowars, some 400 in number, under Sirdar Abbas Khan, his brother-in-law, to Khalifeh-Robat to collect supplies and send them to us.

19th July.—Moved camp to an open position, some three miles nearer Girishk. A spy (formerly a sepoy in the 1st Biluch Regiment) returned from the Helmund with news that the Luinab, with about 1,500 sowars, arrived at Girishk on the 18th, and said that Ayub, with the main body which is now at Mahmudabad, would come in on the 19th or 20th. Considerable numbers of ghazis have passed us by bye-roads to join Ayub. Abubakr, a minor Alizai Chief (the same who attacked Colonel Malcolmson here last year), has brought a contingent from Zamindawar. Cavalry patrols are sent by General Burrows towards Maiwand, Sangbur, and the Arghandab.

A man of the Wali's came from Maiwand to report that Abubakr has come to Malmund, and is plundering the place.

A. B. writes from his village (Nahar-i-Sarkar), near the junction of the Arghandab and Helmund, that bodies of ghazis have passed from the Garmsir direction.

20th July.—Strong patrols of cavalry sent to Miskarez and Garmawak this morning, brought no intelligence except that some ghazis had passed the latter place.

The Wali received intelligence that the family of Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, returning to Kandahar, had been attacked by Aitchakzais beyond Panjwai. Sirdar Abbas Khan, who was near at hand with 400 sowars, came up and drove off the Aitchakzais, killing four of them. The Wali sent the remainder of his sowars under Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan and Taj Muhammad Khan, Popalzai, to Panjwai to aid in keeping order.

From Gurek news arrived that Habibulla Khan, Barakzai, nephew of the Sartip, has plundered the village of Taj Muhammad, Popalzai.

21st July.—A spy returned from Kalah-i-Gaz (on the further bank of the Helmund opposite Haidarabad) with news that half of Ayub's force reached the Helmund yesterday and sent back camels to bring up baggage and stores left behind at the last stage for want of carriage. A considerable number of tribal sowars, mutineers, and ghazis had joined them.

It is reported in their camp that Ayub Khan will move by Sangbur and attack us here. Luinab, with 2,500 cavalry, is reported to have started down the Helmund with the intention of crossing to the Arghandab and attacking our camp at night. The people about the Helmund at first refused to supply Ayub with provisions, but on his assembling the chief men, and declaring that this was a holy war, and that it was incumbent on all Muhammadans to devote their lives and property to his service, moreover, that he would excuse them from payment of two years' revenue should the

country become his, they brought in provisions freely. The same informant states that there are 200 ghazis at Sangbur on their way to join Ayub.

Another spy states that half the enemy's camp is at Shoraki, and the other half coming up (Shoraki and Kalah-i-Gaz are adjacent districts). Nazir Muhammad Sadik (a dependant of the Sartip's) has been appointed Governor of Girishk, with two hundred sowars.

The patrol returning from Sangbur captured a prisoner, unarmed, who states that Ayub's regulars have crossed the Helmund to Haidarabad, but that the ghazis are still on the further bank.

As a precaution against the night attack said to be projected by the Luinab, General Burrows this evening moved the entire force to a new position, a few hundred yards west of the camp. Here the whole of the heavy baggage was parked in two small walled enclosures, between which the camels were placed, with an entanglement of pack saddles and ropes beyond them. On the east the cavalry and artillery horse lines were established, with Officers' tents between them and the enclosures. Outside all, the infantry were disposed in a semicircle, with guns at intervals, behind a breastwork formed of their tents and packs.

22nd July.—Spies returned from Helmund report Ayub Khan's camp to be on this side of river about Haidarabad, and that his cavalry has made a reconnaissance to Sangbur. It was reported that his whole cavalry force, 4,000 in number, would return there to-morrow, Ayub Khan, with the rest of the army, following the next day. The force was currently stated at 4,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, 8,000 ghazis, and 36 guns. A small party of ghazis, about 40 in number, were at Sangbur.

Cavalry patrols sent to Maiwand captured five armed sowars, who proved to be followers of one of the Wali's people who had been sent to bring in supplies. They had run away the evening before on hearing a report that Ayub's cavalry was approaching, and were returning when captured.

One of my spies returning from the Helmund was captured by our cavalry patrol, and kept in the guard for six hours before being made over to me. He corroborated report of the first generally, but said that Ayub's irregulars had not yet crossed the river. He was told by some of the Kandahari sepoy that Ayub's intention is to incite the ghazis and cavalry to attack the English, and await the result with the regulars. He intends to advance to Maiwand. The Luinab, with four hundred sowars, was coming *via* Malmund to Maiwand, which he intended to reach to-morrow. The main body will march to Sangbur either to-morrow or the day after. He heard two Herati sepoy discussing the situation, and saying that it would be absurd for them to fight the English, as, if Ayub won, he would take them on to Kabul. The Kandahari regiment was also discontented at the non-receipt of a year's arrears of pay, and saying that they had come on because they could not help themselves. The soldiers received less than a pound of meal a day as a ration. This informant declared that in his belief they had not more than a thousand irregular sowars, and an equal number of ghazis. Eighty sowars were at Sangbur when he passed.

The Wali suggested that we should set fire to the corn ricks about Maiwand. General Burrows arranged that a party should go out the next morning to carry out this suggestion.

23rd July.—At daybreak this morning shots were heard from the westward. Shortly afterwards a sowar of the Sind Horse came in with a message from Captain Monteith, that on proceeding on patrol with a troop of his regiment he had come upon a strong body of the enemy's cavalry, with whose scouts he had exchanged shots. He had fallen back towards camp, and halted a mile distant. The force, which was at the time getting under arms as usual, moved out at once. After a short time I rode out, and found Captain Monteith's troop drawn up facing the enemy, who were moving leisurely along in a long straggling line towards Maiwand. They were about two miles off. With Major Leach, R.E., I rode out about half way towards them. There appeared to be about four hundred, and their advanced guard had already entered the northern villages of Khushk-i-Nakhud. About this time, probably seeing our force, they commenced to return along the road they had come. Seeing that no attempt at intercepting them was being made on our side, we returned and found that a staff officer had reported three battalions of infantry concealed behind a hill. This and another report that another body of cavalry had been seen to the south proving erroneous, General Nuttall, with two guns, Royal Horse Artillery, and a couple of

squadrons of cavalry, galloped off on pursuit of the now disappearing enemy. After a couple of miles, their rearguard of thirty or forty men being within gunshot, the artillery fired four shells at them, causing them to ride off, but apparently doing little or no damage. The cavalry and artillery then returned to camp.

A special messenger from Kandahar, who returned this morning, reports that he met a hundred sowars* coming from the direction of the Maiwand pass towards Hauz-i-Madat.

* These proved to have been men sent by the Sartip to bring away his women who were concealed in the villages about Koh-karan.

In consequence of the affair of the morning, the expedition to burn the stacks at Maiwand did not start, but one of the Wali's sowars sent there reported none of the enemy to be seen.

A troop of cavalry sent later in the afternoon brought back similar intelligence, but a man of the Wali's told the Officer in command that he had heard that the enemy's cavalry intend attacking us to-night.

A certain Malik came into camp to the Wali, and states that Habibulla Khan, Barakzai, a nephew of Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, came to him a few days ago with a letter from Ayub Khan, to the effect that he has arrived on the Helmund with twelve regiments, 42 guns, 7,000 sowars, and many mullas and seyyids, to commence a religious war and drive the infidel from the country. He therefore calls on him to collect his tribe and join Habibulla Khan on the Arghandab. The Malik affected compliance, but warned his people that they had better keep quiet, and came off to tell the Wali. On the way he came across some more of Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan's sowars, who pursued, but failed to capture him.

Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan writes from Khalifah-Robat that he has attacked the Aitchakzai robbers, killed one of them, and sent several prisoners to Kandahar.

Arrangements were made for sending off all baggage and stores that can be spared to Kandahar.

24th July.—A spy from Band-i-Taimur (on the Arghandab) returned with news that no one had passed that way, nor had any of the enemy's cavalry appeared in that direction.

Cavalry patrols to Sangbur and Garmawak report both places empty.

25th July.—The cavalry patrol sent to Sangbur found it apparently unoccupied, but was suddenly attacked by a body of mounted men, who issued from a ravine and cut off two of their number. A strong party was sent out under a European Officer, who found the place empty, and brought in the bodies of the two sowars stripped and decapitated.

A spy from Haiderabad reports the enemy's camp still there. He was told that they had eleven regiments and 35 guns, with a very large number of cavalry and ghazis. He himself counted 13 guns only. It was generally said in the camp that they were to march the next day or the day after, though some people expected to remain on the river for two or three days longer. It is also said that half the force would go by Malmund and half by Sangbur. They make a cavalry reconnaissance every day to Kalah-i-Surkh (about a mile east of Sangbur), some remaining there during the day. There are a great many ghazis with the force, but the majority have only sticks and pikes. All these are anxious to attack the British force, but the regulars wish to avoid fighting and pass on to Kandahar.

A spy from the Helmund reports that it is intended to send four thousand sowars, with an equal number of infantry riding behind them, to Shorawak, *via* the sandy desert, to attack our line of communications with India. Many Ghazis have come to Ayub's camp, but nothing is decided about a move. No one has arrived at Malmund or Maiwand. Provisions are reported very scarce in enemy's camp, and it is said that Ayub Khan has ordered all villages in his vicinity to furnish a quota of bullocks to drag his guns.

Considerable quantities of grain and atta were brought by the Wali's people from Maiwand and Khalifah-Robat.

26th July.—The cavalry patrol to Sangbur reports about 300 horsemen and Ghazis there. Men of the Wali's sent in the morning to Maiwand to bring atta returned in

the afternoon with intelligence that Muhammad Zaman Khan, Barakzai, and Abubakr, Alizai, with a number of sowars and ghazis, have occupied Garmawak (four or five miles from Maiwand), and that a few ghazis have arrived at that place.

General Burrows held a meeting of Commanding and Staff Officers at the receipt of this intelligence, and decided to move towards Maiwand in the morning to prevent Ayub turning his flank and cutting him off from Kandahar, or passing into the Arghandab valley and making his way to Ghazni.

27th July.—Orders were issued for the march of the force at 6 a.m., but owing to the difficulty of unpacking and loading the stores in the confined enclosure where they have been for the last six days, it was not till seven that a start was made. The cavalry and horse artillery led, and the baggage was massed on the right flank of the infantry which marched in contiguous columns of companies at deploying distance. Owing to the necessity for allowing the camels to keep up, the pace was very slow. From 9 to 10 a halt was made near a large village, at which time a spy came up with the intelligence that Ayub had arrived yesterday with his whole force at Sangbur, and was now on his way to Maiwand.

At half past ten the advanced guard reached the first village of Maiwand, a small hamlet surrounded by walled gardens with few trees and a central building commanding the whole. At its west side a considerable karez issuing from high banks afforded an ample supply of water. About three-quarters of a mile further up the same karez and on the same side of it was a second village surrounded by thick orchards. From two to three miles beyond, the little fortified enclosure of Maiwand was barely visible through the haze to-day unusually dense. To the west a wide plain stretched away to the hills, some four miles distant, at the foot of which the trees of the villages of Garmawak were just discernible with field glasses.

Shortly afterwards a considerable body of cavalry was perceived about due west of the nearest village and from a mile and half to two miles distant. Two guns Royal Horse Artillery with an escort of cavalry crossed the karez between the villages, galloped about a mile beyond, and opened fire. Immediately afterwards large masses of men became visible apparently marching towards Maiwand, from which a number of horse and foot also issued. In a very few minutes a long line of regular infantry was formed, and there could be no doubt that we were in presence of Ayub's whole army.

The rest of the cavalry and horse artillery had now crossed the Karez, and advanced some thousand yards beyond it, taking up a position about the same distance from the two guns already in action, and to their right.

The infantry also crossed the karez, but remained halted not far from it. The baggage was mostly massed under the walls of the furthest of the two villages mentioned before, but part of it crossed the karez. The Wali and his people, with Nawab Mirza Hasan Khan, remained with it.

About half an hour after our artillery came into action, the enemy's guns replied. This was at half-past eleven. The distance was about two thousand yards, and their fire did little or no harm, though many of the projectiles, lead-coated Armstrong shells, passed over our heads.

After several rounds had been exchanged, Major Blackwood, commanding the Artillery, informed General Burrows that his guns could do no good at that range, and requested leave to advance 500 yards nearer. General Burrows assented, and a forward move was made.

The infantry and four guns of the smooth-bore battery were now brought up, and the latter came into action. The infantry was disposed as follows:—On the right and inclined at an angle to the front, five company's of Her Majesty's 66th; next to them and facing the enemy's line directly, Jacob's Rifles; beyond them the guns, and, lastly, the Grenadiers. All the infantry lay down, the 66th being in a hollow that afforded almost complete protection. This formation was retained till the close of the action, except that two companies of Jacob's Rifles were later on withdrawn from the centre to make room for Captain Slade's guns, and placed on the extreme left, facing slightly outwards. The force then formed three sides of an irregular hexagon.

The cavalry under General Nuttall was formed up on the extreme left.

The enemy's order of battle had before this become clearly developed. In his centre was a long line of infantry, estimated by the standards at seven battalions. On his right a cloud of irregular horse enveloped our left, and while keeping at a safe distance from our cavalry, menaced the baggage. On the enemy's left a swarm

of irregular infantry with a few mounted men among them formed a broken line between the left of the regulars and the village of Maiwand, whence another considerable body came up to the village, behind which the baggage was posted. The enemy's guns, as was apparent from the flashes, (the haze made the guns themselves quite indistinguishable) were posted at five different points of the line of infantry.

The object appeared to be to attack the baggage with irregulars on both flanks while engaging our main body with the regulars and guns. Two attacks were accordingly made on the baggage, but were repulsed by the rearguard without difficulty.

A number of irregular infantry also came up in front of the 66th, but were kept at a distance by slow file firing. A good many, however, took advantage of inequalities of the ground, and kept up a steady fire which passed over the heads of the 66th, but caused some loss beyond them.

About one or half past the enemy advanced to about one thousand yards, and the fire became very much hotter, though still doing little harm.

Two mounted men now rode out of the enemy's line and reconnoitred our position, advancing to 300 or 400 yards. The sharp-shooters of the Grenadiers fired several shots at them, but without effect.

Shortly afterwards the enemy's line advanced to 600 yards. Their artillery fire was now crossing in several directions, and they began to use grape. The left of their infantry ceased to be visible, but their right opposite the Grenadiers was in full view, and a few volleys from that regiment drove it back in disorder. Two of the enemy's guns now appeared not more than three or four hundred yards distant on our right front, from which they enfiladed our line at an angle of 45° , while a heavy musketry fire from the same direction showed the position of the left of the line of infantry. At the same time the irregular infantry on our right and cavalry on our left advanced closer, and rifle fire on our side, which had previously been intermittent, became general, though not fully developed. This was about half-past two, and about this time the four smooth-bore guns were sent out of action, their ammunition being exhausted.

All efforts to keep down the fire of the two guns on our right were ineffectual, and the enemy gradually came on, except in front of the 66th, whose steady slow fire kept the irregulars opposed to them at a distance. It would appear, however, that a considerable number of ghazis were brought up by a hollow of the ground imperceptible to us, for they suddenly charged the front of our line, the irregular cavalry on our left at the same time closing right in, and the enemy's guns ceasing to fire. The two companies of Jacob's rifles on the left were the first to give way, the Grenadiers then formed square, but immediately began to fall back, while the rest of Jacob's Rifles fell back on the rear of the 66th, leaving the guns. Four of these were limbered up and galloped off, but two, whose limbers I believe had gone to the waggons for fresh ammunition, were left on the field.

Having been with the 66th at the time, I cannot describe from personal observation what followed on the other part of the field, but I believe that the Artillery, Grenadiers, and Sappers fell slowly back towards the karez, which may have been three quarters of a mile distant, pursued closely by a few ghazis only, the Afghan regulars continuing their slow advance in line.

The 66th, as I have mentioned, were lying down in a hollow. When the general attack began they rose and almost immediately a crowd of Jacob's Rifles came running into their rear. As they had been concealed by the ground till within a few yards, this sudden irruption took the British soldiers by surprise, and before long all formation was lost.

General Burrows now rode up alone, and attempted to turn the men towards the rest of the force, but it was in vain, though the left of the slowly retreating crowd came gradually round, and after 10 minutes or a quarter of an hour's retreat under a very heavy fire we reached the karez, here a nullah 30 yards wide with steep banks 10 feet high, just opposite the further end of the village, at the other extremity of which our baggage was massed. The village at this time was crowded with the enemy, who kept up a heavy fire. The ghazis in our front were still falling back, not daring to come to close quarters.

Seeing no further use in remaining with the infantry, I left them and galloped along the bank of the karez past the enemy's cavalry to the rest of the force, which I could see falling back, hoping to obtain assistance towards extricating the infantry and bringing them back to the proper line. Nothing, however, could be done.

The greater part of the baggage had by this time started off on the road to Kandahar.

Of these there are two. One to the left leading direct to Sinjiri, across the desert, and

Note.—During the night and the next morning certain heavy reports were attributed to the enemy's guns, and very circumstantial accounts were given me of the enemy's cavalry having been seen as far as Sinjiri, 10 miles from Kandahar, but I saw none myself, and there is every reason to believe that the pursuit ceased at four or five miles from the field.

utterly waterless at this season, and the other following the route we had come by Khushk-i-Nakhud and Karez-i-Ata; the first is unfortunately well marked by a broad trodden path, and along this the fugitives were moving in a scattered column. Small bodies of the enemy's cavalry moving in the right from village to village further tended to keep our people from the proper road. Until we left the Karez the

Afghan infantry kept up a pretty hot fire. After that the pursuit was confined to cavalry and artillery, and was not, I believe, continued beyond four or five miles, and that very languidly.

The artillery and part of the cavalry still retained order and discipline and covered the retreat; but all or nearly all the infantry were dispersed in small parties.

The cavalry, with whom were General Burrows and Nuttall, left the great road two miles beyond Khushk-i-Nakhud and went to Karez-i-Ata, where they arrived shortly after dusk, and halted a couple of hours.

At Hauz-i-Madat, nine miles distant, the cavalry caught up the artillery, whose carriages were crowded with wounded Officers and men, and where a little drinking water was discovered in a well by the exertions of Major Leach, R.E., and Captain Slade, R.H.A.

As soon as day broke our infantry commenced firing at everything living within sight, but the fire was hardly returned from any of the villages along the road.

About seven water was reached in a canal near Sinjiri, and here some 50 infantry were assembled, and kept together during the rest of the march. About nine the river Arghandab was reached, and here the last of the smooth-bore guns, which had been left along the road as the horses became exhausted, had to be abandoned.

The infantry crossed first, and lined a bank facing Kohkaran, which was evidently occupied in force, it was feared, by a body of country people, determined to dispute the passage. But half an hour later an Officer, with an escort of cavalry, rode up with the information that Kohkaran was being held by Brigadier-General Brooke with a force of all arms detached to the assistance of General Burrows by General Primrose.

From him I learnt that the news of the defeat had been brought in by a Native Officer and 25 men of the Sind Horse at 2 a.m., that orders had been at once issued for the abandonment of the cantonment, and the removal of all troops to the citadel, which was at once carried out; and that the people of the villages had fired on General Brooke's force on its way out.

The Wali and Mirza Hasan Ali Khan had arrived at 5 a.m., preceded and followed by several Officers.

The work of bringing in the guns was so slow that it was not till 2 p.m. that we reached the cantonment.

I here learnt that at daybreak the wire between Kandahar and Abdur Rahman was found cut. A party was sent out and successfully repaired it. The fact of the defeat at Maiwand was communicated to Government, together with the names of Officers who had returned up to 11 a.m., when the wire was again cut. In the meantime orders had been sent to the garrisons of the posts at and beyond Abdur Rahman to retire to Chaman, and to that of Mund-i-Hisar to come to Kandahar.

A large number of Afghans, estimated at 2,500 to 4,000, at the invitation of Sirdar Nur Ali Khan, had left the city.

The Idgah gate was still open. All the others had been closed and blocked up with earth.

All troops, stores, and baggage animals were being collected in the citadel and adjoining enclosures. None were in the city; but the guards on the gates were doubled.

As much property and stores as possible were brought into the citadel before evening, but much was left behind, besides what had been plundered by the villagers in the early morning when the Native Infantry square and the Engineers' quarters were abandoned. Very little of the stores belonging to the sutlers in the cantonment bazaar were brought. At my quarters in Muhammad Amin's garden a new single-poled tent was left standing for want of labour and carriage to bring it in. A quantity of wine and stores, a large case of books, another of books, manuscripts, and maps, crockery, glass, &c., had also to be abandoned.

Finding no quarters in the citadel, I obtained a guard of a Duffadar and 12 sepoy, and went to Mir Afzal's house in the city, in which Mirza Hasan Ali Khan has been living for the last year.

The Wali hearing late at night that I had come to the house, and fearing that some attempt at a rising might be made by the Afghans in the city in the absence of troops, sent a number of his followers under his son Nur Ali Khan, to remain the Char-su during the night, while his brother Muhammad Husain Khan patrolled the streets. The night, however, passed perfectly quietly.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

No. 41.

No. 460 of 1880.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her
Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS, Simla, 26th October 1880.

WE have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the papers noted in the margin,* relating to the operations of a detachment under the command of the late Brigadier-General H. F. Brooke, between Kandahar and Kokeran, on the 28th July last.

*G. G. O., No. 589, dated the 22nd October 1880, and papers published therewith.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" J. STRACHEY.
" W. STOKES.
" J. GIBBS.
" D. M. STEWART.
" C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 41.

GENERAL ORDER.

Military Department.

Simla, 22nd October 1880.

Field Operations.

No. 589.—The Governor General in Council is pleased to direct the publication, for general information, in continuation of the previous accounts of the Maiwand and Kandahar operations, of the following correspondence and despatches, relating to the operations of a detachment under the command of the late Brigadier-General H. F. Brooke, between Kandahar and Kokeran, on the 28th July last.

2. The Governor General in Council entirely concurs in His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's appreciatory remarks on the excellent service rendered by Brigadier-General Brooke on this occasion.

Enclosure 2 in No. 41.

From Colonel T. E. GORDON, C.S.I., Deputy Adjutant-General in India, to the
SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department, No. 5726A.,
Kabul, dated Simla, the 13th October 1880.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 5351A., dated the 25th September 1880, I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward the accompanying letter from Lieutenant-General Primrose, transmitting Brigadier-General Brooke's report of the

part taken by the troops under his command in protecting and bringing in the remnants of Brigadier-General Burrows' brigade returning from Maiwand.

2. His Excellency feels sure the Government will concur with him in considering the above report a record of excellent service performed by the late Brigadier-General Brooke and the small force placed at his disposal.

3. The delay which has taken place in rendering this Despatch is much to be regretted, it having been obtained only on being called for.

Enclosure 3 in No. 41.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. PRIMROSE, C.S.I., Commanding the 1st Division, Southern Afghanistan Field Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Kandahar, the 28th September 1880.

With reference to your telegram to the address of Sir Frederick Roberts, K.C.B., received this day, intimating that copies of any instructions issued to Brigadier-General Brooke on his proceeding to meet the troops returning from Maiwand on the 28th July should be forwarded, I have the honour to inform you that my instructions were given verbally to that Officer, to the effect that he should proceed along the Kokeran road, with a small force of all arms, in the direction of Singiri, with a view of helping in the men and followers of Brigadier-General Burrows' column, and protecting them from the villagers, who were then firing on them. He was to use his own discretion in carrying out these instructions.

2. I beg herewith to forward a copy of Brigadier-General Brooke's report of his proceedings.

3. With regard to paragraph 8 of Brigadier-General Brooke's report, the information he received was probably conveyed to him in a note from Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, who was also returning to Kandahar, in the following terms:—

“The hills about Abásábad and neighbouring villages are full of men, and passage to cantonment impossible. Skirmishers going out, but guns wanted.

Enclosure 4 in No. 41.

From Brigadier-General H. F. BROOKE, Commanding the 2nd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, Kandahar Field Force, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Kandahar Field Force, (No. 300, “Field Operations,” dated Kandahar, the 8th August 1880).

I have the honour to report that, in compliance with the orders received from the Lieutenant-General, I left cantonments at 5.30

* Poona Horse, 40 sabres, under Captain J. W. Anderson.

C/2nd Royal Artillery, two guns, under Captain W. Law.

7th Royal Fusiliers, 3 Officers and 70 rank and file, under Lieutenant R. P. B. Rodick.

28th Native Infantry, 100 rank and file, under Major F. C. Singleton.

a.m. on the 28th July, with the force as per margin,* to proceed to Kokeran to cover the retirement of the force under Brigadier-General Burrows, whose movement on Kandahar was, as reported by an Officer who had arrived half an hour previously, being endangered by the opposition of the country people, who had collected in large

numbers for that purpose.

2. On leaving cantonments, the only practicable road to Kokeran passes for about one mile (as the Lieutenant-General is aware) through walled gardens, and along the main street of the village of Abásábad, which is narrow and tortuous. The gardens were full of armed men, who, however, fell back without much resistance before my skirmishers, and thus allowed the guns and the remainder of the column to pass unopposed through the village of Abásábad into the more open country beyond.

3. From the time of leaving Kandahar, parties of the retiring force were met, who reported that they had been attacked by the country people all along the route, but especially at the villages of Singiri and Kokeran.

4. I therefore pushed on as quickly as the weakness of my force and the necessity of clearing my flanks of the large number of armed men who crowded the high hills on my left, and the walled enclosures and strongly-placed villages on my right, would allow. Although the resistance offered was not important, considerable time was

necessarily occupied in clearing the numerous positions taken up by the enemy, and it was nearly 9 o'clock a.m. before I reached Kokeran.

5. Here I took up a position which enabled me to command the Herat road, the village, and the fortified residence of the Sártíp; and at once sent on some cavalry to communicate with the force under Brigadier-General Burrows, which had at that time completed the crossing of the Argandab river, and was halted about a mile from Kokeran.

6. On the appearance of the force under my command, the village and fortified post at Kokeran were hurriedly evacuated by a very considerable body of armed men, who, up to this time, had been harassing and killing all small parties of the retiring force who had passed within their range. This body of men then established themselves in a village on the bank of the Argandab, about 800 yards from my right flank, from which position, however, they were quickly dislodged, and all further firing from the enemy prevented until the rearguard of General Burrows' force had passed me on their way to Kandahar. I caused the Sártíp's house to be entered by a party of the Royal Fusiliers, under Lieutenant Rodick, but no one was found in it.

7. When the last man of the retiring force had passed me, I recalled that portion of my cavalry which, under Captain Anderson, had been watching the ford of the Argandab, and as soon as they had rejoined my column, I commenced to return to Kandahar, picking up all stragglers who had been unable to keep up with General Burrows' force. In returning from the ford Captain Anderson's small party of cavalry were attacked by very superior numbers, but they quickly overcame the resistance, and inflicted considerable loss on the enemy.

8. Our return was unmolested for about three miles and a half, when I received information from the front that the hills immediately over the village of Abásábad and the walled enclosures round it were strongly occupied by the enemy. I at once sent forward the two guns of C/2nd Royal Artillery, under Captain Law, with a cavalry escort, following myself with the remainder of the cavalry and infantry, and, passing through General Burrows' force, which was then halted, pushed rapidly to the front, throwing out skirmishers to clear the gardens and village. Some excellently directed shells from the guns caused the enemy to evacuate their fortified posts on the hills, while the skirmishers cleared the walled enclosures of all opposition, enabling both my force and that of Brigadier-General Burrows to pass through the extremely difficult village of Abásábad with trifling loss.

9. On reaching the open ground on the Kandahar side of Abásábad, I again halted and formed up my force, and so remained until the main portion of the force of Brigadier-General Burrows had passed me, sending back a company of the Royal Fusiliers,* under Captain E. W. Adderley, to keep the outskirts of the village of Abásábad clear of the enemy and bring in all stragglers. I then followed General Burrows' force into cantonments, where I arrived about 1.30 p.m.

* Obtained from the regiment.

10. The loss of the enemy in the operations above described must have been considerable, not only from our artillery and rifle fire, but also consequently on two well executed charges which were made by the Poona Horse, admirably led by Captain J. W. Anderson, whom I desire to commend to the favourable consideration of the Lieutenant-General.

11. The conduct of the troops under my command was, in all respects, excellent and full of spirit.

12. The well directed fire of the two guns of C/2nd Royal Artillery proved most useful. They were excellently commanded throughout the day by Captain W. Law, whom I desire to bring to special notice as an Officer of much professional knowledge, zeal and forwardness.

13. Major F. C. Singleton, 28th Bombay Native Infantry, and Lieutenant R. P. B. Rodick, Royal Fusiliers, commanded their respective detachments to the entire satisfaction, leading them in a very forward manner against positions of exceptional difficulty.

14. I would ask the Lieutenant-General's special consideration and approval of my Staff Officers,—Captain F. W. V. Leckie, 8th Bombay Native Infantry, Brig

Major, and Captain F. C. Keyser, Royal Fusiliers, Orderly Officer,—both of whom are Officers of superior attainments and qualifications. The zealous assistance they afforded me throughout the whole day was invaluable. Surgeon J. McNamara, the Medical Officer in charge of the column, was also most useful to me.

* Sowar Rugotoollah Khan, Poona Horse, killed. 15. I annex the usual casualty roll.*

ALLEN JOHNSON, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 42.

No. 473 of 1880.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 2nd November 1880.

IN continuation of our Military Letter, No. 434, dated the 5th October 1880, we have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the papers noted in the margin,† relating to the gallant and devoted conduct of the 66th Foot in the action fought at Maiwand on the 27th July last.

† G. G. O., No. 598, dated the 27th October 1880, and documents published therewith.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) J. STRACHEY.
" F. P. HAINES.
" W. STOKES.
" J. GIBBS.
" C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 42.

GENERAL ORDER.

Military Department.

Simla, the 27th October 1880.

Field Operations.

No. 598.—The Viceroy and Governor General in Council has much satisfaction in directing the publication, for general information, in continuation of G.G.O. No. 551 of 1880, of the subjoined correspondence regarding the gallant and devoted conduct of the 66th (The Berkshire) Regiment of Foot at the affair of Maiwand, on the 27th July last.

Enclosure 2 in No. 42.

From Major-General G. R. GREAVES, C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department. (No. 5994 A., "Kabul," dated Simla, the 25th October 1880.)

I AM directed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward, for the information of Government, the accompanying letter from Lieutenant-General Primrose, C.S.I., reporting on the gallant and determined stand made by the 66th Regiment at Maiwand.

The events mentioned have already been referred to in my Letter, No. 5351 A., dated the 25th September 1880; but the details now given show the gallantry and devotion to duty of the Officers and men who fell on that occasion.

The "accompanying documents" mentioned in paragraph 1 of Lieutenant-General Primrose's letter are Brigadier-General Daubeney's report and accompaniments of the proceedings of the force under his command in connection with the burial of the dead on the field of Maiwand, which have been forwarded to Government with this Office, No. 5948 A., dated the 22nd instant.

Enclosure 3 in No. 42.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. PRIMROSE, C.S.I., Commanding the 1st Division Southern Afghanistan Field Force, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India, Simla. (No. 1050 K., dated Kandahar, the 1st October 1880.)

In forwarding the accompanying documents, I would most respectfully wish to bring to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's notice the gallant and determined stand made by the Officers and men of the 66th Regiment at Maiwand.

The disposition of the regiment was as per margin, and, of this number, 10 Officers and 275 Non-commissioned Officers and men were killed, and 2 Officers and 30 Non-commissioned Officers and men wounded.

<i>Fighting Line.</i>	<i>With Smooth-bore Battery.</i>	
15 Officers.	1 Officer.	
364 men, all ranks.	42 men, all ranks.	
<i>Baggage Guard in rear.</i>	<i>Sick.</i>	
4 Officers.	32 men.	
63 men, all ranks.		

These Officers and men nearly all fell fighting desperately for the honour of their Queen and country.

I have it on the authority of a Colonel of Artillery of Ayub Khan's army, who was present at the time, that a party of the 66th Regiment, which he estimated at one hundred Officers and men, made a most determined stand in the garden marked "A" in the accompanying plan.

They were surrounded by the whole Afghan army, and fought on until only eleven men were left, inflicting enormous loss upon the enemy.

These eleven charged out of the garden, and died with their faces to the foe, fighting to the death.

Such was the nature of their charge and the grandeur of their bearing that, although the whole of the ghazis were assembled around them, not one dared approach to cut them down.

Thus standing in the open, back to back, firing steadily and truly, every shot telling, surrounded by thousands, these eleven Officers and men died; and it was not until the last man had been shot down that the ghazis dared advance upon them.

He further adds that the conduct of these men was the admiration of all who witnessed it.

This is the testimony of a man who witnessed the scene, and who gave the information before Brigadier-General Daubeny proceeded to Maiwand.

From an examination of the ground, from corroborative evidence, and from the position in which the bodies were found, I have not the least hesitation in stating that this account is true; and I think His Excellency will agree with me when I say that history does not afford any grander or finer instance of gallantry and devotion to Queen and country than that displayed by the 66th Regiment on the 27th July 1880.

A nominal roll of the Officers and men who fought and died thus nobly has been already forwarded to you; and inquiries from survivors elicit the following facts:—

Lieutenant-Colonel James Galbraith was last seen on the nullah bank, kneeling on one knee, with a colour in his hand, Officers and men rallying round him; and on this spot his body was found.

Here too fell Captain William Hamilton M'Math, a gallant soldier, and one who would, had his life been spared, have risen to distinction in Her Majesty's service.

Close by, Second Lieutenant Harry James Outram Barr was shot dead over one of the colours.

Captains Ernest Stephen Garratt and Francis James Cullen were both killed on the field in front of the nullah, up to the last moment commanding their companies and giving their orders with as much coolness as if on an ordinary regimental parade.

Captain Walter Roberts was mortally wounded in the garden, where the last stand was made; and here also fell Lieutenant Maurice Edward Rayner, Lieutenant Richard Trevor Chute, Second Lieutenant Walter Rice Olivey, and Second Lieutenant Arthur Honywood.

The two latter Officers were seen holding up the colours, the pole of one of which was shattered to pieces, as rallying points; and Lieutenant Honywood was shot down whilst holding a colour high above his head, shouting, "Men, what shall we do to save this!"

Sergeant-Major Alexander Cuppage was shot dead outside the garden whilst carrying a colour; and many other Non-commissioned Officers and men laid down their lives in the attempt to save the colours of their regiment on that day.

With the gallant band who made this last grand effort, fought and died Major

George Frederick Blackwood, Royal Horse Artillery; Lieutenant Thomas Rice Henn, Royal Engineers; and Lieutenant Charles William Hinde, 1st Bombay Grenadiers, Native Infantry, with some of his men.

The men of the 66th on baggage guard, under the command of Captain J. Quarry, did excellent service during the retreat.

The party told off to man the smooth-bore battery, under Lieutenant G. De la M. Faunce, worked their guns steadily and well during the fight.

ALLEN JOHNSON, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 43.

No. 474 of 1880.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 2nd November 1880.

IN continuation of our Military Letter, No. 442, dated the 12th October 1880,

* G. G. O., No. 599, dated the 27th October 1880, and documents published therewith.

we have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the papers noted in the margin,* relating to the proceedings of the troops under the command of Lieutenant-General J. M. Primrose, C.S.I., during the operations of the 1st September last, near Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)	J. STRACHEY.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	W. STOKES.
"	J. GIBBS.
"	C. U. FITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 43.

GENERAL ORDER.

Military Department.

Simla, the 27th October 1880.

Field Operations.

No. 599.—The Governor General in Council is pleased to direct the publication, for general information, in continuation of G.G.O. No. 582 of 1880, of the following correspondence and despatch, relating to the part taken by the troops of the Kandahar garrison, under the command of Lieutenant-General J. M. Primrose, C.S.I., in the action of the 1st September last, near Kandahar.

Enclosure 2 in No. 43.

From Colonel ALLEN JOHNSON, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL in India. (No. 8853 K., "Kabul Field Operations," dated Simla, the 27th October 1880.)

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter, No. 5754 A., dated the 14th instant, forwarding a despatch from Lieutenant-General J. M. Primrose, C.S.I., detailing the part taken by the troops under his command in the operations of the 1st September 1880, near Kandahar.

2. With reference thereto, I am to state that the Governor General in Council concurs in the remark made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in paragraph 12 of your Letter, No. 5585 A., dated the 7th instant, that these troops rendered good service on the occasion referred to.

3. Lieutenant-General Primrose's report will be published in the "Gazette of India," on an early date, for general information.

Enclosure 3 in No. 43.

From Major-General G. R. GREAVES, C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department. (No. 5754 A., dated Simla, the 14th October 1880.)

IN continuation of my Letter, No. 5585 A., dated 17th instant, paragraph 12, I am instructed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward here with Despatch No. 999, of the 27th ultimo, from Lieutenant-General Primrose, C.S.I., reporting the part taken by the troops under his command on the 1st September.

2. His Excellency concurs in the remarks already made by Sir Frederick Roberts, that the Kandahar Force rendered good service in the engagement.

Enclosure 4 in No. 43.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. PRIMROSE, C.S.I., Commanding the 1st Division, Southern Afghanistan Field Force, to Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., Commanding in Southern Afghanistan. (No. 999 K., "Field Operations," dated Kandahar, 27th September 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to report that, in compliance with instructions received from you early on the morning of the 1st September 1880, I issued the following orders:—

"I. E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, escorted by two companies of the 7th Fusiliers and four companies of the 28th Native Infantry, will march from Kandahar *via* the Edgah gate, so as to reach the hill beyond the village of Gandizan by 9 a.m.

"II. The Officer in command of this party will report himself to Brigadier-General Gough, V.C., commanding the Kabul Field Force Cavalry Brigade, which is to be formed up behind the Gandizan Hill by 9 a.m.

"III. The infantry and guns will precede the cavalry, and clear the way for them.

"IV. The detachment of infantry with E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, at Gandizan, will remain stationary when the cavalry advances.

"V. The troops, as per margin,* under the command of Brigadier-General Burrows, will be formed up at Kalacha-i-Maidar (the old cavalry lines) at 8 a.m., for the purpose of threatening the Baba Wali Kotal and watching the Kotal-i-Murcha.

"VI. The Commanding Royal Engineer will detail a party of sappers to accompany the force.

"VII. This force will remain stationary during the day.

"VIII. The Officer commanding the Royal Artillery will see that a good position is taken up by No. 5/11th, Royal Artillery, for firing at the guns on the Baba Wali Kotal, and, in doing this, he will bear in mind that the object of the movement on the right is entirely to hold the enemy on and about the pass, whilst the real attack is delivered by the left in the direction of Pir Paimal.

"IX. The following troops, under the command of Brigadier-General Daubeny, will at once occupy a line of pickets (in relief of those of the Kabul Field Force) extending from Picket Hill on the right by Karez Hill to Chil-Zina on the left:—

4 companies,	66th Regiment.
2 "	1st Bombay Native Infantry.
2 "	28th " "

"X. The whole of the available cavalry of regiments, as per margin,† under the command of Brigadier-General Nuttall, will move out in advance of Brigadier-General Burrows, and take up a good position for watching the Baba Wali and Kotal-i-Murcha passes, with the ground intervening.

"XI. C/2nd Royal Artillery will proceed at once to Picket Hill, where Major Greig will report to Colonel Johnson for further orders.

"XII. A day's cooked rations to be taken by the troops.

"XIII. Only the first reserve of ammunition will accompany the troops.

"XIV. Signallers to accompany each party.

"XV. The Deputy Surgeon-General will make all arrangements for the reception and care of the wounded.

* No. 5/11th, Royal Artillery, four guns,
40 pounders.
4 companies, 7th Fusiliers.
4th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry.
19th " " " "

† 3rd Light Cavalry.
Head-quarters, Poona Horse.
3rd Sind Horse.

"XVI. The head-quarters of the Lieutenant-General will be at first in the Sappers' garden.

"XVII. Colonel Mainwaring, 30th Native Infantry, will take command of the city during the day, and make all local arrangements."

2. In accordance with the above, the cavalry moved out at about 7.30 a.m., and Brigadier-General Daubeny followed at about 8 a.m., occupying the ground ordered as follows :—

- 2 companies, 1st Bombay Native Infantry, were posted on Picket Hill.
- 2 " 66th Regiment, on Karez Hill.
- 1 company, 66th Regiment, between Karez Hill and Picket Hill.
- 1 " 28th Bombay Native Infantry, between Chil-Zina and Karez Hill.
- 1 " 28th Bombay Native Infantry, watching the gardens in left rear of the Chil-Zina.

3. Brigadier-General Burrows marched shortly after, taking up a strong position in the old cavalry and Jacob's Rifles' lines.

4. An excellent position was found for No. 5/11th Royal Artillery, about one hundred yards to the right of Picket Hill.

5. During the whole of the march of the above troops into position they were constantly shelled by the enemy from guns in battery on Baba Wali Kotal, but no casualties occurred.

6. At 9.15 a.m. No. 5/11th came into action under a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery, and remained in action until 12.30 p.m., engaging the guns on the Kotal, which replied with much spirit until about noon, when they were apparently directed upon the troops who were making the turning movement by Pir Paimal.

7. During the early stage of the advance of the 1st and 2nd Brigades on the village of Gandhi Mulla Sahibdad, the enemy gathered in strong force on the low hills directly in front and east of the Baba Wali Pass, evidently contemplating a rush on the guns of No. 5/11th, but their leaders, who could be distinctly seen urging them on in the direction of Kalacha-i-Haidar, could not force the ghazis collected there to face the position taken up by Brigadier-General Burrows, and, though some few actually advanced down the hills, the main portion would not follow, and they remained under cover until the position was turned, when they retreated rapidly over the Kotal.

8. At 9 a.m. Major Tillard, commanding E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, with the escort of the 7th Fusiliers and the 28th Native Infantry, arrived at the village of Abásábad and reported to Brigadier-General Gough, who directed him to proceed along the Kokeran road and clear the low hills near the village of Gandizan.

9. Immediately on opening fire the enemy commenced a heavy musketry fire on the guns (which was, however, soon silenced), and also fire from the two guns at the foot of the south-west spur of the Pir Paimal.

10. The practice of these two guns was continuous and good, and, though the guns of E/B were engaging them some time, they were unable to silence them.

11. Shortly after 11 a.m. Brigadier-General Gough directed this party to advance and hold the hills by Gandizan, which had been abandoned by the enemy, and in this position they remained until ordered to return to quarters at 5 p.m.

12. On reporting to Colonel Johnson, Major Greig, commanding C/2nd Royal Artillery, was ordered to form up behind Karez Hill with the rest of the attacking troops.

13. At about 9 a.m. two guns of this battery moved to the right of Karez Hill, and opened fire against the village of Gandhi Mulla Sahibdad, and were shortly after joined by the rest of the battery, which kept up a fire on the village until masked by the advance of the 1st Brigade.

14. The battery then limbered up and followed the 1st Brigade during the remainder of the day, coming into action on the left of the village of Gandhi Mulla Sahibdad, but, the enemy dispersing, they did not fire.

15. At 2 o'clock the cavalry, which had been watching the passes, received orders to cross by the Baba Wali Kotal and pursue up the Arghandab valley in the direction of Kajah Mulk.

16. Brigadier-General Nuttall, taking with him the 3rd Sind Horse and the 3rd Light Cavalry, proceeded at once to carry out these orders, and, pushing on, came upon bodies of the enemy making for the hills and along the valley.

17. These he charged and dispersed, following up the retreating enemy to Mansurabad, a distance of some fifteen miles.

18. Night coming on compelled him to abandon the pursuit, and he, therefore, returned, reaching the lines at about 10 p.m.

19. Brigadier-General Nuttall estimates the loss of the enemy in this pursuit at one hundred men killed.

20. At 5 p.m. the whole of the pickets being relieved returned to quarters.

21. A complete casualty list, with amount of ammunition expended, has been already forwarded.

No. 214, "Field Operations," dated Quetta, 2nd October 1880.

Forwarded to the Adjutant-General in India, in continuation of Field Force, No. 88, dated 26th September 1880, to which I beg that it may be attached.

F. S. ROBERTS, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding in Southern Afghanistan.

No. 44.

No. 485 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 9th November 1880.

WE have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's

* From the Adjutant-General in India, No. 5498 A., dated the 22nd October 1880, and enclosures.

Military Department Letter, No. 8876 K., dated the 29th October 1880.

Government, the correspondence noted in the margin,* relating to the proceedings of a column commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Daubeny, 7th Fusiliers, which was sent out from Kandahar to Maiwand in September last, for the purpose of burying the dead on the field of battle, and recovering prisoners, arms, &c. that may have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

We have, &c.

(Signed) J. STRACHEY.
" W. STOKES.
" C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 44.

From Colonel T. E. GORDON, C.S.I., Deputy Adjutant-General in India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department. (No. 5948 A., Kabul, dated Simla, the 22nd October 1880.)

IN forwarding, for the information of Government, the accompanying papers, relating to the proceedings of the special column of troops sent to bury the dead on the field of Maiwand, and to recover prisoners, arms, &c. captured by the enemy, I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to state that the duty which devolved upon Brigadier-General Daubeny appears to have been performed in a thoughtful and thoroughly satisfactory manner.

Enclosure 2 in No. 44.

From Brigadier-General A. G. DAUBENY, Commanding the Maiwand Field Column, to the ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, 1st Division, Kandahar Force, Bombay Army. (No. 350, dated Kokeran, the 23rd September 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Lieutenant-General, that, in consequence of orders received, the Field Column destined for Maiwand moved into camp on the maidan opposite the Herat front on the night of the 8th September, and marched for Kokeran at 5.30 the following morning. On the road, one body, a sowar of the Poona Horse was found and buried. At Kokeran we found some difficulty in procuring supplies, and no atta could be got, all being required for the use of the cavalry brigade, under Brigadier-General Gough, encamped on the other side of the river. During the night we had a heavy fall of rain, which delayed our marching until the tents were dry. In the meantime I sent Colonel Tanner with a force to search Singiri and to procure atta. The result of the search was four old guns, quite useless; 30 maunds of atta were procured. After leaving Singiri the road opens out into a wide plain; here the cavalry were spread out, and a body of skirmishers passed through the enclosed ground to the left, searching for bodies; 18 in all were found and buried.

The Transport Officer reporting that the camels were much fatigued with the day's march, I decided to remain here (at Ashu Khan) to-morrow, and utilize the day in searching for arms and bodies.

11th September.—The search for arms was carried out under Colonel Bannerman, but was not satisfactory; 23 bodies were found on the line of route to Maiwand and buried, and a few were found on the outskirts of the village. A reconnoitring party was sent in the direction of Hauz-i-Madat, and reported all quiet; in fact most of the villagers seem to have deserted their homes. In the evening, Shirindil Khan sent in a man of Jacob's Rifles, a doolie-wallah, and a milkwoman, who had been made prisoners by the enemy; they appear to have been well treated, especially the woman. Three rifles have also been sent in (Snider).

12th September.—Marching on a wide front, with the cavalry well ahead, and provided with picks and shovels, we continued the search as far as Hauz-i-Madat, where, owing to the late rain, I was able to halt; just as we were coming into camp, one of the missing field guns was found, partly covered over with earth. Shirindil Khan, late Governor of Khelat-i-Ghilzai, came into camp in the evening, bringing prisoners and a rifle with him; he asked us to breakfast the following morning, an invitation which I accepted for a few of us, hoping that our visit might procure us information regarding the remainder of the lost guns.

13th September.—The column continued its march in the same order as yesterday, while I, attended by Lieutenant Muir, Colonel Tanner, and eight others, rode over to Shirindil Khan's house, where we were most civilly and hospitably received; but we procured but little information. Shirindil Khan said that the people of the villages which had opposed us had fled, taking the rifles with them, but he hoped on their return to be able to get some of them back for us, and also information as to the whereabouts of the guns. Supplies were sent in freely to camp.

The cavalry were sent along the line of retreat from Maiwand under the hills, and buried a good many bodies.

14th September.—The cavalry were sent to recommence their search at the point they left off yesterday, and the column marched straight to Khushk-i-Nakhud.

Patrols were sent out in the direction of Girishk, who, on return, reported all quiet, and that the people seemed to have deserted the country.

15th September.—On reaching Maiwand we encamped to the right (to east) of the line of villages below the battle-field, where there is good water in abundance from a karez. The position occupied by our troops is easily traced by the line of empty Henry-Martini and Snider cartridge cases, and the positions of the artillery and of the 1st Grenadier Native Infantry could be further traced,—in the former by the bodies of horses, and in the latter by the small caps which are worn by that regiment. The bodies on the field had all been buried, but the earth on the graves of our men was quite fresh; whereas the ghazis had evidently been buried shortly after the battle, the earth on their graves having set. I considered it best to form a committee to examine the graves on the field of battle and in the gardens in rear of the position, and also to

institute a thorough search for unburied bodies, and erect a cairn to those who had fallen, on a conspicuous spot on the field of battle. Colonel Bannerman, 4th Rifles, Captain Beresford Peirse, 66th Regiment, and Lieutenant Waller, R.E., constituted the committee; they continued their labours for two days. Where the dead had been insufficiently buried fresh graves were dug, and the bodies carefully transferred to them, under the superintendence of an officer, and the names of all those who could be recognized recorded; in other instances it was considered sufficient to make the graves secure by the addition of fresh soil. In almost all cases stones were likewise placed over the graves, to render them still more secure. On the 16th and 17th instant, services were held over the freshly made graves by the Reverend Mr. Cane and Father Jackson, all Officers off duty attending, and on the concluding day the band of the Fusiliers played the "Dead March in Saul." The proceedings of the committee have been most complete, and a neat cairn has been erected on the battle field. A report of their proceedings is attached, and a sketch of the ground, by Lieutenant Waller, R.E., showing the positions of the graves.

During the days I remained halted at Maiwand, as also during the march, the country was well scoured by patrols, and neither in the direction of Girishk or elsewhere have there been indications of anything but perfect quiet. At first the villages near which we passed were deserted, the people evidently expecting retaliation for the part they had taken in cutting up our wounded and stragglers, but lately supplies have been freely sent to camp, and the inhabitants appear to be aware that they have nothing to fear as long as they maintain a peaceful attitude, and I think the passage of the column through the country to Maiwand will be found to have had a beneficial effect in re-opening our intercourse with the people, and therefore facilitating the transmission of supplies to Kandahar and other places.

As regards the main object of the expedition, viz., the burial of the bodies of our people on the line of march to and on the field of battle, I have to report that 144 bodies were found and buried on the line of march, and that about 522 bodies were buried on the field of battle and in the gardens in rear of the position. This number is based on measurement of the unopened graves, and on the number of bodies found in those that were opened.

As regards the recovery of small arms, I regret to say that little has been done, although many villages have been searched, and, for the few we have, we are indebted to the agency of Sirdar Shirindil Khan, as also for prisoners.

As already mentioned, the field gun was found by the troops at Hauz-i-Madat. I have reason to believe that the remaining four guns are buried at Kokeran; this I communicated to General Gough, but, as far as I am aware, all search has hitherto proved ineffectual.

I am much indebted to Mr. Muir for his arrangements and help on all occasions.

To the Brigade generally, and especially to Colonel Bannerman and the burial committee, for the patient and careful manner in which they performed a painful, and at times anything but an agreeable duty.

To Colonel La Touche, for the thorough search that was made of the line of retreat.

To Major Bryant, Provost Marshal, and to Captain Dobbs, Commissariat Officer, and Captains Leckie and Harris.

Attached—

- (1) Report of burial committee, with plan of graves on the field of battle and in the villages in rear of the position, by Lieutenant Waller, R.E.
- (2) Statement of guns and artillery, stores, &c. recovered.
- (3) List of small arms recovered.
- (4) List of prisoners recovered.

No. 594 K, dated Kandahar, 27th September 1880.

Forwarded for the information of the Lieutenant-General commanding the Southern Afghanistan Force.

(Signed) J. M. PRIMROSE, Lieut.-General,
Commanding 1st Division, S. A. F.

No. 192, dated Quetta, 2nd October 1880.

Submitted. Brigadier-General Daubeney seems to have performed the duty entrusted to him in a very creditable manner.

(Signed) FRED. ROBERTS, Lieut.-General,
Commanding in Southern Afghanistan.

Enclosure 3 in No. 44.

List of Prisoners, Arms, &c. recovered by the 2nd Brigade.

Prisoners.

Lance-Naique Narayen Lokhunday, 1st Grenadier Native Infantry.
 „ Ramzan Khan, 30th Regiment Native Infantry.
 Transport Surwan Oomer.
 Dooli-bearer Luximon.
 Bhisti Peerbux, 3rd Light Cavalry.
 „ Shaid Adam, 66th Regiment.
 Doodwalee Moonia, 66th „

Arms, &c.

2 Martini-Henry rifles.
 3 Snider rifles, 1st Grenadier Native Infantry.
 2 „ „ 30th Regiment, Native Infantry.
 2 Bayonets, 30th Regiment, Native Infantry.
 1 Cleaning rod, 30th Regiment, Native Infantry.
 1 6-pdr. smooth-bore field gun.
 1 Waist-belt with pouches, 66th Regiment Native Infantry.
 1 „ „ 1st Grenadier „ „

(Signed) A. G. DAUBENEY, Brigadier-General,
Kokeran, the 23rd September 1880. Commanding 2nd Brigade.

Enclosure 4 in No. 44.

From MAJOR P. H. GREIG, Commanding C Battery, 2nd Brigade, Royal Artillery, to the BRIGADE MAJOR, 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, Kandahar Force. (Dated Camp, Kokeran, the 22nd September 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Brigadier-General Commanding, that on the arrival of the brigade at Hauz-i-Madat, I found one of the 6-pdr. guns belonging to the Wali of Kandahar lying on the side of the road, together with the remains of the gun carriage. I mounted the gun on my spare gun carriage, and have brought it in with me, together with two wheels; three other wheels I handed over to the Assistant Political Agent, and the remainder of the gun-carriage I destroyed. On arrival at Maiwand, I found the *debris* of four wagons of E/Battery Royal Horse Artillery on the field of battle, consisting of the ironwork of two limbers and four wagon bodies and the tires of eleven wheels. I had them brought into camp, and mounted the ironwork of one wagon on my spare wheels, and placed the remaining ironwork on the top of it, and have brought the whole in. The tires of the wheels I placed in a deep karez. Colonel LaTouche, commanding the Poona Horse, also sent me in two naves of wheels, which I buried. I examined the field of battle and the surrounding villages and removed all traces I could find of the wagons, &c., of E Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.

On returning to Khushk-i-Nakhud, two camel loads of old harness, shafts, lifting jacks, &c., were sent to me. I found nearly the whole of the things worthless and buried them, with the exception of two shafts, two lifting jacks, and a few straps. At Ashar Khan, the *debris* of the store wagon of E/B., Royal Horse Artillery, was found in the nullah near the village. The axletrees, a few of the boxes, the pole chain, and one shaft I have brought in.

Enclosure 5 in No. 44.

Proceedings of a Committee ordered to assemble at Maiwand, Southern Afghanistan, by order of Brigadier-General Daubeny, commanding the Maiwand Field Column, for the purpose of counting the approximate number of graves containing our troops who fell in the battle of Maiwand, and to select a site for the erection of a memorial cairn. (Dated 15th September 1880.)

President :

Colonel W. Bannerman, 4th Rifles.

Members :

Captain W. J. De la P. Beresford-Peirse, 66th Regiment,
Lieutenant E. A. Waller, R.E.

The Committee having assembled pursuant to order, proceeded to inspect the battle field and line of retreat through the villages as indicated on sketch attached, and find that the number of graves on the battlefield are in number as per margin, and estimated to contain 400 bodies. Those in the gardens and enclosures consisted of, in the place marked "A" on the sketch, three large graves; that at place marked "B," one large grave; and at the place marked "C," one large grave. On examination, the Committee determined to have the bodies disinterred at the three last named places and marked "A," "B," and "C" on the annexed sketch, and reinterred in one grave at each place, on account of the bodies being only slightly covered over with earth.

The Committee, after having examined the field of battle, selected the spot marked "M," as a suitable place for the erection of a cairn in memory of the men who fell in the action at Maiwand. To Captain Beresford-Peirse, 66th Regiment, was entrusted the duty of preparing the new graves and re-interring the bodies of our men who were buried in the gardens and enclosures.

At "A" were found three large graves; the remains of the men, numbered as per margin, were interred in one grave in the corner of enclosure.

At "B" was found one large grave, which contained the remains of men, number as per margin, and were entered in one grave close by.

At "C" was found one grave, which contained the remains of men, number as per margin, which were interred in one grave close along side.

The graves of the remains of men on the field of battle were enlarged and improved by Lieutenant Waller, R.E., to whom was entrusted the erection of the memorial cairn.

The bodies of the following officers were identified :—

Lieutenant-Colonel Galbraith, late commanding the 66th Regiment.

Major Blackwood, late commanding E/B Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.

Captain M'Math, 66th Regiment.

Lieutenant Henn, Royal Engineers.

„ Rayner, Adjutant, 66th Regiment.

„ Chute, 66th Regiment.

2nd Lieutenant Olivey, 66th Regiment.

One officer's body not identified.

These bodies were interred with the bodies of the men at the places where they were found.

The body of Captain Smith, 30th Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles), was discovered by Lieutenant Monteith of the Sind Horse, on the 17th September, and buried that same evening at the place marked "K" on the annexed sketch.

The following are the names of the bodies identified and buried in graves marked "A," "B," and "C":—

Corporal Eugene Mahoney.

Lance Corporal Lester Weston.

„ „ George Hinton.

Drummer John Groves.

Lance-Corporal Edward Beggs.

Lieutenant and Adjutant M. E. Rayner.

Private John Mannon.

„ John Evans.

„ Geo. Carter.

Surgeon William Guntrip.

Private Crispin Barrett.	Private Martin Diamond.
Lance Corporal George Tuttle.	" Alfred Castle.
No. 850, Private John Beard.	" George Anderson.
Private Benjamin Watts.	" John Ferney.
" Robert Donnon.	" William Wilson.
488 Private Wm. Brown.	831, Private Joseph Jones.
1449 " Joseph Jackson.	Drummer Michael Darby.
" Samuel Weleh.	Private Henry Murrell.
" George West.	Private Owen McCaffrey.
Colour-Sergeant Frederick Gover.	
(Signed) W. BANNERMAN, Colonel,	

4th Rifles, President.

W. J. DE LA P. BERESFORD-PEIRSE, Captain,
66th Regiment.E. A. WALLER, Lieutenant, R.E.,
Assistant Field Engineer, 2nd Brigade.

Enclosure 6 in No. 44.

From Colonel ALLEN JOHNSON, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL IN INDIA. (No. 8876 K, Kabul (Field Operations), dated Simla, 29th October 1880).

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 5918A, dated the 22nd instant, forwarding papers regarding the proceedings of the special column sent out from Kandahar to Maiwand under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Daubeny, 7th Fusiliers, to bury the dead on the field of battle at the latter place, and to recover prisoners, arms, &c.; and, with reference thereto, to state, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that the Government of India fully concur in His Excellency's estimate of the very satisfactory manner in which the duty referred to was carried out.

LONDON:
Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty,
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

C O R R E S P O N D E N C E

RELATING TO THE

E S T I M A T E S

FOR THE

W A R . I N A F G H A N I S T A N .

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



L O N D O N :

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

[C.—2560.] *Price 1s.* 1880.

Correspondence relating to the Estimates for the War in Afghanistan.

No. 1.

EXTRACT from DESPATCH to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, dated July 17, 1879,
No. 261 (Financial).

i.e., 1879. 52. The low state to which your balances had been reduced at the beginning of March* compelled your Excellency to request that the amount of bills offered for sale weekly might not exceed 25 lacs, and it was not until the 16th of May that you were able to intimate your ability to meet larger drawings. The result is that up to the 9th of July bills have only been sold to the extent of Rs. 4,20,00,000, and, assuming that an average of 30 lacs can be disposed of weekly to the end of November, the total amount allotted would then be Rs. 10,20,00,000, which at 1s. 7½d. the rupee would give 8,287,500l. The requirements of the year were estimated at 17,290,000l. but have since been reduced to 15,000,000l., of which, perhaps, 500,000l. may be obtained by the purchase of gold in India. This leaves about 6¼ millions sterling to be obtained in the last four months of the year, which, even taking the exchange as high as 1s. 9d. the rupee, would imply an average drawing of 42 lacs a week. Experience does not warrant the belief that the market will bear so heavy a drain, except in the height of the export season; and I am anxious, therefore, to impress on your Government the necessity of making such arrangements in future years as will admit of the largest drawings at the time when your treasuries are at the fullest, if the rate of exchange should then be favourable.

No. 2.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, September 9, 1879.

Although it is of course impossible now to estimate future military expenditure in Afghanistan, it is desirable that Her Majesty's Government should know that in all other respects our financial prospects seem to us very favourable.

As regards present year, the condition of our cash balance is such that there is no room for anxiety, all branches of revenue are satisfactory, the rainy season has been highly favourable through India, and we may reasonably anticipate for next year general internal prosperity.

Following estimate assumes exchange value of rupee at one shilling and sevenpence. By arrangements already settled, with complete approval of Local Governments, we can reckon on reducing provincial grants next year by more than 700,000l., but we shall be able to make equally large reductions after 1880-81. These measures, together with savings on Public Works and otherwise, would, if peace had been maintained, have secured for next year a probable surplus of at least two millions. This estimate supposes not only that no fresh taxation will be imposed, but that large exemptions will be made in favour of poorer classes now liable to license tax. It also takes credit for no reduction in military charges consequent on Commission now sitting, although we hope that this will ultimately be large, nor for any reduction in Home military charges, to which we again earnestly beg your attention. By extending license tax to official and other classes, as already sanctioned by you on 21st November last, and by other measures, which will be reported hereafter, we think it probable that we shall be able to raise our surplus next year, apart from fresh military charges, to three millions. We hope this will more than suffice to meet all probable additional expenditure in Afghanistan, although it may be necessary to suspend operations of famine surplus.

No. 3.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, October 3, 1879.

Yours 9th September. Taking rupee at $19\frac{3}{4}d.$, we ought to draw weekly in October 35 lacs, November and December 40, January and February 45, March 40. This is within estimate of rupee drawings, but will give us half million more sterling, which must be drawn, if possible, considering fresh heavy demands for railway stores.

Referring to Afghanistan, have you any doubt as to ability to meet such drafts? Having to deal with Five per cent. Stock, any material reduction of drawings may be very embarrassing.

No. 4.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, October 6, 1879.

Remittance proposals 3rd., accepted meanwhile. Despatch follows.

No. 5.

LETTER from the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, October 16, 1879, No. 335 (Financial).

MY LORD,

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt from Your Lordship, dated 3rd instant, of the following telegram:—

“Yours dated 9th September. Taking (the) Rupee (at) $1s. 7\frac{3}{4}d.$, we ought to draw, weekly, in October 35 lakhs, (in) November and December 40, (in) January and February 45, (and in) March 40. This is within the estimate of rupee drawings, but will give us half a million more sterling, which must be drawn if possible, considering (your) fresh heavy demands for railway stores. Referring to Afghanistan, have you any doubt as to (your) ability of meeting such drafts? Having to deal with Five Per Cent. Stock, any material reduction of drawings may be very embarrassing.”

2. We replied on the 6th instant as follows:—

“(Your) remittance proposals (of the) third, accepted meanwhile. Despatch follows.”

3. Provision was made in our Estimates for the remittance of £15,000,000 at a cost of Rs. 18,95,20,000: but we did not expect to cover the whole net current expenditure proper from the Home Treasury, which was estimated at £15,738,900, exclusive of Debt and Railway Capital transactions, and is now, we apprehend, likely largely to exceed this sum. Including our shipments of gold, we have remitted to the Home Treasury during the first six months of the year, that is to say, to the end of September, £6,548,598, at a cost of Rs. 7,99,52,059. Your Lordship now proposes to sell bills on us, during the latter half of the year, for Rs. 10,95,00,000, by which you estimate that you will raise, at $1s. 7\frac{3}{4}d.$ the rupee, £9,010,937. If this programme is realised, we shall have remitted, during 1879–80, in all, £15,559,535, at a cost of Rs. 18,94,52,059.

4. We fully concur with Your Lordship as to the extreme importance of our remitting, yearly, a sum at least equal to the net expenditure proper from the Home Treasury. We explicitly and unreservedly recognize our obligation in this respect, and we should have been glad not only to meet the demands which Your Lordship now proposes to make upon us, but even to remit one or two crores of rupees more than you intimate your intention of drawing. The revenues of the current year are, so far, prosperous; and, but for the renewal of hostilities in Afghanistan, we should have had no difficulty in meeting Your Lordship's drafts to any extent to which you are likely to be able to dispose of them.

5. The war will, however, necessarily, be costly. We have been obliged to undertake the construction of railways towards our North-Western Frontier, which are estimated to cost between $1\frac{1}{2}$ and 2 crores of rupees before the close of the year, and our military operations must, inevitably, involve the free expenditure of money in other respects.

6. It will be our anxious desire to avoid placing any check on your drafts upon us: but your Lordship will understand that it is not, at the present time, possible for us to say confidently that we shall be able to meet your Lordship's bills to the full extent proposed in your message. We shall not fail to communicate to your Lordship without delay any further conclusions which we may be able later on to form.

We have, &c.

LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

No. 6.

EXTRACT of a LETTER from the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, December 19, 1879,
No. 405 (Financial).

Para. 1. In continuation of our Despatch No. 87A, dated 13th March last, we have the honour to present abstract revised estimates of our revenue and expenditure in 1879-80, which show a net improvement of £359,000 as follows:—

	Original Estimates.	Present Estimates.	Better.	Worse.
Revenue - - -	64,562,000	67,056,000	2,494,000	—
Expenditure - - -	65,957,000	68,092,000	—	2,135,000
Deficit - - -	1,395,000	1,036,000	359,000	—

2. The revised estimates include a special additional expenditure of £3,500,000 to be incurred, during the year, in consequence of the renewal of hostilities in Afghanistan, namely:—

	£
Railways to Kandahar, Khushalgarh, and Peshawar - - -	2,500,000
Under the head of "The Army," in addition to the £2,000,000 originally provided - - -	1,000,000
Total - - -	£3,500,000

3. Notwithstanding the instructions contained in your Lordship's Despatches, Nos. 161 and 162, dated 23rd October, we have, for the present, entered the first of these items under No. 34, State Railways, and, unless we hear from you to the contrary, we shall persevere in this course. We submit that, in view of our hereafter working these lines, like the rest of our lines, as commercial undertakings, it is not convenient that their capital cost should now appear under the head of "The Army"; also, that, in any case, it seems scarcely justifiable to connect the cost of great permanent works of this kind exclusively with the recent and present operations in Afghanistan. Even if these lines be treated, exclusively, as military works, their value will be permanent. We shall therefore be glad to be informed by telegraph of your Lordship's assent to our recording the cost of these lines under State Railways, and, in that case, of any needful corrections in the forthcoming estimates of the transactions at the Home Treasury.

4. The extra 1,000,000% which we have entered under "Army" is, as yet, only a very rough forecast. Until the situation in Afghanistan is more settled than at present, and until we are in a position to determine our future policy in regard to that country, it is impossible to say, with any approach to accuracy, even what the whole cost of the military operations there will be, much less how much will be brought to account during the current year.

5. All that we can say at present is, that we estimate the whole cost of all the military operations in Afghanistan, original and renewed, to the end of the current year 1879-80, at 3,600,000%, of which about 600,000% is recorded in

the Accounts of 1878-9. The whole cost of the Frontier Railways is now estimated at 3,500,000*l.*, of which we expect to spend 2,500,000*l.* this year, and 1,000,000*l.* next year.

6. It thus appears that, but for the renewal of hostilities in Afghanistan, we might now be hoping for an improvement of the finances of the year of no less than 3,859,000*l.*, that is to say, for a surplus of 2,464,000*l.* instead of the deficit of 1,395,000*l.* originally estimated; and that this large estimated surplus of two and a half millions sterling would have remained, notwithstanding a special provision of 2,000,000*l.* for the operations in Afghanistan, which in March last we hoped were drawing to a close.

No. 7.

EXTRACT of a TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, December 24, 1879.

* *i.e.*, for 1879-80.

Revised estimate * of figures in even thousand pounds sterling. Revenue 67,056,000*l.*; expenditure 68,092,000*l.*; deficit 1,036,000*l.*; being 359,000*l.* better than Budget. 2,500,000*l.* provided for frontier railways, and under army 1,000,000*l.* more than Budget for Afghanistan.

No. 8.

EXTRACTS of a LETTER from the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, dated the 7th January, 1880, No. 9, (Financial).

Para. 9. We earnestly trust that your Lordship may see fit to reduce your demands upon us next year to 16,000,000*l.*,* contenting yourself with a closing balance of 1,058,500*l.* Should circumstances admit of your raising more than 16,000,000*l.* on reasonable terms, we shall, if the year proves financially prosperous, be prepared to meet your drafts for the purpose; but we are not sanguine that this contingency will occur.

* *i.e.*, instead of 16,900,000*l.*

Para. 15. We are not yet able to say how much money it will be necessary for us to borrow in 1880-81. The exact amount will depend, amongst other things, upon your Lordship's decision upon the request made in the 9th paragraph of this despatch. Meanwhile, we may perhaps assume that, so long as we do not propose to raise more than 2½ crores of rupees in one year, and see our way to borrowing in India all that we want, we need not communicate specially with your Lordship before settling the loan arrangements of the year. We shall probably raise as part of the Four and a half per cent. Transfer Loan 1879, whatever money we resolve to borrow in 1880-81.

No. 9.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, January 30, 1880.

Your Financial 9, Remittances. Send directly roughly estimated surplus of 1880-81, and cash balance in India on 31st March 1881, assuming Home Estimates remain; and state what outlay on famine insurance during year is intended.

No. 10.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, February 3rd, 1880.

Gazette, January 3rd*, Trades and Professions Tax: Have you sent letter with explanation of reasons for complete change in Bill?

No. 11.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, February 6, 1880.

License Tax: I regret that we inadvertently omitted to send covering despatch with Finance Member of Council's explanation published in Gazette, 3rd January.

* Debate in the Legislative Council on the proposal to refer the Trades and Professions Tax Bill to a Select Committee, published in the Supplement to the Gazette of India of the 3rd of January 1880.

Separate report appeared unnecessary, because change proposed would restore measure to the identical form in which it was proposed by us, 22nd July 1878, and sanctioned by your Despatch 21st November, same year. Sole difference is the exemption from tax of all trades with income under 500 rupees, which we felt sure you would approve. The great and unexpected improvement in our financial position may, however, make it expedient to reconsider the question of extending tax to the official and professional classes. We shall telegraph our conclusion shortly.

No. 12.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, February 13, 1880.

Before settling loan, inform me of reason for preferring $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and await reply.

No. 13.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, February 14, 1880.

Your Lordship's telegrams, 30th January and yesterday. Surplus next year about 40 lacs of rupees. Balance in India, 31st March 1881, 1,225 lacs, after borrowing 150 lacs of rupees. If you can reduce your bills upon us to 16,000,000%, we shall estimate to borrow nothing unless Exchange collapses, or the war costs more than is now expected. We earnestly advocate this solution. Surplus would then exceed 60 lacs of rupees, notwithstanding our abandonment of the proposed extension of License Tax. Famine Tax will be thus about one crore, half License Tax, half cesses. No expenditure estimated on famine insurance and only 50,000 rupees on famine relief, 436 lacs of rupees provided for Afghanistan including frontier railways, all in the ordinary expenditure. If the year prosper, we could meet your bills for the extra 900,000% also. If we borrow, we should not willingly borrow at 4 per cent., because of the heavy discount, and because $4\frac{1}{2}$ loan is at present proportionately dearer. Please answer as quickly as possible.

No. 14.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, February 16, 1880.

Yours 14th. Arguments insufficient to justify borrowing here, even temporarily, which would be necessary if drawings reduced, since, through East Indian Railway arrangements and conversion of stock, payments in first days of April 1881 estimated at 1,900,000%. In your announcement, state that less than 16,900,000% could not be put into Estimate, but you may add that drawings may be reduced, if demand for bills prove insufficient. I think you should borrow in India as much, not exceeding $2\frac{1}{2}$ crores, as necessary for sufficient balances. Avoid stating in Budget rate of interest on new loan.

No. 15.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, February 16, 1880.

With present condition and prospect of finances, we cannot justify extension of taxation to official and professional classes, and have resolved to drop proposal. Sole change in existing law will be exemption of all incomes under 500 rupees.

No. 16.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, February 17, 1880.

Yours yesterday, License Tax. Policy of abandoning extension much questioned here, for reasons stated in my Despatch 402 of 1878.* How do you justify suspending operation of Famine Insurance another year?

* "I might have felt some doubt as to the expediency of a measure imposing fresh taxation of " which the receipts were likely to be so small, if I did not consider that there was some ground for " the feeling that the operation of the Licensing Acts was partial, and that, while the proposed " measures would be beneficial to the revenue, they would remove from the minds of the classes taxed " under those Acts a sense of having been subjected to somewhat unequal treatment." Despatch to India, Nov. 21, 1878, No. 402, paragraph 5.

No. 17.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, February 18, 1880.

YOUR telegram yesterday, License Tax Extension. Whatever view be taken of policy, it is impossible now to carry measure. Neither I nor any member of Executive Government can support it, and Legislative Council would probably not accept it. Your doubt regarding Famine Insurance not understood. In my telegram of 14th, for "famine" read "protective works." We suspend nothing, and have fulfilled all financial plans and conditions made in 1878. Our explanation regarding Famine Insurance will be complete and unanswerable.

No. 18.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, February 24, 1880.

Sir John Strachey will present the financial statement for 1880-81 in the Legislative Council; results are highly favourable. In 1878-79, surplus 2,044,000l.; in 1879-80, surplus 119,000l.; Budget estimate 1880-81, surplus 417,000l.; foregoing figures in each case are after paying from ordinary revenue all charges for famine, Afghan war, and frontier railways.

War charges, 1878-79, 676,000l.; 1879-80, 3,216,000l.; 1880-81, 2,090,000l.; setting off increase railways and telegraphs revenues, total net expenditure on war to end of 1880-81, $5\frac{3}{4}$ millions; frontier railways, present year 1,670,000l.; next year 2,270,000l.; total $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions.

Expenditure on productive works in 1878-79, 4,381,000l.; 1879-80, 3,700,000l.; 1880-81, 2,500,000l., besides outlay on East Indian Railway.

Secretary of State's bills, present year 15,750,000l.; next year 16,900,000l. No loan to be raised in coming year according to present intentions, unless events not now foreseen occur, but power to borrow in case of need reserved.

Closing balances in India, 1879-80, 14,193,000l.; 1880-81, 11,444,000l. Exchange estimate for next year 1s. 8d.

Extension of taxation to official and professional classes abandoned for the present, fresh taxation not being desirable under existing financial circumstances. License tax remains unaltered, except that all incomes below Rs. 500 are exempted, causing remission of 340,000l. taxation. Export duties on indigo and lac abolished, causing loss of 54,000l. No export duty now remains except on rice. No present change in cotton duties, but prolonged maintenance of remaining duties declared impossible. Loss of revenue next year from previous remissions of cotton duties estimated at 250,000l.

Notwithstanding reduction of salt duties in greater part of India, salt shows large increase of revenue and consumption.

Principal improvements in 1879-80, compared with estimates:—Opium, 1,900,000l.; exchange, 1,010,000l.; public works savings, 661,000l.; land revenue, 450,000l.; salt, 362,000l.; interest, 389,000l.

Army Commission recommends important measures for increasing efficiency of army, with estimated annual saving of $1\frac{1}{4}$ million. No credit taken for this in Budget.

Sir John Strachey stated that former plans regarding famine insurance had been completely successful, and declared objects thoroughly fulfilled. Restriction of Productive Public Works expenditure to $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions has, however, checked efforts of Government of India to protect country from famine by construction of cheap railways and canals. War estimates have hitherto proved very accurate, and are believed to be ample for all contingencies now contemplated. Comparison between present total net ordinary expenditure with that of 12 years back shows, apart from loss by exchange, only trifling increase either in civil or military charges. Including loss by exchange, total net expenditure shows no increase, owing to improvement in railways and canals.

No. 19.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT for 1880-81.

SPEECH in the LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL of His Excellency the GOVERNOR GENERAL of INDIA, by the Honble. Sir JOHN STRACHEY, G.C.S.I. February 24th, 1880.

1. My Lord, I have now to lay before the Council the Financial Statement for the coming year 1880-81. It takes what has become the somewhat unusual

Preliminary.

form of a speech by myself, instead of a Resolution published in the Gazette. I shall state to the best of my ability all facts necessary to enable the Council and the public fully to understand the present condition and apparent prospects of our finances.

I propose in the first place to give a summary of the main facts and figures for the year 1878-79, for the year 1879-80, now about to close, and for the coming year 1880-81, and to reserve for a later part of my statement the observations which I may wish to make upon some of the more important questions of our financial policy.

Changes in the forms of the Accounts.

Registration.

Railways.

2. The Council will see, from the Abstract Statements which have been laid on the table, that a few changes have been made in the forms of the accounts.

New major heads have been opened to show separately the revenue from *Registration* and the expenditure on that department of the administration.

The *Guaranteed* and *State Railways* are now shown together under the single head *Railways*. The purchase of the East Indian Railway by the State, involving its transfer from the category of guaranteed to that of state railways, has made comparisons of the current estimates with the past accounts in each separate category impossible; and a like disturbance will ensue on the acquisition of other lines constructed by private capitalists under a guarantee of interest from the public revenues. Moreover, negotiations are already in progress for the working of the Indus Valley State Railway by the Sindh, Punjab, and Delhi Railway Company. It would be difficult to distinguish between the transactions of the two railways under one management. Similar arrangements for the management of other state railways are likely in the future.

Irrigation and Navigation.

For like reasons, the transactions with the *Madras Canal and Irrigation Company* will henceforth be entered under the major head, *Irrigation and Navigation*, under which head the cost of agricultural works (drainage and embankments) will also, hereafter, be shown.

Thus the public works heads of account will now be *Railways*, *Irrigation and Navigation*, and *Other Public Works*.

Accounts, 1878-79.

3. In March last the Regular Estimate for 1878-79 showed a probable surplus, on the ordinary Account, of £1,300,000; the actual surplus was £2,044,391, or £744,391 better than the estimate. The differences between the Accounts and the Regular Estimates are for the most part unimportant, and there are not many of them which now call for remark.

War in Afghanistan.

The net cost of the war in Afghanistan in 1878-79 was £676,381, a close approximation to the estimate of £670,000 made last year. Against this must be set the gain, the amount of which cannot be exactly stated, under the heads of *Railways* and *Telegraphs*. We estimate at £575,000 the ultimate net total cost of the operations in Afghanistan recorded in the Accounts of 1878-79. The sum of £313,420 was spent on *Famine Relief*.

Famine Relief.
Comparison with 1877-78.

4. Compared with 1877-78, the Revenues of 1878-79 show an improvement of £6,238,393, of which, however, £2,400,331, under the head of *Provincial Rates*, for the first time incorporated in these accounts, is nominal. The largest increase was under *Land Revenue*, £2,460,919; the loss under this head in 1877-78, in consequence of famine, had been very large. There was a saving of £5,032,355 in *Famine Relief*; there was an increase of expenditure of £1,705,767 under *Loss by Exchange*, and £1,339,281 under *Public Works*. The apparent increase under *Public Works* is explained by the transfer of charges in the earlier year from this head to that of *Famine Relief*, and does not represent a real fluctuation of Public Works expenditure. Altogether the expenditure of the year exceeded that of the previous year by £650,915. The net result is £5,587,478 better than the result of 1877-78.

General result favourable.

5. Thus the financial out-turn of 1878-79 was very satisfactory; with the help of the additional taxation imposed in that and in the previous year, amounting to £1,227,891, of which £313,420 was spent on Famine Relief, the true surplus of the year exceeded the amount of £2,000,000, decided to be necessary to meet our obligations on account of famine, and to leave a margin for other contingencies; and this result was obtained, notwithstanding the expenditure on the war, and the remission of the Inland Sugar Duties and some of the

Customs Duties on cotton goods and other articles. The standard at which, for ordinary times, the Government aims, namely, a surplus of £2,000,000, less any expenditure on Famine Relief and exclusive of extraordinary charges such as those for great military operations, would have been attained if the accounts had shown a surplus of only £1,010,199, or £1,034,192 less than the actual surplus. Accounts, 1878-79.

6. I see only one drawback to entire satisfaction with these results; some of the capital expenditure under productive public works, as, for example, that on the Indus Valley and Punjab Northern Railways, cannot at present be regarded as directly reproductive. The works themselves possess the highest value; and for the future, as the Council is aware, no expenditure which is not really and directly reproductive is to be excluded from the comparison upon which the Surplus or Deficit of the revenue is ascertained. It will be seen later on that we are acting strictly on this principle in the present and coming years. Doubtful Productive Public Works.

7. I come now to the Regular Estimates for the present year, 1879-80.

It is now expected that the Revenue will amount to £67,583,000, or £3,021,000 more than the original estimate, and that the ordinary expenditure will be £67,464,000, or £1,507,000 more than was estimated. Thus, instead of a deficit of £1,395,000, with which, when our budget estimates were framed, we expected that the present year would close, our estimates now show a surplus of £119,000. Regular Estimates, 1879-80.
Comparison with original estimate

8. The original estimates provided for an additional military expenditure of £2,000,000 for the war in Afghanistan. If the war had ended with the treaty of Gundamak, I believe that this estimate would not have been exceeded; but, in consequence of the renewal of hostilities, the estimated additional charge has risen to £3,216,000. In addition to this amount, we have had to undertake the construction of railways on our frontier. I shall have to speak of them further on; but in the present year they are estimated to cost £1,670,000. Thus the total provision on account of the war has now been increased to £4,886,000. With the exception of £230,000 on account of the Railway from Jhelum to Rawal Pindi, which is included under the head of *Railways*, the whole of this sum, under orders from the Secretary of State, is charged against *Army*. It was a question whether they ought not to have been included under the head of *State Railways*, and as they will undoubtedly, quite independently of their present military importance, possess great and permanent value to the country, much was to be said in favour of this view. But, as their construction was primarily due to the war, it was decided to include their cost in the war expenses. The result will be to exaggerate the apparent amount of our military expenditure. War in Afghanistan.

An expenditure of £10,000 upon *Famine Relief* was estimated; this, on account of distress in parts of the Bombay Presidency, has been raised to £99,000. On the other hand, the Railway and Telegraph receipts are better, by reason of the war, to the extent of about £300,000. Railways charged as War Expenditure.
Famine Relief.

9. Thus, but for war and famine, the Regular Estimates of the present year would have shown a surplus revenue of about $4\frac{3}{4}$ millions sterling. The taxes imposed in 1877 and 1878, to enable us to discharge our obligations in time of famine, will, it is estimated, yield £1,184,000; and, if we deduct the sum of £99,000, actually spent on famine relief, there will remain of this revenue £1,085,000. To this extent, the new taxes have had the effect of preventing debt. Making allowance for other abnormal items on both sides of the account, the true surplus of the year for comparison with the standard surplus of £2,000,000, at which we aim, will be about £4,160,000. This surplus, if it had been actually obtained, would have been much in excess of the whole expenditure on productive public works, which is estimated at £3,700,000. Surplus compared with standard.

If present prospects are fulfilled, the financial out-turn of the present year 1879-80 will leave nothing to be desired.

10. The most important variations from the original estimates are the following:— Detail of variations.

Land Revenue.—Improvement, £450,000; more than half of this has been collected on account of arrears of former years, and the increase is due to the increased prosperity of the country. Land Revenue.

Salt.—Net improvement, £362,000; this also is highly satisfactory, as showing a general increase of consumption. Salt.

Opium.—Net improvement, £1,900,000. In September last the duty on Malwa Opium was raised by Rs. 50 a chest; the revenue from Opium this year has been unprecedentedly large. Opium.

*Regular
Estimates,
1879-80.*

Assessed Taxes.

Stamps.

Interest on debt.

Post Office.

Telegraphs.

Stationery and
Printing.

Superannuation.

Railways.

Public Works.

Provincial and
Local Surpluses,
and Balances.

Assessed Taxes.—Decrease, £93,000. This is the result of the orders given during the year for the exemption of the smaller incomes from taxation.

Stamps have improved by £114,000. The stamp revenue has been constantly increasing; during the last seven years it has risen from £2,516,400 in 1872-73 to £3,090,000 in 1879-80, or by £573,600.

Under no head of the revenue has there been any serious decrease.

11. On the expenditure side of the account, the following are the chief variations from the original estimates:—

Interest on Debt.—Decrease £389,000; the chief saving is in the discount on the loan of March 1879.

There has been a satisfactory increase in the Savings Bank Deposits, which now exceed £2,000,000; in December last new rules were issued increasing the rate of interest from $3\frac{3}{4}$ to $4\frac{1}{8}$ per cent., and for preventing trouble to depositors.

Post Office.—Increase £63,000. The new contract with the Peninsular and Oriental Company came into force in February 1880. The yearly subsidy has been reduced from £430,000 to £360,000; the efficiency of the service has been increased, and the rates of postage to Great Britain have been reduced. Post cards costing $\frac{1}{4}$ anna each were introduced in April 1879, and are already so popular that it is difficult to supply the demand.

In *Telegraphs*, the excess of expenditure over receipts will, this year, be only £6,000; there has been a satisfactory growth of revenue, amounting to £145,000, of which, however, £50,000 is attributed to the war.

Stationery and Printing.—Decrease of expenditure £99,000; this is to some extent nominal. Supplies will, in future, be largely bought in India, instead of in England.

Superannuations.—Increase of net expenditure, £168,000; this is owing to the reduction of Public Works establishments, to which I shall have again to refer.

Including an expenditure of £230,000 on the Jhelum and Rawal Pindi line, *Railways* are worse by £204,000, of which, however, £150,000 appears as a transfer under *Gain by Exchange*. If these adjustments are made, the Railways show an improvement of £176,000. But the Railways, and especially the Great Indian Peninsular and the Oudh and Rohilkund lines, have not been as prosperous as, at one time, we hoped they would be.

Public Works.—There has been a saving of £747,000, to which I shall refer again.

Provincial and Local Surpluses.—Net surplus, £265,000. Improvement, 456,000*l.*

There was a like improvement of £469,000 in the accounts of 1878-79, as compared with the regular estimates. The provincial and local balances at the end of 1879-80 are now expected to exceed the sums last estimated as follows:—

	Provincial. £	Local. £	Total. £
Now estimated - - - -	1,331,800	1,336,700	2,668,500
Estimated last year - - - -	837,000	716,900	1,553,900
Better - - - -	494,800	619,800	1,114,600

This result is the more remarkable and satisfactory in that, during the year, the Local Governments agreed to contribute from their balances in special aid of the imperial treasury the sum of £670,000, half of which, £335,000, is charged in the accounts of the current year. The other half will be charged in 1880-81. The reduction of their expenditure on public works and the general improvement of their provincial resources has enabled the Local Governments to afford this timely help to the general finances with little apparent difficulty.

Army.

The *Army* shows an increase of £2,768,000; which I have already noticed. Apart from the war, the regular estimate is for a net expenditure of £15,487,000; the excess of £112,000 over the original estimate being due to high prices.

Exchange.

Exchange shows an improvement of £1,010,000; the original estimate was for the remittance to the Home Treasury of £15,000,000 at an exchange of 1*s.* 7*d.*; it is now hoped that £15,750,000 will be remitted at an average rate of 1*s.* 8*d.*

Productive Public
Works.
Railways.

Productive Public Works, on which £3,700,000 was spent, show a small increase; 511 miles of railways have been opened for traffic during the year. At the end of the year there will be 8,724 miles in use and 1,462 under con-

struction. I shall speak again of the frontier railways. Great progress has been made during the year with the Rajputana Line. The Lines in Bengal have been completed, and fair progress has been made on the Line from Nágpúr to Ráipúr.

*Regular
Estimates,
1879-80.*

Irrigation Works show an expenditure of £797,000. In Madras, much progress was made with the Godaveri and Kistna Delta and other works. In Bengal, the Orissa project, so far as the works have been sanctioned, approaches completion. In the North-Western Provinces and Punjab, much useful work has been done on the Upper and Lower Ganges Canals, and on the Western Jumna and Sirhind Canals.

Irrigation.

Satisfactory progress has been made with the Madras Harbour Works.

Revenue and Working expenses of Productive Public Works show an improvement of £638,000, due mainly to the inclusion, so long desired, of the land revenue in the Madras Presidency attributable to these works.

12. The details of the Loan operations of the year are as follows:—

Debt incurred.—Net £5,131,000. More than estimate £804,500, of which £540,700 was in India, where less was paid off than was expected, and £263,800 in England, where 270,016 less than was estimated in March last was raised at the close of 1878-79.

Loan operations.

The loan of £5,000,000, which was notified on the 13th March 1879, was subscribed at an average of 95-0-6 per cent. The discount upon it charged in the accounts of 1879-80 was £247,239. Of the outstanding portion of the 5½ per cent. Loan of 1859-60, £1,123,900 will be paid off during the year, leaving £105,600 still due. Other outstanding notes, amounting to £2,400, have been discharged. The net sum borrowed is thus £3,850,000.

13. A Local Debenture Loan of £45,020 was raised for the Cawnpore-Farakhábad Light Railway at 4 per cent. interest with share of profits.

*Local Debenture
Loans.*

A Local Debenture Loan of £50,000 was offered at Nágpúr in November at par at 4½ per cent. interest, with half the percentage of surplus profits on the Nagpur-Ráipúr Railway. The subscriptions amounted to £42,700, of which £17,300 is payable this year and £25,400 next year.

The Secretary of State received £2,000,000 without interest from Her Majesty's Imperial Government under the Indian Advance Act, 1879: but on the other hand he repaid sterling debt amounting to £736,200.

14. Thus the net debt incurred amounted to £5,131,000, or, excluding the loan from Her Majesty's Government, £3,131,000. Including railway capital transactions, savings bank deposits, service funds, loans to native states, &c., and the repayment of such loans, the net amount borrowed in 1879-80 was apart from the £2,000,000 advanced as aforesaid under the Indian Advance Act, £3,523,000.

Net debt incurred.

The equation of the year 1879-80 may accordingly be stated thus—

	£		£
Borrowed ...	5,523,000	Net expenditure ...	3,581,000
Net other receipts ..	148,000	Balances decreased ..	2,090,000
	<u>5,671,000</u>		<u>5,671,000</u>

15. The price of public securities has risen rapidly during the year. The price of 4½ per cent. paper has for some time been more than 101, and that of 4 per cents. now exceeds 94.

Public securities.

16. I come now to the Budget Estimates for the coming year 1880-81.

*Budg et estimates,
1880-81.*

The revenues are estimated at £66,746,000. The ordinary expenditure is estimated at £66,329,000; we expect therefore a surplus of £417,000.

General.

17. The estimated expenditure includes excess military charges, amounting to £4,360,000, of which £2,090,000 is for military operations proper, and £2,270,000 for the frontier railways; against this, there will be a set-off on account of improvement in the Railway and Telegraph revenues, estimated to £300,000, leaving the net charge for the war on the estimates of 1880-81 at £4,060,000.

*Effect of war on
estimates.*

Budget
Estimates,
1880-81.

But for the war expenditure, the true surplus of the year, to compare, as before, with the standard surplus of £2,000,000, would not have been less than £4,000,000.

The estimated revenue includes £982,000 obtained from the taxes imposed in 1877 and 1878, to enable the Government to meet its famine obligations.

Satisfactory result.

18. The estimates for 1880-81 thus show an extraordinarily satisfactory result, far surpassing the standard at which two years ago the Government of India aimed. The result is the more satisfactory, because the total estimated expenditure on the productive public works of a doubtful character, to which I have before referred, is only £398,000.

Revenue.

19. I will notice a few only of the heads in which the Budget Estimate differs from the Regular Estimate of the present year.

Assessed Taxes
and Customs.

20. *Assessed Taxes and Customs* show a decrease of revenue, to which I shall refer later on. I may, however, notice here that, in February 1879, the Hon'ble Mr. Hope and Mr. J. D. Maclean were appointed Commissioners to report, *inter alia*, whether it was desirable to revise the tariff valuations yearly, and, if so, how such revision should be made. The Commissioners recommended a yearly revision of the tariff values, and advised that the materials for such revision should be systematically collected throughout the year at the ports of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Rangoon, and Kurrachee, and collated in Calcutta, in February of each year, by a Committee of three persons to be appointed by the Government of India, one of them being *ex-officio* the Collector of Customs at Calcutta. The first committee of revision was accordingly appointed in January last; the Hon'ble Mr. Hope, and, on the nomination of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Mr. J. W. O'Keefe, a member of the firm of Messrs. Kettlewell, Bullen, and Company, consented to serve upon it, with Mr. J. D. Maclean, Collector of Customs, Calcutta. The Committee has just completed its revision, which is estimated to produce an increase of £15,000 to the Customs revenue.

Salt.

21. *Salt* shows an increase, of which also I shall speak separately.

Opium.

22. The net revenue from *Opium* is estimated at £7,250,000; this estimate, although £1,150,000 less than the amount we expect to receive in 1879-80, is largely in excess of any estimate made in any previous year. Although the actual net revenue of the last two years has been more, it is not thought prudent to take the estimate for the coming year at a larger amount than that which I have stated.

The Bengal crop of 1878-79 yielded 29,876 chests 75% consistence and 20,175 chests 70% consistence. Thus the stock in hand on the 1st January 1880 was 38,179 chests 75% consistence, and 43,404 chests 70% consistence, total 81,583 chests. The provision for sale during 1880 is 28,200 chests of each consistence, so that the reserve on the 1st January 1881 will be 9,979 chests 75% consistence, and 15,204 chests 70% consistence, total 25,183 chests.

Telegraphs.

23. Under *Telegraphs* we estimate for the first time that the revenue will exceed the expenditure.

Railways.

24. *Railways*.—Net revenue £794,000, of which £250,000 is attributed to the military operations in Afghanistan. Improvement £1,080,000.

Of this large amount £268,337 is nominal, owing to only three-quarters of the East Indian Railway annuity falling due in the financial year 1880-81, against which, however, may be set a payment of £235,000 due to the Company under the old contract for the second half of 1879. The purchase of the East Indian Railway is expected, upon the estimates of 1880-81, to produce a net revenue of £300,000 in excess of what it would have yielded under the old system. The guaranteed Railways will, it is hoped, in the prosperous season which we anticipate, yield £405,000 more than this year.

From the State Railways an improvement of £231,000 is expected from increased mileage open and from development of traffic.

There is no doubt always an element of speculation in the estimates of Railway revenues; but an increasing return may fairly be expected from the constantly increasing capital expenditure on the construction of these works, which by the end of 1880-81 will amount to £130,000,000, or 144 crores of rupees.

The chief event of the year is the purchase of the East Indian Railway for the State with effect from the 1st January 1880. The price paid was £37,200,000. I need not repeat the details of the new arrangements under which the line has been purchased, and under which it is to be worked.

On the expenditure side of the account an improvement is expected of £242,000 under *Interest*; this partly arises from the proposed conversion of the 5 per cent. sterling loan, and is partly nominal.

25. Under *Administration* there is a decrease of £30,000, in consequence of various reductions in Imperial Establishments.

26. The grants for 1880-81 for *Ordinary Public Works* are less than those for 1879-80 by £597,000; the grants for *Productive Public Works* have been reduced by £1,000,000. There is thus a total gross reduction in Public Works expenditure of £1,597,000, of which the saving in establishments is estimated at £247,000. Against this, however, must be set the special grant of £230,000 under *Railways* on the Jhelum and Rawal Pindi line.

The reduction in the ordinary expenditure on Public Works, apart from establishments, is more apparent than real; for the actual expenditure in past years has never exceeded the amount granted for 1880-81. I shall again refer to the question of expenditure on Public Works.

27. I have already spoken of the *Army* expenditure. Apart from the war, the estimate stands at £15,330,000. According to our present accounts and estimates, the net cost of the war from 1878-79 to the end of 1880-81 will be about 9½ millions, of which about 3½ millions is for the railways, and 5½ millions for military operations. The estimates of the cost of the war must of course be to a great extent speculative; but they have been prepared with much care; and their accuracy up to the present time is highly creditable to Major Newmarch and the Military Department. There is no reason to suppose that they err on the side of being too low.

To what extent it will be found hereafter that stores, chiefly camp equipage, have been expended and wasted and lost, we cannot possibly know accurately until the war is over; but every thing bought for the war is included in the estimates, and the reserves in our arsenals are being maintained at their proper standard, the cost being charged, for the present, as current expenditure.

28. Our estimates show under *Loss by Exchange* a net loss of £3,174,000, being an increase on the regular estimate for the present year of £310,000; in 1880-81 it is proposed to remit £16,900,000; the expenditure of the Home Treasury will be largely increased by the payments for stores for the frontier railways. We assume that the average rate of exchange will be the same as that of the present year, or 1s. 8d.

29. The rate of exchange for the adjustment of the public accounts between the English Treasury and India has been fixed at 1s. 8½d.

30. *Productive Public Works (Capital expenditure)*.—Grant £3,312,000. Decrease £388,000. The grant is thus distributed:—

Irrigation and Navigation	...	...	£ 630,000
Madras Harbour (besides £50,000 granted under 34, <i>Other Public Works</i>)	...	...	70,000
East Indian Railway	...	...	630,000
Other State Railways	...	...	1,982,000
TOTAL	...	...	3,312,000

This grant is made in strict accordance with the conditions prescribed by the Secretary of State as follows:—

Fixed grant...	...	...	£ 2,500,000
Saving in 1879-80 re-granted	...	...	182,000
Capital expenditure on the East Indian Railway	...	...	630,000
TOTAL	...	...	3,312,000

*Budget
Estimates,
1880-81.*

Purchase of East
Indian Railway.

Expenditure.

Interest.

Administration.

Public Works.

Army.

Loss by Exchange

Adjusting Rate,
1880-81.

Productive Public
Works.

<i>Budget Estimates. 1880-81.</i>	It is hoped that 988 miles of railway will be opened for traffic in 1880-81. This will complete the communication between Bombay and the North-Western Provinces through Rajputana. Good progress will be made towards the completion of railways and works of irrigation already begun, but the funds at our disposal for productive works are now so small that we cannot commence in the coming year any new works of magnitude. In Madras the chief outlay on irrigation works will be in the Godaveri Delta. In Bombay and Bengal the sanctioned works will be nearly all completed. In the North-Western Provinces the principal work will be on the Lower Ganges Canal. In the Punjab the weir at the head of the Shirhind Canal and the remaining large masonry work will be nearly finished; the new main line of the Western Jumna Canal will probably be opened, and the new Delhi branch will be well advanced.
<i>Expenditure.</i> Railways and irrigation.	Madras Harbour. It is hoped that the Madras Harbour works will be finished in 1880-81. It was not possible to grant on this account more than £70,000 under the head of <i>Productive Public Works</i>, but the completion of the work being very important, this amount has been supplemented by a grant of £50,000 under the ordinary head.
Net revenue from Productive Public Works.	31. <i>Revenue and Working expenses, Public Works.</i>—Net revenue £318,000. The improvement is under Railways.
<i>Ways and Means. 1880-81.</i>	32. I now come to the important subject of the provision of the Ways and Means for the service of the ensuing year.
Home Remittances	33. In this respect the responsibility of the Government of India is confined chiefly to the requirements of the public service in India. Its direct concern with the provision of Ways and Means to meet the demands of the Home Treasury is limited to the remittance of the amount for which the Secretary of State intimates his intention of drawing bills during the year. The Secretary of State has resolved to raise, in this way, during 1880-81, the sum of £16,900,000. Owing to the heavy estimated expenditure at home for the frontier railways (£360,000 in 1879-80, and £1,070,000 in 1880-81), this large sum will not much exceed the current requirements of the Home Treasury. The Secretary of State could not therefore frame his requisition upon us for less than £16,900,000; but he has authorised the Government of India to state that his drawings may be reduced if the demand for his bills upon India proves insufficient.
Assets and Liabilities.	34. According to present prospects, the balances in the treasuries in India on the 31st March 1880 are expected to amount to Rs. 14,19,00,000. The surplus of Imperial revenue in India during 1880-1 is estimated at Rs. 12,88,68,000, or, deducting from the expenditure the loss by exchange on the Secretary of State's bills, Rs. 16,26,68,000. We expect to receive in India the sum of Rs. 1,01,38,000 for remittance to England, and, in the shape of Savings Banks and Service Funds Deposits and recoveries of Railway Capital, Rs. 56,15,000. Besides the Secretary of State's bills, provision must be made for the estimated deficit in the Provincial and Local revenues of Rs. 11,60,000 and for the net disbursement of Rs. 19,50,000 on the Remittance and Deposit Accounts. Thus, including Rs. 20,28,00,000 for the Secretary of State's bills, we have to contemplate a liability of net Rs. 20,59,10,000, against which we have net assets amounting to Rs. 17,84,21,000, showing a deficiency of Rs. 2,74,89,000.
No Loan.	35. The Government of India has had to consider whether the whole or any part of this sum should be provided from the balances, or whether it shall raise the whole or any part of it by loan. After due deliberation we have resolved to adopt the former alternative, and to endeavour to meet all the expected demands in India, during the coming year, without recourse to the money market for a loan.
Reduction of balances.	36. In consequence of this resolution the balances in the treasuries in India on the 31st March 1881 are expected to fall somewhat below 11½ crores of rupees, a sum considerably less than the minimum sum which the Government of India usually estimates.
Free power to borrow reserved.	37. The estimates of the Home remittance and Loan Transactions are habitually presented with expressed reserve; and this reserve must be understood to be this year greater than usual. But while thus emphatically reserving to our-

selves the freest discretion to raise, during the year, any loan which actual events may render necessary, we consider the prospects of our being able to dispense with a loan during the year sufficiently substantial to make it unnecessary for us to enter any loan upon the estimates. We shall not in any case hesitate to raise any small Local Debenture Loans which may seem expedient during the year. *Ways and Means.*

38. The year 1878-79 was one of restricted and depressed trade as compared with the trade of the year immediately preceding it, though the value of the merchandize imported and exported (excluding gold and silver) was hardly below the average of the four years ending with 1877-78. When it is considered that famine still afflicted extensive provinces, that the war with Afghanistan was in progress, interfering with ordinary traffic on railway lines, causing a scarcity of carriage, and increasing the effects of drought and floods on the prices of food, and that trade generally in Europe and America was passing through a prolonged period of depression, it is a matter for congratulation that the industry of the country was able to bear up so well against adverse influences. *Trade, 1878-79.*

The value of the exports of raw cotton, oilseeds, hides and skins, indigo, silk, wheat, salpetre, lac, teakwood, and sugar, exhibited a sensible decline, most strongly marked in cotton, seeds, indigo, wheat, and sugar. The fall in cotton followed on a continuous decline of some years; the crops of seeds failed extensively, and at the same time the European and American demand for them fell off; the wheat trade was for the time almost annihilated, the low range of prices and enormous supplies from America forbidding the competition of Indian wheat; and sugar, after a large trade in the two previous years, suffered from the increase of prices caused by exhaustion of stocks and a failure of the sugarcane crop in the North-Western Provinces. Large quantities in excess of the imports of the previous year were imported to supply the deficiency. *Exports and imports.*

But while the trade in these articles diminished, owing to what we may hope were in most cases temporary causes, the exports of cotton twist and piece goods, rice, jute and jute manufactures, tea, coffee, and wool, afforded indications of prosperity in some of our chief staples.

The value of the cotton manufactures imported was smaller than it had been for many years. Metals, railway materials, liquors, coal, and apparel all declined, and there was an increase in silk, sugar, provisions, woollen goods, machinery, and spices.

The net imports of silver were nearly £10½ millions less than those of 1877-78, and gold was sent out of the country to the value of nearly £900,000. *Import of silver.*

The trade of the ten months of the current year for which figures are available shows a marked recovery from the depression of 1878-79, a recovery which, with abundant harvests, a decline in the prices of food stuffs, and renewed vitality in European and American trade, may reasonably be expected to continue. *Recovery of trade.*

Even raw cotton has shared in the recovery, both quantities and values having, for the first time for years, increased instead of diminished. Twist, rice, jute, hides, and skins, tea, indigo, wheat, and saltpetre, have all increased, in some cases remarkably. The recovery of the rice trade, with the fall of prices and the reduced demand for consumption in India, is very satisfactory. So also is the increase in the trade in tea, although it is said that the planting interest has not been a gainer by the increased exports.

The imports of merchandise also, like the exports, are much larger than in 1878-79. A large and active trade is being done in cotton goods, in the development of which there is reason to believe that the remission of duty on the coarser kinds of grey goods has aided. On the whole, the prospects of trade are satisfactory.

39. I have now, my Lord, stated the general facts and figures for the past and present years, and for the year that is about to commence. The result must be considered highly satisfactory. The aggregate actual and estimated surpluses of the three years amount to £2,580,000. Let it be remembered that this will be arrived at after spending, out of our ordinary revenue, 5¼ millions on the war, 3½ millions on frontier railways, and £400,000 on *General satisfactory result.*

Afghan War.

famine relief; let it be remembered that the amount charged in these three years under the head *Loss by Exchange* has been nearly 10 millions; let it also be remembered that we have given up £340,000 from the License tax; £150,000 from Salt; £150,000 from the Inland sugar duties; £300,000 on cotton goods, and a multitude of other articles; and that the sum raised by taxation is thus less than the sum raised at the beginning of 1878, by more than £900,000.

War in Afghanistan.

40. I shall now, My Lord, proceed to notice some of the more important questions of policy which the Government has had to consider. And first I may refer to that question which, at the present time, chiefly occupies our thoughts, the war in Afghanistan.

Its policy does not affect financial aspect.

My Lord, I do not now propose to discuss the reasons which led the Government to undertake this war. The discussion by me of such questions on the present occasion would be irrelevant to the matter before me. Whether the war has been just and necessary, or iniquitous and foolish, it has now to be carried on and paid for, and my present duty is confined to showing how the Government proposes to meet the obligations which, whether rightly or wrongly incurred, cannot now be avoided.

Cost to be borne by India or England.

41. There is, however, one question to which I must refer. It has been maintained by many persons that England, and not India, ought to bear the cost of the war in Afghanistan. I must explain why I consider this opinion incorrect.

Circumstances may be imagined under which it would be just that England should bear the whole cost of military operations carried on by the Government of India, even though the finances of India might be so prosperous that they could without difficulty dispense with such assistance. It is conceivable that a war might be undertaken for the maintenance or defence of purely English interests, real or imaginary does not matter, and that India might be called upon by England to co-operate in such a war, although no Indian interests could be possibly served by it. In such a case the liability of England could not justly be denied.

It will be said by those who are opposed to the policy which the Government has followed, that the war in Afghanistan falls precisely within this category, and that this war has been entered upon in defence of no Indian interest whatever, but in furtherance of the so-called Imperial policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government. Persons who hold this opinion may reasonably object to throwing any part of the cost of this war upon India; but this is not the opinion of the Government.

Indian interests involved.

42. Her Majesty's Government, and the Government of India, and, I will make bold to say, the intelligent loyalty of the people of India itself, hold that the war in Afghanistan was undertaken for the protection of India from the menaces of foreign aggression, and for the maintenance within her borders of permanent domestic tranquillity. The Government believed that this war could not be avoided, unless we were prepared to acquiesce in the establishment on our North-West Frontier of new conditions, which would infallibly lead to a great increase of military expenditure, to intolerable financial burdens and difficulties, and to the disturbance throughout India of the very foundations of our power. Great as is the interest of England in preventing such consequences, the questions at issue were primarily and essentially Indian questions.

Believing that the true interests of India are indissolubly bound up with the peaceful maintenance of our own dominion, we say that this war was undertaken with the conviction that justice to India herself rendered it unavoidable. If it be right to expend the revenues of India in maintaining the armies by which British supremacy is ordinarily secured, in giving to her internal peace and good administration, in the development of her wealth and civilization, and on the thousand other beneficial objects which we desire to promote, it is right to spend those revenues in rendering it impossible that any hostile influence should grow up on her borders, to threaten the existence of everything which the duty of England to India makes us most desirous to develop.

Necessity of financial independence of India.

43. I can imagine few greater misfortunes to India than the loss of her financial independence, and the acceptance by England of financial responsibility for

her Indian Empire. It would signify to India the loss of control over her own affairs in every department of her administration, the possible subordination of her interests to those of a foreign country, and the substitution of ignorance for knowledge in her Government. Although some rare instances may be quoted in which, when there seemed to be a conflict between English and Indian interests, it may perhaps be doubted whether India has been treated with perfect fairness, there can be no question that, on the whole, the government of India has been carried on with as honest and thorough a regard for Indian interests as could have happened if India had a separate national existence of her own. England may rightly be proud of the way in which she has treated her great dependency. These fortunate results have, however, been due not only to her justice, but also to the wisdom with which she has left to India a separate financial responsibility. England has felt that it would be no kindness to take upon herself burdens which India now bears, to guarantee Indian debts, pay for Indian wars, and relieve Indian famines. England has also felt that it was wise in her own true interest, to refuse to take into her own hands the control of the £67,000,000 which now constitute the revenue of India. England does not choose that there should be grounds for even a suspicion in regard to the purity of her motives. I say this in the belief that India has before her a future of increasing wealth and prosperity; but if this anticipation should not be verified, and her future should be one of financial embarrassment, the loss of her financial independence would bring with it other misfortunes. I trust that the people of England may never find cause for believing that the maintenance of their Indian Empire means the imposition of heavy burdens on themselves.

Afghan War.

44. If, my Lord, India is ever to have a separate national existence, she must have self-respect and self-reliance, and I am sure that Indian patriots, who, with perfect loyalty to British rule, may nevertheless have, as they may rightly have, visions and aspirations of a distant future of another kind, ought to be the first to declare that their magnificent country shall bear its own burdens. India expects justice from England, but does not ask for charity. She feels that, with her ample and splendid resources, her two hundred millions of people, her revenue, which is surpassed by that of two only of the greatest European nations, she is a source of strength, not of weakness, to the British Empire. Whether we look to the extent of her territory, or to the numbers and character of her population, her military strength and capabilities, her public revenue and credit, India is one of the great powers of the world, ready at all times to stand side by side with England, and to fulfil every obligation which she owes to the common interest. If England be wise, she will not suffer either her own people, or her friends, and still less will she suffer her enemies, to be ignorant of the fact that her Indian Empire possesses almost inexhaustible resources. I repudiate, as unworthy of India and of England, the notion that India requires help to protect herself against the hostility of an Afghan Chieftain, encouraged though he may have been by a great power beyond. Nor does the fact that English as well as Indian interests are at stake, afford any reason for asking England to help us with her money. Everything which conduces to the safety and prosperity and progress of India, is a matter of concern to England; but there is no more reason that England should help us to pay for a local war, necessary for the protection of the interests of India, than that she should help us in the relief of our famines, or in meeting the ordinary charges of our administration.

Resources of India

45. Holding, my Lord, these views, it was, I confess, with some regret that I saw India, a year ago, accepting from England even the small amount of assistance which was given to us in the shape of a loan of £2,000,000, to be repaid without interest in seven years. But the circumstances of the time were peculiar. India had been suffering from a succession of famines and other unavoidable misfortunes, which had thrown enormous burdens on her finances, and there was a strong feeling in England, shared by men of all classes and parties, that, when the new calamity of war was added to the calamities which had gone before, England should help India in her difficulties. Although the course prompted by this generous feeling may not have been

Loan from England to India.

Afghan War.

Cost to be borne
by India.

politically wise, its motives were so honourable to the people of England that I cannot cavil at it.

46. But, whatever may be thought of the action taken in the past, when we were in a position of temporary embarrassment, no reasons exist at the present time for asking England to help us to meet the charges of the war. The figures which I have stated to the Council show that we have in our possession ample means of defraying all expenditure which it is likely we shall have to incur. We have obtained these means not only without the imposition of fresh burdens on the people, but at a time when we are reducing their burdens by £900,000 a year, when we are relieving important industries, and freeing from taxation a vast number of persons, who, if not actually, are still relatively poor. To say that when we are reducing the pressure of taxation, when the general condition of the people of India is one of great prosperity, when every branch of our revenue is flourishing, and when we have actually got all the money that we want, we ought nevertheless to ask England to tax herself, and relieve us from a burden which we are perfectly able to bear, does not seem to me reasonable.

Cost of war to be
met out of current
income.

47. But it will be said that, even if India must bear the cost of the Afghan war, and must pay for the frontier railways, the construction of which the war has made inevitable, all these charges ought not to be thrown on the present generation of taxpayers; that this expenditure is undertaken for the future, rather than for the present protection of India; that posterity should pay its share of burdens imposed for its benefit; and that these charges should be met by loans, not out of the income of the year.

The question thus raised is an old one; but I think I may be allowed, without disrespect to those who think differently, to say that, in England at least, statesmen of all parties have agreed about the principles on which such questions are to be decided. Those principles are, that, especially in a country with a heavy public debt, and not able to reckon confidently on a large and consequently recurring surplus, by means of which new debt can certainly and speedily be cleared off, the wise course is undoubtedly to provide for war expenditure out of the revenue of the year, so far, but so far only, as this is possible without throwing excessive burdens on the taxpayers, and overloading (to use Sir Stafford Northcote's words) the springs of industry and commerce; and that, if the expenditure cannot thus be covered, the deficiency may properly be made good by loans or other temporary resources not included within the regular revenue of the year. This is the doctrine which I understand to be held by that great authority in matters of finance, Mr. Gladstone, and I have partly stated it in his own words, although at one time he went further in his advocacy of meeting such expenditure without recourse to loans. In India there may undoubtedly be special reasons for charging heavy war expenditure against loans, in preference to placing new burdens on the country. Not only is it difficult to make a very large and sudden addition to our existing taxation, but it may be politically unwise to do so. There would therefore be no cause for surprise if, in the case of having to meet a large expenditure on war, we were unable to contribute from current revenue as large a proportion of the cost as in England would be thought right. Nevertheless, the general principle is as true in India as in England,—that, to the utmost of our ability, we ought to provide for the expenses of every year out of the year's income, and to allow no borrowing that is not really unavoidable. As the late Prince Consort, contrasting these two plans of meeting war charges, observed:—"The former course is manly, statesmanlike, honest; the latter is convenient, cowardly, perhaps popular."

No need for in-
creased taxation.

48. For the reasons which I have given, it is improbable that the Government would, if our finances had been less prosperous, have thought it right to propose the imposition of fresh taxation to meet the expenses of the present war; but it is fortunate that no such question now arises. We can carry out the wise principles which I have quoted, not only without any fresh demand upon the resources of the country, but while we are giving relief from present taxation. I can hardly conceive that it can seriously be maintained that, having in our possession all the money that we are likely to require for the prosecution of the war, we should not spend it on that object, that we should abandon existing income, and then borrow to supply the loss.

49. The reasons for which it is right to provide for the charges of the war out of current income apply equally, and indeed with greater force, to the charges for the frontier railways. Although they will permanently benefit the country, it is plain that we could not construct them with borrowed money on the grounds on which we borrow for productive public works, and that their cost must be included among our ordinary charges. If, however, we could not have paid for them out of our ordinary revenue, it would have been quite right to borrow for their construction. I should have said this because the works are absolutely necessary, and because the political and financial evils of borrowing would be less serious than those involved by fresh taxation. I should not have defended borrowing for these railways on the ground that they will benefit posterity as well as the present generation. That is a matter about which I know nothing; but I know that posterity will have quite enough to do in bearing its own burdens.

Frontier Railways.

Cost of frontier Railways similarly treated.

50. I may add, with reference to these railways, that the urgent necessity for pushing on their construction is not likely to be denied even by those who have opposed the policy under which the war in Afghanistan was undertaken. The estimates show a probable expenditure on this account of £1,440,000* in the present year, and of £2,270,000 next year. The council is aware of the great and unprecedented speed with which the Railway from the Indus to the foot of the Biluchistan hills, on the line towards Kandahar, has been pushed on. The extension of the Punjab Northern Railway from Jhelam to Rawalpindi and Peshawar, and to Khushalgarh, is making rapid progress. In less than four months from the commencement of operations, trains were running for 140 miles towards Kandahar; while on the Peshawar line, where the rails have to be carried over viaducts 100 feet high and through cuttings of rocks 60 feet deep, the engines are expected to reach the banks of the Indus before the end of 1880. Independently of military considerations, which, possess, of course, at the present time, extreme importance, the completion of these lines, within the shortest practicable time, has become very urgent. As the Government of India has written on this subject, "it is obvious that immediate outlay upon the early and effectual improvement of our means of transport would be amply repaid by reduction in the excessive, and, to a great extent, wasteful expenditure which must otherwise be prolonged throughout the course of our present military operations, with the certainty of its recurrence on the first occasion of their renewal. The financial and economical interests affected by the inadequacy of our present Frontier communications are far-reaching, and the injury they sustain can scarcely be exaggerated."

Urgent necessity for improved frontier communications.

51. I have now, my Lord, to state to the Council the course which the Government proposes to take in regard to the Bill for amending the Licence Acts. It will be remembered that, when this measure last came before us, I announced, on behalf of the Government, that it was not proposed to take any further steps in the matter, until after the publication of the Financial Statement.

License Acts Amendment Bill.

The changes proposed in the existing law, when the Bill was introduced in November last, would, if they had been adopted, have had no appreciable effect upon the revenues, the amount surrendered by the exemption from taxation of the lower classes of traders being just made good by the extension of taxation to the official and professional classes. The effect of the further modifications subsequently proposed, and of the additional exemptions in favour of the poorer traders, would have been a loss on the one hand of £340,000 a year, and a gain on the other hand of £240,000, thus leaving us, as the general result, with £100,000 less revenue than we get now. The measure was essentially one which had for its object the equitable re-adjustment of taxation, and it had no financial importance.

Proposed changes.

52. Before going further, I wish to ask the Council to recall the circumstances under which fresh taxation was imposed two years ago.

Original intention of increased taxation.

The object of the new taxes was described in the preamble of the License Act passed by this Council; and nearly the same words were used in the other similar Acts passed for the various provinces of the Empire. It was stated that—"in order to provide means for defraying the public expenditure from time to time incurred, and to be incurred, for the relief and prevention of famine in British India, it is necessary to effect a permanent increase of the revenue."

* NOTE.—The amount should apparently be £1,670,000, including £230,000 entered under Railways.

License Tax.

In making this quotation, I do not attach any exaggerated importance to the declaration that these taxes were intended to give a "permanent increase" to the revenues. It is, of course, competent to the Legislature to alter its policy in regard to this, as to any other matter. The declaration, nevertheless, has this value, that it shows the intention of the Legislature, when these measures were enacted two years ago; and since the object for which they were enacted—the protection of the country against famine—is undoubtedly as important now as it was then, and as earnestly desired by the Government, it is reasonable to say that very good cause ought to be shown, before we consent to give up taxes avowedly imposed to make a "permanent increase" to the revenues.

Total amount of
Famine Insurance
Taxation.

53. I may remind the Council what this increase really was. Taking together the measures adopted in the two years 1877 and 1878, the first new taxation was the Public Works cess, imposed on the land in Bengal: this yielded in 1878–79 £355,590. In 1878, new cesses were also imposed on the land in the North-Western Provinces, Oudh, the Punjab, and the Central Provinces, yielding about £170,000. The total amount of new taxation on the land was therefore about £525,000: the actual receipts during the last two years have however not been so large, because it was thought right to postpone for a time the collection of the cess in parts of Northern India which had suffered from drought. Similar taxation was not imposed on the land in Madras and Bombay: the principal reason for this exemption was, that the salt duties had just been increased in those presidencies, and it was held to be inexpedient to impose cesses on the land at a time when the effects of the famine were still being felt, and when the salt duties were being increased. A license-tax on traders was first imposed in 1877 in the North-Western Provinces, and, in the following year, the present License Acts were applied throughout India. They yielded at their maximum, about £820,000 net.

The total amount of what has been called the Famine Insurance taxation was therefore about £1,345,000.

Local Rates and
License Taxation
stand on same
basis.

54. Considering that precisely the same reasons were given by the Government, and accepted by the Legislature, for imposing fresh taxation on the trading and on the agricultural classes, with the object of protecting the country against the financial consequences of famine, and that special stress was laid upon our desire to make the burden fall with approximate equality on each of these classes, it would be difficult, for the present Government at least, to accept any proposition for treating them differently now. In fact, it would be hardly possible to maintain the cesses on the land, if the tax on trades were abolished. It might be more possible to defend the abolition of the cesses on the land and the maintenance of the tax on trades. But it is needless to discuss such questions. Practically, so far as we are now concerned, these taxes on the agricultural and trading classes stand on the same basis.

They cannot be
abandoned.

I need hardly say, after what has been said on former occasions, that the Government can entertain no idea of giving these taxes up, and of sacrificing a million a year of revenue. Even if these taxes were as bad as some think them, a time like the present, when we have to meet the heavy obligations entailed by a serious war, would not be opportune for abandoning them; still less could such a course be approved by those who believe with me, that these taxes are far less objectionable than others that could be named, and that when the time comes for remitting taxes, it is not with these that we ought to begin.

Exemption of
small traders from
taxation.

55. At the same time, the Government desires to make all practicable improvements in the assessment and the administration of the License Acts. It was this desire which led the Government to the conclusion, explained by me to the Council, when the Bill for amending those Acts last came forward, that it was desirable to exempt from liability all persons whose annual earnings are less than Rs. 500 a year. As I formerly said, we expect by this change to exempt from taxation about a million and three quarters of the smaller traders, and to lose £340,000. The Government still adheres to these conclusions.

Extension of tax-
ation to profes-
sional and official
incomes recon-
sidered.

56. Although, when this Bill was last before the Council, I was able to state that there had been great improvement in the financial position of the Government, I did not then venture to anticipate that the improvement would, when

we came to make our estimates for next year, be so considerable as it is now shown to be. It has necessarily obliged the Government to reconsider the question of the propriety of extending taxation to the official and professional classes, and thus making good the greater part of the loss incurred by the exemption of the smaller traders from the License Acts.

Famine Finance.

Although the main object of the Government in this part of its proposals was a more equitable adjustment of taxation, we felt that it was hardly prudent to give up £340,000 of income without any compensation, and this was one of the reasons assigned for the proposal to tax the officials and professional men. The Government has now had to consider this question:—admitting—as we must do, in the present state of the finances—that we do not absolutely require the £240,000 which the contemplated taxation of these classes would yield, is it now desirable to impose it merely for the purpose of making our system of taxation more theoretically equal, and removing to some extent the reproach, which undoubtedly is true, that certain classes do not at present bear their full share of the public burdens?

Original reasons therefor.

If it had now been possible to attempt the removal of the numerous inequalities and anomalies which are inseparable from any such partial system of taxation as that which now exists, this would have been an object of high importance; but the mere extension of taxation to the official and professional classes would clearly be no complete solution of such a problem, although it might be a step towards it. On the whole, the Government thinks it better, for the present at any rate, not to press this part of its proposals. We have given up £340,000 from our existing taxes, and we do not ask that any fresh taxation shall be imposed. The amendment of the present law is desirable to carry out the exemption of the lower classes of traders, and for the removal of one or two difficulties which I shall explain later on; but with these exceptions no change is proposed in the License Acts now in force.

Extension abandoned.

57. I do not intend, my Lord, on this occasion to discuss afresh the vexed question of the Famine Insurance Fund or Surplus. There has been much misunderstanding between the Government and some of its critics as to what was said and as to what, though unsaid, we are presumed to have meant when the taxes to which I have referred were first imposed in 1877 and 1878: for this misunderstanding, so far as it has been due to want of precision in the explanations of our policy, I am prepared to accept my full share of responsibility, but for my part, I do not intend to refer to it again. I shall only say further that there has been, in regard to this matter, no change in the financial policy of the Government, nor is any change proposed now. In the following remarks, I shall endeavour to avoid controversy, and to refer only to actions and to facts which, whatever their motives and origin, can hardly be misconstrued.

Famine Insurance Fund or Surplus.

58. When the serious character of the financial obligations of the State in times of famine had been recognised, it became the duty of the Government of India to make sure that the public resources were adequate to meet the fresh strain imposed upon them. Upon careful inquiry we came to the conclusion that we must contemplate a liability from famine amounting, in loss of revenue and actual expenditure, to, on an average, £15,000,000 in ten years. It was clear that this liability must be included among our ordinary obligations, and that it would have been a fatal error to go on increasing the public debt to meet charges which must periodically occur. To enable us to discharge the liability thus estimated, we determined to aim constantly at a surplus of £1,500,000, supplemented by a further surplus of £500,000 to provide for extraordinary and abnormal demands, other than famine, as, for example, to name the most serious of such demands, for war.

Standard Surplus how fixed.

This standard surplus of £2,000,000 was to be ascertained on a comparison of the revenues with the expenditure, exclusive of:—First, Productive Public Works, which, to whatever extent might be necessary, it was assumed might be provided for by loan; Secondly, Famine Relief, and loss of revenue due to famine; Thirdly, Protective works, *i.e.*, works not strictly fulfilling the definition of Productive Public Works, but constructed specially for the pro-

Famine Finance. Standard Surplus. tection of the country against famine; and Fourthly, Abnormal expenditure, other than for famine, as, for example, on war.

I do not stay to inquire afresh how far the standard thus adopted was adequate to the object in view, namely, the solvency of the State, although I believe it to have been so; I only recite facts.

Measures for securing the same.

59. In order to secure this standard average surplus of £2,000,000 the Government next resolved that it was necessary to increase the revenues of the country. The occasion for such increase was the recognition of the increased obligations of the State in times of famine, and the measures of taxation adopted were framed in the belief that there were certain classes upon which this particular burden ought primarily to fall. As I have already explained that taxation amounted originally to £1,345,000. It has now been reduced to £1,000,000.

Prevention of Debt by increased Famine Taxation.

60. Whether the public accounts show surplus, equilibrium or deficit, it is indisputable that these taxes must prevent debt by the exact amount which they yield, and that, when famine occurs, our resources for meeting it will be increased by an amount exactly equal to the amount obtained from these taxes, with compound interest upon them. This part of the subject needs no further remarks.

I have shown to-day that the precise burden borne by the country during these three years for this purpose has been or is estimated to be—

	£
in 1878-79	1,227,891
in 1879-80	1,184,000
in 1880-81	982,000
	3,393,891

The actual expenditure on famine relief has been or is estimated to be :—

	£
in 1878-79	313,420
in 1879-80	99,000
in 1880-81	5,000
	417,420

Therefore, the taxation thus levied in these three years, has enabled us to defray the expenditure on famine relief, and, moreover, to prevent debt to the amount of £2,976,471, with interest upon this sum. That this result has been achieved is self-evident, and, being independent of the surplus or deficit of the revenue as a whole, requires no further demonstration.

Standard Surplus surpassed.

61. I have perhaps already said enough upon the other part of this subject. The standard which we accepted was £2,000,000 revenue in excess of the expenditure on the ordinary account, excluding the expenditure upon famine, and other abnormal obligations. In my opinion this standard has been, in each of the three years of which I am speaking to-day, greatly surpassed.

It will doubtless be always right to scrutinise rigidly and jealously the validity of the grounds upon which any part of the public expenditure is excluded from the account upon which the surplus for comparison with our standard surplus of £2,000,000, is ascertained; but I believe that, if the accounts and estimates of the three years before us are subjected to the most severe criticism, it will be found that the actual and estimated surplus of revenue during this period does truly far exceed the £6,000,000 which, according to the standard which we have prescribed for ourselves, should be attained in three years, if the solvency of the State is to be ensured.

Illustration from ten years' accounts.

62. I find an apt illustration of our policy in this matter, ready to my hand, which I quote the more willingly, because it is, in other respects, of much interest. According to present prospects, in the ten years ending with 1880-81 we shall have spent, all told, including productive public works, war, and

famine, £36,848,000 more than our whole revenue. The items included in this expenditure, which should be excluded before applying our standard, are—

*Famine Finance.
Public Works.*

	£
Productive Public Works*	35,881,000
War in Afghanistan	9,250,000
Famine	14,607,000
Total	59,738,000

Our revenue will have exceeded the rest of our expenditure by £22,890,000; and, but for loss of revenue from famine, this surplus would have been £25,890,000, or, on an average, £2,589,000 a year.

Thus, during these ten years, with an average surplus of £2,589,000 to compare with our standard of £2,000,000, we expect to have defrayed the whole cost of our famines and our wars, from our revenues, excepting only the trifling deficiency of £967,000. Considering the magnitude of our expenditure on famine and war during this period and the immense increase of charge under Loss by Exchange, this retrospect appears to me highly satisfactory.

Retrospect satisfactory.

63. I wish I could say that our plans for the construction of works for the actual prevention and relief of famine had been as successful as our financial arrangements have been. And this brings me, My Lord, to another part of my subject.

Original programme of works for prevention and relief of famine.

Financial safety was by no means our sole object. We felt not only that we had financially to provide the means of relieving famine when it occurred, but that the equally important duty devolved upon us of doing everything which it was possible for a Government to do, towards preventing these most terrible of all natural calamities, and furnishing the country with the machinery by which, when they occurred, the largest practicable amount of relief could be, most speedily and effectually distributed. The new taxation and the other measures by which our finances were improved, would give us, we believed, the means of carrying out these objects with a certainty and rapidity which would otherwise have been difficult.

The investment of our surplus in Productive Public Works was, from a merely financial point of view, in no sense essential to our scheme, and it will be seen, from what has been said elsewhere, that this part of our plans was modified by the orders of the Secretary of State in a manner to which, on financial grounds, we could take no exception. But we certainly contemplated the extensive construction of works for the protection of the country against famine; and it was to these projects that public attention was mainly directed, and in them the public naturally and rightly felt a deeper interest than it could take in any merely financial arrangements.

Subsequently modified.

64. A nobler programme was, in my opinion, never put forth by any Government than that put forth by Your Excellency; a more beneficial scheme was, in my judgment, never formed for the material improvement of any country, than the scheme which Your Excellency explained to this Council on the 27th December 1877, in your Minute of March 1878, and on other occasions. I desire to remind the Council and the public of what the plans of the Government of India were, and to explain why they have not been carried into effect as completely as we desired.

Its benefits.

65. I wish, My Lord, it were possible for me to read to the Council, and incorporate in this Financial Statement, Your Excellency's speech of the 27th December 1877. As I cannot do this, but am anxious to place the whole case in the clearest light, I must ask Your Excellency's permission to string together some passages from that speech, for I could not describe the programme of the Government in any words so good as those which Your Excellency used—

Viceroy's programme of December 1877.

"The measures now before the Council have for their principal object, the provision of that increase of the public income which experience has proved to be the first condition of any practical insurance against famine; and, therefore, it is only proper that the Council should know how we intend to employ the resources which its adoption of these measures will place at our disposal for that purpose. * *

* Including £11,076,000 spent on what I have called doubtful works.

*Famine Finance.
Public Works.*

"Of the countless suggestions made from time to time, and more especially during the present year, for rendering less bitterly ironical than it still seems, that famous inscription on the huge granary built at Patna, for 'the perpetual prevention of famine in these provinces,' there are only three which merit serious consideration. These are firstly, Emigration; secondly, Railways; and, thirdly, Irrigation Works. Unfortunately for India, the first of these three material factors in the practical solution of problems similar to those we are now dealing with, is inapplicable, or only very imperfectly applicable, to the actual conditions of this country; * * * though emigration unquestionably claims our fostering encouragement, I fear that, for many years to come, we must practically exclude this expedient from the list of those on which we mainly rely as a means of insuring the population of India against the calamities of periodical famine. The conclusion thus arrived at forcibly confines our immediate efforts to the most rapid development, by the cheapest methods, combined with the most appropriate and efficient application, of the only two remaining instruments for increasing the produce of the soil, facilitating its circulation, and thereby improving the general social condition, and augmenting the collective wealth, of the whole community. Those instruments are railroads and irrigation works.

"Now the incalculable value to India of her present railways has been unmistakeably demonstrated during the past year; and the Government is unquestionably bound to stimulate the extension of this class of works to the greatest extent and with the greatest rapidity, consistent with the requirements of financial prudence.

"* * It is an unquestionable fact, that the railways, and the railways alone, were the salvation of the situation in Northern Behar during the famine of 1874; and that they have again been the salvation of the situation in Madras during the famine of the present year.

"* * Had there been no railway within reach of these districts, the people, where they have now died by hundreds, must have assuredly succumbed by thousands.

"I am satisfied that the development of a network of subsidiary lines of railway giving the means of transport through every district of British India, has become a matter of vital necessity for the attainment of the great object now before us. Our present object is to render available within the shortest possible time a maximum length of line, especially constructed for a slow goods traffic, rather than to provide those more ample conveniences for passengers and goods, which have commonly been deemed necessary for all Indian railways hitherto constructed. * * *

"The early conclusion of such an undertaking must necessarily depend upon its financial practicability; and, for this reason, all minor considerations must be subordinated to the most rigid economy in construction, and the most severe limitation of the works to what is indispensable for the efficient exercise of their special function. But, if these conditions be duly complied with, I have confidence that, at a comparatively early period, we shall, without any strain upon our financial resources, have extended to all parts and provinces of our empire the most efficacious protection, not indeed from dearth (for that is impossible), but from those terrible effects of dearth which now generally terminate in famine.

"These, then, are the principles on which we are prepared to apply at once to the extension of our railway system, as a means of insurance against famine, an adequate proportion of the resources at our command for that purpose. * * *

"We propose to apply to the extension of irrigation works precisely the same principle and policy. * *

"I am not now speaking of what we ought to do, or would do, to ensure this country against the worst effects of future famine, had we only the means of doing it; but of what we can do, and will do, with the means already provided for in the measures now before the Council. I do not mean to say that the construction of such an extensive system of local railroads and irrigation works as we propose to undertake, will not be the gradual task of many years. But I do mean to say that, in the manner and on the principles already explained, we are now providing for the prompt commencement, and uninterrupted continuation of this great and necessary task. We are systematising a policy, the principles of which have been repeatedly proclaimed and approved by our predecessors. We are associating with it the interests, the powers, and the duties of our local administrations. We are providing them with the means of permanently prosecuting and developing it, not without reference to our financial control, but exempt from the distressing uncertainty which has hitherto been inseparable from the practical execution of this policy, in consequence of the obligation, which has till now rested upon the Government of India, with the very limited funds at its disposal for the prosecution of public works, to choose, from year to year, between the conflicting claims upon its purse of the various and dissimilar localities of this spacious Empire."

Construction of
Productive Public
Works defended.

66. My Lord, I am convinced that the policy, which Your Excellency thus proclaimed your resolution to carry out, was not only wise and humane, because it provided the only possible means by which the Government could protect the country against the future calamities of famine, but that, financially,

it was sound and prudent. Notwithstanding many mistakes which, in transactions of such magnitude, were inevitable, the policy by which, for many years past, we have been constructing railways and canals in India was, in my belief, sound and statesmanlike in its conception, and its practical results have been triumphantly successful. The wealth of the country, and the prosperity and happiness of its people, have been increased by it to an incalculable extent; the consequent gain to the country and the public finances has been immense, and is not to be measured by figures showing only the direct returns from the works which have been constructed. For my part, I see no drawbacks, no dangers, and no disadvantages, which deserve to be weighed for one moment against the benefits which have been derived. The Government of Your Excellency desired to extend and develop this policy, and hoped, by the construction of a network of cheap railways and of carefully planned works of irrigation, to do all that it was in the power of a Government to do, to prevent the frightful calamities of famine to which the country is now periodically exposed. We believed, and I believe still, that we could do this not only without financial risk, but with certain financial advantage.

*Productive
Public Works.*

67. The Local Governments shared our convictions and our expectations. Sir Ashley Eden, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, was prepared to undertake, from the resources already assigned to him, a system of railway communications which, without costing the imperial revenues a shilling, would, he believed, have added millions to the wealth of his great province. Sir George Couper sent us up a scheme, carefully prepared by my friend General Fraser, for constructing a complete system, some twelve or thirteen hundred miles in length, of light railways, which, in combination with works of irrigation, would have gone far, if not to make future famines in the North-Western Provinces improbable, at least to render the relief of such famines a comparatively easy and a certainly successful operation.

And supported by
Local Govern-
ments.

68. My Lord, these visions have for the present, but I hope only for the present, faded. The plans which Your Excellency described to the Council two years ago, and which I have repeated to-day, have not yet been carried out; we have had to defer the hope of protecting the country against famine by the rapid development of railways and works of irrigation; and not only this, but we have even been compelled largely to reduce the expenditure which, for many years past, we have been incurring on works of this description.

But deferred
owing to recom-
mendations of
Committee as to re-
duction of expendi-
ture on Productive
Works.

My Lord, I shall not call in question the sufficiency of the reasons which led Her Majesty's Government, and a Committee of the House of Commons, to think that a very large reduction should be made in the expenditure of the Government of India on Productive Public Works; nor is it necessary that I should now repeat those reasons, because they have been fully explained in the Report of the Committee, which was published during the last Session of Parliament. Nor do I wish it to be supposed that I am insensible to the advantages which we derive from this temporary restriction of expenditure. It has enabled us to carry out in a way which might otherwise have been hardly practicable, important reforms in the Public Works Department, and to get rid of hugely overgrown establishments.

69. The limit of £2,500,000 which has been placed on our annual expenditure on productive public works has avowedly no sort of finality. "The amount to be annually expended" (I am quoting from the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons) "should mainly depend upon the financial condition of India, and should, therefore, for the present be limited to an amount of £2,500,000, as recently fixed by the Secretary of State for India in Council." Considering what our financial condition already is, and what we hope it will be in the future, I predict with confidence that the check, which has been placed upon our expenditure on useful works essential to the progress of the country and to its protection against famine, will be only temporary, and that the execution of the plans described by Your Excellency two years ago has been only temporarily deferred. But at the same time I wish to make it clear that, if the Government of India has failed for the present fully to carry out its programme for the construction of material works for protecting the country against famine, no responsibility

Present limit of
such expenditure.

*Productive
Public Works.*

for that failure rests upon us. While I say this, I must again ask the Council to remember that, however much we may regret this disappointment, it in no way affects the financial efficacy of the measures taken to enable us to discharge our obligations in times of famine without fear of insolvency. Nothing can prevent the success of those measures, which have been subjected to this modification only, that, owing to the improvement of our general financial position, we have ventured to dispense with about a quarter of the additional taxation (amounting at its maximum to £1,345,000 a year), which was their main feature.

*Policy as to ex-
penditure on Pro-
ductive Public
Works defined.*

70. I may here notice, with regard to the policy of the construction of productive public works, that, although the correspondence on the subject between the Government of India and the Secretary of State is not concluded, it is understood that the following points have been settled for the present:—

- i. That any money which it may be necessary to borrow for the construction of such works shall be borrowed in India in rupees, and not in London in sterling money.
- ii. That not more than £2,500,000 a year, on an average, shall be thus borrowed, in addition, however, to any capital expended upon the East Indian Railway or any other undertaking which may be hereafter acquired by the State in like manner; in addition also to any money which may be lent to the Government of India by Native States for the construction of productive public works.
- iii. That the yearly grant for the construction of productive public works shall not exceed £2,500,000 in addition to the capital expended upon the East Indian Railway or any undertaking similarly acquired hereafter, and to the expenditure upon any works the funds for the construction of which are lent to the Government of India by Native States.
- iv. That the unexpended portion of the grant of the past year may be re-granted for expenditure in the following year. The object of this provision is to prevent the waste and inconvenience incident to the lapse of unspent grants for the construction of public works.

As already explained, the grant for the construction of productive public works in 1880–81 has been regulated strictly by these principles.

*Customs tariff duty
on cotton goods
not further re-
duced at present.*

71. There are, My Lord, various questions connected with the customs tariff to which I must now refer.

Beginning with the import duties, there is first the duty on cotton goods, and this is a subject of which I cannot speak without some reserve, because there has been in past times, as everybody knows, no unanimity of opinion regarding it among the members of the Government. Speaking, as I now am, on behalf of the Government generally, I desire to say nothing to which any of my colleagues might take exception, and, although it will not be possible for me altogether to avoid the expression of my own opinions on questions of past and future policy, I hope it will be understood that I shall, in giving such opinions, be stating only what I myself think.

The Government does not at present propose to make any alteration in the duties actually levied on cotton goods. There are, however, obvious and serious defects in the existing system, and no one can say that it can long be maintained.

*No longer pro-
tective but admit-
tedly anomalous.*

72. The measures taken during the last two years, whatever other results may have followed, have at least effected the particular object for which they were declared necessary. They have, for the present, removed all grounds for the complaint, that we were levying protective duties in favour of the Indian mills in their competition with English manufacturers. Some classes of English goods may be unduly favoured in comparison with other classes of English goods; but no protection remains for the special benefit of goods produced in India.

When, last year, Your Excellency decided that it was impossible to defend the maintenance of the duty on certain classes of cotton goods, because it had a distinctly protective character, it was thought right to make a considerable sacrifice of revenue for its immediate removal. Whether the course adopted was right, as I then thought and think still, or whether it was wrong, is a question which I will not now discuss, but the Government feels that it

cannot at the present moment go further, or submit to loss of revenue beyond that which the measures of the last two years have rendered unavoidable.

Cotton Duties.

73. I must say something of the effect which those measures have actually produced. Mr. Hope's Commission stated in its report last year that the remission of duty on all goods made of thirties and under "would probably soon effect a complete revolution in the piece goods trade," and it quoted, in support of its own conclusions, a report by Mr. Pritchard, the Commissioner of Customs in Bombay, who, with reference to this remission, wrote as follows :—

Effect of abolition of duty on coarser cotton goods.

"It will operate to create a new class of shirtings made of yarns 28 by 29 or 30, instead of the present standard quality of 32 by 36. This will pass free of duty, and, if it finds favour in the market, will take the place to a large extent either of the long cloths or of the shirtings now used, or of both."

The Commission also quoted the following opinion of a large mercantile firm :—

"There can be no doubt that a trade in cloth made of yarn just within the limit of exemption of duty would be fostered, and which might gradually become of considerable importance. Such cloth would probably be appreciated by consumers for its intrinsic value, as well as for its comparative cheapness, owing to there being no duty upon it ; and, if this should be the case, it might do away with the importation of cloth made of yarns varying from 32s upwards."

74. I quote these passages, because the actual results have closely corresponded with the anticipations thus formed by the Commission and adopted by the Government. The chief difference has been that those results have followed more rapidly than either the Commission or the Government expected.

Anticipated.

The immediate consequence of the exemption from duty of goods containing no yarn of a higher number than 30s, was the rapid development of the manufacture and import of a new class of goods made of 30s and lower counts. In consequence of their superior cheapness these duty-free goods have rapidly become popular ; and the experiment having thus proved successful, the tendency is now to make of the coarser yarns all cloth for which they can be used, and to substitute the coarser for the finer fabrics formerly made of yarns ranging from 30s to 40s. This process has already reached such a point, that last month the duty-free shirtings and longcloths constituted more than 74 per cent. of those kinds of imported goods, and the dutiable qualities of some other classes of goods have almost disappeared from the market. We estimated last year that we might lose in the first year revenue to the amount of £150,000, and in subsequent years more. It is now probable that the loss in the first year, now about to close, will be nearly £230,000, and for the coming year it is estimated at £20,000 more.

75. Now, clearly, the present state of things is not satisfactory. We are holding out to English manufacturers a strong inducement to supplant finer by coarser classes of goods, and it has been forcibly represented that these and other anomalies ought not to be left uncorrected. I may refer in particular to a letter addressed to us by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber points out that the declaration made last year by the Government, that "it is not reasonable that certain goods should be admitted free, while large quantities of goods of almost precisely the same character in every thing but name remain liable to duty," is still true, with this difference, that the hardship is now "not caused by the competition between Lancashire and our local mills, but by competition amongst Lancashire manufacturers themselves, to secure the full benefit of the Government of India's last act. They do not, however, carry less weight on that account." The letter of the Chamber has been seen by the Council ; I need not repeat the forcible illustrations which it contains of the anomalies which now exist, but I fully admit the accuracy of its statements.

But anomalous and objectionable.

The Chamber says that "to all appearance, these duties are dying a natural death, and as that process involves serious anomalies and hardships, it is a question whether the present is not a fitting moment to abolish them *in toto*. To the Committee there does not appear any other course open, consistent with the declarations of Government, to which they have referred."

Cotton Duties.

Present anomalies
cannot be imme-
diately remedied.

76. If I could now put aside financial considerations, I should say that this conclusion of the Chamber is perfectly right. I may add that the alternative course which it has suggested as possible, namely, the recall of last year's exemptions, and the re-imposition of a uniform duty of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on all imported cotton goods, would not only be, in my opinion, objectionable in itself, but seems impracticable, because it would be opposed to the policy laid down for our guidance by Parliament, and by Her Majesty's Government. That policy was declared on the 4th April 1879, by the House of Commons, in the following Resolution:—

“That the Indian import duty on cotton goods, being unjust alike to the Indian consumer and the English producer, ought to be abolished, and this House accepts the recent reduction in these duties as a step towards their total abolition, to which Her Majesty's Government are pledged.”

I need not pursue this subject further. It is impossible to deny that the present state of things is anomalous and objectionable. The Government will give to this question in the future that constant attention which its importance demands, but it cannot, at the present moment, make the large sacrifice of revenue which its complete solution would involve, and, as a provisional arrangement, meanwhile, it does not seem possible to draw any line better than that drawn last year. The abolition of the remaining duties on cotton goods would cost us £615,000, in addition to the £250,000 which we have given up already.

I may remind the Council that the measures of last year were not hastily taken, and that they were in precise accordance with the specific recommendations of the Chambers of Commerce of Manchester, of Bengal, and of Bombay. I may add that, although I cannot doubt that the objections to which I have referred must have been felt as strongly in Lancashire as anywhere else, the Government has not received from the English manufacturers any complaints regarding them.

Personal explana-
tion.

77. Although, my Lord, I do not intend to discuss the propriety of the course that has been followed in regard to the removal of the duty on cotton goods, I must ask Your Excellency's permission to say a few words on what is, in some respects, a personal matter. We are constantly told that these measures have been adopted in disregard of the interests of the people of India, and in obedience to the selfish demands of the Manchester manufacturers. If, my Lord, we had, indeed, manipulated, in the interests of England or of any political party in England, the taxes paid by the people of India, our conduct would have been not only shameful and odious, but absolutely criminal, and I, as Your Excellency's chief constitutional adviser in the financial measures of the last two years, must have borne my share of the responsibility. But for myself, who have taken part in these measures, I wish to say that I hardly remember the time when I did not argue, in the interests of India, for the removal of these and all other restrictions on her commerce. I advocated the abolition of these duties before, to the best of my belief, Manchester had herself discovered that she was injured by them, and long before Lord Salisbury had proved in his despatches, in a manner which seems to me unanswerable, the serious injury which they were inflicting upon this country. As I said in my first Financial Statement three years ago, I would not have accepted my present office, if I had not hoped that I should have an opportunity of co-operating with Your Excellency in carrying out what, I may say without exaggeration, have been the convictions of a life-time. I have had that opportunity. The cotton duties are, in my opinion, virtually dead.

Approaching pro-
bable abolition of
all customs duties
in India.

78. Before leaving this subject, I think it right once more to point out that we ought not to shut our eyes to the consequences which, as it seems to me, must inevitably follow from the loss of the cotton duties. Whether those consequences ought, as I believe, to be welcomed as fraught with a great development of wealth and prosperity to India, or ought, as others think, to be looked on as disastrous, we cannot wisely shut our eyes to the fact that the abolition of the duty on cotton goods will involve in all probability the loss of a great

part of our revenue from sea customs. In the Financial Statements for 1877-78 and 1878-79 this was clearly pointed out. In the former of these, I said that I looked forward with confidence to the almost total abolition of customs duties in India, and I used these words:—"I do not know how long a period may elapse before such a consummation is reached, but, whether we see it or not, the time is not hopelessly distant, when the ports of India will be thrown open freely to the commerce of the world."

Customs Reforms.

My Lord, the fulfilment of this vision seems to me now not far off. It was shown in the Financial Statement for 1878-79 that, putting aside the duties levied on salt and alcoholic liquors, which stand on special grounds, and on which internal excise duties corresponding with the customs duties are imposed, there would remain, apart from the cotton duties, a very small amount of import duties. Taking the estimates for the coming year, the net sum which we expect to receive from the sea customs duties, exclusive of salt, alcoholic liquors, and arms, is £1,115,000. The cotton duties will yield say £615,000, and, if I am right in believing that they must ultimately be altogether given up, our whole import duties would then yield only about £500,000. The truth is that cotton goods are the sole article of foreign production, which the people of India now largely consume, and there is no present possibility of a large customs revenue from anything else. Will it be possible, when cotton goods have been freed from duty, still to tax woollen goods and many other articles? And can it be believed that we should long maintain our customs establishments for the sake of obtaining the insignificant revenue that would remain?

79. I know only one suggestion which seems to deserve discussion, for saving a considerable portion of our customs revenue. I do not remember by whom it was first made, but I have heard of it for a good many years past. I believe that it really had its origin in a plan which at one time Mr. Gladstone thought of for England. My hon'ble friend, Mr. Hope, has lately given it his attention.

Substitution of registration fees for customs duties.

Starting with the assumption that our customs tariff on its present footing cannot be maintained, this suggestion is that, instead of customs duties properly so called, we should, with certain exceptions, levy on all articles imported into India, and possibly, also, on those exported, a registration fee at a very low rate. In this way, it is urged, we might obtain a considerable revenue in an unobjectionable way. I give no opinion of my own, much less do I give any opinion on behalf of the Government, in favour of this scheme, and all I say of it is that it deserves to be considered.

80. Another solution of these difficulties has lately been suggested, but it seems to me unsound in theory, and impossible in practice. It is that a sort of treaty of commerce should be entered into between England and India, on the principle that India will admit all English merchandise free, on condition that England gives up the duties which she now levies on Indian tea and coffee; if, it is added, England, in order to maintain her duty on China tea, prefers to continue to levy duty on tea and coffee from India, she might pay the proceeds amounting to a million a year, into the Indian Treasury.

Suggested reciprocity between England and India condemned.

Of course we should be glad to see the English or any other duties on Indian tea and coffee or on anything else removed; but, if free trade be good for India, it is good for her whether other countries maintain duties on Indian products or not, and the fact that England (for, as it seems to me, excellent reasons) taxes our tea and coffee, is no reason for our taxing her cotton manufactures, and almost everything else that we get from her. To maintain the contrary is, to maintain the old delusion of reciprocity. In regard to the suggestion that England should pay to India the million which she levies on Indian tea and coffee, this is clear, that, whoever else might profit from such an arrangement, it would not be our tea and coffee interests. They would have to pay as much as before, nor would they be reconciled to the new arrangement by the reflection, that it was almost equivalent to the imposition upon them of an export duty for the purpose of saving the English treasury from loss, and for the benefit of the general revenues of India.

Not beneficial to tea and coffee interests.

Customs Reforms.

Equally appli-
cable to tobacco,
but impracticable.

81. I must add that I do not know why tea and coffee have alone been mentioned, as if they were the only articles of Indian production on which England levies any duty. There is tobacco, from which England derives a revenue of between eight and nine millions; I hope and believe that Indian tobacco has before it a great future; I should be delighted to see every legitimate encouragement given to its production; but I cannot conceive how it can be admitted into England free of duty. As, however, the adoption of the proposals, to which I have alluded, would practically lead to the surrender by England of the greater part of her customs revenue, I need hardly say more on this subject.

Duties on exports.

82. Leaving the import tariff, I come now to questions connected with the duties on exports. Since 1875, the only export duties have been those on indigo, lac, and rice.

Exemption of
indigo from
export duty

83. It is surprising that the duties on the two first of these articles should have survived so long. Nobody has ever defended them, and the only reason assigned for keeping them has been that the Government could not give up the revenue yielded by them, though this has never been great. The average amount derived annually from the export duty on indigo is £42,000. The duty is levied at a fixed rate on quantity, so that the revenue does not fluctuate with the fluctuation of prices. On the finer qualities the incidence of the duty is not much over one per cent.; on the lower qualities it may be as much as four per cent. The cultivation of indigo by natives of the country has, in Northern India, been somewhat rapidly increasing, and the duty falls much more heavily on the qualities made by them, than on the better qualities turned out by the factories managed by Europeans. Indigo from Central America competes with ours in the European markets, but not very actively; and a more serious future danger to this industry is probably to be found in the competition of chemically prepared substitutes. The danger is not the less real because no efficient substitute has yet been found. The progress of scientific discovery is now so rapid, that we might hear almost any day that this highly important Indian industry was seriously threatened, and we should then be exposed to the deserved reproach that this competition had been stimulated by the suicidal folly of our fiscal legislation. Export duties enjoy the credit of having ruined the Indian trade in saltpetre; they were taken off when it was too late to repair the mischief; the Government does not wish to run any similar risk with indigo. A notification, will, therefore, be issued to-day under the powers conferred on the Governor General in Council by the Sea Customs Act, 1878, exempting indigo from liability to export duty.

And of lac.

84. The same notification will abolish the equally indefensible export duty on lac. The trade in lac has been in a depressed condition, and during the last two years the average amount of revenue yielded by the duty has been only about £9,000.

85. I do not think that any one will question the propriety of these exemptions. Taking them both together, they involve a loss of about £54,000 a year.

Export duty on
rice retained.

86. The only export duty, which will now remain, is that on rice. It yielded, in 1878-79, a net revenue of £556,000. As it is an export duty, it is often assumed that its effect must be more mischievous than that of any import duty. No one can be more alive than I am to the economical objections to export duties; but this duty on rice is, in my opinion, at the present moment less open to objection than some of our other customs duties. I have before me a valuable note by Mr. O'Connor on the Indian rice trade. It is shown that more than half of our exports of rice goes to Europe. Of the remainder, the greater part is consumed in the countries near India, such as Arabia, Persia, Ceylon, the Straits, &c., or is sent to various colonies, of which Mauritius is the most important, for the supply of the cooly population. The rice exported from Bengal to Europe, "table rice," as it is called, is used as food; the rice from Burmah, a thick coarse grain, is chiefly used for distillation, or for conversion into starch.

87. There is practically, at the present time, no competition with India on the part of other countries in Asia or America in the rice trade. Great apprehensions were expressed some years ago of the competition of Saigon. Similar apprehensions have been felt in regard to Siam. As yet these apprehensions have not been justified; but I must observe that there has been this year a large increase in the export of rice from Saigon to Europe. Northern Italy produces a good deal of rice, and sends large quantities to France; other countries furnish smaller supplies. Rice cultivation, which was formerly very extensive in North Carolina, has ceased to be important, and little rice now goes from the United States to Europe. Thus, although it would not be correct to say that India has a monopoly of the trade in rice, she has something approaching to it, and so long as this remains true, it cannot be said that the export duty has a seriously injurious effect on Indian interests. At the same time, it is impossible to say how long this may continue true; the Government cannot keep too watchful an eye on the rice trade, and must be prepared, if it should become necessary, to take immediate action. While, therefore, I am not prepared to say that our export duty on rice is at the present moment especially objectionable, I feel that we cannot count upon it as a permanent source of revenue, and if we could afford the loss, I should be very glad to get rid of it. The exports of rice from India, during the last seven years, have not very greatly varied in quantity. In 1873, the year before the Bengal famine, they were 1,164,697 tons; in 1875, in consequence of the famine, they fell to 869,646 tons, and this was the lowest amount reached; in 1879 they had again risen to 1,061,861 tons, and the trade is now again increasing.

Customs Duties.

And by reason of India's practical monopoly of rice trade, not specially objectionable.

88. Considering that, between 1874 and 1878, the country was passing, with hardly any intermission, through a period of drought and famine, and that vast quantities of rice were absorbed in feeding the famine-stricken population, it is satisfactory to find that exports to other countries should have shown little diminution, and that the enormous increase in prices should not have interfered materially with the foreign demand. In 1878-79, although prices still ruled high and an active demand continued for internal consumption, the exports nearly attained the level of the trade previous to the famine period. This year the exports will, it is thought, exceed those of last year, and, if harvests continue good, next year will probably be a time of great activity in the rice trade.

Prospects of rice trade.

89. In leaving this part of my subject, I will only add, that I am as sure as ever that there is no country in the world in which the fullest application of the principles of free trade is more desirable than it is in India. India (to repeat what was said in the Financial Statement for 1878-79) "is a country which, from its poverty, the primitive and monotonous condition of its industrial life, and the peculiar character of its political condition, seems to require from its Government, before all things, the most economical treatment of its resources, and, therefore, the greatest possible freedom in its foreign exchanges." I confidently believe that the time is not far off, when the truth of this will be generally recognised.

Fullest application of principles of free trade desirable in India.

90. The re-adjustment of the salt duties, to which I must next refer, has proved a very successful measure. It will be in the recollection of the Council that, at the end of 1877, a step was taken towards equalizing the rate throughout India, by raising it, in the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, from 1 Rupee 13 annas to 2 Rupees 8 annas per maund, and by lowering it, in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, from 3 Rupees 4 annas to 3 Rupees, and, in the Upper Provinces, from 3 Rupees to 2 Rupees 12 annas per maund. In the following August, a further reduction was made of 2 annas in Lower Bengal, and of 4 annas in the Upper Provinces. By these means a uniform rate of 2 Rupees 8 annas per maund has been established throughout India, except in Bengal, where the duty is 6 annas higher, and in Burma and part of the Punjab trans-Indus, where it is nominal.

Measures for equalisation of salt duties successful.

On the 1st October 1878, the salt sources which the British Government had, under recently negotiated agreements, obtained on lease from the Native States in Rajputana, were taken over, and at these, as well as at the Sambhar Lake already in our possession, the duty of 2 Rupees 8 annas per maund was then levied on all salt, excepting that exempted under the agreements just mentioned, the details of which were fully described in the Financial State-

*Equalisation of
Salt Duties.*

ment of last year. Considering that this result has been obtained not only without any general increase in the rate of duty on salt, but with a large reduction of that rate throughout by far the greater part of India, and simultaneously with a reduction of price to the vast majority of the population, I think we may congratulate ourselves on the success of our policy.

It was formerly shown that, by the re-adjustment of the rates of duty, we hoped to lower the price of salt to 130,000,000 of people, while only 47,000,000 were affected adversely. Rajputana and Central India are now liable to the salt tax, but a portion of the population still obtains its salt free of duty, and another portion pays only half the usual rate. Throughout the greater part of these States the price of salt, independent of the duty, has been greatly diminished, not only directly, but by the extension of railways. The people have further been relieved by the abolition of local transit duties, and by the abolition of the British duty on sugar taken across the now defunct Inland Customs Line, which yielded £150,000 a year. The Government is now endeavouring to redeem all remaining transit duties on salt in Rajputana and Central India, so that the transport of salt may everywhere be free from restriction.

*Inland customs line
finally abolished.*

91. The Inland Customs Line, on the enormities of which I have so often dilated, finally disappeared at the commencement of the present official year. When I think of this abominable barrier, which was likened to the Great Wall of China, stretching 2,000 miles across the whole of India, so that, if it had been put down in Europe, would have reached from London to Constantinople, with the countless evils that it entailed, I find it difficult not to begin again my old expressions of indignation. However, it is now dead, and I congratulate Your Excellency and the country on the fact. By its disappearance we have saved about £100,000 a year.

*Results of policy
as regards con-
sumption of salt
and salt revenue
and expenditure.*

92. I will state to the Council the principal facts in my possession, illustrating the effect produced by our measures on the consumption of salt and on the public revenues.

We have complete returns for the first ten months of the present year. Comparing these with the returns for the same period in 1877-78, the last year in which the old rates of duty were in force, there has been an increase of consumption, throughout India, amounting to about 2,400,000 maunds; the total consumption in the former period was 20,373,000, and in the latter period 22,776,000 maunds. More than 537,000 maunds of this increase is the increase in Lower Bengal, and nearly 1,900,000 maunds in Northern India. About a third part of the latter is attributed to the consumption in the Native States of Rajputana and Central India. In Madras and Bombay there was a small falling off in the consumption, which fell from 8,850,000 to about 8,654,000 maunds, or by 196,000 maunds. The reduction in Madras is believed to be more apparent than real, because a large number of the population consume untaxed salt. The law relating to salt in the Madras Presidency is as yet very leniently enforced, or is, perhaps, not sufficiently stringent.

In making the above comparison, I have taken the most unfavourable figures for my own argument that I could find; 1877-78 was the great famine year, but nevertheless for some reason, which I have failed to understand, the amount of salt taxed in Madras in that year was, as I noticed in the last *Financial Statement*, extraordinarily large.

If we compare the returns for the first ten months of the present year with those of 1876-77 (and, if I went further back, my case would be still stronger), we find that, taking the whole of India, there has been an increase in the total consumption of 2,718,000 maunds, or from 20,058,000 to more than 22,776,000 maunds; and this increase has been spread over the whole country. In Lower Bengal the consumption has risen from 6,822,000 to 7,682,000 maunds, and notwithstanding the reduction of duty, the revenue has only fallen off by £30,000, or from £2,220,000 to £2,190,000.

In Northern India the consumption has risen from 3,775,000 to 5,442,000 maunds, and, in spite of the reduction of duty, the revenue has increased from £1,142,000 to £1,348,000. Even in Madras and Bombay, where the duty was

increased, and where the revenue has risen from £1,662,000 to £2,155,000, the consumption has increased from 8,641,000 to 8,654,000 maunds.

Salt Duties.

The figures I have just quoted refer to revenue derived from the duty on salt. There are, besides this, large receipts from other heads, such as the sale price of Government salt.

In 1877-78 the gross salt revenue of the whole year was under $6\frac{1}{2}$ millions sterling; in 1878-79 it had risen to 7 millions; the Regular Estimates for the current year exceed $7\frac{1}{2}$ millions, while, for next year, our estimate of salt revenue is $7\frac{1}{2}$ millions. Thus the improvement is expected to be more than one million in four years.

While the revenue has thus increased, the salt expenditure has diminished from £508,000 in 1875-76 to £404,000 in 1878-79, and is estimated at £368,000 in 1880-81. Against this saving in expenditure, however, must be put £253,000 on account of the annual compensations paid to the Native States and to Portuguese India; this, with £70,000 for the Sambhar Lake, is charged in the public accounts under *Allowances and Assignments*.

93. I think, my Lord, I may now say confidently that the wisdom of the policy followed in regard to the equalization of the salt duties has been proved by experience. To what extent the increased consumption and lower price of salt throughout the greater part of India have been the consequence of the reduction of the duty, and to what extent they have been attributable to the extension of railways, to the general improvement of communications, the opening out of new markets, and the increase of the population, it is not possible to say; these various influences have, doubtless, all contributed to the result; but it was with the knowledge, and indeed with the certainty, that all the conditions with which we had to deal were highly favourable to the success of our policy, that we were induced to adopt it.

Wisdom of policy vindicated by experience.

94. I must add that we received a few weeks ago a representation from the President of the Salt Chamber of Commerce, Cheshire and Worcestershire, to the effect that one of the results of our late measures has been an increase of the former difference between the rates of duty on Liverpool salt and that produced in Northern India, which places the former at a greater disadvantage than heretofore, and has driven it back from markets in Behar formerly supplied by it. Although, as I have already shown, there has lately been a great increase in the consumption of Liverpool salt in Bengal, careful inquiry is now being made into this subject. But, whatever may be the result of that inquiry, I may say at once that, although the Government cannot, at the present moment, make any further reduction in the Salt Duty in Bengal, it fully recognises the necessity of completing, as soon as possible, the actual equalization of the duty throughout India. It is an essential part of our policy to do so, and I feel sure that the measures which have still to be taken will prove as satisfactory to the country, and as beneficial to the revenue, as those of which I have been describing the result.

Necessity for further extension of policy recognised.

95. When, my Lord, the Financial Statement for 1879-80 was published a year ago, we were far from foreseeing the extraordinary improvement which was about to take place in our financial position, and which we now perceive had even then commenced. The loss caused by the great disturbance in the relative value of gold and silver had reached alarming proportions, and there was nothing to re-assure us regarding the future. We were engaged in war; the surplus which we considered necessary to protect the country against the financial consequences of famine had disappeared; our estimates, apart from the war, showed a surplus of only £605,000. We decided, however (to quote the words of the last Financial Statement), that it was "wise to abstain from imposing any fresh burdens on the country, and to accept the temporary loss of the surplus by which it was hoped that an insurance against famine had been provided."

Improvement in financial position not foreseen.

96. I see nothing to be ashamed of in our want of foresight. I do not see how we were to know that there would be a great improvement in the exchange, which would last through nearly the whole year, and which, in spite of an increase in our remittances, would better our position by £760,000; that our

Explanation.

*Improvement in
Financial
Position.*

opium estimate, which we had taken at a higher amount than, with one exception, it had ever been taken at before, would prove, taking both sides of the Account, to be too low by £1,900,000; that in consequence of the most favourable season which India has known for many years, the increased prosperity of the people, and other causes, every great branch of the public income would show an increase; that we should get £450,000 more from Land Revenue, £335,000 more from salt, and so on.

Beneficial reduction of expenditure.

97. Although, as I need hardly say, it was not a pleasant task, which I had last year to perform, in laying before the Government and the public so unpromising a budget, there are now good reasons for not expressing much regret that we were not gifted with greater powers of foresight. For the result was to make us undertake a most searching examination into every branch of the public expenditure, with the firm resolution that everything superfluous should be ruthlessly sacrificed. The reductions which we have made already, and which we hope still to make, are not the least satisfactory part of the year's history.

The Local Governments throughout India loyally responded to our invitation to co-operate in the task which we had undertaken. We left it entirely to their discretion to decide where they could reduce their expenditure, and exercised no kind of interference in their proceedings. The result of our communications with them was, that, with their full consent in every case, the assignments made to them from the Imperial treasury in the present year have been reduced by £335,000, and a similar reduction will be made in the coming year.

Especially on public works.

98. Besides less important savings, which I need not now detail, there has been in the present year a reduction in the Public Works expenditure of £661,000. I hope that £400,000 to £500,000 a year will eventually be permanently saved by getting rid of superfluous establishments. Some explanation is necessary on this subject.

Reduction of public works establishments necessary.

99. Before any orders to reduce the expenditure on Productive Public Works had been issued by the Secretary of State, or the question of reducing the Ordinary Public Works expenditure had been taken up afresh by the Government of India, it was an acknowledged fact that the strength of our Public Works establishments was enormously in excess of what was necessary. When the Secretary of State ordered, subject to certain conditions, the reduction of our annual expenditure on Productive Public Works to the sum of £2,500,000, this excess became, of course, a still more serious evil. I will not now go into the question of the causes which led to the growth of these needlessly large establishments. It is easy to be wise after the event; they were, for the most part, the result of errors of system which were only discovered to be errors by experience. However, this may have been, we found ourselves, at the beginning of the present financial year, in this position, that our Public Works establishments were declared by the highest authorities in the Public Works Department to be costing not less than £500,000 a year more than was necessary for the expenditure on Ordinary and on Productive Works which had to be carried on. We therefore resolved that these superfluous establishments must be at once reduced.

And carried out efficiently.

100. The Local Governments and the authorities in the Public Works Department deserve the thanks of the Government of India for the efficient manner in which the serious task of making this great reduction has been performed. I think it will be admitted that the measures of the Government were carried out with the greatest possible consideration to individuals, and that the engineers, with whose services we have unwillingly been compelled to dispense, have been treated liberally. The reductions actually made will save us £250,000 a year. In the present year there will, of course, be a large set-off on account of pensions and gratuities; it amounts, indeed, to about £280,000; but the greater part of the cost of reduction will be incurred once for all in the shape of gratuities.

Although these great changes in the constitution of the Public Works Department could not be made without some temporary inconvenience, there can be no doubt, I hope, that they will lead to a permanent increase

of efficiency. Our difficulties, however, are not over; our Public Works establishments are still larger than they ought to be, and the constant supply of young engineers that pours in from Cooper's Hill will, if it be not speedily stopped, prove a cause of renewed embarrassment, and of useless and serious expense.

Reduction of Expenditure, 1879-80.

101. Before leaving this subject, there is one important point that I must notice. It will be plain from what I have said, or have still to say to-day, that the Government of India looks with regret on the reduction of expenditure on Productive Public Works, and that it hopes to see that expenditure again increased hereafter. How, it may be asked, holding these opinions and expectations, can you justify this reduction of Public Works establishments? If, hereafter, your expenditure is increased as you hope it will be, you will have deprived yourself of the machinery necessary for the execution of your works.

No difficulty in increasing expenditure on Productive Public Works in future.

102. If, my Lord, this were true, I should, for my own part, have thought our proceedings very foolish; but I am satisfied that we need be under no apprehensions of the kind. I think that I cannot better explain the views of the Government on this subject, than by reading to the Council the following extract from a despatch addressed by the Government of India to the Secretary of State in September last:—

The Public Works Department being re-organized to meet this difficulty.

"Our present difficulties have not disturbed our belief in the great importance of the most rapid possible development of the means of communication and other material improvements in India. * * * * *

With these convictions, we should not have acquiesced, without remonstrance, in the absolute permanent restriction to £2,500,000 a year, of our expenditure on the construction of Productive Public Works, if we had understood this to be Your Lordship's intention. * * * Accordingly, we have been careful so to frame our proposals for the re-organisation of our establishments, that we shall have no difficulty in hereafter increasing our expenditure on Productive Public Works to any extent which is likely to be considered expedient. We could not have undertaken any reductions not compatible with this condition.

The ordinary difficulty of organising an efficient and economical service has been aggravated, in the case of the Public Works Department, by the fluctuations of public policy which have manifested themselves in large variations of the grants made for expenditure in this Department. We need not now inquire into the causes of these fluctuations, and we do not wish to criticise the policy either of the school which advocates a lavish public expenditure on such works, or of that which regards with distrust any such expenditure which can be avoided. It only concerns us now to recognise the fact that we have no reason for expecting, hereafter, more immunity from such alternations of conflicting influences than we have enjoyed heretofore. Our duty, therefore, is to anticipate their recurrence, and frame our measures accordingly.

Hitherto, our establishments have been organised on a plan which demands, for successful and economical results, a steady and unbroken prosecution of works; engineers having been brought into the service on engagements which have been understood as ensuring to them continuous employment. But such employment is incompatible with the conditions on which we can provide funds for the construction of Productive Public Works; and, clearly, we must now so organise our establishments that their strength may be, at any time, readily reduced or increased. In other words, the cause of our present difficulties being that we have, on the whole, been burdened with establishments in excess of what, with the funds at our disposal, we could constantly and profitably employ, we must, for the future, take care to engage no establishments in excess of the greatest strength for which we can confidently expect to provide constant and full employment, whatever policy as to the material improvement of the country may be in the ascendant.

We have resolved therefore, to organise our permanent establishment, rather upon the model of the staff of a great contractor, supplementing it, as occasion requires, by temporary establishments engaged for particular works only, with no claim to absentee allowances, pensions, employment upon any other work, or any of the rights and privileges of a regular establishment. Moreover, we desire to look, more and more, to the employment, upon considerable undertakings, of contractors with large capital, and to the development of the existing system of petty contracts for petty works. In this way we expect to avoid a recurrence of the inconvenience from which we are now suffering.

We anticipate no difficulty in carrying out the policy thus designed; on the contrary, we believe that, while guarding us against a return of our present embarrassment, this policy will, by encouraging persons to adopt the profession of Civil Engineer, and otherwise, promote the general interests, and be favourable to the extended employment of Natives of India in this department of our service, an object which we have much at heart."

103. Before leaving the subject of reduction of expenditure, I have still to mention what I hope may prove hereafter to have been the most important

Proposals of Army Commission for reduction of expenditure.

*Reduction of
Expenditure.*

measure of the year. I refer to the appointment of the Special Commission, presided over by Sir Ashley Eden, to inquire into the organisation and expenditure of the army in India. The Report of the Commission is now under the consideration of the Government, and I should be going altogether beyond my own proper business, if I were to attempt in any way to discuss the recommendations which the Commission has made, or to give any opinion as to the extent to which those recommendations may be carried out. But there are some facts to which I may refer without impropriety, and which seem to me highly encouraging. This Commission, presided over by one of the most eminent of Indian statesmen, and including among its members some of our greatest Indian soldiers, has arrived at unanimous conclusions on almost every one of the questions submitted to it. These high authorities believe that the adoption of their proposals would greatly increase the efficiency of the army in peace and war; that it would add to the military strength of the British portion of our forces; that the strength and efficiency of the Native army, as a fighting body, and the popularity of the service, would be increased; that the medical service would be placed in harmony with the true principles of army organisation; that in the departments of the army greater uniformity and power of administration would be obtained; that the great lines of military communication would be improved and made permanently secure; that, under a more scientific system, the troops could be more rapidly and easily mobilised; and that (to quote the words of the Commission) "with improved transport arrangements, with a more thorough knowledge of the vast resources of the country in supply and transport, and with a decentralized military system, the Government of India will be able, provided the details are thoroughly worked out beforehand, to place in the field a force which will be a powerful weapon of offence or defence, while the troops remaining in garrison will be ample to supply a reserve if needed, and to maintain the peace of the country undisturbed." The Commission believes that these great results, by which the efficiency of the army would be immensely increased, could be attained, not only without additional expense, but with a positive saving to the State of 1,250,000*l.* a year.

I have not been able to take credit for any part of such savings in the coming year; but I sincerely trust that this most important matter will not be allowed to sleep, and that no feeling that the improvement in our finances has rendered military economy less urgently necessary, will be permitted to cause delay in settling the questions which have been raised. As the Commission, quoting the principles strongly enunciated by Lord Mayo, and reiterated by his successors, has observed, "the people of India ought not to be called upon to support or pay for one unnecessary soldier."

Financial prospects
though favourable
still somewhat
uncertain.

104. The warning which I have now given, that we ought not to be induced by the improved state of our finances to relax our efforts in the direction of economy, is not true in regard to military expenditure alone. It would be a dangerous mistake to conclude that our prospects are not still uncertain.

In the Financial Statement for last year prominent attention was called to the consequences entailed upon India by the violent disturbance of the long standing equilibrium between gold and silver. It was then stated that the Government of India had submitted its views on this subject to the Secretary of State, and, as the Council is aware, Her Majesty's Government did not think it possible to accept our recommendations.

Although the exchange has, during the present year, been less unfavourable to India than we anticipated, it would be a great error to suppose that our anxiety on this account has been removed or even seriously diminished. The gravity of the subject can hardly be better illustrated than by this fact, that, even in the present year, which has been comparatively favourable, the charge for Loss by Exchange amounts to £3,188,000, while for the coming year it is estimated at £3,411,000. Ten years ago, in 1869-70, the charge was £142,555. Although the relations between the two metals have, of late, been comparatively steady, yet, as this stability does not rest upon any known foundation, it does not afford ground for confidence in the future relations of the two metals, which, under the existing conditions, cannot be predicted for a single month.

Obviously we cannot depend on the maintenance of our Opium revenue at its present unprecedentedly high amount. Other causes for a prudent anxiety are not wanting. It is, for example, plainly impossible to say what may be the actual cost, and the future obligations entailed upon us by the war in Afghanistan; although, so far as can now be foreseen, ample provision on this account seems to have been made. Altogether, while our financial prospects look, on the whole, far brighter than they were a year ago, we cannot say that there are not many causes for anxiety remaining. The prudent view to take is this, that we ought to take advantage of the breathing time that has now been obtained, and set our house in order.

*Financial
Prospects.*

105. I think, my Lord, that there is only one remaining subject to which I need refer. Attempts have recently been made in England to compare the financial condition of India as it is now with what it was in past periods, and it seems to have been assumed by many persons that, because difficulties are found in making such comparison without more information than is given in the published abstracts of our accounts, therefore there is something wrong in the structure of our accounts themselves. The fact is that, for many years past, we have been steadily striving to make such improvements in our published abstracts as were called for by changes in financial circumstances, and in order to give fuller information. In this view, heads of accounts which used to be lumped up together have been separated, while others have been consolidated, and, instead of entries showing merely the net result of the differences between revenue and expenditure, the actual revenue and expenditure have been entered on each side of the account respectively.

Complaints of difficulty of comparison of financial condition with past periods owing to changes in form of Abstracts.

106. For example, in Mr. Wilson's Budget Statement in 1860, there were only six revenue heads. The first was "Land Revenue, Sayer and Abkaree," and it included Land, Forest, and Excise revenue, all lumped together; then came, separately, "Customs," "Salt," and "Opium"; then "Miscellaneous," a large item of over 4 millions; and lastly, "Receipts from Railway Companies," which at that time were only £330,000. On the expenditure side the charges on account of collecting the revenue on account of Land, Forest, Excise, Customs, Salt, Opium, Post Office, and Stamps, together with Political Pensions, Allowances, Assignments, and Charitable Grants, were all included under one head; the remaining heads were "Interest on Debt in India;" "Military Charges;" "Marine;" "Civil Charges," which included all Political, Judicial, and Police Establishments, and all Public Works, except Military and Marine; "Miscellaneous;" and "Guaranteed Interest on Railway Capital." The charges incurred in England were not classified at all. In the next year, 1861, the heads of Revenue and Expenditure were re-arranged and somewhat increased in number. The net charges in England were also shown separately.

Accuracy and completeness of Abstracts now published compared with those of past years.

From that time the abstract has been, from year to year, improved in the manner I have indicated. In the last few years these changes have been considerable, involving the entry of large amounts on each side of the Account, which were previously shown net on one side only. For instance, until quite recently, the excess of the Guaranteed Interest on Railway Capital over the net earnings of the Railways was shown in one entry on the expenditure side, instead of the net earnings being entered on the revenue side and the full Guaranteed Interest on the expenditure side; this obvious improvement has caused an addition to each side of the account of some five millions sterling. So again, the Provincial Revenue and Expenditure is now entered in the gross, under the appropriate heads, instead of net on one side only of the account. This has added about a million to both sides. Finally, local revenue and expenditure which, although as much public transactions as any other, used to be excluded altogether from the Financial Statements, have now been included, adding more than 2½ millions to each side of the account.

Thus, under these three heads alone, the totals of our revenue and expenditure have been increased by about 8½ millions, without any addition whatever to our revenue or expenditure. I will not say that our form of abstract is even now perfect; but it gives detailed information which it was impossible to obtain from the abstracts as formerly framed. The improvement of late years has been great, and it is certain that few countries now publish such full and accurate accounts as India. It can hardly be contended that the difficulties which such changes

Present Expenditure compared with 12 years ago.

General comparison of Accounts for 1868-69 & 1869-70 with accounts of 1878-79 and estimates of 1880-81.

throw in the way of persons who wish to make minor comparisons, ought to have deterred us, or should in future deter us, from rendering our published accounts as perfect and comprehensive in form as possible, or that because our published statements were incomplete ten or twenty years ago they ought to have remained incomplete for ever.

107. I cannot now take up the time of the Council with any elaborate comparison between our present financial position and that of ten or twenty years ago. As, however, there seems to be an impression that there has been a great increase in the public expenditure, I will briefly compare the accounts of our net expenditure in 1868-69 and 1869-70 with the accounts of 1878-79 and the estimates of 1880-81. That this comparison may be effective, I have eliminated the expenditure from Local Funds, recently incorporated with the rest of the public expenditure, and also the expenditure on the war in Afghanistan. In like manner I have removed, throughout, the credits from the extinct Military Funds. I have, then, divided the net expenditure thus ascertained into four groups, as follows:

First.—Land Revenue (except Charges of collection, Surveys and Settlements), Post Office, Administration, Minor Departments, Jails and Penal Settlements, Law and Justice, Police, Marine, Education, Ecclesiastical, Medical, Stationery, Printing, Political, and Miscellaneous.

Second.—Interest, Loss by Exchange, Furlough Allowances, Pensions, and Famine.

Third.—Public Works, Telegraphs, Railways, and Canals.

Fourth.—The Army.

The whole net expenditure thus classified is as follows:—

	1868-69	1869-70	1878-79	1880-81
	£	£	£	£
Group I.—Effective civil administration	10,084,000	10,566,000	10,901,000	11,166,000
Group II.—Non-effective civil expenditure	7,054,000	6,543,000	11,177,000	10,536,000
Group III.—Public Works	8,195,000	6,235,000	3,399,000	1,882,000
Group IV.—The Army	15,137,000	15,251,000	15,442,000	15,330,000
Total	40,470,000	38,596,000	40,918,000	38,915,000

Effective Civil Charges.

108. *Group I.*—The effective civil charges proper have increased in the twelve years by about one million sterling, of which £500,000, under the Head of Law and Justice, is due to the development of backward provinces, such as Assam, Burmah, and Oudh, and to improved administration; and £250,000, under Education and Medical Services, is to be attributed to the constant demands for more schools and dispensaries. It does not seem to me that either the fact that the whole active civil administration of this great country costs only a fraction over net 11 millions a year, or the increase of its cost in twelve years by one million sterling, is indicative of any laxity of financial control or any disregard of the interests of the tax-payers.

Non-effective Civil Charges.

109. *Group II.*—The non-effective civil charges, many of which are not subject to control, show an increase of about 3½ millions, caused mainly by the disturbance of the relative values of gold and silver, but also notably by the growth of the pension list. Notwithstanding the addition of 37¼ millions (net) to our debt, the charge for interest shows little or no increase, the rate of interest having been, by successive operations, involving labour and forethought, constantly reduced. The average rate of interest upon the whole debt is now 4.40 per cent.

Public Works.

110. *Group III.*—The growth of the revenue from Railways, Telegraphs, and Canals, and the reduction of the expenditure on Public Works Ordinary has produced a diminution of the net expenditure in this group of more than six and a quarter millions a year, which therefore largely exceeds the increase in Group II.

During this period we have spent $65\frac{1}{4}$ millions sterling upon Railways, including the Guaranteed Railways, Canals, and Telegraphs. The result shown in the figures here given is remarkable evidence of the manner in which India responds to outlay of this character.

We have seen that in the coming year, the revenue derived from productive public works is likely to exceed the interest on the capital expended in their construction, together with the working expenses. I have read criticisms, in which the policy of constructing these works has been condemned on the ground that they had not yielded, and in many cases were not likely to yield, any extra profit after fully paying their expenses. But if the Government has succeeded in making these magnificent works for nothing, that is, without throwing any permanent charge for them on the people of India, surely it may well be contented.

111. *Group IV.*—Although there was an intermediate reduction of the cost of the Army, the net military expenditure here shown is little larger in the later than it was in the earlier years. The Army.

112. Owing to the rapid improvement in the financial results of our Railways, Canals, and Telegraphs, and to economy in the expenditure on public works ordinary, the whole net expenditure shows no increase, but a positive reduction. Whole net expenditure.

113. Considering that, during this period, the charge for loss by exchange has increased by $3\frac{1}{4}$ millions, and that, including the guaranteed railways, we have invested no less than $65\frac{1}{4}$ millions in productive public works, this, My Lord, is a result of which the Government of India need not be ashamed, and which I earnestly commend to the study of those statesmen who, from motives worthy of all respect, but which appear to me to be founded upon a dangerous misapprehension of facts, would withhold from India those material benefits which are to be obtained only by the expenditure of capital upon the development of her vast resources. Comparison satisfactory.

114. It now, My Lord, only remains for me to make the motion standing against my name. If it be adopted by the Council, it will be equivalent to a resolution that the Trades and Professions Bill shall be dropped altogether, and I shall afterwards ask permission to introduce a new Bill for the amendment of the present law. It will be understood, from what I have said to-day, that it will be a very short and simple measure, and its principal effect will be to relieve the poorer classes of traders from the taxation to which they are now liable.

STATE-

I.

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF THE GOVERNMENT

Estimates,

REVENUES.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-9.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
CIVIL.	£.	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
I.—LAND REVENUE	22,450,808	21,939,000	22,389,000	450,000	—	22,062,000	—	327,000
II.—TRIBUTES	703,660	703,000	714,000	11,000	—	698,000	—	16,000
III.—FOREST	605,433	672,000	662,000	—	10,000	690,000	28,000	—
IV.—EXCISE	2,619,349	2,742,000	2,765,000	23,000	—	2,782,000	17,000	—
V.—ASSESSED TAXES	900,920	896,000	797,000	—	99,000	535,000	—	262,000
VI.—PROVINCIAL RATES	2,638,835	2,740,000	2,706,000	—	34,000	2,764,000	58,000	—
VII.—CUSTOMS	2,326,561	2,248,000	2,231,000	—	17,000	2,175,000	—	56,000
VIII.—SALT	6,941,120	7,000,000	7,335,000	335,000	—	7,541,000	206,000	—
IX.—OPIUM	9,399,401	9,000,000	10,459,000	1,459,000	—	9,410,000	—	1,049,000
X.—STAMPS	3,110,540	3,087,000	3,203,000	116,000	—	3,194,000	—	9,000
XI.—REGISTRATION	266,360	267,000	262,000	—	5,000	265,000	3,000	—
XII.—MINT	172,335	180,000	254,000	74,000	—	196,000	—	58,000
XIII.—POST OFFICE	911,806	983,000	968,000	—	15,000	1,008,000	40,000	—
XIV.—TELEGRAPH	426,694	380,000	486,000	106,000	—	486,000	—	—
XV.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS	84,968	58,000	98,000	40,000	—	81,000	—	17,000
XVI.—LAW AND JUSTICE	647,130	649,000	663,000	14,000	—	680,000	17,000	—
XVII.—POLICE	211,108	233,000	221,000	—	12,000	232,000	11,000	—
XVIII.—MARINE	250,595	206,000	206,000	—	—	226,000	20,000	—
XIX.—EDUCATION	147,425	139,000	137,000	—	2,000	137,000	—	—
XX.—MEDICAL	44,332	39,000	54,000	15,000	—	40,000	—	14,000
XXI.—STATIONERY AND PRINTING	47,096	46,000	52,000	6,000	—	45,000	—	7,000
XXII.—INTEREST	628,367	634,000	709,000	75,000	—	651,000	—	58,000
XXIII.—SUPERANNUATIONS	675,258	526,000	529,000	3,000	—	336,000	—	143,000
XXIV.—MISCELLANEOUS	348,554	310,000	324,000	14,000	—	268,000	—	56,000
XXV.—RAILWAYS	6,178,134	6,454,000	6,701,000	247,000	—	7,545,000	844,000	—
XXVI.—IRRIGATN. & NAVIGATN.	790,775	788,000	871,000	83,000	—	861,000	—	10,000
XXVII.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS	571,076	477,000	480,000	3,000	—	471,000	—	9,000
XXVIII.—PROVL. & LOCAL DEFICITS	973	208,000	59,000	—	149,000	247,000	188,000	—
XXIX.—ARMY	974,773	880,000	924,000	44,000	—	833,000	—	91,000
XXX.—GAIN BY EXCHANGE	133,313	78,000	324,000	246,000	—	237,000	—	87,000
GRAND TOTAL	65,207,694	64,562,000	67,583,000	3,021,000	—	66,746,000	—	837,000
DEFICIT	—	1,395,000	—	—	—	—	—	—

FORT WILLIAM;
DEPT. OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE,
The 24th February, 1880.

E. W. KELLNER,
Deputy Comptroller-General.

MENTS.

OF INDIA IN INDIA AND IN ENGLAND.
1880-81.

EXPENDITURE.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
CIVIL.	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1.—INTEREST ON DEBT	5,982,893	6,353,000	6,039,000	—	314,000	5,739,000	—	300,000
2.—INTEREST, OTHER ACCOUNTS	378,703	386,000	382,000	—	4,000	400,000	18,000	—
3.—REFUNDS AND DRAWBACKS	406,562	356,000	350,000	—	6,000	318,000	—	32,000
4.—LAND REVENUE	2,960,010	3,028,000	2,945,000	—	83,000	2,995,000	50,000	—
5.—FOREST	454,934	510,000	521,000	11,000	—	532,000	11,000	—
6.—EXCISE	87,839	118,000	110,000	—	8,000	111,000	1,000	—
7.—ASSESSED TAXES	37,617	29,000	35,000	6,000	—	20,000	—	15,000
8.—PROVINCIAL RATES	64,431	53,000	50,000	—	3,000	53,000	3,000	—
9.—CUSTOMS	200,417	203,000	201,000	—	2,000	204,000	3,000	—
10.—SALT	404,743	383,000	356,000	—	27,000	368,000	12,000	—
11.—OPIUM	1,698,730	2,500,000	2,059,000	—	441,000	2,160,000	101,000	—
12.—STAMPS	115,452	111,000	113,000	2,000	—	105,000	—	8,000
13.—REGISTRATION	160,801	155,000	162,000	7,000	—	166,000	4,000	—
14.—MINT	103,991	113,000	104,000	—	9,000	111,000	7,000	—
15.—POST OFFICE	1,033,327	1,083,000	1,131,000	48,000	—	1,142,000	11,000	—
16.—TELEGRAPH	470,790	531,000	492,000	—	39,000	467,000	—	25,000
17.—ADMINISTRATION	1,487,665	1,498,000	1,485,000	—	13,000	1,466,000	—	19,000
18.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS	355,325	375,000	367,000	—	8,000	437,000	70,000	—
19.—LAW AND JUSTICE	3,297,063	3,236,000	3,292,000	56,000	—	3,353,000	61,000	—
20.—POLICE	2,419,119	2,472,000	2,485,000	13,000	—	2,513,000	28,000	—
21.—MARINE	548,703	546,000	558,000	12,000	—	568,000	10,000	—
22.—EDUCATION	978,254	1,025,000	972,000	—	53,000	1,016,000	44,000	—
23.—ECCLESIASTICAL	155,200	161,000	156,000	—	5,000	159,000	3,000	—
24.—MEDICAL	669,059	679,000	673,000	—	6,000	709,000	36,000	—
25.—STATIONERY AND PRINTING	471,470	536,000	443,000	—	93,000	482,000	39,000	—
26.—POLITICAL	448,793	426,000	471,000	45,000	—	436,000	—	35,000
27.—ALLOWANCES & ASSIGNMENTS	1,826,484	1,909,000	1,900,000	—	9,000	1,846,000	—	54,000
28.—CIVIL FURLOUGH ALLOWANCES	231,561	232,000	220,000	—	12,000	233,000	13,000	—
29.—SUPERANNUATIONS	1,995,520	1,923,000	2,094,000	171,000	—	1,982,000	—	112,000
30.—MISCELLANEOUS	293,368	277,000	314,000	37,000	—	264,000	—	50,000
31.—FAMINE RELIEF	313,420	10,000	99,000	89,000	—	5,000	—	94,000
32.—RAILWAYS	6,561,827	6,536,000	6,987,000	451,000	—	6,751,000	—	236,000
33.—IRRIGATION & NAVIGATION	1,063,037	1,085,000	1,173,000	88,000	—	1,077,000	—	96,000
34.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS	4,318,247	4,895,000	4,146,000	—	749,000	4,306,000	160,000	—
35.—PROVL. & LOCAL SURPLUSES	716,378	17,000	324,000	307,000	—	131,000	—	193,000
36.—ARMY	17,092,426	18,255,000	21,067,000	2,812,000	—	20,293,000	—	774,000
37.—LOSS BY EXCHANGE	3,359,144	3,952,000	3,188,000	—	764,000	3,411,000	223,000	—
TOTAL ORDINARY	63,163,303	65,957,000	67,464,000	1,507,000	—	66,329,000	—	1,135,000
SURPLUS	2,044,391	—	119,000	1,514,000	—	417,000	298,000	—
38.—PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS	4,381,898	3,500,000	3,700,000	200,000	—	3,312,000	—	388,000

W. WATERFIELD,
Comptroller General.
Q 1468.

R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF THE GOVERNMENT
(Distinguishing Revenue and Charges
Estimates,

REVENUE.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
CIVIL.	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
I.—LAND REVENUE	22,323,869	21,778,000	21,679,000	—	99,000	21,359,000	—	320,000
II.—TRIBUTES	703,660	703,000	714,000	11,000	—	698,000	—	16,000
III.—FOREST	605,433	672,000	662,000	—	10,000	690,000	28,000	—
IV.—EXCISE	2,619,349	2,742,000	2,765,000	23,000	—	2,782,000	17,000	—
V.—ASSESSED TAXES	900,920	896,000	797,000	—	99,000	535,000	—	262,000
VI.—PROVINCIAL RATES	2,638,835	2,740,000	2,706,000	—	34,000	2,764,000	58,000	—
VII.—CUSTOMS	2,326,561	2,248,000	2,231,000	—	17,000	2,175,000	—	56,000
VIII.—SALT	6,941,120	7,000,000	7,335,000	335,000	—	7,541,000	206,000	—
IX.—OPIUM	9,399,401	9,000,000	10,459,000	1,459,000	—	9,410,000	—	1,049,000
X.—STAMPS	3,110,540	3,087,000	3,203,000	116,000	—	3,194,000	—	9,000
XI.—REGISTRATION	263,362	267,000	262,000	—	5,000	265,000	3,000	—
XII.—MINT	172,335	180,000	254,000	74,000	—	196,000	—	58,000
XIII.—POST OFFICE	911,806	983,000	968,000	—	15,000	1,008,000	40,000	—
XIV.—TELEGRAPH	426,694	380,000	486,000	106,000	—	486,000	—	—
XV.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS	84,968	58,000	98,000	40,000	—	81,000	—	17,000
XVI.—LAW AND JUSTICE	647,130	649,000	663,000	14,000	—	680,000	17,000	—
XVII.—POLICE	211,108	233,000	221,000	—	12,000	232,000	11,000	—
XVIII.—MARINE	250,595	206,000	206,000	—	—	226,000	20,000	—
XIX.—EDUCATION	147,425	139,000	137,000	—	2,000	137,000	—	—
XX.—MEDICAL	44,332	39,000	54,000	15,000	—	40,000	—	14,000
XXI.—STATIONERY & PRINTING	47,096	46,000	52,000	6,000	—	45,000	—	7,000
XXII.—INTEREST	628,367	634,000	709,000	75,000	—	651,000	—	58,000
XXIII.—SUPERANNUATIONS	675,253	526,000	529,000	3,000	—	386,000	—	143,000
XXIV.—MISCELLANEOUS	351,552	310,000	324,000	14,000	—	268,000	—	56,000
XXV.—RAILWAYS	10,822	10,000	—	—	10,000	—	—	—
XXVI.—IRRIGATION & NAVIGN.	168,619	184,000	192,000	8,000	—	181,000	—	11,000
XXVII.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS	571,076	477,000	480,000	3,000	—	471,000	—	9,000
XXVIII.—PROVL. & LOCAL DEFICITS	973	208,000	59,000	—	149,000	247,000	188,000	—
XXIX.—ARMY	974,773	880,000	924,000	44,000	—	833,000	—	91,000
XXX.—GAIN BY EXCHANGE	133,313	78,000	324,000	246,000	—	237,000	—	87,000
TOTAL	58,291,292	57,353,000	59,493,000	2,140,000	—	57,818,000	—	1,675,000
<i>Revenue from Productive Public Works.</i>	<i>£</i>							
I.—LAND REVENUE	126,934	161,000	710,000	549,000	—	703,000	—	7,000
XXV.—RAILWAYS	6,167,312	6,444,000	6,701,000	257,000	—	7,545,000	844,000	—
XVI.—IRRIGN. & NAVIGATION	622,156	604,000	679,000	75,000	—	680,000	1,000	—
TOTAL	6,916,402	7,209,000	8,090,000	881,000	—	8,928,000	838,000	—
GRAND TOTAL REVENUE	65,207,694	64,562,000	67,583,000	3,021,000	—	66,746,000	—	837,000
DEFICIT	—	1,395,000	—	—	—	—	—	—

FORT WILLIAM;
DEPT. OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE,
The 24th February 1880.

E. W. KELLNER,
Deputy Comptroller General.

OF INDIA IN INDIA AND IN ENGLAND.
of Productive Public Works.
 1880-81.

EXPENDITURE.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
CIVIL.	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1.—INTEREST ON DEBT -	4,575,069	4,758,000	4,452,000	—	306,000	4,014,000	—	438,000
2.—INTEREST, OTHER ACCOUNTS -	378,703	386,000	382,000	—	4,000	400,000	18,000	—
3.—REFUNDS AND DRAWBACKS -	406,562	356,000	350,000	—	6,000	318,000	—	32,000
4.—LAND REVENUE -	2,964,288	3,028,000	2,945,000	—	83,000	2,995,000	50,000	—
5.—FOREST -	454,934	510,000	521,000	11,000	—	532,000	11,000	—
6.—EXCISE -	87,839	118,000	110,000	—	8,000	111,000	1,000	—
7.—ASSESSED TAXES -	37,617	29,000	35,000	6,000	—	20,000	—	15,000
8.—PROVINCIAL RATES -	64,481	53,000	50,000	—	3,000	53,000	3,000	—
9.—CUSTOMS -	200,417	203,000	201,000	—	2,000	204,000	3,000	—
10.—SALT -	404,743	383,000	356,000	—	27,000	368,000	12,000	—
11.—OPIUM -	1,698,730	2,500,000	2,059,000	—	441,000	2,160,000	101,000	—
12.—STAMPS -	115,452	111,000	113,000	2,000	—	105,000	—	8,000
13.—REGISTRATION -	156,523	155,000	162,000	7,000	—	166,000	4,000	—
14.—MINT -	103,991	113,000	104,000	—	9,000	111,000	7,000	—
15.—POST OFFICE -	1,033,327	1,083,000	1,131,000	48,000	—	1,142,000	11,000	—
16.—TELEGRAPH -	470,790	531,000	492,000	—	39,000	467,000	—	25,000
17.—ADMINISTRATION -	1,487,665	1,498,000	1,485,000	—	13,000	1,466,000	—	19,000
18.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS -	355,325	375,000	367,000	—	8,000	437,000	70,000	—
19.—LAW AND JUSTICE -	3,297,063	3,236,000	3,292,000	56,000	—	3,353,000	61,000	—
20.—POLICE -	2,419,119	2,472,000	2,485,000	13,000	—	2,513,000	28,000	—
21.—MARINE -	548,703	546,000	558,000	12,000	—	568,000	10,000	—
22.—EDUCATION -	978,254	1,025,000	972,000	—	53,000	1,016,000	44,000	—
23.—ECCLESIASTICAL -	155,200	161,000	156,000	—	5,000	159,000	3,000	—
24.—MEDICAL -	669,059	679,000	673,000	—	6,000	709,000	36,000	—
25.—STATIONERY AND PRINTING -	471,470	536,000	443,000	—	93,000	482,000	39,000	—
26.—POLITICAL -	448,793	426,000	471,000	45,000	—	436,000	—	35,000
27.—ALLOWANCES & ASSIGNMENTS	1,826,484	1,909,000	1,900,000	—	9,000	1,846,000	—	54,000
28.—CIVIL FURLOUGH ALLOWANCES	231,561	232,000	220,000	—	12,000	233,000	13,000	—
29.—SUPERANNUATIONS -	1,995,520	1,923,000	2,094,000	171,000	—	1,982,000	—	112,000
30.—MISCELLANEOUS -	293,368	277,000	314,000	37,000	—	264,000	—	50,00
31.—FAMINE RELIEF -	313,420	10,000	99,000	89,000	—	5,000	—	94,000
32.—RAILWAYS -	226,846	94,000	360,000	266,000	—	304,000	—	56,000
33.—IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION	630,919	644,000	711,000	67,000	—	634,000	—	77,000
34.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS -	4,318,247	4,895,000	4,146,000	—	749,000	4,306,000	160,000	—
35.—PROVL. & LOCAL SURPLUSES	716,378	17,000	324,000	307,000	—	131,000	—	193,000
36.—ARMY -	17,092,426	18,255,000	21,067,000	2,812,000	—	20,293,000	—	774,000
37.—LOSS BY EXCHANGE -	3,359,144	3,952,000	3,188,000	—	764,000	3,411,000	223,000	—
EXPENDITURE ORDINARY -	54,988,380	57,479,000	58,788,000	1,309,000	—	57,714,000	—	1,074,000
<i>Expenditure on Productive Public Works (Working Expenses and Interest).</i>								
1.—INTEREST ON DEBT -	1,407,824	1,595,000	1,587,000	—	8,000	1,725,000	138,000	—
32. RAILWAYS -	6,334,981	6,442,000	6,627,000	185,000	—	6,447,000	—	180,000
33.—IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION	432,118	441,000	462,000	21,000	—	443,000	—	19,000
TOTAL -	8,174,923	8,478,000	8,676,000	198,000	—	8,615,000	—	61,000
GRAND TOTAL -	63,163,303	65,957,000	67,464,000	1,507,000	—	66,329,000	—	1,135,000
SURPLUS -	2,044,391	—	119,000	1,514,000	—	417,000	298,000	—
38.—PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS	4,381,898	3,500,000	3,700,000	200,000	—	3,312,000	—	388,000

W. WATERFIELD,
Comptroller General.

R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt of India.

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN INDIA AND

REVENUE.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.				BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.			
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	TOTAL.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	TOTAL.
OPENING BALANCE	£ —	£ 1,323,500	£ 1,092,700	£ 2,416,200	£ —	£ 1,331,800	£ 1,336,700	£ 2,668,500
I.—LAND REVENUE	21,236,200	1,027,300	125,500	22,389,000	20,911,300	1,025,800	124,900	22,062,000
II.—TRIBUTES	714,000	—	—	714,000	698,000	—	—	698,000
III.—FOREST	619,700	18,300	24,000	662,000	650,300	16,800	22,900	690,000
IV.—EXCISE	644,400	2,119,400	1,200	2,765,000	661,500	2,119,400	1,100	2,782,000
V.—ASSESSED TAXES	600,300	196,700	—	797,000	351,700	183,300	—	535,000
VI.—PROVINCIAL RATES	148,200	376,200	2,181,600	2,706,000	169,600	404,600	2,189,800	2,764,000
VII.—CUSTOMS	2,016,500	214,500	—	2,231,000	1,962,000	213,000	—	2,175,000
VIII.—SALT	7,318,800	16,200	—	7,335,000	7,522,500	18,500	—	7,541,000
IX.—OPIMUM	10,459,000	—	—	10,459,000	9,410,000	—	—	9,410,000
X.—STAMPS	566,800	2,636,200	—	3,203,000	566,800	2,627,200	—	3,194,000
XI.—REGISTRATION	600	261,400	—	262,000	900	264,100	—	265,000
XII.—MINT	254,000	—	—	254,000	196,000	—	—	196,000
XIII.—POST OFFICE	965,300	2,300	400	968,000	1,005,500	2,100	400	1,008,000
XIV.—TELEGRAPH	486,000	—	—	486,000	486,000	—	—	486,000
XV.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS	51,300	31,000	15,700	98,000	30,300	35,700	15,000	81,000
XVI.—LAW AND JUSTICE	77,300	577,400	8,300	663,000	77,100	594,800	8,100	680,000
XVII.—POLICE	100	181,600	39,300	221,000	100	192,900	39,000	232,000
XVIII.—MARINE	78,300	127,700	—	206,000	90,800	135,200	—	226,000
XIX.—EDUCATION	1,000	110,800	25,200	137,000	1,500	110,300	25,200	137,000
XX.—MEDICAL	2,200	49,500	2,300	54,000	1,900	35,200	2,900	40,000
XXI.—STATIONERY AND PRINTING	13,000	39,000	—	52,000	11,200	33,800	—	45,000
XXII.—INTEREST	687,900	13,400	7,700	709,000	628,900	15,500	6,600	651,000
XXIII.—PENSIONS	511,400	12,600	5,000	529,000	368,400	12,600	5,000	386,000
XXIV.—MISCELLANEOUS	67,900	144,100	112,000	324,000	49,900	131,000	87,100	268,000
XXV.—RAILWAYS	6,348,500	352,500	—	6,701,000	7,115,000	430,000	—	7,545,000
XXVI.—IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION	322,500	547,600	900	871,000	306,400	553,700	900	861,000
XXVII.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS	70,400	311,400	98,200	480,000	69,300	300,500	101,200	471,000
XXVIII.—PROVL. AND LOCAL DEFICITS	59,000	—	—	59,000	247,000	—	—	247,000
XXIX.—ARMY	924,000	—	—	924,000	833,000	—	—	833,000
XXX.—GAIN BY EXCHANGE	320,100	3,900	—	324,000	234,400	2,600	—	237,000
	55,564,700	9,371,000	2,647,300	67,583,000	54,657,300	9,458,600	2,630,100	66,746,000
otments	—	4,497,100	—	—	—	4,426,700	—	—
tributions	400	52,700	95,000	—	400	37, 70	115,700	—
bt	—	—	6,400	—	—	—	100	—
Total	—	13,920,800	2,748,700	—	—	13,923,000	2,745,900	—
GRAND TOTAL	—	15,244,300	3,841,400	—	—	15,254,800	4,082,600	—
OVINCIAL AND LOCAL DEFICIT	—	—	—	—	—	160,300	—	—

FORT WILLIAM;
DEPT. OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE.
The 24th February 1880.

E. W. KELLNER,
Deputy Comptroller General.

IN ENGLAND IN THE THREE DIVISIONS, IMPERIAL, PROVINCIAL, AND LOCAL.

EXPENDITURE.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.				BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.			
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	TOTAL.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	TOTAL.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1.—INTEREST ON DEBT - - -	5,352,200	686,800	—	6,039,000	5,010,100	728,900	—	5,739,000
2.—INTEREST, OTHER ACCOUNTS - - -	378,700	500	2,800	382,000	396,600	600	2,800	400,000
3.—REFUNDS AND DRAWBACKS - - -	193,200	150,900	5,900	350,000	190,700	121,200	6,100	318,000
4.—LAND REVENUE - - -	872,000	1,586,900	486,100	2,945,000	862,600	1,628,400	504,000	2,995,000
5.—FOREST - - -	488,200	15,300	17,500	521,000	498,300	13,200	20,500	532,000
6.—EXCISE - - -	21,900	87,400	700	110,000	22,700	87,400	900	111,000
7.—ASSESSED TAXES - - -	8,100	26,900	—	35,000	5,000	15,000	—	20,000
8.—PROVINCIAL RATES - - -	—	4,400	45,600	50,000	—	5,100	47,900	53,000
9.—CUSTOMS - - -	23,000	178,000	—	201,000	22,600	181,400	—	204,000
10.—SALT - - -	300,700	55,300	—	356,000	302,700	65,300	—	368,000
11.—OPIUM - - -	2,059,000	—	—	2,059,000	2,160,000	—	—	2,160,000
12.—STAMPS - - -	51,600	61,400	—	113,000	42,800	62,200	—	105,000
13.—REGISTRATION - - -	600	161,400	—	162,000	800	165,200	—	166,000
14.—MINT - - -	104,000	—	—	104,000	111,000	—	—	111,000
15.—POST OFFICE - - -	1,044,000	31,600	55,400	1,131,000	1,050,800	31,600	59,600	1,142,000
16.—TELEGRAPH - - -	492,000	—	—	492,000	467,000	—	—	467,000
17.—ADMINISTRATION - - -	911,700	563,100	10,200	1,485,000	881,200	572,800	12,000	1,466,000
18.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS - - -	250,400	83,000	33,600	367,000	312,700	90,200	34,100	437,000
19.—LAW AND JUSTICE - - -	583,400	2,768,500	100	3,292,000	583,700	2,769,200	100	3,353,000
20.—POLICE - - -	61,400	2,174,700	248,900	2,485,000	72,800	2,166,600	273,600	2,513,000
21.—MARINE - - -	423,700	134,300	—	558,000	409,200	158,800	—	568,000
22.—EDUCATION - - -	11,400	701,300	259,300	972,000	11,300	720,100	284,600	1,016,000
23.—ECCLESIASTICAL - - -	115,700	40,300	—	156,000	119,400	39,600	—	159,000
24.—MEDICAL - - -	166,500	421,500	85,000	673,000	171,800	435,300	101,900	709,000
25.—STATIONERY AND PRINTING - - -	86,700	355,100	1,200	443,000	122,600	358,100	1,300	482,000
26.—POLITICAL - - -	470,500	400	100	471,000	435,500	400	100	436,000
27.—ALLOWANCES - - -	1,237,100	662,900	—	1,900,000	1,193,400	652,600	—	1,846,000
28.—C. F. & A. ALLOWANCES - - -	219,500	500	—	220,000	232,500	500	—	233,000
29.—SUPERANNUATION - - -	1,944,500	148,800	700	2,094,000	1,835,700	146,000	300	1,982,000
30.—MISCELLANEOUS - - -	104,600	134,400	75,000	314,000	71,000	112,800	80,200	264,000
31.—FAMINE RELIEF - - -	98,900	100	—	99,000	5,000	—	—	5,000
32.—RAILWAYS - - -	6,694,500	292,500	—	6,987,000	6,465,100	285,900	—	6,751,000
33.—IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION - - -	761,100	407,500	4,400	1,173,000	645,800	421,200	10,000	1,077,000
34.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS - - -	1,478,900	1,573,200	1,093,900	4,146,000	1,475,800	1,613,000	1,217,200	4,306,000
35.—P. & L. SURPLUSES - - -	324,000	—	—	324,000	131,000	—	—	131,000
36.—ARMY - - -	21,067,000	—	—	21,067,000	20,293,000	—	—	20,293,000
37.—LOSS BY EXCHANGE - - -	3,188,000	—	—	3,188,000	3,411,000	—	—	3,411,000
	51,588,700	13,448,900	2,426,400	67,464,000	50,023,200	13,648,600	2,657,200	66,329,000
Special Contributions to Imperial Treasury -	—	335,000	—	—	—	335,000	—	—
Contributions - - -	—	123,600	59,400	—	—	99,700	44,100	—
Debt - - -	—	—	18,900	—	—	—	31,100	—
TOTAL - - -	—	13,912,500	2,504,700	—	—	14,083,300	2,732,400	—
CLOSING BALANCE - - -	—	1,331,800	1,336,700	2,668,500	—	1,171,500	1,350,200	2,521,700
GRAND TOTAL - - -	—	15,244,300	3,841,400	—	—	15,254,800	4,082,600	—
PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL SURPLUS - - -	—	8,300	256,500	—	—	—	44,500	—

W. WATERFIELD.
Comptroller General.

R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN INDIA AND IN ENGLAND.

DISBURSEMENTS.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1.—IMPERIAL EXPENDITURE -	67,545,201	69,457,000	71,164,000	1,707,000	—	69,641,000	—	1,523,000
2.—PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL DEFICITS -	973	208,000	59,000	—	149,000	247,000	188,000	—
3.—SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL -	520,026	453,000	421,000	—	32,000	451,000	30,000	—
4.—SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY -	349,940	214,000	220,000	6,000	—	32,000	—	188,000
5.—LOANS ADVANCED TO NATIVE STATES, CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS -	1,277,066	416,000	1,251,000	835,000	—	232,000	—	1,019,000
6.—SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS WITHDRAWN -	690,880	700,000	648,000	—	52,000	669,000	21,000	—
7.—OTHER DEPOSITS REPAID AND ADVANCES MADE -	18,484,743	12,247,000	12,437,000	190,000	—	12,170,000	—	267,000
8.—LOCAL REMITTANCES -	42,079	837,000	—	—	837,000	—	—	—
9.—INTER-PROVINCIAL AND IN- TER-DEPARTMENTAL TRANS- ACTIONS -	19,566,018	24,525,000	25,539,078	1,014,078	—	26,667,000	1,127,922	—
10.—REMITTANCE ACCOUNT WITH THE HOME TREASURY -	1,688,813	1,290,000	1,949,000	659,000	—	1,252,000	—	697,000
11.—SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS ON INDIA PAID -	15,464,758	15,000,000	15,750,000	750,000	—	16,900,000	1,150,000	—
12.—POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS	260,456	368,000	134,000	—	234,000	151,000	17,000	—
13.—PUBLIC DEBT DISCHARGED -	3,871,490	3,683,000	8,007,000	4,324,000	—	2,127,000	—	5,880,000
14.—TREASURY NOTES -	139,886	126,500	39,000	—	87,500	33,000	—	6,000
15.—GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPI- TAL WITHDRAWN -	3,339,208	3,073,000	2,660,000	—	413,000	2,391,000	—	269,000
16.—BALANCE -	13,910,078	13,500,000	16,000,000	2,500,000	—	13,250,000	—	2,750,000
TOTAL -	147,151,615	146,097,500	156,278,078	10,180,578	—	146,213,000	—	10,065,078

best that can now be made ; but they are subject to modification as the year goes on ; the Government must not be understood to or that the exact amount stated will be borrowed during the year.

Ways and Means are provided.

MATES, 1879-80.				BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.			
	£				£		£
DEFICIT OF IMPERIAL REVENUE -	3,581,000			SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL -	152,000	DEFICIT OF IMPERIAL REVENUE -	2,895,000
SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY -	220,000			SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSIT -	124,000	DEFICIT OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL REVENUE -	116,000
LOANS TO NATIVE STATES, COR- PORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS	173,000			DEPOSITS -	436,000	SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY -	32,000
POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS	60,000			PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED -	706,000	LOANS TO NATIVE STATES, COR- PORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS	19,000
REMITTANCES -	161,078			TREASURY NOTES -	275,000	REMITTANCES -	631,000
BALANCE INCREASED -	2,089,922			BALANCE REDUCED -	2,750,000	POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS	68,000
TOTAL -	6,285,000			TOTAL -	4,443,000	GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPI- TAL WITHDRAWN -	682,000
						TOTAL -	4,443,000

W. WATERFIELD,
Comptroller General.

R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secty. to the Govt. of India.

V.

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF THE
Estimates,

REVENUE.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
CIVIL.	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
I.—LAND REVENUE -	22,323,869	21,773,000	21,679,000	—	99,000	21,359,000	—	320,000
II.—TRIBUTES -	703,660	703,000	714,000	11,000	—	698,000	—	16,000
III.—FOREST -	603,939	670,400	660,600	—	9,800	688,400	27,800	—
IV.—EXCISE -	2,619,349	2,742,000	2,765,000	23,000	—	2,782,000	17,000	—
V.—ASSESSED TAXES -	900,920	896,000	797,000	—	99,000	535,000	—	262,000
V.—PROVINCIAL RATES -	2,638,835	2,740,000	2,706,000	—	34,000	2,764,000	58,000	—
VII.—CUSTOMS -	2,326,561	2,248,000	2,231,000	—	17,000	2,175,000	—	56,000
VIII.—SALT -	6,941,120	7,000,000	7,335,000	335,000	—	7,541,000	206,000	—
IX.—OPIUM -	9,899,401	9,000,000	10,459,000	1,459,000	—	9,410,000	—	1,049,000
X.—STAMPS -	3,110,540	3,087,000	3,203,000	116,000	—	3,194,000	—	9,000
XI.—REGISTRATION -	263,362	267,000	262,000	—	5,000	265,000	3,000	—
XII.—MINT -	172,283	180,000	254,000	74,000	—	196,000	—	58,000
XIII.—POST OFFICE -	911,806	933,000	968,000	—	15,000	1,008,000	40,000	—
XIV.—TELEGRAPH -	403,627	357,000	460,300	103,300	—	463,100	2,800	—
XV.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS -	60,142	32,400	59,500	27,100	—	61,700	2,200	—
XVI.—LAW AND JUSTICE -	647,130	649,000	663,000	14,000	—	680,000	17,000	—
XVII.—POLICE -	211,108	233,000	221,000	—	12,000	232,000	11,000	—
XVIII.—MARINE -	250,595	206,000	203,000	—	3,000	226,000	23,000	—
XIX.—EDUCATION -	147,425	139,000	137,000	—	2,000	137,000	—	—
XX.—MEDICAL -	42,419	37,500	52,000	14,500	—	38,200	—	13,800
XXI.—STATIONERY & PRINTING	47,096	46,000	52,000	6,000	—	45,000	—	7,000
XXII.—INTEREST -	612,934	624,000	701,500	77,500	—	641,000	—	60,500
XXIII.—SUPERANNUATION CON- TRIBUTIONS -	571,871	430,500	430,500	—	—	291,700	—	138,800
XXIV.—MISCELLANEOUS -	327,691	306,100	315,000	8,900	—	262,000	—	53,000
XXV.—RAILWAYS -	10,822	10,000	—	—	10,000	—	—	—
XXVI.—IRRIGATION AND NAVI- GATION -	168,619	184,000	192,000	8,000	—	181,000	—	11,000
XXVII.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS	554,295	461,000	464,600	3,600	—	456,700	—	7,900
XXVIII.—PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL DEFICIT -	973	208,000	59,000	—	149,000	247,000	188,000	—
XXIX.—ARMY -	926,962	844,500	858,300	13,800	—	800,200	—	58,100
XXX.—GAIN BY EXCHANGE -	133,313	73,000	324,000	246,000	—	237,000	—	87,000
TOTAL -	58,042,667	57,140,400	59,226,300	2,085,900	—	57,615,000	—	1,611,300
<i>Revenue from Productive Public Works,</i>								
I.—LAND REVENUE -	126,934	161,000	710,000	549,000	—	703,000	—	7,000
XXV.—RAILWAYS -	6,167,312	6,444,000	6,701,000	257,000	—	7,545,000	844,000	—
XXVI.—IRRIGN. & NAVIGATION	621,604	603,500	678,000	74,500	—	679,200	1,200	—
TOTAL -	6,915,850	7,208,500	8,089,000	880,500	—	8,927,200	838,200	—
GRAND TOTAL -	64,958,517	64,348,900	67,315,300	2,966,400	—	66,542,200	—	773,100

PORT WILLIAM;
DEPT. OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE,
The 24th February 1880.

E. W. KELLNER,
Deputy Comptroller General.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN INDIA.
1880-81.

EXPENDITURE.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DE- CREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
CIVIL.								
1.—INTEREST ON DEBT -	£ 1,981,957	£ 2,089,500	£ 1,862,600	—	£ 226,900	£ 1,644,100	£ —	£ 218,50
2.—INTEREST, OTHER ACCOUNTS -	377,827	385,000	380,600	—	4,400	398,400	17,800	—
3.—REFUNDS AND DRAWBACKS -	406,562	356,000	350,000	—	6,000	318,000	—	32,000
4.—LAND REVENUE -	2,962,494	3,025,300	2,944,100	—	81,200	2,994,400	50,300	—
5.—FORESTS -	451,106	505,900	516,200	10,300	—	527,600	11,400	—
6.—EXCISE -	87,839	118,000	110,000	—	8,000	111,000	1,000	—
7.—ASSESSED TAXES -	37,617	29,000	35,000	6,000	—	20,000	—	15,000
8.—PROVINCIAL RATES	64,431	53,000	50,000	—	3,000	53,000	3,000	—
9.—CUSTOMS -	200,417	203,000	201,000	—	2,000	204,000	3,000	—
10.—SALT -	404,743	383,000	356,000	—	27,000	368,000	12,000	—
11.—OPIUM -	1,697,792	2,499,100	2,058,700	—	440,400	2,159,500	100,800	—
12.—STAMPS -	73,807	74,900	76,900	2,000	—	77,500	600	—
13.—REGISTRATION	156,523	155,000	162,000	7,000	—	166,000	4,000	—
14.—MINT -	94,607	87,300	83,300	—	4,000	91,500	8,200	—
15.—POST OFFICE -	941,971	983,300	1,005,600	22,300	—	1,043,800	38,200	—
16.—TELEGRAPH -	388,313	392,200	385,200	—	7,000	380,900	—	4,300
17.—ADMINISTRATION	1,269,500	1,279,600	1,271,900	—	7,700	1,245,500	—	26,400
18.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS -	328,265	346,600	336,100	—	10,500	415,100	79,000	—
19.—LAW AND JUSTICE -	3,295,968	3,234,500	3,290,100	55,600	—	3,350,900	60,800	—
20.—POLICE -	2,419,119	2,472,000	2,485,000	13,000	—	2,513,000	28,000	—
21.—MARINE -	404,700	396,900	385,800	—	11,100	419,000	33,200	—
22.—EDUCATION -	977,100	1,024,500	971,600	—	52,900	1,015,800	44,200	—
23.—ECCLESIASTICAL -	153,562	159,900	154,700	—	5,200	158,600	3,900	—
24.—MEDICAL -	661,851	679,000	665,000	—	14,000	701,400	36,400	—
25.—STATIONERY AND PRINTING -	283,446	345,900	328,700	—	17,200	415,700	87,000	—
26.—POLITICAL -	435,858	375,700	428,200	52,500	—	393,600	—	35,200
27.—ALLOWANCES AND ASSIGNS -	1,792,419	1,887,900	1,878,900	—	9,000	1,824,900	—	54,000
28.—CIVIL FURLO. ALLOWANCES -	4,482	2,000	4,000	2,000	—	3,000	—	1,000
29.—SUPERANNUATIONS -	683,269	634,000	764,200	130,200	—	646,300	—	117,900
30.—MISCELLANEOUS -	266,220	245,000	294,000	49,000	—	243,300	—	50,700
31.—FAMINE RELIEF -	312,823	10,000	99,000	89,000	—	5,000	—	94,000
32.—RAILWAYS -	226,846	94,000	360,000	266,000	—	304,000	—	56,000
33.—IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION	629,308	643,800	710,800	67,000	—	633,800	—	77,000
34.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS -	4,220,707	4,752,200	4,006,400	—	745,800	4,216,500	210,100	—
35.—PROVINCIAL & LOCAL SURPLUS	716,378	17,000	324,000	307,000	—	131,000	—	193,000
36.—ARMY -	13,109,553	14,135,300	16,448,600	2,313,300	—	15,171,900	—	1,276,700
37.—LOSS BY EXCHANGE -	3,359,144	3,952,000	3,188,000	—	764,000	3,411,000	223,000	—
TOTAL -	45,878,524	48,027,300	48,972,200	944,900	—	47,776,400	—	1,195,800
Expenditure on Productive Public Works (Working Expenses and Interest).								
1.—INTEREST ON DEBT -	1,407,824	1,595,000	1,587,000	—	8,000	1,725,000	138,000	—
32.—RAILWAYS -	1,645,705	1,697,500	1,890,200	192,700	—	1,855,000	—	35,200
33.—IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION	382,007	391,000	412,000	21,000	—	393,000	—	19,000
TOTAL -	3,435,536	3,683,500	3,889,200	205,700	—	3,973,000	83,800	—
GRAND TOTAL -	49,314,060	51,710,800	52,861,400	1,150,600	—	51,749,400	—	1,112,000
38.—PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS	3,689,029	2,720,700	3,066,700	346,000	—	1,906,000	—	1,160,700

W. WATERFIELD,
Comptroller General.
Q 1468.

R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

VI.

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF THE HOME

Estimates,

REVENUE.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
III.—FOREST - -	1,494	1,600	1,400	—	200	1,600	200	—
XII.—MINT - -	52	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
XIV.—TELEGRAPH -	23,067	23,000	25,700	2,700	—	22,900	—	2,800
XV.—MINOR DEPART- MENTS	24,826	25,600	38,500	12,900	—	19,300	—	19,200
XVII.—MARINE - -	—	—	3,000	3,000	—	—	—	3,000
XX.—MEDICAL - -	1,913	1,500	2,000	500	—	1,800	—	200
XXII.—INTEREST -	15,433	10,000	7,500	—	2,500	10,000	2,500	—
XXIII.—SUPERANNUATION CONTRIBUTIONS -	103,387	95,500	98,500	3,000	—	94,300	—	4,200
XXIV.—MISCELLANEOUS +	13,861	3,900	9,000	5,100	—	6,000	—	3,000
XXVII.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS - -	16,781	16,000	15,400	—	600	14,300	—	1,100
XXIX.—ARMY - -	47,811	35,500	65,700	30,200	—	32,800	—	32,900
TOTAL -	248,625	212,600	266,700	54,100	—	203,000	—	63,700
<i>Revenue from Productive Public Works.</i>								
XXVI.—IRRIGATION -	552	500	1,000	500	—	800	—	200
TOTAL -	249,177	213,100	267,700	54,600	—	203,800	—	63,900

FORT WILLIAM;
DEPT. OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, }
The 24th February 1880.

E. W. KELLNER,
Deputy Comptroller General.

TREASURY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

1880-81.

EXPENDITURE.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DE- CREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
1.—INTEREST ON DEBT - -	£ 2,593,112	£ 2,668,500	£ 2,589,400	—	£ 79,100	£ 2,369,900	—	£ 219,500
2.—INTEREST, OTHER ACCOUNTS -	876	1,000	1,400	400	—	1,600	200	—
4.—LAND REVENUE - -	1,794	2,700	900	—	1,800	600	—	300
5.—FOREST - - -	3,828	4,100	4,800	700	—	4,400	—	400
11.—OPIUM - - -	938	900	300	—	600	500	200	—
12.—STAMPS - - -	41,646	36,100	36,100	—	—	27,500	—	8,600
14.—MINT - - -	9,384	25,700	20,700	—	5,000	19,500	—	1,200
15.—POST OFFICE - - -	91,356	99,700	125,400	25,700	—	98,200	—	27,200
16.—TELEGRAPH - - -	82,477	138,800	106,800	—	32,000	86,100	—	20,700
17.—ADMINISTRATION - -	218,164	218,400	213,100	—	5,300	220,500	7,400	—
18.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS -	27,061	28,400	30,900	2,500	—	21,900	—	9,000
19.—LAW AND JUSTICE - -	1,095	1,500	1,900	400	—	2,100	200	—
21.—MARINE - - -	144,003	149,100	172,200	23,100	—	149,000	—	23,200
22.—EDUCATION - - -	1,184	500	400	—	100	200	—	200
23.—ECCLESIASTICAL - - -	1,638	1,100	1,300	200	—	400	—	900
24.—MEDICAL - - -	7,208	—	8,000	8,000	—	7,600	—	400
25.—STATIONERY AND PRINTING -	188,024	190,100	114,300	—	75,800	66,300	—	48,000
26.—POLITICAL - - -	12,935	50,300	42,800	—	7,500	43,000	200	—
27.—ALLOWANCES AND ASSIGN- MENTS - - -	34,065	21,100	21,100	—	—	21,100	—	—
28.—CIVIL FURLOUGH ALLOWANCES	227,079	230,000	216,000	—	14,000	230,000	14,000	—
29.—SUPERANNUATIONS - -	1,312,251	1,289,000	1,329,800	40,800	—	1,335,700	5,900	—
30.—MISCELLANEOUS - - -	27,148	32,000	20,000	—	12,000	20,700	700	—
31.—FAMINE RELIEF - - -	597	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
33.—IRRIGATION - - -	1,611	200	200	—	—	200	—	—
34.—OTHER WORKS - - -	97,540	142,800	139,600	—	3,200	89,500	—	50,100
36.—ARMY - - -	3,982,372	4,119,700	4,618,400	498,700	—	5,121,100	502,700	—
TOTAL - - -	9,109,856	9,451,700	9,815,800	364,100	—	9,937,600	121,800	—
<i>Expenditure on Productive Public Works.</i>								
32.—RAILWAYS - - -	4,689,276	4,744,500	4,736,800	—	7,700	4,592,000	—	144,800
33.—IRRIGATION - - -	50,111	50,000	50,000	—	—	50,000	—	—
TOTAL - - -	4,739,387	4,794,500	4,786,800	—	7,700	4,642,000	—	144,800
TOTAL - - -	13,849,243	14,246,200	14,602,600	356,400	—	14,579,600	—	23,000
38.—PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS -	692,869	779,300	633,300	—	146,000	1,406,000	772,700	—

W. WATERFIELD,
Comptroller General.R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

VII.

RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS AT THE TREASURIES

RECEIPTS.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DE- CREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
I.—BALANCE	£ 14,498,302	£ 12,988,800	£ 12,792,153	—	£ 196,647	£ 14,193,075	£ 1,400,922	—
II.—IMPERIAL REVENUE	64,958,517	64,348,900	67,315,300	2,966,400	—	66,542,200	—	773,100
III.—PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL SURPLUS	716,378	17,000	324,000	307,000	—	131,000	—	193,000
IV.—SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL	616,401	603,000	591,000	—	12,000	603,000	12,000	—
V.—SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
VI.—LOANS TO NATIVE STATES, CORPORATIONS AND IN- DIVIDUALS REPAID	228,361	216,000	1,078,000	862,000	—	213,000	—	865,000
VII.—SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS	677,946	730,000	765,000	35,000	—	793,000	28,000	—
VIII.—OTHER DEPOSITS RECEIVED AND ADVANCES RE- COVERED	16,825,797	12,429,000	12,670,900	241,900	—	12,602,500	—	68,400
IX.—LOCAL REMITTANCES	167,330	456,000	178,000	—	278,000	86,000	—	92,000
X.—INTER-PROVINCIAL AND INTER-DEPARTMENTAL TRANSACTIONS	17,967,362	25,000,000	25,663,000	663,000	—	26,019,000	356,000	—
XI.—REMITTANCE ACCOUNT WITH THE HOME TREASURY	1,389,859	1,089,000	1,335,600	246,600	—	1,054,000	—	281,600
XIII.—POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS	267,380	384,000	74,000	—	310,000	83,000	9,000	—
XIV.—PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED*	4,344,174	5,000,000	9,264,500	4,264,500	—	819,700	—	8,444,800
XV.—TREASURY NOTES	262,636	218,000	195,000	—	23,000	308,000	113,000	—
XVI.—GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL RECEIVED	2,310,878	2,149,700	2,022,600	—	127,100	1,459,000	—	563,600
TOTAL	125,231,321	125,629,400	134,269,053	8,639,653	—	124,906,475	—	9,362,578

* The Estimates in this Statement of the amounts to be borrowed and to be supplied to the Home Treasury by Bills in 1880-81 are the that the Secretary of State will raise by Bills the exact amount stated; or that the exact amount stated

Abstract of the above showing how the

ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.			REGULAR ESTI		
SURPLUS OF IMPERIAL REVENUE	£ 11,955,428	SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY	£ 349,940	SURPLUS OF IMPERIAL REVENUE	£ 11,387,200
SURPLUS OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL REVENUE	715,405	LOANS TO NATIVE STATES, COR- PORATIONS, AND INDIVIDUALS	1,048,705	DO. OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL	265,000
SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL	96,375	SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS WITH- DRAWN	12,934	SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL	170,000
POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS	6,924	SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS PAID	15,464,758	SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS	117,000
PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED	3,847,184	DEPOSITS REPAID	1,649,656	DEPOSITS	238,400
TREASURY NOTES	122,750	REMITTANCES	695,236	REMITTANCES	729,022
GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL RECEIVED	771,014			PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED	3,867,200
BALANCE REDUCED	1,706,149			TREASURY NOTES	156,000
				GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL RECEIVED	674,100
TOTAL	19,221,229	TOTAL	19,221,229	TOTAL	17,603,922

FORT WILLIAM:
DEPT. OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE,
The 24th February 1880.

E. W. KELLNER,
Deputy Comptroller General.

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN INDIA.

DISBURSEMENTS.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DE- CREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
1.—IMPERIAL EXPENDITURE	£ 53,003,089	£ 54,431,500	£ 55,928,100	£ 1,496,600	£ —	£ 53,655,400	£ —	£ 2,272,700
2.—PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL DE- FICITS	973	208,000	59,000	—	149,000	247,000	188,000	—
3.—SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL	520,026	453,000	421,000	—	32,000	451,000	30,000	—
4.—SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY	349,940	214,000	220,000	6,000	—	32,000	—	188,000
5.—LOANS ADVANCED TO NATIVE STATES, CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS	1,277,066	416,000	1,251,000	835,000	—	232,000	—	1,019,000
6.—SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS WITHDRAWN	690,880	700,000	648,000	—	52,000	669,000	21,000	—
7.—OTHER DEPOSITS REPAID AND ADVANCES MADE	18,475,453	12,243,000	12,432,000	189,500	—	12,166,500	—	266,000
8.—LOCAL REMITTANCES	42,079	837,000	—	—	837,000	—	—	—
9.—INTER-PROVINCIAL AND INTER- DEPARTMENTAL TRANS- ACTIONS	19,566,018	24,525,000	25,539,078	1,014,078	—	26,667,000	1,127,922	—
10.—REMITTANCE ACCOUNT WITH THE HOME SECRETARY	611,690	256,500	908,500	652,000	—	109,200	—	799,300
11.—SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS ON INDIA PAID *	15,464,758	15,000,000	15,750,000	750,000	—	16,900,000	1,150,000	—
12.—POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS	260,456	368,000	134,000	—	234,000	151,000	17,000	—
13.—PUBLIC DEBT DISCHARGED	496,990	1,673,500	5,397,300	3,723,800	—	836,700	—	4,560,600
14.—TREASURY NOTES	139,886	126,500	39,000	—	87,500	33,000	—	6,000
15.—GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPI- TAL WITHDRAWN	1,539,864	1,608,900	1,348,500	—	260,400	1,312,500	—	36,000
16.—BALANCE	12,792,153	12,568,500	14,193,075	1,624,575	—	11,444,175	—	2,748,900
TOTAL	125,231,321	125,629,400	134,269,053	8,639,653	—	124,906,475	—	9,362,578

best that can now be made; but they are subject to modification as the year goes on; the Government must not be understood to pledge itself will be borrowed during the year; or that it will be borrowed in India or in England as the case may be.

Ways and Means are provided.

MATES, 1879-80.		BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	
	£		£
SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY	220,000	SURPLUS OF IMPERIAL REVENUE	12,886,800
LOANS TO NATIVE STATES, COR- PORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS	173,000	SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL	152,000
POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS	60,000	SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS	124,000
SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS PAID	15,750,000	DEPOSITS	436,000
BALANCE INCREASED	1,400,922	REMITTANCES	332,800
		TREASURY NOTES	275,000
		GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL RECEIVED	146,500
		BALANCE REDUCED	2,748,900
TOTAL	17,603,922	TOTAL	17,152,000
		DEFICIT OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL EXPENDITURE	115,000
		SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY	32,000
		LOANS TO NATIVE STATES, CORPORA- TIONS AND INDIVIDUALS	19,000
		POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS	68,000
		DEBT DISCHARGED	17,000
		SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS PAID	16,900,000
		TOTAL	17,152,000

W. WATERFIELD,
Comptroller General.

R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

VIII.

RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS AT THE HOME

RECEIPTS.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DE- CREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH THE REGU- LAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
I.—BALANCE - - -	1,076,657	1,211,200	1,117,925	—	93,275	1,806,925	689,000	—
II.—PUBLIC REVENUE - -	249,177	213,100	267,700	54,600	—	203,800	—	63,900
VII.—DEPOSITS RECEIVED AND ADVANCES RECOVERED -	28,070	4,000	30,100	26,100	—	3,500	—	26,600
XI.—SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS ON INDIA AND BILLS BOUGHT IN INDIA -	15,464,758	15,000,000	15,750,000	750,000	—	16,900,000	1,150,000	—
XII.—OTHER MISCELLANEOUS REMITTANCES FROM INDIA	501,249	107,000	150,400	43,400	—	129,000	—	21,400
XIV.—PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED *	3,726,584	3,009,500	3,873,500	864,000	—	2,013,300	—	1,860,200
XV.—GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL RECEIVED -	873,799	923,300	819,400	—	103,900	250,000	—	569,400
TOTAL -	21,920,294	20,468,100	22,009,025	1,540,925	—	21,306,525	—	702,500

* The Estimates in this Statement of the amount to be supplied to the Home Treasury by Bills in 1880-81 and of the Debt transactions are the the Secretary of State will raise by Bills the exact amount stated, or that

Abstract of the above showing how the

ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.		REGULAR ESTI	
£	£	£	
NET DEPOSITS RECEIVED AND AD- VANCES RECOVERED - -	18,780	DEFICIT OF REVENUE - -	14,292,935
SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS -	15,464,758	NET MISCELLANEOUS REMIT- ANCES - -	575,874
NET PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED -	352,084	NET GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL WITHDRAWN -	925,545
		BALANCE INCREASED - -	41,268
TOTAL -	15,835,622	TOTAL -	15,835,622
		TOTAL -	17,039,400

FORT WILLIAM;
DEPT. OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, }
The 24th February 1880.

E. W. KELLNER,
Deputy Comptroller General.

TREASURY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

DISBURSEMENTS.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH THE REGU- LAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1.—PUBLIC EXPENDITURE	14,542,112	15,025,500	15,235,900	210,400	—	15,985,600	749,700	—
2.—DEPOSITS REPAYED AND ADVANCES MADE	9,290	4,000	4,500	500	—	3,500	—	1,000
10.—MISCELLANEOUS REMITTANCES TO INDIA	1,077,123	1,033,500	1,040,500	7,000	—	1,142,800	102,300	—
13.—PUBLIC DEBT DISCHARGED	3,374,500	2,009,500	2,609,700	600,200	—	1,290,300	—	1,319,400
4.—GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL WITHDRAWN	1,799,344	1,464,100	1,311,500	—	152,600	1,078,500	—	233,000
5.—BALANCE	1,117,925	931,500	1,806,925	875,425	—	1,806,825	—	1,100
TOTAL	21,920,294	20,468,100	22,009,025	1,540,925	—	21,306,525	—	702,500

best that can now be made; but they are subject to modification as the year goes on; the Government must not be understood to pledge itself that the Debt transactions will be carried out as estimated.

Ways and Means are provided.

MATES, 1879-80.		BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	
	£		£
DEFICIT OF REVENUE	14,968,200	SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS	16,900,000
NET MISCELLANEOUS REMIT- TANCES TO INDIA	890,100	NET DEBT INCURRED	723,000
NET GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL WITHDRAWN	492,100	BALANCE REDUCED	1,100
BALANCES INCREASED	689,000		
TOTAL	17,039,400	TOTAL	17,624,100

W. WATERFIELD,
Comptroller General.

R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

IX.

CLOSING BALANCES OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS.

		REGULAR ESTIMATE, 1879-80.			BUDGET ESTIMATE, 1880-81.		
		Provincial.	Local.	TOTAL.	Provincial.	Local.	TOTAL.
INDIA	.	£ —	£ 4,900	£ 4,900	£ —	£ 3,000	£ 3,000
CENTRAL PROVINCES	.	64,500	40,700	105,200	59,400	34,100	93,500
BRITISH BURMAH	.	166,900	49,800	216,700	122,300	47,800	170,100
ASSAM	.	16,300	2,600	18,900	25,800	4,300	30,100
BENGAL	.	524,900	256,500	781,400	561,700	324,400	886,100
NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH	.	337,200	430,700	767,900	195,600	474,200	669,800
PUNJAB	.	86,700	54,400	141,100	98,100	58,500	156,600
MADRAS	.	44,100	372,500	416,600	76,200	306,600	382,800
BOMBAY	.	91,200	124,600	215,800	32,400	97,300	129,700
TOTAL		1,331,800	1,336,700	2,668,500	1,171,500	1,350,200	2,521,700

Fort William;
DEPT. OF FINCE. AND COMMERCE,
The 24th February 1880.

E. W. KELLNER,
Deputy Comptroller General.

W. WATERFIELD,
Comptroller General.

R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

APPENDIX.

TABLE I.—Miscellaneous.

	1874-75.	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.	1879-80.	1880-81.
DEBIT of recorded Revenue compared with whole recorded Expenditure	£ 3,930,374	£ 2,601,684	£ 5,992,062	£ 8,384,139	£ 2,337,507	£ 3,581,000	£ 2,895,000
PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS, Capital Expenditure	4,249,571	4,270,629	3,809,284	4,791,052	4,381,898	3,700,000	3,812,000
Recorded Revenue compared with the recorded Expenditure, excluding Expenditure on Productive Public Works—							
Surplus	319,197	1,668,945	—	—	2,044,391	119,060	417,060
Deficit	—	—	2,182,778	3,543,987	—	—	—
Net Public Debt incurred	8,398,168	4,109,522	4,750,145	7,345,416	4,199,268	5,131,000	706,000
Net Public Debt incurred, including Capital transactions with Guaranteed							
Railway and other companies and Native States, &c.	4,382,300	2,878,300	3,317,000	6,496,200	3,209,100	5,523,300	488,000
Value of Commodities exported, excluding Gold and Silver	56,339,000	58,081,000	61,014,000	65,222,000	60,937,000	—	—
Value of commodities imported, excluding Gold and Silver	36,222,000	38,887,000	37,428,000	41,464,000	37,800,000	—	—
EXCESS OF EXPORTS OVER IMPORTS, excluding Gold and Silver	20,117,000	19,304,000	23,586,000	23,758,000	23,137,000	—	—
Net imports of Gold	1,874,000	1,545,000	207,000	468,000	(Exports) 896,000	—	—
Net imports of Silver	4,642,000	1,553,000	7,199,000	14,676,000	3,970,000	—	—
TOTAL NET IMPORTS OF GOLD AND SILVER	6,516,000	3,098,000	7,406,000	15,144,000	3,074,000	—	—
Excess of Exports over Imports, including Gold and Silver	13,621,000	16,106,000	16,180,000	8,614,000	20,063,000	—	—
Grand total value of Imports and Exports of all kinds	102,348,000	104,430,000	113,908,000	126,252,000	109,777,000	18,900,000	20,230,000
SECRETARY OF STATE'S Bills sold (Rupees)	Rs. 11,74,37,000	Rs. 13,75,00,000	Rs. 14,85,70,000	Rs. 11,69,85,000	Rs. 16,91,24,000	15,750,000	16,900,000
Sterling Equivalent received	10,841,600	12,390,000	12,696,000	10,134,000	13,949,000	8,421,902	—
Silver coined at the Indian Mints	4,897,000	2,550,000	2,890,000	16,180,000	7,210,770	1,509,877	—
Gold coined in Germany	—	12,756,000	2,873,000	7,112,000	5,475,340	—	—
Silver coined in Germany	593d. (25th April)	573d. (27th April)	585d. (15th Jan.)	553d. (8th Oct.)	544d. (2nd April)	533d. (Nov.)	—
Maximum price of an oz. TROY STANDARD SILVER in London	57d. (9th March)	52d. (22nd March)	47d. (7th July)	53d. (21st June)	483d. (21st Dec.)	493d. (April)	—
Minimum	10 12 0	11 12 0	13 (7th July)	11 14 0 (5th Sept.)	12 11 (March)	12 11 (May)	—
Maximum price of a sovereign in Calcutta	10 9 0	11	11Rs. 3as. (6th Feb.)	11 4 0 (10th April)	11 11 (11th June)	11 15 (Jan.)	—
Minimum	1s. 10-22d.	1s. 9-64d.	1s. 8-49d.	1s. 8-79d.	1s. 7-76d.	1s. 8d.	—
AVERAGE EXCHANGE upon Secretary of State's Bills sold per rupee	1s. 10d.	1s. 10½d.	1s. 9½d.	1s. 9½d.	1s. 9d.	1s. 7½d.	1s. 8½d.
Fixed RATE OF EXCHANGE for the ADJUSTMENT of transactions between the Indian and Imperial Treasuries	11 (11th April)	9 (May)	11 (April)	12 (May)	9 (18)	9 (April)	—
Maximum RATE OF DISCOUNT ON LOANS ON DEMAND at the BANK OF ENGLAND, Calcutta	3½ (July to Nov.)	4 (Nov. and Dec.)	5 (Aug. and Sept.)	5 (Dec. and Jan.)	3 (7th Nov.)	3 (Jan.)	—
Minimum	6 (Dec.)	4 (Oct. and Jan.)	2 throughout the year.	5 (Oct. and Nov.)	6 (Oct. and Nov.)	2 (Nov. to Feb.)	—
Maximum	2½ (July)	2 (Aug.)	6,382,700 (July)	7,574,900 (Jan.)	2½ (26th May)	7,703,600 (Feb.)	—
Maximum MONEY BALANCES of the three PRESIDENTIAL BANKS	6,927,800 (July)	7,041,800 (July)	6,382,700 (July)	7,574,900 (Jan.)	6,978,500 (July)	7,703,600 (Feb.)	—
Minimum	4,859,200 (May)	4,762,300 (May)	4,132,500 (Oct.)	3,672,200 (April)	4,589,800 (Jan.)	4,150,400 (April)	—
Maximum price in Calcutta of Govt. FOUR PER CENT. RUPEE SECURITIES	104½ (15th July)	102½ (3rd June)	102½ (25th July)	92½ (27th June)	97 (July and Aug.)	95½ (July)	—
Minimum	101½ (25th March)	99 (31st March)	96½ (13th Jan.)	92 (8th Sept.)	91½ (March)	91½ (May)	—
Maximum amount outstanding on London Register, of RUPEE SECURITIES ENCASED FOR INTEREST DRAFTS	14,214,617 (Nov.)	14,407,861 (Oct.)	14,125,982 (April)	14,588,744	15,950,092 (Feb.)	19,210,709 (Jan.)	—
Minimum	13,098,988 (May)	14,111,441 (April)	12,655,322 (Dec.)	13,057,964	13,826,433 (Oct.)	15,998,182 (May)	—
Maximum price in London of such securities (in Gold)	98	93½ (7th April)	92 (15th Dec.)	84½ (15th April)	81½ (1st April)	80½ (Oct.)	—
Minimum	93½	82 (4th March)	77 (6th July)	81½ (23rd Jan.)	79 (23rd Oct.)	71½ (May)	—
Maximum price in London of Secretary of State's FOUR PER CENT. SERRAVALLO BONDS	104½ (Feb.)	104½ (3rd June)	104½ (22nd Feb.)	104½ (26th Oct.)	104½ (21st March)	105½	—
Minimum	100½ (April)	102½ (3rd June)	101 (26th Oct.)	100½ (21st March)	97 (Oct.)	100½	—
Maximum GOVERNMENT PAPER CURRENCY outstanding	11,327,607 (7th Feb.)	12,161,224 (22nd Oct.)	12,551,185 (7th Feb.)	15,757,790 (15th Jan.)	14,584,900 (Sept.)	14,329,700 (Jan.)	—
Minimum	9,221,438 (7th April)	10,668,628 (7th May)	10,532,294 (15th May)	11,130,528 (30th April)	11,423,600 (March)	11,113,800 (June)	—
Number of SAVINGS BANKS	326	330	340	343	338	339	—
Number of Depositors in Savings Banks	67,316	73,401	80,004	83,518	84,503	90,084	—
Amount deposited in Savings Banks	1,746,793	1,895,452	1,986,193	1,925,335	1,912,401	2,057,639	—
Average of each Deposit	25	25	24	23	22	22	—
Net addition to Deposits	9,936	148,659	40,741	10,858 (Decrease.)	12,984 (Decrease.)	145,238	—
Cash Reserve at the BANK OF FRANCE in December of each year—in 000's of Francs	1,325,300	1,679,300	2,169,000	2,042,500	2,041,700	1,979,017	—
Silver	313,200	503,000	638,600	865,400	1,068,100	1,230,501	—
Percentage of Silver on the Total Reserve	24	31	30	43	52	62	—

APPENDIX.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

TABLE II.—*Sea-borne Trade for the Year (Principal Articles arranged in order of their declared value.)*

No.	EX-PORTS.	1874-75.	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.
1	OPIMUM— Quantity - - - - - Chests. Value - - - - - £ Average declared value per chest, in Rupees - - - - - Rs.	94,746 11,956,972 1,262	88,350 11,148,426 1,261	96,870 12,404,748 1,281	92,820 12,374,355 1,333	91,200 12,993,979 1,425
2	COTTON— Raw— Quantity - - - - - £ Value - - - - - Cwt. Average declared value per { Annas lb.— { Pence, at average exchange - - - - -	5,600,086 15,257,342 As. 3 11 5-40	5,009,788 13,278,964 As. 3 9 5-13	4,557,914 11,746,184 As. 3 8 4-71	3,459,077 9,383,534 As. 3 10 4-98	2,966,060 7,913,046 As. 3 10 4-73
	Twist and Yarn— Quantity - - - - - Lbs. Value - - - - - £ Average declared value per lb. - - - - - Annas. Other manufactures—Value - - - - - £ Average declared value per { Grey or unbleached yard— { Coloured, printed, or dyed Percentage of manufactures on whole value exported - - - - -	2,834,725 147,562 As. 8 4 364,812 — — 3-25	6,228,511 266,951 As. 6 10 396,472 As. 2 6 As. 4 9 4-76	7,926,713 367,303 As. 7 5 445,079 As. 2 6 As. 5 3 6-47	15,600,291 682,059 As. 7 0 460,674 As. 2 3 As. 4 10 10-85	21,332,508 886,481 As. 6 7 511,498 As. 2 1 As. 4 7 15-01
3	RICE AND PADDY— Quantity - - - - - Cwt. Value - - - - - £ Average declared value of { Rupees husked rice per cwt.— { Shillings, at average exchange - - - - -	17,392,938 4,765,324 2 0 10 5-11	20,416,032 5,311,095 2 2 3 4-70	19,914,334 5,815,221 2 15 1 5-02	18,428,386 6,950,276 3 12 6 6-55	21,237,233 8,973,722 4 4 4 7-03
4	JUTE— Raw and manufactured—Value - - - - - £ Average declared value of { Rupees raw jute per cwt.— { Shillings, at average exchange - - - - - Percentage of manufactures on whole value exported - - - - -	3,485,522 5 14 7 10-94 6-85	3,294,521 5 6 2 9-72 14-85	3,356,124 5 13 1 9-94 21-43	4,289,241 6 7 3 11-18 17-97	4,898,860 6 5 0 10-39 22-42
5	SEEDS— Quantity - - - - - Cwt. Value - - - - - £ Average declared value of { Rupees linseed per cwt.— { Shillings, at average exchange - - - - -	6,074,756 3,235,950 5 0 0 9-27	10,506,822 5,461,982 5 4 6 9-52	9,582,865 5,319,124 5 5 11 9-17	12,187,020 7,860,284 5 13 10 10-16	7,200,977 4,675,036 6 3 11 10-28
6	TEA— Quantity - - - - - Lbs. Value - - - - - £ Average declared value per { Annas lb.— { Shillings, at average exchange - - - - -	21,137,087 1,937,429 As. 14 3 1-70	24,361,599 2,166,417 As. 14 3 1-60	27,784,124 2,607,425 As. 15 0 1-60	33,459,075 3,044,571 As. 14 6 1-57	34,432,573 3,138,424 As. 14 7 1-50
7	HIDES AND SKINS— Quantity - - - - - No. Value - - - - - £ Percentage of dressed or manufactured to whole value - - - - -	18,162,851 2,677,767 18-87	19,433,332 2,943,575 40-44	19,792,877 2,998,684 49-77	22,916,317 3,756,888 48-29	21,223,403 3,096,847 42-06
8	INDIGO— Quantity - - - - - Cwts. Value - - - - - £ Average declared value per { Rupees cwt.— { Sterling, at average exchange - - - - -	81,466 2,576,302 316 3 10 29-27	110,392 2,875,062 260 7 0 23-48	100,384 2,962,785 295 2 4 25-19	120,605 3,494,334 289 11 9 25-09	105,051 2,960,462 281 13 0 23-20
9	COFFEE— Quantity - - - - - Cwts. Value - - - - - £ Average declared value per { Rupees cwt.— { Shillings, at average exchange - - - - -	311,831 1,305,835 41 13 9 77-51	371,986 1,627,027 43 11 10 78-88	302,489 1,345,822 44 7 10 75-97	297,327 1,338,499 45 0 3 77-98	341,186 1,543,643 45 3 11 74-30
10	WOOL— Raw and manufactured—Value - - - - - £ Average declared value of { Annas raw wool per lb.— { Pence, at average exchange - - - - -	1,159,086 As. 7 2 9-99	1,295,193 As. 7 4 9-95	1,293,490 As. 7 2 9-22	1,151,518 As. 6 6 8-44	1,243,275 As. 6 4 7-82
11	SILK— Raw and manufactured—Value - - - - - £ Average declared value of { Rupees raw silk per lb.— { Shillings, at average exchange - - - - -	998,450 4 10 1 8-57	656,728 3 2 9 5-72	1,000,566 5 7 8 9-25	854,629 4 10 5 8-06	746,687 4 4 7 7-06
12	WHEAT— Quantity - - - - - Cwts. Value - - - - - £ Average declared value per { Rupees cwt.— { Shillings, at average exchange - - - - -	1,069,076 490,435 4 9 5 8-50	2,498,185 901,026 3 9 8 6-51	5,583,336 1,956,332 3 8 0 5-98	6,340,150 2,856,990 4 8 1 7-80	1,044,709 513,778 4 14 8 8-09
13	SALTPETRE— Quantity - - - - - Cwts. Value - - - - - £ Average declared value per { Rupees cwt.— { Shillings, at average exchange - - - - -	553,330 501,468 9 1 0 16-78	415,080 348,949 8 6 7 15-16	466,218 381,706 8 3 0 13-96	389,002 379,002 9 11 11 16-88	382,405 361,766 9 7 4 15-57
14	LAC— Value - - - - - £	254,011	755,747	536,976	362,048	298,716
15	TEAK WOOD— Quantity - - - - - Cubic Tons. Value - - - - - £ Average declared value per { Rupees cubic ton— { Sterling, at average exchange - - - - -	42,868 328,564 76 10 4 7-09	60,612 440,618 72 11 1 6-83	45,108 332,764 73 12 4 6-29	56,939 406,652 71 6 8 6-19	37,413 268,959 71 14 3 5-92
16	SUGAR— Value - - - - - £	319,238	253,937	925,196	745,851	204,360

APPENDIX.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

Sea-borne Trade for the Year, &c.—continued.

No.	IMPORTS.	1874-75.	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.
1	COTTON—					
	Twist and Yarn—					
	Quantity - - - - - Lbs.	37,097,260	31,927,340	33,270,208	36,196,661	33,145,631
	Value - - - - - £	3,157,780	2,794,769	2,733,535	2,850,616	2,779,774
	Average declared value { Annas - - - - -	—	14·00	13·14	12·60	13·42
	per lb. - - - - - { Pence at average exchange - - - - -	—	1s. 6·93d.	1s. 4·83d.	1s. 4·37d.	1s. 4·57d.
	Other manufactures—					
	Value - - - - - £	16,263,560	16,463,875	16,012,932	17,332,639	14,137,694
	TOTAL COTTON GOODS.—Gross Imports - - £	19,421,340	19,258,644	18,746,467	20,183,255	16,917,468
	Re-exports—					
	Twist and Yarn—					
	Quantity - - - - - Lbs.	781,220	792,668	839,539	934,437	754,648
	Value - - - - - £	56,249	57,424	58,423	62,733	51,217
	Other manufactures—					
	Value - - - - - £	1,061,727	984,105	1,064,392	1,089,614	1,132,627
	Total Re-exports - - - - - £	1,117,976	1,041,529	1,122,815	1,152,347	1,183,844
	TOTAL COTTON GOODS.—Net Imports - - £	18,303,364	18,217,115	17,623,652	19,030,908	15,733,624
2	METALS - - - - - Value £	2,607,122	3,310,452	3,721,007	3,736,958	3,372,903
3	SILK (Raw and Manufactured) - - - - - " "	1,583,405	1,404,235	1,037,957	1,485,550	1,496,487
4	RAILWAY PLANT AND ROLLING STOCK - - - - - " "	780,867	1,079,105	1,194,145	1,727,560	1,491,831
5	SUGAR - - - - - " "	516,564	895,929	403,607	798,036	1,480,880
6	LIQUORS - - - - - " "	1,636,368	1,702,197	1,585,345	1,683,655	1,372,487
7	PROVISIONS - - - - - " "	363,727	717,234	664,938	361,116	990,530
8	WOOLLEN MANUFACTURES - - - - - " "	557,385	1,119,274	911,890	955,142	961,666
9	MACHINERY AND MILL-WORK - - - - - " "	1,185,943	1,439,921	963,504	873,960	893,875
10	COAL (excluding coke and patent fuel)—					
	Quantity - - - - - Tons	360,252	388,480	523,384	603,731	473,027
	Value - - - - - £	685,720	647,562	918,309	1,004,942	881,444
	Average declared value { Rupees - - - - -	19·03	16·67	17·54	16·64	18·63
	per ton— { Shillings, at average exchange - - - - -	34·94	31·01	30·34	28·83	30·63
11	SALT—					
	Quantity - - - - - Tons	277,085	365,254	298,776	254,231	274,182
	Value - - - - - £	755,771	601,146	430,895	401,366	593,621
	Average declared value { Rupees - - - - -	27·28	16·45	14·42	15·78	21·65
	per ton— { Shillings, at average exchange - - - - -	50·51	29·66	24·62	27·35	35·65
12	APPAREL - - - - - Value £	629,456	634,256	542,860	579,106	546,089
13	SPICES - - - - - " "	179,126	395,988	432,991	488,884	509,043

TABLE III.—*Sea-borne Trade for the first Ten Months (Principal Articles arranged in order of their Declared Value).*

	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.	1879-80.
	£	£	£	£	£
Value of commodities exported, excluding gold and silver - -	46,309,370	48,265,519	52,210,342	47,821,206	51,522,819
Value of commodities imported, excluding gold and silver - -	30,830,219	30,408,746	34,457,474	32,426,805	33,557,095
Excess Exports. - - - - -	15,479,151	17,856,773	17,752,868	15,394,901	17,965,724
Net imports of silver - - - - -	966,336	5,628,814	13,117,467	2,187,577	6,680,763
Net imports of gold - - - - -	1,486,222	— 410,234	278,765	— 482,078	1,388,535
TOTAL NET IMPORTS OF GOLD AND SILVER - - - - -	2,452,558	5,218,580	13,396,232	1,705,499	8,069,298
GRAND TOTAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF ALL-KINDS - - - - -	83,124,766	91,365,735	104,112,057	88,090,522	96,944,010

APPENDIX.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

TABLE III.—*Sea-borne Trade for the first Ten Months, &c.*—continued.

No.	EXPORTS.	TEN MONTHS, 1ST APRIL TO 31ST JANUARY.				
		1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.	1879-80.
1	OPIUM - { Quantity - - - - Chests Value - - - - - £ Average value per chest - - Rs.	73,095 9,186,788 1,256-13-3	81,613 10,490,687 1,285-6-8	77,387 10,264,066 1,326-5-3	76,165 10,917,614 1,433-6-8	91,081 12,299,004 1,350-5-5
2	COTTON, RAW { Quantity - - - - Cwts. Value - - - - - £ Average value per lb. - - Rs.	4,295,871 11,476,987 0-3-9	3,561,477 8,968,014 0-3-7	2,585,377 6,949,554 0-3-10	2,281,507 6,149,132 0-3-10	2,895,909 7,992,393 0-3-11
	MANUFACTURES—					
	Twist and Yarn { Quantity - - - - lbs. Value - - - - - £ Average value per lb. - - Rs.	4,587,225 196,768 0-6-10	6,817,270 316,636 0-7-5	12,779,989 558,913 0-6-11	18,306,631 767,675 0-6-8	20,445,445 854,667 0-6-8
	Other manufactures—Value - - - - £	326,201	375,860	392,895	431,844	420,624
	TOTAL COTTON (RAW AND MANUFACTURED) - £	11,999,956	9,660,510	7,901,362	7,348,651	9,267,684
3	RICE AND PADDY. { Quantity - - - - Cwts. Value - - - - - £ Average value per cwt. - - Rs.	13,045,994 3,549,719 2-11-6	11,658,224 3,397,812 2-14-8	10,186,650 4,017,310 3-15-1	12,420,606 5,699,274 4-9-5	12,507,197 5,149,989 4-1-11
4	JUTE (Raw and Manufactured)—Value - - - - £	2,639,630	2,895,432	3,679,332	4,076,573	4,539,642
5	SEEDS - { Quantity - - - - Cwts. Value - - - - - £ Average value per cwt. - - Rs.	8,514,379 4,414,548 5-2-11	8,559,142 4,688,529 5-7-8	11,239,493 6,758,930 6-0-2	6,357,845 4,089,485 6-6-11	5,767,116 3,764,594 6-8-5
6	HIDES AND SKINS. { Quantity - - - - Cwts. Value - - - - - £ Average value per cwt. - - Rs.	534,504 2,378,801 44-8-1	495,367 2,309,783 46-10-0	709,852 2,990,696 42-2-1	630,278 2,455,043 38-15-2	709,755 2,786,059 39-4-1
7	TEA - { Quantity - - - - lbs. Value - - - - - £ Average value per lb. - - Rs.	21,254,915 1,899,961 0-14-4	25,186,248 2,361,799 0-15-0	30,366,610 2,770,735 0-14-7	30,692,313 2,808,432 0-14-8	34,243,539 2,746,782 0-12-10
8	INDIGO - { Quantity - - - - Cwts. Value - - - - - £ Average value per cwt. - - Rs.	78,004 2,037,990 261-4-3	83,443 2,450,385 293-10-7	90,577 2,632,728 290-10-7	64,514 1,767,026 273-15-0	78,538 2,256,421 287-6-11
9	WOOL (Raw and Manufactured)—Value - - - - £	1,061,452	1,079,667	939,198	1,049,930	1,007,621
10	WHEAT - { Quantity - - - - Cwts. Value - - - - - £ Average value per cwt. - - Rs.	2,155,626 775,554 3-9-6	4,839,290 1,673,400 3-7-4	6,206,669 2,790,304 4-7-11	1,035,857 508,125 4-14-6	1,814,566 918,918 5-1-0
11	COFFEE - { Quantity - - - - Cwts. Value - - - - - £ Average value per cwt. - - Rs.	164,692 662,275 40-3-5	168,552 722,544 42-13-11	191,693 846,358 44-2-5	201,626 885,939 43-15-0	188,080 833,670 44-5-2
12	SILK (Raw and Manufactured)—Value - - - - £	531,870	801,388	766,098	607,139	584,575
13	SALTPETRE - { Quantity - - - - Cwts. Value - - - - - £ Average value per cwt. - - Rs.	300,501 254,955 8-7-9	369,887 302,734 8-2-11	311,682 304,068 9-12-1	311,091 296,222 9-8-4	421,268 386,482 9-2-9
14	TEAK - { Quantity - - - - C. tons. Value - - - - - £ Average value per ton - - Rs.	48,776 356,332 73-0-11	35,771 263,504 73-10-8	44,153 311,678 70-2-9	34,115 247,752 72-9-11	30,810 222,878 72-5-5
15	LAC - - - - - - - - - - £	593,588	425,327	299,599	234,712	220,105
16	SUGAR - - - - - - - - - - £	94,465	425,940	447,616	184,724	156,533

APPENDIX.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

TABLE III.—Sea-borne Trade for the first ten months—concluded.

No.		IMPORTS.	TEN MONTHS, 1ST APRIL TO 31ST JANUARY.									
			1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.	1879-80.					
1	COTTON—											
	Twist and yarn	Quantity	-	-	lbs.	25,923,585	26,724,669	30,872,371	29,736,857	27,809,866		
		Value	-	-	-	£	2,286,139	2,230,376	2,425,336	2,480,030	2,248,408	
		Average value per lb.	-	-	-	Rs.	0-14-1	0-13-4	0-12-7	0-13-4	0-13-2	
	Ditto in sterling average exchange		-	-	-	-	1s. 7d.	1s. 5d.	1s. 4½d.	1s. 4½d.	1s. 4½d.	
	Other manufactures - Value	-	-	-	-	£	13,097,382	13,056,417	14,512,524	12,274,502	13,819,200	
	TOTAL COTTON GOODS		-	-	-	£	15,383,521	15,286,793	16,937,860	14,754,532	16,067,608	
	Re-exports											
	Twist and yarn	Quantity	-	-	-	lbs.	701,646	614,051	736,160	651,373	730,075	
		Value	-	-	-	-	£	50,656	43,119	49,811	44,508	47,715
		Average value per lb.	-	-	-	-	Rs.	0-11-7	0-11-3	0-10-10	0-10-11	0-10-5
	Other manufactures—Value		-	-	-	-	£	819,803	859,708	875,357	966,712	857,852
	Total Re-exports		-	-	-	-	£	870,459	902,827	925,168	1,011,220	905,567
	TOTAL COTTON GOODS—Net Imports		-	-	-	-	£	14,513,062	14,383,966	16,012,692	13,743,312	15,162,041
2	METALS	-	-	-	-	Value	£	2,533,767	2,893,993	3,008,118	2,919,762	2,849,539
3	SILK (Raw and Manufactured)	-	-	-	-	"	"	1,126,453	831,428	1,271,782	1,313,747	1,263,602
4	LIQUORS	-	-	-	-	"	"	1,194,828	1,286,521	1,431,367	1,113,119	1,250,897
5	RAILWAY PLANT AND ROLLING-STOCK	-	-	-	-	"	"	931,228	1,013,812	1,227,159	1,249,238	1,104,248
6	WOOLLEN MANUFACTURES	-	-	-	-	"	"	856,225	823,119	849,529	846,254	901,642
7	PROVISIONS	-	-	-	-	"	"	560,436	539,059	716,939	834,573	882,062
8	COAL (excluding Coke and Patent Fuel)—	Quantity	-	-	-	Tons		262,999	347,716	469,270	377,684	446,226
		Value	-	-	-	-	£	428,558	643,794	764,610	708,320	860,491
		Average value per ton	-	-	-	-	Rs.	16-4-10	18-8-2	16-4-8	18-12-1	19-4-6
9	SUGAR	-	-	-	-	Value	£	618,833	349,806	657,043	1,137,030	853,951
10	SALT	Quantity	-	-	-	Tons		302,897	255,504	217,202	223,565	277,279
		Value	-	-	-	-	£	505,238	363,684	324,628	477,384	611,322
		Average value per ton	-	-	-	-	Rs.	16-10-10	14-3-9	14-15-1	21-5-7	22-0-9
11	MACHINERY AND MILL-WORK	-	-	-	-	Value	£	1,243,685	803,705	724,078	781,963	549,049
12	APPAREL	-	-	-	-	"	"	548,970	460,767	491,306	464,159	466,922
13	SPICES	-	-	-	-	"	"	315,656	367,877	389,649	430,862	406,197

TABLE IV.—Wholesale Prices of typical commodities in Gold and Silver in London and Calcutta in December of each year.

(Prices of March 1873=100.)

IN LONDON—(prices quoted from the LONDON ECONOMIST.)	MEASURED IN GOLD.							MEASURED IN SILVER.*						
	1873.	1874.	1875.	1876.	1877.	1878.	1879.	1873.	1874.	1875.	1876.	1877.	1878.	1879.
Scotch Pig Iron (Warrants) -	91	68	54	49	43	36	55	95	71	58	51	48	44	63
Coals, Hetton, Wallsend (London) -	94	90	75	57	55	60	50	97	94	79	59	61	72	57
Copper, Chili Bars -	93	93	92	85	74	64	74	96	97	98	90	82	77	85
Straits Tin -	79	65	56	52	45	42	62	82	67	60	54	50	50	71
Wheat -	112	81	83	91	94	72	85	115	84	88	96	104	87	97
Flour, town-made -	111	82	90	82	98	69	86	114	85	96	86	109	83	98
Beef, inferior -	125	110	128	98	85	90	85	129	115	136	102	94	108	97
Cotton, No. 40, Mule Twist -	95	83	86	80	71	61	77	97	88	91	84	78	73	87
Wool, Southdown Hogs -	96	89	85	80	76	65	71	99	93	91	85	84	78	81
Sugar, Foreign Muscovado -	92	87	77	113	74	80	95	95	91	82	119	82	96	108
Coffee -	124	97	105	101	98	73	83	128	101	111	106	109	88	94
Pepper -	126	95	78	69	63	N.	—	109	100	83	73	70	N.	—
Saltpetre -	86	80	83	87	98	89	96	86	82	88	92	109	108	110
Gold -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	103	104	106	105	111	120	114
Silver -	97	96	94	95	90	83	88	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
IN CALCUTTA (prices quoted from the CALCUTTA PRICE CURRENT.)														
Grey Shirtings (8½ lbs.) -	93	84	84	78	73	74	81	93	84	84	78	73	74	81
Mule Twist, white, good, No. 40 -	96	91	87	87	75	75	88	96	91	87	87	75	75	88
" " Turkey, red, No. 40 (12 lbs.) -	115	104	94	85	85	78	77	107	93	87	90	83	73	87
" " Orange, No. 40—60 -	102	100	102	93	83	80	87	102	100	102	93	83	80	87
Copper Sheathing -	115	89	78	68	60	56	76	115	89	78	68	60	56	76
Iron, flat, bolt, bar and square -	114	118	148	143	130	107	121	114	118	148	143	130	107	121
Spelter, hard -	92	88	75	104	75	69	96	92	88	75	104	75	69	96
Hides, buffalo, slaughtered -	110	Nil.	90	110	86	100	119	110	Nil.	90	110	86	100	119
Indigo, good -	144	137	125	150	147	153	169	144	137	125	150	147	153	169
Jute, picked -	87	60	55	69	58	54	73	87	60	55	69	58	54	73
Lacdyne, fine -	129	183	119	68	49	56	153	129	183	119	68	49	56	153
Shell Lac, fine orange -	111	110	92	102	106	N.	120	111	110	92	102	106	N.	120
Linseed, fine bold clean -	165	153	135	159	168	259	153	165	153	135	159	168	259	153
Rice, Ballam -	80	58	40	98	80	69	87	80	58	40	98	80	69	87
Silk, raw, Cossimbazar -	94	87	87	88	Nil.	—	—	94	87	87	88	Nil.	—	—
Sugar, Benares -	114	123	104	123	100	77	82	114	123	104	123	100	77	82
Tea, good Souchong -	115	96	78	96	104	109	109	115	96	78	96	104	109	109
Wheat, Doodiah -	102	100	102	103	105	109	110	102	100	102	103	105	109	110
Gold -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

* The values measured in silver in London have been calculated from the values in gold on the basis of the price of standard silver in London.

APPENDIX.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

TABLE V.—*Actual CAPITAL EXPENDITURE on RAILWAYS in 1878-79, and estimated Expenditure on such works in 1879-80 and 1880-81, and to the end of 1880-81.*

	1878-79, Accounts.	1879-80, Regular Estimate.	1880-81, Budget Estimate.	To end of 1880-81.	Sanctioned Estimate.	Balance remaining to be spent.
	£	£	£	£	£	£
East Indian - - - - -	297,314	58,700	630,000	(a) 38,266,381	—	—
Rajputana - - - - -	359,296	248,000	172,000	3,545,000	3,267,000	—278,000
Western Rajputana - - - - -	344,633	681,000	385,000	1,649,000	1,604,000	—45,000
Sindia - - - - -	241,264	130,000	100,000	893,000	904,000	11,000
Holkar - - - - -	—73,865	36,000	19,000	1,260,000	1,246,000	—14,000
Neemuch - - - - -	226,255	278,000	339,000	1,786,000	2,202,000	416,000
Wardah Coal - - - - -	11,027	15,000	—	501,000	541,000	40,000
Nagpur and Chattisgarh - - - - -	106,300	250,000	217,000	593,000	837,000	244,000
Rangoon and Irrawaddy Valley - - - - -	121,375	40,000	10,000	1,262,000	1,261,000	—1,000
Northern Bengal - - - - -	386,180	129,000	60,000	2,139,000	1,945,000	—194,000
Tirhoot - - - - -	20,850	27,000	15,000	565,000	600,000	35,000
Patna and Gya - - - - -	250,105	73,000	25,000	350,000	404,000	54,000
Nalhati - - - - -	6,968	—1,000	—1,000	32,000	36,000	4,000
Calcutta and South-Eastern - - - - -	14,069	—1,000	—2,000	672,000	739,000	67,000
Cawnpore and Furruckabad - - - - -	59,715	154,900	68,000	282,000	322,000	40,000
Ghazipur and Dildarnagar - - - - -	2,653	44,000	5,000	55,000	65,000	10,000
Muttra-Hattas - - - - -	3,740	1,000	—	110,000	125,000	15,000
Muttra-Achneyra - - - - -	5,311	—	55,000	60,000	90,000	30,000
Dhond and Mapmad - - - - -	359,469	112,000	100,000	1,124,000	1,350,000	226,000
Indus Valley - - - - -	816,105	304,000	200,000	6,295,000	7,180,000	885,000
Punjab Northern - - - - -	369,905	663,000	303,000	4,053,000	3,808,000	—245,000
Fluctuations in Store Balances - - - - -	—166,725	—243,000	—80,000	155,000	—	—155,000
Reserve - - - - -	—	—	242,000	242,000	—	—242,000
	3,464,630	2,940,000	2,232,000	27,623,000	28,526,000	903,000
Deduct PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS OUTLAY in- cluded in the above - - - - -	3,327,888	2,608,000	1,982,000	26,533,000	—	—
Balance ORDINARY OUTLAY - - - - -	136,742	332,000	250,000	1,090,000	—	—
Railways constructed wholly from Ordinary Funds—						
Patri Salt Railway - - - - -	—	—	—	81,000	90,000	9,000
Frontier Railways chargeable to Army - - - - -	—	1,440,000	2,040,000	3,480,000	—	—
Total ORDINARY - - - - -	136,742	1,772,000	2,290,000	4,651,000	—	—
GRAND TOTAL - - - - -	3,464,630	4,380,000	4,272,000	31,184,000	—	—

(a)—£6,550,000 added on account of premium added to the Capital of the East Indian Railway on the purchase being effected.

APPENDIX.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

TABLE VI.—*Actual Capital Expenditure on works of Irrigation, &c., for which Capital and Revenue Accounts are kept, in 1878-79, and estimated expenditure on such works in 1879-80, 1880-81, and to the end of 1880-81, &c.*

	1878-79 Actuals.	1879-80 Regular Estimates.	1880-81 Budget- Estimates.	To END OF 1880-81.			Estimated cost (current sanctions.)	Balance of current sanctions remaining to be spent.
				Outlay against current sanctions.	Outlay against sanctions that have expired.	Total.		
IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS.								
Orissa Canals - - - - -	56,266	78,000	44,000	1,953,300	—	1,953,300	1,931,000	—
Midnapore Canal - - - - -	27,817	7,300	15,500	755,800	—	755,800	768,000	12,200
Tidal Canal - - - - -	—	—	—	177,300	—	177,300	177,000	—
Sone Canals - - - - -	171,768	139,700	80,500	2,298,500	—	2,298,500	2,736,000	437,500
Ganges Canal - - - - -	61,798	30,000	59,500	743,825	2,343,275	3,087,100	1,021,000	277,175
Agra „ - - - - -	6,597	5,000	7,500	786,800	—	786,800	801,000	14,200
Lower Ganges Canal - - - - -	157,693	151,100	133,000	1,688,100	—	1,688,100	2,473,900	784,900
Western Jumna „ - - - - -	79,438	58,100	65,000	462,000	312,000	774,000	722,000	260,000
Bari Doab „ - - - - -	11,376	10,000	5,000	1,509,600	—	1,509,600	1,652,000	142,400
Other projects - - - - -	233,945	318,200	220,000	—	—	4,955,600	—	—
TOTAL -	806,638	797,400	630,000	—	—	17,986,100	—	—
Deduct Ordinary outlay on Productive Public Works included above.	11,984	—	—	—	—	5,306,300	—	—
NET TOTAL *	794,654	797,400	630,000	—	—	12,679,800	—	—
IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION WORKS. (Not classed as Productive Public Works.)								
Eastern Jumna Canal - - - - -	1,511	9,700	10,000	69,000	204,000	273,000	139,000	70,000
Other projects - - - - -	105,653	134,600	95,500	—	—	2,294,900	—	—
Ordinary outlay on Productive Public Works - - - - -	11,984	—	—	—	—	5,306,300	—	—
TOTAL -	119,148	144,300	105,500	—	—	7,874,200	—	—
Deduct Outlay against the grant for Productive Public Works or works not admitted to the category of Productive Public Works -	—3	—	—	—	—	255,200	—	—
NET TOTAL *	119,151	144,300	105,500	—	—	7,619,000	—	—
GRAND TOTAL -	913,805	941,700	735,500	—	—	20,298,800	—	—

APPENDIX.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

TABLE VII.—*Gross earnings, Working expenses and net traffic earnings of Guaranteed and State Railways to end of 1878-79, with Regular Estimates for 1879-80 and Budget Estimates for 1880-81.*

GUARANTEED RAILWAYS.	ACTUALS.					Regular Estimates, 1879-80.	Budget- Estimates, 1880-81.
	1874-75.	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.		
OPEN MILEAGE AT BEGINNING OF YEAR	4,057	4,093	4,308	4,495	4,532	4,541	4,562
<i>Gross Earnings.</i>	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Eastern Bengal	365,956	323,889	376,650	507,641	439,942	460,000	470,000
Madras	581,955	644,832	806,164	930,759	643,613	675,000	675,000
South Indian	97,401	129,578	221,266	335,118	318,431	350,000	370,000
Bombay, Baroda, and Central India	605,398	646,577	704,747	786,775	698,533	700,000	780,000
Great Indian Peninsula	2,039,012	2,163,264	2,679,511	3,270,167	2,719,740	2,450,000	2,750,000
Oudh and Rohilkhand	226,694	238,164	369,638	437,015	468,885	400,000	480,000
Sind, Punjab, and Delhi	680,318	697,041	833,540	1,014,304	909,393	1,100,000	1,000,000
Total	4,617,734	4,833,345	5,991,516	7,281,777	6,223,337	6,135,000	6,525,000
<i>Working Expenses.</i>							
Eastern Bengal	208,462	206,842	172,357	200,690	198,347	220,000	215,000
Madras	387,265	454,362	475,576	600,831	484,080	450,000	450,000
South Indian	56,101	66,795	118,537	186,407	225,093	265,000	240,000
Bombay, Baroda, and Central India	304,545	372,720	366,980	311,786	325,578	350,000	350,000
Great Indian Peninsula	1,143,102	1,001,079	1,235,797	1,507,671	1,447,744	1,450,000	1,500,000
Oudh and Rohilkhand	141,082	175,733	216,563	238,022	257,360	260,000	275,000
Sind, Punjab, and Delhi	439,748	452,104	549,777	582,253	584,833	700,000	600,000
Total	2,687,308	2,720,235	3,134,989	3,687,666	3,532,590	3,705,000	3,630,000
<i>Net Traffic Earnings.</i>							
Eastern Bengal	160,494	117,047	204,293	306,951	241,595	240,000	255,000
Madras	194,687	190,470	330,588	329,928	159,533	225,000	225,000
South Indian	41,300	72,783	102,729	143,711	83,333	85,000	130,000
Bombay, Baroda, and Central India	298,853	273,857	338,367	474,989	372,955	370,000	430,000
Great Indian Peninsula	908,910	1,101,585	1,443,714	1,702,496	1,271,936	970,000	1,250,000
Oudh and Rohilkhand	86,612	112,431	153,073	198,981	236,325	140,000	205,000
Sind, Punjab, and Delhi	240,570	244,937	283,763	432,045	325,010	400,000	400,000
Total	1,980,426	2,113,110	2,856,527	3,594,111	2,690,747	2,490,000	2,595,000
STATE RAILWAYS.							
<i>East Indian.</i>							
OPEN MILEAGE AT BEGINNING OF YEAR	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503	1,503
Gross Earnings	3,451,465	3,011,412	3,818,147	4,362,133	4,052,536	4,250,000	4,250,000
Working Expenses	1,317,081	1,140,861	1,313,076	1,396,092	1,465,990	1,500,000	1,500,000
Net Traffic Earnings	2,134,384	1,870,551	2,504,471	2,966,441	2,586,546	2,750,000	2,750,000
<i>Other State Railways.</i>							
OPEN MILEAGE AT BEGINNING OF YEAR	221	485	683	806	1,287	2,014	2,493
<i>Gross Earnings.</i>							
Rajputana and Western Rajputana (Northern Section)	93,319	203,102	289,349	261,434	330,077	332,500	450,000
Western Rajputana (Southern Section)	—	—	—	—	—	15,000	55,000
Holkar and Neemuch	16,702	38,340	39,272	62,666	93,311	122,500	152,500
Sindia	—	—	—	3,319	10,812	11,500	20,000
Wardah Coal	2,112	2,936	3,635	10,639	11,373	32,000	55,000
Punjab Northern	—	22,657	50,154	76,412	108,400	195,000	240,000
Indus Valley	—	—	—	—	113,921	370,000	450,000
Dhond and Mamnad	—	—	—	—	25,041	50,000	67,000
Nagpur and Chattisgarh	—	—	—	—	—	10,000	30,000
Rangoon and Irrawaddy Valley	—	—	—	—	97,561	100,000	120,000
Patna and Gya	—	—	—	—	—	33,000	40,000
Northern Bengal	—	—	—	—	109,289	140,000	160,000
Tirhoot	—	4,304	31,353	34,324	44,981	45,000	47,500
Calcutta and South-Eastern	9,861	10,486	9,775	12,616	12,599	13,000	14,500
Nalhati	8,492	7,173	8,698	9,130	8,531	9,000	9,000
Cawnpore and Furruckabad	—	—	—	—	—	—	11,000
Hatras-Mutra	—	—	8,977	9,363	10,322	12,500	12,500
Ghazipore and Dildarnagar	—	—	—	—	—	—	4,000
Total	130,936	289,512	380,668	557,890	976,828	1,531,000	1,917,000
<i>Working Expenses.</i>							
Rajputana and Western Rajputana (Northern Section)	57,336	119,638	159,082	184,331	203,316	230,000	275,000
Western Rajputana (Southern Section)	—	—	—	—	—	15,000	60,000
Holkar and Neemuch	11,078	35,715	39,047	39,319	67,903	92,500	102,500
Sindia	—	—	—	2,137	12,734	14,000	18,500
Wardah Coal	2,403	3,150	3,658	7,043	11,104	29,500	27,500
Punjab Northern	—	13,737	45,953	70,499	83,506	160,000	160,000
Indus Valley	—	—	—	—	109,861	300,000	360,000
Dhond and Mamnad	—	—	—	—	24,569	50,000	67,000
Nagpur and Chattisgarh	—	—	—	—	—	10,000	30,000
Rangoon and Irrawaddy Valley	—	—	—	—	59,904	80,000	80,000
Patna and Gya	—	—	—	—	92,561	19,000	20,000
Northern Bengal	—	—	—	—	16,402	80,000	110,000
Tirhoot	—	4,006	14,189	23,572	32,993	34,000	27,500
Calcutta and South-Eastern	7,329	9,303	12,320	8,226	—	9,000	9,500
Nalhati	7,367	7,936	8,315	8,732	—	6,500	7,000
Cawnpore and Furruckabad	—	—	—	—	—	—	7,000
Hatras-Mutra	—	—	4,919	5,251	5,996	6,700	6,500
Ghazipore and Dildarnagar	—	—	—	—	—	—	3,000
Total	86,064	193,435	237,968	426,006	740,347	1,166,200	1,321,000
<i>Net Traffic Earnings.</i>							
Rajputana and Western Rajputana (Northern Section)	35,983	83,464	80,267	76,603	126,261	152,500	175,000
Western Rajputana (Southern Section)	—	—	—	—	—	15,000	5,000
Holkar and Neemuch	5,624	2,634	225	23,347	25,608	30,000	50,000
Sindia	—	—	—	816	—	—	1,500
Wardah Coal	—	—	27	—	—	—	2,500
Punjab Northern	—	—	225	—	—	—	27,500
Indus Valley	—	8,920	4,196	5,913	21,894	35,000	80,000
Dhond and Mamnad	—	—	—	—	4,060	70,000	100,000
Nagpur and Chattisgarh	—	—	—	—	372	—	10,000
Rangoon and Irrawaddy Valley	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Patna and Gya	—	—	—	2,832	5,000	20,000	40,000
Northern Bengal	—	—	—	—	—	14,000	20,000
Tirhoot	—	798	7,169	709	19,716	20,000	50,000
Calcutta and South-Eastern	2,541	1,183	—	10,752	11,988	11,000	20,000
Nalhati	1,125	—	—	4,390	14,257	4,000	4,000
Cawnpore and Furruckabad	—	—	—	398	4,052	2,500	2,000
Hatras-Mutra	—	—	4,056	—	—	—	4,000
Ghazipore and Dildarnagar	—	—	—	4,112	4,826	5,800	1,000
Total	44,982	96,027	92,680	181,834	236,431	364,800	598,000

APPENDIX.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

TABLE VIII.—Gross earnings, working expenses and net earnings of works of Irrigation, &c., for which Capital and Revenue Accounts are kept, to end of 1878-79, with Regular Estimates for 1879-80 and Budget Estimates for 1880-81.

	ACTUALS.					Regular Estimates, 1879-80.	Budget Estimates, 1880-81.
	1874-75.	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.		
IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS.							
GROSS DIRECT REVENUE.							
Orissa Canals	4,848	4,549	7,456	16,110	18,200	27,000	28,500
Midnapore Canal	11,622	11,111	13,699	17,009	17,071	22,100	26,000
Tidal Canal	5,289	2,293	4,503	6,228	6,079	6,100	6,100
Sone Canals	—	5,090	7,318	10,130	43,763	51,500	56,000
Ganges Canal	201,988	212,882	230,154	250,453	261,114	271,500	245,000
Agra "	55	3,709	8,952	21,467	42,633	35,900	43,500
Lower Ganges Canal	—	—	—	—	—	9,100	18,000
Western Jumna "	91,290	100,872	87,813	99,210	113,056	117,400	114,000
Bari Doab "	64,663	77,189	59,270	56,963	80,606	98,400	108,400
Other projects	10,462	11,984	16,036	25,372	25,748	27,900	35,100
TOTAL	390,222	429,679	425,201	502,882	613,270	666,900	680,600
INDIRECT REVENUE.							
Ganges Canal	41,915	62,580	64,279	72,290	67,181	66,900	66,900
Agra "	—	—	—	4,509	—	—	—
Western Jumna Canal	37,256	40,128	38,593	37,376	10,937	21,700	11,700
Bari Doab "	14,625	16,653	4,679	11,903	17,738	14,700	10,000
Other projects	24,291	20,345	25,966	27,789	31,078	606,200	614,000
TOTAL	118,087	139,706	133,517	153,867	126,934	709,500	702,600
TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT REVENUE.							
Orissa Canals	4,848	4,549	7,456	16,110	18,200	27,000	28,500
Midnapore Canal	11,622	11,111	13,699	17,009	17,071	22,100	26,000
Tidal Canal	5,289	2,293	4,503	6,228	6,079	6,100	6,100
Sone Canals	—	5,090	7,318	10,130	43,763	51,500	56,000
Ganges Canal	201,988	212,882	230,154	250,453	261,114	271,500	245,000
Agra "	55	3,709	8,952	21,467	42,633	35,900	43,500
Lower Ganges Canal	—	—	—	—	—	9,100	18,000
Western Jumna "	91,290	100,872	87,813	99,210	113,056	117,400	114,000
Bari Doab "	64,663	77,189	59,270	56,963	80,606	98,400	108,400
Other projects	10,462	11,984	16,036	25,372	25,748	27,900	35,100
TOTAL	508,309	569,385	558,718	656,749	740,204	1,376,400	1,383,200
WORKING EXPENSES.							
Orissa Canals	19,643	20,762	21,466	21,607	23,909	25,100	29,700
Midnapore Canal	13,043	10,740	17,128	20,932	17,283	12,900	12,900
Tidal Canal	3,453	3,904	1,243	3,056	2,318	2,700	2,400
Sone Canals	—	11,543	19,959	25,241	37,051	41,300	32,800
Ganges Canal	97,323	105,462	105,640	97,879	96,991	102,100	94,000
Agra "	4,576	8,319	11,613	13,792	18,359	19,700	20,100
Lower Ganges Canal	—	—	—	—	450	9,100	21,000
Western Jumna "	33,874	37,516	38,337	41,873	51,436	46,100	40,100
Bari Doab "	35,746	48,094	55,365	52,398	41,543	46,500	46,700
Other projects	41,337	98,418	92,605	86,239	91,710	106,300	92,600
TOTAL	247,495	350,768	363,356	364,458	381,550	411,800	393,000
NET REVENUE.							
Orissa Canals	-14,795	-16,213	-14,010	-5,497	-5,709	1,900	-1,200
Midnapore Canal	-1,421	-5,629	-3,429	-3,373	-212	9,200	13,100
Tidal Canal	1,836	-1,611	3,260	3,172	3,761	3,400	3,700
Sone Canals	—	-6,453	-12,641	-15,111	6,712	10,200	23,200
Ganges Canal	146,580	170,006	179,393	224,873	231,304	236,300	217,300
Agra Canal	-4,521	-4,610	-2,661	10,184	23,774	16,200	23,400
Lower Ganges Canal	—	—	—	—	-450	—	-3,100
Western Jumna Canal	94,072	103,484	87,469	94,713	77,557	93,000	85,600
Bari Doab Canal	45,547	45,746	5,534	16,408	56,801	66,600	71,700
Other projects	-7,064	-60,989	-50,903	-35,078	-34,834	527,800	553,500
TOTAL	200,814	238,627	195,862	292,291	353,654	964,600	990,200
IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION WORKS. (Not classed as Productive Public Works.)							
GROSS DIRECT REVENUE.							
Eastern Jumna Canal	61,111	59,249	56,541	57,563	63,198	72,900	60,300
Other projects	22,741	20,053	29,593	19,333	23,908	29,300	30,200
TOTAL	83,852	79,302	86,137	76,896	87,106	102,200	90,500
INDIRECT REVENUE.							
Eastern Jumna Canal	16,989	22,152	22,153	22,680	22,153	22,200	22,200
Other projects	95,825	131,608	123,430	125,987	134,181	137,000	222,900
TOTAL	112,814	153,760	145,633	148,667	156,334	259,200	245,100
TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT REVENUE.							
Eastern Jumna Canal	78,100	81,401	78,694	80,243	85,351	95,100	82,500
Other projects	118,296	157,661	153,076	145,349	158,085	216,300	253,100
TOTAL	196,396	239,062	231,770	225,593	243,396	311,400	335,600
WORKING EXPENSES.							
Eastern Jumna Canal	20,171	23,027	21,474	20,357	20,415	18,700	19,600
Other projects	95,933	108,947	108,489	109,822	95,925	91,500	94,300
TOTAL	116,104	131,974	129,963	130,179	116,340	110,200	113,900
NET REVENUE.							
Eastern Jumna Canal	57,929	58,374	57,220	59,886	64,936	76,400	62,900
Other projects	22,363	42,714	44,587	35,518	62,114	124,800	158,800
TOTAL	80,292	101,088	101,807	95,404	127,050	201,200	221,700

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE.

NOTIFICATION.

Fort William, the 24th February 1880.

In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 23 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, the Governor General in Council has exempted the following articles from the duties of Customs to which they are liable under Schedule B of the Indian Tariff Act, 1875 :—

INDIGO, all sorts.

LAC, all sorts.

This Notification shall take effect on and after the 25th February 1880.

R. B. CHAPMAN,

Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 20.

EXTRACTS from a RESOLUTION of the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, February 24th, 1880,
No. 985 (Financial).

Para. 121. The net cost of the military operations in Afghanistan recorded in the accounts of 1878–79 is 676,381*l.*, a close approximation to the estimate (670,000*l.*) made in paragraph 142 of the last financial statement. Against this must be set the gains which may be attributed to these operations under the heads of *Railways* and *Telegraphs*. It is not possible to estimate with precision either these gains, or, on the other hand, the extra expenditure in the general administration, both military and civil, in consequence of the rise of prices in Upper India attendant upon these operations. But the ultimate net total cost of the operations in Afghanistan recorded in the accounts of 1878–79 may be fairly estimated at 575,000*l.*

* * * * *

130. The original estimates provided for an abnormal military expenditure of 2,000,000*l.* for the war in Afghanistan (*see* para. 262 of the last statement). In consequence of the renewal of hostilities, that provision has now been increased to 4,886,000*l.*, as follows :—

	£
Military expenditure proper	3,137,000
Frontier railways	1,670,000
Post office †	37,000
Telegraphs	42,000
Total	4,886,000

Of which 4,656,000*l.* is provided under 36, *Army*, and 230,000*l.* under 32, *Railways*.

Moreover, instead of 10,000*l.*, as granted, a famine expenditure of 99,000*l.* is now estimated. So that the regular estimates provide for an abnormal expenditure amounting to 4,985,000*l.*, as follows :—

	£
War	4,886,000
Famine	99,000
Total	4,985,000

On the other hand, it is estimated that the railway and telegraph revenues are net better by reason of the war than they would otherwise have been by about 300,000*l.* Then, but for war and famine, the regular estimates would have shown a surplus revenue, as compared with ordinary expenditure, amounting to 4,769,000*l.* or about 4 $\frac{3}{4}$ millions sterling.

* * * * *

† Besides expenditure on military train.

171. 36 & XXIX. *Army*.—Net expenditure, 20,143,000*l.*; increase, 2,768,000*l.*

This is in consequence of the renewal of hostilities in Afghanistan, and, in particular, to provide for the construction of the railways to Kandahar and Peshawar. The original grant included 2,000,000*l.* for the operations in Afghanistan. The regular estimate contains the following provisions:—

				£
Military expenditure proper	-	-	-	3,137,000
Frontier railways	-	-	-	1,440,000
Construction of telegraphs	-	-	-	42,000
Post office	-	-	-	37,000
Total	-	-	-	<u>4,656,000</u>

Apart from these operations, the regular estimate is for a net expenditure of 15,487,000*l.*, being in excess of the estimate by 112,000*l.*, which is due to high prices.

187. The estimated expenditure in 1880–81 includes grants for 4,360,000*l.* for the military operations in Afghanistan, as follows:—

				£
Military operations proper	-	-	-	1,978,000
Frontier railways	-	-	-	2,270,000
Telegraphs	-	-	-	72,000
Post office †	-	-	-	40,000
Total	-	-	-	<u>4,360,000</u>

Of which 4,130,000*l.* is shown under 36, *Army*, and 230,000*l.* under 32, *Railways*.

Against this must be set an improvement in the railway and telegraph revenues, estimated at 300,000*l.*, leaving the net charge for the war upon the estimates of 1880–81 at 4,060,000*l.* It may be safely said that, but for the war expenditure, the true surplus upon the estimates, to compare with the standard surplus of 2,000,000*l.* (less famine and other abnormal expenditure), would not have been less than 4,000,000*l.*

236. 36 & XXIX. *Army*.—Net expenditure, 19,460,000*l.*; decrease, 683,000*l.* *Army*. Apart from the war in Afghanistan, the estimate is for 15,330,000*l.*; decrease, 157,000*l.*, which is based upon the expectation that prices will fall. Provision is made here for the operations in Afghanistan as follows:—

				£
Military expenditure proper	-	-	-	1,978,000
Frontier railways	-	-	-	2,040,000
Telegraphs	-	-	-	72,000
Post office	-	-	-	40,000
Total	-	-	-	<u>4,130,000</u>

Besides 230,000*l.* under 32 railways.

Thus the whole cost of the military operations in Afghanistan are now estimated as follows:—

				£
In 1878–79	-	-	-	676,381
1879–80	-	-	-	4,886,000
1880–81	-	-	-	4,360,000
Total	-	-	-	<u>9,922,381</u>

Of which—

				£
For the frontier railways	-	-	-	3,940,000
For the military operations proper, including telegraphs and post office	-	-	-	5,982,381

† Besides the military transport train worked by the post office for the military authorities.

Expenditure.

The net improved revenues attributed to the war amount to 701,381 $\frac{1}{2}$., as follows :—

1878-79	-	-	-	-	£ 101,381
1879-80	-	-	-	-	300,000
1880-81	-	-	-	-	300,000

701,381 to the end of 1880-81.

So that the net cost of the war is now estimated at 9,221,000 $\frac{1}{2}$., or say 9 $\frac{1}{4}$ millions, of which about 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ millions (net) may be set down for the railways, and 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions (net) for the military operations proper.

Stores.

All stores bought expressly for the war are included in these estimates, but not the wear and tear of equipments or the expenditure and waste of stores in excess of the normal amounts. It has been found impossible to obtain any estimate of the money equivalent of such expenditure and waste. It occurs not so much in the article of ammunition, of which the expenditure is never large, as in camp equipage, and cannot be ascertained till the campaign is over. Meanwhile the reserve stores in the arsenals are being maintained at their proper standard, the cost of replenishment being, as usual, charged as current expenditure.

No. 21.

EXTRACTS of a LETTER from the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, February 25th, 1880,
No. 81 (Financial).

Paragraph 9. Our decision to endeavour to carry on the public service during 1880/81 without a loan may entail upon us some inconvenience in the course of the year, by reason of the depletion of our balances. But we deliberately determined to face this inconvenience, in order that we might announce so satisfactory an evidence of the sound state of our finances. We anticipate no difficulty in obtaining temporary assistance during the year, in case of need; and we shall not hesitate to propose a loan, if, despite our present anticipations to the contrary, events show that we ought to increase our funded debt.

Paragraph 11. We have no further objection to make to your Lordship's requisition upon us for 16,900,000 $\frac{1}{2}$., to be remitted by bills in 1880/81. In the press of business, we had overlooked the fact that the remittance of even this large sum will hardly more than suffice for the current requirements of the Home Treasury. We consider that we should never willingly, or only to support the exchange, allow our remittances to fall below this standard. It may be proper that we should use discretion in going beyond this standard, and choose our opportunity for a reduction of our sterling debt with discrimination; but it must in our opinion seldom, if ever, be proper for us to seek temporary relief, whether from the drain upon our treasuries or the losses of an unfavourable exchange, by remitting less than the current requirements of the Home Treasury, and thus increasing our sterling debt.

Paragraph 14. Your Lordship will observe that, in obedience to your instructions, we have entered under the head of the Army, instead of under their appropriate heads, all the charges which can be traced to the war. Doubtless this method is, in some respects, convenient; nevertheless, we deem it inconsistent with the principles upon which our accounts are classified, and destructive of the integrity of the heads under which the transferred charges would, but for your Lordship's instructions, have appeared. Accordingly, as already intimated, we should have preferred to follow the course taken in the case of famine, namely, to leave all charges to fall naturally under their appropriate heads of record without regard to their origin, and then, without interference with the Finance and Revenue Accounts, to extract the revenues and charges belonging to the war into a separate account or statement. We shall still be glad to be authorised to dispose of these charges in this manner, in the Accounts of 1879/80 and in future Estimates.

No. 22.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, March 13, 1880.

We were not prepared for your drawing more than eight weeks at 45 lacs, and earnestly hope that you will now reduce as much as possible. We shall not be able to meet continued drawings at 45 or even 40 lacs without borrowing, which we are extremely anxious to avoid as long as possible.

No. 23.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, March 15, 1880.

Total drawings 1880/81, for which you prepared in Budget, require 39 lacs weekly. If we reduce now, we cannot make up deficiency later. With 14 millions cash balance, why cannot you meet 45 now?

No. 24.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, March 17, 1880.

Your Lordship's telegram 15th. Opening balance 14 crores estimate only; remains to be seen whether it will be realized. Estimated closing balance only 11½ crores, which means only 8 crores in October, November. We have to meet constant military drain, ultimate aggregate amount of which quite uncertain. We cannot therefore too strongly deprecate your drawing at outset more than average 39 lacs, and earnestly trust you may be able substantially to reduce more. Securely, in our present circumstances, we cannot drain our Treasury here, in order to remit in advance. Can you not increase your bills from November as easily as now?

No. 25.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, March 20, 1880.

Experience shows large demand in November cannot be reckoned on. Important to draw when market is good; and, for interest of India, must continue 45 while present large demand lasts. Apparently nothing new in situation since Budget was published.

No. 26.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, March 23, 1880.

Your telegram 20th. (1.) We made no provision for any advance. (2.) Since estimate was framed, we have sent to form reserves, and to accumulate immediately six months' supplies for troops in field. (3.) Abnormally large opium crops expected. All phenomena indicating correctness of my telegram 13th. Cost of war still quite uncertain. We cannot possibly acquiesce in a continued accumulation of 45 allotments.

No. 27.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, March 24, 1880.

Yours yesterday. Most anxious to meet all reasonable wishes, but 16,900,000*l.* essential, and agreed to in your Letter 81 of 25th February, and adopted in your Budget. In forecasting drawings necessary to obtain that sum, I feel reduction at this period would prevent our obtaining whole amount, as average cannot be drawn throughout summer. Nor can I borrow here without violating pledges given to Parliament. Refer to concluding passage of para. 52 of my Despatch 17th July last, and to para 9 of your Letter 81 of 25th February. You must obtain temporary assistance until you can raise a loan in India for Productive Works, which seems, from what you say, almost inevitable. If terms good to-day, I must continue drawing 45.

No. 28.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, April 8, 1880.

Outgoing from our treasury for the war very alarming, far exceeding estimate. Immediate loan highly objectionable; indeed, as we cannot now estimate amount necessary to carry us through year, essential to postpone loan till we can see our way more clearly. Our Budget arrangements were made on the confident assumption that weekly allotments of 45 lacs would not exceed 8. If you now continue such allotments we cannot answer for the consequences. Inconvenience may result hereafter. We consider it essential that you should reduce temporarily to at most 30 lacs. We feel no confidence that even this will give us sufficient relief. We shall ask you to enlarge again as soon as we can safely do so.

No. 29.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, April 8, 1880.

Telegraph immediately present state of your balances.

No. 30.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, April 9, 1880.

Yours 8th. Much surprised by contents. What has caused unexpected and excessive war demand? I reduce to 40 lacs in notice next week, but further sudden drop, in middle of busy season, to 30 lacs would excite much adverse criticism, and probably cause Indian securities to fall in value. Obtain temporary assistance to meet present pressure.

No. 31.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, April 10, 1880.

Balance end of February 13,103 lacs;* estimated balance end of March 1,260; April 1,075; May only 897 lacs; but such estimates are usually too unfavourable. Excessive military drain chiefly explains deficiency from the regular Estimate.

No. 32.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, April 13, 1880.

From yours 10th it appears there is an unexpected deficiency by end of May, when balances should be about same as at end of March, of $5\frac{1}{4}$ crores. Allowing 1 crore for excess bills and opium, there remains $4\frac{1}{4}$ crores. How is this accounted for? What is your present estimate of war expenditure, excluding railways, for 1879/80 and 1880/81, and what for each month from February to June 1880 inclusive? Please explain why estimated deficiency of $1\frac{1}{2}$ crores in March, and change in situation, were not reported sooner. As you evidently must have a loan, it is most important not to damage your credit by suddenly reducing drawings. Bills will, therefore, be advertised for 40 lacs for at least next two weeks. Surely this small addition of 10 lacs weekly over your proposed 30, and payable in May, cannot materially affect your position.

No. 33.

DESPATCH to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, April 15, 1880, No. 119 (Financial).†

MY LORD,

Para. 1. It is with much regret that I have found myself unable to accede to the request contained in your telegrams of the 13th, 17th and 23rd of March, for a reduction of the amount of bills which is now being weekly offered for sale; and I desire to draw the attention of your Government to the following considerations.

2. At the time of the pressure on your Treasury arising from the famine in Southern India, your difficulties were greatly relieved by the reduction of the drawings of the Secretary of State in Council. The balances of the Home Treasury were thereby brought down to an unusually low point; but the strain caused by the war last year prevented the remittance by you of the sum needed to replenish them. The arrangements made with regard to the payment of the East Indian Railway annuity and the dividend on the India 4 per cent. stock issued in exchange for that at 5 per cent. will, however, throw on the Home Treasury an additional expenditure of 920,000*l.* in April 1881, which, together with the other liabilities, will involve a payment of upwards of 1,900,000*l.* between the 1st and 5th of April in that and future years. In view of this state of affairs, it became evident that, considering the improved condition of your finances, it would not be prudent longer to delay the remittance from India of the amount required to bring the cash balances in the Home Treasury on the 31st of March 1881 up to a sum of about 2,000,000*l.*

3. Accordingly, in the estimate forwarded with my Despatch of the 11th of December last, No. 484, the cash balance on the 31st of March 1881 was taken at 1,958,525*l.* (which was altered to 1,985,825*l.* by my telegram of the 7th of

* Sic. ? Rs. 13,10,30,000.

† Approved by the Secretary of State in Council, April 13th.

February), and, for this purpose, it was calculated that 16,900,000% must be remitted from India in the year 1880-81, at an *average* of 39 lacs a week.

4. On receiving that Despatch, your Excellency, in a Letter, dated the 7th of January, No. 9, requested me to reduce the demand to 16,000,000%, and, in order to judge whether it was absolutely necessary that I should accede to the request, at the risk of great inconvenience in this country, I inquired at what amount you estimated your surplus in 1880-81, and your cash balance at the close of that year.

5. In reply, you telegraphed on the 14th of February that the surplus was estimated at about 40 lacs; and the balance in India on the 31st of March 1881 at 1,225 lacs, after borrowing 150 lacs. As I could see no reason why you should abstain from borrowing the full amount of $2\frac{1}{2}$ crores which has been authorised for outlay on Productive Public Works, if it was needed to give you the requisite balance, I informed you, by a telegram of the 17th of February, that, holding that view, I considered your arguments not sufficient to justify me in borrowing here, even temporarily, which would be necessary if the drawings were reduced.

6. On receiving this decision, your Government determined to announce the Financial Estimate for the coming year, as reported in your Excellency's telegram of the 24th of February, as showing a surplus of 417,000%, the drawings of the Home Government being taken at 16,900,000%; and you added that "no loan" was "to be raised in coming year according to present intentions, unless events "not now foreseen occur, but power to borrow in case of need reserved." The closing balances would, however, be reduced to 11,444,000%.

7. In the 9th paragraph of your Letter of the 25th of February, No. 81, it is stated that this "decision to endeavour to carry on the public service during "1880-81 without a loan may entail upon us some inconvenience in the course "of the year, by reason of the depletion of our balances. But," you add, "we deliberately determined to face this inconvenience in order that we might "announce so satisfactory an evidence of the sound state of our finances."

8. I find it difficult to reconcile with these words the request made in your telegram of the 13th of March, that I would reduce my drawings as much as possible, because you would "not be able to meet continued drawings at 45 or "even 40 lacs without borrowing."

9. In the 52nd paragraph of my Despatch of the 17th of July 1879, No. 261, I pointed out the importance of your "making such arrangements in future years "as will admit of the largest drawings at the time when your treasuries are at "the fullest, if the rate of exchange should then be favourable," as drawings on a large scale in the summer can never be relied on, and it is necessary that the heavier portion of the demand should be placed on the market in the height of the export season, if the average required throughout the year is to be preserved. In 1878 an allotment of 50 lacs was made each week, from the 6th of March to the 8th of May; and, similarly, in this year, having taken care that the total drawings in 1879-80 should not put a greater strain on your treasury than you were prepared to meet,* I deemed it essential that, with the prospect of a large trade and a rising rate of exchange, the opportunity of receiving in the month of April some considerable portion of the remittances required during the year should not be thrown away. Your available balances, moreover, as estimated for the 31st of March 1880, were at a higher point than they had been in recent years,†

* Drawings in 1879-80.

		Rs.
Original estimate	-	18,95,20,000
Revised estimate of 16th October 1879	-	18,94,52,059
Actual drawings :		Rs.
Bills	-	18,35,00,000
Gold	-	60,71,681
Total	-	Rs. 18,95,71,681

† Balances in India 31st March.

		Rs.
1877	-	12,75,06,980
		Rs.
1878	-	14,49,83,020
Less Cash Subscriptions to Transfer Loan	-	1,40,94,800
	-	13,08,88,220
1879	-	12,79,21,530
1880 (estimate)	-	14,19,30,750

and there seemed no reason why my demands should not be met for the time, your balances being subsequently replenished either by a loan for productive works, or by temporary assistance, which you state that you anticipate no difficulty in obtaining.

10. Your Excellency inquires whether it would not be possible to increase the bills from November as easily as now, but at that time of year the demand on account of the ensuing export season has scarcely commenced, and, as a matter of fact, it has been found impossible to be sure of obtaining even a moderate amount at that time, regardless of the rate at which tenders may be made.

11. I am thus forced to the conclusion that, unless the drawings are continued so long as there is a good demand for bills, there would be no alternative but to raise money by borrowing in England at a later period of the year. Such a step would, in my opinion, be far more damaging to the credit of the Government than the raising of a loan in India; and as, moreover, the necessity for it would manifestly have been caused by your refraining from strengthening your balances by the usual loan in India, while proceeding to incur an outlay of more than three millions sterling during the year on Productive Public Works, it would be alleged that it was the expenditure on such works which made the occasion for borrowing in this country, and hence the recommendations of the Select Committee of the House of Commons would have been disregarded, and the pledges given by Her Majesty's Government to Parliament would have been violated.

12. Independently, too, of these considerations, there are grave objections to any addition to the sterling debt. Many measures have been adopted in recent years which, though reducing the Military and Civil expenditure in India, have added considerably to the non-effective charges in this country; and the policy of constructing public works through the agency of the State, while greatly increasing the payments for stores purchased in England, has led to a discontinuance of the raising and deposit in the Home Treasury of railway capital which for many years aided the Government in meeting the demands. On extraordinary emergencies, such as the famine in Southern India, it may become impossible to avoid resorting to a loan in England, again increasing the expenditure for which remittances must be made from India. From these and similar causes, it has happened that the amount of bills which it has been necessary to offer for sale has risen from 6,789,473*l.* in 1864-65 to 13,939,095*l.* in 1872-73 (in neither of which years was any money raised by loan in this country), and is now further increased to 17,000,000*l.* (reduced to 15,900,000*l.* by the loan from the British Government) in 1879-80, and 16,900,000*l.* for 1880-81. Borrowing in England merely to reduce the amount of the Secretary of State's drawings, can only purchase temporary relief at the expense of greater embarrassment hereafter, and it must be obvious that, unless some reduction of the debt in England be made in seasons of financial prosperity, the time may come when it will be impossible to meet the increasing requirements of the Home Government by drafts on India.

13. I trust that you will find no serious difficulty in surmounting the present inconvenience caused by my decision, and that on another occasion your financial arrangements will be so made that no doubt may exist as to your power of meeting drawings of even 50 lacs a week at this period of the year, if the necessities of the Home Treasury and the condition of the market make it desirable to offer so large an amount.

14. I have only further to observe that it is, in my opinion, better that a moderate sum should be borrowed each year for productive works, than that the cash balances should be dangerously reduced at one season and be refilled by an unusually large loan in the following year.

15. Since this Despatch was written, I have received your Excellency's further telegram of the 8th instant, stating that the outgoing from your Treasury for the war is very alarming, far exceeding the estimate, and that it is, in your opinion, essential that the drawings should be temporarily reduced to at most 30 lacs a week, though you feel no confidence that even this will give you sufficient relief. Your telegram gave no information regarding the state of your balances, and I therefore inquired on the same day what is the present amount.

16. In the discussion which took place in the Legislative Council on the 2nd of March, your Excellency referred to the remarkable accuracy of your estimates of the expenditure on the war, so far as it had yet been possible to verify them; and I am not aware of any development of the military operations which was not foreseen, and should not have been provided for, two months ago, when the net cost

was estimated at 4,060,000*l.* during the year 1880–81, including the frontier railways, or about 2,000,000*l.* for the military operations proper.

17. Assuming, however, that, in addition to this outlay of 2,000,000*l.* during the whole year, you now find it probable that further expenditure to even the extent of another 2,000,000*l.* will be needed during the next six months, your balances can in July, if not earlier, be replenished by a loan of 2½ millions for Productive Public Works, and they will then, if in other respects your estimates prove correct, be higher than they were taken when Sir John Strachey made his Financial Statement.

18. Moreover, I am apprehensive that the sudden reduction of the drawings which you urge would impress the public with the belief that your estimates were untrustworthy, and that some emergency was anticipated which made it necessary for the Home Government to come to your assistance. I have, accordingly, not thought it right to invite tenders on the 21st instant for less than 40 lacs, but a further reduction will be made as soon as the position of the market and the requirements of the Home Treasury justify such a step.

19. The following telegram was sent to your Excellency on the 9th instant :—
 “ Yours 8th. Much surprised by contents. What has caused unexpected
 “ and excessive war demand? I reduce to 40 lacs in notice next week,
 “ but further sudden drop in middle of busy season to 30 lacs would excite
 “ much adverse criticism, and probably cause Indian securities to fall in value.
 “ Obtain temporary assistance to meet present pressure.”

I have, &c.

CRANBROOK.

No. 34.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, April 15th 1880.

Your Lordship's telegram 13th. Some mistake must have occurred in the transmission of my message of the 10th. Balances then telegraphed were, March 1,260 ; May 897 ; difference 363, not 525 lacs. Bills paid intermediately are a principal factor in the relation between March and May balances. In 1878 we paid 363, and balances fell 21 lacs. This year we expected, on the assumption that the 45 allotments would continue, to pay 405 lacs, besides which we estimated our war expenditure 125 lacs. We are carefully revising war estimate by our present information, and telegraph result soon. Balances telegraphed on your requisition on 10th were usual monthly estimate, compiled by the Comptroller from the returns of the Accountant General, which had been received only on the 9th. As already said, such estimates are ordinarily too low, and are useful only as general indication of the prospect of our resources. We will telegraph actual March balances in a fortnight. We will not object further to your drawing 40 lacs twice, and then reducing to 35, leaving for future consideration whether we can dispense with further reduction. We have ascertained that, in case of need meantime, Bengal Bank can give us temporary assistance. We must probably issue loan early in May for the full amount of our productive expenditure. Whether even this will suffice for the service of the year will depend on actual cost of the war.

No. 35.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, April 19th 1880.

Your explanation by no means accounts for whole anticipated reduction of balances from Budget estimate 1,419 lacs on 31st March. Send as soon as possible detailed letter, explaining wide deviation from original Budget. Telegraph proposals regarding loan, before announcing.

No. 36.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, April 20th 1880.

Until clearer idea can be formed of the probable course of events in Afghanistan, and probable date of our withdrawal from the country, which we are

most anxious to complete as quickly as possible, it is impossible to frame with any confidence revised estimate of the future and total cost of the war. The following statement of our present anticipation must be, therefore, taken with great reserve, and may hereafter require much correction :—

War expenditure in February and March estimated at 75 lacs monthly. Nevertheless, regular estimate of expenditure recorded in the account of last year may not be much exceeded, although we shall have adjusted as much as possible in the account of that year.

With regard to this year, it was hoped, when the Budget estimates were made, that the war expenditure would be more rapidly reduced by the withdrawal of our troops than has been since found possible. On the contrary, the number of troops has been greatly increased, in order to meet new combinations and probability of attack in various directions; and it is clear that troops cannot be withdrawn as soon as had been hoped.

Expenditure on carriage and supplies of all kinds has greatly increased. Prices have become enormous. Famine rates rule at Peshawur and Rawul Pindee. Probable result will be a large increase of expenditure over Budget estimate.

From April inclusive, monthly expenditure is now estimated at 50 lacs. If the war continues for six months on something like present scale, estimate of two crores may have to be increased to $5\frac{1}{2}$ or 6 crores, of which one crore may possibly not be recorded till next year. If the regular estimate of the expenditure to be recorded in the account of last year be exceeded, preceding estimate for two later years may be proportionately reduced; on the other hand, if the expenditure recorded in the account of last year is less than regular estimate, it may be increased.

We shall telegraph immediately about proposed loan.

No. 37.

MINUTE by MR. STANHOPE, Under Secretary of State for India, April 21, 1880,
on the Expenditure for the Afghan War.

LORD CRANBROOK,

ALTHOUGH our information is at present much too meagre to enable us to form any confident opinion, yet the recent financial telegrams from India appear to disclose a state of things which is disheartening, and comes upon the India Office as a complete surprise. It may be well at this juncture to place on record the information we possessed as to the expenditure for the Afghan War.

The Budget of 1879–80 had estimated the war expenditure in Afghanistan for 1878–79 at 670,000*l.*, and for 1879–80 at two millions. On the 9th of September 1879, after the commencement of renewed hostilities, a telegram from the Viceroy informed us that, “although it is of course impossible now to estimate future military expenditure in Afghanistan, it is desirable that Her Majesty’s Government should know that in all other respects our financial prospects seem to us very favourable.” And, after giving certain details of improvement, which were expected to result in a surplus of three millions, it is added, “We hope this will more than suffice to meet all probable additional expenditure in Afghanistan” in the year 1880–81.

On 24th December 1879 another telegram from the Viceroy informed us that the revised estimates for 1879–80 showed an improvement on the Budget estimate (apart from war) of no less than 3,819,000*l.*, so that, after allowing $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions for frontier railways, and one million for the war, in addition to the amount estimated in the Budget, the estimated deficit upon the year 1879–80 would be reduced from 1,395,000*l.* to 1,036,000*l.*

The estimates themselves, received on the 12th of January 1880, fully bore out these statements. But the letter enclosing them added :—

“4. The extra one million which we have entered under ‘Army,’ is, as yet, only a very rough forecast. Until the situation in Afghanistan is more settled than at present, and until we are in a position to determine our future policy in regard to that country, it is impossible to say, with any approach to accuracy, even what

the whole cost of the military operations there will be, much less how much will be brought to account during the current year.

"5. All that we can say at present is, that we estimate the whole cost of all the military operations in Afghanistan, original and renewed, to the end of the current year, 1879-80, at 3,600,000*l.*, of which about 600,000*l.* is recorded in the accounts of 1878-79."

In a private letter from Sir J. Strachey, dated 19th December 1879, and received in the middle of January, he adds, "Considering the nature of the data which have been at our disposal, the estimates of the cost of the military operations have hitherto been singularly near the truth, and they have erred rather on the side of being too high than too low."

Speaking at Hackney, on the 19th January 1880, I said of the estimates for the war that they "are made in India by gentlemen of undoubted integrity and financial reputation. . . Their statements have hitherto been singularly accurate, and I have no reason to suppose they will be otherwise than accurate for the future." And then I added, "We shall approach the Budget of next year (1880-81) without any apprehension whatever. And as regards the current year (1879-80), I believe that we shall be able to meet, not only the largely increased cost of operations of the Afghan war, but also all the charges for the frontier railways we are pushing on, which is no less than 2½ millions for the current year, and we shall be able to meet it, I say, out of surplus revenue."

On the 19th of February 1880, the Secretary of State in Council, in acknowledging the receipt of the revised estimates, stated that they "give, on the whole, a highly satisfactory view of your finances."

On the 24th of February a telegram from the Viceroy gave the details of the annual budget, as follows:—

"Results are highly favourable. In 1878-79, surplus 2,044,000*l.*; in 1879-80, surplus 119,000*l.*; budget estimate 1880-81, surplus 417,000*l.* Foregoing figures in each case are after paying from ordinary revenue all charges for famine, Afghan war, and frontier railways.

"War charges, 1878-79, 676,000*l.*; 1879-80, 3,216,000*l.*; 1880-81, 2,090,000*l.* Setting off increase railways and telegraph revenues, total net expenditure on war to end of 1880-81, 5¾ millions. Frontier railways, present year 1,670,000*l.*, next year 2,270,000*l.*; total, 3½ millions. . . . War estimates have hitherto proved very accurate, and are believed to be ample for all contingencies now contemplated."

The Financial Statement itself (received in London on March 12th) states:—

"8. The original estimates provided for an additional military expenditure of 2,000,000*l.* for the war in Afghanistan. If the war had ended with the treaty of Gundamak, I believe that this estimate would not have been exceeded. . . ."

"27. The estimates of the cost of the war must, of course, be to a great extent speculative; but they have been prepared with much care, and their accuracy up to the present time is highly creditable to Major Newmarch and the Military Department. There is no reason to suppose that they err on the side of being too low. To what extent it will be found hereafter that stores, chiefly camp equipage, have been expended and wasted and lost, we cannot possibly know accurately until the war is over; but everything bought for the war is included in the estimates, and the reserves in our arsenals are being maintained at their proper standard, the cost being charged for the present as current expenditure."

It will be seen that, whereas the revised estimates in December had shown that (apart from war) the prospects of 1879-80 had improved by no less than 3,819,000*l.*, the circumstances had so far changed in February that the improvement was estimated at 4,400,000*l.*, while the war expenditure payable in the financial year 1879-80 was expected to exceed the December estimate only by 216,000*l.* The estimate of war expenditure in 1880-81, including, as it did, the charge for further military operations, was, of course, of a more uncertain character: Upon this estimate, of course, various opinions have been expressed at the India Office; but as regards that for the year 1879-80 I never heard any doubt expressed there, and indeed it was in India alone that any data existed for framing either of them.

So satisfied did the Government of India appear to be with their estimates, that they not only remitted certain export duties, and unanimously resolved to abandon the proposed extension of the License Tax, but they also refused to

borrow anything at all, even in aid of the capital expenditure upon productive Public Works, and they pressed forward, as a charge upon the revenue of the year, an extensive system of frontier railways.

In the "Times" of Monday, 8th March, a long telegram described the debate on the budget which had taken place in Calcutta on the previous Tuesday, and the Viceroy in the course of his speech was reported to have said, "He now came to Mr. Gladstone's last allegation.* It was that the Indian Government had deliberately falsified its military accounts to conceal the real cost of the Afghan war." After expressing his indignation at the charge, he went on to add: "So far from seeking to conceal the true cost of the war, they had charged against it all stores and material, as well as the cost of frontier railways, telegraphs, and postal communication."

The text of the Viceroy's speech, since received, confirms this account, and he goes on to say: "Our estimates, so far as it has hitherto been possible to verify them, have proved to be remarkably accurate."

On the 12th of March there was a debate in the House of Commons on the cost of the Afghan war, when I took occasion in answer to Mr. Gladstone to deny the statement that the full cost of the war had not been put forward, and said that I believed that the Government of India "had put forward as honestly as any Government could, every item of expenditure that could possibly be included" in the cost.

Up to that time no information, either public or private, had reached us, which tended to show that the estimates for the war would be exceeded, and it was only on the 17th of March that the first note of alarm was sounded, in a telegram from the Viceroy which stated, "Opening balance, 14 crores, estimate only; remains to be seen whether it will be realized. . . . We have to meet constant military drain, ultimate aggregate amount of which quite uncertain." Even this telegram, as it referred only to an increase in our drawings from 40 to 45 lacs, did not seem to be very serious. At this time the annual migration to Simla was commencing, and Sir John Strachey had already left Calcutta.

On the 23rd of March we heard further, "cost of war still quite uncertain," and on the 8th of April, "outgoing from our Treasury for the war very alarming, far exceeding estimate." All these telegrams, with the answers to them, were, according to the usual course, submitted to the Finance Committee and your Council.

It is no part of my present purpose to make any comment on these recent telegrams, which may, I hope, prove to be exaggerated, but as to which much further information is required.

EDWARD STANHOPE.

No. 38.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, April 21, 1880.

With reference to my telegram of yesterday, we consider it essential to raise as quickly as possible loan of 330 lacs of rupees, being full estimated expenditure on productive works. For the reason given in our Budget Despatch we propose $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. loan. Draft notification will reach Financial Secretary 6th May, which we propose publishing 7th. Please publish simultaneously, substituting amount herein telegraphed, leaving all dates unchanged.

We hope Her Majesty's Government will borrow in London anything that may be necessary additional during the year, if, in consequence of prolongation of the war, further help becomes unavoidable. May we promise that nothing more will be borrowed in India?

* This, Mr. Gladstone, on 12th March 1880, explains to have never been "his allegation. It was the allegation of others, given to him with such an appearance of truth that he thought it right to mention it publicly, in order that if inaccurate it might be contradicted."

No. 39.

DESPATCH to the Government of India, April 22, 1880, No. 133 (Financial).

MY LORD,

Para. 1. In the 16th paragraph of my Despatch of the 15th instant, No. 119, I mentioned that I had found it necessary to telegraph, on the 8th of April, for information regarding the present amount of your cash balances, and in the last paragraph I referred to the telegram which I addressed to your Excellency on the following day, inquiring the cause of the unexpected and excessive war demand, and explaining that, in view of the importance of taking no step which should adversely affect Indian securities, I could not reduce the weekly drawings below 40 lacs at present.

2. On the 10th of April your Excellency telegraphed the balance at the end of February as "13,103 lacs," which I understand to mean Rs. 13,10,30,000. The estimate of your balances at the end of March was 1,260 lacs; at the end of April 1,075 lacs, and at the end of May only 897 lacs; but you added that "such estimates are usually too unfavourable." The excessive military drain would, you stated, chiefly explain the deficiency from the regular estimate.

3. According to the estimate formed towards the close of February you anticipated a balance on the 31st of March of Rs. 14,19,30,000, and as, in normal years, the balance at the end of May is not lower than two months previously, there would have been reason to expect that the balance on the 31st of May would be as high as Rs. 14,19,30,000. Your present estimate of Rs. 8,97,00,000, therefore, shows a deficiency of Rs. 5,22,30,000, which can be only attributed to a falling off in the receipts (which has not been suggested), or to expenditure not foreseen at the time that the Budget was prepared.

4. In your telegram of the 23rd of March three reasons were assigned as having brought about a change in the situation. The first of these was the fact that, notwithstanding the explicit instructions in my Despatch of the 17th of July 1879, No. 261, para. 52, you had "made no provision for any advance," by which I understand you to mean that you had made no provision in the early part of the official year for any increase in the amount of my bills during that period above the weekly average of 39 lacs. Thus, it would seem that, although you were aware that it was necessary to draw *on the average* 39 lacs of rupees a week throughout the year, and had told me that you had arranged your Budget on that understanding, you had made preparation for meeting no more than that amount of bills during the latter part of April and May, to be drawn while the export season was at its height, notwithstanding the well known impossibility of maintaining such an average throughout the summer. In my Despatch of the 15th instant, I impressed upon your Excellency the necessity of meeting more than the average at such a time; and, therefore, I need now only observe that, on the assumption that you have to pay in April and May nine drawings of 45 lacs instead of two of 40 and seven of 39 lacs, for which it would appear that you estimated, the reduction of your balances attributable to this cause is only 52 lacs.

5. Another reason assigned as affecting your position is the expectation of an abnormally large opium crop. The estimated charge under the head of Opium was entered in the Budget as 2,160,000*l.*; I have no information as to the amount which you now expect to pay, but I find that the heaviest charge defrayed in any year was 2,842,000*l.*, so that the excess can scarcely be expected to exceed 682,000*l.*, of which it is improbable that the whole will be incurred by the end of May. I may observe, moreover, that this charge is of such a character that the amount should have been foreseen when your Financial Statement was made.

6. The third ground assigned for anticipating decreased balances is that, since your estimate was framed, you have "sent to form reserves and to accumulate" immediately six months' supplies for troops in field." When the Budget Statement was prepared, some portion of the sum of 3,216,000*l.* inserted in your Regular Estimate for 1879-80 must have been in hand to meet the expenditure during the five weeks which remained of the year; and you were satisfied with the provision, in addition thereto, of an amount of 2,090,000*l.* for the whole of the year 1880-81. At the very least, one sixth of the latter sum, or 350,000*l.*, must have been expected to be spent in the first two months of the official year. From your telegram of the 15th of April, I gather that you now estimate the

outlay during those two months at 1,250,000*l.*, or 900,000*l.* in excess, in addition to which the difference of 1,593,000*l.* between your estimates of 24th February and 10th April, as to the amount of the closing balance on the 31st of March, is said to be chiefly due to "excessive military drain."

7. Adding together these unanticipated advances on account of Military expenditure, charges for opium, and payment of bills, I arrive at an amount of 3,693,000*l.*,* which might possibly have to be met from your balances by the 31st of May; but this falls short by 1,530,000*l.* of the deficiency between your Budget estimate for the 31st of March and your present estimate for the end of May.†

8. Finding that, after allowing 1,000,000*l.* for the probable excess under the heads of Bills and Opium advances to the end of May, there was a difference between these two estimates of 4,223,000*l.*, I telegraphed on the 13th instant to know how this was to be accounted for, and I asked for more detailed estimates regarding the outgoings on account of war. In your reply of the 15th you observe that some mistake must have occurred, as your balances at the end of March were estimated at 1,260 lacs; but in saying this you overlook the necessity for an explanation of the discrepancy between that estimate and the former one giving 1,419 lacs. You further state that the "bills paid intermediately are a principal factor in the relation between March and May balances;" but, as the anticipated weekly drawings of 45 lacs would not in the nine weeks be more than 52 or 54 lacs above the average of 39 lacs weekly which you seem to have taken in the estimate, it cannot be admitted that such a reduction is a "principal factor" in a deficiency of either 363 or 525 lacs.†

9. It seems evident that your difficulties must mainly have arisen from an under-estimate of your liabilities in regard to the war; and I am desirous of drawing your attention to the manner in which this question has been placed before Her Majesty's Government. On the 24th of February your Financial Statement was published, showing an anticipated expenditure on account of military operations in 1880-81, amounting to 2,090,000*l.*, subject to reduction by railway and telegraph receipts. So sanguine were you of the adequacy of this estimate, that you determined not to proceed with the revision of the License Taxes which had been proposed to me as tending to remove certain inequalities felt to be injurious, and had received my cordial sanction, and you abandoned the measure, notwithstanding some urgency on my part, because you stated that in the flourishing state of your finances neither your Excellency nor any member of your Government was prepared to proceed with that part of it which involved fresh taxation. You further determined to remit the export duties on certain articles, and you resolved on the unusual step of meeting, during a time of war, an expenditure of 3,312,000*l.* for Productive Public Works, without resorting to the money market for a loan. At the same time, you informed me that you had deliberately determined to face any inconvenience resulting from the depletion of your balances, in order that you might announce so satisfactory an evidence of the sound state of your finances.

10. In reliance on these assurances, statements were made in Parliament on the part of Her Majesty's Government, in the full belief that the expectation of a surplus rested on a sure basis. Yet on the 13th of March, or less than three weeks from the time when your statement had been laid before the public with so much confidence, your Government found itself unable to meet the usual drawings at this time of year; on the 17th of March you telegraphed regarding the "constant military drain," of which the "ultimate aggregate amount" was "quite uncertain," and on the 23rd you informed me that you had been obliged "to form reserves, and to accumulate immediately six months' supplies for troops

	£
* War in February and March - - - -	1,593,000
„ in April and May - - - -	900,000
Opium advances - - - -	680,000
Bills - - - -	520,000
	<u>£3,693,000</u>

† NOTE.—Since this despatch was written, it has been explained that this deficiency of 1,530,000*l.* is accounted for by the drawings of the Secretary of State during March and April having been greater than in the average of previous years, so that, apart from other causes, the balances at the end of May would have been considerably less than those at the end of March.

“ in field,” in consequence of which it was impossible to fulfil your undertaking to meet the wants of the Home Treasury. It further appears that the estimate of 2,090,000*l.* was so utterly inadequate for the War expenditure to be incurred beyond that provided for 1879–80, that by the end of May a sum of nearly 2,500,000*l.* has to be met in excess of that for which you had made provision.

11. Your Excellency will of course understand that I am not now expressing any opinion as to the necessity for this unexpected charge for military expenditure, which must be determined by other than financial considerations, but I cannot avoid the conclusion that, considering the extent of the military operations in progress, it was not prudent to reject the means of improving your revenue, and of increasing your cash balances. It is now shown by your telegrams that those balances have in your opinion been reduced to so dangerous an extent, that the transfer of even 50 lacs of the home remittance to an earlier period of the year than you had estimated imposed such pressure that you “cannot answer for the consequences.” Even now that your difficulty has been laid before me, the information is so meagre and so inconsistent with the previous announcements, that, having in view the extreme importance of meeting the remittances required for the Home Treasury, the absolute necessity of raising in India whatever amount is needed for the purposes of your Government, so far as that can be done without imprudently straining the resources of the local money market, and the necessity for avoiding any sudden step which may cause Indian securities to be depreciated, I have not felt justified in making any but a gradual reduction of the drawings. In my telegram of the 10th of April, therefore, I stated that bills would be advertised for 40 lacs for at least two weeks. In your reply of the 15th your Excellency says, “We will not object further to your drawing 40 lacs twice, “and then reducing to 35, leaving for future consideration whether we can “dispense with further reduction.” I trust that, before the time arrives for deciding this point, you will have been able to send the estimate of outgoings on account of the war called for by my telegram of the 13th of April. This, however, is insufficient without a detailed explanation of the wide deviation from the original Budget; and accordingly, in my telegram of the 19th instant, I have requested that Her Majesty’s Government may be furnished with a letter as soon as possible, giving the requisite information.

12. Since this Despatch was written I have received your Excellency’s telegram of the 20th of April, from which I learn that the expenditure on military operations in February and March is estimated to have been 1,500,000*l.*, the bulk of which, however, seems likely to fall into the present year as a matter of account; and that in April and May it is expected to amount to 1,000,000*l.* It is not stated that this outlay is in excess of that provided in your Budget; but, assuming it to be so, the total of 2,500,000*l.* to the end of May corresponds almost exactly with the sum reckoned in the calculation given in the 7th paragraph of this Despatch. The discrepancy of 1,530,000*l.* in the estimates of the cash balances is therefore still unexplained.

13. In addition to the excess of 1,500,000*l.* in February and March, you now contemplate the possibility of an excess on account of the war expenditure of 3,500,000*l.* or 4,000,000*l.* in 1880–81, of which, perhaps, 1,000,000*l.* may not be brought to account till 1881–82. In place, therefore, of an anticipated surplus of 417,000*l.*, the result of the current year may be a deficit of 3½ or 4 millions, in addition to a charge of one million deferred to the following year.

I have, &c.,

CRANBROOK.

No. 40.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, April 22, 1880.

Yours as to proposed loan. As only holding office until successor named, cannot deal with the matter.

No. 41.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, April 29, 1880.

Actual closing balances exceed 13 crores. Chief cause of the deficiency, military outgoings underrated 60 lacs, and London bills paid 28. Revenue returns satisfactory. Aggregate collection under all principal heads approximates closely to the regular estimate.

Will telegraph further about the war expenditure immediately.

No. 42.

EXTRACT from TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, April 30, 1880.

Amount (of loan), if announced as for Productive Works only, must not exceed 313 lacs for fixed grant and East Indian; but you may advertise larger loan if war renders it necessary. Make no promises as to further borrowing. Time must be allowed me to consider proposed notification. Telegraph necessary alterations, and await approval before any publication.

No. 43.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, May 3, 1880.

Summary of Despatch regarding war estimates issuing to-morrow:—

Paras. 1 and 2 report belief that cost of war will seriously exceed estimates in Financial Statement.

Paras. 3 and 4 send memorandum by Military Accountant General, detailing manner in which estimates made, with Minute by Sir Edwin Johnson showing that estimates were examined and accepted by Military Department, and, on official advice of that Department, dated 26th January, embodied by Financial Department in Budget. Military Department maintained estimate till last, and Financial Department saw no cause for distrust.

Para. 5. Early in March, uneasiness being caused by unexpected large demands on frontier treasuries, fresh inquiries showed that drafts of Military Department so much exceeded normal payment as to suggest strong doubts of accuracy of Military Department estimates.

Para. 6. Although balances in Military treasure chests very large, and other causes mentioned may reduce obligations, cannot now doubt that total war charges will much exceed estimates.

Paras. 7 and 8. Cannot yet send satisfactory new estimates, but will telegraph latest estimates before Financial Statement made to Parliament. For the present, advise addition of at least 4 crores to estimate for 1880-81. Responsible officers of Military Department still confidently expect that 10 crores will not be nearly reached, but Financial Department fears that it may rather be exceeded. Careful inquiry as to possible neglect of precautions and individual responsibility being made. Although amount of War charges outstanding from 1879-80 and adjustable in 1880-81 will be much larger than expected, not anticipated that amount brought to account in former year will seriously differ from regular estimate. Condition of finances in all other respects as satisfactory as described in Financial Statement. We still believe that, apart from war, there would have been surplus of four millions in both past and present years, and we modify no favourable anticipations of Financial Statement.

Military Member's minute assumes complete responsibility for War Estimates; states reasons for which Military Department accepted them and recommended adoption by Financial Department, and causes which were not foreseen, and which led to their insufficiency. Among these are specially noticed purchase, instead of hire, of great proportion of transport,—purchase and transport of six months' supplies to be stored at front before hot weather,—enormous increase in price of grain supplies and stores, both at base and in Afghanistan,—necessity of paying increased wages to all followers from dread of service and other causes,—necessity of works to maintain positions and protect troops consequent on prolongation of

war; local resources being exhausted, supplies and transport have to be sent from distant provinces, at constantly increasing cost. States that, when War Estimate was made, it was believed by Military Department sufficient to provide for war expenditure at rates found sufficient for preceding year. In such operations cost increases in progressive ratio with continuance.

Memorandum by Military Accountant-General shows, in detail, manner in which Estimates were prepared in usual course by the three Military Controllers, and revised by him.

We have thought it necessary to publish here greater part of Despatch and Minute to prevent mischievous misapprehensions.

No. 44.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, May 13, 1880.

April balance 1,150 lakhs.

No. 45.

LETTER from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, May 4, 1880, No. 142 (Financial).

MY LORD MARQUIS,

By Viscount Cranbrook's telegram dated 19th April we were instructed to send, as soon as possible, a detailed letter explaining the wide deviation of the closing balance of 1879-80 from the "original budget," by which we understand his Lordship to have meant the closing balance brought out by the Regular Estimates published on the 24th February last.

2. In this instruction, Lord Cranbrook refers to the revised estimate of 1,260 lakhs as the closing balance of the year, which, in obedience to His Lordship's request, we telegraphed on the 10th April. In our message of that date, and again on the 15th April, we were careful to explain that intermediate estimates of the kind are usually too unfavourable, and that they are useful only as a general indication of the prospects of our resources. Being familiar with such estimates, and understanding exactly the degree of confidence which they deserve, we are able ourselves to appreciate their value more correctly than a distant authority can do, and we can hardly be surprised that Her Majesty's Government should have been startled by figures which, although the only estimates that we could supply, we should not have thought of reporting except in obedience to a special requisition.

3. As we have repeatedly explained, and as is, indeed, self-evident, the balances remaining at our disposal on any date are the final outcome of innumerable transactions at our numerous and widely-scattered treasuries and sub-treasuries. No estimate of the contents of our treasuries and our balances in the Presidency banks on any future day, with whatever care, experience and skill it may be made, can be, within a considerable margin, any better than a guess.

4. The actual balances in our treasuries and at our credit in the Presidency banks, on the 31st March 1880, are now reported to have aggregated 1,301 lakhs, which amount is still subject to correction when the remittances between treasuries shall have been adjusted by the Comptroller General.

5. Appendix VII. to the Financial Statement contains the figures which worked up to the closing balance of 1,419 lakhs expected according to the Regular Estimates. Until the accounts of 1879-80 are completed it will be impossible to say, with any completeness, how those figures will be altered in order to produce the balance of 1,301 lakhs now returned, or whatever may be the final adjusted balance.

6. But we are able at once to offer the following general explanations of the deficiency of the approximately actual balance of 1,301 lakhs, as compared with the 1,419 lakhs of the Regular Estimates:—

- (1.) Before closing our Regular Estimates we had ascertained by telegraph that our balances on the 31st January had aggregated approximately 1,358 lakhs. They eventually proved to be only 1,352 lakhs.

- (2.) We estimated at that time that we should pay, during February and March, Council bills for 355 lakhs. We actually paid 383 lakhs. Our under-estimate is due to the bills having been presented for payment with unusual promptitude, so that on the 1st April bills for only 20 lakhs were outstanding unpaid.
- (3.) The Military Accountant General calculated that the demands of the Military Department upon us would amount during the two months to 280, or, to be on the safe side, 300 lakhs, which sum we adopted. We shall not know our actual military disbursements for some little time; but they are not likely to have been less than 350 lakhs.
- (4.) The grant for the construction of the Jhelum and Rawal Pindi Section of the Punjab Northern State Railway having been exhausted early in March, we were obliged to allow a supplementary grant for this work of 10 lakhs,* in order that the progress of this important accessory to our military operations might not be impeded.
- (5.) Owing to a check in the Málwa Opium and Sámbar Lake Salt Trades, our principal heads of fluctuating Revenue—namely, I.—*Land*, IV.—*Excise*, V.—*Assessed Taxes*, VII.—*Customs*, VIII.—*Salt*, IX.—*Opium*, and X.—*Stamps*—yielded, in the aggregate, 8 lakhs less than we estimated.
7. Thus, of the 118 lakhs by which the approximately actual closing balance of 1879-80 fell short of the Regular Estimate, we can account already, roughly, for 102 lakhs, as follows:—

	Lakhs.
January balance over-estimated - - - - -	6
London Bills paid under-estimated - - - - -	28
Military disbursements under-estimated - - - - -	50
Extra grant for the Punjab Northern State Railway - - - - -	10
Revenue known to have been over-estimated - - - - -	8
	102

8. The remaining discrepancy is unimportant: our estimate was based upon the assumption that, excepting the items which we have mentioned, the net result of the aggregate transactions in February and March, at our treasuries or upon our accounts at the Presidency banks, would be the same this year as last year. A variation of 17 lakhs, on the whole, between the two years is not surprising.

We have, &c.

LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
ALEX. FRASER.

No. 46.

LETTER from the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, May 4, 1880, No. 143 (Financial).

MY LORD MARQUIS,

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 81, dated 25th February, and with reference to the telegrams cited below,† we regret to report, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, that we have grave reasons for apprehending that the cost of the military operations in Afghanistan will seriously exceed the amount entered in the Financial Statement for 1880-81.

* In our telegram dated 29th April this item was, for brevity's sake, included with item (3) as a military disbursement.

† To Secretary of State, dated 8th April.	To Secretary of State, dated 15th April.
From " " 9th "	From " " 19th "
From " " 10th "	To " " 20th "
To " " 10th "	To " " 21st "
From " " 13th "	To " " 29th "

2. The total expenditure upon those operations in India was calculated in that document at 5,512,670*l.*, as follows :—

	<i>£</i>
In 1878-79 (Account No. 57) - - - -	600,270
In 1879-80 (para. 130 of Statement, less expenditure from the Home Treasury)* - - - -	2,954,400
In 1880-81 (para. 187 of Statement, less expenditure from the Home Treasury)* - - - -	1,958,000
	<u>5,512,670</u>

3. The estimates for 1879-80 and 1880-81 were prepared in the Military Department by the usual methods, with careful deliberation. We forward with this Despatch a Memorandum by Major Newmarch, the Military Accountant General, detailing the procedure in ordinary use, describing how it was actually employed on the present occasion, and explaining, in particular, his estimates of the cost of the war. Major Newmarch submitted his estimates to the Military Department with a Memorandum, No. 4108, dated 19th January. It is shown in the Minute of our Honourable Colleague, Sir Edwin Johnson, which accompanies this Despatch, that those estimates were carefully examined and accepted in the Military Department; they were formally transferred by that department, on the 26th January, to the Financial Department, with the recommendation that they should be adopted; and they were incorporated, in usual course, in the Budget presented with the Financial Statement.

4. The estimates were held open to revision till just before the Statement was made; but no correction was suggested in the Military Department, or considered necessary in the Financial Department. On the contrary, the unexpectedly high amount of our January balances (1,352 lakhs), coupled with the comparatively moderate amount of the military expenditure brought on record up to that date, gave rise to a doubt whether the Accountant General in the Military Department might not have entered too large an amount in his Regular Estimate; but it was ascertained specifically on the 18th February, six days before the Statement, that the Accountant General in the Military Department fully maintained that estimate, and it was not altered. There being thus, at that time, no apparent cause for distrusting the sufficiency of the Military Department's estimates, Sir John Strachey, in paragraph 27 of the Financial Statement, while pointing out that "the estimates of the cost of the war must of course be, to a great extent, speculative," said that he saw "no reason to suppose that they erred on the side of being too low."

5. Before the middle of March, however, we became uneasy at the unexpectedly large demands upon our frontier treasuries; and, not being satisfied with the result of a summary investigation of the causes, we instituted a fresh inquiry into the cost of the war, which has brought to light the fact that the aggregate net disbursements from our treasuries to the Military Department since the beginning of the operations have so much exceeded the normal payments to that department as to suggest strong doubts of the correctness of its estimates of the cost of the war.

6. No doubt, the balances in the treasure chests and with the military disbursers are much in excess of the ordinary amount. Moreover, apart from the operations in Afghanistan, the disbursements on account of the Malta Expedition, the Naga disturbances, and political events in Burma have caused exceptional military drafts upon our treasuries; and there may be other abnormal transactions which may operate, eventually, in reduction of the obligations of the Military Department. Nevertheless, and taking the most sanguine view of the prospects of the termination of the war, we cannot now doubt that its cost will largely exceed the departmental estimates.

7. There is, however, much still to be done before we can venture to estimate the cost of the war afresh with any precision. It has not yet been fully explained why the large outflow from our treasuries in excess of the military estimates did not show itself sooner in the diminution of our balances, which we are now at last witnessing. Nor is the Accountant General in the Military Department, an

* NOTE.—The "Military Expenditure proper" in 1879-80, mentioned in paragraph 130 as 3,137,000*l.*, included 182,600*l.* in England, leaving the expenditure in India (exclusive of frontier railways, post office, and telegraphs) at 2,954,400*l.* The estimate of 1,978,000*l.* for 1880-81, mentioned in paragraph 187, similarly included 20,000*l.* in England.

officer in whose prudence and ability we place the greatest confidence, as yet able to reconcile the treasury figures with the estimates which reach him from the Military Controllers.

8. Under ordinary circumstances, we should have thought it desirable to wait until we could explain the facts better than is yet possible. But we are sensible of the inconvenience which must result from the failure of our war estimate, and deem it incumbent on us to substitute for that estimate at once the most correct forecast that we can make with our present data, however imperfect such may be. We hope that, before your Lordship makes the yearly Financial Statement to Parliament, we may be in a position to telegraph more trustworthy estimates of the cost of the war than we can now make. Meanwhile, we consider that it will be necessary to add at least 4,000,000*l.* to our estimate of the cost of the war in 1880-81. We can only speak now with much reserve of the total amount which the war, apart from the Frontier Railways, will ultimately cost. The responsible officers in the Military Department still confidently expect that its cost will not be nearly so much as 10,000,000*l.*; but we are unable, at present, to reconcile this expectation with the actual outgoings from our treasuries.

9. Our Honourable Colleague, General Sir Edwin Johnson, has recorded, for our information and for that of Her Majesty's Government, a Minute, which we transmit herewith, describing the action of the Military Department throughout the whole proceedings, the manner in which the estimates for the war were made, and the circumstances under which the Military Department thought itself justified in recommending the Financial Department to accept them, and explaining, so far as this can now be done, the causes which, in our Honourable Colleague's opinion, have operated, and are still operating, to render those estimates insufficient.

10. As stated by the Military Accountant General in paragraph 14 of his Memorandum, although it cannot now be doubted that the amount of the war charges outstanding at the close of 1879-80, and which will have to be adjusted in 1880-81, will be much larger than was anticipated, there is no reason for supposing that the amount of these charges brought to account in the former year will seriously differ from the Regular Estimate presented with the Financial Statement.

11. The duty of supplying funds for the conduct of the operations in the field was entrusted to our Comptroller General, in immediate personal concert with the experienced Comptroller of Military Accounts in Bengal. We have not yet ascertained why it did not sooner occur to either of these high officers to warn us, that the rate of outflow from our treasuries appeared to be greatly in excess of the estimated cost of the war. We shall use our best endeavours to discover by what neglect of precautions we have been misled, and to what degree, if at all, individual officers are responsible for such neglect.

12. It seems probable that the error may be traced mainly to the peculiarity of the procedure for the record of our Military Accounts. As a general rule, to which we attach the greatest importance, our revenue and expenditure is severally brought to account immediately from the transactions at our treasuries. We thus know the facts many weeks before we should know them if we were to wait till the Departmental Accounts were prepared and audited. In the Military Department and in some other departments, however, this procedure has been pronounced impracticable, owing to the intermixture of debt items in the treasury transactions and to other causes. We have long since endeavoured to apply in the Military Department the procedure found so convenient in other departments, but have hitherto been unable to do so. The consequence is, that the Military Accounts, though doubtless admirably correct when completed, are not usually known to us for nearly three months after the end of the month to which they refer, and, which is still worse, even then exclude many items awaiting audit or adjustment. In time of war, the discrepancy between the audited accounts and the treasury transactions becomes, as we now experience to our cost, such that the progressive accounts convey a false and inadequate impression of the facts. We shall consider afresh whether this cannot be remedied.

13. As we have been obliged to take the unusual course of revising our estimate of one important item before the Financial Statement is made to Parliament, we subjoin, for any use which your Lordship may think fit to make of it, a statement of the other variations from our Regular Estimates which are now known to us:—

	Regular Estimates.	Approximate Accounts.	Better.	Worse.
	£	£	£	£
I. Land Revenue - - - - -	22,389,000	22,426,200	37,200	—
IV. Excise - - - - -	2,765,000	2,792,587	27,587	—
V. Assessed Taxes - - - - -	797,000	783,800	—	13,200
VII. Customs - - - - -	2,231,000	2,283,352	52,352	—
VIII. Salt - - - - -	7,335,000	7,256,698	—	78,302
IX. Opium - - - - -	10,459,000	10,361,555	—	97,445
X. Stamps - - - - -	3,203,000	3,192,811	—	10,189
TOTAL - - - - -	49,179,000	49,097,003	—	81,997

14. We shall not know for some time whether the slight improvement in the land revenue belongs to the Revenue from Productive Works or not. Meanwhile it had better be shown under the general head of *Land Revenue*. The deficiency under *Salt* is due to an unexpected intermission of the deliveries from the Sámbar Lake, which will, doubtless, soon be resumed. The deficiency under *Opium* is owing to a similar temporary check in the trade in Málwa Opium.

15. On the whole, our estimates have been very satisfactorily realised. The only considerable Revenue Head of which we do not yet know the approximate result is that of *Railways*, the accounts of which cannot be quickly closed. We know no grounds for revising our estimates of Railway revenue.

16. On the expenditure side, however, 100,000*l.* must be added under Head 32—*Railways*, being the supplementary grant made for the Jhelum-Rawalpindi Section of the Punjab Northern State Railway, as explained in paragraph 6 (4) of our Despatch No. 142 of this date. This is, in truth, part of the cost of the war.

17. However disappointing it is to find that the war is likely to cost so much more than was expected, the permanent effect upon the condition of our finances will be limited to the extent to which the charge for interest on the debt may be increased. In all essential respects the condition of our finances appears to us no less sound and satisfactory now than it did when the Financial Statement was made. The improvement in our general financial position remains as unquestionable as before; there is still no reason to doubt that, but for the war, our surplus of revenue over expenditure would have hardly been less than 4,000,000*l.*, both in the year 1879-80, which has just closed, and in the year 1880-81, which has now commenced; nor do we see reason to modify any of the views regarding the past, or any of the anticipations regarding the future, which were set forth in the Financial Statement.

We have, &c.,

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

J. STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

ALEX. FRASER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 46.

MEMORANDUM by MAJOR O. R. NEWMARCH, Accountant General, Military Department No. 451, dated Simla, 30th April 1880, to the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department.

WITH reference to Military Department No. 6538K, of the 28th April 1880, the undersigned has the honour to explain, for the information of Government, the course followed in the preparation of the estimates of expenditure on account of the operations in Afghanistan:

2. The military estimates are prepared by the Comptrollers of Military Accounts, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, received and consolidated in this branch, and submitted by the Military Department to the Financial Department. In all

ordinary cases the figures proposed by the Comptrollers—officers of considerable experience and having the advantage of local knowledge—are accepted. But when there is reason to suppose, from a reference to past actuals, from a consideration of impending changes of organisation or other facts not known to the Comptrollers when their estimates were prepared, from the prospects of the harvests, from the progress of the accounts which are more advanced when the estimates are finally consolidated, and for other reasons, that their estimates are not correct, then they are increased or diminished to the extent thought to be necessary, in view of the foregoing considerations.

The reasons for any variation from the figures of previous years are always given in abstract and in detail in the transmitting memorandum and its appendices.

3. The first provision for the Kabul Campaign was made in the revised estimate for 1878-79.

In this estimate the Comptroller of Military Accounts, Bengal, provided 90 lakhs on this account, with the remark:—

“This sum may cover the extra charges that will be brought forward this year, but a correct estimate seems impossible at present.” The Madras Comptroller made no provision. The Bombay Comptroller estimated the charges at 20 lakhs; total of estimates 110 lakhs. Judging from the state of the accounts when the estimate was made up, and from the known delays in their receipt from officers in the field, it appeared to the undersigned that the charges to be brought into the year would not exceed 67 lakhs, and that there would remain between 50 and 60 lakhs to be adjusted in the accounts of 1879-80.

4. In proposing these figures the following remarks were made in paragraph 5 of the transmitting memorandum:—

“Looking at the two-fold uncertainty attending this item, the doubtful estimate of the probable expenditure, and the progress of adjustment, every allowance must be made for any want of accord hereafter between the revised estimate and the actual charges.” The amount charged in the year in India was Rs. 60,02,703, a tolerably close approximation to the estimate.

This left, according to the above calculation, about 60 lakhs outstanding from 1878-79, under the head of advances recoverable, unadjusted items, &c., which would have to be adjusted and charged in the accounts of 1879-80.

5. In the budget estimates of that year, the Bengal Controller, writing on the 17th December 1878, made no provision whatever for Kabul, remarking, “At present it is impossible to state what amount will be charged to this head in the accounts of 1879-80; perhaps later on more definite information than now exists may be available.” The Comptrollers of Military Accounts, Madras and Bombay, made no provision for the “Kabul operations,” having no information as to whether the war was likely to extend to the year 1879-80, or, if it did, as to how long it might be expected to continue. Allowing for the arrears to be brought forward from 1878-79, and in the anticipation of an early termination of the campaign, the extra expenditure of the year was estimated in this branch at 200 lakhs, with the following remark:—“It is, of course, impracticable to form any trustworthy estimate of the year, but it is not considered necessary to make any larger provision on this account at present than the above sum.”

The above anticipation was realised by the signing of the Treaty of Peace on the 26th May 1879, and had the war then been finally concluded, the estimate would probably have proved to be fairly correct.

6. On the renewal of hostilities in September, it, of course, became necessary to increase the estimate.

In submitting his revised estimate for the year 1879-80, the Bengal Comptroller provided 300 lakhs under the head of “Kabul” in lieu of 170 lakhs, the sum allotted to Bengal in the budget estimate, with the remark—“increased, to provide for charges on account of the second expedition.”

The Madras Comptroller reduced his allotment of 12 lakhs to 8 lakhs, with reference to the amounts compiled under this head in the accounts received by him up to date.

The Bombay Comptroller increased the 18 lakhs assigned to that Presidency to 40 lakhs, with the remark—“provision made for second Kabul Expedition.”

The total of these estimates amounted to 348 lakhs.

7. After the most careful and anxious consideration of all the facts available, and after personal consultation with the officers in charge of the field commissariat

accounts, with the special examiner of these accounts, and with the Comptroller of Military Accounts, Bengal, the undersigned considered that about 300 lakhs would probably be charged in the year, and that something over 100 lakhs would, as in 1878-79, be outstanding under the head of advances recoverable, unadjusted items, &c., and fall into the charges of 1880-81.

8. It was, as may be easily understood, extremely difficult, if not wholly impracticable, with the scanty materials available, and in view of the uncertainty as to the progress, extent, and duration of operations, the phases of which were changing from week to week, to frame even an approximate estimate of the extra cost of the war, and the above conclusion was not arrived at without much hesitation and anxious consideration. In submitting it, the following remarks were offered for the consideration of Government :—

“ In the revised estimate it has been deemed necessary, owing to the renewal of hostilities, to increase the provision on this account to Rs. 3,00,00,000. The estimates submitted by the Comptrollers provided Rs. 3,48,00,000 on this account; but, so far as any estimate can be made of charges so uncertain, both in their nature and as to the period within which they may be brought forward, their estimates appear susceptible of reduction by Rs. 48,00,000. There is one charge in particular which may affect the calculation very considerably—the compensation for loss of camels; but up to date no trustworthy statistics, or even estimate, of the probable losses and consequent claims have been received. With every desire to make full provision for the war charges, the undersigned can, at present, see no reason for going beyond the above figures.”

9. These figures are exclusive of the charge for the construction of frontier railways and telegraphs, the estimate for which in *India* is Rs. 1,12,15,000 in 1879-80, and Rs. 1,04,22,000 in 1880-81.

10. In the estimate for the year 1880-81, the Comptroller of Military Accounts, Bengal, provided 200 lakhs for “Kabul” without remark. The Madras Comptroller provided six lakhs with remark that the figure had been reduced (that is, from last year’s figures), with reference to the first four months of 1879-80. The Bombay Comptroller made no provision, with the remark—“provision on this account was made by the Accountant General in the current year’s budget, and will, it is assumed, be similarly made for 1880-81, if necessary.”

11. Following the course pursued in preparing the estimate of 1879-80, as explained in paragraph 5, it was estimated by the undersigned that about 100 lakhs would be brought forward from 1879-80, and that, anticipating, as in 1879-80, an early termination of the campaign, 100 lakhs would be spent on the war during the year 1880-81. This rate of expenditure was based on rough estimates prepared in this branch of the cost of the war, and supported by a consideration of the expenditure incurred in 1878-79 and in the early months of 1879-80.

12. In submitting this estimate the following remarks were made in the transmitting memorandum :—

“ For the Kabul charges it has not been considered necessary to do more than repeat last year’s provision, Rs. 2,00,00,000. But for the renewal of hostilities in September last, that sum would probably have sufficed to meet the extra charges of the year. With an early settlement of affairs beyond the frontier, the same amount may suffice to wind up the accounts of the campaign; should the operations be protracted, this figure will, no doubt, have to be increased hereafter in the revised estimate, as has been done this year.”

13. As regards the threatened inadequacy of the estimates, the undersigned proposes to defer any explanation on this head till the accounts for the year 1879-80 are completed, and the further information called for by the Military Department has been received.

14. The completed accounts for January 1880 have been received, with approximate figures for the remaining two months of the year; and there are grounds for supposing that, apart from the charges for frontier railways and telegraphs, the recorded charges of the year will not much exceed the estimate of 300 lakhs. There is, however, reason to fear that, owing to the largely increased expenditure of the last three months of the year—January, February, and March 1880—considerably more than 100 lakhs will be outstanding at the close of the year, and have to be adjusted in the accounts of 1880-81. At the same time this increased rate of expenditure shows no signs of diminution, and the war promises to be protracted considerably beyond the anticipation of the

estimate, while the operations are more extended than they were, or than was foreseen, when that estimate was prepared. It may also be noted that from various causes, which will, no doubt, be elucidated hereafter, the war expenditure has increased, beginning from January last, and is progressing at a rate far beyond any calculation that could have been made, based on the past rate of expenditure, and on the relative number of troops in the field at various periods.

From these two causes, the expected increase in the outstandings from 1879-80 and in the cash expenditure in 1880-81, the budget estimate of the year threatens to prove very inadequate. To what extent it will actually be found to be insufficient can only be determined on the receipt of the further information lately called for, and by the progress, extent, and duration of the campaign.

On this point a further report will be submitted hereafter.

Enclosure 2 in No. 46.

MINUTE by General the Honourable SIR E. B. JOHNSON, K.C.B., C.I.E.

THE attention of the Financial Department having been directed to the large disbursements which were being made from the Civil Treasury on account of the war in Afghanistan—disbursements seriously in excess of the estimated cost of the operations—the Military Department was requested to cause inquiry to be made, and to furnish information as to the cause of this difference between the estimates and the actual expenditure.

In accordance with this request, the Military Accountant General was called on for a report on the subject; and at the same time full inquiry was ordered in other branches of the Military Department, in view to eliciting the causes of these unexpected calls on the Civil Treasury.

Pending the result of these inquiries, the Military Accountant General has furnished a statement explaining, fully and clearly, the course he has followed in the preparation of the estimates of expenditure on account of the operations in Afghanistan for 1880-81.

To Major Newmarch's statement, which I attach, I need add nothing; but, as head of the Military Department, I desire to state that the estimates which were prepared by the Military Accountant General were not submitted by me to the Financial Department until, in personal and anxious communication with him, I had satisfied myself that they were framed on just principles and on data which might fairly and reasonably be accepted in the forecast of the probable expenditure on account of the war.

Satisfied, therefore, of the correctness of the estimates, which appeared to me as accurate as any estimate of the cost of military operations can be, I accepted them, and caused them to be sent to the Financial Department, with a recommendation that they should be adopted.

It will be seen, therefore, that though the estimates were prepared by the Military Accountant General, they were submitted and explained to me before acceptance; and I desire to state, without any reserve whatever, that, as head of the Military Department, I alone am responsible for the estimates, and that I fully accept such responsibility.

That this Department has under-estimated the probable cost of the war cannot be gainsaid; but until the result of the inquiries which have been ordered to be made is received, it is not possible for this Department to state either the extent to which the estimates have been exceeded, or the causes which have led to such excess.

Without attempting to anticipate the result of the inquiry, I may be permitted, however, to touch very briefly on some of the causes which have led to such a disturbance of our calculations, and which were not, and could hardly have been, foreseen at the time the estimates were prepared.

First, the purchase of a very great proportion of the transport, instead of hiring it. This recommended itself to the Comptroller General of Transport and Supply as not only a measure of expediency and improved organisation, but one which, owing to the nature of the service and to the extreme difficulty of hiring, appeared to be an absolute necessity. The outlay under this head has been considerable.

The necessity, as a measure of precaution when it became evident that the war would not be brought to a close as early as was anticipated, for purchasing and transporting six months' supplies to be stowed at the front and on all the lines of communication before the hot weather set in.

The enormous increase in the price of grain and other supplies—famine prices in fact—owing to the unexpected scarcity which prevailed in the Peshawar and Rawalpindi districts, notwithstanding the promise of an abundant harvest, which has been fulfilled everywhere else.

A similar, and also unexpected, increase in the price of stores, such as firewood, forage, &c., purchased in Afghanistan itself.

The necessity for paying increased wages, in addition to half rations, to all followers north of Jhelum, a necessity which arose partly from the growing dread of service in Afghanistan, and partly from the extreme demand for labour, locally, by the railway authorities on the line to Rawalpindi.

In addition to what has been already stated, there is also this fact to be taken into consideration, that when it became evident that the occupation would be prolonged through the summer months, and even into autumn, the works necessary for the maintenance of our positions and protection of the troops, thus detained, necessarily far exceeded any charges which had hitherto been incurred, or would under other circumstances have been needed, both at Kabul and on the whole line of communications.

In short, in such operations as those in which we are engaged, their cost increases in a progressive ratio, week by week, with their continuance. For not only are the local resources of a poor country drawn on to a point almost of exhaustion, thereby forcing supplies to be sent from remote bases, but also the transport, which has to be continuously renewed to supply the ordinary casualties, has to be procured and drawn from far distant provinces in India at an ever-increasing cost.

It is now clear to myself that, in accepting, as the basis of the estimated cost of the war carried on in the year 1880–81, the estimates which had proved sufficient for the operations of the corresponding months of the previous year, I had not sufficiently appreciated the main fact of progressive rates of expenditure—an expenditure necessarily increasing through an expansion both of the period and scope of the operations which have since been developed.

It seemed to me that, in providing for the war expenditure up to the month of July of the present year, based on the rate which had proved sufficient for those of the preceding year, which I had no reason to believe was being materially exceeded, I was making the utmost provision which I could at the time have been justified in recommending to the Council; and I submit that the correctness of the course I then pursued is not invalidated by the facts which have since come to our knowledge.

E. B. JOHNSON.

Simla, 1st May 1880.

No. 47.


TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, May 20, 1880.

Failure of the war estimate. Despatch by next mail, in continuation of Despatch 4th May, with minutes by Viceroy and Finance Member of Council, gives complete information, which it was not possible to give in that letter. We trust that, pending its receipt, you will postpone orders.

L O N D O N :
Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty. •
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE
RELATING TO THE
ESTIMATES
FOR THE
WAR IN AFGHANISTAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty,



LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1880.

[C.—2617.] *Price 3½d.*

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 48.

LETTER from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, June 1, 1880, No. 176
(Financial). (Received June 26, 1880.)

MY LORD MARQUIS,

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 143, dated 4th May, we have the honour to forward a minute by Sir John Strachey, dated 20th May, and a minute by his Excellency the Viceroy, dated 26th May, in explanation of the principal causes of the failure to estimate more correctly the cost of the military operations in Afghanistan.

2. Our Despatch of the 4th May, although it correctly indicated those causes, was, necessarily, incomplete. The papers now transmitted will fully explain the circumstances of the case. They show how the military accounts, in themselves accurate, gave an altogether erroneous representation of the actual cost of the war, and misled the Government, not only in regard to the probable future expenditure, but in regard to the expenditure which had already been incurred.

3. The system of our military accounts was elaborated under the advice of the most

Erratum.

In the Correspondence relating to the Estimates for the War in Afghanistan, on page 46, in the Abstract of the Accounts for 1878-79, for "Secretary of State's Bills Discharged," read "Remittances."

origin of our error.

5. We have only, now, to express our regret for the serious extent to which Her Majesty's Government has thus been misled in regard to the cost of the Afghan war. But there is no reason to suppose that the failure to estimate its cost aright has led to any increase in the actual expenditure on the war, or that that failure will cause an addition to the public burdens which a better forecast would have enabled us to avoid.

The question whether our military operations have been conducted with that regard for proper economy which we have always desired to enforce, has little connexion with the accuracy or failure of our estimates; but we concur with his Excellency the Viceroy in thinking that a careful inquiry, hereafter, into the cost of the war will be valuable for future guidance, and that it ought certainly to be undertaken.

6. Revised estimates of the cost of the war are under preparation, and will be submitted at an early date.

We have, &c.

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

J. STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

ALEX. FRASER.

Enclosure 1. in No. 48.

MINUTE by the Honourable Sir JOHN STRACHEY, G.C.S.I., C.I.E., on the failure of the estimates of the expenditure on the Army in 1879-80 and 1880-81 in India.

In making the following observations for the consideration of the Governor-General in Council, and, eventually, of Her Majesty's Government, on the error which has occurred in the military estimates, I thoroughly recognise the fact that, while Her Majesty's Government holds the Government of India responsible for the correctness of the yearly estimates, that responsibility obviously falls in particular on the Financial Department, and on myself as the member in charge of it. It is, therefore, my duty to give, as soon as possible, a complete statement of the nature and causes of the error which has come to light, and to show what measures have been taken to prevent the recurrence of similar errors. When our Despatch No. 143, of the 4th May, was sent to the Secretary of State, our information was, in many respects, incomplete; but we are now able, if not to clear up all points of doubt, to explain much more fully than we could do before, what has actually occurred.

2. The object of the Government of India in that Despatch was not to define the separate or relative responsibilities of its several officers or departments for the war estimates; that is a matter which mainly concerns its own internal administration. Its purpose was to make it clear, *in limine*, that those estimates had not been prepared arbitrarily, but by the usual means and in the usual way, and, especially, that there had been no irregular interference in their preparation. All this has already been done, and I do not propose to enter further into such considerations. It has been sufficiently described how the estimates were made in the Military Department, how they were accepted in the Financial Department, and how they were incorporated in the Budget.

3. In his minute of the 1st May my honourable colleague, Sir Edwin Johnson, with a generosity which all who know him will feel to be characteristic, claimed for himself personally complete responsibility for the estimates which have proved so inaccurate. Now it is true that my honourable colleague is the head of the Military Department, and that the Military Department was responsible for supplying to the Financial Department the estimates of the whole military expenditure; but Sir Edwin Johnson could no more make those estimates, or supervise their details, than I could have undertaken such a duty myself. He trusted the machinery which had been provided, and which he, and all of us, believed to deserve complete confidence. An elaborate system had been carefully devised and matured by the most competent authorities that the Government could find; it had worked for many years in a manner that had given no suspicion of practical imperfection; and it was believed that, under this system, the Government would always be kept informed of everything regarding the military expenditure that it behoved it to know. We now find that this belief was incorrect; the system which we trusted has failed us, and the Government has been left in ignorance of facts of essential importance. Sir Edwin Johnson was misled, and the Financial Department also was misled, by accounts which were in themselves, as far as they went, perfectly correct, but which, nevertheless, totally failed to show the actual expenditure on the war.

4. I do not now propose to enter into further consideration of the points to which the attention of my honourable colleague Sir Edwin Johnson was chiefly directed in his minute of the 1st May, or to discuss the causes which led, in his opinion, to increased expenditure. Such points are apart from the main question now before me, which is how it happened that both the Military and the Financial Departments failed to appreciate not only what the war would cost in the future, but what it had cost in the past. For we have now not merely to show why we failed in the task of making an accurate estimate of the future cost of a war; if this had been the extent of our error, we need not have troubled ourselves about it much. Our real failure has been far more serious; we have not only been unable to foresee the expenditure of the future, but we have been deceived in regard to the expenditure of the past, and in regard to the expenditure that was actually going on. It is this that really requires explanation, and on which I shall throw the fullest light in my power.

5. In the 12th paragraph of our Despatch of the 4th May, we stated our belief that our inability to estimate aright the cost of the war was mainly due to the peculiarity of the system of our military accounts. It has become more and more clear that the principal source of our mistake was then indicated.

6. Our civil revenues and expenditure are, for the most part, recorded in the Finance and Revenue Accounts, directly from the transactions at our treasuries, a procedure which ensures the promptest possible record of the facts, and that nothing shall be kept out of the accounts, pending inquiries and perhaps controversies, which may be interminable.

The Government knows how tenaciously the Financial Department clings to this procedure, and resists the many endeavours which are made to disturb, by interdepartmental adjustments and the like, the simple record thus provided. Secure in this record, we trouble ourselves comparatively little about the subsequent completion of the several departmental accounts, which would often be found lagging long behind.

7. To this wholesome procedure there are some exceptions, which have, hitherto, been considered unavoidable, owing to the admixture in the treasury transactions affected of items which are neither revenue nor expenditure. For example, the transactions at our treasuries with the Post Office include money-order remittances and many other debt items, and would, therefore, be no guide to the postal revenue and expenditure. In like manner the transactions with the Public Works Department include the revenue and working expenses of the railways, State and Guaranteed, the outlay upon the construction of productive public works, and so on.

In such cases it has been considered that we should lose more than we should gain by attempting to work upon the treasury figures; and it has been thought better to wait for our accounts until the departmental account officers can audit and classify the treasury transactions. It is an essential part of the duty of those officers to take care that their accounts, eventually, correspond in all particulars with the treasury transactions; but it is plain that the system is much less satisfactory than the simpler method to which we adhere whenever possible.

8. It has not hitherto been thought practicable to treat the military accounts by the simpler and safer method; the plan always adopted has been to wait until the pecuniary transactions of the Military Department could be classified and audited in the Military Account Department, upon which rests the responsibility of seeing that the accounts of the military revenue and expenditure are in true accord with the treasury transactions. The character of the military accounts will be readily understood from a paper written in 1868, by the late Colonel Arthur Broome, when Controller General of Military Expenditure,* extracts from which are printed in Appendix A. (II.). The accounts rendered by the military disbursing officers are audited, classified, and compiled in the Account Department; disbursements which cannot be sufficiently vouched by the disbursers, or which are challenged by the auditors, being entered under the suspense head "Advances Recoverable," and not recorded as expenditure. The general result is, that the audited and classified expenditure in any month is not known for about ten weeks, and that an indefinite balance, which is really expenditure, always remains unaudited and, therefore, unadjusted. In quiet times this balance is not large, and no serious inconvenience ensues; but when field operations are in progress on a large scale, the unadjusted residue may attain to such dimensions that the accounts of the audited and classified expenditure afford no indication of the real outlay. It is in consequence of disregard of these considerations that the present error has occurred.

9. The system of our military accounts was carefully remodelled by the English Commissioners of inquiry into Indian accounts, Messrs. Foster and Whiffen, as explained in their elaborate report dated 30th August 1864; but they suggested no material organic changes in the procedure previously followed. The Commissioners did not, apparently, think it practicable to follow, in respect of the military accounts, what I have called the simpler system; but they were alive to the dangers involved at several points of the procedure which they advocated. I have extracted in Appendix A. (I.) the paragraphs of their report which bear immediately upon this subject, and show the nature of the precautions which they recommended.

10. Effect was gradually given to the recommendations of the Commissioners; but the final orders of the Government on their report were not issued till the 7th July 1868. In Appendix A. (II.) will be found extracts, which now possess a special significance, from the review by Colonel Broome upon which the orders of the Government were based.

11. The Government of India in the Military Department re-echoed the spirit of Colonel Broome's remarks, as follows:—

"3. The conclusion at which Colonel Broome has arrived in paragraph 23 also appears to his Excellency in Council to be strictly correct; the new head of 'Advances Recoverable' being, in reality, nothing else than an 'Inefficient Balance' with the same inconvenience, and with no actual diminution of amount. Considering, however, the extensive and multifarious character of military charges, it is, the Governor General in Council observes, almost inconceivable that any system can be devised which can free the military accounts from some amount of unadjusted charges—in other words, an 'Inefficient Balance.'

* By a resolution in the Financial Department, No. 4474, dated 21st October 1871, the title of this officer was changed to "Accountant General, Military Department," without material change of his functions.

“4. Colonel Broome’s review of the new system appears to the Governor General in Council to be a fair and candid one; and the conclusion he arrives at, viz., that the present system should be regarded as one of a permanent nature, trusting to vigilance to mitigate the defects inherent in the system, has the cordial assent of the Government of India in the Military Department.”

12. The final resolution by the Government in the Financial Department was of a formal character, and contains no reference to the defects thus recognised. None of the authorities who took part in those discussions allude to the possibility of the elimination of these defects by the direct record, in the finance and revenue accounts, as military revenue and expenditure, of the military transactions at our civil treasuries, after a few suitable adjustments.

This preliminary discussion may appear tedious; but it is essential to the full understanding of the case.

13. I now invite attention to the two appended statements marked B and C, being returns of—

(B) the net military expenditure in India as recorded in the Finance and Revenue Accounts, month by month, from April 1869 to February 1880, which is the latest month for which the accounts are complete, with an estimate for March; and

(C) the net disbursements from the civil treasuries in India to the Military Department, month by month, from April 1869 to April 1880. The entry for March is, however, only an estimate. We know that the net amount disbursed in March was 2,082,500*l.*; but we do not yet know the sets-off still to come in the shape of excess payments made, during the year, by the Military Department on account of the Civil Department, and the like, which still await adjustment in the accounts of March. Such sets-off will certainly be large. I have, therefore, entered 1,750,000*l.*

14. If these two statements be compared it will be found that—

(1) until the end of 1877-78, the recorded net military expenditure was, invariably, more or less in excess of the net disbursements to the Military Department : the explanation of this excess is that, besides the sums withdrawn from the civil treasuries, the Military Department spends some portion of the departmental receipts, including money which it receives for remittances to families in England, and so on :

(2) till the end of 1877-78, if allowance be made for the aforesaid normal difference, the two accounts corresponded closely: clearly, with a few appropriate adjustments, the treasury accounts might, till then, have been substituted for the accounts of audited and classified revenue and expenditure without substantial or ultimate inaccuracy; but, apparently, till the end of 1877-78, little would have been gained by such substitution:

(3) from the beginning of 1878-79, these normal conditions were reversed, the net disbursements having, since the beginning of 1878-79, constantly exceeded the net recorded expenditure; and

(4) from October 1878, this excess became constantly larger and larger.

Our troops crossed the frontier on the 21st November 1878; but as we all remember, expenditure in preparation for war had been going on for some time before that event.

15. Instead of the moderate excess, usual in previous years, in the net recorded expenditure as compared with the net disbursements, the net military disbursements from the civil treasuries, during the two latest years, exceeded the net recorded military expenditure by 4,214,000/., as follows:—

	£	
In 1878-79	- - - - -	2,222,000
and		
In 1879-80 (by estimate as regards March, and compared with the regular estimate)	- - - - -	3,092,000
Total	- - - - -	<u>5,314,000</u>
Deduct—		
Advances made on account of the Malta expedition, and recovered from the Imperial Government	£ 250,000	
Unspent balances in the hands of the military disbursers or held at the disposal of the Military Department	850,000	1,100,000
Remains	- - - - -	<u>£4,214,000</u>

16. To this large excess some considerable addition should, probably, be made, because, as has been pointed out, the net recorded expenditure ordinarily exceeds the disbursements; so that there remains a very large sum which must be eventually adjusted, in the finance and revenue accounts, as military expenditure in India, in excess of the estimates of 1879-80 and 1880-81.

17. It would be premature to attempt to state precisely the amount by which the estimates have thus been exceeded; and it would be still more premature to inquire how much of such excess is due to the war in Afghanistan, and how much to other causes, such as the operations on the North-Eastern Frontier, the military preparations in Burma, or, even, to an under-estimate of the normal military expenditure, apart from all extraordinary operations. Moreover, it is manifest that a similar excess is still accruing as compared with the estimate for 1880-81. We are not yet, therefore, in a position to conjecture, with any approach to accuracy, by what aggregate amount, and in what particulars, the estimates of the two years 1879-80 and 1880-81 will, eventually, be found deficient.

In paragraph 8 of our Despatch of the 4th May, the opinion was expressed that at least 4,000,000*l.* must be added to the estimate of the cost of the war in 1880-81, and we said that we could only speak with much reserve of the total amount which the war would ultimately cost. "The responsible officers," it was added, "of the Military Department still confidently expect that its cost will not be nearly so much as 10,000,000*l.*; but we are unable, at present, to reconcile this expectation with the actual outgoings from our treasuries." I feel still less able to share that expectation now. Although I will not attempt to anticipate the results which our advisers may place before us as their revised estimate of the total cost of the war, yet, considering what we already know regarding the expenditure of the past; considering, also, the present scale of our military operations, the uncertainties of the future, and, on the other hand, the certainty, under the most favourable expectations which can be entertained, that a great expenditure is still before us; considering I say, all the facts and probabilities of the case, it appears to me hardly possible to doubt that the fears expressed in our Despatch of the 4th May will be justified, and that the ultimate cost of the war will largely exceed the sum of 10,000,000*l.*, which was then named with so much hesitation. With our present knowledge, I cannot feel any confidence that, even if the war is brought to a termination as soon as we now anticipate, it will cost, independently of the frontier railways, less than 15,000,000*l.*

18. Statement C has been compiled only since the Government found reason to doubt the correctness of the military estimates. So far as I am aware, no similar comparative statement of the disbursements to the Military Department during a long succession of months has ever before been compiled. The English Commissioners of Inquiry into Indian Accounts suggested no such check, and the expediency of a precaution of this nature has not occurred, at any time, to any of the officers of the Civil or Military Account Department. Thus, this statement, which seems to me to show plainly what has happened, was not in the hands of any of the officers who took part in the preparation of the military estimates; nor was it before the Government of India in either the Military or the Financial Department, when those estimates were under consideration. When the military estimates were before the Government in the Financial Department, the latest completed military accounts were those for October 1879; they showed a net expenditure, in the first seven months of the year 1879-80, of 7,161,000*l.*, being only 724,600*l.* more than the corresponding expenditure of 1878-79, and only 1,061,000*l.* more than the least corresponding expenditure during the preceding 10 years. There was nothing in these figures to suggest any distrust of the departmental estimates.

19. From the extracts collected in Appendix A, it appears that the system of the military accounts provides for a vigilant attention to the expenditure held in suspense under the head "Advances Recoverable"; and that the English Commissioners insisted prominently upon the vital importance of a punctual interchange of the military accounts with the civil treasuries.

I will not, with the information actually before me, assert, in regard to any individual officer, among the responsible officers concerned, that the salutary warnings of the Commissioners were, in the present instance, neglected, and it is true that the most exact observance of the prescribed precautions would not have supplied the place of such a check as Statement C, the virtue of which consists in the means which it affords for the promptest possible comparison of the total current military outgoings from our treasuries with the corresponding transactions in the past, and with the contemporary estimates of the military receipts and expenditure.

Plainly, however, it was the duty of the officers of the Military Account Department, in the preparation of their estimates, to pay special regard to the large advances of which they must have been aware. They have been officially called upon to explain upon what grounds they, nevertheless, believed that their estimates of the cost of the war in Afghanistan were adequate, and it will be right to await their explanations before we impute blame to officers who have, hitherto, been distinguished for the zealous and intelligent discharge of their duties, and have enjoyed the confidence of the Government of India; but I must say, at once, that it appears inconceivable that the Government could thus have remained in ignorance of facts which it was essential it should know, if the duties imposed on the several departments concerned had been performed in a really intelligent manner.

20. It must be remembered that the elaborate recommendations of the English Commissioners concern exclusively the Offices of Account; primarily, the Military Offices of Account, and, in a secondary degree, the Civil Offices of Account in their relation to the Military Offices. Those recommendations had no reference at all to the procedure of the Government of India itself, but only to the provision of the best precautions which could be devised against such oversight or failure in the Account Offices as might cause the Government to be misled.

21. In popular apprehension, the Financial Department is regarded as one homogeneous organisation, the responsibilities of which are common to the whole body. But, in truth, the Financial Department consists of two separate sections with distinct and clearly defined functions, namely—

- (1) the Financial Department of the Government; and
- (2) the Offices of Account and Audit.

Although the Account Offices are entirely subordinate to, and at the command of, the Government, the functions and responsibilities of the Financial Department of the Government should not be confounded with those of the Account Department.

It is the duty of the Government to make intelligent use of the Finance and Revenue Accounts and Estimates laid before it, and to correct the estimates by any fresh information in its possession, or if it draws different inferences from the data furnished by the Account Department; but although the Government alone is responsible for the estimates ultimately adopted, it takes no part in their detailed preparation.

A costly trained agency is provided, whose whole time and attention is devoted to the record of the public accounts, and periodically to the preparation of the public estimates. An elaborate system and carefully considered rules are prescribed for the guidance of this agency. The Government is bound to introduce any improvement in that system which experience may suggest, and to correct any defects which may come to light; but only mischief and confusion would ensue, if the Government were to interfere with the Account Department in the discharge of its daily duties, or to test, by extraneous checks, the correctness of its work. Any such misdirected activity would, almost inevitably, result in the formation of a second and less trustworthy system of public accounts, in a weakening of the proper sense of their responsibilities on the part of the Account Officers, and in a dissipation of energy injurious to the public interests. The true policy in this matter lies in the proper division of labour, and not in the interference of one Department with the proper functions of another. The procedure of the Government of India in this respect does not, I believe, differ from that of Her Majesty's Government, or from that of the Governments of other civilised countries.

22. The preparation of a correct, intelligent, punctual and efficient record of the actual public receipts and disbursements, and of the most trustworthy possible estimates of the public receipts and disbursements, is the duty of the Account Department, upon which rests the obligation of seeing that the Government is not misled by any superficial aspects of the public accounts, or otherwise. It is of great public importance that these responsibilities of the Account Department should be in no way compromised or lost sight of; and in this view I proceed, now, to give a sketch of the duties of the principal officers concerned on the present occasion.

What follows will be better understood if it be borne in mind that the machinery for the compilation of the public accounts in India is, to all intents and purposes, divided into three independent departments. The departments which keep the accounts of the Army and of the Public Works Department are quite separate from the department which keeps the Civil Accounts, and, although their accounts eventually flow into the general books kept by the Comptroller General, in the Central Office of Account, they owe no direct allegiance to the Comptroller General. The Military

Account Department is directly subordinate to the Government of India in the Military Department; and the Public Works Account Department to the Government of India in the Public Works Department.

It was the particular duty of the Controller of Military Accounts in Bengal to watch the expenditure on the military operations in Afghanistan, as an obviously important part of that section of the public expenditure for the record of which he is responsible; to take especial care that there was no avoidable delay in the audit and classification of the war expenditure; to bring immediately to notice any obstacles or hindrances in the way of its prompt adjustment; to ascertain with particular vigilance that the accounts corresponded with the transactions of the Military Department, or on behalf of the Military Department, at the civil treasuries within his jurisdiction; to keep the Government constantly and truly informed of the progress of the war expenditure; and, at the prescribed intervals, to estimate its probable amount, after carefully collating all the data necessary for the purpose.

With this officer rested the duty of issuing assignments or letters of credit upon the civil treasuries in favour of the spending departments; so that he had in his own hands the means of knowing readily the general scope and progress of the bulk of the outlay. This remark does not include the expenditure by civil officers on behalf of the Military Department, but the Controller should have taken special precautions to acquaint himself with such expenditure as promptly as possible. It was not the specific duty of the Controller of Military Accounts to suggest the particular check the application of which has now discovered the error in the war estimates, but he might have been expected to ascertain, by some equally effective check, that his accounts and estimates of the war expenditure were consistent with the disbursements to the Military Department from the treasuries within his own jurisdiction, which constituted by far the greater part of all the war disbursements.

23. The functions of the Accountant-General, Military Department, are less exactly defined than those of the Controller of Military Accounts; but they include the whole of India, and thus extend over a wider range. His duties are twofold:—

- I.—He is responsible for the scrutiny of the several presidential estimates and accounts, and for their review and consolidation into the Imperial estimates and accounts. He is also required to collect and prepare statistics and other information on military subjects required by the Government.
- II.—He is the *ex-officio* adviser of the Government of India in the Military Department in respect to military accounts, economy, and finance; in this capacity his office is a branch of the Military Secretariat.

In the first of these capacities, the Military Accountant-General deals only with the completed estimates and accounts received from the Controllers of Military Accounts, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, supplementing and correcting their estimates, reports, &c. by the light of the further information, which he may possess as to the views and intentions of the Government, probable changes of organisation, or other circumstances. He has no executive functions as regards pay, audit, and allotment of funds to the military disbursing officers.

As regards his duties under the second head, he advises the Government of India on the financial aspect of all military questions which may be referred to him, and in this respect, and in his close connexion and subordination to the Military Department, he occupies in relation to the Military Department very much the position of the Accountant-General in relation to the War Office in England. The duties, however, of the two officers are not otherwise analagous, as the Military Accountant-General in India is not an executive officer, and keeps no detailed accounts, these being kept and compiled for each Presidency by the several Controllers.

But although the functions of this officer are rather those of a Financial Deputy Secretary in the Military Department than of an Accountant-General, yet in respect to the war in Afghanistan, the Government might, I think, fairly have looked to him to watch the proceedings of the Controllers of Military Accounts, and to take care that the Government was informed of the facts of the war expenditure as punctually as possible. Indeed, I know that, although his endeavours have been unsuccessful, the Accountant-General did anxiously endeavour to discharge such duties. At all events, the sooner such duties, and perhaps other cognate duties, are definitively imposed upon the Accountant-General the better. It is one of the defects of the present system that the Accountant-General is an Accountant-General only in name; there is really no one head of the Military Account Department in the sense in which the Comptroller-General is at the head of the Civil Account Offices, and to a limited extent, of all account offices in India, and in which the Accountant-General, Public Works Department, is at the

head of all account offices in the Public Works Department. The Controllers of Military Accounts occupy this position each in his own presidency, but there is no Military Comptroller-General for all India. The Military Accountant-General, according to the present definition of his duties, does not supply this void.

24. The Comptroller-General is head of the Civil Account Department. He has nothing to do with the preparation of the military estimates, or even of the civil estimates. It is not his specific duty to take official note of the military estimates, or to ascertain that the subsequent facts are in accord with those estimates. Eventually, indeed, the military receipts and expenditure are recorded from the military books in the Comptroller-General's books, and it would be incumbent on him to bring to notice any error, or any practice or procedure likely to lead to error, of which he might at any time or in any way become cognisant. The immediate connexion of the Comptroller-General with the present war expenditure is confined to the provision of funds on the demand of the Controller of Military Accounts, the two officers having been placed in special communication for the purpose. He has been called upon to say whether he has made any comparison between the funds he has thus supplied and the war estimates, and if not, why not.

It was open to the Comptroller-General to apply the check that has now been applied, the essential figures of which were, indeed, in his own keeping; but it cannot be said that it was his recognised duty to do so.

25. Early in March last the Comptroller-General brought to the notice of the Government in the Financial Department the increasing drain from the Punjab treasuries in connexion with the war, and the Government thereupon seeing, for the first time, reason to fear that the estimates of the cost of the army prepared in the Military Account Department might be untrustworthy, lost no time in instituting inquiries which revealed the facts stated in this minute. The check now applied was not thought of in the Military or Civil Account Department, but originated in the Financial Secretariat.

26. I do not intend now to offer any opinion as to the degree of responsibility that may attach to the several officers concerned. As already said, before coming to any conclusions in this respect the Government must await the explanations which have been called for. If it be found, hereafter, that there have been shortcomings, we must be prepared to find some excuses for them in the strain to which the system of military accounts must have been subjected during the progress of field operations of the magnitude of those in which the army has been engaged. On such occasions the disbursements are on a suddenly increased scale, and the disbursing officers being actively engaged in the field or at the base, have less time to give to the punctual and orderly preparation of their accounts. Under such circumstances delays and irregularities may be almost unavoidable.

But meanwhile, without losing sight of my disclaimer of any intention to repudiate my personal responsibility, or that of the Financial Department of the Government, for the failure of the war estimates, I think it necessary to make it clear at once that for the ignorance of the war expenditure actually incurred, to which this failure is due, it is in the first instance to the Account Department rather than to the Secretariat, in either the Military or Financial Department, that we must look for an explanation. And although I am most anxious not, prematurely, to award blame to any individual officer, I think it right to state, in the plainest terms, my conviction that no mere defects of system can possibly explain away the ignorance in which the Government has been left. The Government of India cannot take refuge in generalities, or attempt to make it appear that such gross errors can occur, and, nevertheless, that nobody is to blame. There must have been extreme negligence, or extreme want of intelligence, somewhere among the responsible officers, and the Government will not shrink from the duty of calling to strict account the officers concerned, whatever may be their position, and whatever may be their previous services or high character.

Whether the Government of India itself took all the steps which it ought to have taken to acquaint itself, in some summary way, with the general progress of the cost of the chief military operations; whether the Military or Financial Department ought not, at an earlier date, to have mistrusted the military estimates; and whether we should not sooner have taken into our own hands the duty of ascertaining the facts, and testing the correctness of those estimates by exceptional and unusual methods, is another question. The confidence that misled the Government is certainly reprovved by the facts now known to us, which show that the Military Department was ignorant of facts which it ought to have known, and that the Financial Department should not have taken the war estimates on trust. I in no way wish to extenuate my own responsibility or that of the Financial Department for our erroneous reliance on those estimates. We were so completely

misled by the apparent correspondence of the estimates of past expenditure with the expenditure actually brought to account, that, in spite of the doubts freely expressed on various occasions in public criticisms, we entertained no misgiving as to their soundness. At that time the Financial Department had discovered no data whatever which could have justified interference with the estimates prepared by the responsible officers.

I do not say this by way of apology. It is clear to me that it is quite impossible, and would be altogether unfair, to throw the whole fault either on the system or on the offices of account. The Military Department of the Government must accept the blame of having recommended to the Financial Department totally inadequate estimates; and the Financial Department must accept the blame of having adopted them. If the system was bad, it was the business of the Government to have found this out, and to have amended it. Our responsibility is indisputable; it cannot be extenuated; nor must it be obscured by any investigations which are made either into the system of accounts or into the conduct of individual officers.

But whatever blame may attach to the Government, or to any of its officers, for this want of precaution and foresight, this at least is clear, that the occurrence of an error of the magnitude now discovered shows, beyond the possibility of doubt, not only that there is something radically wrong in our system of accounts, but also in my opinion that this system cannot have been applied with proper care and intelligence. It is our obvious duty to probe this matter to the bottom.

27. The nature of our failure was not ascertained immediately upon our confidence in the estimates being disturbed. Inquiries were, indeed, promptly instituted and, as the result has proved, in the right direction. But although the figures in statement C were obtained from the civil account offices with a speed which is creditable to their efficiency, it took time to verify them in the Military Account Department. Thus we could not at first feel quite sure that we had discovered the true character of our error. The gradual process by which we have satisfied ourselves on this point will explain some apparent inconsistencies between this minute and our telegram to the Secretary of State at different dates, as well as some want of harmony between Sir Edwin Johnson's minute of the 1st May and the Despatch No. 143, with which it was sent to Her Majesty's Government. In that Despatch, our principal error was plainly indicated, though not in such detail, or with such an absence of all hesitation, as in this minute.

28. My conclusion then is, that the failure of our estimate is due to our ignorance of the actual expenditure on the army, rather than to an inadequate *a priori* appreciation of the probable cost of the field operations.

In the absence of any independent investigations of their own, it is not surprising that the advisers of the Government, in either the Military or the Financial Department, should have failed to frame any approximately accurate estimate of the cost of the war, seeing that, as we now know was the case, not only were they without the assistance of accounts punctually completed, but the facts which appeared on the face of the accounts were, taken alone, wholly misleading. Personally, I never doubted that the estimates which I presented were framed upon a full and correct knowledge of our actual expenditure to a comparatively recent date. As they were not so, I do not wonder that they have proved fallacious.

29. I have at the present moment nothing more to say as to the past, except to express my great regret that so great an error should have found its way into the Budget.

30. It is more satisfactory to turn to the future. I cannot say whether our inquiries will result in the Government of India thinking it desirable to alter the record in the finance and revenue accounts, of our military receipts and expenditure, in the manner which I have indicated; or whether if the Government of India should advocate such an alteration, it will be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government. I am aware that the obstacles in the way of this alternative are formidable. Among them is the impossibility of reconciling accounts based directly upon the treasury transactions with the classified and detailed record of the cost of the army, which forms an important section of the finance and revenue accounts as now presented to Parliament. These are questions which require careful consideration; and they must be treated separately. It is plainly the immediate duty of the Government to subject them to the most thorough investigation. But I may at once say that if the change in question be found practicable it will, in my opinion, be highly desirable to make it; for the existing system is essentially defective.

31. Whether, however, that system be maintained or altered, we are, I believe, now secure against being again surprised and discredited. A simple check is already in

operation which will effectually save us from such ignorance as that from which we have now suffered.

Experience shows that it is no easy matter to reconcile in detail the transactions at the civil treasuries with the military accounts. The Report of the English Commission in 1864 contains serious animadversions on the neglect of this duty in the past; and we are aware that the difficulty still continues. The work involves tiresome, detailed, and apparently unimportant correspondence, which is apt to be neglected or overlooked; and although much attention is constantly given to the subject, there are arrears of this kind now as there were in 1864. But there is nothing to prevent the Government of India, in the Military and Financial Departments, being made acquainted, soon after the end of each month, with the actual amounts disbursed to the Military Department from all the treasuries all over India. Arrangements have accordingly been made for the prompt and regular compilation of these figures, and for their communication to the Accountant-General, Military Department, upon whom will devolve in future the duty of comparing the expenditure of the Military Department with the departmental transactions at the civil treasuries throughout India.

32. It will not, indeed, be possible to ascertain by this method the exact cost of any particular military operation, or of any branch of the military service. But with such a return before itself and the proper account officers, the Government of India may, I think, be assured that any very large divergence between the estimates and the facts can never again evade prompt detection; and that the Government will be as well protected from a sudden surprise in respect to the military expenditure as I believe it to be already protected from any like surprise in respect to any of the civil revenues or expenditure. No system can ensure us absolutely against the failure of one estimate or another; but we ought to be secure against such a failure happening, as it has happened on this occasion, without our immediately discovering it; and I believe I may safely promise this degree of immunity from error in the military estimates in future.

33. To sum up the whole matter, the error in the estimate is in my judgment mainly due, not to any misapprehension as to the extent or character of the military operations, but to the fact that we were ignorant of the actual current cost of the war. I attribute this ignorance mainly to the defect which I have described in the military accounts, which although themselves perfectly correct, failed to give to the Government timely information of the expenditure which was really going on. In this respect the whole history furnishes a fresh illustration of the fact that, in regard to such matters as keeping accounts and framing estimates, it is never safe to assume that the care and intelligence of individuals will afford sufficient safeguards against the dangers of a defective system.

I admit that, if, instead of depending according to custom on the accounts alone, the Government of India had itself watched the current cost of the war, it might have, to a great extent, avoided the error into which it has fallen. But I place the defect in the system of the military accounts in the forefront, because, but for that defect, no oversight, omission, or negligence by departments or individual officers, whether in the Secretariat or in the account offices, could have prevented the earliest possible knowledge of the facts, and because such knowledge would itself have neutralised all individual and minor failures.

JOHN STRACHEY.

Simla, 20th May 1880.

APPENDIX A (I).

EXTRACTS from the REPORT of the ENGLISH COMMISSION OF INQUIRY into INDIAN ACCOUNTS, dated 30th August 1864.

31. The paymaster of each circle is furnished by the regimental paymaster or other disbursing officer with an estimate of the amount required, during the ensuing month, for the payment of the troops; this estimate is certified by the officer commanding the regiment or battery. The circle paymaster compiles these estimates into a general return, adding thereto the amount he requires for the payment of staff and other allowances, and he specifies the sum that he will require to draw upon each treasury; this document is furnished to the Military Accountant on the 1st of the month for the ensuing month's payments, in whose office the returns from the several circle paymasters and other accountants are compiled into a general statement showing the amount to be drawn, during the month, at each treasury in the several presidencies; this statement is

forwarded to the Controller, who transmits it to the Civil Department, from whence the necessary authority is issued to the treasury officers.

70. The aggregate amount of the inefficient balance was, on the 31st March 1864, as follows, viz. :—

	Rs.
Presidency Circle - - - - -	2,84,849
Allahabad - - - - -	2,82,936
Lucknow - - - - -	3,89,401
Meerut - - - - -	5,63,000
Lahore - - - - -	2,39,241
Trans-Ravi - - - - -	2,69,689
Hyderabad Contingent - - - - -	56,683
Total - - - - -	<u>20,85,799</u>

71. The amount of the inefficient balance in the Madras Presidency is $8\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs, and in the Bombay Presidency it is 9 lakhs, or, in all, no less than upwards of 38 lakhs.

72. The inefficient balance is an exceedingly embarrassing item in the military accounts, and leads to great difficulties in adjusting them at the end of the year; for, whilst the Annual Account of Receipts and Disbursements made up by the Military Department exhibits the audited expenditure only, the account of military expenditure compiled by the Financial Department for the information of the Home Government shows the audited expenditure, plus the amount of inefficient balance at the end of the year, minus the amount of that item at the commencement of the year. The two accounts can never agree, and *it is always a matter of opinion and not one of fact*, as to what has been the military expenditure for any one year; moreover, the “inefficient balance” is differently treated in each presidency.

74. We are in possession of a copy of the “Preliminary Rules and Instructions for conducting the duties of the Military Finance Department,” dated 18th October 1861; it is therein stated, article VII., p. 19—“The Military Accountant will also take care that outstandings are not allowed to remain unsettled, and he will carefully scrutinise the state of all inefficient balances.”

III.—ADVANCE FROM LOCAL TREASURIES.

211. The course pursued in regard to supplying the disbursing officers with funds has already been described in paragraph 31. We would here wish to draw attention to the manner in which a settlement is effected in regard to these advances between the Military and Civil Departments.

212. The adjustment of the advances from civil treasuries for military services is a duty that appertains to the Military Accountants. They alone have the information upon which the amount drawn by disbursing officers can be checked, and they alone can certify that the sums claimed by civil treasuries on account of military advances have been duly acknowledged by the officers to whom the advances have been made.

213. Knowing the importance of a prompt settlement in regard to these transactions, we inquired very minutely into the course pursued in the office of the Military Accountant. We found it unsatisfactory in the extreme. The adjustment with the Deputy Auditor and Accountant-General was considerably in arrear, and no adjustment had been effected in regard to the advances from the Bengal treasuries since April 1869.

214. It would appear, from papers referred to us, that this important part of the business of Military Accountant is in an equally unsatisfactory state in the presidencies of Madras and Bombay. The papers to which we allude contained a Report from the Deputy Auditor and Accountant-General, Bombay, complaining that he had not received from the Military Accountant any statement of civil charges incurred in the Military Department, nor the reports of the result of the examination of the statements furnished in regard to military remittances.

215. On the papers in question we suggested that the Deputy Auditor and Accountant-

Generals of the several presidencies and provinces should be called upon to report—

- I. The period to which the statement of advances from civil treasuries on account of military charges has been rendered to the Military Accountant.
- II. The period to which the accounts between the two departments have been adjusted.
- III. The differences, if any, that exist between the record in the military books and that in the books of the Civil Department.
- IV. What steps have been taken to reconcile the differences.

216. The replies to these inquiries are worth a careful perusal, as they plainly indicate that the system adopted in the Military Department, at least in regard to this important element, has entirely broken down.

* * * * *

342. Before we proceed to the explanation we have to submit in regard to the record of the expenditure, and the books that should be kept, we would direct attention to what we consider one of the most important elements in the military accounts.

343. The funds necessary for carrying on the military service throughout the country are, for the most part, furnished from civil treasuries. The manner in which disbursing officers draw upon these treasuries has already been described in paragraph 31. There can be no doubt that, unless the accounts between the Civil and Military Departments in regard to these transactions are promptly and regularly adjusted, inextricable confusion will take place, the whole system of accounts will be compromised, and frauds to a large extent might remain undetected.

* * * * *

351. The following arrangements are submitted with the view of obtaining a prompt settlement of the amount drawn by disbursing officers on the civil treasuries :—

352. I.—The Deputy Auditor and Accountant-General of each presidency or province should, so soon as the monthly accounts of the several treasury officers shall have been received, transmit to the Military Account Department, Bengal, Madras, or Bombay, as the case may be, an abstract list (*see* Appendix No. 22) of all advances for military services in the previous month. This list should be supported by copies of the original details furnished by the officer in charge of each treasury and by the original drafts or orders.

353. II.—The disbursing officer should debit himself in his monthly account current or pay list with the amount that he has *drawn* upon the several civil treasuries, and he should transmit a list of all the drafts or orders drawn by him on the form given in Appendix No. 20.

354. The course to be adopted in order to record these transactions in the books of the Accountant-General may be as follows :—

355. I.—The disbursing officer will be debited, in the principal books, with the amount stated by him as having been *drawn* during the month. The aggregate amount *drawn* by disbursing officers will be passed to their debit and to the credit of an account to be opened in the principal ledger, to be entitled “Advances from Civil Treasuries.”

356. II.—The monthly lists forwarded by the Deputy Auditor and Accountant-Generals of the several presidencies or provinces will be examined by the Accountant-General, Military Department, so far as Bengal is concerned, with the original orders, drafts, &c., forwarded in support of the charge. To facilitate this operation, a register, as per form Appendix No. 21, should be kept, showing the amount that has been drawn from each civil treasury.

357. III.—The differences between the amount drawn by disbursing officers and that paid by the civil treasuries should be explained in detail monthly. A copy of this explanation, which should show all drafts or outstanding orders, should be rendered to the Deputy Auditor and Accountant-General of each presidency or province. (*See* Appendix No. 23.)

358. IV.—In concluding this subject, we would suggest that there should be established, under the immediate direction and control of the principal book-keeper, a section of the Accountant-General's office specially charged with the duty of regulating and adjusting the entire transactions relating to cash advances from the several treasuries.

* * * * *

II.—REGISTER OF CLAIMS, No. 2.—*Orders on Mofussil Treasuries.*
Appendix No. 13.

362. In this book would be recorded all claims, after they have been examined, which are made wholly payable by orders signed by the Accountant-General on Mofussil Treasuries. This is also a branch of the business hitherto conducted by the presidency paymaster. The course to be followed in regard to the final record is similar to that suggested in regard to Register No. 1. The account to be opened in the ledger, instead of being styled "Orders Payable," should be denominated "Advances from Civil Treasuries." It must be distinctly understood that these orders have no connexion with the drafts or orders drawn by disbursing officers on the treasuries in question. The treasury officers need, however, send to the Civil Department but one general list for all drafts or orders discharged during the month. The due appropriation of these orders to the debit of the accounts concerned would be conducted in the office of the Accountant-General.

* * * * *

X.—REGISTER FOR THE RECORD AND ADJUSTMENT OF ADVANCES FROM CIVIL TREASURIES.
Appendix No. 21.

375. In this book will be recorded the particulars of every draft drawn or order issued by the several disbursing officers upon the civil treasuries. The orders will be carefully compared with the returns furnished by the Deputy Auditor and Accountant-General, and the transactions should be adjusted monthly on the adjustment sheet prepared for that purpose.

* * * * *

408. We would again direct particular attention to the importance of adjusting every separate account now standing unclosed in the "deposit" and "advances repayable" ledger. The Military Accountant should be directed to report the total number of unsettled accounts; and a monthly return should then be forwarded by that officer to the Accountant-General, showing the number of these accounts which have been adjusted month by month.

409. The adjustment of the advances from civil treasuries on account of military services is another subject that should demand the immediate and earnest attention of the Military Accountants of the three presidencies. No time should be lost in obtaining a complete explanation in regard to every item of difference that may exist between the military and civil books, and the accounts should be adjusted to the latest date.

410. We regret that we have not had an opportunity of personally inspecting the books and accounts kept in the Military Account Offices of Madras and Bombay. It would appear that, so far as relates to the adjustment of the advances from civil treasuries, there is every reason to apprehend that the books are in an unsatisfactory state. This, however, cannot be fully ascertained, unless they are subjected to a searching investigation by an officer totally unconnected with the department. This, so soon as an opportunity should arise, we would suggest, should be done.

* * * * *

CONCLUSION.

417. We will now proceed to summarise the principal recommendations contained in this Report.

* * * * *

Disbursing officers should render monthly statements of the drafts or orders drawn by them on the civil treasuries; and the Deputy Auditor and Accountant-Generals of the several presidencies or provinces should send corresponding statements to the Accountant-General, Military Department, in Bengal, and to the controllers at Madras and Bombay, respectively.

* * * * *

The greatest importance should be attached to a prompt and careful adjustment of the advances from civil treasuries on account of military services. A separate section of the book-keeper's branch of the office should be established with the view of making these adjustments.

APPENDIX A (II).

EXTRACTS from the REVIEW (No. 1367 A., dated 29th February 1868) of the COMMISSION'S REPORT by COLONEL ARTHUR BROOME, Controller General of Military Expenditure.

20. The main object to which all the changes of system introduced by the English Commissioners have converged, is the *timely* rendering of the accounts in a classified and intelligible form; and as these are required to be based on deliberately audited transactions, there is, presumed, imparted to them a reliability which was wanting in the former system. This quality of reliability, however, does not pervade all the transactions exhibited, but only extends to the *classified charges*, as set forth therein, they being merely that portion of the entire charges which on investigation has been found unobjectionable.

21. On the most favourable estimate of the present system, it cannot be said either to give the charges under the prescribed classified heads *complete* for the year, or to ensure accuracy of description or certainty in respect of amounts in the *accounts* of the transactions of the year.

This remark may need further explanation. One of the fundamental principles of the present system of accounts is, that the *annual receipts* exhibited shall be the sums which come in course of receipt during the year, and that the *annual expenditure*, that is, the charges falling against the budget grants, shall be the sums which come in course of payment during the year. But, in order to expedite the compilation of the monthly accounts, two courses are adopted—

1st. When disbursing officers are unable to produce complete vouchers for services involving cash disbursements, for instance, moneys advanced to commissariat agents for purchases, &c., they are permitted to charge such disbursements to the head "Advances Recoverable," subject to further adjustment.

2nd. When vouchers for services said to have been completed are found by the auditors to be insufficient, the amount is disallowed, and deducted from the disbursements taken credit for by the executive officer; and this sum also passes under the head "Advances Recoverable." The *classified charges*, therefore, are exclusive of these transactions, and, to that extent, incomplete. As, however, these unaudited or unauthorised disbursements under the head "Advances Recoverable" (to be afterwards adjusted) are necessarily admitted in the accounts of the year as a set-off against the cash receipts from the civil treasuries, &c., they form the *uncertain* element adverted to in the preceding paragraph.

22. By this arrangement it will be perceived that there is a certain sum disbursed within the year that is neither a charge against the budget nor a balance, not being practically treated as an asset of the Government. The effect of this arrangement on the classified and recorded charges of a year may be favourable or unfavourable. If the previous year had closed with a larger sum under the head "Advances Recoverable," and the following year with a smaller sum, the difference, which must necessarily have been adjusted in the interim, will tend to swell the classified charges of that particular year, and *vice versa*. At the close of the last official year, the amount standing to credit and

Cr. 4,51,85,312

Dr. 4,42,25,750

9,59,562

debit of this head in the three presidencies was as noted in the margin, indicating that the legitimate charges of the year were increased by a sum of Rs. 9,59,562, appertaining properly to the charges of previous years. In this instance, the per-centage of increase is small, being only .06 per cent. of the aggregate amount of charges; but, with any relaxation of audit, or during extensive field operations, the results might probably be inconvenient. It may be as well to observe also that the amount disbursed in March last, and exhibited under this head at the date of the closing of the accounts of the year 1866-67, was Rs. 46,34,416 in the three presidencies, indicating that expenditure to this extent had remained unpassed and unclassified, but which will appear as classified charges in the succeeding year's accounts.

23. Without the slightest desire to revive previous objections, or to criticise the present system in any carping spirit, the undersigned feels bound to point out that the new head of "Advances Recoverable" is, in reality, the much-abused "Inefficient Balance" under a new name, with the same inconvenience, and with no actual diminution of amount.

*

*

*

*

*

*

25. A perfect system is not to be hoped for; and, in noticing these drawbacks or defects, the undersigned has no desire to suggest any change or modification in that so recently adopted. The defects referred to, being inherent, could only be removed by a complete reorganisation; and of late the changes have been so many, and their effects so unsettling and embarrassing, that any further measures of the kind are greatly to be deprecated. Moreover, the present system has been introduced under special advantages. A prominence was given to the question which no previous discussion of plans of accounting was ever fortunate enough to secure; and this has been attended with energy of action, and no little expenditure of money and labour. The disruption of former modes of procedure has been radical; establishments have been re-formed and re-constituted; printed forms reducing the duties to a definite and regular routine, and prepared at considerable cost, have been prescribed; and all offices of military account have been, or are being, arranged in adaptation to the system. It is very desirable, therefore, that it should be regarded as one of a permanent nature. But while the undersigned conceives it his duty to make this recommendation in the interests of Government, and zealously to act on it, he believes it to be no less his duty to indicate the obvious but inseparable defects of the system. It has struck him that, in its arrangements, despatch has been considered of more importance than accuracy, and that a rigid check has been subordinated to the advantages anticipated from a combination of duties, or, as it is termed, "a systematic allotment of work"; and further that being a graft of the War Office system, the difference between the character and qualifications of the subordinate agency available in India and England has not been sufficiently considered in the changes made.

26. The fact, however, of being alive to the defects is, next to their removal, the best means of obviating evil results, and by care and constant watchfulness, the greater evil* may be guarded against, and the lesser one mitigated.

* NOTE.—By "the greater evil" Colonel Broome here means the evil described in paragraphs 20 to 23 above.

(C.)—Net Monthly Disbursements from the Civil Treasuries in India to the Military Department. (In thousands of Rupees, omitting 000.)

	1869-70.	1870-71.	1871-72.	1872-73.	1873-74.	1874-75.	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.	1879-80.	1880-81.	1881-82.	1882-83.
IN THE MONTH.														
April -	1,04.40	96.51	93.70	1,02.15	94.58	92.59	92.13	89.35	96.87	1,10.78	1,70.18	1,71.99		
May -	99.05	90.59	93.92	94.57	91.32	89.08	91.68	88.59	94.41	99.30	1,34.08			
June -	94.93	89.84	88.17	86.88	86.58	89.86	86.81	84.76	89.48	90.05	1,18.51			
July -	98.53	90.92	85.07	87.56	82.09	86.65	86.28	80.99	88.46	90.11	1,06.46			
August -	94.39	83.48	83.09	83.67	81.45	79.72	81.11	77.53	88.93	85.14	1,15.97			
September	95.09	86.88	79.75	81.49	81.86	79.74	78.79	75.79	84.72	85.46	1,23.45			
October -	96.02	85.87	86.57	86.97	88.40	87.26	84.76	88.20	95.47	1,04.74	1,49.55			
November -	99.66	93.17	97.36	93.88	88.70	94.17	96.40	89.85	97.70	1,29.35	1,57.84			
December -	87.53	86.36	89.63	83.29	87.02	90.94	84.15	92.12	89.35	1,28.95	1,53.16			
January -	1,05.10	99.29	94.99	99.45	92.38	97.46	93.15	92.76	95.28	1,51.85	1,76.67			
February -	88.39	89.95	91.86	81.46	90.87	86.17	89.55	89.07	93.60	1,51.05	1,71.51			
March -	1,01.25	91,27,28*	88.43	88.35	96.58	895.44	84.96	91.43	96.40	2,13.68	1,75,00†			
Total	11,64.34	11,20,14*	10,72,54	10,69,72	10,61,83	10,69,08	10,49,77	10,40,44	11,10,67	14,40,46	47,52,38			
Net military expenditure in India recorded in the Finance and Revenue Accounts	11,76.83	11,60,55*	11,14,68	11,09,38	10,89,02	10,79,39	10,78,68	10,96,42	11,54,85	12,18,26	44,43,18	43,28,95		
Net expenditure compared with net disbursements	+ 12.49	+ 40.42	+ 42.14	+ 39.66	+ 27.19	+ 10.31	+ 28.91	+ 55.98	+ 44.18	- 2,22,20	- 3,09,20			
TO THE END OF THE MONTH.														
April -	1,04.40	96.51	93.70	1,02.15	94.58	92.59	92.13	89.35	96.87	1,10.78	1,70.18	1,71.99		
May -	2,03.45	1,87.10	1,87.62	1,96.72	1,85.90	1,81.67	1,83.81	1,77.94	1,91.28	2,10.08	3,04.26			
June -	2,98.38	2,76.94	2,75.79	2,83.60	2,72.48	2,71.53	2,70.62	2,62.70	2,80.76	3,00.13	4,22.77			
July -	3,96.91	3,67.86	3,60.86	3,71.16	3,54.57	3,58.18	3,56.90	3,43.69	3,69.22	3,90.24	5,29.23			
August -	4,91.30	4,51.34	4,43.95	4,54.83	4,36.02	4,37.90	4,38.01	4,21.22	4,58.15	4,75.38	6,45.20			
September	5,86.39	5,38.22	5,23.70	5,36.32	5,17.88	5,17.64	5,16.80	4,97.01	5,42.87	5,60.84	7,68.65			
October -	6,82.41	6,24.09	6,10.27	6,23.29	6,06.28	6,04.90	6,01.56	5,85.21	6,38.34	6,65.58	9,18.20			
November -	7,82.07	7,17.26	7,07.63	7,17.17	6,94.98	6,99.07	6,97.96	6,75.06	7,36.04	7,94.93	10,76.04			
December -	8,69.60	8,03.62	7,97.26	8,00.46	7,82.00	7,90.01	7,82.11	7,67.18	8,25.39	9,23.88	12,29.20			
January -	9,74.70	9,02.91	8,92.25	8,99.91	8,74.38	8,87.47	8,75.26	8,59.94	9,20.67	10,75.73	14,05.87			
February -	10,63.09	9,92.86	9,84.11	9,81.37	9,65.25	9,73.64	9,64.81	9,49.01	10,14.27	12,26.78	15,77.88			
March -	11,64.34	11,20,14	10,72,54	10,69,72	10,61,83	10,69,08	10,49,77	10,40,44	11,10,67	14,40,46	47,52,38			

a. Exclusive of a nominal credit of about 4,28.09 and a nominal debit of 62.03 in adjustment of certain charges and receipts on account of the Abyssinian Expedition.
b. Exclusive of a nominal debit of 58.97 in adjustment of certain charges on account of the Abyssinian Expedition.
* Includes a write back of 39½ lakhs on account of the overland troop transport service.
† Net disbursements reported at 2,08,25; transfer adjustments still to come.

Enclosure 2. in No. 48.

MINUTE by HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY, dated 26th May 1880.

1. I circulate herewith a minute by the Honorable Sir John Strachey, on the failure of the military estimates for 1879-80 and 1880-81.

2. Beyond the acknowledgment due to the clearness with which he has stated it, I have but very few remarks to make on the case as it now stands. I must first, however, refer to the minute written upon this subject by Sir Edwin Johnson on the 1st instant, which reached my hands on the 4th instant, when it was forwarded to the Secretary of State with our Despatch of that date.

3. I could not with advantage make any comment on Sir Edwin Johnson's above-mentioned minute pending the completion, thus far, of inquiries which the Financial Department had then in hand, and of which the result has now been laid before us by Sir John Strachey. I fully appreciate the chivalrous impulse of our military colleague in taking to himself personally whatever responsibility might rest on his department. But it is now obvious that both the impressions which inspired, and the explanations which accompanied, that minute are inapplicable to the facts established by subsequent inquiry, and unknown to Sir Edwin Johnson when he wrote it.

4. In whatever manner, or degree, responsibility for the failure that has occurred may, hereafter, be apportioned between persons or departments, the immediate duty involved in the responsibility which rests collectively with the Government of India, is to search out the whole matter down to the root of it, by prosecuting energetically and impartially the investigations initiated by Sir John Strachey; and to lay before the Secretary of State, as soon as we can confidently do so, a complete statement of the final result of these investigations.

5. What we have now to ascertain, with the utmost possible precision, is how, and why, this failure has occurred; the extent to which the evil has reached; and the most effectual means of preventing its recurrence.

6. It is, clearly, not to be explained by reference only to the defects of a system, or to the errors of individual subordinate officers, whatever those errors or defects may have been. Inquiry must also be directed towards every other aspect of the subject, in connexion with which a more active exercise of intelligence could have prevented what has occurred.

7. The statements contained in Sir John Strachey's minute appear to me as complete as they can possibly be, pending the replies still awaited by this Government to the references already made, on the subject of them, to its officers of account and control.

8. The absence of those replies need not, meanwhile, delay the submission of our further report to Her Majesty's Government. Nor do I think that the failure in the war estimates, serious and extensive though it is, can materially affect that real and substantial improvement in the Government of India's general financial position, which Sir John Strachey described in his late financial statement.

9. Neither does this failure in any way affect the soundness of the general principles of our financial policy. It has, however, misled the Government of India, and it has caused us to mislead the Government of Her Majesty, as to the cost of the Afghan War. For this we owe to the Secretary of State the expression of an unqualified regret. But, in contemplating every other aspect of what has occurred, the Government should, I think, be upon its guard against premature assumptions, or exaggerated apprehensions.

10. Whether, apart from the seriously mistaken estimate of it, the actual expenditure incurred on account of the Afghan War has been as reasonable and economical as we have striven to render it, and believed it to be, is a question which cannot now be determined. It is one, however, which, in my opinion, will hereafter demand searching and independent investigation on the part of the Government of India.

11. Such an inquiry cannot be opened while military operations are still in active progress, and while our knowledge of the expenditure actually incurred, or to be incurred, is necessarily imperfect. But if, hereafter, conducted with wisdom and impartiality, it will not only give to the Government valuable information in regard to the past, but will also furnish means for utilising the lessons of the past, to the best advantage, for the guidance of the future.

LYTTON.

No. 49.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, June 1, 1880.

War estimate Despatch posted, with minute by Viceroy and Sir John Strachey, in continuation of Despatch 4th May. That Despatch avowedly incomplete, but opinion of Government now unanimous that principal causes of failure were defects in system of military accounts, indicated in para. 12. System revised by English Commissioners in 1864 worked satisfactorily in peace, but during war proved defective, and precautions ineffectual. Consequently we were misled entirely by military accounts.

Regarding actual war expenditure, which to end of 1879-80 greatly exceeded amounts shown by accounts, consequent misapprehension vitiated estimates for future. Inquiries still being prosecuted into questions of individual responsibility and otherwise. No reason to suppose that error in estimate has affected actual expenditure. Revised estimates as soon as possible, although postponing opinion regarding probable total cost of war. We fear doubts expressed at end of para. 8, Despatch 4th May, are justified, and must expect total cost largely to exceed sum therein mentioned.

So many technical and other matters involved, that telegraphic summary of Despatch and minute is impossible. We can only repeat former request that you will await papers now sent, which contain full information. We shall not publish here anything more.

No. 50.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, June 4, 1880.

It would much help me to understand the case if your Excellency could telegraph dates when first information reached Government, or orders were issued, on points mentioned by Sir Edwin Johnson, namely, purchase of transport, supplies for six months, great increase of prices, necessity for extra wages to followers, and for construction of protective works.

No. 51.

DESPATCH to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, June 7, 1880, No. 179
(Financial).

MY LORD MARQUIS,

1. I HAVE received and considered in Council the letter from the Government of India, dated the 4th of May, No. 143, reporting that they had grave reasons for apprehending that the cost of the military operations in Afghanistan would seriously exceed the amount entered in the financial statement for 1880-81.

2. I have also received a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 20th of May, stating that a further letter was about to be sent, containing minutes by his Excellency and the Financial Member of Council giving complete information on the subject, and requesting that orders by Her Majesty's Government may be deferred pending its receipt; and I have received a further telegram of the 1st of June announcing the despatch of that letter, and indicating the nature of its contents.

3. In accordance with the request of your predecessor's Government, I suspend my final judgment until the arrival of their further communication; but, in the meantime, I think it right to apprise your Excellency that I consider the explanations at present before me to be unsatisfactory and insufficient.

4. From a careful examination of the information which has been supplied, I am unable to gather that the estimates for 1880-81 will be even sufficient to meet the outstanding charges of 1879-80, so that there was in effect no provision whatever for the military operations of the current year.

5. I find that the estimate of the Military Accountant-General for the year 1880-81 was submitted by him on the 19th of January 1880, with a memorandum containing the following words:—"For the Kabul charges it has not been considered necessary to do more than repeat last year's provision, Rs. 2,00,00,000. But for the renewal of hostilities in September last, that sum would probably have sufficed to meet the extra charges of the year. With an early settlement of affairs beyond the frontier, the same amount may suffice to wind up the accounts of the campaign; should the operations be protracted, this figure will no doubt have to be increased, hereafter, in the revised estimate, as has been done this year."

6. Major Newmarch states that he had the following data for his estimate :—

1. He considered that something over 100 lacs of expenditure incurred in 1879–80 would be outstanding at the end of the year, and have to be provided for in 1880–81.

2. The estimates of the Controllers of Military Accounts for 1880–81 (of which the dates are not given) were as follows :—

Bengal, 200 lacs, without remark.

Madras, 6 lacs, with a remark that it was prepared with reference to the first four months of 1879–80, which appears to imply that it was an estimate for the cost from April to July inclusive, at the rate of expenditure of 1879–80.

Bombay, nothing, the Controller leaving it to Major Newmarch to supply the figures.

7. Thus the Controllers' estimates amounted to 206 lacs, without any provision for the expenses in 1880–81 of the Bombay army engaged on the Kandahar-line, or for the arrears on that line for 1879–80, so far as regarded Bombay troops. Major Newmarch, however, submitted an estimate of 200 lacs upon the supposition that this amount would suffice if the operations were not protracted. Even upon this supposition, the estimate seems to have been insufficient; the 200 lacs provided in 1879–80 included arrears of only 60 lacs, whereas the 200 lacs provided for 1880–81 included an estimated arrear of 100 lacs; consequently, the provision for the current expenditure of the later year was less by 40 lacs than had been allowed for the past year.

8. But, putting aside this minor question, I cannot understand how an estimate based on the expenditure of 1879–80 could have been thought sufficient for 1880–81. I find, from statements transmitted in the Military Department, that the total force in the field and warned for service amounted to 40,260 on the 1st January 1879, and to 51,746 on the 1st January 1880, a large part of the latter force being employed at a much greater distance from its base, and on much more extended operations, than in 1879. During January and February last the military expenditure is stated to have greatly increased; yet, without any prospect of a speedy termination of the operations when the estimates were revised just before the financial statement was delivered, no alteration of the figures was made.

9. Sir Edwin Johnson does not state whether, in recommending the estimate for adoption on the 26th of January, he drew attention to the remark of Major Newmarch above quoted; but I presume that, according to what I understand to be the usual practice, the memorandum was forwarded to the Financial Department with the estimate. If this was done, it requires explanation how, when the time came for revision, no correction was considered necessary in the Financial Department.

10. It is stated in the 4th paragraph of the letter from the Government of India of the 4th of May, that a doubt was felt whether too large an amount had not been inserted by the Military Accountant-General in the Regular Estimate for 1879–80; but, as he maintained the accuracy of the estimate, it was not altered. The great increase of expenditure, however, which is said to have begun in January, and which would materially affect the estimates for 1880–81, seems to have been unknown to the Government of India, or overlooked by them, when the statement was made in the Legislative Council by Sir John Strachey on the 24th of February, and when the Viceroy concluded the debate on the 2nd of March.

11. Yet, assuming that Major Newmarch had made allowance in his original estimate for the great increase of the force shown in the orders given at the end of December 1879, it seems unaccountable that it should not have been foreseen that additional expense would be caused by the orders issued in January.

12. I further remark that this increase, actual or possible, in the force engaged in active operations is not one of the reasons assigned by Sir Edwin Johnson as having led to a disturbance of the calculations. In his minute of the 1st of May he assigns five causes for the disturbance, "which were not, and could hardly have been, foreseen at the time the estimates were prepared;" namely (1), the purchase of a very great proportion of the transport, instead of hiring it; (2), the necessity for purchasing and transporting six months' supplies, to be stowed at the front and on all the lines of communication before the hot weather set in; (3), the enormous increase in the price of grain and other supplies, and of stores, such as firewood and forage; (4), the necessity for paying increased wages, in addition to half-rations, to all followers north of Jhelum; and (5), the necessity for constructing works for the maintenance of the positions and protection of the troops.

13. The dates when orders were issued or information received regarding these

several measures are not stated by Sir Edwin Johnson; and I have applied for this information by a telegram to your Excellency on the 4th instant.*

14. But another question remains, on which none of the papers before me appear to throw any light. I have already referred to the passage in the memorandum of Major Newmarch (para. 12) enclosed in the letter of 4th May, in which it was distinctly stated that his estimate of Rs. 2,00,00,000 was a simple repetition of the sum which, but for the renewal of hostilities in September last, would probably have sufficed to meet the extra charges of the year 1879-80, when, as is known, the spring campaign terminated in the course of June, and the extra military expenditure was reduced within narrow limits.

15. I am unaware of any circumstances which could have enabled the Government of India, at any moment since the commencement of the present year, to anticipate the termination of the campaign of 1880 before the later months of the autumn; and all the information which I possess points to the opposite conclusion.

16. The state of affairs in January rendered it impossible for the Government of India to forecast, with any precision, the duration of their military operations in Northern Afghanistan. At that time the plan of the campaign involved not only the movement of troops on a considerable scale and the purchase and transport of large supplies for Kabul, but also the special enlistment of native soldiers under a system of bounties which were to be granted during nine months from February last. A display of force in the spring was also distinctly contemplated, while there was no indication of any approach to such arrangements for the future Government of the country as could have rendered probable the withdrawal of the troops before the winter.

17. It does not, therefore, appear that, when the estimate of Major Newmarch was finally accepted by the Government of India on the 18th February, any reasonable hope could have been entertained of an "early settlement of affairs beyond the frontier," on which assumption alone the estimate of Rs. 2,00,00,000 had been considered by that officer to be "probably" sufficient; and I am unable to understand how the Government of India, fully acquainted, as they must have been, with the political and military position of affairs in Afghanistan, could have arrived at the conclusion stated in the 4th paragraph of their letter of the 4th May, that there was "no apparent cause for distrusting" the sufficiency of the Military Department's estimates."

18. Your Excellency will gather from the preceding observations that I regard the circumstances connected with the estimates of war expenditure published in the Budget of this year as of the utmost gravity; and I am only awaiting the explanations which your predecessor's Government have promised me, to communicate to your Excellency the conclusions at which her Majesty's Government may arrive upon these transactions.

I have, &c.

HARTINGTON.

No. 52.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, June 7, 1880.

Your telegram 4th. Orders for purchase (of) transport, mobilisation, reserves, storage, supplies, &c. all issued before closure of estimates, but local failure of crops and other causes augmented expense (of) measures thus sanctioned. Sir E. Johnson did not, in his minute, intend to imply that above-mentioned orders had not been considered in framing estimates, but that cost of carrying them out was not then sufficiently appreciated, and was increased by circumstances, some of which could not have been foreseen. Sir E. Johnson desires to explain that, in framing his estimates, he fully realised that in any circumstances it would most probably, for sanitary reasons, be impossible to completely withdraw troops to within our own frontier before October, but he considered that active military operations, and consequently war expenditure properly so called, were not likely to extend beyond July, after which date military expenditure would be confined to maintenance of positions, with consequent large reductions of cost. All such considerations as these, however, have become unimportant, as explanations of failure of estimate in light of full information subsequently obtained, which was not before Sir Edwin Johnson when he wrote, and which was sent by last mail. It is now shown that failure (of) estimates is due to Government having been misled as to actual past cost of war, not to any

* "It would much help me to understand the case, if your Excellency could telegraph dates when first information reached Government or orders were issued on points mentioned by Sir Edwin Johnson, namely, purchase of transports, supplies for six months, great increase of prices, necessity for extra wages to followers, and for construction of protective works."

unforeseen expansion of military operations. It has been explained in papers accompanying last Despatch that, for some time after first discovery of failure of estimates, we were looking for explanation in wrong direction; and some of our telegrams, as well as parts of Sir E. Johnson's minute, were consequently written under entire misapprehension of real causes. See specially telegrams of 23rd March and 20th April.

No. 53.

EXTRACT of a LETTER from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, dated June 8, 1880, No. 177 (Financial). (Received July 3, 1880.)

We have the honour to reply to Lord Cranbrook's Despatches, No. 119, dated the 15th April, and No. 133, dated the 22nd April 1880.

In his minute forwarded with our Despatch No. 176, dated the 1st June, Sir John Strachey has explained the origin and nature of the failure of the estimates of the cost of the war in Afghanistan included in the financial statement of the 24th February last, and has given such indications of its apprehended extent as are possible, in anticipation of the formal revised estimates.

That failure fully accounts for our disappointment in respect to the opening balances of the current year and for our present financial condition, and explains our inability to meet your Lordship's bills, as we expected to do.

2. We cannot be surprised at the dissatisfaction manifested in these Despatches at the contrast between the representations of the condition of our finances contained in the financial statement and subsequent communications. We have already expressed our regret that, having been misled ourselves, we have so misled Her Majesty's Government.

3. Under these circumstances, we think it unnecessary to notice all the details of the criticisms contained in Lord Cranbrook's Despatches. Some of them are based upon hypotheses (as for example estimates of our balances) which later events have disturbed, and others will appear unimportant in the light of later information.

4. We have only to add, upon this part of the subject, that the expectations of an abnormal production of opium under the Bengal agencies have not been realised. The unseasonably early heat appears to have seriously interfered with the amount of the produce, both in Bengal and Malwa, so that it is now doubtful whether we shall not have to indent upon our reserve stock of Bengal opium to complete the provision of 56,400 chests in 1881.

5. Apart from the cost of the war, the accounts of 1879-80 seem likely to show, on the whole, results at least as favourable as the regular estimates; and we are aware of no present reason for anticipating any failure of our estimates for the current year.

6. In the light of subsequent events, we entirely share Lord Cranbrook's regret that we did not arrange for a loan in India as part of the programme of the year; but, with reference to paragraph 14 of Despatch No. 119, we desire to explain that the course which we took was not based upon any intention to borrow a very large sum in 1881. On the contrary, the general prospects of our finances seemed so favourable, that we had some hope that we might avoid borrowing in 1881 also, and certainly did not anticipate that we should have to borrow more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ crores in that year, unless some unforeseen calamity such as war or famine should occur.

* * * * *

We have, &c.

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

J. STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

ALEX. FRASER.

No. 54.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, June 16, 1880.

Can you telegraph how far provision made in Budget for war in 1879-80 and 1880-81 respectively will be insufficient, and do you adhere to estimates for frontier railways?

No. 55.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, June 22, 1880.

Yours, 16th. Cannot yet send detailed revised estimates. Following based on actual treasury outgoings to May. No better estimate probable before statement (for) Parliament. Cannot safely reduce 15 millions (in) paragraph 17, financial member's minute (of) 20th May, but, assuming evacuation begins (in) October, that sum probably sufficient. Total deficiency (in) military estimates 9 millions,—almost wholly due depends on (? to defects in) war record (in) accounts. Financial member's suggested reform. If reform complete, war charges in 1879-80, $8\frac{3}{4}$ millions,—1880-81, $5\frac{1}{2}$ (millions); being excess over estimates (of) 1879-80 (of) $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions,—1880-81, $3\frac{1}{2}$ (millions). If system unchanged, total recorded charges (in) 1878-79, 676,000l.; 1879-80, $3\frac{3}{4}$ millions; 1880-81, 9 (millions); 1881-82, $1\frac{1}{2}$ (millions). Foregoing figures all gross. Sets off, increased railway (and) telegraph receipts, possibly one million. Suggested account reforms also involve record (in) 1879-80 (of) other unadjusted differences (in) military and civil accounts, about 450,000l. Thus total possible addition in 1879-80 6 millions. Charges (for) frontier railways, 1879-80, closely agree (with) regular (estimate). 260,000l. more granted (in) 1880-81 to prevent stoppage (of) work, especially Rawulpindee section.

No. 56.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, June 24, 1880.

Yours, 22nd. Am I right in believing excess $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions 1879-80 was disbursed during that year, and therefore, when March balance 1,301 lacs was ascertained, $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions excess, besides 260,000l. railways, was all that remained to be met beyond Budget provision, 2,090,000l.?

No. 57.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, June 26, 1880.

Yours, 24th. Yes, present estimates only $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions excess (of) war payments this year besides 260,000l. railways; rest paid last year. To reconcile 4,214,000l., paragraph 15 (of) minute, with $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions, add 850,000l. unspent balances, and 500,000l. (for) reasons given (in) paragraph 16.

No. 58.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, June 30, 1880.

Yours, 26th. Besides balance 13,010,000l., was 850,000l. unspent balances available for war? If so, deducting that sum and budget provision from 5,500,000l., is not excess to be met 2,560,000l. only? What is your revised estimated balance for 31st March 1881, assuming home drawings 15,000,000l.?

No. 59.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, July 2, 1880.

No. Including balances, war payments this year 635 lakhs; closing balance 12 crores.

MEMORANDUM ON THE FOREGOING TELEGRAMS.

The total cost of the war in Afghanistan, excluding the expenditure on frontier railways, was given in the financial statement as 676,381l. expended in 1878-79, 3,216,000l. estimated for 1879-80, and 2,090,000l. estimated for 1880-81, making a total of 5,982,381l., or say 6,000,000l.

In the telegram of the 22nd of June, the total gross cost (that is, without allowing for extra receipts from railways and telegraphs) is estimated at 15,000,000l. shewing an excess of 9,000,000l. over the former estimate. If a reform which has been suggested by the Financial Member of Council be carried out, by which the military expenditure would apparently be brought into the accounts at a much earlier date than before, the

portion of the excess so brought to account in 1879-80 would be 5,500,000*l.* By this alteration the sum of 71,164,000*l.* shewn (on page 47 of the correspondence laid before Parliament) as "Imperial expenditure" in that year, would be increased by 5,500,000*l.*, a corresponding reduction being made under the heads of "other deposits repaid and advances made" and "balances." Thus, the war expenditure brought to account to the 31st of March 1880 would be nearly 9,500,000*l.*

The cash balance in India was, on the 31st of March 1880, about 1,183,000*l.* below the estimate of February. It has since been strengthened by the loan in India, of which the proceeds will amount to about 3,229,770*l.* On the other hand, the war disbursements in 1880-81 would, under the suggested reform be 5,500,000*l.* instead of 2,090,000*l.* or an excess of 3,410,000*l.* over the provision in the budget. Adding this last 5,500,000*l.* to the former expenditure of 9,500,000*l.*, the total becomes 15,000,000*l.* in the three years.

To this excess of 3,410,000*l.* must be added 260,000*l.* granted for frontier railways; but an extra receipt of 300,000*l.* seems to be expected from railways and telegraphs. Thus there will be a total amount of 3,370,000*l.* to be provided in the current year, if the present estimates of the Government of India regarding the war should be realised, and if in other respects the anticipation of the budget estimate should prove correct.

It is uncertain what amount of bills will be drawn in 1880-81; but, on the assumption that the drawings will be reduced to 15,000,000*l.*, the cash balances in India on the 31st of March 1881 are now estimated at 12,000,000*l.*, or about 556,000*l.* higher than the estimate of February last.

India Office, July 2, 1880.

HENRY WATERFIELD,
Financial Secretary.

LONDON:

Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE
RELATING TO THE
ESTIMATES
FOR THE
WAR IN AFGHANISTAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1880.

[C.—2674.] Price $\frac{1}{2}d$.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

No. 60.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, 14th July 1880.

How do you explain that during last year $5\frac{1}{2}$ crores were expended beyond estimate, but cash balance only reduced by 118 lakhs? Where did remainder come from?

No. 61.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, 16th July 1880.

EXPLAIN basis of calculation of war estimate 15 millions, if evacuation begins October. Does it assume total withdrawal from Kabul; and if so, when completed? Does it assume retention of force in Khyber, Kurram, and Kandahar or Pishin, and how long? Does it include half million batta?

No. 62.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, 17th July 1880.

JUNE military issue only 139 lakhs. Fifteen millions may be taken now as an outside estimate.

No. 63.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, 20th July 1880.

ESTIMATE 15 crores, based on (1) actual Treasury issues to end of June; (2) assumption that we shall have completed evacuation of Northern Afghanistan by the end of October, present rate of expenditure continuing meanwhile. On this assumption there will then remain at least two crores, which, with the proceeds of sale of surplus carriage and stores, should certainly cover all remaining expenditure till end of March, including batta. Whatever may be decided about Kurram and Khyber, no subsequent serious expenditure probable on our north-west frontier. Kandahar prospects uncertain, but any probable expenditure there and in Pishin will be fully met from the balance aforesaid.

No. 64.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, 25th July 1880.

YOURS 14th. Of remaining 432 lakhs, 230 disbursed in advances (in) 1878-9. We cannot fully explain remaining 202 till accounts closed, but betterness public works explains part. We anticipate other improvements, item 43 lakhs less bills paid than drawn. More hereafter.



FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

ESTIMATES

FOR THE

WAR IN AFGHANISTAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

Price 2d.

[O.—1772.]

BOMBAY BRANCH

OF THE

Royal Asiatic Society

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 65.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, September 8, 1880.

War Estimates. Do you intend to reply to my Despatch 7th June, or is yours of June 1st final explanation?

No. 51 of
Correspond-
ence given
to Parlia-
ment.
No. 48.

No. 66.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, September 10, 1880.

Shall not answer your 179 till you answer our 176, which contains final explanation.

No. 67.

DESPATCH to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, September 23, 1880,
No. 317 (Financial).

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Para 1. I desire to draw the attention of your Excellency to the following passage in Her Majesty's speech, delivered on the occasion of the prorogation of Parliament on the 7th instant:—

"I regret that it has not hitherto been possible to give you such information on the general state of Indian finance, and the recent miscarriages in presenting the accounts of military expenditure, as you would justly require before entering on a practical consideration of the subject. You may, however, rest assured that I shall redeem my pledge to supply you with this information at the earliest period in my power."

2. You will perceive from these words the necessity of losing no time in taking such measures as may be necessary in order to present to Parliament immediately on its reassembling the most complete statement that can be given of the expenditure incurred in the Afghan war.

3. Inasmuch, too, as Her Majesty's Government have determined that a substantial contribution to these expenses shall be made by the Imperial Treasury, and as the financial arrangements for the ensuing year, both of the British and the Indian Governments, will be largely affected thereby, it is essential that the actual cost of the war should be determined without delay.

4. If the recent success in Southern Afghanistan should, as may be hoped, lead to a termination of the active military operations, there is no reason that the accounts should not be completed within a few months, provided that measures are at once adopted for their systematic preparation, while the officers on whose orders the expenditure has been incurred are at hand to render any requisite explanations. Otherwise, the experience of former campaigns shows that claims are preferred, the correctness of which it is impracticable to check, and that not merely is much time lost in the endeavour to verify their accuracy, but frequently payments are unavoidably admitted which it might at an earlier period have been possible to refuse.

5. Your Excellency will be able to judge of the propriety of forthwith issuing a notification that all claims of every description, in connection with the war, shall be submitted at once to the respective Military Controllers in the three Presidencies, and that none will be entertained if brought forward after a specified date, say the 31st of December next, unless sufficient cause is shown to your Government for the delay.

6. All possible efforts should be made to obtain accounts from the Paymasters and the Officers of the Commissariat, Transport, and Supply Departments, who have to

account for money advanced to them for the purposes of the war, as well as to expedite the audit and classification of the accounts when received, and the requisite clerical aid should be sanctioned for this purpose.

7. Complete returns should be rendered of payments, of whatever description, made from Civil Treasuries for military purposes during the years 1878-79, 1879-80, and 1880-81.

8. All civil and military account officers should be enjoined to co-operate heartily in giving effect to the wishes of Her Majesty's Government for an early adjustment of the expenses of the war, and the results of the accounts, as progress is made, should be carefully noted, and thrown into the form of a comprehensive account and report, which should be submitted by your Excellency to Her Majesty's Government as soon as you are in a position to do so.

9. The account will of course include all civil and political charges connected with the war, and, bearing in mind the heavy burden likely to be imposed for pensions, it will be necessary to frame an estimate of the capitalized value thereof. It may be possible for you to send a brief abstract by telegraph, with sufficient information to furnish the means of arriving at a decision regarding the apportionment of the expenditure between the two Treasuries.

10. In the foregoing paragraphs I have not referred to the question of the causes of the error in the Estimates. You will of course lose no time in completing the investigation which you are conducting into the matter, and in reporting to me the conclusions at which you may arrive.

I have, &c.,
HARTINGTON.

No. 68.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, October 2, 1880.

Essential in view of contribution from English Treasury that we should have by middle November complete account of cost of war to latest possible date, and best estimate possible of war expenditure after such date to probable close.

Please take immediate steps for preparation of such account and estimate. Despatch sent 23rd September with instructions on the subject, but necessary to anticipate complete account by preliminary information required by us.

No. 69.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, October 10, 1880.

Yours dated 1st (2nd).

Including occupation of Kandahar to end of March, we estimate gross cost of war at 1,578 and frontier railways at 590 lakhs. These amounts include all sterling expenditure, converted at 1s. 8d. Deducting net war gains to railway and telegraph revenues, grand total of estimated net cost of war and frontier railways, about 21 crores of rupees, or 17½ millions sterling, viz., 5 for railways and 12½ for war.

Despatch by next mail.

No. 70.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, October 22, 1880.

Yours dated 1st.

Including occupation Kandahar to end March, we estimate gross cost of war 1,578, and frontier railways 590 lakhs. These amounts include all sterling expenditure converted at 20 pence. Deducting net war gains to railway and telegraph revenues, grand total estimated net cost of war and frontier railways about 21 crores, or 17½ millions sterling, namely, 5 railways and 12½ army. Despatch next mail.

No. 71.

LETTER from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, October 26, 1880, No. 354
(Financial). (Received November 24, 1880.)

MY LORD MARQUIS,

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the following telegram from No. 68.
your Lordship, dated the 1st instant:—

"It is essential, in view of the proposed contribution from the English Treasury, that we should have by the middle of November a complete account of the cost of the war in Afghanistan to the latest possible date, and the best estimate possible of the war expenditure after such date to the probable close of the war. Please take immediate steps for the preparation of such an account and estimate. A despatch was sent on the 23rd of September with instructions on the subject, but it is necessary to anticipate the complete account called for in that despatch by the preliminary information required by us in November."

2. The Despatch No. 317 of the 23rd September, to which your Lordship refers, No. 67. reached us on the 16th instant, and will receive our immediate attention. We had already taken measures to hasten, by every means in our power, the completion of the accounts of the war.

3. In complying now with the request contained in your telegram we shall make the following assumptions:—

First—That, until our future permanent military frontier position is settled and occupied, all extra expenditure for the troops which continue upon a war footing, beyond our old frontier, is part of the cost of the war:

Second—That upon this basis the war expenditure may be expected to continue to the end of the current financial year:

Third—But that no expenditure within our old frontier (excepting that upon the frontier railways), incurred after the end of the current month of October, should be attributed to the war:

Fourth—That our military expenditure in the Year 1877-78 may be taken, for purposes of comparison, to be a fair measure of our normal military expenditure before the war.

4. We append an account and estimate of the cost of the war in Afghanistan, prepared upon these hypotheses, from which Her Majesty's Government will learn that we now estimate the net cost of the war, including that of the frontier railways, at about 21 crores of rupees, or 17½ millions sterling, as follows:—

	Rs.	£
Net military expenditure proper	- 15,77,71,000	=@ 1s. 8d. 13,148,000
Frontier railways	- 5,90,03,000	4,917,000
Grand total	- 21,67,74,000	18,065,000
Deduct excess revenues from telegraphs and railways attributed to the war	- 68,00,000	567,000
Estimated net cost of the war	- 20,99,74,000	17,498,000

5. We offer the following observations upon this account and estimate:—

- (1.) Our object being to make as correct a calculation as possible of the cost of the war, we have converted all the sterling expenditure upon the war into rupees, at the rate of Re. 1=1s. 8d.
- (2.) We have included the whole civil and political expenditure beyond the frontier during the war.
- (3.) The estimated cost of the frontier railways does not include the sum of Rs. 76,98,000,=£641,500, expended, or to be expended, on the completion of the Jhilm-Rawalpindi section of the Panjab Northern State Railway; because, under the orders contained in paragraph 4 of Lord Cranbrook's Despatch No. 54, dated 19th February 1880, this amount is being recorded, in the Finance and Revenue Accounts, under the head 32, *Railways*.

- (4.) It will be easy for your Lordship to deduct any portion of the estimated remaining monthly cost of the war if you deem it expedient to close the account of the expenditure to be attributed to the war, upon any hypothesis other than what we have assumed.
- (5.) On the one hand, we have made no allowance for the proceeds sale of surplus stores and animals on the return of our army into its quarters within our frontier: on the other hand, (i) without detailed inquiries, which will take time, we are quite unable to frame any estimate whatever of the capital value of the pensions, in excess of the average incidence of such charges, which will result from the war; (ii) we have not specially provided for the cost of the extra British troops temporarily upon our hands, owing to their earlier despatch to India after the defeat at Maiwand; and (iii) we have estimated no further expenditure from the Home Treasury excepting upon the frontier railways. We are disposed, however, to think that a better aggregate estimate cannot now be made than the total which we have named.
6. It is impossible for us at present to say how the war expenditure will be distributed in the Finance and Revenue Accounts among the several years affected.
7. The Military Accounts, classified and audited to the end of July in India, and of August in England, contain the following record of the net expenditure on the war:—

	In India. £	In England. £	Total. £
1878-79 Fin. & Rev. Acct. No. 57	600,109	76,111	676,220
1879-80 - - -	4,595,300	174,480	4,769,780
1880-81 - - -	1,623,116	38,016	1,661,132
Total - - -	<u>6,818,525</u>	<u>288,607</u>	<u>7,107,132</u>

or, if the sterling expenditure be converted into rupees at 1s. 8d., Rs. 7,16,49,000; so that, if our estimate is correct, there remains, apart from the cost of the frontier railways, net, Rs. 8,61,22,000 yet to be recorded in the Finance and Revenue Accounts, under the head 36, *Army*. We are doing all that we can to expedite this process.

8. The distribution of the record of the cost of the frontier railways is equally uncertain. We do not expect that this record will be completed before the year 1882-83.

9. In anticipation of this despatch, we telegraphed, on the 22nd instant, the following reply to your Lordship's message:—

"Your Lordship's message dated 1st instant. Including our occupation of Kandahar to the end of March, we estimate the gross cost of the war at 1,578 lakhs, and that of the frontier railways at 590 lakhs. These amounts include all the sterling expenditure converted into rupees at 20 pence the rupee. Deducting the net war gains to the railway and telegraph revenues, the grand total estimated net cost of the war and frontier railways is about 21 crores of rupees, or 17½ millions sterling, namely, 5 millions for the railways and 12½ millions for the Army et cetera. Despatch by next mail."

We have, &c.,

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

J. STRACHEY.

W. STOKES.

J. GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure in No. 71.

NET COST of the WAR in AFGHANISTAN, as now estimated.
(In Rupees, 000's omitted. No digits omitted from the sterling figures.)

I.—NET MILITARY EXPENDITURE PROPER.

Net disbursements from the Civil Treasuries in India to the agents of, or on account of, the Military Department, from 1st April 1878 to the 31st August 1880					Rs.	39,81,26
Deduct—Advances by the Military Department for the Malta Expedition, recovered at the Home Treasury					Rs.	20,89
Nága Campaign						5,88
Preparations for military operations in Burma						7,53
Added to the balances of the Military Department						28,39
Deficiency as compared with 1877–78, in the supplies obtained by the Military Department from sources other than the Treasuries (causing a corresponding excess demand upon the Treasuries)						5,39
Excess net military expenditure due to other causes*						24,51
						92,59
						38,88,67
Corresponding net disbursements on the scale of 1877–78, namely, two years at 11,10,67=22,21,34+(first five months) 4,58,15						26,79,49
Excess net disbursements to the end of August, in India, due to the war						12,09,18
Spent in England—					£	
In 1878–79						76,111
In 1879–80						174,480
In 1880–81						38,016
Total					288,607 @ 1s. 8d.	34,63
Estimated net military disbursements proper on account of the war, to the end of August						12,43,81
Add—Donation Batta authorised by G. O. G. G. No. 459, dated 6th April					Rs.	60,00
Compensation to the Native Cavalry ditto						10,00
Compensation for the loss of hired camels						12,00
Subsidy to the Amír Abd-Ur-Rahmán (still to pay)						13,00
Postal war expenses (1880–81)						16,90
Telegraph ditto (1880–81 and 1881–82)						12,00
Current war expenses for seven months, @ Rs. 30,00 a month						2,10,00
						3,33,90
Total					Rs.	15,77,71

	1878–79.	1879–80.	1880–81.
			(First four months.)
* Thus calculated :—	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Recorded military expenditure in India	12,18,26	16,41,26	5,42,93
Deduct—Afghán war expenditure	60,01	4,59,53	1,62,31
Nága campaign	—	3,88	2,00
Burma preparations	—	7,53	—
Total deductions	60,01	4,70,94	1,64,31
Remains for comparison with 1877–78	11,58,25	11,70,32	3,78,62
Recorded expenditure, 1877–78	11,54,85	11,54,85	3,74,11†
Excess due to causes other than war	3,40	15,47	4,51

	Abstract.	Rs.
1878–79	—	3,40
1879–80	—	15,47
1880–81	—	4,51
Do. August 4,51÷4	—	1,13
		24,51

† Includes 3,86 for stallions transferred to the Civil Department, for which credit was originally taken in the Military Accounts, but which was written back after the Monthly Accounts were closed.

II.—FRONTIER RAILWAYS.

	Rs.	Rs.
Expenditure to the end of 1879-80—		
In India - - - - -	1,09,00	
In England, 244,475 <i>l.</i> @ 1 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i> - - - - -	29,33	1,38,33
Estimated remaining expenditure—		
In India (less expected recoveries) - - - - -	2,13,50	
In England, 1,985,000 <i>l.</i> @ 1 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i> - - - - -	2,38,20	4,51,70*
Total - - - - -		5,90,03

III.—GRAND TOTAL.

	Rs.	£
Net military expenditure proper - - - - -	15,77,71=@1 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i>	13,148,000
Frontier railways - - - - -	5,90,03	4,917,000
Total - - - - -	21,67,74	18,065,000
Deduct—		
Excess revenue from railways (55,50), and telegraphs (12,50), attributed to the war - - - - -	68,00	567,000
Grand total estimated net cost of the war - - - - -	20,99,74	17,498,000

No. 72.

LETTER from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, November 2, 1880. (Financial.)
(Received December 1, 1880.)

MY LORD MARQUIS,

No. 71.
No. 67.

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 354, dated 26th ultimo, and with reference to paragraph 9 of your Lordship's Despatch No. 317, dated 23rd September, we think it right to point out that the calculation of the capital cost of the pensions which will result from the war will involve considerable labour and expense, and that as it will not always be possible to trace the connection between the war and its consequences in this respect, the result must, after all, be inconclusive and unsatisfactory.

2. It must be borne in mind that the whole true cost of the war is not susceptible of precise calculation. Doubtless the bulk of the expenditure upon the war can be so classified, without doubt or difficulty, but there must always remain a large margin of expenditure concerning which it will be a matter of opinion whether it should or should not be attributed to the war.

3. Moreover, some items of public outlay cannot, under any circumstances, be so charged. For example, there can be no question that one effect of the war has been largely to increase the cost of labour, transport, and supplies in many parts of India, especially in the Punjab, and that this has caused much excess expenditure on the general administration, particularly on Public Works and on the Army in garrison. But it would be quite impracticable to calculate this excess with any sufficient accuracy for its inclusion among the war charges. On the other hand the calculation of the war gains to the Telegraph and Railway Revenues is equally problematical.

* Distributed in the Department of Public Works, with all reserve, as follows :—

	In India. Rs.	In England. £
1880-81 - - - - -	1,73,50	1,285,000
1881-82 - - - - -	80,00	700,000
1882-83 - - - - -	20,00	—
	2,73,50	1,985,000
Deduct—Expected recoveries - - - - -	60,00	—
	2,13,50	1,985,000

4. We venture, therefore, to think that it will not really be worth while to undergo the labour and incur the expense of the detailed calculations necessary for an estimate of the capitalised value of the pensions attributable to the war, and we shall be glad if Her Majesty's Government should see fit to relieve us from this duty.

We have &c.,

J. STRACHEY.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
J. GIBBS.
C. U. AITCHISON.

No. 73.

DESPATCH to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, November 4, 1880, No. 368
(Financial).

MY LORD MARQUIS,

In my Despatch of the 7th of June, No. 179, I drew the attention of your Excellency to various points connected with the preparation of the estimates for the war in Afghanistan, on which I considered the explanations then before me to be unsatisfactory, and I stated that I was only awaiting the explanations which your predecessor's Government had promised me, to communicate to you the conclusions at which Her Majesty's Government might then arrive. No. 51.

2. Shortly afterwards I received the Letter from the Government of the Earl of Lytton dated the 1st of June, No. 176, forwarding minutes by his Lordship and Sir John Strachey; but I have hitherto deferred the further communication promised, under the impression that you might wish to make some reply to my Despatch of the 7th of June. As, however, I have now learned, from your telegram of the 10th of September, that the final explanation which the Government of India have to make was contained in the letter of the 1st of June and its enclosures, I proceed to communicate to you the views which Her Majesty's Government entertain on the subject of this correspondence. No. 48, No. 66.

3. From the Minute of Sir John Strachey I learn that the estimates of the war expenditure in the year 1880-81 were framed on a calculation based on the amounts actually brought to account and audited at the time when the estimates were prepared; that the Government were thus misled, both as to the expenditure already incurred, and as to that which was likely to occur in the coming year; that, notwithstanding the doubts freely expressed on various occasions in public criticisms, no mistrust was felt of the military estimates; and that the Financial Department never tested their accuracy by reference to the issues of cash from the civil treasuries to the military disbursing officers. Encl. 1 in No. 48.

4. Sir John Strachey sums up his explanation in the concluding paragraphs of his Minute as follows:—

“The error in the estimate is, in my judgment, mainly due, not to any misapprehension as to the extent or character of the military operations, but to the fact that we were ignorant of the actual current cost of the war. I attribute this ignorance mainly to the defect which I have described in the military accounts, which although themselves perfectly correct, failed to give to the Government timely information of the expenditure which was really going on. In this respect the whole history furnishes a fresh illustration of the fact that, in regard to such matter as keeping accounts and framing estimates, it is never safe to assume that the care and intelligence of individuals will afford sufficient safeguards against the dangers of a defective system.

“I admit that if, instead of depending, according to custom, on the accounts alone, the Government of India had itself watched the current cost of the war, it might have, to a great extent, avoided the error into which it has fallen. But I place the defect in the system of the military accounts in the forefront, because, but for that defect, no oversight, omission, or negligence by departments or individual officers, whether in the Secretariat or in the Account offices, could have prevented the earliest possible knowledge of the facts, and because such knowledge would itself have neutralized all individual and minor failures.”

5. It is thus admitted by Sir John Strachey that if the Government of India “had itself watched the current cost of the war,” it might have, to a great extent, avoided the errors into which it has fallen. I am compelled, therefore, in estimating their

responsibility for these errors, to inquire what were the means at their command for obtaining the requisite information.

6. In considering this question, I must remark that, whatever defects may exist in the system of military accounts, there was nothing, as Sir John Strachey himself observes, "to prevent the Government of India in the Military and Financial Departments from being acquainted, soon after the end of each month, with the actual amounts disbursed to the Military Department from all the treasuries all over India."

7. It is admitted that no recourse was had to this obvious check, viz., the comparison of the issues of cash with audited expenditure, nor can I discover any other trace of the careful examination and deliberation with which, it is stated in the Government Despatch of the 4th May, the estimates were prepared and accepted in the Military Department.

No. 46.

8. The Memorandum of the Military Accountant General, transmitted with that Despatch, gave an account of the procedure adopted, and there is nothing whatever in the information before me to show what were the measures taken for verifying its sufficiency or for inquiring as to the current expenditure of the war.

9. In a war, the scale and duration of which is uncertain, and of which the circumstances may vary from day to day, it is obviously impossible to frame any accurate estimate for a period far in advance, but there were two elements in such a calculation which it was both possible and necessary to take into account, viz., the actual war expenditure of the past, so far as means existed for ascertaining it, and the duration of the war in the future, so far as it was possible to foresee it.

10. Neither of these elements of opinion appears to have received consideration.

11. As I have already observed, no attempt was made to compare the actual disbursements with the audited expenditure, and, with a full knowledge that there was little hope of a termination of the campaign before the end of the autumn, an estimate was sanctioned which was avowedly framed on the assumption that it would be brought to a close at the same time as in the preceding year, viz., at the end of the spring.

12. The failure in the estimates, therefore, is in no way due to causes which might not have been known or foreseen, but to the fact that they rested on no solid foundation either of actual experience or of reasonable opinion. Nor was the error under review an error merely in an estimate of future expenditure.

13. It is not denied that both the Financial and Military Departments were altogether ignorant of the scale of expenditure in progress at the time when the estimate was framed, and which had been going on for several previous months.

Encl. 2 in
No. 48.

14. From Lord Lytton's Minute of 26th May, I learn that the Government of India had striven to render the war expenditure, and believed it to be, both "reasonable and economical."

15. I am unable to perceive how the smallest results can be expected from the efforts of a Government to secure reasonable economy in expenditure, when neither its Financial nor Military Departments possess any accurate or even approximate information as to the scale of that expenditure, as it is difficult to see how, in such circumstances, any intelligent or effectual control can be exercised.

16. I cannot, therefore, refrain from expressing my surprise that the responsible members of the Government of India should have accepted the military estimates thus placed before them. As pointed out in my Despatch of the 7th June, the estimating officers took no account of the increase of force, of the greater extent of the operations, and of the probability of their being longer protracted than in the previous year; but no inquiries were made by the Government regarding the principle on which the estimate was prepared, nor any steps taken to ascertain whether allowance had been made for facts which could not have been known when the estimate was first framed, and of which the framers of the estimates might have still been ignorant.

17. Yet, although no such examination had been made, the language publicly used regarding the estimates was calculated to convey the idea that all that was possible had been done to ascertain their accuracy. It was stated by Sir John Strachey that they had "been prepared with much care," and that there was "no reason to suppose that they err on the side of being too low;" and the Governor General said that, "so far as

it has hitherto been possible to verify them," the estimates have proved to be remarkably accurate.

18. Lord Lytton has now vacated the office of Viceroy, and the Military and Financial Members have resigned; and it is, therefore, unnecessary to enlarge on their responsibility for statements by which Her Majesty's Government were seriously misled, not merely as to the amount of the military expenditure, but also as to the care and attention which the estimates had received before sanction, by language which could not fail to have the effect of allaying any suspicion of error. But it is with great regret that I feel it to be my duty to place on record the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the Government of India must be held to have failed in taking measures of ordinary precaution, at a time when unusual vigilance was peculiarly required; to have neglected the means at their command for obtaining the materials of trustworthy estimates of the cost of great operations which were being conducted under their orders; and to have given public expression to their confidence in those estimates for which in such circumstances there was no justification.

19. It is not my wish, even if I had the means of doing so, to attempt to decide as to the degree of blame attaching to the officers of your Government in these transactions. I can only observe that the explanations which I have received convey a general impression of inefficiency in the Financial Department as well as in the Department of Military Accounts. In a Despatch of the Government of India, of the 1st June, I was informed that an inquiry was in progress which would enable them to decide how far the errors under review were the result of defects of system, and what responsibility attaches to individual officers by whom the system has been administered. I have also deemed it to be my duty to appoint a Committee in this country to inquire, with reference to the recent error, into the system of military account and estimate in India, and as to the relations existing between the Military Account Department and the Comptroller-General, and to report whether any defects exist therein, and, if so, the best mode of remedying them. No. 48.

20. I hope that I may be shortly furnished with the result of these inquiries, which I consider essential in the interests of good government, and also in justice to the several officers concerned, on some of whom an undue share of blame may otherwise devolve.

I have, &c.,

HARTINGTON.

No. 74.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, November 11, 1880.

Your Telegram of 22nd October. I understand your estimate of war expenditure, No. 70. exclusive of railways, down to 31st March 1881 to be 12½ millions. Does promised despatch state total disbursements on military account from civil treasuries from beginning of war to 30th September 1880, and basis of estimated war expenditure to 31st March next, and if any remaining liabilities beyond that date?

No. 75.

TELEGRAM from the PRESIDENT IN COUNCIL, Simla, November 12, 1880.

Despatch of 26th October explains fully basis of war estimates. Please await.

No. 71.

No. 76.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, November 20, 1880.

Your Financial 354 Appendix. Doubt correctness of comparison* with net disbursements at 11,10,67 in 1877-78. If made with audited expenditure at 11,54,85 in 1877-78 and deficiency in other supplies 539 omitted, result gives 14,92,13 to August, or 15,21,17 if audited September is added, estimating in each case 30 monthly to end of year. Or taking net disbursements for three years estimated at 49,49,03, and deducting advances, except deficiency in other supplies, there is excess over net

Encl. in No. 71.

audited expenditure on scale of 77-78 of 13,97,28. Adding English expenditure, batta compensation, subsidy, post and telegraph, result is 15,55,81. Have you ascertained from frontier treasuries and military chests all claims advised but outstanding?

No. 77.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, November 22, 1880.

No. 75. Yours 20th. We prefer our own method and deprecate reduction of our war estimate. Treasuries know nothing about outstanding claims, which are probably moderate.

No. 78.

LETTER to the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, dated India Office,
November 24, 1880.

SIR,

No. 71. WITH reference to the intention expressed by Her Majesty's Government in Parliament to propose that a contribution should be made from Imperial Revenues towards the expenses of the Afghan war, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to transmit, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, a copy of a Letter* which has been received from the Government of India, enclosing an estimate of the total expenses in connection with that war.

It is explained that the estimate is framed on the basis of including all probable extra expenditure for troops beyond the former frontier line to the 31st of March 1881 (estimated at 30 lakhs a month from September 1880 to March 1881 inclusive), and all civil and political expenditure beyond the frontier during the war, but no expenditure within the frontier, except on the railways, after the 31st October last.

On this hypothesis it is estimated that the net disbursements from the Civil Treasuries to the Military Department will, after allowing for abnormal expenditure not connected with the Afghan war, and after the inclusion of expenditure in England and of certain other expenses which are specified, amount to Rs. 15,77,71,000, or (at the exchange of 1s. 8d. the rupee) 13,148,000l. in excess of the military expenditure of 1877-78, which is taken as the normal military expenditure before the war.

The outlay on the frontier railways, after deducting the cost of completing the line from Jhilmam to Rawalpindi, which would probably have been undertaken irrespectively of the war, is estimated at Rs. 5,90,03,000 or 4,917,000l.

From the aggregate of these sums is deducted Rs. 68,00,000 or 567,000l., estimated to be the revenue derived from telegraphs and railways in consequence of the military operations; and the result is to show a total estimate of Rs. 20,99,74,000 or 17,498,000l. as the net cost of the war.

It would seem that, while the Government of India may, perhaps, be able, in the spring, to show a larger portion of the expenditure as audited and a smaller portion as estimated, it is not probable that any very different figures can be given as the aggregate expenditure until the whole outstanding amount has been finally audited.

In these circumstances I am directed to say that, for the purpose of distributing the expenses between the two Governments, the Secretary of State in Council is prepared, on his part, to accept the statement now forwarded as representing the whole cost of the late war, any further charges being treated as ordinary Indian expenditure, and I am to inquire whether the papers now forwarded are sufficient for the purposes of their Lordships, as, if further information is needed, it will be necessary to give instructions to the Government of India without delay to procure it.

I have, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

No. 79.

DESPATCH to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, December 9, 1880, No. 410
(Financial).

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Para. 1. I HAVE considered in Council your Excellency's Letters, dated the 26th of October and 2nd of November, Nos. 354 and 363, regarding the estimate of expenditure incurred and likely to be incurred to the 31st of March 1881 in connection with the war in Afghanistan. Nos. 71 and 72.

2. As I did not feel sure that the basis of comparison with the net disbursements from Civil Treasuries to the Military Department in 1877-78 afforded so accurate a measure of the true war charges as would a comparison with the actual audited military charges of that year, I addressed to your Excellency a telegram on the 20th ultimo, in which I also inquired whether allowance had been made for claims still outstanding, but of which advice had been sent to the frontier treasuries and military chests by the officers incurring the liability. No. 76.

3. Learning from your Excellency's telegraphic reply of the 22nd ultimo that you deprecated any reduction of your estimate, and that there was no information at the treasuries about any outstanding claims, I caused your Letter of the 26th of October, with the accompanying estimate, to be sent to the Treasury in a letter dated the 24th of November, of which I enclose a copy for your information. No. 77. No. 78.

4. Your Excellency will observe that, in view of the necessity for placing before Her Majesty's Government at once an estimate on which it would be possible for them to act, in deciding the proportion of the cost which they propose to Parliament to defray from Imperial revenues, I have determined that, unless further information is required by the Treasury, the estimate which you have transmitted shall be taken as representing, for the purpose of that decision, the whole cost of the late war, any further charges being treated as ordinary Indian expenditure. It will, therefore, be unnecessary that you should attempt to frame an estimate of the capitalised value of the pensions.

I have, &c.,
HARTINGTON.

No. 80.

LETTER from the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY to the SECRETARY OF
THE INDIA OFFICE, dated Treasury Chambers, December 31, 1880.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of the 24th ultimo, covering a Despatch from the Government of India, giving an estimate of the total expense of the Afghan war. I am to say that there are some points on which my Lords would be glad if the Secretary of State in Council could supply further information, with the view of facilitating the main question of the contribution to be made by this country towards the cost of the war. No. 78.

1. It is assumed, in paragraph 2 of your Letter, and under No. 3 of paragraph 3 of the Despatch of the Government of India, that no expenditure within the old frontier incurred after 31st October last—except upon the railways—is included in the account. I am to ask whether my Lords are to understand that, from that date, your establishment within the frontier is a normal one.

2. In paragraph 5 (5) of the Despatch, allusion is made to the proceeds of sale of surplus stores and animals hereafter; but it is not stated whether on the whole the stock of stores has been unduly swollen or unduly depleted by the war; if the former, the real cost of the war has been overstated, if the latter, understated. Is there any information on the subject in the possession of your Department?

3. My Lords observe that the net cash issues from Civil Treasuries to the 31st of August have been taken as the basis of the estimate. But it is not said whether on that date large or abnormal balances existed in field chests, or in the hands of Military

Disbursing Officers. If there were, the excess should be applied in diminution of the estimate of issues in the period 1st November 1880—31st March 1881, which is taken at Rs. 3,00,000 a month.

I have, &c.,
F. CAVENDISH.

No. 81.

LETTER to the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, dated India Office,
January 4, 1881.

MY LORD,

No. 80.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo, No. 20143/80, regarding the estimate of the total expense of the Afghan war, and, in reply, to make the following observations.

With reference to the inquiry whether the military establishment within the frontier of India has, from the 31st of October last, been a normal one, I am to point out that, immediately after the close of the war, and while the political condition of Afghanistan remains as unsettled as at present, it is impossible that the military establishment to be eventually kept up within the frontier of India can be determined, and that, in the fifth clause of the fifth paragraph of the letter from the Government of India, dated the 26th of October 1880, a temporary excess of strength was mentioned. Measures are, however, in progress for reducing the military force to the point at which it is for the present considered necessary to maintain it.

With regard to the inquiry whether the stock of stores has been unduly swollen or depleted, the only information sent to the Secretary of State is contained in the 27th

* See Command Paper 2560, page 13.

paragraph of Sir John Strachey's Financial Statement,* in which it was mentioned that the waste of stores and camp equipage could not be then determined, but that the reserves in the arsenals were being maintained at their proper standard.

It is, however, evident that the Government of India consider that it will be not unfair to set off the proceeds of the sale of surplus stores and animals against the temporary excess in the Military establishment, and the cost that will have to be borne by that Government on account of pensions arising from the war.

On the question whether the military balances on the 31st of August 1880 were large or abnormal, I am directed to state that they had been reduced from 1,009,600*l.* on the 1st of April 1880 to 432,900*l.* on the 1st of September; and that the estimate of expenditure contained in the enclosure to the above-mentioned letter from India was apparently based on the supposition that the disbursements in the last seven months of the year 1880-81 would amount to the sum therein mentioned *in addition to* the excess of the departmental balances above the amount of 149,000*l.* at which they stood on the 31st of March 1878, and to which it was assumed, for the purpose of the estimate, that they would be reduced by the 31st of March 1881.

I have, &c.,
LOUIS MALLETT.

LONDON:

Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

IX. Parliamentary Papers:—
 Afghanistan. Further Correspondence
 relating to the estimates for the war
 in.
 Further Papers relating
 to the occupation of
 Kandahar.
 Central Asia. Correspondence respecting
 affairs in.
 Central Asia. Further Correspondence
 respecting affairs in.
 Army (Indian Home charges).
 East India (Vernacular Press Act).
 East India (Bengal Rent Law Commis-
 sion.)

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

ESTIMATES

FOR THE

WAR IN AFGHANISTAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
 PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

[C.—2840.] Price 2½d.

BOMBAY BRANCH

OF THE

Royal Asiatic Society

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 92.

LETTER from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, January 26, 1881,
No. 19 (Financial). (Received February 23, 1881.)

MY LORD MARQUIS,

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 354 of October 26, 1880, we have the honour to make the following reply to your Lordship's Despatch No. 317 of the 23rd of September. No. 71.
No. 67.

2. The only information in connection with the war expenditure, based on ascertained facts, which we are at present in a position to submit to your Lordship consists of (1) the net disbursements from the Civil Treasuries in India to the agents of or on account of the Military Department up to December 31, 1880, (2) the total amount of audited and classified war expenditure in England and in India up to October 31, 1880.

3. The total amount of net disbursements from the Civil Treasuries to the agents of or on account of the Military Department, from April 1, 1878, to December 31, 1880, is as follows:—

	Rs.	
1878-79	14,41,00,000	
1879-80	18,07,05,000	
1880-81 (to December 31, 1880)	12,93,33,000	
TOTAL	45,41,38,000*	= £37,845,000.

The monthly detail of these figures is given in Appendix A.

4. In our Despatch No. 354 of October 26, 1880, para. 3, we laid down the principle that "our military expenditure in the year 1877-78 may be taken, for purposes of comparison, to be a fair measure of our normal military expenditure before the war." It follows that the difference between our net disbursements from April 1, 1878 to December 31, 1880, and the amount which those issues would have been had our expenditure been on the scale of 1877-78, affords as near an approximation of the actual cost of the war in India up to December 31, 1880 as it is, for the present, at all events, possible to make.

	Rs.	
Two years at Rs. 11,10,67,000	22,21,34,000	
Nine months (April 1st to Dec. 31st)	8,25,39,000	
TOTAL	30,46,73,000	

5. The net disbursements during the period in question, based on the scale of 1877-78, would have been Rs. 30,46,73,000 (£25,389,000).

6. The actual net disbursements amounted, as we have already observed, to Rs. 45,41,38,000 (£37,845,000). In order, however, to arrive at a just comparison between the actual disbursements and the normal scale, it is necessary to eliminate from

* We have, throughout this Despatch, converted rupees into sterling at the exchange of 1s. 8d., because that rate was adopted in our Despatch No. 354 of October 26, 1880. A comparison between the figures in that despatch and those now given is thus facilitated.

the former the sum of Rs. 83,52,000* (£696,000), being abnormal disbursements made between April 1, 1878 and December 31, 1880 on other accounts than that of the war. Deducting this amount we arrive at Rs. 44,57,86,000 (£37,149,000) as the amount of the net disbursements for ordinary military expenditure and on account of the Afghan war during the period in question.

7. If now we deduct Rs. 30,46,73,000 (£25,389,000), being the amount of the disbursements on the normal scale, we arrive at a sum of Rs. 14,11,13,000 (£11,760,000). This sum may, therefore, be taken as the actual net disbursements from the Civil Treasuries in India on account of the war up to December 31, 1880.

8. In the Appendix to our Despatch No. 354 of October 26, 1880, we estimated that the total cost of the war in India, exclusive of the Frontier Railways would be Rs. 15,39,54,000 (£12,825,000). It follows, therefore, that a sum of Rs. 1,28,41,000 (£1,070,000) may be spent in the months of January, February, and March 1881, without the total war expenditure exceeding that estimate.

* Advances by the Military Department for the Malta Expedition recovered at the Home Treasury		Rs.	
Nágá Campaign		-	20,89,000
Preparations for Military Operations in Burma		-	7,57,000
Added to the Balances of the Military Department		-	7,53,000
Deficiency, as compared with 1877-78, in the supplies obtained by the Military Department from sources other than the Treasuries (causing a corresponding excess demand upon the Treasuries)		-	23,56,000
Excess Net Military Expenditure due to other causes†		-	21,15,000
			2,82,000
			<u>83,52,000</u>
			<u>Rs.</u>
		1878-79.	1879-80.
			1880-81
			(First seven months.)
† Thus calculated :—		Rs.	Rs.
Recorded Military Expenditure in India		12,18,26,000	16,43,34,000
DEDUCT—			
Afghan War Expenditure		60,01,000	4,59,17,000
Nágá Campaign		—	3,93,000
Burma Preparations		—	7,53,000
Total Deductions		60,01,000	4,70,63,000
Remains for comparison with 1877-78		11,58,25,000	11,72,71,000
Recorded expenditure, 1877-78		11,54,85,000	11,54,85,000
Differences due to causes other than the War		+ 3,40,000	+ 17,86,000
			— 14,34,000
			<u>Rs.</u>
Worse than 1877-78—		Rs.	Rs.
1878-79		—	3,40,000
1879-80		—	17,86,000
Better than 1877-78—			
1880-81 (first seven months)		—	14,34,000
Do. (8th and 9th months)		$\frac{14,34,000}{7} \times 2 =$	4,10,000
			<u>Rs.</u>
Net worse than 1877-78			2,82,000

† The audited and classified war expenditure in England at the same date was as follows :—

		£	
For 1878-79		76,111	
„ 1879-80		174,480	
„ 1880-81		67,464	
TOTAL		<u>318,055</u>	(Rs. 38,17,000.)

9. We could readily give the total audited and classified military expenditure up to October 31, 1880; but we think it will render the actual position of affairs clearer if we compare the audited and classified expenditure on the war only with the net disbursements on account of the war up to that date.

10. The audited and classified war expenditure in India to October 31, 1880 was as follows:—

	Rs.
For 1878-79	60,01,000
„ 1879-80	4,59,17,000
„ 1880-81	4,29,41,000
Total	9,48,59,000 (£7,905,000)

	Rs.	
Net disbursements to October 31*	13,35,26,000	It follows, therefore, that on October
Audited and classified expenditure to October 31	9,48,59,000	31st there remained Rs. 3,86,67,000
Difference	3,86,67,000	(£3,222,000) outstanding which had to be brought to account.

The details of the war expenditure audited and classified to the 31st October, 1880 are given in Appendix B.

11. The measures which we have taken to expedite the classification and audit of the considerable expenditure awaiting these processes are explained in the accompanying Report by the Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal, to the Secretary of the Military Department, and in the letter addressed on the 5th instant by the Secretary in the Military Department to the Commissary General.

12. We have carefully considered whether in view of the desirability of laying full information before Parliament with the least possible delay, it would not be possible to classify roughly the outstanding charges under a few general heads, such as Transport, Supplies, &c. After full consideration we have decided to make no such attempt at classification. The results would, we are convinced, be untrustworthy, and the additional labour thrown on the Commissariat Officers would only serve to retard the compilation of more accurate information. In arriving at this conclusion we have been to some extent guided by the consideration that much of the present delay in rendering accounts is the result of the necessity in which we have been placed, owing to the pressure caused by the war, of employing officers in the Commissariat Department, whose experience in the matter of rendering accounts is very limited. We think that for the present, at all events, the object we have in view will be better attained by inciting the officers concerned to exert themselves in carrying out the existing system, rather than by adopting any changes which might affect their procedure at a time of unusual pressure.

13. We have also considered whether it would expedite matters to issue any such notification as that to which allusion is made in paragraph 5 of your Lordship's despatch No. 317 of September 23, 1880. If the Government had any considerable creditors, some such notification might perhaps be useful, but the real difficulty in the present case consists in the fact that large advances have been made to agents, called in India "gomáshtas," to whom nothing is due, but who on the contrary more often owe money to Government. We can only rely on the individual energy of the disbursing officers to bring pressure to bear on these agents, whose interest it often is to delay the production of their accounts, until, from the absence of the officers who are most intimately acquainted with the detail of their transactions with Government, or other causes, a thorough scrutiny of those transactions is rendered difficult.

We have, &c.
 (Signed) RIPON.
 „ F. P. HAINES.
 „ W. STOKES.
 „ RIVERS THOMPSON.
 „ J. GIBBS.
 „ D. M. STEWART.
 „ E. BARING.

* Calculated in the same manner as the figure Rs. 14,11,13,000 in paragraph 7 is calculated.

Enclosures in No. 82.

APPENDIX A.

NET DISBURSEMENTS from the CIVIL TREASURIES in INDIA to the agents of, or on account of the MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

	In the Month.			To the end of the Month.		
	1878-79.	1879-80.	1880-81.	1878-79.	1879-80.	1880-81.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
April - - -	1,10,78,000	1,70,18,000	1,72,83,000	1,10,78,000	1,70,18,000	1,72,83,000
May - - -	99,30,000	1,34,08,000	1,61,78,000	2,10,08,000	3,04,26,000	3,34,61,000
June - - -	90,05,000	1,18,51,000	1,40,18,000	3,00,13,000	4,22,77,000	4,74,79,000
July - - -	90,11,000	1,06,46,000	1,29,06,000	3,90,24,000	5,29,23,000	6,03,85,000
August - - -	85,14,000	1,15,97,000	1,27,36,000	4,75,38,000	6,45,20,000	7,31,21,000
September - - -	85,46,000	1,23,45,000	1,46,72,000	5,60,84,000	7,68,65,000	8,77,93,000
October - - -	1,04,74,000	1,49,55,000	1,43,03,000	6,65,58,000	9,18,20,000	10,20,96,000
November - - -	1,29,35,000	1,57,84,000	1,38,25,000	7,94,93,000	10,76,04,000	11,59,21,000
December - - -	1,28,95,000	1,53,16,000	1,34,12,000	9,23,88,000	12,29,20,000	12,93,33,000
January - - -	1,51,85,000	1,76,67,000	—	10,75,73,000	14,05,87,000	—
February - - -	1,51,05,000	1,71,51,000	—	12,26,78,000	15,77,38,000	—
March - - -	2,14,22,000†	2,29,67,000	—	14,41,00,000	18,07,05,000	—
Total - - -	14,41,00,000†	18,07,05,000	—	—	—	—

* The net disbursements in January 1881 have, subject to correction, been telegraphed as 149 lakhs.

† These figures differ slightly from those appended to Sir John Strachey's Minute, dated May 20, 1880, having been affected by certain transfers made while the books were being closed.

APPENDIX B.

NET CHARGES ON ACCOUNT of MILITARY OPERATIONS in AFGHANISTAN classified and audited to the end of October 1880.

Grants.	Charges.	1878-79.	1879-80.	April to October 1880.	Total.
		Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1.	Army and garrison staff - - -	1,91,713	6,72,256	6,88,919	15,02,888
2.	Administrative staff - - -	10,699	64,423	69,358	1,44,480
3.	Regimental pay and allowances - - -	7,40,231	36,55,788	30,41,468	74,37,487
4.	Commissariat - - -	37,47,003	3,03,37,413	3,22,55,965	6,63,40,381
5.	Remount and cattle establishments - - -	19,250	14,881	12,857	46,988
6.	Clothing - - -	5,09,399	7,60,493	7,31,996	20,01,888
7.	Barrack - - -	54,827	54,582	90,596	2,00,005
8.	Martial law - - -	2,887	15,290	24,044	42,221
9.	Medical - - -	1,30,775	2,75,896	3,03,217	7,09,888
10.	Ordnance - - -	3,06,639	5,00,789	4,73,544	12,80,972
11.	Ecclesiastical - - -	6,203	31,437	12,923	50,563
12.	Education - - -	—	113	240	353
13.	Sea transport - - -	32,309	1,58,523	2,58,268	4,49,100
14.	Miscellaneous (includes civil, political, telegraph, and postal charges). - - -	2,50,768	98,79,356	58,93,707	1,60,23,831
18.	Military pensions - - -	—	138	106	244
19.	Widows' pensions, &c. - - -	—	50	—	50
	Total charges - - -	60,02,703	4,64,21,428	4,38,07,208	9,62,31,339
	Total receipts in 1878-79, 1879-80, and up to October 31, 1880. - - -	1,614	5,04,990	8,65,739	13,72,343
	Net charges - - -	60,01,089	4,59,16,438	4,29,41,469	9,48,58,996

No. 15,433, dated December 31, 1880.

From Colonel W. T. CHITTY, Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal, to the
SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, Military Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the early and serious consideration of Government, the great embarrassment and difficulty experienced from the present state of the accounts in the Military Department, to remedy which it appears to me to be imperative that stringent measures should be taken.

2. I am called upon to submit estimates to Government of the military expenditure; but as the accounts now stand, as I have already represented to the Accountant General, Military Department, this duty cannot, if possible at all, be performed with any degree of accuracy, or with that reliability that Government have a right to expect. The Military Account Department, whilst doing all that can be done by it to meet the orders of Government, cannot therefore be held responsible for failure arising from causes over which it has no control.

3. The outstandings of disbursing officers, commissariat and transport, at this present time are, I believe (for no exact amount can be given at present), little short of five crores of rupees. To say how much of this amount will be brought into the current year's account is not possible, for it does not rest with the Account Department, but with disbursing officers, to bring it forward. Since I assumed charge of my present duties, the matter has had my most serious and constant attention. I would have preferred deferring any representation to Government on the subject until I could obtain more exact details; but foreseeing that this would take some time, I feel I should be assuming a grave responsibility were I any longer to postpone bringing it to notice.

4. I submit two statements furnished by the Examiner and Additional Examiner of Commissariat Accounts of the sums held in the latest inefficient balances received by them. Some Controller of Military Accounts' letter No. ³³⁶ of November 25, 1880. have not yet been rendered as already represented to Government, but these aggregate Rs. 2,73,06,962, and to this would have to be added the amount of those not received. There is also a large amount to come forward in the accounts now being rendered by the Field Account Offices, which, though it cannot be given with any degree of accuracy, will probably be 150 lakhs. It is, however, to the items shown in the inefficient balance statements I would more particularly draw attention.

5. The Examiners have, I believe, done all they can, and have not failed to bring the matter to my notice. In a recent letter Major Pritchard says, referring to the balances, of the several Commissariat ranges—

"I beg that measures may be adopted to urge the officers concerned to at once take steps to adjust these balances by bringing the transactions regarding them into their accounts supported by proper vouchers. I am, as Examiner, quite powerless to bring sums into this year's accounts if the disbursing officers do not submit to me their accounts of the same."

The Commissary General is fully aware that this large amount is outstanding, and has received the orders of Government to impress on his officers the necessity for the prompt settlement of all outstandings connected with the war.

6. It is, however, not to the war alone that these outstandings are attributable, for I find that Commissariat Officers are in the habit of placing in their inefficient balance statements items without any authority and contrary to orders.

I have had a few such items taken out by the Examiner to exemplify this, and annex a statement thereof. It would also appear that bills submitted for payment are paid and not charged, as they should be, in the month's accounts, but placed in the inefficient balance to be charged in the following month. So long as the regulations and orders are thus ignored and disregarded, so long will these inefficient balances remain as a hindrance to the adjustment of accounts, the embarrassment of the Examiners, and not improbably involve a loss to the State, for they facilitate delay, as can be shown from the statements, until adjustment becomes so difficult as to be almost impracticable.

7. The tendency of all advance payments is to delay adjustment, for it is far more difficult to obtain bills after than before payment. In time of war such payments are

unavoidable, but Government has a reasonable right to expect that, whilst allowing such advances as a convenience and necessity for carrying on the public service, officers will take prompt measures to adjust them, instead of allowing month after month to pass with little, if any, attempt to clear them, and still more that they should immediately settle sums which have been improperly treated as advances.

8. The statements annexed show how little has been done. If the demands of the Secretary of State for bringing the charges to account is to be met at all, I am of opinion that each accounting officer must receive from Government imperative orders to bring these charges forward within the next three months, and further be prohibited from treating payments, which should be final in any other way, by entering them in their inefficient balance.

9. In conclusion I would remark that whilst doing their best to prevent delay and arrears, it is impossible for the several examiners to do so, and perform their duties properly, unless the accounts come to them in regular order and at due date. They have not only at times to deal with a mass of papers coming irregularly and imperfectly, but to watch outstandings which should not exist. The result is delay at every stage except disbursement of the money, inconvenience to all parties concerned, and serious increase of clerical labour.

A.

STATEMENT showing the TOTAL AMOUNT OF ADVANCES OUTSTANDING in the INEFFICIENT BALANCE STATEMENTS for the month of October 1880.

Stations.	Total Amount Outstanding.			Outstandings.		Remarks.
				From.	To.	
	Rs.	As.	P.			
Calcutta - - -	59,750	0	11	July 1879 -	October 1880	
Store and Shipping, Calcutta	51,289	2	10	December 1879 -	Do.	
Dinapore - - -	22,456	10	11	February 1880 -	Do.	
Darjeeling - - -	18,952	15	5	April 1877 -	Do.	
Allahabad - - -	39,111	14	1	March 1879 -	Do.	
Jubbulpore - - -	34,843	9	9	January 1880 -	Do.	
Lucknow - - -	20,884	14	4	December 1879 -	Do.	
Cawnpore - - -	3,35,576	0	1	May 1879 -	Do.	
Gwalior - - -	12,101	10	11	August 1879 -	Do.	
Agra - - -	16,522	15	9	February 1880 -	Do.	
Bareilly - - -	47,127	9	10	July 1878 -	Do.	
Ranikhet - - -	15,079	10	11	November 1879	Do.	
Meerut - - -	91,350	2	11	September 1879	Do.	
Umballa - - -	6,68,787	9	4	May 1879 -	Do.	
Kasauli - - -	12,541	2	11	April 1880 -	Do.	
Lahore - - -	6,53,945	9	1	July 1879 -	Do.	
Ferozepore - - -	3,98,177	6	5	May 1878 -	Do.	
Sialkot - - -	64,545	1	3	September 1879	Do.	
Mooltan - - -	4,65,409	5	6	December 1878 -	Do.	
Rawal Pindi - -	7,75,924	13	5	July 1880 -	Do.	
Do. (arrear) -	27,13,818	14	11*	May 1878 -	-	*Total amount for sup. March and June 1880.
Peshawar - - -	14,97,851	12	7†	-	-	†Inefficient balance statement not received.
Dacca Khedda - -	16,086	2	7	May 1879 -	October 1880	
Naga Expedition -	2,91,483	2	2	November 1879 -	Do.	
Total - - -	83,23,618	6	10			

(Signed)

H. PRITCHARD, Major,
Examiner of Commissariat Accounts.

Military Account Department,
Office of Examiner Commissariat Accounts,
Calcutta,
December 16, 1880.

B.

INEFFICIENT BALANCES.

STATEMENT showing the AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING on ACCOUNT of the 1st and 2nd CAMPAIGNS, as taken from the latest CASH ACCOUNT received up to the 17th December 1880.

Cash Account.	Amounts.			Total.		
	Rs.	As.	P.	Rs.	As.	P.
1ST CAMPAIGN ACCOUNT.						
Right 1st Division for October 1880	2,36,838	8	10			
Do. 2nd ditto for ditto	4,35,098	13	10			
Kuram for ditto	2,18,956	7	4			
Jhelum for November 1880	55,466	6	0			
Left 1st Division from January to March 1880	37,18,751	11	2			
Do. 2nd ditto for November 1880	1,86,351	4	7			
				48,51,463	3	9
2ND CAMPAIGN ACCOUNT.						
Kuram for October 1880	23,87,277	9	8			
Jhelum ditto	31,40,688	1	10			
Advance Force ditto	16,63,389	9	8			
Reserve ditto ditto	68,373	5	3			
Khyber ditto	24,47,168	5	6			
				97,06,896	15	11
TRANSPORT ACCOUNT.						
Khyber for August 1880	39,01,317	7	6			
Kuram for April 1880	3,15,378	13	1			
Advance Force for November 1880	2,08,287	11	10			
				44,24,984	0	5
Total				1,89,83,344	4	1

(Signed) C. CARTER, Lieut.-Col.,
Additional Examiner,
Commissariat Accounts.

C.

STATEMENT showing a few SELECTED ITEMS of PAYMENTS IRREGULARLY MADE by EXECUTIVE COMMISSARIAT OFFICERS and shown in their INEFFICIENT BALANCE STATEMENTS for October 1880; also ADVANCES made for DEPARTMENTAL PURPOSES, which it would appear should have been adjusted monthly instead of being delayed and shown in the inefficient balance statements.

Executive Commissariat Officer concerned, and Name of Officer.	Date of Payment.	Amount Paid.	On what Account Paid.	Proper Mode of Settlement.
Calcutta Executive. Lieutenant-Colonel W. E. D. Broughton, Officiating Executive Commissariat Officer.	1880. 6th Jan.	Rs. As. P. 19 0 11	Sergeant McArthur, A. C. D.—Balance of advance on account of his pay, &c., when proceeding for field service at Naga Expedition.	By Circle Paymaster.
	30th „	100 0 0	Deputy Commissary-General, Lower Circle—Advance for his office telegram charges.	From office contingent allowance, and reimbursed by bill submitted to Circle Paymaster.
	25th Feb.	8 4 5	Private Miller, late acting Cattle Sergeant, Hastings—Balance of advance on account of his staff pay from 1st to 24th February 1880.	By Circle Paymaster.
	11th June	9 13 1	Mrs. Martin, wife of Sub-Conductor Martin—Balance of advance on account of her husband's pay for March 1880.	Ditto. ditto.

Executive Commissariat Officer concerned, and Name of Officer.	Date of Payment.	Amount Paid.	On what Account Paid.	Proper Mode of Settlement.
Calcutta Executive. Lieutenant-Colonel W. E. D. Broughton, Officiating Executive Commissariat Officer.	1880. 8th Sept.	Rs. As. P. 4 5 9	Mrs. McArthur, wife of Sub-Conductor McArthur—Balance of advance on account of her husband's pay for July and August 1880.	By Circle Paymaster.
	27th „	12 4 0	Kalleemooddeen, Duftry—Cost of binding files, &c., for August 1880.	From office contingent allowance, and reimbursed by bill on Circle Paymaster.
	30th „	109 10 2	Officiating Sub-Conductor Saxon—Advance on account of his pay, &c., for September 1880.	By Circle Paymaster.
	1st Oct.	18 12 0	Proprietor of the Probhakar Press—Cost of advertising commissariat notices.	From office contingent allowance, as above.
	5th „	50 0 0	Mrs. McArthur, wife of Officiating Sub-Conductor McArthur—Advance on account of her husband's pay for September 1880.	By Circle Paymaster.
	7th „	60 0 0	Mrs. Clements, wife of Sergeant Clements—Advance on account of her husband's pay for September 1880.	Ditto. ditto.
	7th „	12 0 0	Manager, <i>Indian Daily News</i> —Cost of advertising commissariat notices.	From office contingent allowance, as above.
	9th „	100 0 0	Deputy Commissary-General, Lower Circle—Advance on account of his office telegram charges.	Ditto. ditto.
	20th „	10 0 0	Sergeant Hatchins, proceeding to Dacca to bring elephants—Advance on account of his pay.	By Circle Paymaster.
	23rd „	100 0 0	Officiating Sub-Conductor McArthur—Advance on account of his arrear pay.	Ditto. ditto.
	27th „	151 2 0	Officiating Assessor to the Municipal Corporation on account of water, police, and lighting rates on premises No. 6, Park Street, Commissariat Offices, for the quarter ending December 1880.	From office contingent allowance, as above.
	29th „	649 10 6	Messrs. Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co., on account of office rent for September 1880.	From office contingent allowance, as above, or by direct bill on Circle Paymaster.
	24th April	23 4 0	Superintendent, Bhagalpore Jail—Cost of blankets.	Cash payment prohibited. Should be adjusted by inter-departmental book debit.
	4th May	4 11 5	Sergeant Williams, in commissariat charge, Chunar—Advance on account of his pay.	By Circle Paymaster.
Allahabad Executive. Major H. G. Waterfield, Officiating Executive Commissariat Officer.	7th June	150 0 0	Ditto ditto	
	31st July	100 0 0	Sergeant J. J. Carter, in commissariat charge, Chunar—Advanced by Store and Shipping Office, Calcutta.	
	19th Aug.	60 0 0	Sergeant J. J. Carter, in commissariat charge, Chunar—Advance of pay.	
	15th Sept.	60 0 0	Ditto ditto	Cash payment prohibited. Should be adjusted by inter-departmental book debit.
	28th Jan.	49 8 0	Pertabghur Jail, per Bill Register No. 97.	
	6th July	8 12 0	Jubbulpore Executive—Paid to Central Jail, Naini, as per memo. No. 415, dated 26th June 1880, from Jubbulpore Commissariat.	

Executive Commissariat Officer concerned, and Name of Officer.	Date of Payment.	Amount paid.	On what Account paid.	Proper Mode of Settlement.
<i>Allahabad Executive.</i> Major H. G. Waterfield, Officiating Executive Commissariat Officer.	1880. 3rd Aug.	Rs. As. P. 150 0 0	Field Account Office, Murree—Mrs. Whitehead, advance for July 1880.	By Circle Paymaster on station order.
	3rd „	60 0 0	Field Account Office, Murree—Mrs. Griffiths, advance for July 1880.	
	3rd „	60 0 0	Field Account Office, Murree—Mrs. Ellis, wife of Sergeant Ellis, advance.	
	7th Oct.	150 0 0	Field Account Office, Murree—Mrs. Whitehead advance for September 1880.	
	7th „	60 0 0	Field Account Office, Murree—Mrs. Griffiths advance for September 1880.	
<i>Bareilly Executive.</i> Colonel Alexander Callander, Officiating Executive Commissariat Officer.	3rd Jan.	100 0 0	Paid to Sub-Conductor Little, Commissariat Department.	By Circle Paymaster.
	19th March	100 0 0	Paid to Sub-Conductor Little, in charge of Bareilly godown, in part of his pay.	
	22nd April	27 0 0	Amount advanced to Sub-Conductor Little on account of his pay for payment of bill of Lawrencepoore Asylum.	
	7th May	100 0 0	Amount advanced to Sub-Conductor Little in part of his pay.	
	17th June	100 0 0	Paid to Sub-Conductor Little in part of his pay.	
	8th July	100 0 0	Ditto ditto	
	11th Sept.	500 0 0	Paid to Sub-Conductor Little in charge of godown as an advance on account of his pay.	
	19th Oct.	160 0 0	Ditto ditto.	
<i>Allahabad Executive.</i> Major H. G. Waterfield, Officiating Executive Commissariat Officer.	11th and 25th Sept.	3,226 4 0	Badoolla, Meat Agent—Cost of cattle and sheep purchased.	
	8th and 29th Oct.	7,500 0 0	Ambica Pershad, Cattle and Station Gomashta—Advance in part of his bills for September and October 1880.	
	8th Oct.	1,554 2 0	Badoolla, Meat Agent—Cost of cattle and sheep purchased.	
	18th and 27th Oct.	5,000 0 0	Sree Nath Sircar, Station Gomashta, Benares—Advance.	
<i>Cawnpore Executive.</i> Major F. P. Worthy, Officiating Sub-Assistant Commissary General.	1879. 9th Dec.	10,000 0 0	Abdool Gunny—Advance for 81st Regiment.	
	1880. 2nd Feb.	10,000 0 0	Abdool Gunny—Advance for current month.	
	1879. — Oct.	30,000 0 0	Chotey Lall, Contractor—Advance for current expenses.	
	— Sept.	10,000 0 0	Abdool Gunny, Station Gomashta Advance for stores, shoes, &c.	

(Signed) H. PRITCHARD, Major,
Examiner of Commissariat Accounts.

Mily. Acct. Dept.,
Office of Exmr. of Comst. Accts.; Calcutta,
The 16th December 1880.

No. 16 B, dated 5th January 1881.

From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,
to the COMMISSARY GENERAL, Bengal.

I AM directed to forward the accompanying copy of a letter from the Controller of Military Accounts, 15433, dated 31st. December 1880, representing the degree of embarrassment and difficulty experienced in dealing with the adjustment of the Commissariat accounts, and to communicate to you, by order of the Governor General in Council, the following observations thereon.

From the statement which accompanies the Controller's letter, it would appear that in addition to the very large arrears in the accounts of disbursing officers connected with the war, there are also large outstanding balances of current expenditure in some of the Commissariat offices which have had nothing to do with the war.

As regards these last, although it may be admitted that the present condition of your department is exceptional, in consequence of the numerous transfers of officers which the war has rendered necessary, still this procrastination in the submission of accounts is altogether excessive and irregular, and the Government of India desire that you will take vigorous measures for at once putting a stop to it, and requiring that this part of the duty of the department shall be properly and punctually performed.

As regards the other officers which have had to deal with war expenditure, the Government of India is fully sensible of the great difficulties with which the Commissariat Department has had to contend, both in the field and in garrison, owing to the peculiar character of the campaign, and to the absence of many of the permanent officers and establishments on field service, and is quite prepared to make all reasonable allowances for delays and imperfections in the submission of the accounts. The audit offices have already been instructed to relax the ordinary and technical rules of audit as far as this can safely be done.

The arrears, however, are so enormous, and the amounts involved so vast, that their continuance is a most serious evil, and even danger, to counteract which it is absolutely necessary that the most stringent measures should now be adopted. Where it is clearly shown that all possible exertions have been made, the officers of the Commissariat Department may rest assured that those exertions will be fully appreciated and acknowledged, and that every allowance will be made for unavoidable delays and difficulties. But equally, in cases where it appears clear that such efforts have not been put forward, and that the work has been carried on in an apathetic or perfunctory manner, the Governor General in Council will not fail to visit such conduct with the severe displeasure of Government.

The head assistants of offices also, and all clerks concerned with the preparation of the accounts, should be warned that the Government of India will not fail to notice and hold them accountable for any want of progress in the adjustment of the accounts for which they are responsible. Should the Controller of Military Accounts report that he has reason to believe that all possible efforts have not been made to overtake the arrears in any particular office, the establishment of that office will, on his report, be put on a reduced scale of pay till Government is assured that a marked improvement has been effected, and that satisfactory progress is being made.

The cases of executive officers whose accounts continue unduly in arrears will be dealt with specially by Government.

The Governor General in Council is satisfied that if strenuous efforts are made, the greater portion of the sums now outstanding in the inefficient balances of the Commissariat ranges can be cleared off within three months, and a special report will be required in explanation of any items still remaining unadjusted after that period. As regards the expenditure in the field, there is also no reason why the cash accounts of the field offices should not be finally adjusted by the end of September, so as to admit of their inclusion in the official accounts of the year 1881-82. Any extra establishments that may be required solely for this purpose will at once be sanctioned, but it must be clearly understood that no deviation from these orders will be permitted.

His Excellency in Council leaves it to you to issue such detailed instructions as may be necessary to give effect to the above orders, and will look to receive at an early date a copy of the instructions issued.

I am to request that at the end of the present financial year you will report which officers have shown that necessary alacrity and zeal in bringing up these arrear accounts which the Government of India expect them to display, and you will also bring to notice

the names of any officers who in your judgment have failed in this important respect; such recommendations and notices will be duly recorded and taken into account in determining the departmental promotions.

Copies of the above forwarded for information to the Finance Department; the Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal; and the Accountant General, Military Department.

No. 83.

LETTER to the SECRETARY TO THE TREASURY, dated India Office,
March 2, 1881.

SIR,

In continuation of the letters addressed to you on the 24th of November 1880, and the 4th of March last, regarding the estimates of the cost of the Afghan War, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to transmit for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury a copy of a letter from the Government of India, dated the 26th of January, No. 19, with its enclosures, giving the fullest particulars which can be obtained from ascertained facts regarding the war expenditure. Nos. 78 and 81.

From this letter it appears that the net disbursements from the civil treasuries in India to the agents of, or on account of, the Military Department between the 1st of April 1878, and the 31st of December 1880, after excluding abnormal disbursements made on other accounts than that of the war, exceeded by Rs. 14,11,13,000 (or at the rate of 1s. 8d. the rupee, 11,760,000L.) the net disbursements for a similar period on the scale of 1877-78. Adding to that sum 318,000L. as the amount of audited and classified war expenditure in England to the 31st of October last, the aggregate 12,078,000L. leaves 1,070,000L. to complete the sum specified in Sir Louis Mallet's letter of the 24th of November as representing the cost of the military operations (excluding the outlay on the frontier railways and receipts from railways and telegraphs) to the 31st of March 1881, so that the last-mentioned sum, namely, 1,070,000L., is available for expenditure in India and in England in January, February, and March 1881 without exceeding the estimate framed by the Government of India in October last, and accepted by the Marquis of Hartington. No. 82.

The amount audited and classified to the 31st of October last was Rs. 9,48,59,000 (or 7,905,000L.) and in the opinion of the Government of India, it would not be desirable to attempt a classification of the charges not yet passed by the officers of audit.

I have, &c.

T. L. SECCOMBE.

No. 84.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, March 8, 1881.

WAR Estimate October 26 assumed, all war expenditure would close by the end of March, whereas troops have not yet begun move. Consequently, preliminary regular war estimate Rs. 1,52,00,000 more than October estimate, of which Rs. 96,00,000 increased expenditure (in) India and England; balance explained by erroneous calculation of the standard upon comparison with which October estimate was based. Expenditure must continue till troops are in cantonments. We shall provide two crores next year, on the assumption all troops but those left about Quetta returned (to) quarters by the end of May. Thus total cost (of) war now estimated (at) Rs. 19,30,00,000 compared with Rs. 15,78,00,000 of October. It must be clearly understood that the regular estimate (is) still subject to much change. There are some compensations; saved Rs. 1,03,00,000 in the frontier railway. No. 71.

No. 85.

LETTER to the SECRETARY to the TREASURY, dated India Office,
March 15, 1881.

MY LORD,

No. 83. IN continuation of the letter addressed to your Lordship on the 2nd instant regarding the estimates of the cost of the war in Afghanistan, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to transmit, for the information of the Lords
No. 84. Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, a copy of a telegram, dated the 8th of March, which has been received from the Viceroy of India.

No. 71. In the estimate which was forwarded to the Treasury on the 24th of November 1880, containing the calculations of the Government of India of all probable extra expenditure for troops beyond the former frontier line to the 31st of March 1881, the total charge at the rate of 1s. 8d. the rupee was put at 17,498,000l.

It is now estimated that that amount will probably be exceeded by 800,000l. (Rs. 96,00,000) owing to the delay in the withdrawal of the troops, and by 470,000l. (Rs. 56,00,000) in consequence apparently of an over-estimate of the charge in 1877-78 which was taken as the normal peace expenditure in order to arrive at the amount due to the war. On the other hand, there is a saving of 860,000l. (Rs. 1,03,00,000), through the restriction of the expenditure on the frontier railways. The cost to the 31st instant is, therefore, reckoned at 17,908,000l. instead of 17,498,000l., as before stated.

It is further estimated by the Government of India that the expenditure to be borne in 1881-82 will amount to about 1,666,000l. (Rs. 2,00,00,000) making the total expenditure on the war 19,574,000l. instead of 17,498,000l., as previously stated.

No. 78. In Sir Louis Mallet's letter of the 24th of November last, it was said that, "for the purpose of distributing the expenses between the two Governments, the Secretary of State in Council is prepared, on his part, to accept the statement now forwarded as representing the whole cost of the late war, any further charges being treated as ordinary Indian expenditure." It does not appear to Lord Hartington that, for the above-mentioned purpose, there is sufficient ground in the telegram now received for departing from the decision at which he then arrived, by which the total net cost of the war was fixed at 17,498,000l.

I have, &c.

T. L. SECCOMBE.

No. 86.

EXTRACTS of a LETTER from the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, dated
February 21, 1881, No. 49, (Financial). (Received March 15, 1881.)

7. The following is the expenditure included in the accounts of 1879-80 attributed to the war:—

	£	£
Punjab Northern State Railway - -	336,770	
Frontier Railways - -	1,334,350	
Military Operations Proper (<i>Account No. 57, p. 152</i>) - - - -	4,816,623	
	<u> </u>	6,487,743
<i>Deduct—</i>		
War Receipts - - - -	50,499	
Estimated Excess Revenue under Railways and Telegraph attributed to the war (<i>see Despatch No. 354, dated 26th October 1880</i>)	312,600	363,099
	<u> </u>	
Net Expenditure in consequence of the war - -		<u>6,124,644</u>

No. 71.

8. Of this total of 6,124,644 ¹ / ₂ the Local Governments contributed during the year			No. 19.
	£	£	
Revenue	-	68,484,666	
Ordinary Expenditure	- 69,667,615		
Deduct War (less contributions of the Local Governments)	- 5,789,644		
		63,877,971	
Surplus	-	4,606,695	

335,000¹/₂., as explained in paragraphs 11 and 170 of the financial statement for 1880-81. Excluding this contribution, the Imperial Revenue would, but for the war, have exceeded the Imperial Expenditure by 4,606,695¹/₂l. As explained in paragraph 15 under the head 36, *Army*, the burden upon the accounts owing to the war, and the surplus apart from that

burden, really exceeded even the amounts here stated.

11. The net expenditure on the war, shown in the Accounts of the years 1878-79 and 1879-80, is as follows, the calculations being made as in para. 7 :—

	£
1878-79	557,419
1879-80	6,124,644
TOTAL	6,682,063

14. We are now in a position to complete our reply to your Lordship's telegram, dated 14th July last.

This telegram was as follows :—

"How do you explain that, during last year, 5½ crores was expended beyond Estimate, but the Cash Balance was only reduced by 118 lakhs? Where did the remainder come from?"

The following is the substance of our reply, dated 25th July :—

"Of the remaining 432 lakhs, 230 were disbursed as Advances in 1878-79. We cannot fully explain the remaining 202 lakhs till the Accounts for 1879-80 are closed."

15. We now invite attention to Appendix C. to this despatch, being an Abstract of our Accounts of Receipts and Disbursements in India in 1879-80, in which the Accounts are compared with the Regular Estimates. The following is a compendium of that Abstract, which shows the exact improvements which counterbalanced the failure of the Regular Estimate of the cost of the War :—

Accounts of 1879-80 compared with the Regular Estimates.

	Better. £	Worse. £
Net Imperial Revenue, exclusive of the Capital Expenditure on the East Indian Railway	—	1,289,633
Capital Expenditure on the East Indian Railway	—	44,923
Provincial and Local Surpluses	348,299	—
Civil, Military, and Trust Funds and Treasury Notes	—	42,413
Loans to Native States, &c.	359,357	—
Savings Bank Deposits	265,607	—
Other Deposits, Advances, and Remittances	—	1,986,411
Public Debt incurred	142,383	—
Capital received from Guaranteed Companies	248,647	—
Secretary of State's Bills	835,906	—
TOTAL	2,200,199	3,363,380
Balance less	1,163,181	—
	3,363,380	3,363,380

16. From this compendium, it appears that the accounts are more unfavourable than the regular estimates by 3,363,380¹/₂l., distributed among four groups of heads; but that this unfavourable result is counterbalanced to the extent of 2,200,199¹/₂l., owing to the accounts being more favourable than the regular estimates under six heads.

We have already explained in detail the discrepancies in the accounts from the regular estimates of revenue and expenditure, as well Provincial as Imperial.

We now offer the following remarks upon the remaining heads:—

Funds and Treasury Notes.—The difference 42,413*l.* is not large, and is the net outcome of several items.

Loans to Native States.—Better 359,357*l.* Of this 185,000*l.* is the Sinking Fund of the Calcutta municipality. The several loans to this municipality were consolidated during the year, a fresh arrangement being made for their liquidation by yearly payments extending over 30 years. Upon this arrangement being concluded, the municipality reduced the amount of its debt to us by the surrender of the securities which constituted its old sinking fund. The amount was not received in cash, and is therefore set off by an entry under advances on the other side of the account. The transaction was not included in the regular estimates. The remainder of the improvement under this head is not particularly explained.

Savings Banks' Deposits.—Improvement 265,607*l.* We under-estimated the effect of the concessions to depositors, which operated from the 1st of January 1880. As your Lordship is aware, the greater part of these concessions have since been cancelled.

Public Debt incurred.—Improvement 142,383*l.*, of which 119,369*l.* is set off by an entry under productive public works capital expenditure, as explained under that head.

Capital received from Guaranteed Companies.—Improvement 248,647*l.*, which is more than explained by the charging off, as expenditure, of the sum of 264,527*l.*, being the capital overdrawn by the East Indian Railway Company. The amount is one of the items entered upon our Indian books as expenditure, on the occasion of the purchase of the East Indian Railway, the net result of which entries is the sum 164,923*l.* as shown on the opposite side of the account. The estimate 220,000*l.* was, by an oversight, not entered in the regular estimate under this head.

Secretary of State's Bills.—Improvement 835,906*l.* Of this 486,947*l.* is nominal. Gold yielding this amount in London was bought in India and remitted home during the year. In the regular estimate these transactions were included under this head; but they were eventually recorded under the general remittance head. Of the remainder, 347,716*l.* (nearly the whole) is owing to the bills outstanding at the end of the year being, to this extent, more than the bills outstanding at the beginning of the year. (See Account No. 79.)

Other Deposits and Advances.—Worse 1,986,411*l.* Of this, 791,316*l.* is counter-balanced by entries on the opposite side of the abstract, namely:—

185,000, as explained under *Loans to Native States*.
119,369, as explained under *Public Debt incurred*.
486,947, as explained under *Secretary of State's Bills*.

791,316*l.*

The bulk of the residue is, doubtless, due to our under-estimate of the cost of the war.

17. The answer, therefore, to the question contained in your Lordship's telegram of July 14th is as follows:—

2,300,000*l.* had already appeared in the accounts of 1878–79 under the head of Advances.

The cash balance was actually less than our Regular Estimate by 1,163,000*l.*

The remainder (2,040,000*l.*) is due to the receipts being greater or the disbursements less under the various other heads of which particulars have now been given.

*

*

*

*

24. We have shown (*paragraph 11*) that during these two years the classified and audited expenditure on the war amounted to 6,682,063*l.*

The funds supplied to the Military Department in India during the two years exceeded the whole net classified and audited military expenditure by 3,863,500l., thus—

Funds supplied—

	£	£
1878-79	14,410,000	
1879-80	18,070,500	
		<u>32,480,500</u>
Classified and audited—		
1878-79	12,182,600	
1879-80	16,434,400	
		<u>28,617,000</u>
Still to be accounted for		<u>3,863,500</u>

This sum represents, roughly, the actual expenditure on the war to the end of 1879-80 in excess of the 6,682,063l. brought to account, so that the whole expenditure on the war in the two years must have been about 10,500,000l.

APPENDIX

RECEIPTS.	1879-80.		Increase.	Decrease.
	Regular Estimates.	Accounts.		
I.—Imperial	£ 67,315,300	£ 68,160,893	£ 845,593	£ —
II.—Public Debt incurred	9,264,500	5,191,886	—	4,072,614
III.—Treasury Notes	195,000	250,949	55,949	—
IV.—Service Funds, Civil	591,000	669,072	78,072	—
V.—Service Funds, Military	—	—	—	—
VI.—Savings Banks' Deposits	765,000	1,009,056	244,056	—
VII.—Excluded Local Funds	462,000	488,265	26,265	—
VIII.—Political and Trust Funds	74,000	54,658	—	19,342
IX.—Provincial and Local Surplus	324,000	633,077	309,077	—
X.—Other Deposits received, and Advances recovered.	12,208,900	47,350,538	35,141,638	—
XI.—Loans to Native States, Corporations, and Individuals, repaid.	1,078,000	1,255,075	177,075	—
XII.—Guaranteed Railway Capital received	2,022,600	2,221,536	198,936	—
XIII.—Local Remittances	178,000	272,606	94,606	—
XIV.—Inter-Provincial and Inter-Departmental Transactions.	25,663,000	21,194,689	—	4,468,311
XV.—Remittance Account with the Home Treasury.	1,335,600	1,314,848	—	20,752
Total	121,476,900	150,067,148	28,590,248	—
Balance April 1st	12,792,153	12,792,153	—	—
GRAND TOTAL	134,269,053	162,859,301	28,590,248	—

	1879-80.	
	Regular Estimates.	Accounts.
	£	£
I. & 1.—Surplus of Imperial Revenue apart from 1A	11,507,200	10,217,567
II. & 2.—Public Debt incurred	3,867,200	4,009,583
III. & 3.—Treasury Notes	156,000	85,151
IV. & 4.—Service Funds, Civil	170,000	151,684
VI. & 6.—Savings Banks' Deposits	117,000	382,607
VII. & 7.—Excluded Local Funds	—	23,841
IX. & 9.—Provincial and Local	265,000	613,299
X. & 10.—Deposits	255,400	—
XI. & 11.—Loans to Native States, Corporations, and Individuals	—	186,357
XII. & 12.—Guaranteed Railway Capital received	674,100	922,747
XIII., XIV. & XV. & 13 to 16.—Remittances	729,022	1,229,460
TOTAL	17,740,922	17,822,296

C.—INDIA.

DISBURSEMENTS.	1879-80.		Increase.	Decrease.
	Regular Estimates.	Accounts.		
1. Imperial Expenditure, excepting 1A.	£ 55,808,100	£ 57,943,326	£ 2,135,226	—
1A. Capital Expenditure on E. I. Railway	120,000	164,923	44,923	—
2. Public Debt discharged	5,397,300	1,182,303	—	4,214,997
3. Treasury Notes	39,000	165,798	126,798	—
4. Service Funds, Civil	421,000	517,388	96,388	—
5. Service Funds, Military	220,000	227,085	7,085	—
6. Savings Banks' Deposits withdrawn	648,000	626,449	—	21,551
7. Excluded Local Funds	479,000	464,424	—	14,576
8. Political and Trust Funds	134,000	60,821	—	73,179
9. Provincial and Local Deficits	59,000	19,778	—	39,222
10. Other Deposits repaid and Advances made	11,953,500	49,622,828	37,669,328	—
11. Loans advanced to Native States, Corporations, and Individuals.	1,251,000	1,068,718	—	182,282
12. Guaranteed Railway Capital withdrawn	1,348,500	1,298,789	—	49,711
13. Local Remittances	—	95,701	95,701	—
14. Inter-Provincial and Inter-Departmental Transactions.	25,539,078	20,378,678	—	5,160,400
15. Secretary of State's Bills on India paid	15,750,000	14,914,094	—	835,906
16. Remittance Account with the Home Treasury	908,500	1,078,304	169,804	—
Total	120,075,978	149,829,407	29,753,429	—
Balance March 31st	14,193,075	13,029,894	—	1,163,181
GRAND TOTAL	134,269,053	162,859,301	28,590,248	—

	1879-80.	
	Regular Estimates.	Accounts.
1A. Capital Expenditure on E. I. Railway	£ 120,000	£ 164,923
V. & 5. Service Funds, Military	220,000	227,085
VII. & 7. Excluded Local Funds	17,000	—
VIII. & 8. Political and Trust Funds	60,000	6,163
X. & 10. Deposits	—	2,272,290
XI. & 11. Loans to Native States, Corporations, and Individuals	173,000	—
15. Secretary of State's Bills paid	15,750,000	14,914,094
Balance increased	1,400,922	237,741
TOTAL	17,740,922	17,822,296

L O N D O N :
Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

AFGHAN CAMPAIGN (CASUALTIES).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons,
dated 11 August 1879;—for,

“RETURN per REGIMENT, TROOP, or BATTERY, of the Numbers KILLED
or DEAD of DISEASE or INVALIDED in each of the Three ARMIES
operating beyond the *Indus* in the late Campaign in *Afghanistan*, from
the Date of the Advance beyond our Frontier into the *Khyber Pass*, up
to the Return across the *Indus*, of the Regiments ordered back at the
Close of the Operations in the Field.”

India Office, }
6 February 1880. }

EDWARD STANHOPE,
Under Secretary of State.

(*Sir Arthur Hayter.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
13 February 1880.

RETURN showing the Numbers KILLED, DIED of DISEASE and INVALIDED, in each of the Three ARMIES operating beyond the *Indus* in the late Campaign in *Afghanistan*, from the Date of the Advance beyond our Frontier into the *Khyber Pass*, up to the Return across the *Indus*, of the Regiments ordered back at the Close of Operations in the Field.

PESHAWAR VALLEY FIELD FORCE.

CORPS.	Killed in Action or Died from Wounds.			Died of Disease.			Invalided.			TOTAL.			
	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	Total.
BRITISH TROOPS:													
9th Lancers	-	-	-	-	-	8	3	-	49	3	-	57	60
10th Hussars	-	-	1	1*	-	94*	1	-	61	2	-	156	158
D-A Royal Horse Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	8	1	-	8	9
H-C " " "	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	2	-	-	9	9
I-C " " "	-	-	2	1	-	11	-	-	18	1	-	31	32
C-3rd Royal Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	11	2	-	13	15
E-3rd " " "	-	-	-	-	-	16	-	-	7	-	-	23	23
13-9th " " "	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
1st Battalion, 5th Foot	-	-	-	2	-	27	3	-	48	5	-	70	75
" " 17th " "	1	-	5	3	-	36	-	-	80	4	-	121	125
" " 25th " "	-	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	47	-	-	51	51
" " 51st " "	-	-	1	-	-	34	-	-	49	-	-	84	84
" " 81st " "	-	-	1	-	-	3	3	-	259	3	-	263	266
4th Battalion, Rifle Brigade	-	-	-	3	-	80	1	-	198	4	-	278	282
TOTAL British Troops	1	-	11	10	-	323	14	-	832	25	-	1,166	1,191
NATIVE TROOPS:													
11th Bengal Lancers	-	-	1	1	-	15	-	-	18	1	-	34	35
18th " " "	-	-	2	1	-	10	-	-	9	1	-	21	22
Corps of Guides	1	1	7	-	-	22	-	-	55	1	1	84	86
Sappers and Miners (Head Quarters)	-	-	-	-	1	30†	-	3	57	-	4	87	91
6th Native Infantry	-	-	3	-	1	29	-	2	113	-	3	145	148
14th " " "	-	-	8	-	1	40	1	-	97	1	1	75	77
20th " " "	-	-	-	-	1	49	-	2	66	-	3	115	118
27th " " "	2	-	6	1	1	47	2	1	170	5	2	223	230
2nd Goorkhas	-	-	3	-	-	9	1	-	17	1	-	29	30
4th " " "	-	-	1	-	2	28	1	1	1	1	3	30	34
1st Sikh Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	63	1	-	27	1	-	90	91
Bhopal Battalion	-	-	-	-	-	36	-	2	47	-	2	83	85
Mhairwarra	-	-	3	-	-	16	1	1	52	1	1	71	73
Sappers and Miners (Madras)	-	-	-	1	1	22	-	-	8	1	1	30	32
TOTAL Native Infantry	3	1	34	4	8	416	7	12	667	14	21	1,117	1,152

KURAM FIELD FORCE.

BRITISH TROOPS:													
9th Lancers (1 Squadron)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NATIVE TROOPS:													
5th Punjab Cavalry	-	-	1	-	2	17	-	-	22	-	2	40	42
Sappers and Miners (1 Co.)	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	7	-	-	16	16
2nd Punjab Infantry	-	-	8	-	1	44	-	1	72	-	2	124	126
TOTAL Native Troops	-	-	9	-	3	70	-	1	101	-	4	180	184

* Includes one officer, 46 men drowned, accidentally, in crossing the Kabul River. † Includes three European Non-commissioned Officers.

KANDAHAR FIELD FORCE.

CORPS.	Killed in Action or Died from Wounds.			Died of Disease.			Invalided.			TOTAL.			
	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	Total.
BRITISH TROOPS:													
15th Hussars	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	10	2	-	11	13
I-1st Royal Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	2	-	-	5	5
P-4th "	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	4	1	-	6	7
16-8th "	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	2
70th Foot	-	-	-	-	-	19	3	-	77	3	-	96	99
TOTAL British Troops	-	-	-	2	-	26	5	-	93	7	-	119	126
NATIVE TROOPS:													
8th Bengal Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	-	6	1	-	11	12
3rd Peshawar Mountain Battery	-	-	-	-	-	20	1	-	26	1	-	46	47
Sappers and Miners (four Companies)	-	-	-	-	-	21	-	-	5	-	-	26	26
12th Native Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	65	1	-	1	1	-	66	67
26th "	-	-	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	-	14	14
32nd "	-	-	-	1	2	80	2	-	49	3	2	129	134
1st Goorkhas	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	2	71	2	2	74	78
1st Punjab Infantry	-	-	6	1	-	66	-	1	19	1	1	91	93
30th Bombay Native Infantry	-	-	-	1	1	34	-	1	15	1	2	49	52
TOTAL Native Troops	-	-	6	3	3	303	7	4	192	10	7	506	523

ABSTRACT.

FORCES.	Killed in Action or Died from Wounds.			Died of Disease.			Invalided.			TOTAL.			
	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	Total.
BRITISH TROOPS:													
Peshawar Valley	1	-	11	10	-	323	14	-	832	25	-	1,166	1,191
Kuram	-	-	-	2	-	26	5	-	93	7	-	119	126
Kandahar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL British Troops	1	-	11	12	-	349	19	-	925	32	-	1,285	1,317
NATIVE TROOPS:													
Peshawar Valley	3	1	34	4	8	416	7	12	667	14	21	1,117	1,152
Kuram	-	-	9	3	3	70	-	1	101	-	4	180	184
Kandahar	-	-	6	3	3	303	7	4	192	10	7	506	523
TOTAL Native Troops	3	1	49	7	14	794	14	17	960	24	32	1,803	1,859
GENERAL TOTAL													
	4	1	60	18	14	1,143	33	17	1,885	56	32	3,088	3,176

Office of Adjutant General in India, Simla,
10 December 1879.

(signed) T. E. Gordon, Colonel,
Deputy Adjutant General.

* Assassinated.

AFGHAN CAMPAIGN (CASUALTIES).

RETURN per REGIMENT, TROOP, or BATTERY, of the
Numbers KILLED or DEAD of DISEASE or INVALIDED
in each of the Three Armies operating beyond the
Indus in the late Campaign in *Afghanistan*, from
the Date of the Advance beyond our Frontier into
the *Khyber Pass*, up to the Return across the *Indus*,
of the Regiments ordered back at the Close of the
Operations in the Field.

(*Sir Arthur Hayer.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed
13 February 1880.

AFGHAN CAMPAIGN (CASUALTIES).

A M E N D E D R E T U R N

(in lieu of Return Ordered to be Printed 13 February 1880).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons,
dated 11 August 1879;—for,


“RETURN per REGIMENT, TROOP, or BATTERY, of the Numbers KILLED
or DEAD of DISEASE or INVALIDED in each of the Three ARMIES
operating beyond the *Indus* in the late Campaign in *Afghanistan*, from
the Date of the Advance beyond our Frontier into the *Khyber Pass*, up
to the Return across the *Indus*, of the Regiments Ordered back at the
Close of the Operations in the Field.”

India Office, }
23 July 1880. }

LOUIS MALLET,
Under Secretary of State for India.

(*Sir Arthur Hayter.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
26 July 1880.



	39th "	"	"	"	"	"	(e) 1	-	-	-	7	20	-	1	1	1	27	28
45th "	-	-	-	-	-	-	(e) 2	-	-	-	32	47	2	2	1	1	81	85
2nd Gorkhas	-	-	-	-	-	2	(f) 1	-	-	-	8	17	1	-	1	-	28	29
4th "	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	18	1	1	1	1	3	20	24
Corps of Guides	-	-	-	-	-	5	(g) 3	-	-	-	18	55	1	1	1	1	80	82
Hazara Mountain Battery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	1	-	-	-	4	5
1st Sikh Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	16	-	-	-	-	76	76
Bhopal Battalion	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	47	-	2	-	-	59	61
Mhairwarra Battalion	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	16	52	1	1	1	1	71	73
Sappers and Miners (Madras)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	8	1	-	-	-	12	13
TOTAL Native Troops	3	1	29	1	-	6	12	2	-	19	419	812	25	25	18	1,272	1,922	

KURAM FIELD FORCE.

[illegible]

KANDAHAR FIELD FORCE.

C O R P S.	Killed or Died of Wounds Received.					Died of Disease.			Invalided.			TOTAL.			R E M A R K S.		
	In Action.			Otherwise than in Action.		European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.		TOTAL.	
	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.												Men.
BRITISH TROOPS:																	
15th Hussars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	10	-	2	-	11	13	(a) Attacked by a fanatic at Kandahar.
A-B Royal Horse Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	13	-	-	-	20	20	
L-1st Royal Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	4	4	
D-2nd "	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	6	-	-	-	10	10	
E-4th "	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	4	-	1	-	6	7	
G-4th "	-	-	-	(a) 1	-	1	-	3	1	-	3	-	2	-	6	8	
16-8th "	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	2	
5-11th "	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
6-11th "	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	
11-11th "	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	2	
59th Foot	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	3	-	-	-	12	12	
2-60th Foot	-	-	-	-	-	(b) 2	-	9	1	-	29	-	1	-	38	39	(b) By Ghazis at Kandahar.
70th Foot	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	3	-	77	-	3	-	86	89	
TOTAL British Troops	-	-	-	1	-	3	-	47	8	-	147	-	12	-	196	208	
NATIVE TROOPS:																	
8th Bengal Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	-	6	-	1	-	11	12	(a) On escort duty.
19th "	-	-	-	(a) 1	-	-	1	23	-	1	24	-	-	2	48	50	
Sappers and Miners	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	-	-	(b) 21	-	-	-	40	40	(b) Includes one European.
12th Native Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55	1	-	-	-	1	-	55	56	
15th "	-	-	-	(c) 1	-	-	-	12	1	2	12	-	1	2	25	28	(c) Murdered by villagers.
19th "	-	-	-	(d) 2	-	-	-	25	1	3	30	-	1	3	57	61	(d) Murdered by fanatics.
25th "	-	-	-	(e) 1	-	-	3	42	-	2	66	-	-	5	109	114	(e) Murdered by Hill-men.
26th "	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	12	
32nd "	-	-	-	(f) 1	-	1	2	79	2	-	49	-	3	2	129	134	(f) Shot by the inhabitants.
1st Goorkhas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	2	71	-	2	2	74	78	
3rd "	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	7	1	-	25	-	2	1	32	35	(f) Shot by the inhabitants.
1st Punjab Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	33	-	-	36	-	1	-	70	71	
2nd "	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	2	41	-	-	2	61	63	

[illegible]

ABSTRACT:

C O R P S.	Killed or Died of Wounds Received.						Died of Disease.						Invalided.						Total.				REMARKS.
	In Action.			Otherwise than in Action.			Died of Disease.			Invalided.			Total.										
	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	Total.				
BRITISH TROOPS:																							
Peshawar Valley Force	1	-	13	-	-	1	6	-	242	14	-	837	21	-	1,093	1,114							
Kuram Force	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	26	2	-	192	2	-	222	224							
Kandahar Force	-	-	-	1	-	2	3	-	47	8	-	147	12	-	196	208							
TOTAL	1	-	17	1	-	3	9	-	315	24	-	1,176	35	-	1,511	1,546							
NATIVE TROOPS:																							
Peshawar Valley Force	3	1	29	1	-	12	2	6	419	19	18	812	25	25	1,272	1,322							
Kuram Force	3	1	34	-	-	3	-	6	201	7	9	264	10	10	502	538							
Kandahar Force	1	-	12	-	-	8	3	9	509	13	16	510	16	25	1,080	1,080							
TOTAL	7	2	75	1	-	23	5	21	1,129	38	43	1,586	51	66	2,813	2,930							
GENERAL TOTAL	8	2	92	2	-	26	14	21	1,444	62	43	2,762	86	66	4,324	4,476							

Office of the Adjutant General in India, }
Head Quarters, Simla, 19 May 1880. }

•
ARGHAN CAMPAIGN (CASUALTIES).

RETURN per REGIMENT, TROOP, or BATTERY,
of the Numbers KILLED or DEAD of DISEASE
or INVALIDED in each of the Three ARMIES
operating beyond the *Indus* in the late Cam-
paign in *Afghanistan*, from the Date of the
Advance beyond our Frontier into the *Khyber*
Pass, up to the Return across the *Indus*, of the
Regiments Ordered back at the Close of the
Operations in the Field.

(*Sir Arthur Hayter.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
26 July 1880.

AFGHANISTAN (1881) No. 1.



FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN,

INCLUDING

THE RECOGNITION OF SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN AS AMIR OF KABUL.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

[C.—2776.] *Price 1s. 2d.*

CONTENTS.

No.	—	From	To	Date.	Subject.	Page
1	Telegram	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	1880. 3 Jan.	Proposed assurance to Sirdar Shere Ali of Kandahar.	1
2	Letter	Government of India	" -	7 " (No. 2.)	Review of circumstances connected with the massacre of the British Mission at Kabul.	I.
3	"	"	" -	7 Jan. (No. 3.)	Policy to be adopted in reference to Afghanistan.	4
4	Telegram	Secretary of State	Viceroy - -	8 Jan.	Assurance to be given to Sirdar Shere Ali of Kandahar.	8
5	"	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	11 Feb.	Report of passage of the Oxus by Sirdar Abdul Rahman.	8
6	"	" - -	" -	3 March	Political arrangements at Kandahar.	9
7	"	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - -	4 "	Approving the above - -	9
8	"	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	14 "	Proposed recognition of Sirdar Abdul Rahman as ruler of Northern Afghanistan.	9
9	"	Secretary of State -	Viceroy - -	15 "	Conditionally approving the above.	9
10	"	Viceroy - -	Secretary of State -	17 "	Movements of Sirdar Abdul Rahman.	9
11	Letter	Government of India (with 6 enclosures.)	" -	31 " (No. 81.)	Recognition of Sirdar Shere Ali as Wali of Kandahar.	9
12	"	Government of India (with 3 enclosures.)	Secretary of State -	7 April (No. 90.)	Policy of the Government of India in Afghanistan.	14
12A	"	Mr. Griffin -	Sir F. Roberts -	15 April	Durbar at Kabul on the 13th April 1880.	16
13	"	Government of India (with 1 enclosure.)	Secretary of State -	27 April (No. 93.)	Kandahar Diary, 15th March 1880.	20
14	"	Government of India (with 4 enclosures.)	Secretary of State -	4 May (No. 104.)	Correspondence with Sirdar Abdul Rahman. Instructions to Mr. Griffin.	22
14A	"	Mr. Griffin -	Sir D. Stewart -	8 May	Date of Evacuation of Kabul -	28
15	Despatch	Secretary of State -	Government of India	21 May (No. 23.)	Policy of Her Majesty's Government in reference to Afghanistan.	29
16	Letter	Government of India (with 1 enclosure.)	Secretary of State -	15 June (No. 131.)	Kandahar Diary, 11th May 1880. Delivery of the Viceroy's letter to Wali Shere Ali.	34
17	"	Government of India (with 2 enclosures.)	Secretary of State -	15 June (No. 134.)	Reply of Wali Shere Ali to the Viceroy's letter.	35
18	"	Government of India (with 2 enclosures.)	Secretary of State -	—	Instructions to General Sir D. Stewart in reference to the political situation at Kabul.	37
19	"	Government of India	Secretary of State -	27 July (No. 166.)	Recognition of Sirdar Abdul Rahman as Amir of Kabul. Review of negotiations.	40

No.		From	To	Date.	Subject.	Page
20				1880.		
20		Correspondence between Mr. Lepel Griffin and Sirdar Abdul Rahman				46
20A	Letter	Mr. Griffin	Sir D. Stewart	4 Aug.	Interview with Sirdar Abdul Rahman.	51
21	Telegram	Viceroy	Secretary of State	5 "	Recommendation of Sir D. Stewart for evacuation of Kabul.	53
22	"	Secretary of State	Viceroy	6 "	Approving evacuation of Kabul.	53
23	Letter	Government of India (With 1 enclosure.)	Secretary of State	24 " (No. 191.)	Proposal of Sir D. Stewart for continuous withdrawal from Northern Afghanistan.	54
24	Telegram	Viceroy	Secretary of State	3 Sept.	Permission to Sirdar Abdul Rahman to occupy the Hariob District of the Kuram Valley.	56
25	Letter	Government of India (With 15 enclosures.)	"	14 " (No. 208.)	Withdrawal from the Khyber Pass and Kuram Valley. Future government of the Turi Tribe.	56
26	Despatch	Secretary of State	Government of India	30 Sept. (No. 40.)	Approving evacuation of Kabul and Northern Afghanistan.	88
27	Letter	Government of India (With 1 enclosure.)	Secretary of State	19 Oct. (No. 225.)	Delivery to Amir Abdul Rahman of a letter defining his political position.	88
28	Despatch	Secretary of State	Government of India	11 Nov. (No. 45.)	Policy of Her Majesty's Government in reference to Kandahar.	89
29	Telegram	Viceroy	Secretary of State	12 Nov.	Proposal of the Wali of Kandahar to retire to Karachi.	93
30	Letter	Government of India (With 11 enclosures.)	"	16 " (No. 233.)	Arrangements for future government of the Turi Tribe.	94
31	Telegram	Viceroy	Secretary of State	17 Nov.	Acceptance of retirement of Wali of Kandahar.	103
32	Despatch	Secretary of State	Government of India	19 " (No. 46.)	Approving arrangements in reference to the Khyber Pass and Kuram Valley.	103
33	Telegram	Viceroy	Secretary of State	30 Nov.	Intended departure of the Wali of Kandahar.	104
34	"	"	"	" "	Public announcement of the above.	104
35	Despatch	Secretary of State	Government of India	3 Dec. (No. 48.)	Review of negotiations with Sirdar Abdul Rahman.	105
36	"	"	"	17 Dec. (No. 53.)	Approving final arrangements for government of the Turi Tribe.	107
37	Telegram	President in Council.	Secretary of State	29 Dec.	Arrival of Sirdar Shere Ali at Karachi.	107

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 3rd January 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

FOLLOWING from Stewart, 1st. Begins :—Effect of Kabul disturbances begins to be felt here. Another Ghazee yesterday. Seditious meetings in mosques last two nights. Sirdar alarmed, and has twice asked permission to send his family to India. Please remember I have nothing to offer him but vague assurances, and cannot even promise our friend that we do not intend to abandon Kandahar again. Ends.

I consider it is now necessary to give Sirdar confidential but precise assurance, that if he behave well, Kandahar will be placed under his hereditary government, supported by us, in order to secure him to our interest, and detach him permanently from other influence, which may increase through his uncertainty of our intentions.

No. 2.

No. 2 of 1880. (Extract.)

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 7th January 1880.

In our letter, No. 160, of the 7th July last, we reviewed the course of events which preceded the signature of the treaty concluded at Gandamak with the Amir Yakub Khan. We explained the objects and reasons of this treaty, and stated the grounds upon which we considered ourselves justified in regarding it as an advantageous resettlement of our relations with Afghanistan. We drew attention, at the same time, to contingencies which might affect the character and permanence of the relations thus established; observing that the practical value of the treaty mainly depended upon the conduct or disposition of the Amir himself; that a settlement effected under the most favourable conditions, and with the most promising prospects, might be impaired by the disloyalty of Afghan princes; and that, for these reasons, we had been careful to render our position substantially independent of the caprices of any Afghan ruler, by securing permanent command of the main avenues from India into Afghanistan. But we thought, and still think, that the arrangements entered into with Yakub Khan at Gandamak were the best that could then be made; we believe that, at the time, the treaty was regarded by the Amir, and his best advisers, as a satisfactory conclusion of hostilities; and, even if an advance on Kabul had, in these circumstances, been justifiable, the serious inexpediency of it has, we think, been sufficiently proved by the political disorganization which has ensued from the unsought, and unavoidable, renewal of hostilities.

2. On the conclusion of the Treaty of Gandamak, the Amir returned to Kabul, accompanied by his Mustaufi, Habibulla Khan, his Commander-in-Chief, General Daud Shah, and a Native Agent in the employ of Sir Louis Cavagnari, named Bakhtiar Khan, who was entrusted with the duty of making preparations for the reception of the British Mission. As already reported to your Lordship, the Amir had at no time evinced reluctance to the subordination of his foreign relations to British control, as a necessary condition of British protection. This claim, with the subsidiary one requiring him to admit British officers to reside at certain places, not specified, within his territories, the Amir had accepted unhesitatingly. When these two conditions were proposed to His Highness in reply to his overtures for the cessation of hostilities, and for the renewal of friendship, he characterized the former as "a good and proper" proposal, in conformity with friendship, leaving "no room for discussion or refusal."

To the second condition the Amir added only the qualification that the British officer should reside at Kabul, under his immediate protection; and during subsequent negotiations the Amir's language certainly conveyed the impression that he admitted the presence of a British Envoy at his capital to be, on the whole, the best means of giving practical effect and recognition to the alliance between the two Governments. It had not been our intention to propose Kabul for the residence of our representative; but, when the capital was thus expressly selected by the Amir himself, there were many motives for deferring to the choice of His Highness, and there was no tenable ground for opposing it. If the Amir felt reluctance to the establishment of a British Embassy at Kabul, he certainly exhibited no sign of it, he raised no difficulties, he suggested no impediments, and while strenuously combating some clauses of the treaty he expressed, from first to last, no disinclination to receive the Envoy, nor any mistrust of his power to protect him.

3. In these circumstances, we deemed it desirable that the British Resident should proceed without delay to take up his appointment at Kabul. Assuming the Amir to be dealing with us in good faith, the advantage to both parties of early action under the treaty was incontestable, while hesitation or inactivity appeared likely to operate adversely not only to our own interests, but to those of the Amir. This view of the situation was strengthened by reports received from Bakhtiar Khan, whose letters warned Sir L. Cavagnari that the party opposed to the British alliance were making open endeavours to neutralize the effect of our recent successes, and to render the Amir averse to a liberal treatment of those persons in whose interests the amnesty clause had been framed, and in whose protection the honour of the British Government was specially concerned. The Amir himself had expressed to Bakhtiar Khan his desire for an early meeting with Sir Louis Cavagnari, and the impression produced by these letters and messages was that the mission should be organized as speedily as possible, and that it should proceed to Kabul without loss of time. This was undoubtedly the view of Sir Louis Cavagnari, who was at the time at Simla, and whose opinion on such a point necessarily carried great weight.

4. The constitution of the Envoy's staff, and of his escort, was carefully considered with Sir Louis Cavagnari at Simla. A strong military escort had been attached to Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission; but the duties which this escort was intended to perform, and the contingencies against which it was meant to provide, were of a wholly different character. Sir Neville Chamberlain, carrying with him valuable gifts for Sher Ali, was about to enter the country of predatory and probably hostile tribes, while the disposition of the Kabul Government toward his mission was very uncertain. Sir Louis Cavagnari, on the other hand, entered Afghan territory under the safe conduct and public guarantee of the Amir, who had recently been a guest in our own camp. Moreover, the strength of Sir Neville Chamberlain's escort, although, for the reasons above mentioned, it was in our opinion absolutely requisite, had furnished the late Amir with a pretext for attributing an unfriendly purpose to the mission which that escort accompanied. It had also been criticised by others, on the ground that, whilst too great for an escort, it was too small for an army, and calculated to provoke an opposition which no mere escort could overcome. Such criticism, though inapplicable to the conditions of Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission, would have been relevant to those which the Government of India had to consider in connection with the Embassy of Sir Louis Cavagnari. If our original plan of placing British officers at some points in Afghanistan, other than the capital, had not been overruled by the Amir's express stipulation regarding Kabul, it might have been expedient to attach to the Envoy a force that would have rendered him independent of the Afghan Government for protection against sudden attacks of local outbreaks. But Sir L. Cavagnari went, at the special desire of the Amir, to reside at the capital of the Amir's country, within the Amir's own stronghold, and in the closest proximity to the Amir's own residence. It was well known that the Bala Hissar was always occupied by the household troops upon whom the actual ruler believed he could best rely; and it was recollected that, at previous periods of extreme anarchy and revolt, the fort had afforded a secure refuge to those officers who succeeded in reaching it. To have required the Amir to entertain within the Bala Hissar a British escort sufficient for ensuring the safety of the Envoy in all eventualities, or to have demanded that these troops should be allowed to occupy an entrenched position within the Amir's own fortifications, would have been inconsistent with the whole character of the relations which Sir Louis Cavagnari's embassy represented; and compliance with such a demand would have relieved the Amir from the greater part of the responsibility

which his treaty guarantees had solemnly affirmed. It is probable, indeed, that a force of this strength and character would not have been admitted within the fortress ; while the objections against placing our Embassy, thus guarded, upon the confines of the city, would have been found to be very serious. All experience shows that in such situations the risk of collisions and misunderstandings is multiplied in proportion to the number of British soldiers and camp followers that are brought into contact with an armed and excitable population. The dangers to which Sir L. Cavagnari considered himself and those who accompanied him most liable were those of assassination by the hand of a fanatic, or assault provoked by some street quarrel between the soldiers of his escort and those of the Amir ; and he was therefore personally desirous that his staff and escort should be reduced to the most moderate and manageable dimensions. In accordance with these considerations, the Envoy's suit was restricted to a Secretary (Mr. Jenkyns), a Medical Officer (Dr. Kelly), and a Military Attaché (Lieutenant Hamilton) in charge of a carefully picked escort of 25 cavalry and 50 infantry of the Guide Corps.

5. Sir Louis started for Kabul from the British frontier at Thull on the 14th July, and entered that capital on the 24th of the same month. He was received beyond the Shutargardan pass by the Amir's Ministers and troops, treated with distinguished attention along the route, and conducted to the Court of His Highness with every possible demonstration of honour and respect, as a welcome guest. The unfortunate death of Bakhtiar Khan, who died suddenly, just before the arrival of the Envoy, had closed a valuable channel of information regarding intrigues or movements below the surface. So far, however, as the disposition of the Amir and his chief officers could be judged from their public acts, such as, for instance, their dismissal of the Russian Envoy, and their compliance with various minor requests and suggestions, it betrayed no tendency towards reaction against the British alliance. The letters and telegrams of the Envoy mentioned the disorderly and mutinous behaviour of some regiments recently arrived at Kabul from Herat, but expressed confidence in the Amir's determination and ability to remove or overcome any danger arising from the disaffection of the soldiery. There had been a dispute in the bazaar between some men of the British escort and some of these troops from Herat, but this had been settled to the satisfaction of Sir Louis Cavagnari ; the regiments from Herat were being paid off and dismissed to their homes, and the uneasiness caused by their presence and conduct at the capital appeared, from later news, to be passing away. The principal difficulties anticipated by our Envoy arose from the opposition of Sirdar Yahia Khan, the Amir's father-in-law, who had great influence with the Amir, and from the general discontent created throughout the country by the maladministration and oppression of the late Kabul Government, from which all classes hoped to obtain relief through the agency of the British representative. As regards the second article of the Gandamak Treaty, which engaged the Amir to publish a full and complete amnesty, Sir Louis more than once mentioned in his correspondence that the persons it concerned had not been dealt with in a liberal spirit, and that the Amir showed no disposition to treat them with generosity. He added, however, that there had been no actual infringement of the article ; that the persons protected by it had been molested neither in person nor in property ; and that His Highness had " done nothing and will do nothing " opposed to the letter of the treaty. His last letter (30th August) concluded with the words, " I personally believe that Yakub Khan will turn out to be a very good ally, " and that we shall be able to keep him to his engagements." Sir Louis Cavagnari always described the personal relations between himself and the Amir as satisfactory. The Amir had suggested that his proposed visit to the Viceroy should take place in the end of December, and had commenced some preparations for carrying it out. His Highness had given orders to tradesmen for the equipment of his retinue, and many of the later communications from Sir Louis Cavagnari referred to the details of the forthcoming visit. The last personal telegram addressed by Sir Louis to the Viceroy was on this subject. That telegram was dated the 2nd September, and it concluded with the words " all well."

6. On the 3rd of September the British Embassy at Kabul was attacked by three regiments, called the Ordal regiments, who had come to the Pay Office in the Bala Hissar to receive arrears of pay. These regiments, it is understood, were the Amir's household troops, composed of men picked from the whole army, and principally, it is said, recruited from the Wardak tribe. They were quartered in the Chaman, under the walls of the fort, and on that day had furnished several of the guards in the Bala Hissar. Two of these three regiments broke out into violent mutiny at the Pay Office

on finding that they were not to be paid up in full; and suddenly turned upon the Residency. The mutineers appear to have been joined by men from other regiments and by some of the city populace; they besieged the Residency from all sides in great numbers, the building was set on fire, and its defenders perished after a desperate resistance. The Government of India must lastingly deplore the untimely and irreparable loss of Sir Louis Cavagnari; who, by his life and death, has bequeathed to the service he adorned a splendid example, and to the Empire for whose interests he lived and died the grateful guardianship of his honoured memory and spotless name.

7. The first intelligence of this catastrophe was received on the morning of the 5th of September last; and on the afternoon of the following day General Roberts left Simla under instructions to lose no time in advancing upon Kabul with a force of between 6,000 and 7,000 men. General Massy was instructed to re-occupy the Shutargardan, and General Stewart to re-occupy Kandahar; whilst a force of the same strength was detailed for the re-occupation of Jellalabad, with an efficient reserve of 5,000 men between Rawal Pindi and Peshawur. We need not here recapitulate the results of these measures, which have been reported to your Lordship, as they occurred, in our preceding Political letters. Their practical consequence has been the occupation of Kabul and the re-occupation of Kandahar and Jellalabad, the voluntary abdication of the Amir Yakub Khan and his deportation at his own request to India, and the complete dissolution of the Afghan Government. These events have annulled the Treaty of Gandamak, and materially altered the situation to which that Treaty had reference.

8. In our accompanying Letter, No. 3, we shall state, and explain, the general principles on which, subject to the approval of them by Her Majesty's Government, we now contemplate the resettlement of our relations with the Afghan people, whenever adequate guarantees for the stability of such a resettlement shall have been thoroughly secured by the successful completion of our present military operations.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) LYTON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
" A. CLARKE.
" J. STRACHEY.
" E. B. JOHNSON.
" W. STOKES.
" A. R. THOMPSON.

No. 3.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 7th January 1880.

1. IN our letter, No. 2, of this day's date, we have reviewed the series of events which, terminating in the occupation of Kabul and the dissolution of Yakub Khan's Government, have annulled the Treaty of Gandamak, and totally altered the political situation to which that treaty was applied. It now devolves on us to indicate, so far as it is at present possible to do so, the general lines of the policy which, under these altered circumstances, we propose to adopt in pursuance of the object we have kept constantly before us, viz., the safety of the Indian Empire and the permanent tranquillity of our northern frontier.

2. Before proceeding, however, to the consideration of a future Afghan policy, we desire to express our strong conviction that no purely political action is desirable, or can be effective, until all military resistance has been effectually overcome, and the pacification of the country fully completed. We also feel that, owing to the unsettled

character of events now passing in Afghanistan, and our still imperfect knowledge of the changing influences by which, from day to day, they are forcibly affected, any present indication of future policy must necessarily be somewhat conditional and indefinite. In short, we can deal only with the general principles of arrangements, subject, in detail, to such modification as may hereafter be dictated by increased knowledge and experience.

3. The Treaty of Gandamak represented a final endeavour to bring into effect the policy of maintaining on our frontier a strong and independent kingdom with a foreign policy exclusively subordinate to British direction, a national unity relying upon the British Government for support against external aggression, and a commercial system connected with India by a natural community of interests. It had been in the hope of consolidating such an alliance that the British Government aided the Amir Sher Ali with money and arms, and enabled him, by his countenance and diplomatic support, to bring under his sovereignty a larger territory than had ever before been united under the rule of the Barakzais. But Shere Ali's estrangement from our Government increased in proportion to his power, until finally, at a critical moment, he leagued himself with a foreign Power which openly courted his friendship, in furtherance of projects and preparations directed against the Government of India.

4. After the discomfiture and death of Sher Ali, his son made overtures for the restoration of peace and friendship between the two Governments; and, believing, as we still do, that Sher Ali's estrangement arose partially from misunderstandings and other causes, to some extent at least preventible, we did not then abandon the hope that arrangements requisite for the permanent security of the Indian Empire might be reconciled with the maintenance of an independent and united Afghan kingdom under a friendly ruler. The result has disappointed this hope. The Amir Yakub Khan has failed altogether to maintain order even in his own capital, or to prevent the treacherous massacre of the British Embassy. The kingdom, laboriously recovered by Sher Ali, has fallen to pieces at the first blow; and it would now be a difficult if not impracticable task, even were it politically desirable, to reunite these fragments under any single ruler.

5. It must not be forgotten that the absorption of the Afghan principalities into one kingdom under Dost Muhammad, and again, after an interval, under Sher Ali, represented only a temporary, and to some degree an accidental, phase of their recent political history. In 1818, the Suddozai monarchy, after much internal dissension, was completely dismembered; and all its territories, except Herat, passed into the hands of different members of the Barakzai family. Dost Muhammad succeeded, after many vicissitudes, in obtaining possession of all the provinces which have since been recognized as belonging to Afghanistan. But he only established his permanent supremacy over Afghan Turkestan in 1850; Kandahar remained separate till 1856; and Herat did not surrender to him until just before he died in 1863. Immediately after Dost Muhammad's death, the ill-compacted and discordant kingdom was plunged into civil war, during the course of which Kabul and Herat became the head-quarters of rival Chiefs, until, after five years of anarchy, the Amir Sher Ali obtained the predominance which, partly through British countenance and support, he consolidated into a well defined kingdom. That kingdom, which it took Dost Muhammad a lifetime, and Sher Ali five years, to rebuild, has been again dissolved. Its provinces are left disconnected and masterless, and any attempt on our part to reconstitute them under one Government would commit us to a course of military and political interference which would certainly entangle us in great and protracted difficulties, and would end, as we believe, in failure.

6. We are of opinion, therefore, that the question of the resuscitation of the fallen kingdom of the Barakzais cannot now be entertained, and that we must accept the separation of its constituent provinces as our basis for the political reconstitution of Afghanistan. But, while the political conditions of the problem we have to deal with are thus altered, the military position, and the objects towards which our military and political action is directed, remain unchanged. It is our desire to avoid territorial annexation and the further extension of our administrative responsibilities. While maintaining a dominant influence over those provinces which form the outworks of our Indian Empire, we still desire to minimize our interference in their internal affairs; and it is still our wish to hold only such military positions as will enable us to maintain

that influence, by commanding the highways which cross our frontier. It has been to us a source of satisfaction to observe how fully the operations of the past autumn have justified the selection of the military positions secured under the Gandamak Treaty. When, in September last, a rapid march on Kabul became suddenly necessary, our forces already held open the two main lines of advance; our communications with India were established without difficulty, and our advanced position at Ali Khel gave us short and speedy access to the capital. Until all resistance has been overcome, and the situation has further developed, it is impossible to say precisely what military positions it may be necessary to hold permanently. But the unanimous opinion of the officers now holding high command in Afghanistan is that the military frontier should not be very materially extended beyond the line taken up under the treaty of last year, and to this line we propose to adhere as closely as circumstances permit.

7. In dealing with a disunited Afghanistan, the more difficult problems are presented by the remoter provinces. The value of Herat to India has been long recognized; and hitherto the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been to keep it in the hands of an independent Afghan State whose interests on that frontier of Afghanistan were considered to be identical with our own. But the circumstances which dictated that policy have now entirely changed; the Afghan States which we maintained in possession of Herat have ceased to exist; and it has become necessary to make, without delay, upon a different basis, some fresh dispositions for the conservation of our interests in this important fortress and province. It is obvious, however, that the distance of Herat from India places it beyond the ordinary range of our military operations, and would, therefore, render difficult the exercise of direct political control. The annexation of Herat to Kabul or Kandahar would neither be popular at Herat, nor provide for the political security of a province peculiarly exposed to the intrigues and cupidity of powerful neighbours; while, as a separate State, Herat would be too weak to stand by itself, and might thus be compelled, in default of control from India (which, as we have already said, would be difficult), to look elsewhere for protection and support. For these reasons we concur in the decision which, as we understand, has already commended itself to Her Majesty's Government on grounds of Imperial policy, whereby Persia will be provisionally permitted to occupy Herat, under sufficient guarantees for her good administration of it, and for her adequate protection of British and Indian interests at that point, and with a special reservation of our right to occupy the place with British forces in certain eventualities.

8. While the terms of this understanding with Persia will, we feel certain, receive from Her Majesty's Government an attention proportionate to the magnitude of the question it raises, and the interests it involves, we are more immediately concerned with those conditions which directly affect our dealings with the rest of Afghanistan. Of these, one of the most important is the future boundary to be assigned to Herat; and this is a point so intimately connected with the territorial and political re-arrangement of the rest of Afghanistan that, if any room is left for misunderstanding or dispute as to the extent of the territory to be assigned to Persia, much confusion and embarrassment may ensue. We are not yet in a position to demarcate this boundary, but we conceive that the question is one that should be decided mainly and specially on considerations of Indian interests and policy; and we are of opinion that Furrah certainly, and possibly Lash Jowain also, should be excluded from the territories placed under Persian control. We are now actively engaged in pushing forward a railway towards Kandahar; and, believing, as we do, that the opening of such communication affords the surest guarantee not only for the peaceful development of the countries traversed, but for the permanent security of our frontier, we consider that Persia should be bound to contribute substantially towards the ultimate extension of this line to Herat. It will be apparent to Her Majesty's Government that such an extension of our Kandahar Railway will be a most effective means of ensuring the stability of any political arrangement with Persia regarding Herat, and will materially strengthen Persia in fulfilling her engagements.

9. The question of Seistan is nearly connected with that of Herat. The conditions which justified our intervention and arbitration in 1872 no longer apply; and if it is decided to make over Herat to Persia, we are prepared to recommend a revision of the Seistan boundary also in favour of Persia. This, however, is likewise a question on which we are not yet in a position to express a decided opinion; though we trust that the decision of it will be practically left to this Government when the general delimitation of the provinces of Afghanistan is considered.

10. Assuming that Herat, and possibly a part of Seistan, will be bestowed conditionally upon Persia, and reserving for separate examination the questions that may arise as to the status of certain semi-independent tribes, we would propose to subordinate the remainder of Afghanistan, directly or indirectly, to distinct Native Governments at Kabul and Kandahar. There can, we conceive, be no doubt of the expediency of separating Kandahar from Kabul. The Duranis of South Afghanistan, who form the predominant class, have no leanings towards the Kabul Government, which has always represented, to the mass of the Kandahar people, an alien and oppressive rule. We propose, therefore, to establish the province of Kandahar as an independent and separate State, under an hereditary ruler selected from the representative of the old ruling families. Having regard to the advance of Persia to Herat, and the responsibilities devolving on us, in relation to that province, as well as to the maintenance of our due influence in Western Afghanistan, we consider that it will be necessary to retain a British garrison at or near Kandahar. But we contemplate no interference in the internal administration of the province. The ultimate boundaries of the province, and the precise terms of the treaty or agreement under which it is made over to the Native ruler, are questions on which we are not yet in a position to place our views before Her Majesty's Government; but they will receive our earliest attention, when the broader questions of policy have been decided.

11. The districts of Pishin, Sibi, and Kuram were assigned to us by the Amir Yakub Khan, under the Treaty of Gundamak, and are now being administered by our officers. We have had under consideration the question of restoring Pishin to Kandahar under its new constitution, and of transferring Sibi to the Khan of Khelat, in recognition of his loyal services during the late and present military operations. It appears to us, however, that there are objections to placing under a Native ruler populations that have once been under our own administration. Furthermore, Sibi and Pishin are both on the line of the proposed Sind-Kandahar Railway, which will run for a considerable part of its course through these districts; and, while the fact of its running through territory administered by us will undoubtedly facilitate the construction and working of this line, it seems also right and desirable that we should reap such profit and advantage as accrues from the development of the districts traversed by a railway constructed at our cost. There are also political advantages in interposing a belt of territory under British administration between the Afghan and Biluch provinces. For these and other reasons, therefore, we do not recommend any present change in the status of the assigned districts.

12. Of the future of Kabul it is difficult to speak at this moment, when military operations are still in progress around its capital. We are decidedly of opinion that this province must remain under military occupation until all resistance has ceased, and until its turbulent population has been thoroughly convinced of our military power, and of the futility of contesting it. Until this has been effected, any attempt at a political settlement would be delusive and dangerous. General Roberts has, however, already, by his large captures of guns, arms, and munitions of war of all kinds, done much to weaken that military power which the Amir Sher Ali had so carefully fostered; and we trust that it will be thoroughly broken by the result of the present operations. When this task has been fully accomplished, and not till then, it will be possible to undertake the political settlement of the country. In this part of the country the disorganization is more complete, and the elements of disorder are stronger and more intractable than elsewhere; and it is impossible at present to forecast with any precision the period within which our occupation of the capital and our direct authority over the surrounding districts are likely to be withdrawn. Our aim, however, is to minimize that occupation and control, and ultimately to make over the internal administration to a Native ruler in subordinate alliance with ourselves, supported and controlled by a strong British cantonment established at some suitable point. Where, however, that cantonment should be, and what should be our permanent line of communication with Kabul, we are not yet in a position to state. The determination of such questions requires more accurate knowledge than we yet possess of the country generally, and a more detailed examination than has yet been made of the several routes and their capabilities for roads or railways.

13. We are unable at present to make distinct proposals regarding the Oxus provinces of Afghanistan. Our information about the events and state of feeling in that country is at present most scanty; it is divided from Kabul by a strong natural boundary, and our interests, whether strategic or political, in these districts are.

comparatively, of minor and less pressing importance. So long, therefore, as Russia observes the engagements which place all Afghan-Turkestan beyond the sphere of her political action, we should deprecate interference with these provinces, which might remain nominally subject to the Kabul Governor, though enjoying practical independence. But on this side, our policy must largely depend upon the action of Russia; and upon the truth, or otherwise, of the rumours which ascribe to that Power the intention of moving forces to the Oxus, next spring, with ulterior designs against Afghanistan. We consider our withdrawal from Kabul to be impossible if the Oxus provinces are entered, or seriously threatened, by a foreign Power; and indeed any political interference from beyond the Oxus would unavoidably embarrass our plans for the evacuation of Kabul. We earnestly trust, however, that Her Majesty's Government will be able to secure us against any such contingency, which might not only necessitate the continued occupation of Kabul, but might possibly compel us to uphold, by force of arms, our supremacy up to the banks of the Oxus.

14. Such are, in general outline, the arrangements we should regard as most suitable for the resettlement of our permanent relations with the Afghan States, whenever the requisite material conditions for the stability of such arrangements have been effectually secured. We consider that the outlines thus sketched may, with safety and advantage, be firmly filled in, as time proceeds and opportunity occurs. And, although the task immediately before us is the removal or destruction throughout Northern Afghanistan of all existing means of armed menace or resistance to our authority, we are of opinion that, when this task has been completed, the political arrangements above indicated will be more conducive than direct annexation, or permanent military occupation, to the attainment of that object which we have already described as the untroubled peace, and improved defensive power, of the Indian Empire, so far as these depend upon the military strength of its north-western frontier, and the undisputed character of its relations with the States beyond.

15. It is, at present, impossible to foresee the precise duration of our military operations in Northern Afghanistan; and we consider that our troops should in any case visit Ghazni and the Hindu-Kush boundaries of the Kabul province before permanently withdrawing from the country. But, subject only to the demarcation of boundaries which cannot yet be undertaken, we recognize no serious impediment to the early application to Kandahar and Herat of the principles discussed in paras. 7 and 8 of our present letter.

	We have, &c.,
(Signed)	LYTTON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
"	A. CLARKE.
"	J. STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	W. STOKES.
"	A. R. THOMPSON.

No. 4.

TELEGRAM from the SECRETARY OF STATE, 8th January 1880, to VICEROY.

(Extract.)

OUR intention to protect Shere Ali in the Governorship of Kandahar may be communicated to him.

No. 5.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 11th February 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

RUMOUR from Turkestan that Abdul Rahman has crossed the Amu and occupied Ghor, that Sultan Murad Khan has joined him, and that troops sent by Gholam Hyder to oppose him have gone over to him.

No. 6.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 3rd March 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE. (Extract.)

ST. JOHN has brought here friendly letter from Sirdar Sher Ali. St. John returns to Kandahar immediately to assume separate political charge on Stewart's departure for Ghuznee. It seems advisable he should take reply from Viceroy to Sher Ali, communicating informally to Sirdar the substance of arrangements proposed regarding Kandahar, mentioning also railway, light subsidy towards cost of troops, and British control of external relations. Sirdar now has verbal assurances only. No objection on his part anticipated.

No. 7.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 4th March 1880, to VICEROY.

YOURS, yesterday. Your proposals as to Sher Ali approved.

No. 8.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 14th March 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE. (Extract.)

NECESSARY to find, without delay, some Native authority to which we can restore Northern Aghanistan, without risk of immediate anarchy, on our evacuation of Kabul not later than next autumn, and, if possible, earlier. No prospect of finding in country any man strong enough for this purpose. I therefore advocate early public recognition of Abdur Rahman as legitimate heir of Dost Mahomed, and open deputation of Sirdars with British concurrence to offer him throne of Afghanistan, as sole means of saving country from anarchy.

No. 9.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 15th March 1880, to VICEROY. (Extract.)

YOURS, yesterday. Assuming that Abdul Rahman is acceptable to the country, and that he would be contented with Northern Afghanistan, it is desirable to support him at Kabul.

No. 10.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 17th March 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

Griffin reaches Kabul on 20th, and will lose no time in endeavouring to ascertain precise whereabouts of Abdul Rahman, but I have now received authentic intelligence that the Sirdar is in Afghan Turkestan, having lately arrived there from Badakshan, where he defeated the Mir Shahzada Hassan, who has fled to Mustoj.

No. 11.

No. 81 of 1880. (Extract.)

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 31st March 1880.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 4th March, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers

regarding the recognition of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan as independent ruler of the province of Kandahar.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) LYTTON.
E. B. JOHNSON.
RIVERS THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th February 1880.

From SIR D. STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

FORMAL orders from Commander-in-Chief for advance to Ghazni under my personal command received. Hope to be in position to move by 20th March. I beg to reiterate request for instructions ratifying continuance of political relations here. Sirdar is as yet uninformed of my projected departure, and will naturally be anxious about future arrangements. The transition should be therefore so managed as to be as little abrupt as possible. I consider that he should be informed at an early date of proposed movement and political arrangements. If these are to be left to me, I will at once submit details for approbation, but would first ask name of the officer appointed to command Bombay troops, which I understand are to remain under my general control even after I leave Kandahar. Also Euan Smith having arrived, is St. John at liberty to leave?

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

TELEGRAM, No. 593 E.P., dated 12th February 1880. (Extract.)

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar.

YOURS 11th. Please submit detailed proposals for political arrangements at Kandahar, including terms of future relations with Sirdar, assistance he may need, and territory to be placed under his government. St. John should remain for the present transition. Name of officer to command troops will follow.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

No. 68 G., dated Kandahar, 16th February 1880.

From Lieutenant-General SIR D. M. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN compliance with the instructions conveyed in your telegram of the 12th instant, I have the honour to submit proposals, detailed as much as possible under the circumstances, for future political arrangements in Southern Afghanistan.

The subject naturally divides itself under two heads—the extent and nature of the authority to be enjoyed by Sirdar Shir Ali Khan, and of the control to be exercised over his rule by the representative of the Government of India; secondly, the machinery for carrying out that control.

2. The minimum boundaries of the State over which the independent authority of the Sirdar is to be acknowledged have already been practically fixed, and include the province of Kandahar proper, excluding the assigned districts of Pishin and Sibi with possibly that part of Afghan Seistan watered only by the Helmund; the district of Kelat-i-Ghilzai separated from Kandahar in 1855; the districts of Pusht-i-Rud and Zamindawar, separated about nine years ago; and the district of Farah originally belonging to Herat, but which has formed a separate province since the capture of that city by the Amir of Kabul in 1863.

3. Our limited knowledge of the topography of these countries renders it impossible to define with sufficient accuracy the boundaries of the State formed by the aggregation of these provinces and districts, but, a cutting herewith enclosed from the latest

map issued by the Survey Department shows its extent and approximate limits. In general terms they would include the whole basin of the Helmund as low down as Rudbar, with the exception of the upper valleys of those of its tributaries which rise in the independent and Hazara and Pathan countries, and of the valley of the Tarnak beyond the Kelat-i-Ghilzai district. North of the Helmund the new State would include the lower part of the valleys of the Har-rub and Farah-rub, and to the south so much of the desert round the dependent principality of Kharan as intervenes between Persian and Biluch territory. This is at present quite indefinable. Azad Khan of Kharan in correspondence which is now in my hands declares his independence of, and contempt for, the Khan of Kelat, and acknowledges himself a vassal of Kandahar, which vassalage has, I believe, been recognized by Her Majesty's Government. If this be the case, the southern frontier of Afghanistan is very incorrectly shown in the Surveyor-General's map attached. But the question of the sovereignty over the desert south of the Helmund is a matter of very minor importance as regards Kandahar. The only object of the Khan of Kharan in declaring himself a subject of Afghanistan was to free himself from dependence on his two immediate neighbours, Persia and Kelat. Whether Kharan remains with or is separated from Kandahar will, I believe, be a matter of indifference to Sirdar Shir Ali Khan.

4. Supposing Kharan and the adjacent desert to remain attached to Kandahar, the State thus formed would be shown in the map by an irregular figure not far removed from an equilateral triangle with sides nearly 400 miles in length and covering about 70,000 square miles. A very small portion of this is cultivated or indeed cultivable. The number of inhabitants I am inclined to place somewhere between half a million and a million, three-fourths of them being Duranis, according to their own account, the only true Afghans.

5. The revenue for the next year (1880-81) has been estimated by Major St. John at 20½ lakhs, a total which will be largely increased by settled government, and still more by the construction of a railway from India to Kandahar.

6. The above is a brief definition of the State over which the tide of affairs has unexpectedly called Sirdar Shir Ali Khan to rule.

7. As regards the measure of authority to be allowed to him, I have no hesitation in recommending that this should be as ample as possible. The only limitations I would recommend being placed on his authority are that foreign relations should be wholly conducted through the representative of Her Majesty's Government, with the possible exception of any Native State which may be formed at Kabul; that his military force should be limited in numbers and at the disposal of the Government of India for the defence of Kandahar against external enemies; and that commercial relations must be the subject of mutual agreement at stated intervals.

8. In all other matters, the Sirdar for whom I would suggest *Wali* as a suitable title, should be entirely free from control; but, for the support of the British force it would be necessary to keep in his country or on its borders, he should contribute a certain fixed amount of coin or grain, preferably the latter.

9. For telegraph and railway construction and maintenance it would be impossible to insist on any contribution now, but this question like that of commerce may be specially excepted from any treaty as subjects for future agreement.

10. The question of the location of a force above the Passes is not one for full discussion in this letter, but I am of opinion that it will be advisable to continue the location of the main cantonment in or about Kandahar instead of shifting it to Pishin. But I think that the Sirdar will never feel himself independent, or be looked on as independent by his people, with British soldiers in his citadel, or within a stone's throw of his gates; and I therefore consider that the British garrison should, as soon as circumstances permit, be established at some distance from the capital, and that the position of the troops should be *mutatis mutandis* that of the garrison of Secunderabad in the Deccan.

11. I am not yet prepared to give a decided opinion as to the best site for a cantonment. More detailed surveys of the country are required, and the settlement of the railway question and other points must be awaited. But the locality fixed on should, I think, be not less than five or more than twenty miles from the city.

12. As regards political control, I think that the safest plan will be to follow the ordinary precedent by keeping the political and military authority in separate hands,

except on those special occasions when important military operations are in actual progress. From certain points of view it would no doubt be convenient to entrust both duties to the same individual, and officers are, no doubt, to be found equally competent for both. But in practice it might, I feel sure, be productive of gross evils if our political relations with the country were to fall into the management of any officer who might chance to fall into the military command.

13. This part of the question is one that requires most careful consideration. The maintenance of satisfactory relations with the ruler of Kandahar and the attitude of the Afghan authorities towards the British officers entrusted with the conduct of affairs in Southern Afghanistan will, in a very great measure, depend on the personal qualifications of the officer who may be appointed by Government to hold chief political authority in that quarter. In my opinion the strongest Political officer in Government service should be selected for this important duty; he should be made Resident and Agent, Governor-General, in Southern Afghanistan; his authority should extend to Biluchistan, and the general conduct of the affairs of that Agency should be placed entirely under his control, the appointment of Agent, Governor-General, in Biluchistan being thus no longer rendered necessary. These measures would, in my opinion, be productive of great advantages to the public interests, but it is of the last importance that the officer selected for this duty should be thoroughly well qualified to deal with the Afghan authorities, whether as regards his knowledge of the Persian language, his political experience or his capabilities for obtaining and retaining the friendship, confidence, and respect of those with whom he has to deal.

14. The measures proposed above must of course be considered as furnishing merely a general outline of the course that, in my opinion, should be followed by Her Majesty's Government with regard to Southern Afghanistan and the Kandahar Sirdar; and the details of such measures will have to be very carefully considered, if once the general basis be approved. Colonel St. John, who leaves for Calcutta this day, is in full possession of the ideas and wishes of Sirdar Shir Ali Khan as to the future of this part of the country, and having my full confidence is also well acquainted with my own views on the subject. These views I have commissioned him to submit fully for the consideration of the Government of India.

Enclosure 4 in No. 11.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR SHERE ALI to the address of HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY AND GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA, 5th Rabi-ul-Awal 1297 H., corresponding with the 16th February 1880.

After compliments. As at this auspicious time my illustrious and kind friend, Colonel St. John, is about to go and wait upon your Excellency, I thought it expedient to bring my sincerity to the notice of your Excellency through this letter. I hope that after Colonel St. John has seen your Excellency he will mention before your Excellency all that I have represented to him regarding my goodwill and firm devotion (to the British Government).

As General Sir D. Stewart has been very kind to appoint me, on behalf of the British Government, to the Governorship of Kandahar and its dependencies, I beg to offer my grateful thanks to the Government of Her Imperial Majesty the Queen-Empress, and to your Excellency for this great kindness. It is incumbent on me to thank also General Sir D. Stewart, Colonel St. John, and their subordinate officers, before your Excellency, for their kindness and help, especially for those of the last-named officer and his subordinates which have secured peace and tranquillity to the people of the province, who feel themselves grateful for the kindnesses of the British Government.

Enclosure 5 in No. 11.

To His Highness SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kandahar and its Dependencies.

MY HONOURED AND VALUED FRIEND,

Fort William, 13th March 1880.

It has given me much pleasure to read the expressions of friendship contained in your Highness' letter, and I have to assure you that your Highness' honourable and

straightforward conduct is fully appreciated, and will always be remembered by the British Government. It is a source of congratulation both for England and for the Durani nation that one of the descendants of Payindah Khan has continued in the straight part of rectitude, and has not wandered into the waterless desert of dishonour and faithlessness.

For good service and faithful conduct reward is justly due, and it is also incumbent on those to whom God has given high birth and capacity for government that they should not shrink from the duty imposed on them. Therefore I have great pleasure in announcing to you that Her Majesty the Queen-Empress has been pleased to recognize your Highness as independent ruler of the province of Kandahar according to limits to be hereafter defined. For the consolidation of your power, and for the proper guardianship of the frontiers of Her Majesty's Empire, it is necessary that a force of Her Imperial troops remain in a cantonment at or near the city of Kandahar. It will therefore be right and proper that a certain portion of the grain revenue of the State, to be fixed hereafter by mutual agreement, should be allotted yearly towards the provision of supplies for these troops. It is also expedient that a special officer of rank shall be deputed to reside in the cantonment as a medium of friendly communication, and to conduct the relations of the British Government with the States upon the frontiers of your Highness' territory. Upon this understanding the government will remain entirely in the hands of your Highness under the protection of the great Government of England.

At a future time it may be necessary to draw up a formal record of the terms upon which your Highness has entered into possession of your country, but this must be postponed until the affairs of other parts of Afghanistan shall have been settled, when the respective interests of British India and Kandahar will have become more fully known.

Your Highness is doubtless aware that Her Majesty's Government has constructed a railway to Sibi to be continued to Kandahar. No greater benefit could be bestowed on the country, since by the commercial advantages and general facilities of friendly intercourse that will thus be secured, the prosperity of the Durani people, and their close connection with the great and powerful British Government, will, if it please God, become firmly established.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself your Highness' sincere friend.

(Signed) LYTTON,
Viceroy and Governor General of India.

Enclosure 6 in No. 11.

No. 1093 E.P., dated Fort William, 23rd March 1880.

From H. M. DURAND, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Lieutenant-General SIR D. M. STEWART, K.C.B., commanding in Southern Afghanistan.

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter No. 68 G., dated 16th February 1880, submitting proposals for future political arrangements in Southern Afghanistan.

2. In reply, I am to forward, for your information, copy of a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General to the address of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, dated 13th March 1880, that Her Majesty the Queen Empress has been pleased to recognise the Sirdar as independent ruler of the province of Kandahar according to limits to be hereafter defined. The original of this letter has been entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel O. St. John, C.S.I., for delivery to the Sirdar.

3. I am to add that the several measures proposed in your letter under reply will be considered in detail hereafter.

No. 12.

No. 90 of 1880. (Extract.)

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 7th April 1880.

WE have the honour to submit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers noted in the accompanying Abstract of Contents, which will serve to show the present situation of affairs in Afghanistan.

2. The policy we are endeavouring to carry out is summed up in the Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General, which forms one of the enclosures to this Despatch. In pursuance of this policy, we have, as already reported, recognized Sirdar Sher Ali Khan as independent ruler of the province of Kandahar. The letter to the Sirdar, a copy of which was submitted with our Despatch of the 31st March, has not yet been formally presented to him, but Colonel St. John, to whose care it was entrusted, reports the Sirdar has been informed of its purport, and Her Majesty's Government is now pledged to support him as ruler of the province. He has expressed his readiness to accept the position, and has been assured that aid in money and material will be freely afforded to him if it should be required to consolidate or extend his rule in the interests of Her Majesty's Indian Empire. The separation of Kandahar from Kabul is therefore an accomplished fact, and the independence of Sher Ali Khan has been solemnly guaranteed.

3. In Kabul no final arrangement has yet been made. The disturbed state of the country and the difficulty of finding among the principal Barakzai Sirdars a man of any capacity or influence has obliged us to defer the recognition of a Chief. But after careful consideration we have arrived at the conclusion that Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, whose presence in Afghan Turkestan is now beyond doubt, would, if willing to accept the province of Kabul without Herat or Kandahar, be more likely than any other member of the family to prove a successful ruler; and we are now endeavouring to enter into communication with him.

4. As regards Herat, it is unnecessary for us to enter into any detailed examination of the state of affairs. It will be seen from Colonel St. John's telegram of the 6th April, a copy of which is enclosed, that Sirdar Ayub Khan is apparently trying to secure our acknowledgment of his title. No communication will be made to him unless he puts forward a clear expression of his wishes.

5. The nature of the future Government of Herat does not, in our opinion, press for settlement. But we consider that the means of influencing Herat from Kandahar will be secured to us by the railway, which will, we hope, be completed early next year as far as Kandahar.

6. In the meantime General Stewart has been directed to march to Ghazni, with the object of breaking any opposition he may find there, and opening direct communication with Sir F. Roberts. This measure was, in our opinion, necessary to overawe opposition and convince the populations concerned that we are in a position to dictate on our own terms the settlement of the questions we are dealing with. We do not, however, desire that Sir D. Stewart's force should remain for long in Ghazni, and arrangements will be made to enable him to leave the place as soon as all opposition is at an end.

7. The movements of our troops in Afghanistan have been guided by the principle that we do not advance to any point of which we are not prepared to retain military occupation as long as our presence there may be demanded by the political situation; and this principle is not departed from in the proposed march to Ghazni. For this march is not an advance, but merely a lateral movement along the direct line connecting General Stewart at Kandahar with General Roberts at Kabul; and the evacuation of Ghazni will not involve any retreat, as the Bengal troops, of which General Stewart's division is composed, can, when at Ghazni, either march to Kabul and thence re-enter India by the Khyber, or return to India, direct by the Kuram.

route, as may be found most expedient on their arrival at Ghazni, by which time the political situation will be further developed.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) LYTTON.
E. B. JOHNSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

MINUTE by the VICEROY, dated 30th March 1880.

ANNEXED is a copy of a telegram from General Sir D. Stewart, dated 29th instant in reply to one sent to him by the Military Department.

I am at a loss to understand why Sir D. Stewart has not received the programme for field operations now being commenced.

It is essential that he should be at once fully informed of the entire plan of operations, and of the political objects desired by the Government of India.

The latter may be thus summed up. The Government is anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the troops from Kabul, and from all points beyond those to be occupied under the Treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. In order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a ruler for Kabul, which will be separated from Kandahar. Steps are being taken for this purpose.

Meanwhile it is essential that we should make such a display of strength in Afghanistan as will show that we are masters of the situation, and will overawe disaffection. But it is not desirable to spread our troops over a large tract of country, or to send small columns to any place where they would encounter opposition, and increase the hostile feeling against us. All that is necessary from the political point of view is for General Stewart to march to Ghazni, break up any opposition he may find there, or in the neighbourhood, and open up direct communication with General Sir F. Roberts at Kabul. This he can do either by the direct route, or by Kushi, as he may think to be most expedient, under such conditions as may exist when he is at Ghazni.

It is not desirable that Sir D. Stewart's troops should remain for long at Ghazni; and it is, therefore, necessary that all military dispositions should be made with a view to enabling him to leave Ghazni as soon as he has put down any open opposition that he may find there.

It is very desirable that the conduct of operations in Afghanistan should, as soon as possible, be brought under one head. Sir D. Stewart should, therefore, assume the supreme command as soon as he is in direct communication with Kabul. In the meantime he should be daily kept informed, both by the Foreign Department and the Military Department, of all news received from Kabul, or from any part of the Khyber or Kuram lines of communication, so that he may be constantly and fully made aware of the exact state of the situation at all points.

This Minute, together with the annexure, should be at once communicated *in extenso* by clear the line telegraph to the Commander-in-Chief; and his Excellency should be requested to state at once by telegraph to Secretary to Government, Military Department, what instructions should, under these conditions, be sent to Generals Sir F. Roberts and Sir D. Stewart.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th March 1880, from General Sir D. M. STEWART, Kandahar, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

I AM not in possession of the orders of Government; nor have I received the programme for field operations now being commenced, but I would point out that I am carrying forward from hence supplies for two months, and that I shall not require to draw more European supplies from India by Kabul or Kuram until the end of May. If it is intended that the division under my command move forward beyond Ghazni towards Kuram, supplies should be collected at some place in Kuram, where the troops under my command may pass the remainder of the hot weather. By the information which I have received, no opposition is likely to be encountered at Ghazni, which may not be easily overcome by the troops with which I am advancing. The movement of a column from Kabul to meet the division under

my command will, in my opinion, increase the strain upon the country which the demands of this division for native supplies must entail. The collections of tribesmen under Muhammad Jan and Muskh-i-Alam have already drawn largely upon the supplies which are procurable in the neighbourhood of Ghazni, and the uncertainty which prevails throughout the country has doubtless prevented large arrears from being cultivated this spring. It is only with difficulty that sufficient transport has been obtained to allow of the division under my command being moved with full equipment, and I am calculating on replacing casualties amongst baggage animals by purchases made at Ghazni. I submit for consideration that it is very desirable that no movement of troops belonging to Kabul or Kuram command should be made in advance of Kushi. I have this morning received a telegram from Sir F. Roberts that he only proposes to supply for my division at Ghazni, tea, sugar, and possibly rum, and that for all other supplies I must depend upon the country. I hope it will be understood that I do not require any supplies to be advanced from Kabul to meet me; and that, if orders are given for my division to remain at Ghazni, I would at once establish communication with Kabul or Kurum, as may be desired, sending my own transport to bring forward necessary supplies. I make this statement, not with a view of disturbing any approved plan of operations, but in order that there may be no misconception regarding the difficulty of feeding a large force at Ghazni during the present season.

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th April 1880.

From COLONEL ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Calcutta.

SIRDAR ABDUL SALAM, who came from Herat in December last as Envoy from Ayub and returned in January, has sent his confidential servant to me with a letter reporting arrival of Persian Commissioner. He offers to be medium of communication with Ayub in our interests, and asks for confidential agent to be sent to him at Herat, or letter declaring that the English Government wish to have friendship and services of Ayub. He hints that Ayub is hesitating between Persia and England, but inclines to latter. Messenger reports that Persian Commissioner left two days before he did, while letter speaks of him as still there. He says Ayub is practically in hands of Kabuli troops, who for two months would not let him leave his house. Object of letter appears to be acknowledgment of Ayub's title to Herat, overtures to Persia having finally failed. I presume letter may be answered in accordance with previous communications, namely, that Ayub can do as he likes; that we want nothing from him; and that if he wants anything from us he should express his wishes.

No. 12A.

No. 5, S. P. C., dated Kabul, 15th April 1880.

From LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., C.S.I., Chief Political Officer, Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, to Lieutenant-General Sir F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding at Kabul. (Extract.)

A durbar was held at 4 o'clock on Tuesday the 13th instant, which was attended by all the Sirdars, Chiefs, and Maliks of Kabul and its neighbourhood, many of the Hazaras, and of the trading classes; a large number of British officers in Kabul were also present. The proceedings were opened by a short speech from Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, a copy of which is herewith forwarded, and were concluded by an address in which I endeavoured to explain both to the Sirdars and people generally, and to the delegates from Maidan, what were the general intentions of the Government, and specially with reference to the representations which had been put forward: a copy of the paper of requests of the Ghazni party with the address has been already forwarded to you. That portion of the Government programme to which I did not allude in the speech was the separation of Herat from Northern Afghanistan, for the reason that I had understood from the Government of India that no final arrangements had been made with regard to Herat, and that its future disposal was consequently still uncertain. Such being the case, and as there was no special

necessity for declaring the policy of Government on this point, I considered it would be more convenient to the Government were any distinct declaration of its intention to separate Western Afghanistan from Kabul deferred.

The effect of the Durbar has been reported from many quarters to have been good, although a large number of representatives are undoubtedly much disappointed that the return of Ameer Yakub Khan has been categorically refused to them. Still all are satisfied that some definite reply has been given.

The allusion in the speech to the Government being the friend, and not the enemy, of Islam; to the large Muhammadan population which lived in perfect liberty under the British rule in India; and to the fact that the Government has several times interposed, at great cost in money and men, to preserve the integrity of the dominions of the Sultan of Turkey, has been welcomed and largely discussed in the mosques and elsewhere.

PAPERS REFERRED TO IN THE ABOVE.

Translation of a document brought before the Chief Political Officer on the
11th April 1880.

We, the undersigned, as representatives of the tribes of Afghanistan, send the following representations to the British Government:—

I. Friendship between the people of Afghanistan and the great British Government should be re-established, as of former years, inasmuch as in this way the interests and welfare of both parties would, God willing, be secured.

II. Our King and Ruler should be released and restored to his former power; and we, the tribesmen, guarantee that, by the blessing of God, he will maintain a lasting and sincere friendship towards the British Government, and that both parties will have identical interests.

III. The British Agent, whoever he may be, should be of the Muhammadan religion, while all British troops should be withdrawn from our country.

IV. The kingdom of Afghanistan should be restored in its entirety to its King and Ruler. In this way it will be able to cope with its foreign enemies.

V. The British Government should furnish such assistance to the King and Ruler of Afghanistan as it may think best for the interests of both parties.

VI. Immediate assistance should be given to the Ameer, seeing that the country has been desolated and nothing of value is left, as the British authorities are themselves thoroughly aware.

We hope that the great British Government will grant these the expressed wishes of the tribes of Afghanistan, as they consult the interests of both parties. All of us have come to the British authorities to ask that we and our sovereign may be forgiven; our wishes are set forth in the paragraphs above.

Dated Friday, 29th Rabi-ul-Sani 1297 (9th April 1880).

Names sealed and signed.

- | | |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Muhammad Alim. | 8. Abdul Ghafur. |
| 2. Muhammad Jan. | 9. Shah Muhammad. |
| 3. Muhammad Sarwar. | 10. Muhammad Afzal. |
| 4. Ghulam Haidar. | 11. Sultan Muhammad. |
| 5. Muhammad Hasan. | 12. Lal Muhammad. |
| 6. Abdul Karim. | 13. Ghulam Haidar. |
| 7. Muhammad Tahir. | |

Suliman Khels,	15 in number.
Andaris,	8 " "
Zurmat Ahmadzais,	17 " "
Wardaks,	17 " "
Logaris and Khanwaris,	15 " "
Ahmadzais,	46 " "
Tajiks,	5 " "
Tajiks of Ghazni,	9 " "
Maidan people,	14 " "
Mangals and Totakhels,	43 " "

Speech delivered by Lieutenant-General Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., &c.,
in Durbar, at Kabul, on the 13th April 1880.

Sirdars and Maliks,—I am very glad to receive you here to-day in durbar, especially those who, through the good offices of my friend, the Mustaufi, Habibulla Khan, have been induced to come to Kabul, and make their wishes known to me. I trust that this durbar is the beginning of the end, and that it will now be possible for us to enter into such arrangements with the people of Afghanistan as will ensure an honourable peace, and a lasting friendship between them and the British. Some of you, I understand, hesitated to accompany the Mustaufi, fearing that your treatment and reception by us might not be such as he had promised you, and that some evil might befall you. You need never have any such fear when your safety has been assured on the word of a British Officer. The British do not say one thing and do another. You who have come in have been honourably treated, and after this durbar is over you are all at liberty to depart. I trust that when you leave Kabul you will carry away with you a more friendly feeling towards us than some of you have hitherto entertained, and that those of your party who are still holding aloof will be wise enough to follow the good example you have set them, and will accept our invitation and come to Kabul.

Mr. Griffin, the Chief Political Officer in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, with whom you have already become acquainted, will now, on the part of the Government of India, answer the requests you have made.

Speech by the Chief Political Officer.

Sirdars, Khans, and Maliks of Kabul,—It has been my wish for some time past to meet you all in durbar and explain to you collectively and publicly, as I have already done privately, the intention of the British Government with regard to the settlement of Afghanistan. This is a favourable opportunity when replies have to be given to the requests of certain Chiefs and Maliks of the neighbourhood of Ghazni, who have been long hostile, but who have, at last, listened to the advice of Mustaufi Habibulla, whom General Sir F. Roberts had sent to reassure them, and have deputed many of their number to place their requests respectfully before the Government. It is to be regretted that the more important of the leaders have not come in person; when the Government promised a safe-conduct there was no reason, for even those who had been most opposed to it, to fear for their lives or liberty. The British Government bears no ill-will to those who have fought fairly against it, and those of the representatives who have come to Kabul are free to leave when they wish; and during their stay will be treated as friends and guests. But those Chiefs who have remained behind at Maidan must not think that their signatures on the paper of requests will be considered as equivalent to their presence; the more so as we know the reason that some of them have not come is that they have secretly abandoned the cause they profess to support, and have made promises to others. When you return to Maidan, ask General Ghulam Haidar and Muhammad Jan when they are going to desert you.

Maliks of Ghazni, Maidan, and Loghar, and Chiefs of the Ghilzai, Wardak, and other tribes in their neighbourhood, I have met you more than once in private interviews, and have discussed with you in a friendly way your requests, and I now only wish to say publicly, and for the information of the Sirdars and people of the city and neighbourhood of Kabul, whom it concerns as closely as it does you, what I have already said to you.

You have first asked that the former friendship between the Government of the Queen-Empress of Hindustan should be restored, that Ameer Yakub Khan should be released and reinstated, and that the British armies should retire from Afghanistan.

In reply, I would first remind you that the breach in mutual friendship was made by Ameer Shere Ali Khan. The British Government not only always desired, and still desires, friendship with Afghanistan, but will not appoint any one as Ameer who does not profess friendship, nor will allow him to continue Ameer unless he plainly shows himself the friend of the friends of the British Government and the enemy of its enemies.

For this reason the Viceroy has decided that Muhammad Yakub Khan shall not return to Afghanistan. You know whether he observed the promises that he made to the British Government. You know that he rewarded those who had opposed us in the first campaign; while those who had assisted us he turned out of their lands and appointments. You have told me privately that if Yakub be not allowed to

return, you are willing to accept as Ameer any one whom the Government may choose to select. This expression of the wish of a large number of respectable Maliks will be, at the proper time, laid before His Excellency the Viceroy, together with that of others who may wish to support the candidature of Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, Sirdar Hashim Khan, Sirdar Musa Khan, Sirdar Ayub Khan, or any other member of the ruling family who may be approved by a large number of the people. The Government has no intention of annexing Afghanistan, and will occupy no more of it than may be necessary for the safety of its own frontiers. But the province of Kandahar will not remain united with Kabul, but will be placed under the independent rule of a Barakzai prince. For the administration of those provinces that remain attached to Kabul, the Government is anxious to appoint an Ameer who shall be strong to govern his people and steadfast in his friendship to the British. And if only these qualifications be secured, the Government is willing and anxious to recognize the wish of the Afghan people and the tribal Chiefs, and to nominate the Ameer of their choice. But no decision can be given at present. You, who have assembled here, represent but a small part of the people, and it is necessary to ascertain the views and wishes of many others, Chiefs and Sirdars, who are absent from Kabul. But your votes in favour of Yakub Khan's immediate family will be remembered and considered if, until the decision of the Government be given, you absolutely abstain from all hostile action. Otherwise, you must not expect that the Government will consider him likely to be a friendly Ameer whose friends are its persistent enemies.

The armies of the Queen-Empress will withdraw from Afghanistan when the Government considers that the proper time has come. As they did not enter Afghanistan with your permission, so they will not withdraw at your request. When the country is again peaceful, and when a friendly Ameer has been selected, the Government has no wish to remain in Afghanistan. The army came to Kabul to inflict punishment for the murder of its Envoy in time of peace, which some of you have called a regretted accident, but which the British Government considers an atrocious crime, and it will remain until some satisfactory settlement can be made. You have been told that an army from Kandahar is now marching on Ghazni, while another from Bombay has taken its place at Kandahar. A third army is in Kuram, a fourth at Kabul, and a fifth at Jellalabad, the Khaibar and Peshawar.

The General has ordered a strong force to march from Kabul to-morrow towards Maidan to co-operate with the Kandahar army. If you are wise you will do everything to assist this force, which is not sent against you, nor will it molest you if only the conduct of the people is friendly. If, on the contrary, you listen to leaders who only deceive you for their own advantage, and commit and excite hostility against the Government, then punishment will quickly and certainly follow. The Khagiani tribes, three weeks ago, attacked a British post near Gundamak at night. They have since had to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000, and five of their towers have been blown up. The Hizarak people have been committing outrages on the road, and carrying off men and cattle. A large force has been sent by the General into Hizarak, and a fine of Rs. 15,000 has been imposed. The Government is quite willing to be friends with you, and to treat you as friends, but it is also resolved to be obeyed so long as its armies are in the country, and to punish severely any open opposition. You have a proverb that force and money are the only powers in Afghanistan. It is for you to choose which you wish. The Government intends to keep the sword for its enemies, and the money for its friends, and, if you are wise, you will count yourselves as our friends. Those people deceive you who preach jihad, and say that the English are the enemies of Islam. In India fifty millions of Muhammadans enjoy, under the Government of the Queen, greater liberty and happiness and security than in any country in the world; and it is the British Government which has many times, by great expenditure of men and treasure, guarded and preserved the Empire of the Sultan of Turkey against his enemies. The Government is the friend and protector of Islam, and not its destroyer.

As to your other requests for the appointment of a Muhammadan Agent at Kabul, and the grant of assistance in money and material to the new Ameer, I can only say that these requests have been made by you in ignorance, for they are matters which will be decided by the Government of India with the Chief whom they agree to appoint as Ameer. It is not fitting for small persons to discuss them. Of this only be assured, that he whom the Viceroy of India may select will be supported by the Government in every possible way so long as he shows friendly intentions towards it.

No. 13.

No. 93 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Secret.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

Simla, 27th April 1880.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the Official Journal of the Southern Afghanistan Field Force for the week ending the 21st March 1880.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) LYTTON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" JOHN STRACHEY.
" E. B. JOHNSTON.
" A. R. THOMPSON.
" A. FRASER.

Enclosure in No. 13.

MEMORANDUM, No. 132, dated Kandahar, 25th March 1880.

From Major C. B. EVAN SMITH, C.S.I., Political Officer, Kandahar Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Has the honour to enclose copy of Official Journal from 15th to 21st instant, inclusive.

Official Journal, Head-quarters, Southern Afghanistan Field Force, Political Department. (Extract.)

Monday, 15th March.—In the afternoon the General received the principal Mullas and Kowamins of the city and surrounding villages in Durbar. They were twenty-nine in number, and had come in consequence of Sir Donald Stewart's late letter to the Sirdar, to inform him that they had all taken an oath on the Koran, to the effect that they would at once deliver up to justice any individual whom they might hear of that was an ill-wisher to the British Government, and intending to do mischief to the troops here in garrison. After the General had heard their statement, he informed them that he wished to say a few words to them, representing as they did the better educated and more sensible classes, and having, as he was aware, a considerable influence either for good or evil on their compatriots. He then briefly recapitulated the circumstances under which, and the reasons for which, the English had first entered Afghanistan, had a second time re-occupied it, and subsequently raised Sirdar Sher Ali Khan to govern in Kandahar. He informed them plainly that as long as Sirdar Sher Ali pursued the same loyal course towards the British Government that he had hitherto followed, he would be supported fully by the English. He pointed out that, in placing Sirdar Sher Ali Khan in power, a Chief of one of the best known families in Afghanistan, and in bestowing on him, as the Government had done, money, arms, guns and ammunition, the Government of India had afforded the most signal proof of their desire and intention to leave Afghanistan to be governed by the Afghans themselves, to abstain from any unnecessary interference whatever in the internal affairs of the country, and to render independent at the earliest possible date the Sirdar on whom the government of the Kandahar province had been bestowed, and who would certainly be assisted in rendering his rule stable and independent. There was no chance of Kandahar again falling under the authority of a supreme ruler in Kabul. Kandahar would for the future stand by itself, and the moment the Sirdar

should inform Sir Donald Stewart that he considered his power sufficiently consolidated to take charge of the city, the General would be quite prepared to make it over to him.

Sir Donald Stewart said that he considered it necessary to make these remarks, as he believed that there was an erroneous impression abroad as to the future of the Kandahar State. The regular official notification of the decision and intentions of the Government would of course be made in the usual manner to the Sirdar at the fitting time, but the people might rest assured that the policy of Government was that now explained to them.

He then proceeded to inform the Mullahs that these remarks were necessary to elucidate what he intended to say to them with regard to the late fanatical and cowardly attacks on the lives of defenceless officers and men of the Kandahar Field Force. The audience were well aware that such attacks were contrary to the laws of all religions. There was no justification for them whatever in the Muhammadan religion, but, nevertheless, it could not be doubted that the miserable men who lost their lives in this shameful way were instigated and encouraged in their attempts by the direct action of the Mullahs, who made use of their influence in this disgraceful manner. Sir Donald Stewart pointed out the futility of these attempts, which, moreover, served no purpose; in no instance had the fanatics been successful in taking life, and in every case they had lost their own. The attempts were therefore foolish as well as criminal. He was aware that some of these attempts were due to the instigation of enemies of the Sirdar, who hoped that occurrences of this nature might embarrass the friendly relations at present existing between the Sirdar and the British Government. The people might rest assured that such would not be the case. He, Sir Donald Stewart, had accurate knowledge of what went on in the city, and in the assemblies, at which sedition was often talked and preached, but, knowing how much of this sedition was due to the desire of self-display, he had up to the present refrained from taking notice of it. He warned the Mullahs, however, that his patience would not always be so great. They were perfectly well aware of the advantages which had accrued to the inhabitants of Kandahar from the English occupation, and no one knew better than themselves how much they owed in the way of security to life and property, and absolute immunity from oppression, to the consideration and forbearance with which they had been treated. In return for this, however, the lives of defenceless and unsuspecting soldiers were continually being attempted by men who were incited thereto by fanatical teaching. Once for all, Sir Donald Stewart informed the Mullahs and Kowanins that he was determined that, if these attempts were persisted in, he would mark his sense of their character by measures that would be exceedingly unpleasant to the whole community, and that would ensure the severe punishment of all who were in any way connected with the wretched individuals who were made the tools of designing men not less guilty than themselves.

The entire assemblage listened to the remarks of General Stewart with profound attention. At the close, one of them acted as spokesman, and most emphatically denounced the fanatical ghazi attempts that had occurred, declaring they were acts contrary to the injunctions of the Prophet, and which were due to the teachings of ignorant men, who could not be classed as Mullahs, or expounders of religion. On behalf of those present, the speaker represented the deep sense of gratitude and acknowledgment felt by all for the policy which had been pursued towards the people of Kandahar by General Stewart, contrasting the quiet reigning here with the anarchy and fighting in the north; and he concluded by once more assuring Sir Donald Stewart that they would to the utmost of their power aid in the apprehension of all ill-wishers of the British Government, while they would one and all give security for the good behaviour of the talibs attending their respective mosques.

The General then dismissed the assemblage, informing them of his own approaching departure, and stating that the policy inaugurated by him under the orders of Government would certainly be continued by his successor as long as the people behaved with loyalty to the Sirdar and the Government.

. No. 14.

No. 104 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

The RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 4th May 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of telegrams from and to the Chief Political Officer at Kabul, regarding the correspondence between the British authorities at Kabul and Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan.

2. We also enclose copy of a letter* to Mr. Lepel Griffin, Chief Political Officer at

* No. 1491 E.P., dated 27th April 1880. Kabul, transmitting the views of the Government of India on the situation of affairs in Kabul, and conveying instructions for his guidance in his communications with the Sirdar.

We have, &c.,

(Signed)	LYTTON.
"	F. P. HAYNES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	A. R. THOMPSON.
"	A. FRASER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

TELEGRAM, dated 22nd April 1880, from MR. LEPEL GRIFFIN, Kabul, to FOREIGN
SECRETARY, Simla.

THE messenger, Sarwar Khan, whom I sent to Kunduz, returned last night. His lengthy statement will be sent by post. The letter of Sirdar Abdul Rahman in reply to mine is as follows—literal translation :—

Whereas at this happy time I have received the kind letter of the British officers, who called me to mind, wrote in a spirit of justice and friendship, to inquire what I wish in Afghanistan. My honoured friends, the servants of the great British Government, know well that throughout these 12 years of exile in the kingdom of the Emperor of Russia, night and day I have cherished the hope of return to my native land. When the late Amir Sher Ali Khan died, and there was no one to rule our tribe, I proposed to re-enter Afghanistan, but as it was not fated then, I turned to Tashkend. Consequently Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan, having come to terms and made peace with the British Government, was appointed Amir of Afghanistan; but since after he had left you he listened to the advice of every interested person and raised fools to power until two ignorant men directed the affairs of Afghanistan, which during the reign of my grandfather, who had 18 able sons, were so managed that it was bright like day. In consequence of that Afghanistan was disgraced before all States and ruined; now therefore that you seek to learn my hopes and wishes, they are these: as long as your empire and that of Russia exist, my countrymen, the tribes of Afghanistan, should live quietly in ease and peace, and that these two States should find us true and faithful; that we should have rest and peace between them, for my tribesmen are unable to struggle with empires, and are ruined by want of commerce. And we hope of your friendship that assistance and sympathy with the people of Afghanistan, you will permanently establish them under the honourable protection of the two Powers. This would redound to the credit of both, would give peace to Afghanistan, and quiet and comfort to God's people. This is my wish. For the rest, it is yours to decide.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

TELEGRAM, dated 23rd April 1880, from Mr. LEPEL GRIFFIN, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla. (Extract.)

MUMAMMAD Sarwar Khan, our agent, left Kabul on 2nd and reached Kunduz on 10th; warmly received by Sirdar Abdul Rahman; gave letter and message.* Sirdar said he was delighted at message; desired nothing more than to be servant of Government. He has written to his friends not to oppose the English and ruin themselves; better days were in store for Afghanistan. After five days agent was given Sirdar's reply in presence of four confidential officers, and verbal message as follows:—

It is quite true that for three generations the English have systematically befriended Afghanistan, and that they have never done me any injury. I am anxious to know the nature of the friendship they now desire. Instead of sending agents I would much prefer, if invited, going to Charikar myself, accompanied by some 500 sowars, and there discuss matters with the English officers in person. If this is approved of, the two or three men, Wali Muhammad Khan and Hashim, now in power, should be set aside and opportunity afforded me to show what I can do in the interests of peace. For 12 years I have been a guest of the Russians, have received many favours from them. I should not like to have conditions imposed upon me which should discredit me with them, or make me appear ungrateful. If the English desire to place me in power they should arrange for the removal of my enemies and make me secure before withdrawing from the country. I shall ever try to be the friend of both powers, and desire nothing more than to be considered the friend of the English, and to secure for my country the royal immunity from foreign interference as is enjoyed by Persia. Sirdar said that he did not write first, because he had no reliable messenger; he shall continue at Kunduz till he receives reply; would come to Charikar in 20 days from messenger leaving Kabul. Sirdar, in answer to agent, said Russia had refused him permission to try his fortune in Afghanistan, and removed him to Tashkend. When telegraphic news reached of Yakub's deportation, General Kaufmann was at Orenberg. General's Secretary sent for him, told him that news, and gave him liberty to go to Turkestan. Sirdar took time to reflect three days after secretary urged him to go. He consented to receive loan of 5,000 Bokhara tillas, and present of 200 breech-loaders and ammunition. Sirdar has eaten Russian salt, and does not wish to quarrel with Russia, but if made Amir will live at peace. Left Tashkend with 100 followers, via Oratipa, Hissar, Kolab, crossing Oxus at Rustac. Sirdar has at Kunduz four infantry, two cavalry regiments, two batteries. Since he left, his family have been moved from Kokand to Tashkend, and his full allowances granted them.

General Roberts and I think and recommend as follows:—It is clear that Sirdar was sent by Russia, or that he does not want to quarrel with them. Nevertheless, he does not appear less eligible than when selected by Government, but more so. He is doubtless anxious to come to terms with English. An interview with him is essential.

* The letter was as follows:—

TO SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 1st April.

After compliments.—It has become known that you have entered Afghanistan, and consequently this letter is sent to you by a confidential messenger, in order that you may submit to the British officers at Kabul any representations that you may desire to make to the British Government with regard to your object in entering Afghanistan."

To Sarwar Khan, the bearer, full and explicit verbal instructions were given. He was directed to inform the Sirdar that the British Government having occupied Kabul, the capital of the Afghan Government, and he, a distinguished member of the late ruling family, having entered Turkistan and occupied places there by force of arms, it was essential for him to declare with what object he had come, and if actuated by friendly or hostile feelings towards the British Government. That the Sirdar's long residence, in Russia, and his notoriously close relations with that Power, might render him, to a certain extent, an object of suspicion, were it not that he had no quarrel with the British, who entertained no hostile feelings towards him. That the British Government were able to benefit him very largely in comparison with that of Russia; and that, if he followed the dictates of wisdom and self-interest, he would at once open a friendly correspondence with the British officers in Kabul. That his opportunity had now come; and that the British Government were disposed to treat him with every consideration, and to consider most favourably any representations that he might have to urge. That on receipt of the letter, he would, if he consulted his own interests, send a reply to the letter by the hand of a respectable and trusted agent, and, later, repair himself to Kabul, where he would be honourably received. The British Government had no intention of annexing the country, and only desired to see a strong and friendly chief established at Kabul; and consequently the present communication was made solely in his own interests, and not in those of the British Government.

It might be at Mootya, or Charikar, as proposed, but probably unnecessary. We would send two or three men of position, one being native official of government, to Sirdar, definitely offering him Amirship with the conditions regarding Kandahar, friendship, frontier, and foreign relations. If he accepts our proposal, to come to Kabul under safe conduct, and discuss all details. He will almost certainly come. The alternative of meeting at Charikar can be reserved, as possibly he will refuse to come to Kabul, or accept conditions without discussion.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

TELEGRAM, No. 1460 E.P., dated 25th April 1880.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to LEPEL GRIFFIN, Kabul.

YOUR telegrams, 22nd, 23rd, transmitting Abdul Rahman's letter with remarks and proposals are received, and instructions issue to you on Monday by letter and telegraph. Meanwhile suspend further proceedings and negotiations, informing Abdul Rahman, if necessary, that his letter is under consideration here.

Enclosure 4 in No. 14.

No. 1491 E.P., dated Simla, 27th April 1880, from A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to LEPEL H. GRIFFIN, Esq., C.S.I., Chief Political Officer, Kabul.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Governor General has received and considered in Council your telegrams of the 22nd and 23rd instant, forwarding the translation of a letter received by you from Sirdar Abdul Rahman on the 21st instant, together with a summary of certain oral explanations which accompanied that letter, and a statement of the recommendations suggested by it to Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts and yourself.

2. In conveying to you its instructions on the subject of this important communication, the Government of India considers it expedient to recapitulate the principles on which it has hitherto been acting in Northern Afghanistan, and clearly to define the point of view from which it contemplates the present situation of affairs in that country.

3. The single object to which, as you are well aware, the Afghan policy of this Government has at all times been directed and limited, is the security of the north-west frontier of India. The Government of India has, however, no less invariably held and acted on the conviction that the security of this frontier is incompatible with the intrusion of any foreign influence into the great border State of Afghanistan. To exclude or eject such influence the Government of India has frequently subsidized, and otherwise assisted, the Amirs of Kabul. It has also, more than once, taken up arms against them. But it has never interfered, for any other purpose, in the affairs of their kingdom.

4. Regulating on this principle, and limiting to this object, the conduct of our relations with the rulers of Kabul, it was our long-continued endeavour to find in their friendship and their strength the requisite guarantees for the security of our own frontier. Failing in that endeavour, we were compelled to seek the attainment of the object to which our Afghan policy was, and is still, exclusively directed, by rendering the permanent security of our frontier as much as possible independent of such conditions.

5. This obligation was not accepted without reluctance. Not even when forced into hostilities by the late Amir Sher Ali Khan's espousal of a Russian alliance proposed by Russia in contemplation of a rupture with the British Government, did we relinquish our desire for the renewal of relations with a strong and friendly Afghan power; and, when the son of Sher Ali subsequently sought our alliance and protection, they were at once accorded to him on conditions of which His Highness professed to appreciate the generosity. The crime, however, which dissolved the Treaty of Gandamak, and the disclosures which followed that event, finally convinced the Government of India that the interests committed to its care could not but be gravely imperilled by further adhesion to a policy dependent for its fruition on the gratitude, the good faith, the assumed self-interest, or the personal character of any Afghan prince.

6. When, therefore, Her Majesty's troops re-entered Afghanistan in September last, it was with two well defined and plainly avowed objects. The first was to avenge the treacherous massacre of the British Mission at Kabul; the second was to maintain the safeguards sought through the Treaty of Gandamak, by providing for their maintenance guarantees of a more substantial and less precarious character.

7. These two objects have been attained—the first, by the capture of Kabul, and the punishment of the crime committed there; the second, by the severance of Kandahar from the Kabul power.

8. Satisfied with their attainment, the Government of India has no longer any motive or desire to enter into fresh treaty engagements with the rulers of Kabul. The arrangements and exchange of friendly assurances with the Amir Sher Ali, though supplemented on the part of the Government of India by subsidies and favours of various kinds, wholly failed to secure the object of them, which was nevertheless a thoroughly friendly one, and no less conducive to the security and advantage of the Afghan than to those of the British power. The treaty with Yakub Khan, which secured to him our friendship and material support, was equally ineffectual. Moreover, recent events and arrangements have fundamentally changed the situation to which our correspondence and engagements with the Amir of Afghanistan formerly applied. Our advanced frontier positions at Kandahar and Kurram have materially diminished the political importance of Kabul in relation to India; and although we shall always appreciate the friendship of its ruler, our relations with him are now of so little importance to the paramount objects of our policy that we no longer require to maintain British agents in any part of his dominions.

9. Our only reasons, therefore, for not immediately withdrawing our forces from Northern Afghanistan have hitherto been, first, the excited and unsettled condition of the country round Kabul, with the attitude of hostility assumed by some leaders of armed gatherings near Ghazni; and, secondly, the inability of the Kabul Sirdars to agree among themselves on the selection of a ruler strong enough to maintain order after our evacuation of the country.

10. The first named of these reasons has now ceased to exist. In a Minute, dated the 30th ultimo, the Viceroy and Governor General stated that “the Government is “anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the troops from Kabul and from all points “beyond those to be occupied under the Treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. In “order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a ruler for Kabul, which will be “separated from Kandahar. Steps” (continued His Excellency) “are being taken “for this purpose. Meanwhile it is essential that we should make such a display of “strength in Afghanistan as will show that we are masters of the situation, and will “overawe disaffection.” * * * “For this all that is necessary from the political “point of view is for General Stewart to march to Ghazni, break up any opposition “he may find there, or in the neighbourhood, and open up direct communication with “General Sir F. Roberts at Kabul.” The military operations thus defined have been accomplished by General Stewart's successful action before Ghazni.

11. With regard to the second reason mentioned for the retention of our troops in North Afghanistan, the appearance of Abdul Rahman as a candidate for the throne of Kabul, whose claim the Government of India has no cause to oppose, and who seems to be approved and likely to be supported by at least a majority of the population, affords fair ground for anticipating that our wishes in regard to the restoration, before our departure, of order in that part of the country will now be fulfilled.

12. The Governor General in Council has consequently decided that the evacuation of Kabul shall be effected not later than October next, and it is with special reference to this decision that the letter and message addressed to you by Sirdar Abdul Rahman have been carefully considered by His Excellency in Council.

13. What first claims notice in the consideration of that letter is the desire it expresses for the permanent establishment of Afghanistan with our assistance and sympathy under the joint protection of the British and Russian empires. This suggestion, which is more fully developed in the Sirdar's unwritten message, cannot be entertained or discussed.

14. As already stated, the primary object and declared determination of the Government of India have been the exclusion of foreign influence or interference from Afghanistan. This cardinal condition of amicable relations with Afghanistan has, at all times, and in all circumstances, been deemed essential for the permanent security

of Her Majesty's Indian empire. As such, it has hitherto been firmly maintained by successive Governors General of India under the explicit instructions of Her Majesty's Government. Nor has it ever been ignored, or officially contested, by the Russian Government. That Government, on the contrary, has repeatedly, and under every recent change of circumstances in Afghanistan, renewed the assurances solemnly given to the British Government that "Russia considers Afghanistan as entirely beyond the sphere of her influence."

15. It is true that negotiations at one time passed between the two Governments with a view to the mutual recognition of certain territories as constituting a neutral zone between their respective spheres of legitimate influence and action, and that at one time it was proposed by Russia to treat Afghanistan itself as neutral territory. Those negotiations, however, having proved fruitless, the northern frontier of Afghanistan was finally determined by mutual agreement; and in 1876 the Russian Government formally reiterated its adherence to the conclusion that "while maintaining on either side the arrangement come to as regards the limits of Afghanistan, which is to remain outside the sphere of Russian action, the two Cabinets should regard as terminated the discussions relative to the intermediate zone, which promised no practical result."

16. The position of Afghanistan as defined and settled by these engagements was again distinctly affirmed, on behalf of the Queen's Government, by the Marquis of Salisbury in 1879, and the Government of India unreservedly maintains it in the fullest conviction of its essential necessity for the peaceable protection of Her Majesty's Indian dominions. It is therefore desirable that you should take occasion to inform Abdul Rahman that the relations of Afghanistan to the British and Russian empires are matters which the Government of India must decline to bring into discussion with the Sirdar. The Afghan States and tribes are too contiguous with India, whose north-western frontier they surround, for the Government of India ever willingly to accept partnership with any other Power in the exercise of its legitimate and recognized influence over those tribes and States.

17. The Governor General in Council is, nevertheless, most anxious that the Sirdar should not misunderstand the light in which his personal sentiments and obligations towards Russia are regarded by the Government of India. So long as the rulers of Kabul were amenable to its advice, this Government has never ceased to impress on them the international duty of scrupulously respecting all the recognized rights and interests of their Russian neighbour, refraining from every act calculated to afford the Russian authorities in Central Asia any just cause of umbrage or complaint. The intelligence and good sense which are conspicuous in the Sirdar's letter and messages to you will enable him to appreciate the difference between conduct regulated on these principles, and that which cost Sher Ali the loss of his throne. This Government does not desire, nor has it ever desired, to impose on any ruler of Kabul conditions incompatible with that behaviour which Russia, as a powerful and neighbouring empire, is entitled to expect from him; least of all can we desire to impose such conditions on a prince who has received hospitality and protection in Russian territory. I am therefore to observe that, in the natural repugnance expressed by Abdul Rahman to conditions which "might make him appear ungrateful" to those "whose salt he has eaten," the Governor General in Council recognizes a sentiment altogether honourable to the Sirdar, and perfectly consistent with the sincerity of his professed good will toward ourselves.

18. These observations will furnish you with a sufficient answer to the question asked by Abdul Rahman, as to the "nature of our friendship," and its "conditions." The frankness with which he has explained his position entitles him to receive from us a no less unreserved statement of our own. The Government of India cordially shares the wish expressed by Abdul Rahman that, between the British and Russian empires, his "tribes and countrymen may live quietly in ease and peace." We do not desire to place them in a position of unfriendliness towards a Power which is pledged to us to regard their country as "entirely beyond the sphere of its action." The injury to Afghan commerce caused by the present condition of Afghanistan, to which the Sirdar has alluded, is fully appreciated by the Government of India, and on the restoration of peace between the two countries the revival and development of trade intercourse need present no difficulty. As regards our own friendship, it will, if sincerely sought, be freely given, and fully continued so long as it is loyally reciprocated. But we attach to it no other condition. We have no concessions to ask or make; and the Sirdar will therefore perceive that there is really no matter for negotiation or bargain between him and us.

19. On this point your reply to Abdul Rahman cannot be too explicit. Previous to the Sirdar's arrival in Turkestan the hostility and treachery of those whose misconduct he admits and deplores had compelled the Government of India to make territorial arrangements of a material and permanent character for the better protection of our frontier. The maintenance of these arrangements is in no wise dependent on the assent or dissent, on the good will or ill will, of any Chief at Kabul. The character of them has been so fully explained by you to all the other Kabul Sirdars, that it is probably well known to Abdul Rahman. But, in order that our present intercourse and future relation with the Sirdar may be perfectly clear of doubt on a point affecting the position he aspires to fill, the Governor General in Council authorizes you, if necessary, to make him plainly understand that neither the districts assigned to us by the Treaty of Gandamak, nor any part of the province of Kandahar, will ever be restored to the Kabul power.

20. As regards this last-mentioned province, the Government of India has been authorized by that of Her Majesty to give to Sher Ali Khan, the present Wali of Kandahar, a distinct assurance that he will be not only recognized, but maintained, by the British Government as the ruler of that province. Sher Ali Khan is one of the native nobles of Kandahar. He is administering the province with ability, good sense, and complete loyalty to the British Government, which has promised him the support of a British garrison, so long as he requires such support. The Governor General in Council cannot doubt that Sirdar Abdul Rahman will readily recognize the obligation incumbent on the honour of the British Government to keep faith with all who, whether at Kandahar or elsewhere, have proved themselves active and loyal adherents. Yakub Khan forfeited our alliance, and with it his throne, by mistrusting the assurances we gave him, and falsifying those which he had given to us. If, misled by his example, Yakub Khan's successor attempts to injure or oppress the friends of the British Government, its power will again be put forth to protect or avenge them. Similarly, if the next Kabul ruler reintroduces into his Court or country foreign influences adverse to our own, the Government of India will again take such steps as it may deem expedient to deal with such a case. These contingencies, however, cannot occur, if the sentiments of Abdul Rahman are such as he represents them to be. Meanwhile, the territorial and administrative arrangements already completed by us for the permanent protection of our own interests are not susceptible of negotiation or discussion with Abdul Rahman or any other claimant to the throne of Kabul.

21. To the settlement of Herat, which is not included in these completed arrangements, the Governor General in Council cannot authorize you to make or invite any reference in your reply to Abdul Rahman. The settlement of the future administration of Herat has been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government, with whose present views in regard to this important question the Government of India is not yet acquainted.

22. Nor can our evacuation of Kabul constitute any subject for proposals in your correspondence with the Sirdar. This measure was determined on by the Government of India long before the appearance of Abdul Rahman as a candidate for the government of the country we are about to evacuate. It has not been caused by the hostility, and is not therefore conditional on the good will, of any Afghan power.

23. The Government of India is, however, very willing to carry out the evacuation of Kabul in the manner most conducive to the personal advantage of Abdul Rahman, whose interests we believe to be, more than those of any other Sirdar, in accordance with the general interests of the Afghan people. For this reason, it is desirable that you should inform Abdul Rahman of our intention to evacuate Kabul, and our desire to take that opportunity of unconditionally transferring to his authority the whole of the country from which our troops will be withdrawn. You are authorized to add that our military and political officers at Kabul will be empowered to facilitate any practical arrangement suggested by the Sirdar for promptly and peaceably effecting, in co-operation with him, the transfer thus contemplated on his behalf. Such arrangement must, however, be consistent with our obligations towards those who have served and aided the British Government during our occupation of those territories.

24. For this purpose, it appears to the Governor General in Council desirable that the Sirdar should lose no time in proceeding to Kabul, and there settling, in conference with General Stewart and yourself, such preliminary arrangements as may best promote the undisturbed establishment of his future government.

25. The Governor General in Council has, however, no desire to press this suggestion should it appear to the Sirdar that his presence at Kabul previous to the withdrawal of our troops, for the purpose of personal conference with the British authorities, might have the effect of weakening his popularity, or compromising his position in the eyes of his future subjects. The point is one which must be left entirely to the Sirdar's own judgment and inclination. But Abdul Rahman is doubtless aware that there are at present, in and around Kabul, personages not destitute of influence, who themselves aspire to the sovereignty he seeks, and that the family of Yakub Khan has still numerous personal adherents, who may possibly take advantage of the withdrawal of our troops to oppose the Sirdar's authority, if he is not personally present to assert it.

26. It should on both sides be remembered and understood that it is not the policy of this Government to impose upon the Afghan people an unpopular ruler, or to interfere uninvited in the administration of a friendly one. If Abdul Rahman proves able and disposed to conciliate the confidence of his countrymen, without forfeiting the good understanding which he seeks with us, he will assuredly find his best support in our political appreciation of that fact. Our reason for unconditionally transferring to him the government of the country from which our forces will, in any case, be withdrawn a few months hence, is that, on the whole, he appears to be the Chief best able to restore order in that country, and also best entitled to undertake such a task. In his performance of it he will receive, if he requires it, our assistance. But we neither need, nor wish, to hamper, by preliminary stipulations or provisoes, his independent exercise of a sovereignty which he declares himself anxious to maintain on a footing of peace and friendship with the British Government.

27. The present statement of the views and intentions of His Excellency the Governor General in Council respecting Abdul Rahman will enable you to represent them with adequate accuracy in your reply to the Sirdar's friendly overtures; and it will now be your duty to convey to Abdul Rahman, without any avoidable delay, the answer of the Government of India to the letter and message received from him. His Excellency feels assured that you will give full expression to the spirit of candour and good will in which these communications have been received and are reciprocated. But I am to impress on your attention the importance of avoiding any expression which might appear to suggest or admit matter for negotiation or discussion in reference to the relative positions of the Sirdar and the Government of India.

28. In conclusion, I am to request that on receipt of this letter you will be so good as to lose no time in submitting its contents to General Sir Donald Stewart, should he then have reached Kabul. In any case, you will, of course, communicate them to General Roberts, and act upon them in consultation with the chief military authority on the spot.

No. 14A.

No. 10 S.P.C., dated Kabul, May 8, 1880. (Extract.)

From LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., Chief Political Officer, North and East Afghanistan, to Lieutenant-General Sir D. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in Afghanistan.

The only other point which remains for decision is the time for evacuating the country. This is governed by two considerations; firstly, how our occupation of Kabul will affect the new Amir; and secondly, whether the supplies available for the army will allow a prolonged occupation.

It will probably, on political grounds, be advisable to withdraw from the capital as soon after the installation of the new Amir as possible. The presence of British troops will not add to the security or popularity of the Chief, when he has once established himself. But whether military exigencies will permit our armies to withdraw to Ali Kheyl, Shalozan, Gandamak, and the slopes of the Sufeid Koh in the Shinwari and Khugiani country, I am unable to say. Their stay or march must in a great measure depend on the supplies procurable in Kabul. My information, which is gathered from many reliable sources, leads me to doubt whether it will be possible to support so large a force as is now in the neighbourhood of Kabul, without importation from India. The Kabul, Logar, Maidan, and Wardak villages are those alone on which we can rely, and even here armed bands of insurgents only too often close the roads

the moment our troops are withdrawn. These valleys although fertile are of but small area ; and many of the villages, according to the revenue returns, only produce sufficient grain for their own consumption. The season, moreover, is not a favourable one ; and while the outturn will be fair on irrigated lands, those dependent on rainfall will have a poor crop. These valleys have already been drained of their food stocks, and Kohistan, which has not yet been visited by our troops, has still been harried by bands of Ghazis, who have lived at free quarters in the villages. Nor is Kohistan a grain country. Its chief produce is from its vineyards, orchards, and gardens, and it pays its revenue in cash, and not in grain.

The question of supplies, as regulating the date of the evacuation of Kabul, is one which is engaging the attention of the military authorities, but its bearing on the political situation is so close that it could not with propriety be omitted from the present memorandum.

No. 15.

No. 23.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

India Office, London, 21st May 1880.

HER Majesty's Government have had under their most anxious consideration the state of affairs in Afghanistan resulting from the war entered upon in the autumn of 1878, the Treaty of Gandamak of 1879, the murder of the British Envoy at Kabul, and the military operations which were renewed with the object of punishing that outrage.

2. According to the latest information at my disposal, the Kabul, Kandahar, and Kurram forces absorb fully 55,000 men, of whom about 16,000 are Europeans. This is exclusive of about 13,500 men on the Punjab frontier, and is also exclusive of a force of more than 14,000 men in Sind and in the Bengal Presidency, who are held in readiness for service in Afghanistan.

3. It is evident that the employment of such a large portion of the Army of India beyond our frontier, while a further considerable force is held in readiness for service, entails a heavy financial burthen on the resources of India, and that the prolonged employment of our troops under such conditions must, especially in the case of the Native regiments, before long very seriously interfere with their efficiency.

4. Already, I have been informed by your Excellency's predecessor that it is most difficult to obtain recruits in India, a difficulty which arises in the main from the extreme dislike of the Native soldier to prolonged service in Afghanistan, and although costly and inconvenient measures have been adopted in order to stimulate enlistment, I am not yet informed that these measures have been attended with success. The continued stoppage of the usual furlough given to the Native troops serving in Afghanistan and the possible extension of a similar deprivation to those in British India itself, in consequence of the heavy duties entailed on them in the absence of a large part of the army, cannot but have a bad effect, and I conceive that, with a force of some 76 Native regiments on or beyond our frontier, it will be very difficult to devise any scheme for their relief.

5. Although our armies have encountered during the last campaign some severe opposition, yet, owing to the conspicuous gallantry and devotion of Her Majesty's troops, both European and Native, on all occasions, the superiority of our arms has been unquestionably established and maintained. Nevertheless, the result, even from a military point of view, is far from satisfactory.

6. The Army in Afghanistan holds positions at Kabul and in its neighbourhood, at Kandahar, with an outpost at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and in the Kurram valley, besides guarding the lines of communication between these places and our frontier. I trust that these lines of communication are now secure from any serious danger, but, up to a recent date, they have not been exempt from annoyance and some loss of life on all three routes ; while beyond the positions actually occupied by our troops we have for the most part established no control. The Government which previously existed has been destroyed, and no authority exists in the country except that of independent

Chiefs over the various tribes. No security can, therefore, be felt that a renewed combination of these tribes against us may not recur at any moment, and that we may not be again compelled to defend positions which we hold.

7. To attempt to occupy the whole country and to reduce it to submission and order would probably require a much larger force even than that which we have now in Afghanistan, and such order as might even then be established would have no prospect of permanence, beyond the period of our occupation. It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider what progress has yet been made towards the conclusion of arrangements which offer any hope of re-establishing a settled Government and which may enable us to withdraw from the country.

8. On referring to the correspondence which has passed between the Government of India and my predecessor, I find that in a Despatch, dated 7th January last, No. 3, Lord Lytton's Government explained as fully, I presume, as was then possible the policy which it was at that time desired to adopt. Its main features were—(1) avoidance of territorial annexation or further assumption by the Indian Government of administrative responsibilities in respect of Afghanistan, and (2) acceptance of the "disintegration of the kingdom of the late Amir Shere Ali Khan as a basis for the political reconstitution of the country." In the opinion of Lord Lytton's Government events, on the one hand, had shown the sufficiency of the military frontier secured by the Treaty of Gandamak, and, on the other hand, had demonstrated that the reconstruction of the Afghan kingdom under a single ruler was not practically possible, even were it politically desirable. They accordingly contemplated a provisional occupation of Herat and Seistan by Persia; the establishment of the province of Kandahar as a separate State under an hereditary ruler selected from among the representatives of the old governing families, to be supported by a British garrison at or near the capital; and a similar arrangement in regard to Kabul to which the Oxus provinces might remain, under certain conditions, nominally subject.

9. But while such were the views entertained by the Government of India in January last, it does not appear that, except in the case of Kandahar, any substantial approach to a definitive settlement in accordance with them has been made since that date. The negotiations which were in progress with Persia in reference to Herat and Seistan led to no result, and have been suspended. At Kabul, Sirdar Wali Mahomed has been placed in charge of the city and adjacent districts, but, by general consent, he would be wholly powerless to assert his authority even in the capital without the support of a British garrison, while no other of the Sirdars now on the spot offers better promises of success as an independent ruler, and the result of communications which have been opened with Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, at present in Afghan Turkestan, is quite uncertain.

10. Turning to the measures which have been actually adopted in reference to Kandahar, Her Majesty's Government find that the Sirdar Sher Ali Khan has been informed in a letter from the late Viceroy, under date the 13th March, which was formally presented to him on the 11th instant, in the presence of a large assemblage, that the Queen has been pleased to recognize him as independent ruler of the province, according to limits to be hereafter defined, but that, for the consolidation of his power and for the proper guardianship of the frontiers of Her Majesty's empire, it is necessary that a force of British troops should remain in a cantonment at or near the city of Kandahar. It appears also, from the Secret Letter of the Government of your Excellency's predecessor, No. 90, dated the 7th April last, that the Sirdar has expressed his readiness to accept the position proposed to him, and that he has been assured that aid in money and material will be freely afforded to him if it should be required.

11. Thus it appears that, as the result of two successful campaigns, of the employment of an enormous force, and of the expenditure of large sums of money, all that has yet been accomplished has been the disintegration of the State which it was desired to see strong, friendly, and independent, the assumption of fresh and unwelcome liabilities in regard to one of its provinces; and a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country.

12. I proceed to consider the question how far it is necessary to acquiesce in the continuance of this position of affairs. The first object which Her Majesty's Government desires to accomplish is the speedy withdrawal of the greater part of the troops now employed in Afghanistan, and the ultimate withdrawal of the whole from positions beyond our own frontier. But they also desire, if it be still possible, to see the

restoration on our north-western frontier of a friendly State capable of maintaining its own independence, and of administering its own affairs without the military support of the British Government. The engagements which have been contracted in the name of the Queen with Sher Ali Khan, or with any other Afghan Chief, must of course be scrupulously respected, and it is essential that, as a preliminary to any change of policy, your Excellency in Council should satisfy yourself of the exact nature of those engagements, and how far they preclude the substitution of some other arrangement if thought desirable.

13. With regard to the measures which have been taken at Kandahar, I find that so recently as the 16th February last Sher Ali expressed his willingness, if not his desire, to retire on a pension from the Indian Government; and, although he has since accepted the proposed arrangements, there is nothing on record to prove that his wishes in this respect are changed. Again, the boundaries of the State are not even approximately defined in Sir D. Stewart's letter of the 16th February, and it does not appear that any communication on the subject has since been made to Sher Ali. The location of the British force to be maintained at Kandahar has not been decided, and upon this point an important difference of opinion exists between Sir D. Stewart and Sher Ali, the General considering that the troops should be at least five miles from the city, whilst the Sirdar wishes that on no account should they be removed to any distance. Moreover, the amount of the subsidy to be paid for the support of the garrison has not been fixed, and Sher Ali has expressed doubts whether he can maintain himself if such subsidy be insisted on.

14. It is possible that a further discussion of the points alluded to in the preceding paragraph may afford an opening for reconsideration of the whole question, if it is thought desirable. The papers, moreover, contain various indications that the Sirdar distrusts his ability to maintain his position at all except by our direct military support. How far the terms of the late Viceroy's letter, and of the assurances subsequently given, constitute a pledge of such support which could not now be withdrawn without breach of faith, is a question upon which it will be for your Excellency in Council to satisfy yourself as soon as possible.

15. With regard to Kabul, the invitation which has been addressed to Abdul Rahman appears to be of a vague character, and no engagements can yet have been entered into with him which practically commit the British Government to his support. In this quarter, therefore, as I have already observed, Her Majesty's Government is free to adopt whatever line of policy may ultimately be deemed best suited to attain the objects which the Government of India have professedly had in view, namely, the restoration of order in Afghanistan, and the peace and security of the British frontier.

16. The withdrawal of the troops cannot, under any circumstances, be immediate, and may probably, upon sanitary grounds alone, require to be postponed until the month of November. The experience of last year has shown the suffering to which an army is liable in traversing the passes at an unfavourable season, and very strong reasons would be required to justify the exposure to heat and epidemic disease of troops who have already been engaged for a lengthened period in service of a trying and difficult character.

17. Her Majesty's Government, moreover, fully recognize that a too hasty withdrawal, either from Kabul or Kandahar, would probably lead to a renewal of disturbances and to prolonged civil war. For the disastrous consequences to the Afghan people the British Government could not be held altogether free from responsibility, while protracted anarchy in Afghanistan would probably cause uneasiness and disquiet in our own dominions, and in the States of our Native feudatories and allies, which it is essential to avoid. An indispensable preliminary, also, to withdrawal, is the dispersion of any considerable hostile forces in the field which might attack and harass the troops on their march. It would not be consistent with the honour of the British arms, that Her Majesty's forces on their return to India should be exposed to insult, or that the least ground should be afforded either to the Afghans or the people of British India to regard the movement as otherwise than voluntary, and as having been decided on as a consequence of the cessation of all serious opposition. It will further be necessary to take every precaution that the tribes and Chiefs who have assisted us shall not be exposed to injury in consequence of their friendly conduct.

18. Subject, however, to the foregoing considerations, the desire of Her Majesty's Government is, as I have already stated, that Afghan territory should be evacuated

whenever it appears possible to entertain the hope that the prospect of a stable Government has been secured. The interval which must elapse before the withdrawal of our troops can be commenced will enable your Excellency in Council to form a judgment and to report fully to Her Majesty's Government as to the manner in which this object may best be attained.

19. The arguments in favour of the subdivision of the Afghan kingdom appear to be twofold. It is, in the first place, held to be impossible to find any Chief sufficiently strong to rule the whole country, but upon this point the information in my possession does not enable me to form a confident opinion.

20. The second argument is of a different kind. In the opinion of those who have been most in favour of a policy of active interference in Afghanistan, it is on the line of Quetta, Kandahar, and Herat, that it is most necessary that our strategic position should be secured. There are few who apprehend any danger or attach much importance to the line of approach to India which lies through Kabul and the Khyber Pass. It was therefore with the Amir of Afghanistan in his capacity of Ruler of Kandahar and of Southern and Western Afghanistan that it has been thought necessary to attempt to improve our relations; and whatever importance may in future be attached by the Government of India to the political condition of that territory, it is thought that it may be better that we should have to deal with the ruler of it alone, and not necessarily be involved in interference with the internal affairs of Central, Northern, and Eastern Afghanistan. Should the result of the consideration which your Excellency in Council will give to the question induce you to regard as sound the view above set forth, it might, perhaps, be feasible to effect an earlier retirement from Kabul and the neighbouring district than from Western Afghanistan. In such a case, assuming the communications which have been addressed to Abdul Rahman to be responded to by him in a satisfactory manner, the object would be to establish that Sirdar at Kabul with as little direct assistance from Her Majesty's agents or troops as possible, and to give him to understand that he must rely on his own resources.

21. It would, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government be undesirable to embarrass him, and to commit ourselves to the possible necessity of further interference, by insisting on his receiving a British Resident. On the other hand a Native envoy would probably be of assistance to him in maintaining his authority, and would supply the Indian Government with all necessary information.

22. But although these arguments may be urged in favour of the establishment of separate kingdoms of Kabul and Kandahar, considerations in my opinion of not less weight point to a different conclusion. It is the strong opinion of experienced men that a permanent peace cannot be established in Afghanistan under such an arrangement. It is argued that, from the character of its population, the fertility of its soil, and its military position, Kandahar is the most important province of the country, that without it no strong and independent kingdom of Afghanistan can exist, and that no ruler of Kabul will acquiesce in its exclusion from his dominions. Sirdar Sher Ali is aware of this, and also that he cannot by himself hold his province against the warlike tribes on his frontier. It must, therefore, be regarded as almost certain that a policy of separation will be found to involve the necessity of affording permanent military support to the ruler of Kandahar, a liability to which Her Majesty's Government would entertain the greatest objection.

23. In the event of it appearing compatible with engagements which have been entered into, and desirable from the point of view of policy, to revert to the idea of the reconstruction of the kingdom of Afghanistan as a whole, and should the negotiations with Abdul Rahman fail to lead to any satisfactory result, it may become necessary for your Excellency carefully to reconsider the position of Yakub Khan, and the facts which have been ascertained with regard to his conduct in Kabul in September last. I am aware that your Excellency's predecessor held a strong opinion that his treachery or incapacity had been so conclusively proved that his restoration had become impossible, and I am far from asserting that this may not be the case. I am also aware that the Government of your Excellency's predecessor had formally decided that the abdication of Yakub Khan is to be treated as irrevocable, that this decision has been communicated to the Government at home, and has been approved, and I understand that it has been announced at Kabul that his return would never be permitted.

24. These circumstances undoubtedly constitute grave, and, possibly, insuperable obstacles to the acceptance of Yakub Khan as a candidate for the throne of Afghan-

istan; but he appears to have a strong party in the country, and if it should be found that, as the heir of the late ruler, he would command more support than any other candidate, and that there is no conclusive proof against him of complicity in the murder of Sir L. Cavagnari and his escort, I am of opinion that his claims, or those of his son, Musa Khan, should not be held to be absolutely excluded.

25. It is probable that, in the negotiations between your Excellency's Govern-

* "The Viceroy replied that the British Government did not share the Amir's apprehensions, but that, as already mentioned in the previous conversation, it would be the duty of the Amir, in case of any actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to that Government, who would endeavour by negotiation and by every means in their power to settle the matter and avert hostilities. It was not intended, by insisting on such previous reference, to restrict or interfere with the power of the Amir as an independent ruler to take such steps as might be necessary to repel any aggression on his territories, but such reference was a preliminary and essential condition of the British Government assisting him. In such event, should their endeavours to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British Government were prepared to assure the Amir that they would afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and would also, in case of necessity, aid him with troops. The British Government held itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent; moreover, the assistance would be conditional upon the Amir himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations."

ment and the candidate who may be accepted as the ruler of Kabul, your Excellency will be asked how far you are prepared to give assurances of support against external attack, such as were so anxiously desired by the late Amir Shere Ali. Her Majesty's Government are prepared to renew the assurances which were offered in 1873 by Lord Northbrook to the Amir, as quoted in the margin,* to the effect that, upon certain conditions, he might rely on the support of the British Government against unprovoked aggression; but they are unable in any degree to extend them, or to assume

undefined liabilities in regard to the foreign policy of a Government the character of which must necessarily be at present so uncertain.

26. The future of Herat presents perhaps greater difficulty than any other part of the Afghan question. The arrangement proposed with Persia, as I have already stated, has been suspended, and the negotiations will probably not be renewed. The most desirable solution would undoubtedly be that the city and dependent territory should continue to form part of an united kingdom of Afghanistan. Indeed, the position of Herat constitutes one of the most serious objections to the disintegration of Afghanistan. It would be difficult for the ruler of either Kandahar or Kabul, as detached provinces, to establish his authority over it, and, in the event of an independent Sirdar assuming power at Herat, it would be practically almost impossible for the British Government to exercise any control or influence over his policy.

27. It will be necessary for your Excellency to consider carefully with your military advisers the expediency of maintaining the advanced military positions on the North-West frontier which have been acquired by the Treaty of Gandamak. The necessity of retaining the posts in the district of Pishin will be materially affected by the policy which may be decided on with reference to Kandahar, and it is probable that, for the present at all events, the maintenance of them will be desirable; but the value of the positions now held in the Kurram and Khyber districts appears to be open to the greatest doubt. A large force is now locked up in the Kurram valley with little or no military advantage, and the military occupation of the Khyber pass can probably not be permanently maintained except by the employment of a considerable force, at much risk to the health and efficiency of the troops and with little compensating profit. It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the question of the permanent tenure of these positions must be determined mainly upon military considerations, and that your decision should not be affected by announcements made under different circumstances upon the termination of the campaign last spring, or by the provisions of the Treaty of Gandamak, with regard to the rectification of the frontier.

28. I have not attempted in the preceding observations to define for the guidance of your Excellency in Council a fixed policy which would admit of no modification. The position of affairs in Afghanistan is still involved in so much uncertainty and obscurity that Her Majesty's Government can as yet do little more than commit them to the judgment of your Excellency in Council, in the full confidence that your Excellency is generally acquainted with, and concurs in, the policy which they desire to pursue, with a view to the restoration of peace, the relief of the present heavy strain upon the resources of India, and the permanent security of the frontier.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 16.

No. 131 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 15th June 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the Diaries of the Resident, Southern Afghanistan, for the period from the 8th to 21st May 1880.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) RİPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" A. CLARKE.
" J. STRACHEY.
" E. B. JOHNSON.
" RIVERS THOMPSON.
" J. GIBBS.

Enclosure in No. 16.

MEMORANDUM, No. 204, dated Kandahar, 19th May 1880.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. C. ST. JOHN, C.B., C.S.I., Political Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

HAS the honour to forward copy of Diary of the Kandahar Residency from the 8th to the 14th May 1880. Extract :—

May 11th.—This morning at 7.30 the Viceroy's letter and gifts were formally presented to the Wali; Lieutenant-General Primrose, commanding the Kandahar force, was kind enough to be present with his staff. Brigadier-General Brooke, the heads of the different departments, and the Officer commanding the citadel, were also present by invitation. The limited space in the Wali's house prevented a larger party being asked. A guard of honour of the 66th Regiment, under Captain McMath, with the band and the regimental colours, were drawn up in the courtyard, and half a battery of artillery in the square in front of the citadel. In the Wali's house we found a numerous assemblage, consisting of his brothers, Sirdars Hussain Khan and Nur Muhammad Khan, his young sons and nephews, the kazi and principal mullas, the leading merchants, a large number of tribal Chiefs and maliks, and others. After tea had been handed round, I addressed the Wali in Persian, as follows :—

" His Excellency the Viceroy has ordered me to deliver to your Highness this letter in answer to that sent to His Excellency by my hand. He has also desired me to request your acceptance of these gifts as a token of the great regard and esteem he has for your Highness."

The Wali expressed his profound gratitude, and asked that Mirza Hasan Ali Khan might read the translation of the letter aloud. The reading of the letter was interrupted and followed by many exclamations of approval, particularly by the mullas. I then asked the Wali's permission to say a few words to those present, and on his begging me to do so, spoke as follows, in

Persian :—

" Ulema, Sirdars, Khans, and others here present, you have seen by the letter which has just been read what great kindness the British Government, which all over the world is the support of Islam, has extended to the people of Kandahar and the Durani nation. You have also seen how peace and prosperity have been brought by us to Kandahar, and how different is its condition now from what it was two

years ago. In order that this condition of peace and prosperity may continue, and that it may not return to its former state of poverty and wretchedness, the Government of England has decided to restore it to its ancient independence under the most worthy and capable descendant of its former Governors, the Sirdars of Kandahar, whose rule only ceased 25 years ago. Under the just Government of Wali Sher Ali Khan, and under the protection of England, Kandahar will, if it pleases God, remain for ever free from foreign oppression, and will rise to such a height of wealth and prosperity that will be the envy of the whole of Islam."

The Wali made a short speech in reply, expressive of his own unworthiness and his gratitude to the English Government. The Viceroy's presents were then brought forward and uncovered. The first, consisting of a sword mounted on blue velvet and silver, with a heavy gold embroidered belt, was buckled round the Wali's waist by General Primrose, on which His Highness said that he trusted he might have an opportunity of showing his readiness to draw it in the cause of the British Government. I then placed a diamond-studded repeater watch and gold chain round His Highness' neck; and presented him with the rest of the gifts, consisting of a large silver salver, a silver ewer and basin, a clock, and several pieces of silk and velvet. The guard of honour then presented arms, and a salute of 21 guns was fired by the artillery. His Highness the Wali then received the congratulations of all present; and the kazi and mullas offered a prayer, in Pushtu, expressive of thanks to God, and exhortation to the Wali to govern justly. To this he replied in the same language, exhorting them also to do their duty in keeping the people in the right way. Sweetmeats were then handed round, and we took our leave. Intelligence reached me the next morning that, after leaving the assembly, the Wali retired into his Andarum, where he took off his dress of ceremony, and, after placing a black rag (expressive of humility) on his head, offered up open prayers to God for having elevated him to so exalted a position, vowing at the same time to be faithful to the British Government, which had so honoured him. This produced an outburst of wrath from his niece, daughter of Khushdil Khan, his eldest brother, and from one of Mihrdil Khan's (his father's) widows, who abused him for joining the infidels, and for daring to compare himself with his ancestors. The Wali's favourite wife (a daughter of Sirdar Sultan Muhammad Khan, Tallai) took his part, and there was a violent quarrel.

No. 17.

No. 134 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 15th June 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter from His Highness Wali Sher Ali Khan, of Kandahar, to the Viceroy, in answer to the Earl of Lytton's letter to him, dated 13th March, which was delivered by Colonel St. John on the 11th May 1880.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) RIPON.
 " F. P. HAINES.
 " A. CLARKE.
 " J. STRACHEY.
 " E. B. JOHNSON.
 " RIVERS THOMPSON.
 " J. GIBBS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 17.

No. 208, dated Kandahar, 20th May 1880.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a letter from His Highness Wali Sher Ali Khan to His Excellency the Viceroy in answer to that delivered by me to His Highness on the 11th instant.

Enclosure 2 in No. 17.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kandahar, to HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY, dated 9th Jamadi-us-Sani (19th May 1880).

After compliments.—I beg to represent that your Excellency's very kind letter, together with the honours and presents which your Excellency was most graciously pleased to send, has reached me and caused me much pleasure; that on Friday, the 1st Jamadi-us-Sani (11th May 1880), I was invested with the honours which your Excellency had kindly sent me by my kind friend Colonel St. John. Both he and General Primrose have treated me with every mark of honour and respect, and the contents of your Excellency's letter afforded me the greatest joy and delight.

I feel extremely thankful to Her Imperial Majesty the Queen of England and the Empress of India for Her Majesty's unbounded favour in having recognized me (the sincere well-wisher of Her Majesty's Government) as the absolute Governor and the independent ruler (Wali) of the principality of Kandahar and its dependencies. For this favour of Her Majesty's illustrious Government I can make no return, but beg to express my most sincere gratitude to Her Majesty.

God willing, so long as I live, I shall not fail to fulfil, as far as lies in my power, the requirements of sincere friendship and devotion, inasmuch as Her Imperial Majesty has been so kind as not to withhold from me (the worthless one) anything which is likely to add to my strength or to put my affairs in order.

I am exceedingly glad to learn that a British force will remain in Kandahar for the security and protection of the frontier of Her Majesty's dominions, as the presence of troops here will ensure safety to the frontier. But in reality all the hardships of the journey, &c., to which the British troops are exposed, are for the sake of protecting my country and strengthening my position. With regard to the point that a certain quantity of the Government share in the grain produce of the country should be supplied to the British troops for provisions, I beg to state that this whole country, with all its resources, is the property and at the disposal of the British Government. Whether there be any excess of grain beyond my own wants or not, I will not fail to provide the fixed quantity for the imperial troops in the same way as I supplied to them what they required last year; a fact of which General Stewart and Colonel St. John are aware. Please God, I will endeavour to act in future as I have acted in the past. I am also exceedingly pleased to learn that a British officer of rank will be located here for the purpose of conveying the friendly communications and wishes of the British Government. I hope that, by the grace of God and the good will and kindness of Her Imperial Majesty the Queen-Empress, all the affairs of this country will be properly arranged and will improve greatly, the interests of this State being identical with those of the British Government. With respect to the extension of the railway to Kandahar, to which your Excellency was pleased to allude, I beg to say that the construction of railways in every country has been the cause of its advancement, as the people derive a great many advantages from them. In fact, there would be nothing so beneficial as the construction of a railway to Kandahar, as it will afford every facility for traffic, &c. I am exceedingly pleased to hear of this proposal. Please God, the good wishes and favours of the British Government towards myself and the people of this country will continue for ever. I feel highly indebted and thankful to all the British officers who were here before, as well as to those who are here at present, especially to Colonel St. John, who pays great attention to me, and is a well wisher of his own Government and a very kind friend of mine.

Usual ending.

No. 18.

No. 164 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of
State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 20th July 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* this day addressed to Lieutenant-General Sir D. M. Stewart, Kabul, conveying to him instructions for concluding the political arrangements preliminary to the withdrawal of the British forces from Kabul.

* No. 2431 E. P.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" JOHN STRACHEY.
" E. B. JOHNSON.
" WHITLEY STOKES.
" JAMES GIBBS.
" C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

No. 2431 E. P.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, to Lieutenant-General Sir D. M. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Forces, Northern and Eastern Afghanistan.

Foreign Department (Political).

SIR,

Simla, 20th July 1880.

THE latest reports from Kabul of the movements of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan show that he has now arrived in Kohistan, and that he may be expected very shortly to proceed towards Kabul. So far as his wishes and intentions can be judged from his recent actions and letters, there is fair ground for supposing that he has fully apprehended the nature and objects of the invitation sent to him in April last, and that his inclinations, as well as his needs and interests, are bringing him toward an arrangement with the British Government. It has, therefore, become expedient that you and Mr. Griffin should be furnished with instructions empowering you to conclude the political arrangements which must precede your departure from Kabul, since the evacuation of the city by our troops cannot, in any event, be much longer delayed.

2. In their correspondence with Abdul Rahman, the Government of India have throughout held steadily to two cardinal points. In the first place, it has been declared from the beginning, and throughout maintained, that our measures for withdrawing our troops from Northern Afghanistan are in no essential degree dependent upon the result of our correspondence with the Sirdar. In the instructions transmitted by my letter of the 27th April, regarding the terms of our communications with Abdul Rahman, it was laid down that our evacuation of Kabul cannot constitute any subject for proposals in Mr. Griffin's correspondence with the Sirdar. Nevertheless, since the Government were willing to carry out this evacuation in the manner most conducive to Abdul Rahman's interests, Mr. Griffin was directed to inform the Sirdar of our intention to quit the place, and of our desire, in the interests of order and the restoration of tranquillity to the country, to transfer the government to him. In my letter of the 20th May to Mr. Griffin the same policy was adhered to, and it was said that we could not materially alter our plans for evacuation upon considerations affecting a new Amir. On the 15th May, also, I telegraphed to Mr. Griffin that he should bear steadily in mind that our policy of withdrawing from Kabul is in no way dependent on establishing a friendly Amir, or on an adjustment of friendly relations, however desirable, with any Kabul ruler. The early retirement of our forces was held to be the main object of all political and military measures, an object to which the establishment of a settled Government at Kabul must, in the case of emergency, be subordinated.

3. In the second place, it was decided, in authorizing correspondence with Abdul Rahman, that this correspondence must not take the form of negotiations, in the sense of proposing or entertaining conditions, or of discussing a bargain. The suggestion that conditions should be offered to the Sirdar was definitely negatived; and the scope of the instructions given regarding this correspondence was carefully limited to authorizing an unconditional invitation and offer. The Government informed the Sirdar that if he came to Kabul upon a friendly understanding he should be recognized as Amir, and assisted to establish himself before the departure of our troops. Subsequently, upon your special recommendation, the Sirdar received a distinct statement of the views and intentions of the British Government upon certain additional points. But this statement, although of high importance to the Sirdar, was given him unconditionally; and while it conveys a declaration of the policy and intentions of Government, the Sirdar's assent has been neither asked nor expected.

4. In regard, therefore, to the plan of early withdrawal of our troops from Kabul, and to the continuance of our correspondence with Abdul Rahman, the lines of instruction originally traced have been substantially adhered to. You are thus free, as matters now stand, to complete the arrangements, political and military, preliminary to the retirement of the British forces, while, as Abdul Rahman has accepted your invitation to Kabul, the time may have arrived for the fulfilment of our offers to him of recognition and assistance. Upon these points I am now to convey to you instructions in continuation and expansion of the orders already telegraphed. The Government of India agree with the opinion of yourself and Mr. Griffin that it will probably be advisable that the Sirdar should not enter Kabul immediately, but that he should remain for the present within a distance convenient for intercourse and for personal conference, if necessary, upon the arrangements for his assumption of authority. First, then, in regard to the Sirdar's recognition as Amir (which, as well as any subsequent arrangement with him, is, of course, dependent upon your being satisfied that he is dealing with us in good faith, and in a friendly spirit), he will be recognized under the title of Amir of Kabul; and whenever the announcement shall have been publicly made, it should be understood as entitling him, thereafter, to your full countenance and political support, but not to any co-operation by British troops in his measures for establishing his authority. It will consequently be your duty to discountenance and discourage all claims of candidates and combinations of parties adverse to or inconsistent with the recognition of Abdul Rahman's Amirship.

5. You have been already instructed that, for the purpose of establishing the Sirdar at Kabul, he may be provided with some artillery, and with money sufficient to meet his immediate wants. The precise number of guns to be given, and their calibre, must be left to your judgment, upon consideration of the Amir's position at Kabul, and of his own resources; the general view of the Government being that the guns should be serviceable, and sufficient to strengthen effectively his occupation of the city. In regard to money, it is important to place the Amir beyond the necessity of levying exactions upon the country, in order to collect funds for the maintenance of the troops he may require, and for the payment of his officials; and your disbursements to him will be proportioned, within a maximum of ten lacs of rupees, to your estimate of his actual wants at the time. But the Sirdar should understand that we can engage ourselves to no regular subsidy or continuous supply of either arms or money, and that, after he has taken possession of his capital, he must rely for holding it upon his own resources.

6. It would be manifestly premature at present to discuss the question whether any formal engagement should hereafter be made with the Amir's Government, before the Sirdar has established himself at Kabul, or has shown what disposition towards the British Government, or capacity for rule, he may possess. Nevertheless, since the point has been raised, and since it has been argued that the Amir may have some claim to be admitted into some such engagement, it may be well that you should receive explicit instructions on the matter. The Government of India, I am to say, see no reason for diverging from the line of policy which has, from the beginning of these transactions with the Sirdar, positively excluded any question of a treaty with him. It is true that in transmitting to the Sirdar the replies of the Government to certain questions regarding his future position, Mr. Griffin added, under authority, that if the Sirdar desired these matters to be stated in formal writing, he should first accept or refuse our invitation to Kabul. This formal statement, if he asks for it (but

not otherwise), can now be given to him ; and I am accordingly to enclose a letter which may be delivered, after the Sirdar's recognition, to him as Amir. But it appears to His Excellency the Governor General in Council that it would be highly inadvisable to enter into any other engagement at the present time. The actual state of Afghanistan would render futile any attempt to introduce regular diplomatic relations with its ruler ; and all questions of reciprocal engagements between the two Governments must necessarily be postponed until some settled and responsible administration shall have been consolidated in North Afghanistan. This is the explanation which, if any reference is made to the question of a treaty, may be given to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan.

7. It will be necessary, before evacuating Kabul, to determine what measures are possible for the protection of the tribes and individuals who have assisted us there from injury in consequence of their friendly conduct. Upon the subject of individuals who may claim our protection, and may not desire to remain in Afghanistan, you will receive a separate letter. You will, however, probably see fit to address some admonition to Abdul Rahman, intimating that, if he seeks to retain our good will, he can give no better proof of his friendly disposition than by his behaviour towards those in whom the British Government is interested. But experience has shown the inutility of making, in favour of individuals, precise stipulations which can easily be evaded, and can very rarely be enforced ; while the case of tribes, who, like the Hazaras, may have compromised themselves by taking part against the Afghans in the recent disturbances, must be reserved for separate consideration.

8. The foregoing instructions will have conveyed to you the views of the Government of India on such questions as may be expected to arise in concluding the transfer of the Kabul Government to Sirdar Abdul Rahman. When in the opening of the present year it was determined to withdraw the British troops from North Afghanistan in the autumn, the Government of India considered that an invitation to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan to assume the Amirship afforded the best prospect of replacing the country under some settled and durable rule. As the Sirdar has accepted this invitation, the most desirable issue for the present situation in Kabul lies, beyond doubt, in the direction of concluding arrangements with him. Nevertheless, in the present unstable position of affairs in North Afghanistan, where the course of events is still liable to sudden changes, it is necessary to provide against the contingency of a failure to bring the correspondence with the Sirdar to a satisfactory termination. Your instructions are that if a breach with Abdul Rahman occurs, you can assemble the leaders of the party which would restore Sher Ali's family to power, offer to recognize any *de facto* Government they may be able to establish, and transfer Kabul to that Government. Moreover, you have been empowered, in the case of rupture with the Sirdar, to use all practical means, in the interval before your complete evacuation of Kabul, to communicate with the leaders of any substantial party in the country, who may be able to organize some administration at Kabul capable of discharging the functions of a Government. With this object you will proceed to notify to the Sirdars and to other representatives of the wishes and feelings of the people round Kabul, with whom it may be possible for you to communicate, that your correspondence with Abdul Rahman is at an end, and that the British Government wishes them to undertake the organization of some ruling authority. You would explain that, if no attempts are made on their part, or with their collusion, to embarrass the movement of your troops, their endeavours to restore order will be supported by your influence, so long as you remain at Kabul, and that if they succeed in setting up a Government *de facto*, you will recognize it by transferring the capital to its charge. But you are not authorized to make any further offers of assistance or specific support ; and the Government of India must reserve full discretion to act, upon all ulterior questions, according to the future course of events in Afghanistan.

9. On the other hand, while the Government of India do not disguise their reluctance to leave Kabul unprotected and to relinquish as unsuccessful their endeavours to promote the restoration of order under some recognized ruler, it would be in the highest degree imprudent to allow your arrangements for the withdrawal of your troops to be materially delayed or deranged. In the eventuality contemplated it is probable that considerable confusion will prevail in the country, and it might take a long time to bring together the leading men of the alternative party. The prospect of any stable Government being formed within the short period to which your stay can in any case be limited, is uncertain ; and in a former letter I have pointed out the need of great

caution in taking steps which might implicate us unprofitably, and, possibly, against the wishes of the country, in struggles among equally matched factions. Subject, therefore, to the foregoing general instructions and limitations, the Government desire to leave you free to use your own discretion as to the measures to be adopted under the circumstances for the establishment of a *de facto* Government in Kabul.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) A. C. LYALL,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

To His Highness Sirdar ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, Amir of Kabul.

After compliments.

July 1880.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council has learnt with pleasure that Your Highness has proceeded toward Kabul, in accordance with the invitation of the British Government. Therefore, in consideration of the friendly sentiments by which your Highness is animated, and of the advantage to be derived by the Sirdars and people from the establishment of a settled government under your Highness's authority, the British Government recognizes your Highness as Amir of Kabul.

I am further empowered, on the part of the Viceroy and Governor General of India, to inform your Highness that the British Government has no desire to interfere in the internal government of the territories in the possession of your Highness, and has no wish that an English Resident should be stationed anywhere within those territories. For the convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse, such as is maintained between two adjoining States, it may be advisable that a Muhammedan Agent of the British Government should reside, by agreement, at Kabul.

Your Highness has requested that the views and intentions of the British Government with regard to the position of the ruler at Kabul in relation to foreign powers, should be placed on record for your Highness' information. The Viceroy and Governor General in Council authorizes me to declare to you that since the British Government admits no right of interference by foreign powers within Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all interference with the affairs of Afghanistan, it is plain that your Highness can have no political relations with any foreign power except with the British Government. If any foreign power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you, to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government necessary, in repelling it; provided that your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations.

I have, &c.,
(Signed)

No. 19.

No. 166 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 27th July 1880.

WE have already reported to your Lordship by telegraph that a durbar was held at Kabul on the 22nd July, in which Sir Donald Stewart publicly and formally recognized Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan as Amir of Kabul.

2. In order to explain clearly the motives and considerations by which we have been actuated in countenancing Abdul Rahman's accession to the vacant rulership at Kabul, it is necessary to give some connected account of the course of affairs in,

Northern Afghanistan, and to define the objects toward which the policy of the Government of India has, during the last few months, been directed.

3. Our Despatch of the 7th April last, upon the situation at that date in Afghanistan, referred to a Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General (the Earl of Lytton) as summing up the policy which the Government of India were then endeavouring to carry out. The Minute stated that the Government were anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the troops from Kabul, and from all points beyond the frontier settled by the Treaty of Gandamak, excepting Kandahar, and that it was desirable, in order that this might be done, to find a ruler for Kabul. Upon this latter point our Despatch reported, more specifically, the conclusion of the Government of India that Sirdar Abdul Rahman, who was known to have entered Afghan Turkistan, would, if he agreed to certain territorial limitations, be more likely than any other of his family to prove a successful ruler. The Sirdar had given, indirectly, some hints that he desired an opening for correspondence with the English, and friendly messages had been sent to him in return; so that there was reason to expect before long some definite overtures on his part. In April last, therefore, the settled policy adopted by the Government of India was to withdraw the British troops as soon as possible from the interior of North Afghanistan, and to open correspondence with Sirdar Abdul Rahman, with the view of facilitating by a friendly understanding his assumption of authority at Kabul.

4. It should be here mentioned that at the end of March a letter had been sent by the British authorities at Kabul to Abdul Rahman, whose presence and movements beyond the Hindu Kush could not in any case be ignored, stating simply that the bearer was authorized to transmit to Kabul any representations the Sirdar might be inclined to make regarding his object in entering Afghanistan. The messenger was empowered also to let the Sirdar understand that the British Government was favourably disposed toward him, and to afford him every opening for a friendly correspondence. This letter elicited a very friendly, though guarded, reply. The Sirdar expressed in very general terms his hope of obtaining power, and said that he greatly desired the friendship of the English and their assistance in restoring peace and order to Afghanistan. At the same time he hinted that his obligations to the Russian Government for the hospitality which he had received placed him in some doubt as to the terms upon which our friendship might be accorded to him. He added, in a verbal message, that he was ready to cross the Hindu Kush to discuss matters with our officers. The receipt of this answer made it necessary to settle carefully the basis upon which the communications, thus initiated, were to be continued, and to define precisely the scope and nature of the arrangements which the British Government might be prepared to conclude with the Sirdar.

5. Accordingly the Government of India, after a very careful survey of the situation, addressed* to Mr. Lepel Griffin at Kabul a full exposition of the policy which was to govern all our relations with the Sirdar, with explicit instructions regarding the language to be held in corresponding with him. In regard to the policy, its main lines and objects, as already determined, were described as follows:—"Our only reasons" (it was said) "for not immediately withdrawing our forces from Northern Afghanistan, have hitherto been, first, the excited and unsettled condition of the country round Kabul, with the attitude of hostility assumed by some leaders of armed gatherings near Ghazni; and secondly, the inability of the Kabul Sirdars to agree among themselves on the selection of a ruler strong enough to maintain order after our evacuation of the country."

"The first named of these reasons has now ceased to exist. In a Minute, dated 30th March, the Viceroy and Governor General stated that 'the Government is 'anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the troops from Kabul, and from all points 'beyond those to be occupied under the treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. 'In order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a ruler for Kabul, which will 'be separated from Kandahar. Steps' (continued His Excellency) 'are being taken 'for this purpose. Meanwhile, it is essential that we should make such a display of 'strength in Afghanistan, as will show that we are masters of the situation, and will 'overawe disaffection.' * * * 'For this, all that is necessary from the political 'point of view is for General Stewart to march to Ghazni, break up any opposition 'he may find there, or in the neighbourhood, and open up direct communication 'with General Sir F. Roberts at Kabul.' The military operations thus defined have 'been accomplished by General Stewart's successful action before Ghazni."

“ With regard to the second reason mentioned for the retention of our troops in North Afghanistan, the appearance of Abdul Rahman as a candidate for the throne of Kabul, whose claim the Government of India has no cause to oppose, and who seems to be approved and likely to be supported by at least a majority of the population, affords fair ground for anticipating that our wishes in regard to the restoration, before our departure, of order in that part of the country will now be fulfilled.”

“ The Governor General in Council has consequently decided that the evacuation of Kabul shall be effected not later than October next, and it is with special reference to this decision that the letter and message addressed to you by Sirdar Abdul Rahman have been carefully considered by His Excellency in Council.”

6. This being the policy and plan of operations of the Government of India, it appeared to the Governor General in Council that to attach any conditions to the proposals which might be addressed to Abdul Rahman, or to enter into any negotiations with him upon the subject, would be unnecessary and inconsistent with the views and course of action laid down. For, in the first place, the Government of India require from the Sirdar no pledges, concessions, or reciprocal engagements. Our invitation to him was given, not as a preliminary to forming an alliance with the Kabul ruler, or that his consent to our political arrangements might be secured; but chiefly in order that, by transferring the administration to a competent ruler, we might be spared the necessity of leaving something like anarchy behind us whenever our troops should have been withdrawn. In the second place, it seemed that any negotiation with Abdul Rahman must in all probability raise some very embarrassing points, and would be very likely to involve us in a protracted discussion, which might entail delay and affect our plans for the withdrawal of our troops. And finally, the Sirdar's capabilities and disposition were little known, while he was obviously in no position to become responsible for the execution of regular political engagements.

7. Mr. Griffin was therefore directed to reply to the Sirdar, by letter and through his confidential agents, expressing satisfaction at the friendly sentiments which the Sirdar's letter contained, and concurring heartily with his desire for peace and the restoration of order. The political arrangements in South Afghanistan were to be communicated to him, and he was to be informed that we had settled to withdraw our troops from Kabul in a few months. It was to be explained to him that we desired, before leaving, to make over Kabul and its provinces to a capable and friendly ruler, whose accession would be in accordance with the wishes and usages of the country, and who would be able to maintain his authority and restore order. That, with this view we were ready to transfer the Government to him and to recognize him as ruler of the State, and further to afford him facilities and even support in reorganizing the administration and establishing himself at the capital. If (it was said) in future Abdul Rahman should prove by his conduct his friendship towards us, and his confidence in us, such behaviour would be fully reciprocated, very much to his advantage; and it was added that his behaviour towards those who have assisted and have been in close intercourse with British officers in Afghanistan would be taken as a test of the sincerity of his desire to acquire and retain our friendship.

8. Upon this basis, therefore, and subject to the limitations above defined, our political officers at Kabul were authorized to proceed with the correspondence with Abdul Rahman.

9. The mission which conveyed Mr. Griffin's reply, stating formally the views of the Government, and inviting the Sirdar to Kabul, was received by Abdul Rahman at Khanabad with much courtesy, and the whole matter was repeatedly discussed at different interviews. It soon became apparent that the Sirdar's needs and interests made an understanding with the English at Kabul of great importance to him, and that he was by no means indisposed to accept the invitation. But the reports of his conversation with the mission indicated some impression on his part that the British Government contemplated a treaty with him, and it was natural that he should show his desire in any case to obtain some information regarding the extent of territory which would be recognized as his dominion, and generally as to the nature of his political relations and responsibilities as ruler of Kabul. The Sirdar's statement upon these points to the members of the mission proved that until his doubts and uncertainty in these points should have been set at rest, he was unwilling to compromise

himself by moving towards Kabul. After consultation with the Sirdars and officers, he made in durbar the following declaration :—

“ When the British Government tell me what are to be the boundaries of Afghanistan, will Kandahar, as of old, be left in my kingdom or not ?

“ Will an European Envoy and a Government (British) force remain within the borders of Afghanistan, after friendship is made between the two parties, or not ?

“ What enemy of the British Government shall I be expected to repel; and what manner of assistance will Government wish me to give ?

“ And what benefits will the Government undertake to confer on me and my countrymen ?

“ These are matters which I must place before the Chiefs of my country, and in concert with them I will, having ascertained how far I can do so, undertake such terms of a treaty as I can accept and carry out. For this purpose, as soon as I am informed on these points, I will at once go to Kabul; and, in order to get a reply quickly, I will at once post mounted couriers at various places on the road. I will also issue a proclamation to my countrymen, directing them to assemble within their own bounds, and to abstain from advancing against the British army, or provoking hostilities. I will send back one of you two with a written reply to the letter sent to me by the British Government. If I receive an answer in accordance with my wishes, and those of my countrymen, I will then set out from here to Kabul. Otherwise, should the conditions be such as I cannot undertake and accept, I will consider carefully whether to go to Kabul and discuss them.”

10. The mission sent to Kabul their report of Abdul Rahman's requests and wishes, adding that his real intentions would be made known by the written reply which the Sirdar was sending. This report was forwarded to us by Mr. Griffin, with a strong expression of his opinion that the Sirdar would not be satisfied without precise information as to the limits of his dominions and the responsibilities which he might incur by dealing with us. The Sirdar's own reply followed on the 2nd of June. It contained merely general expressions of friendship and hope for support, but the Sirdar mentioned that Ibrahim Khan, who took the letter, would add some verbal explanations. The account, however, of the state of affairs at Khanabad and of the Sirdar's disposition, given by the two British agents on their return to Kabul with this reply, appears to have convinced our political officers that the Sirdar had been merely temporizing. They recommended, therefore, that an ultimatum should be addressed to him, stating plainly his position in certain particulars regarding which the Sirdar was believed to require a clear understanding with the British Government. But the Government of India decided that, since a reply on these points might involve questions of decisive importance to our future course of action in North Afghanistan, it would be right to await, before answering the telegram, the arrival of the present Viceroy at Simla.

11. In the meantime it had become known throughout North Afghanistan that the British Government was in communication with Abdul Rahman Khan. The general uncertainty as to the result of this correspondence, the rumours prevalent regarding the Sirdar's real disposition and plans, and the jealousies of opposing factions, caused much fermentation among the people; while this uneasiness was increased and extended by letters, purporting to emanate from the Sirdar, and bidding the tribes to be armed and ready, which circulated through the country. Some of these letters were intercepted and brought to Kabul, and the Sirdar was simultaneously reported to be in close correspondence with Muhammad Jan, who was undoubtedly engaged in levying forces against us. These reports, and the spread of excitement throughout the country, suggested to our chief military and political officers grave doubts as to the good faith of the Sirdar, and it became necessary to consider very seriously the expediency of continuing with him amicable communications which General Stewart and Mr. Griffin were disposed to abandon.

12. Upon this situation of affairs, which for the moment assumed a critical aspect, the Government of India, after the present Viceroy's arrival, deliberated carefully. The question to be determined was whether, at this stage of the correspondence with Abdul Rahman, having regard to what had actually passed between him and our representatives at Kabul, to the Sirdar's public acts and letters, to his position in Afghan Turkistan, and to our declared intention of speedily withdrawing our troops from Kabul, we should undertake the responsibility of breaking off the correspondence. It appeared to us to be very probable that Abdul Rahman might be endeavouring

to bring pressure to bear upon the British Government, and at the same time to strengthen himself independently by encouraging the fanatic spirit of the people, and by summoning them to be ready to join his standard. It was manifestly his interest, particularly as our intention to withdraw early from Kabul was no secret, to gain over as many adherents as possible, and in prosecuting these intrigues and combinations he incurred great risk of setting in motion forces which he might be unable to control, and of provoking, intentionally or otherwise, collision with the British troops, or at any rate of straining his relations with us beyond the point up to which they could be prudently maintained. On the other hand, we were without actual evidence that the Sirdar was deceiving us, and that he had secretly resolved not only to refuse our invitation, but to engage in hostilities against us. On the whole, therefore, we resolved that, finding no distinct proof of the Sirdar's duplicity, and taking into account the known difficulties of his position, the fair and politic course of action before finally closing, as we had been advised to do, our correspondence with him, would be to send him plain replies upon the points to which he evidently attached particular importance. There was no reason why these replies should be withheld, while to break off communications abruptly, leaving his questions unanswered, might have afforded the Sirdar some pretext for declaring the British Government responsible for this unsatisfactory conclusion. We therefore telegraphed to Kabul precise instructions on the points reported to be essential, and we desired a letter to be written, in pursuance of these instructions, to Abdul Rahman. The messenger taking this letter was ordered to request an answer within four days of its receipt by the Sirdar, and to set out on his return to Kabul, with or without an answer, on the fifth day.

13. A copy of this letter, dated 14th June, is already in the possession of Her Majesty's Government. It contains a statement of the views which we entertain with respect to the position which the ruler of Kabul holds in relation to foreign powers, and it explains to what extent, and under what circumstances, the British Government would be prepared to afford support to the new Amir against external attack. In regard to territorial limits, the letter bars discussion on certain points settled or held in reserve, but expresses the willingness of the British Government that over the rest of Afghanistan the Sirdar shall re-establish the authority exercised by previous rulers of his family. He is further informed that there is no wish to station English Residents within his territories. In conclusion, he is told that, if he desires a more formal record of these matters, he must first accept the invitation sent him by the British authorities, must proceed toward Kabul, and must state his propositions for ulterior arrangements.

14. On the day after this letter had been despatched, a letter from the Sirdar, dated 9th June, reached Kabul, in which he announced that, after settling all his affairs, he would start in the direction of Kabul. To this Mr. Griffin replied expressing pleasure at this intelligence, but pointing out that the Sirdar's exhortations to the chiefs to collect their men and be ready for action had caused much excitement, and requesting him to use his authority to dissolve and repress these gatherings.

15. The Sirdar replied within the prescribed period of four days to Mr. Griffin's letter of the 14th June, which had reached him on the 20th at Khanabad. In his answer, received at Kabul on the 26th June, he declared that the communications made to him regarding his future position as ruler of Kabul was in all respects satisfactory. He intimated that he had addressed the Afghan Chiefs in the same sense, and he stated that he would himself very shortly reach Parwan, on the southern slope of the Hindu Kush mountains. But, simultaneously, a secret message was received from a confidential and trustworthy source, implying strong distrust of Abdul Rahman's sincerity, while it was observed that both in the Sirdar's letter to Mr. Griffin, and in his address to the chiefs, that portion which alluded to the territorial reservations was certainly worded ambiguously. These indications, and the disturbed aspect of affairs round Kabul, increased the strong misgivings entertained by our political officers as to the Sirdar's real intentions, and strengthened their belief that he might be only protracting the correspondence in order to gain an advantageous position for further demands, and possibly for eventual hostility. Sir D. Stewart and Mr. Griffin represented to the Government of India, for the second time, their conviction of the danger of trusting Abdul Rahman, the imprudence of delaying immediate action, and the necessity, in this critical situation, of breaking off with Abdul Rahman, and adopting other means for establishing a government in Kabul before our evacuation.

16. We have already, in our Despatch of the 6th July, submitted to your Lordship a full statement of the difficult case which was thus again placed before us for decision upon the issue whether the correspondence with Abdul Rahman should or should not be closed, and we have explained at length the grounds upon which our decision was framed. These grounds, stated briefly, were that, as a rupture with Abdul Rahman appeared to us hardly justifiable, we preferred holding on our course, at the risk of some disadvantage or embarrassment, to incurring, by a sudden premature change, any possible imputation on our good faith and firmness of purpose. We considered, moreover, that, as matters stood then, an arrangement with Abdul Rahman offered the most advisable solution, while we doubted whether it would not be found very difficult to enter into any alternative arrangement. The subsequent course of events has as yet given us no reason to regret our determination not to pronounce for the rupture, nor has Sir D. Stewart been compelled to use the authority, vested in him conditionally by our final instructions, to break off, in certain circumstances, the negotiations with Abdul Rahman.

17. Rissaldar Afzul Khan, who had remained at Khanabad after the return of the other two members of the mission originally sent from Kabul to Abdul Rahman, arrived at Kabul on the 3rd July. He brought a reply to Mr. Griffin's letter requiring the Sirdar to use his authority to repress tribal gatherings, in which Abdul Rahman pleaded the weakness of his authority, and represented that by ordering the clansmen to disperse he should only alienate all his supporters. We suggested to Sir D. Stewart that, if these excuses seemed to him reasonable, he might consider the expediency of not pressing too closely upon Abdul Rahman the final requisition that he should disperse the gatherings in Kohistan. The general situation was described by Mr. Lepel Griffin on the 7th July:—

“The position of affairs, so far as the probabilities of a settlement with Abdul Rahman, as desired by the Government of India, are concerned, appear far more favourable than they did last week. The firm and decided tone in which the Sirdar has been addressed, the precision and definiteness of the conditions which have been laid down as necessary for his acceptance, have had the anticipated effect. Abdul Rahman has seen that we have been fully informed of the game he has been playing, that trickery and treachery would not be tolerated, and that, if he intends coming to a settlement with us at all, he must be prepared to accept our terms rather than dictate his own.”

18. On the 10th July Abdul Rahman's answer to Mr. Griffin's final letter, desiring him to proceed at once to Kabul, and to take measures for controlling the tribal gatherings, was received at Kabul. Its purport was to adjourn any specific reply until he should have arrived in Kohistan, and as there was at the moment no sign of growing hostility against us, while the country was outwardly quiet, Sir D. Stewart determined that the Sirdar need not be hurried in his compliance with our requisitions. A deputation of influential persons, friendly to British interests, was sent to meet the Sirdar, and was very courteously received by him at Tutandara. He wrote again to Mr. Griffin, explaining that he was detained for a few days at that place; but on the 20th he reached Charikar. A large number of leading chiefs and other influential personages, including Mushk-i-Alam, and some of the principal Ghilzai and Wardak Chiefs, have signified their adherence to his cause, or their acquiescence in his recognition, and many have gone to meet him at Charikar. Sir D. Stewart and Mr. Griffin considered that, under these circumstances, it was advisable that the Sirdar's public recognition as Amir should no longer be deferred; and the Sirdar himself, who was consulted, expressed much satisfaction at the proposal. On the 22nd, accordingly, a durbar was held attended by a large number of chiefs and influential personages, and by a deputation representing the Sirdar; when Abdul Rahman was formally and publicly recognized, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, as Amir of Kabul.

19. In the foregoing paragraphs we have endeavoured to place before Her Majesty's Government a general summary of the proceedings which have been taken since April last, to accomplish that part of the policy which related to the establishment, before the withdrawal of the British forces from Kabul, of a government in North Afghanistan. Our detailed instructions to Sir D. Stewart for completing the political arrangements with which his occupation of the city should terminate, were transmitted to your Lordship in our Despatch of the 20th July; and they need not be here recapitulated. In those instructions it was necessary to provide, not only for the contingency of Abdul Rahman's final recognition, and of his peaceful accession to the Amirship on the basis of a friendly understanding with the British Government, but

also for the possibility of an interruption or breach of that understanding. To this latter case we need not now more specifically allude, except to observe that Sir D. Stewart's instructions for dealing with that eventuality left much, within certain limits, to his discretion, and that he was enjoined to use all practical means for establishing some *de facto* government before his departure. But all his measures for this object were to be subject to military considerations; nor could they be permitted materially to delay or derange his operations for the withdrawal of the British troops.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) RIPON.
 F. P. HAINES.
 JOHN STRACHEY.
 E. B. JOHNSON.
 WHITLEY STOKES.
 JAMES GIBBS.
 C. U. AITCHISON.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN referred to in the foregoing Despatch.

Mr. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 1st April.

It has become known that you have entered Afghanistan, and consequently this letter is sent to you by a confidential messenger, in order that you may submit to the British officers at Kabul any representations that you may desire to make to the British Government with regard to your object in entering Afghanistan.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 15th April 1880.

WHEREAS at this happy time I have received your kind letter. In a spirit of justice and friendship you wrote to inquire what I wished in Afghanistan. My honoured friend, the servants of the great (British) Government know well that throughout these 12 years of exile in the territories of the Emperor of Russia night and day I have cherished the hope of re-visiting my native land. When the late Amir Shere Ali Khan died, and there was no one to rule our tribes, I proposed to return to Afghanistan, but it was not fated (that I should do so) then, I went to Tashkend. Consequently Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan, having come to terms, and made peace with the British Government, was appointed Amir of Afghanistan; but since, after he had left you, he listened to the advice of every interested (dishonest) person, and raised fools to power, until two ignorant men directed the affairs of Afghanistan, which during the reign of my grandfather, who had 18 able sons, was so managed that night was bright like day, Afghanistan was, in consequence, disgraced before all States, and ruined. Now, therefore, that you seek to learn my hopes and wishes, they are these:—That as long as your Empire and that of Russia exist, my countrymen, the tribes of Afghanistan, should live quietly in ease and peace; that these two States should find us true and faithful, and that we should rest at peace between them (England and Russia), for my tribesmen are unable to struggle with empires, and are ruined by want of commerce; and we hope of your friendship that, sympathizing with and assisting the people of Afghanistan, you will place them under the honourable protection of the two powers. This would redound to the credit of both, would give peace to Afghanistan, and quiet and comfort to God's people.

This is my wish; for the rest it is yours to decide.

Mr. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 30th April 1880.

On the 21st April I received your friendly letter from Kunduz, and understood its contents, together with the messages which you sent by Muhammad Sarwar. Both were submitted by telegram for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India at Simla, and I am now commanded by him to reply to your letter to the following effect.

The friendly sentiments which you have expressed are cordially reciprocated, and the British Government has only one object in its communications with you, namely, to restore peace to Afghanistan, and friendly relations between that country and itself. For this it is believed that the time is opportune. An army marching from Kandahar has just occupied Ghazni and is now pursuing its march to Kabul; while the Wardaks, who have opposed the march of a brigade sent from Kabul to co-operate with the Kandahar army, have been defeated with heavy loss.

The British Government does not desire to annex Afghanistan, and will withdraw its armies from Kabul so soon as it has established an Amir who is willing to live in peace and friendship with the Government.

This you are ready to do, and consequently the Viceroy and Governor General, believing you to be the most capable of the Barakzai family and most approved by the people of Afghanistan, offers you the Amirship, and will assist you to establish yourself, and supply your immediate wants.

What you have said regarding Russia has been fully understood, and the Government appreciates your sentiments towards those from whom you have so long experienced hospitality. But on this point no difficulty need arise, for with regard to your future relations with Russia, the Government desires nothing different from what has already been agreed upon between that country and Her Majesty's Government.

It is of great importance for you to take action at once; should you accept this friendly offer of the Government, you will do well to come to Kabul without delay, where you are assured of honourable reception and personal safety. But at no place but Kabul can final arrangements be satisfactorily and quickly made.

This letter, in duplicate, is taken by Wazirzada Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, a trusted official of the British Government, who will explain other matters by word of mouth, and by Sirdar Sher Muhammad Khan, who is well known to you, and who is a well-wisher of the British Government and of Afghanistan.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 16th May 1880.

BE it known to your friendly mind that I have received by the hands of Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan and Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan and Sher Muhammad Khan the kind letter which you wrote to confirm our friendship, to show your sympathy with the sorrow of Afghanistan, to exalt me amongst my peers, and to honour Afghanistan with the friendship of the British Government. My heart is filled with joy and with boundless hope for your kindness. You were good enough to write I should proceed to Kabul without delay. My friend, I had and still have great hope from the British Government, and your friendship has justified and equalled my expectations. You know well the nature of the people of Afghanistan. The word of one man can effect nothing until they feel that I speak for their good. For this reason I explained some matters to the Sirdars, of which they have informed you by letter, and I have now sent Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan to you, who will tell you what he has heard and seen. For the rest, I pray to God for your honour that you may work for the honour of myself and nation and for their prosperity. I trust in God that this people and I may some day unite to do you service, although the British Government has no need of it, but occasions of necessity may yet arise in this world. I hope the British Government will strengthen my position (literally reputation) amongst my people, that I may be enabled to keep my faith and my word, for a faithful ally alone is useful. Lastly, I pray for your health and honour. May God preserve you.

Mr. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 14th June 1880.

MY friend, I have received your letter of the 16th May by the hand of Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, Sirdar Bahadur, who arrived at Kabul on the 23rd May, and have fully understood its friendly sentiments and the desire which it expresses for a cordial understanding between the British Government and yourself. This letter, together with the memorandum of the members of the mission, which was shown to you before despatch, and which mentioned certain matters regarding which you desired further information, has been laid before His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India; and I am now commanded to convey to you the replies of the Government of India to the questions which you have asked.

Firstly. With regard to the position of the ruler of Kabul to foreign Powers, since the British Government admit no right of interference by foreign Powers in Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all political interference with Afghanistan affairs, it is plain that the Kabul ruler can have no political relations with any foreign Power except the English; and if any such foreign Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the Kabul ruler, then the British Government will be prepared to aid him, if necessary, to repel it, provided that he follows the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations.

Secondly. With regard to limits of territory, I am directed to say that the whole province of Kandahar has been placed under a separate ruler, except Pishin and Sibi, which are retained in British possession. Consequently the Government is not able to enter into any negotiations with you on these points, nor in respect to arrangements with regard to the North-Western Frontier, which were concluded with the ex-Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan. With these reservations the British Government are willing that you should establish over Afghanistan—including Herat, the possession of which cannot be guaranteed to you, though Government are not disposed to hinder measures which you may take to obtain possession of it—as complete and extensive authority as has been hitherto exercised by any Amir of your family. The British Government desires to exercise no interference in your internal government of these territories, nor will you be required to admit an English Resident anywhere; although, for convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse between two contiguous States, it may be advisable to station, by agreement, a Muhammadan Agent of the British Government at Kabul.

If you should, after clearly understanding the wishes and intentions of the British Government, as stated in former letters and now further explained, desire these matters to be stated in a formal writing, it is necessary that you should first intimate plainly your acceptance or refusal of the invitation

of the British Government, and should state your proposals for carrying into effect friendly arrangements.

Sirdar Wazirzada Muhammad Afzal Khan has been ordered to leave Khanabad within five days after receipt of this letter, as it is necessary to understand from him, by word of mouth, the position of affairs, and your wishes and sentiments. Should your reply be sent by his hand, it will prevent delay and accelerate the conclusion of final arrangements, and consequently the Government trusts that you will be able to make use of his agency.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to Mr GRIFFIN, 9th June 1880.

TO-DAY, the 1st Rajab, 1297 A. H. (9th June) I write to you. Yesterday I received a letter from Muhammad Sarwar Khan (Purwani). He writes that the people of Tagao have collected, and considers precautions are necessary to prevent their increasing the present agitation. Sayad Ghous-uddin, my servant, has verbally represented to me that you had desired to know "How it was that I did not come quickly, as the time for doing so was opportune?" The receipt of the letter (from Muhammad Sarwar) and your verbal message have decided me. I will, after settling all my affairs, start for that direction, as reported to you in the letter from Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan. I pray to God for the enlargement of the friendship between us.

MR. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 15th June 1880.

My friend. The receipt of your friendly letter of the 1st Rajab, corresponding with the 9th June, has caused me the greatest pleasure, as also to hear of your decision to proceed, without delay, in this direction. Yesterday, by the hand of swift messengers, a letter was despatched to your address, under cover of a letter to Sirdar Wazirzada Muhammad Afzal Khan, Sirdar Bahadoor, containing the replies of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to those inquiries which you had some time back made as to the limits of the territories of the Amir who would be acceptable to the British Government, and as to his relations with foreign powers. I now only write to express to you the friendly sentiments of Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, commanding Her Majesty's forces in Afghanistan, and of myself. I have also to thank you for the letter of Sarwar Khan, Purwani, and for the copy of the letter addressed by you to the Chiefs and Elders of Tagao. In this letter there is nothing calling for objection, but I desire in all friendliness to point out to you that your exhortation to the Chiefs to be active in the matter of collecting their men, remaining equipped, ready and prepared for service, will be and has been misunderstood by the Chiefs and people.

In proof of this, I enclose, for your information, copy of a letter of General Muhammad Jan to the Maliks of Maidan, forwarding to them your letter to the same Maliks, which is also herewith enclosed. You will observe that Muhammad Jan is summoning the tribes with hostile intentions to the British Government.

I also forward, for your information, copy of a letter of General Nizam-ud-din Khan, of an objectionable nature, together with one of Sirdar Ishak Khan, and one or two others of many that have reached me, from which you will see that your friendly disposition towards the British Government is not shared by those who write in your name. Should those persons, who by thus writing seriously injure you, cause an assemblage of large bodies of armed men in the neighbourhood of Kabul, these will undoubtedly be attacked and defeated, and a friendly arrangement will become more difficult. It will therefore be true wisdom on your part to at once address all those Chiefs or tribes, to whom you may have sent letters which have been thus misunderstood, and peremptorily order them to withdraw their people to their respective districts. If this be at once done, there can be no doubt but that friendship between the British Government and yourself will speedily be cemented; otherwise difficulties will certainly arise.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 22nd June 1880.

THE kind letter, sent by the hand of Taj Muhammad Khan, telling me of your welfare and friendship, arrived on the 11th Rajab (20th June), and caused me great pleasure. What was the wish and object of myself and people, you yourself have kindly granted.

Regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan which were settled by treaty with my most noble and respected grandfather, Amir Dost Muhammad, these you have granted to me. And the Envoy which you have appointed in Afghanistan you have dispensed with, but what you have left to (be settled according to) my wish is, that I may keep a Mussulman Ambassador, if I please. This was my desire and that of my people, and this you have kindly granted.

About my friendly relations and communication with foreign powers, you have written that I should not have any without advice and consultation with you (the British). You should consider well that if I have the friendship of a great Government like yours, how can I communicate with another power without advice from and consultation with you? I agree to this also.

You have also kindly written that should any unwarranted (improper) attack be made by any other power on Afghanistan, you will under all circumstances afford me assistance; and you will not permit any other person to take possession of the territory of Afghanistan. This also is my desire, which you have kindly granted.

As to what you have written about Herat. Herat is at present in the possession of my cousin. So long as he does not oppose me, and remains friendly with me, it is better that I should leave my cousin in Herat, rather than any other man. Should he oppose me, and not listen to my words (advice) or those of my people, I will afterwards let you know. Everything shall be done as we both deem it expedient and advisable.

All the kindness you have shown is for my welfare and that of my people, how should I not accept it? You have shown very great kindness to me and my people.

I have written and sent letters containing full particulars to all the tribes of Afghanistan, and I have given copies of these papers to Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, for transmission to you; and I have also communicated verbally to Afzal Khan certain matters.

Three days after this I will give him leave to start. Consider me also, the slave of the threshold of God, as having already arrived at Parwan.

Send me back a verbal reply by Muhammad Afzal Khan, so that he may reach me on the road wherever I may be. Dated 13th Rajab.

(P.S.—In Abdul Rahman's own hand.)

I have signed this, and sealed this envelope with wax.

In this letter, and the former letters, all is written by the same hand, and there is no alteration (erasure) anywhere.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 24th June 1880.

The friendly letter which you sent by the hand of Sayad Ghous-ud-din has reached me. Enclosed in it were the following letters. One from Sirdar Muhammad Ishak Khan, dated three months back; two letters from General Najm-ud-din Khan, who has been dismissed; one letter from Ghulam Hydar, dated a month and a half ago; and one letter of Muhammad Jan Khan, Wardak, and copy of a letter which I had sent to Mir Bacha Khan. I read these letters and understood their contents.

My friend, you know well the character of the people of Afghanistan. What shall I write about it? Further, you wrote that I should send orders to the tribes to dismiss their gatherings, lest something untoward should happen. If they disperse their gatherings, friendship will speedily be attainable. My friend, you yourself understand best the management of Afghanistan. I have passed these last 11 years of my life in Samarkand; and of all those who were alive in my time, not one in ten remains. The whole affairs of Afghanistan have gone to ruin; and now all the men who have appeared on the scene are youths, who do not obey their own fathers and mothers. How then will they listen to my words? Nevertheless, as was suitable to the time, I have before this written to all the tribes letters enjoining peace, and have sent copies to you. These will doubtless have been perused and fully understood by you. I cannot apply a forcible remedy. Accordingly, I have written to explain the state of affairs to you. Former rulers in spite of having exercised power and authority during several years were unable to effect this. I, who have only arrived a few days ago, have succeeded so far that I am obeyed, though empty-handed, by people who have never thought of entering into friendly relations with you, but who, their hearts being little by little reassured, are now beginning to give utterance to friendly words. If I should all at once order them to disperse to their homes, they would be estranged from me also, and the whole arrangement will fall through. For this reason I am unable to order them.

Further, with regard to Kandahar, I have already told Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, and also Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan, how Shere Ali Khan, Kandahari has done me mortal injury with the Russian Government. He will have explained this to you. I have again talked to Sirdar Afzal Khan on the subject; he will lay my representation before you.

Mr. GRIFFIN to SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 2nd July 1880.

I HAVE received with much pleasure your friendly letter of 22nd June, which has been forwarded by telegraph to Simla, and laid before his Excellency the Viceroy of India.

As you have desired a reply, I am directed to inform you that the Government of India are rejoiced that the friendly explanations which have been furnished to you have fulfilled your wishes, and that you appreciate the objects of the Government.

With regard to your reference to the resignation to you of Afghanistan up to the limits which were settled of old by treaty with your renowned grandfather, Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, the Government is not sure what treaty is alluded to by you. But the Government assume that you fully understand the statement in my former letter regarding reservations of territory.

You have written that Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan will explain certain matters verbally. Be assured that these will receive immediate consideration.

With regard to your statement that you will shortly reach Parwan, I am commanded to state that in the present state of affairs it is necessary that you should, without delay at Parwan, proceed at once towards Kabul, with such moderate force only as may be sufficient for your protection, in order that remaining arrangements may be definitely concluded.

You have already written to the tribes to do nothing improper to excite the distrust of the English, and you should now take effective steps to insure immediate obedience to these orders; and especially the gathering of large bodies of armed men in Kohistan must be prevented by you.

These are the points on which his Excellency the Viceroy has directed a further communication to be made to you.

Accept the assurance of my high regard and consideration.

SIRDAR ABDUL KHAN to Mr. GRIFFIN, 6th July 1880.

YOUR kind and honour-conferring favour of the 20th (evidently a mistake for 2nd) July reached me to-day, Monday, (mistake for Tuesday) 27th Rajab 1297, the 6th of June (July?) at Khinjan. I was glad to learn of your keeping well.

Respecting your kind request that I should make for Kabul, my kind friend, you will fully understand that in case I omit in the first instance to consult the people of Afghanistan, their minds will be estranged from me. Having arrived in Kohistan and explained to the tribes their interests, (I) will be able to come, having secured the consent of the nation.

Respecting the people of Kohistan, they are armed and seated in their homes. In this matter what can I say to them and such outside Baam as Tagawis and Nigrabis, who having come with their collections have all returned to their homes. After I have been some time in Kohistan, the Kohistanis will have been conciliated.

I look upon you as my kind patron. May you keep well.

MR. GRIFFIN TO SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 8th July 1880.

I RECEIVED your friendly letter of the 3rd July, from Kinjan, with much pleasure, and am rejoiced that you have reached so far in safety. I trust that nothing will now delay your arrival at Charikar at Istalif, on your way towards Kabul, as it is for the advantage of yourself and of the British Government to complete friendly arrangements as speedily as possible.

SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN TO MR. GRIFFIN, 16th July 1880.

At this happy time, your kind letter, dated the 6th day of the month of Barat sent by the hand of Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan and Abdul Rahman, Khan-i-Mulla, has been delivered by them to me. I am extremely pleased to hear the news of your welfare, and to learn of your good health. Further, you were pleased to ask me to leave for Charikar, or Istalif, or Kabul. My friend, before I came to Kohistan, I wrote to all the tribes far and near, that in accordance with the desire both of the British Government and of themselves, I was coming to Kohistan; and that in consultation with them (the tribes), I would make arrangements (with the Government). Therefore, when I arrived at Tutandarra, I despatched letters to the leaders of all these tribes by the hands of swift horsemen, asking them to come to me soon. If God please, they will arrive here in five or six days. After I have once seen them and have freed myself from the responsibility of my former promises, which I wrote to them, to consult them, I will leave for Charikar without delay, and there, or at Istalif, I will await your favours.

Your letter to my uncle, Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan, sent by the hand of Syud Ghous-ud-din, contained expressions of favour towards me, and I am pleased to learn this. If I live, please God, I will show such friendship as may be suitable for me to show such a great Government, so that I may get a good name in other States, with my own nation, and with the British Government. Further, until we see each other, please remember me. I wish you from God to be kind to me. May you enjoy good health.

MR. GRIFFIN TO SIRDAR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, 16th July 1880.

YOUR friendly letter by the hand of Mir Agha Sahibzada has been received by me, and its contents understood. I offer you my congratulations on your safe arrival in Kohistan, and trust that further good fortune may await you. Mir Agha has further verbally expressed your strong desire of friendship with the British Government. Be assured your desire is reciprocated by the Government, which only wishes the good of you and of the people of Afghanistan.

General Sir Donald Stewart, whose letter of congratulation is herewith forwarded, will make arrangements for the withdrawal of the army at an early date. In order to secure this, it is desirable that the personal interviews regarding which you have written should take place as soon as possible. We think that some place in the neighbourhood of Zimma would be suitable; but should any place nearer Kabul on the direct road from Farza to Kabul suit you, this would be preferable.

Kindly intimate your wishes in this matter, and the place that would be convenient to you. There everything that you desire to discuss can be considered; and, if God will, a speedy and satisfactory settlement can be made. This will be far better than sending a British officer to Charikar, as it would not be expedient to send him without a strong escort of Her Majesty's troops, and you know well, my friend, that this would cause excitement among those who are ill-disposed.

I have invited Sirda Musa Jan to come to Kabul; should he do so, he would either accompany his family to India, or would otherwise be free to go where he wished. This invitation is only with the object of preventing disturbances and opposition in the direction of Ghazni.

I have the greatest desire for a personal meeting with you. God willing, this will not be delayed. Do not delay to send me assurances of your good health, and of your wishes with regard to the time and place of interview. With high sentiments of regard, &c.

No. 20A.

No. 62 S.P.C., dated Kabul, 4th August 1880. (Extract.)

From LEPHEL GRIFFIN, Esq., Chief Political Officer, North and East Afghanistan, to Lieutenant-General SIR D. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in North Afghanistan.

1. I have kept the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department so fully and frequently informed of everything connected with the situation at Kabul, and the intentions, action, and prospects of Abdul Rahman Khan, that it is unnecessary, in the present letter, to do more than allude to the circumstances under which you fully concurred in the desirability of acting on the discretion granted by the Supreme Government, and publicly acknowledging the Sirdar as Amir of Kabul. He had, indeed, fulfilled those conditions which the Government had prescribed as essential to such public recognition. He had left Turkistan, at the invitation of the Government, with a portion of his army; he had crossed the Hindu Kush and had marched, contrary to his own intention, but in accordance with the wishes expressed by the British representatives at Kabul, to Charikar, where he had been enthusiastically received by a large number of Chiefs and people. He had publicly, privately, by letters, circulars, and in public speeches in his daily durbars, declared his firm intention of making friendly arrangements with the British Government; he had discouraged the assembly of armed men; had allayed the fanaticism which his previous letters had excited, and had acted in such a manner as to prove his sincerity and good faith. Such being the state of the case, delay in his public recognition by the Government would have been productive of harm. It might be urged that it would have been wiser to delay his public recognition until he had come into the British camp at Kabul; but this criticism would have been uninformed. In the first place, the suspicion, which Abdul Rahman certainly felt when overtures were first made to him, had not disappeared at the time of his arrival in Kohistan, while that of the people was as active as ever. They feared greatly, and he in a less degree, that our intention was to rid ourselves of a formidable opponent, and that, had he come straight into Kabul, he would have been arrested, and deported to British India. Foolish as such a fear may seem, it was nevertheless general, and the Afghan nature is suspicious beyond all others. I do not believe that Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan would either himself have ventured, or been by his army and the Chiefs permitted, to have entered Kabul or the British camp, or to have marched from Kohistan to hold interviews with the British officers, unless he had been first acknowledged by the Government as Amir.

2. The expressed opinion of Mushki Alam was further entitled to consideration. He wrote from Maidan, and his letter was sealed by many of the principal Chiefs, such as Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzai, Abdul Ghafur, Akhundzada of Laugar, and some thirty-five men of more or less note, to say that he and all there assembled were ready to accept as Amir whomever the British Government might select, whether Yakub Khan, or Abdul Rahman, or Ayub Khan; but that in the interests of the country and the Government it was essential to at once declare the choice of Government, as there was no other way of bringing to an end the period of uncertainty, and of re-assuring the people. The durbar of recognition was accordingly held, with reasonable but not excessive display, and the intentions of the Government were fully explained to the people. The name of the new Amir recited in the Khutba and public prayers on the following day was received with general enthusiasm, and although there is a very powerful and numerous party who are opposed to Amir Abdul Rahman, yet a very large number of Chiefs and people have joined him and have promised him their support.

3. The public recognition has had a most beneficial effect upon the quiet of the country. All districts in the neighbourhood of Kabul have remained absolutely undisturbed, if petty raids by Safi and Khairo Khel robbers be set aside, and the roads have been opened for trade in all directions to a greater extent than I have known since I have been in Kabul. The recognition of Abdul Rahman was, moreover, specially well timed, as considered in connection with the defeat which General Burrows has met on the Helmund. The unfortunate results of this military disaster can hardly be predicted as yet with any certainty; but the decision of the Government to send a powerful division from here to Kandahar, *via* Ghazni, will, more than any other measure which could have been adopted, minimize and, perhaps altogether,

neutralize its injurious effects. Had the public recognition of Abdul Rahman been delayed till after the defeat and dispersion of General Burrows' brigade was generally known, it might have been difficult or impossible to have made it at all; and the interviews with the Amir would not have been unattended with danger, as his camp is filled with Chiefs and people who had for long been openly and fiercely hostile to us, and who would have been only too glad of an opportunity to compromise him.

4. The news of the Kandahar defeat impelled us to hasten arrangements with the Amir and dispose of the matters for discussion in as few interviews as possible. A meeting was accordingly arranged at Zimma, about sixteen miles north of Kabul, and some six miles from Killa Haji, where General Gough's brigade was encamped, the camp of the Amir being pitched some miles to the north at Ak Serai. On the 31st ultimo, I proceeded to the place appointed, with a strong cavalry escort, composed of a squadron of the 9th Lancers, and another of the 3rd Bengal and 3rd Punjab Cavalry. The durbar tent was pitched on a hill affording a good out-look on all sides. And His Highness was accompanied by only two or three hundred horse and a few infantry, while a large number of followers, estimated at from three to four thousand, accompanied him to within half a mile of the place of meeting, and remained there till proceedings had terminated.

5. Amir Abdul Rahman Khan is a man of about forty, of middle height, and rather stout. He has an exceedingly intelligent face, brown eyes, a pleasant smile, and a frank, courteous manner. The impression that he left on me and the officers who were present at the interview was most favourable. He is by far the most prepossessing of all the Barakzai Sirdars whom I have met in Afghanistan, and in conversation showed both good sense and sound political judgment. He kept thoroughly to the point under discussion, and his remarks were characterized by shrewdness and ability. He appeared animated by a sincere desire to be on cordial terms with the English Government, and although his expectations were, as might have been anticipated, larger than Government is prepared to satisfy, yet he did not press them with any discourteous insistence, and the result of the interviews may be considered on the whole to be highly satisfactory.

6. Before taking leave of His Highness at the last interview, I again expressed my hope that he would be able the next day to come into the British camp and meet General Sir D. Stewart in Durbar; but the Amir said that a large number of the people with him were opposed to this, and that he feared it could not be. I, however, left Mr. Christie to see if this interview could not be quietly arranged without unduly pressing the Amir, who seemed himself sincerely anxious to meet our wishes. His Highness returned to Ak Serai and had a long and somewhat stormy meeting with the Chiefs. The Maidans, Kohistanis, and Kohdamanis were in favour of his visiting the British camp; but the Ghilzai Chiefs, Asmatulla Khan of Jekan, Mazulla Khan of Hizarak, Bahram Khan of Lughman, and Badshah Khan of Logar, all men who have been fighting against us, vehemently opposed it, and swore, by their faith, they would leave him if he persisted. Nevertheless the Amir determined to come, telling the Chiefs that the durbar tents were pitched on the Koh-Daman side of the pass, while he really intended to come into the British camp. He also sent me a private note, written with his own hand, to the following effect:—"If you really wish me to come to you, irrespective of the opinion of the people, I am quite ready to do so. Please write and let me know your wishes. I am in the hands of ignorant fools, who do not know their own interests, good or bad. What can I do? I am most anxious to meet you."

7. After explaining to you the state of the case, you were strongly of opinion that it would be impolitic to hold the durbar, as instead of strengthening the Amir, as was intended, it would evidently have the opposite effect. The durbar was consequently abandoned, and the following day we returned to Kabul.

8. There is no advantage in writing at great length on the present situation and the probabilities of the future,—firstly, as a few days will show how affairs will tend, and, secondly, that the numberless arrangements, consequent on the immediate march of the army to Gandamak and Kandahar, leave me little time for writing as carefully as I could wish. I would merely observe that I believe Abdul Rahman Khan is sincerely anxious for friendship with the Government, and that, if he can maintain his position, he will hereafter prove a valuable ally. But there is necessarily much anxiety for the immediate present. He is weak, in that he has little money, and

many of the Chiefs are opposed to him, or have only joined him as the best thing to do under the circumstances. They are ready to leave him for Ayub Khan, should he come in this direction. I have not yet heard what effect the Kandahar news, exaggerated as a matter of course, has had in the Amir's camp. The people were riotous enough there before; it was only after great difficulty His Highness could obtain their consent to our interview, and they only half believe that we will really evacuate Kabul.

9. It is not impossible that difficulties may arise before we leave Kabul, and that the people with the Amir may get out of hand and compromise him fatally. Everything possible is being done to keep the people quiet, and it is probable that there will be no opposition whatever to our retirement. But of course we must be prepared for any fortune. The Kandahar news has greatly excited the city, and all the bad characters are ready for mischief.

10. As to money, I have already made over to him one lac, and on the day of our departure I will give him four lacs more. It would be most inadvisable to give him too much before we leave Kabul, as his troops would not be more amenable to discipline, but less so, at the unusual sight of a large sum of money in their master's possession. The remainder of the grant must be paid at Jellalabad.

To secure the unopposed march of the divisions to Ghazni and Gandamak, the Amir has been requested to send an energetic Sirdar to accompany General Roberts' force, and to nominate a Governor who would be left at Ghazni when the division moved from there. The son of Mushk-i-Alam has been asked to accompany this division with some of the Andari, Wardak, and Taraki Maliks. There may be no fighting north of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, but nothing can be confidently predicted. With regard to the Gandamak division, the Amir has been urged to keep the Ghilzai leaders in his camp. If this be successfully done, there can be no serious resistance, though the Khairo Khels and Maruf Khel robbers will doubtless be ready for mischief, as indeed they have been ever since our occupation of Kabul.

No. 21.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 5th August 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE. (Extract.)

STEWART telegraphs 5th. All our objects here have been attained, and nothing remains to be done but to hand over Kabul to the Amir, who is naturally anxious to establish himself in his capital and bring his government into working order.

Politically, withdrawal now will be well-timed, and it happens that we shall leave Kabul on the day fixed for that purpose two months ago. The state of affairs at Kandahar, moreover, renders it highly necessary that we should avail ourselves of present opportunity, whilst country here is quiet and free from complications. Ends.

We are of opinion that Stewart's proposal to evacuate Kabul must be approved. I entirely agree with him as to the political importance of seizing present opportunity; if we let this slip, the situation may change, and we may be unable to withdraw without serious embarrassment. Evacuation would take place on 11th and 12th. Reply as soon as possible as final orders must issue at once.

No. 22.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY OF STATE, 6th August 1880, to VICEROY.

YOUR Lordship's telegram 5th. I entirely approve evacuation of Kabul.

No. 23.

No. 191 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 24th August 1880.

IN our Despatches of the 20th and 27th July last, we reported to your Lordship the instructions that had been issued to Sir Donald Stewart for completing the political arrangements with which the occupation of Kabul, by the British troops under his command, should terminate, and also the proceedings that had been taken, up to the date of the latter Despatch, for placing the government at Kabul in the hands of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan. It had been understood that, whatever might be the result of these proceedings, Sir D. Stewart's operations for the withdrawal of his troops would not be materially delayed or deranged; but this point has been placed beyond question by Sirdar Abdul Rahman's undisturbed accession to power at Kabul.

2. The news of the reverse suffered by a British brigade on the Helmund has not, as yet, outwardly affected the political situation in North Afghanistan. A strong division under Sir Frederick Roberts has left for Kandahar, but we decided that it was not desirable, either upon political or upon military grounds, to change our settled purpose of withdrawing all our troops from Kabul. In a telegram, dated 5th August, we transmitted to your Lordship Sir D. Stewart's urgent recommendation that the evacuation should proceed, and the reasons, with which we concurred, upon which he argued against any alteration of our plans for operating the withdrawal. Accordingly, immediately after the march of Sir Frederick Roberts' division for Kandahar, the rest of the Kabul field force left Kabul on the direct route for India, and Sir D. Stewart's head-quarters have already reached Jellalabad without opposition or interruption of any kind.

3. We have now the honour to enclose, with this Despatch, copy of a letter,* in which Sir D. Stewart strenuously advocates, and supports by reasons of much cogency, the entire withdrawal of our troops from North Afghanistan. Having regard to these strong representations of the General in chief command (with which the Chief Political Officer concurs), and upon a careful survey of the military and political considerations involved, we have determined, after consultation with the chief medical authorities, that the Kabul field force shall be withdrawn continuously, on its present line of retirement, until all the troops shall have passed the line of frontier that has been occupied since the Treaty of Gandamak, in 1879. The posts at Lundi Kotal and in the Khyber Pass will for the present continue to be held by our troops, since the whole question of maintaining our advanced military positions on the north-west frontier is necessarily reserved for future determination and report.

We have, &c.,

(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	E. B. JOHNSON.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure in No. 23.

From Lieutenant-General Sir D. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in Northern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department (No. 415, dated Kabul, 10th August 1880). (Extract.)

IN accordance with instructions which have been conveyed to me, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India in the Foreign

Department, the reasons which appear to me of sufficient weight and urgency to determine the withdrawal of Her Majesty's forces from Northern Afghanistan with as little delay as possible. These reasons are military, sanitary, and political; and from whatever point of view the question is regarded the conclusion appears to me the same.

2. The sanitary question is one of primary importance, as it would not be justifiable, except for urgent military reasons, to move troops under conditions dangerous to their health or life, and it has to be considered whether their march towards India during the hot season of the year will be as injurious to them as their continued maintenance at Gandamak, and on the line of communication between it and Peshawar. I do not hesitate to express my conviction—a conviction in which I am supported by the best medical advice at my disposal—that an early withdrawal would be more advantageous to the troops than their remaining in Afghanistan. I do not under-estimate the inconvenience of a march during the hot season; but it is not necessarily prejudicial to health or dangerous to life if the season be, as fortunately this year it has so far been, free from severe epidemic disease. The last reports received from the Punjab show that province to be almost entirely free of cholera, and, although there have been severe outbreaks at some of the north-west stations, yet these have been of short duration, and the disease has not shown a disposition to spread over an extended area.

3. Troops on active service in Afghanistan and India must occasionally be exposed to some risk and inconvenience from the climate. But the withdrawal being necessary on military and political grounds, there is no such sanitary risk in the withdrawal as to cause its postponement until a cooler season. In many ways I am disposed to think that the troops will be healthier withdrawn than remaining for the rest of the hot weather in Afghanistan. The climate of Kabul may no doubt be favourably compared with that of many Indian stations, but during the last two or three months sickness has been greatly on the increase, and a very large number of invalids have been sent to India. The cantonment and its surroundings have been polluted by the long-continued presence of so large a body of troops, camp followers, and animals; and it will be obvious to the Government of India that, in spite of all possible precautions, there are neither appliances nor staff to carry out those efficient sanitary measures which can alone ensure the health and safety of a large resident population.

4. At the stations along the road, more cramped for space and with a worse climate, that of Jellalabad, Pesh Bolak, and Dacca being hardly cooler than the plains of India, the sanitary conditions are still more unfavourable; and in these, as in Kabul, the causes of sickness must be held to be the same, and the activity of these must continue and not diminish. Indeed, the exposure of marching to India is no more than that to which the troops are now constantly exposed in their harassing convoy duty, while their tents are a poor substitute for barracks. On sanitary grounds, therefore, and in the interest of the health of the troops, I am strongly of opinion that no delay in the withdrawal from Afghanistan should be sanctioned.

5. The political question covers much of the ground which is occupied by that portion of the subject which is purely military, and may be conveniently discussed next. But here no lengthened remarks appear to me to be required. I firmly believe, and the Political Department at Kabul is entirely in accord with me, that on political grounds it is most expedient to withdraw from Northern Afghanistan as quickly as possible. If His Highness the Amir had felt himself so insecure as to have urgently requested us to remain and garrison for him, for a time, the eastern districts of Afghanistan, then it would have been for the Government of India in the Foreign Department to decide whether this, under the circumstances of the case, was expedient or possible. But he has made no such request. On the contrary, he has expressed his strong wish that the withdrawal from Gandamak should not be postponed or delayed. He feels that, once established in his capital, he will be stronger and not weaker by the withdrawal of Her Majesty's forces. The people will then associate his accession to power with the retirement of the invading army, and this will confer upon him some additional popularity.

6. As the Amir, then, desires the withdrawal of the troops, the question can be regarded from a more general point of view, and here there can be no doubt it is politically expedient to leave the country at a time when it is altogether tranquil, and when our withdrawal will probably be unaccompanied by any hostile manifestations. This state of affairs has been brought about by much labour, and by the concurrence of many fortunate circumstances; although the reverse which our arms have

experienced in Kandahar threatened for a time to shake severely the arrangements which had been all but completed at Kabul. It is of the highest political importance to withdraw while the tribes are peaceful, if not friendly, and, were we to delay, the temper of the people might and probably would change; and our retirement, though not less secure, would undoubtedly be less dignified.

7. The military question is, as before noted, in a great measure identical with the political, as it is obviously important that the troops on their retirement should not be harassed along difficult mountain roads and passes by a hostile population. Although the army which I have the honour to command is equal to any task which may be imposed upon it, yet such a harassed retreat would not improve either its credit or its *morale*.

8. I may here mention, though the details of the scheme will be communicated to the Government of India by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I propose that the force retire from Gandamak by brigades to Dacca, from which place they will file through the Khaibar by detachments of from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 regiments, as there is not accommodation in the Pass for large bodies of troops. The retirement will thus be slow from Dacca.

It is further my intention to leave a brigade of Infantry, a regiment of Cavalry, and a battery of Artillery in the Khaibar (the main body at Lundi Kotal and a regiment of Infantry at Ali Masjid), until the Government has decided what is to be done in the matter of Pass arrangements.

No. 24.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 3rd September 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

The Jajis of Upper Kurram being inclined to place themselves under Amir of Kabul, we decided in Council to-day, in accordance with advice of chief military and political officers in Kurram, to inform Abdul Rahman that he might take over those tribes and the Hariob District, but that he must not touch the independence of the Turis.

No. 25.

No. 208 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 14th September 1880.

IN your Despatch of the 21st May last,* on the state of affairs in Afghanistan, your Lordship observed that it would be necessary for us to consider carefully the expediency of maintaining the advanced military positions on the north-west frontier which were acquired by the Treaty of Gandamak. And the Despatch also intimated that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the question of the permanent tenure of these positions must be determined mainly upon military considerations, and that our decision should not be affected by announcements made under different circumstances upon the termination of the campaign last spring, or by the provisions of the Treaty of Gandamak with regard to the rectification of the frontier.

* No. 23, paragraph 27.

2. This question, accordingly, we have examined carefully from the point of view indicated by Her Majesty's Government. It will be remembered that since September 1879, and indeed (with a brief interval in 1879) since they were first taken up in 1878, the positions in the Khyber pass and the Kurram valley have been held as important points upon actual or possible lines of communication with the army at Kabul. By the withdrawal of our force from Kabul, and by its retirement within the line of frontier acquired under the Gandamak Treaty, these posts have now again become advanced frontier positions; so that the ground is cleared and the time has arrived for considering the necessity of maintaining them permanently in that character. Upon this subject we have had the advantage of consulting all those among our chief military

and political officers who, by their personal knowledge of the Khyber and Kurram districts, and by their general experience of the north-west frontier, are best qualified to advise. We forward papers containing the more important opinions and information thus collected; and we also take this opportunity of enclosing two Minutes recorded by the late Viceroy (the Earl of Lytton) upon the comparative value of the Kurram and the Khyber routes. We have now the honour to report to your Lordship our decision regarding the permanent maintenance of these military positions, with a brief explanation of the grounds upon which we have proceeded, and of the subsidiary arrangements that it has been necessary to make in consequence of this decision with certain tribes in the Khyber and in the Kurram valley.

3. The question of retaining our military positions in the Khyber Pass, at Lundi Kotal, and Ali Masjid, offers little or no room for discussion. On the one hand, the expediency of keeping open this difficult and important pass, so far as may be necessary to prevent its being held and fortified against us by regular troops, and to maintain it as a tolerably safe and uninterrupted thoroughfare for commerce between Afghanistan and India, is very generally admitted. On the other hand, from whatever side the subject is considered, there is an entire concurrence of opinions, on political as well as on military grounds, against garrisoning the pass with British troops; nor, indeed, has it ever been proposed to do so as a permanent military arrangement. The extreme unhealthiness of the stations in the pass, the discontent which its regular occupation by our forces would excite among the tribes, and the strong political reasons in favour of placing the road under their independent charge, are considerations which have always militated forcibly against keeping the Khyber in our own possession; while to contest this conclusion no single argument has, so far as we know, been adduced. It has already been observed that since our troops first entered the pass in 1878, the positions have been held almost entirely for the protection of communications with an army in front of them; and we consider that with the retirement of that army their object and value have disappeared. Nevertheless, there are obvious reasons why the pass should not be abruptly evacuated, before the existing arrangement with the tribes for its independent charge and management shall have been revised and consolidated, or until our future relations with them shall have been thoroughly made known and understood. There are also various matters of detail connected with the recent operations, such as the disposal of the fortifications and other buildings in the pass belonging to the British Government, which require some little time for proper regulation. But when these affairs are satisfactorily terminated, we intend that our present garrisons in the pass shall withdraw across the frontier of British India.

4. We propose that the immediate management of our future relations with the Khyber tribes shall remain in the hands of the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, by whom these affairs have been administered, during a period of difficulty and occasional anxiety, with skill and success. We enclose copy of instructions issued to the Punjab Government for summoning the representatives of the tribes, and for ascertaining what modifications in the present arrangements have been rendered practicable by the cessation of our military operations in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of our troops from the pass. There may probably be material reduction in the Jezailchi Corps that has been entertained for the duties of escort and convoy; and questions may arise regarding the taking of tolls, and as to the compensation to be fixed in lieu of their collection by the tribes, with other similar points which will need careful examination by the local authorities on the spot.

5. Your Lordship will observe that our instructions to the Punjab Government desire that the representatives of the Khyber tribes be informed that their independence is, as heretofore, recognized, and that the conditions of our arrangements with them will be that the pass shall remain under their independent and exclusive charge, and shall be kept by them open and free from interference. We have said, moreover, that so long as these conditions are fulfilled, it is not our desire to station any troops in the pass; but we shall also, if necessary, take care to make it plainly understood that no other regular troops will be permitted, without the consent of the British Government, to occupy posts in the Khyber. This arrangement will be most congenial to the traditions and wishes of the Afridis themselves, who prefer to be left undisturbed in their own country, acknowledging obligations of service and duties only to those with whom they have made engagements, and from whom they receive the customary allowances.

6. In the Kurram district our chief military position, to which all other posts, in front or in the rear, are subsidiary, is the Peiwar Kotal. The question of the strategical value of this position, and of the expediency of holding it permanently with a

strong garrison, has been very thoroughly debated. The arguments used and the opinions elicited will be found stated at length in the papers accompanying this Despatch, and they may be summed up as representing an almost unanimous verdict against our permanent retention of any military positions in the Kurram district. It is true that Sir Frederick Roberts' judgment against holding the Kurram presupposes, to some degree, the maintenance of a base of operations within South Afghanistan, which is a matter that lies beyond the limits of the question discussed in this Despatch. But his main argument is directed toward proving the inutility of holding positions on the Kurram line by showing that, in any future war in Afghanistan, we ought to remain on the defensive on our North-West frontier, and that our most effective line of advance against an enemy in the interior of the country would be from the southward, while, apart from strategical considerations of this general nature, the special weight of his reasoning on military, political, and financial grounds bears decidedly against our maintaining garrisons on the Kurram headlands.

7. We have therefore determined that our troops may leave the Kurram district as soon as this can be conveniently arranged. But the military evacuation of Kurram inevitably raises questions, connected with our relations to the tribes of the valley, that are not altogether free from difficulty. For whereas in the Khyber the tribes have been always treated as independent, and our dealings with them have concerned only the passes which traverse their territory, the whole Kurram district, including the Hariob tract beyond the Peiwar Kotal, has been more or less in our possession since the beginning of 1879, so that our relations with the people, especially in the lower valley which we have administered, have naturally taken a character corresponding to the belief that our tenure of the country might be expected to last for some time. There can be no doubt that the Turi tribe, inhabiting the greater part of the cultivated valley from the eastern slopes of Peiwar Kotal south-eastward toward the Indian border, have received from our officers repeated assurances that they will not be replaced, without their consent, under the power of the Barakzai dynasty at Kabul. It is equally certain that, relying on these pledges, they have conducted themselves in a friendly and loyal manner toward us during our occupation of their country, rendering us help in various ways, and abstaining from all attempts to molest our troops. As Mussulmans of the Shiah sect, they are to some extent isolated among the neighbouring Sunni tribes, while they have little sympathy with the Barakzai rulers, to whom they voluntarily submitted themselves only some 15 years ago, and under whose dominion they are said to be decidedly unwilling to return. They have, in fact, claimed from us the fulfilment of our pledges that they shall not pass again under a Barakzai ruler, and to this extent their claim upon us appears incontestable.

8. In this state of affairs, although under the instructions of Her Majesty's Government our decision regarding the permanent tenure of the military positions in Kurram would not be affected by the announcements that have been made to the Turis, we felt bound to take measures to prevent the withdrawal of our troops being followed by the reoccupation of the Lower Kurram valley by the Amir's officials, against the will of the Turi tribe. Whether the territory thus set apart should be placed under a separate Governor, nominated and upheld by the British Government, was a point on which some difference of opinion existed among the local political authorities. The difficulties which such an arrangement would entail are obvious, for it is very questionable whether a Sirdar, whoever he might be, appointed by and holding from our Government, could govern without our strong military support. His subordination to our authority would render us responsible for his acts; the Kabul Government and the neighbouring tribes might foment troubles and intrigues against him, and he might find himself in the position of a representative of our dominion, without the strength and order which are its chief advantages to the people. Against these objections were to be set the drawbacks to leaving the district altogether without a government. On the whole, however, since it appeared to be the conviction among those best acquainted with the wishes of the Turis that they themselves are anxious to be left to manage their own affairs, we have finally resolved to recognize the tribe's independence, and to undertake that it shall be maintained against any interference from Kabul, without attempting to select for them a Governor, or to impose a government upon them against their expressed will. General Watson has accordingly been authorized to announce to them their future status, and to warn them that they must avoid disputes with the Kabul Government, and must comply with the wishes of the British Government in matters affecting the tranquillity of the frontier. The question of their future self-government has not, however, been finally and unalterably decided,

for Major-General Watson, our chief Political Officer in the Kurram, has been empowered to take any further steps that he may judge necessary to satisfy himself as to the real needs and wishes of the Turis. Any practicable arrangement that may be acceptable to a substantial majority of the tribe, and that is not incompatible with the early withdrawal of the British troops, will be carefully considered by the Government of India.

9. With the Jaji tribe inhabiting the Hariob country, beyond the Peiwar Kotal, our connection has been much slighter, and of a different nature. They were indeed informed, in the earlier period of our occupation of the Shuturgardan line, that the Hariob had passed under British jurisdiction, and this tract has since been more or less under our control. But any obligations that the announcements made to them might have been supposed to involve, have been cancelled by the subsequent turbulence and hostility of the Jajis, who took active parts in the attacks made on Ali Khel and upon our communications beyond the Peiwar Kotal in the autumn and early winter of 1879. Moreover, while they have shown no inclination whatever to appeal to their former relations with us, or to claim our intervention on their behalf as against the Amir Abdul Rahman, there have been strong indications that they seek neither our patronage nor our protection, but, on the contrary, are content to return again into their former state of semi-allegiance to Kabul. Upon these considerations, the advisability of permitting the Amir to resume authority in the Hariob was pressed upon the Government of India by the political officers on the spot, who urge that, as the Jajis, when left to themselves, will certainly revert to Kabul, it will be in accordance with good policy that they should do so with our consent and sanction. This view we have accepted, and the requisite communications have been sent to the deputies whom the Amir has sent across the Shuturgardan, with orders to make territorial arrangements with our officers, and to settle any question regarding the future border or the control of the tribes. The opportunity has been taken to inform His Highness the Amir that the independence of the Turi tribe in the Kurram valley has been recognized, and His Highness has been reminded that, in the correspondence with him regarding the establishment of his authority in Afghanistan, the districts assigned in 1879 to the British Government by the ex-Amir Yakub Khan were expressly excluded from discussion.

10. We enclose copies of the orders that have been issued for the completion of these political arrangements, and we trust that our proceedings, which appear to us to be in accordance with the general lines of policy marked out for our guidance in your Lordship's Despatch of the 21st May last, will meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

11. Our late colleague, Sir Edwin Johnson, who was a member of our Government when these arrangements were under discussion, wishes us to state that, while agreeing with the measures proposed, and thus consenting to give up the command over Kabul which the Khyber positions in his opinion possess, he considers that such a measure only renders it still more incumbent on us not to relax our hold on Kandahar, nor to abandon the strategical advantages which he believes its occupation affords. He desires it therefore to be understood that any change in respect to our tenure of Kandahar would materially alter the conditions of the discussion, and the state of affairs with which the present Despatch deals, and that it would therefore set him free to reconsider altogether his opinion on the subject. Sir Edwin Johnson considers that this view is supported by the recorded opinion of Sir Frederick Roberts, which forms one of the enclosures to this Despatch.

12. We enclose copies of three separate Minutes recorded by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, upon the main questions dealt with in this Despatch. The Hon. Whitley Stokes concurs in one of these Minutes.

	We have, &c.,
(Signed)	RIPON.
"	F. P. HAINES.
"	JOHN STRACHEY.
"	WHITLEY STOKES.
"	JAMES GIBBS.
"	C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 25.

MINUTE by the VICEROY (LORD LYTON) on the Comparative Value of the Khyber and Kurram Lines. (Extract.)

1. In all probability one of the first questions which the Government of India will have to settle in connection with the close of the Afghan campaign is, whether such funds as may be available for either purpose shall be devoted to the improvement and development of the Khyber, or to those of the Kurram, line of communication with North Afghanistan.

2. So far as I can judge, the present preponderance of opinion on the part of our higher military and political authorities is in favour of treating the Khyber as our main permanent line of advance towards Kabul, and either abandoning or leaving unimproved our present advanced position in the Kurram. As, however, I do not share that opinion, I write the present Minute; not with any wish to prejudge a question which cannot be satisfactorily decided without very careful reference to financial and engineering, as well as political and military considerations, but for the purpose of placing on record the reasons which induce me to attach very great political importance to the permanent maintenance of a commanding military position in the Kurram, and to contemplate with aversion and mistrust any permanent military expenditure upon the Khyber.

3. In the first place, I observe that all those who advocate, whether on political or military grounds, the virtual projection of our frontier along the Khyber line towards Kabul, have hitherto assumed, as a *sine quâ non* condition of the advantages they ascribe to it, the extension of this line considerably beyond the point to which our hold of it was distinctly limited by the Treaty of Gandamak. The Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, for instance, and Mr. Lepel Griffin, so far as their views have been made known to me, lay great stress on the value of a military cantonment and political officer at Jellalabad, as a means partly of protecting Kunar and other petty States, and partly of strengthening and superintending in the direction of Badakshan those British interests which are at present confided to the management of our Political Officer at Gilgit.

4. Now, the territorial arrangements of the Treaty of Gandamak were fixed with great deliberation, after lengthened reflection, and frequent consultation with the highest military, political, and financial authorities. All the arguments for and against the annexation or permanent military occupation of Jellalabad were fully examined and discussed in a conference held by me at Lahore, and attended by Sir Robert Egerton, Sir Louis Cavagnari, Sir Edwin Johnson, and Sir John Strachey; and the suggestion in favour of extending our frontier, or our frontier liabilities, along the Khyber line, in any sense other than that which is implied by the assertion of our right and intention to deal directly with the Pass tribes, instead of assigning to the Amirs of Kabul a responsibility, which experience had proved our complete inability to enforce, for the good behaviour of those tribes, was then unanimously rejected. The reasons for this decision I need not now recapitulate, but they have, in my own judgment, at least, been strongly confirmed by subsequent events. In any case, however, the soundness of those reasons has been virtually reaffirmed by the Government of India in framing the programme of present and future Afghan policy, which was submitted by it last winter to the Secretary of State. From that programme we unanimously and distinctly excluded any alteration or extension of the territorial settlement fixed by the Gandamak Treaty, except in so far as regards the arrangements subsequently carried out for the permanent severance of the Kandahar province from the jurisdiction of the Kabul power, and its guaranteed protection by the British Government. This decision was approved by Her Majesty's late Government. It is, I venture to think, unlikely to be upset by Her Majesty's present Government in favour of extended political or military liabilities; and it has up to the present moment governed every instruction issued to our political authorities at Kabul for the guidance of their relations, on behalf of this Government, with the various aspirants to the vacant Amirship of Northern and Eastern Afghanistan.

5. In view of all these facts it seems to me perfectly clear that the Government of India is practically precluded from even discussing the views which I understand to be held by the Punjab Government, and urged by some of our own political and military officers, in favour of extending our Khyber frontier in any sense or form beyond Lundi Kotal, the point to which its recognized extension was formally limited by the terms of the Treaty of Gandamak.

6. But, even were it otherwise, even were the Government of India equally free to contemplate the extension of its Khyber frontier beyond that point, I am still most

strongly of opinion that any such arrangement is altogether inexpedient. The following are, briefly stated, the main grounds on which I base this conclusion.

7. Although we hold (and, in my opinion, rightly) that our arrangements in regard to Kandahar, coupled with the advanced frontier positions secured to us by the Treaty of Gandamak, suffice for the practical protection of our frontier interests from relapse into their previous condition of dependence on the good or ill will, the strength or weakness, of the Kabul Power, it is, nevertheless, *cætaris paribus*, a thing obviously to be desired that our permanent relations with the future representatives of that Power should be, so far as possible, of an amicable character, and free from all avoidable causes for mutual mistrust. Now, whether the next ruler of Kabul be Abdul Rahman or any other Sirdar, it cannot be reasonably expected that he will submit without reluctance and regret to the loss of the Kandahar province; involving, as it does, a limitation of his power and resources which the Government of India, deems indispensable for the protection of interests otherwise liable to serious injury from the unfriendly employment of that power and those resources. There are, however, numerous reasons why the Kandahar arrangement, regarded as the result of two wars ostentatiously provoked by the action of the Kabul Power, which throughout the course of them has been defeated in every engagement, cannot constitute any legitimate grievance on the part of that Power. It is but recently that the rulers of Kabul acquired possession of Kandahar by conspiracy and violence. Their authority has always been repugnant to the inhabitants of the province, whose local Government has welcomed its release from an uncongenial yoke. Between the Kandaharis and the Kabulis there is the strongest possible antipathy. But Jellalabad has never before been independent of the Kabul Power. On the contrary, it represents all that remains to that Power, in the direction of British India, of territory once belonging to Afghanistan, and now belonging to us. It lies close to the very capital of the country; and, from every point of view, it naturally coheres with the provinces of Kabul Proper. If an ambitious Amir could dream of, and plot for, Russian aid towards the pre-conquest of Peshawur, can we reasonably expect that even the most unambitious of his successors will view with indifference the loss of Jellalabad? And, if we take from the next ruler of Kabul, Kandahar with one hand, and Jellalabad with the other, can we hope that his subsequent relations with us will not be animated by a sentiment of chronic resentment, and a strong desire to seize the first favourable opportunity for reversing the basis on which we have settled them?

8. What are the alleged political advantages to be set off against this obvious consideration? If the management of our north-west frontier were to remain permanently in the hands of the Punjab Government, the retention of Jellalabad would doubtless enable that Government to extend a strong local influence over the petty chieftoms of Kunar, Dir, Swat, Bajour, &c. But for the attainment of that object, the Punjab Government would probably require frequent support from the resources at the disposal of the Supreme Government; and, although I do not say that the creation of a fringe of small States east of the Khyber, under British influence and protection, would be without political advantage to the security of our frontier, I must say that it seems to me extremely undesirable to furnish any local Government with the inducement or the power to involve the resources of the empire in the prosecution beyond its frontier of a policy not completely under the control of the Supreme Government of the empire. Her Majesty's late Government has, however, acquiesced in my strong recommendation that the political and military management of the frontier be withdrawn from the Punjab Government and placed under the undivided authority of the Government of India. If this arrangement be adopted, the Government of India will, I doubt not, reflect very seriously before it embarks upon a policy certain to bring it into increasingly close contact with fresh tribes and numerous petty Chiefs, all impecunious, greedy, and untrustworthy. As regards the alleged value of Jellalabad as a fulcrum for political influence in Badakshan, I do not underrate the political importance which Badakshan is likely to assume in the development of events which must be foreseen. But it seems to me that we have certainly no sufficient evidence of the alleged political value of Jellalabad to justify our retention of that place on any political grounds, considering the strong probability that our presence there would prove a constant stumbling block in our relations with the future rulers of Kabul.

9. It remains to consider the military and financial conditions of a permanent occupation of Jellalabad. It is notoriously impossible to keep troops in this city, owing to its extreme unhealthiness during the hot season. We should therefore be obliged to construct and maintain at a considerable distance from our present frontier two large cantonments; a winter one at Jellalabad, and a summer one at Gandamak, or along

the slopes of the Safed Koh. For their security, I gather from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and all the military authorities hitherto consulted that it would be necessary to connect them by a line of military posts with their base at Peshawur; and possibly even to strengthen the permanent garrison of that unhealthy place, which on every other account it seems to me most desirable to reduce.

10. In consequence, however, of the almost deadly unhealthiness of the Khyber in summer, and the known repugnance with which permanent or prolonged service on that line is contemplated by our Native troops, it would probably be impossible to serve the line thus extended without some special system of frequent reliefs, or special recruitment of local levies. I need hardly point out that the financial conditions of such an arrangement would be very onerous.

11. On general grounds, therefore, I am of opinion that the extension of our Khyber line beyond Lundi Kotal would be inexpedient, not to say impracticable, even were the Government of India free to adopt such a measure. But, as I have already shown, the Government of India is not free to adopt it. And therefore the relative merits of the Khyber and Kurram lines must be considered only in strict reference to the permanent limits assigned to each by the Treaty of Gandamak.

12. Under these conditions, I would almost say, *cadit quaestio*. For the superior advantages of a military position at the Peiwar, as compared with those of a military position at Lundi Kotal, appear to me incontestible.

13. It must be remembered that the reason why we dispense with treaty engagements, European Agents, and other guarantees for the future good behaviour of the Amirs of Kabul, is that our present frontier positions, if properly utilized, will enable us promptly and easily to punish their bad behaviour when necessary; and that their knowledge of this fact constitutes the best guarantee we can have for the regulation of their conduct in accordance with it. Placed between permanent British garrisons at Kandahar and the headlands of the Kurram, the Kabul Power cannot misbehave with impunity: and, so long as we virtually command possession of the Shuturgardan when required, we shall be at all times, except during a few months of the year, within five days' easy march of Kabul.

14. But, it is urged, access to Kabul by the Kurram is closed during the winter months by snow on the Shuturgardan; whereas during that season the Khyber is open. True. But military operations in Afghanistan are notoriously impossible during the winter months. Throughout the whole of the past winter General Roberts with a strong force, well supplied and equipped, has been unable to move out of Kabul, or undertake active operations in the field. If during this comparatively short period of the year, a military advance upon Kabul should at any time be absolutely or urgently requisite, the Khyber will of course be still, as heretofore, available for that purpose; nor can any money spent on the improvement of this route up to Lundi Kotal render it very much more available for such a purpose than it is already. But during the whole of the fighting season which covers the greater part of the year, while the Kurram route is open and perfectly healthy, the Khyber route is so unhealthy as to be practically useless for military purposes. At no time between spring and autumn can we employ this pass for the withdrawal or reinforcement of troops in Afghanistan.

15. I sincerely hope that the Government of India will not be easily persuaded to keep troops permanently stationed in the Khyber. I feel little doubt that such a course would tend rather to cause trouble than to keep order. Small bodies of troops would be a constant provocation to attack; large bodies would die like flies. We should probably lose more men during peace time every year, in the Khyber, than we have yet lost in any single engagement beyond it. I believe that the Pass tribes themselves, if properly managed, will prove the best guardians of the Pass, and be able, as well as willing, to keep it open for us if we make it worth their while to do so.

16. All that is known of the climate of the Kurram completely justifies the opinion expressed by General Fraser that "we shall find there sites for military stations 'rivaling Simla in regard to healthiness.'" And I entirely agree with him that such an advantage can scarcely be overrated. The rapidity and vigour of General Roberts' masterly march upon Kabul was in no small degree attributable to the splendidly healthy condition of the troops after a summer passed in the Kurram. Peshawur is in summer a perfect fever pit; and I should rejoice to see its permanent garrison reduced to a minimum.

17. Finally, it is as yet by no means certain that the Kurram would, even in the depth of winter, cease to be available for an advance upon Kabul, owing to the obstruction of the Shuturgardan. There is much reason to believe that the Shuturgardan is turned by an easy route, along which a strong force starting from the

Kurram could reach either Kabul or Ghazni without difficulty. Complete information on this very important point is greatly to be desired.

18. I should much like to see a cheap surface narrow gauge railway carried as far as possible towards the foot of the Peiwar Kotal. But I purposely refrain from discussing in this Minute all questions relating to the construction of railways, tramways, or improved military roads, through the Khyber and Kurram Valleys. On these questions a considerable amount of useful information will be found in the Public Works Department of the Government of India, with valuable notes upon it by General Fraser, General Trevor, and Mr. Molesworth. But all such questions can be more profitably considered after the close of the present war. Further information will probably be required to enable the Government of India to come to a sound conclusion upon them; but their treatment must obviously depend to a great extent upon a final decision of the preliminary question whether it is to the Khyber or the Kurram route that the Government of India attaches most political importance.

19. I wish this Minute to be circulated, and then placed on record in the Political Department. *

LYTTON.

Simla, 20th May 1880.

Enclosure 2 in No. 25. (Extract).

MINUTE by the VICEROY (Lord Lytton).

1. In connection with my Minute of 20th ultimo on the subject of the relative merits of the Khyber and Kurram as permanent lines of communication with Afghanistan, I wish in the present Minute to add a few observations.

2. This question was, many months ago, commended by me to the attention of Generals Stewart and Roberts, from whom, I have no doubt, the Government of India will, in due course of time, receive official statements of their opinion, and who should, I consider, be consulted before the Government commits itself to any final decision on the subject. A confidential official report for record in the Foreign Department is, I know, being prepared by General Roberts; and although that report has not been yet officially received, my private correspondence with General Roberts has sufficiently acquainted me with the views which it will probably embody, to justify the opinions which I now wish to place on record in regard thereto.

3. Broadly speaking, the conclusion arrived at by General Roberts is that it is not worth while to keep up either the Khyber or Kurram. He considers that the importance of each will be practically superseded by the maintenance of a permanent British garrison at Kandahar. The Khyber he condemns on precisely the same grounds as those I have previously indicated. The political and military advantages I myself attach to the Kurram, he admits; the first wholly, the second with some qualification. But he, nevertheless, condemns the Kurram on financial grounds, and these, as stated by him, are certainly very strong, much stronger than I had previously realized. They unquestionably demand the most serious consideration, and I am not sure that they are not conclusive in favour of the military abandonment of the Kurram. But I wish to point out that what we have to guard against is, not the military, but the political action of Russia in Afghanistan. We must take it for certain, I think, that wherever the failure of British influence leaves a political vacuum in that country, Russian influence will speedily fill it, and we have still to guard, most vigilantly, against the professedly spontaneous hostile or insulting action of the Kabul power itself, if it again becomes the puppet of Russia's unavowed diplomacy. Now, as we cannot avert such a contingency, either by treaty engagements with a new Amir, or by keeping an agent at his court, or by reliance on his gratitude for any subsidy, or other assistance we may give him, it is, in my judgment, absolutely indispensable that, at the close of a war so serious and costly as that of the last two years, we should leave ourselves permanently in a position to punish promptly, easily, efficaciously, and inexpensively any outrage or insult on the part of the Kabul power, which a great Government, especially a Government in such a position as that of the Government of India, could not leave unpunished without damaging its reputation, and weakening the foundations of its security. It is, moreover, to a wholesome and very real knowledge, on the part of future Amirs of Kabul, that we have retained in our hands the permanent, practical means of inflicting such punishment, that we must look mainly to our future exemption from the necessity of inflicting it. Now, Kandahar, though a position of the greatest importance as regards Western Afghanistan, does not, so far

as I can see, furnish us with any fulcrum from which we could, in case of need, deal a rapid and decisive blow at Kabul, without entangling ourselves in lengthened operations, or requiring any large force for that purpose. The Kurram does all this for us, at least so it seems to me; but, as I said before, against the political advantages must be weighed the heavy cost of its permanent military occupation. I would certainly, in no case, restore an inch of it to the Kabul Power; but, on the whole, I am inclined to think that the best way of treating it would be to keep no troops in it, no cantonment, but to place it under the government of some Sirdar selected and protected by us, retaining, in our arrangements with him, the right of sending troops into it whenever we require to do so, and leaving him in undisturbed possession of the entire revenue and administration of the district. So far as I can at present perceive, no small ruler placed by us in such a position could have any possible inducement to intrigue against us with the Kabul Power, from which he would have nothing to gain. On the contrary, that power would be, I should think, a constant bugbear to him, and he would fear to be absorbed by it if he forfeited our protection. If there is, amongst the present Kabul claimants to protection, any Chief or Sirdar sufficiently intelligent and suitable for such a position, this arrangement would, perhaps, enable us to satisfy, with advantage to ourselves, an otherwise inconvenient claim. As for the Khyber, nothing on earth would induce me to keep troops in such a fever trap, or to spend money upon it, and the permanent extension of our Khyber line to Gandamak, either in a military or a political sense, appears to me quite out of the question. In saying this, however, I wish it to be understood that I by no means advocate, or contemplate, the relinquishment of our present hold upon the Khyber. My view is that such a hold over the pass, which it is, I think, essential to retain, can be sufficiently secured by proper arrangements with the Pass tribes, if the authority of the Kabul Power over those tribes be excluded as it now is, and that the Pass should be held for us by Jezailchis, not by British troops, European or Native.

4. As regards the Kurram line, it is certainly true, as pointed out by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that General Roberts, when advancing upon Kabul by this line, was obliged to cut himself off from his base of operations, and that, until that base was transferred to the Khyber, his force was virtually acting as a flying column. It must be remembered, however, that he could not, by any other line, have struck an equally rapid blow at Kabul, at a time when the Amir and his councillors were confidently reckoning on the assumed inability of any British force to march upon their capital for six months. The considerations urged by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and which I do not underrate, in favour of abandoning the Kurram, as a permanent military line, appear to me to point very strongly to the expediency of the arrangement I have suggested, viz., that the occupation of the Kurram on our behalf should be entrusted to some friendly chief independent of the Kabul power. All these matters must now, however, be settled by Lord Ripon, whom I expect at Simla on the 7th or 8th instant.

5. To be circulated, recorded in Political Department, and submitted, together with my previous minute on the same subject, to the Secretary of State, and to my successor.

(Signed) LYTTON.

Simla, 5th June 1880.

Enclosure 3 in No. 25.

From Lieutenant-General Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., C.I.E., Commanding 1st and 2nd Divisions, Northern Afghanistan Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (No. 11 K.-L., dated Kabul, 29th May 1880.)

WITH reference to the wish expressed by you when at Kabul last March, I have prepared a memorandum regarding the best line of communication connecting India with Afghanistan; I now beg to submit the same for the consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council.

2. His Lordship will observe that, while I advocate the exclusion of Afghan control over the whole of the country acquired by the provisions of the Treaty of Gandamak, I am in favour of the withdrawal of our troops to the limits of the frontier held by us previous to the present campaign, excepting in the direction of Kandahar.

3. My reasons for this are explained at considerable length in the memorandum; they are, briefly, as follows:—

I. The altered conditions of Northern Afghanistan since operations commenced, consequent on the overthrow of the Amir's power.

II. The announced intention to maintain a British garrison permanently at Kandahar.

4. We are thus committed to communication with Kandahar being ensured, and are, in my opinion, relieved from the necessity of incurring military responsibility in the direction of the Khyber or Kurram.

MEMORANDUM by Lieutenant-General Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., C.I.E.,
on the best permanent line of communication between India and Afghanistan,
dated Kabul, 12th May 1880.

THE question as to which is to be the permanent line of communication between the frontier of India and North-East Afghanistan, is one of such importance that I feel it needs no apology on my part for bringing it to the early consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India.

2. It will, I think, be admitted that we are not justified in maintaining two separate lines of communication. Their existence causes a drain on our resources which the Indian army is ill calculated to meet. I will therefore place before His Excellency what appear to me to be the relative advantages and disadvantages of the routes to Kabul *via* Kohat and Kurram, and by Peshawur and Gandamak.

3. Rawalpindi may be looked upon as a common starting point for both, and the distances to Kabul *via* Kohat and Peshawar respectively are as follows:—

	Miles.
From Rawalpindi to Kohat	106
„ Kohat to Thull	66
„ Thull to Kuram	50
„ Kuram to Kushi (<i>via</i> Shutargardan)	67
„ Kushi to Kabul	43
Total	332
	Miles.
From Rawalpindi to Peshawar	101
„ Peshawar to Jamrud	10
„ Jamrud to Jellalabad	66
„ Jellalabad to Gandamak	30
„ Gandamak to Kabul (<i>via</i> Lataband)	58
Total	265

4. It will be seen from this table of distances that the route *via* Peshawar is about 67 miles shorter than that by Kohat. There will doubtless be a rail as far as Jamrud (beyond which point Engineers have decided that a line could only be laid at prohibitive rates), and therefore, from that place to Kabul, 154 miles, the ordinary route march would be followed.

5. From Rawalpindi to Kohat a line of railway may perhaps also be laid at some future time; and there are no physical reasons why this line should not be prolonged to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal. The terminal station on this line would then be about 93 miles from Kabul. Showing a gain of quite 60 miles over the Khyber line. Of this distance, that section which lies between the Peiwar Kotal and Kushi (which includes the Shutargardan Pass) alone presents any difficulty to the construction of an easy road.

6. I propose to consider these two routes separately, and balance as carefully as I can their respective merits and drawbacks. It would be as well, perhaps, that I should here note the number of men and guns now employed in keeping open communications along these lines. Between Kohat and Ali Khel, 19 guns, 829 cavalry, and 5,313 infantry are engaged; and between Jamrud and Butkhak (the post next to Kabul) there are 34 guns, 2,134 cavalry, and 15,545 infantry.

Kurram could never probably do with less, and at least as many more men would be required to maintain the safety of the communications between Ali Khel and Kabul.

7. The advantages of the Kurram route, with which I will first deal, are—

I.—If a line of rail is constructed to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal, there would remain but 90 miles between it and Kabul.

II.—At the Peiwar Kotal, Ali Khel, and on the table-land of the Hariah which lies between these places, any number of troops could be located in a climate admirably suited to Europeans.

III.—The only period during which the Shutargardan Pass is closed to the passage of troops is from the middle of December to the end of March, and though it is of course objectionable to have an army practically cut off from Kabul for from three and a half to four months, still it must be remembered that during this period the plains of Kabul are more or less covered with snow, and that this season of the year would certainly not be selected for military operations in Afghanistan except under very pressing circumstances. But I think I may safely assert that, even in the depth of winter, were a move necessary, an enterprising commander could cross the Shutargardan. Practically, therefore, troops quartered in the upper portion of the Kurram Valley are capable of being pushed on to Kabul all the year round.

IV.—Kushi once reached, the force enters the rich and fertile valley of the Logar, where supplies are immediately procurable.

V.—From Kushi, Kabul is approached by the least defensible and least difficult line; the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, within five miles of Kabul, being the only point at which an effective stand could be made, and even if this position were held, there would be no difficulty in turning it by following the Indiki route and passing across the Chardeh Valley to either the Deh-i-Mozang gorge or the Kotal-i-Nanuchi.

VI.—As far as Thull the road runs through British territory, and from Thull to the Peiwar Kotal the country of the Turis is traversed. This tribe have been most friendly all along, and, being Shiah, would not easily be induced to combine with the fanatical Afghan Sunnis against us.

From the Peiwar Kotal to Dreikula (eight miles beyond Ali Khel) the route lies through the country of the Jajis, a people not well disposed to us, but whose villages and crops are so completely at our mercy that they could never exhibit open hostility.

Beyond Dreikula the country is absolutely uninhabited; and, though Jajis, Mongals, and Ghilzais can undoubtedly collect there in considerable numbers to oppose the advance of a force both in the Hazardarakht defile and on the slopes of the Shutargardan, still what has been done before can be accomplished again, and the difficulties to be overcome are certainly not greater than must be looked for and encountered on entering any mountainous district with hostile intent.

8. The disadvantages of this line are as follows :—

I.—From Rawalpindi to Kohat the country is sparsely cultivated and inhabited; from Kohat to Thull this remark applies with even greater force; whilst from Thull to Kushi no supplies whatever are procurable to meet the requirements of an Anglo-Indian army. This difficulty would, in a great measure, disappear with the construction of a railway, and the further the line could be pushed the better. The nearest point whence a fair amount of supplies could be drawn is the Kuttak country, and the next district is Bunn, famous for its grain-crops; but good roads, assistance in carriage (for local transport is scarce), and safe communications are needed before this source could be thoroughly utilized. Large quantities of ghee can be brought down from Tusafzai, but such articles as dhal and rice would have to be drawn from more distant districts of the Punjab.

II.—Viewed from a sanitary point, the prospect of an occupation of the Kurram Valley is not cheering. During the past eighteen months it has proved very unhealthy to Native troops, more especially at Thull and Balesh Khel, while throughout the valley pneumonia and fever have been very prevalent.

III.—The physical difficulties of the road between the Peiwar Kotal and Kushi are certainly far greater than any which present themselves on the Khyber route. Doubtless in time they could be materially lessened, and at no very considerable outlay; but the construction of a really good cart road between the points indicated would be a matter of great difficulty and vast expense.

IV.—From a political stand-point this route possesses no marked advantages. It is, as it were, but a by-road to Kabul or Ghazni, and its possession does not place us in a position of vantage with regard to the tribes whose districts it skirts.

9. I will now deal with the Peshawar-Gandamak route. Its advantages are—

I.—The total distance from Rawalpindi to Kabul is 67 miles shorter than by the Kurram line.

II.—It is never rendered impassable by snow. In the depth of winter the Lataband Kotal is not closed for more than a couple of days at a time.

III.—A good cart road might be made from Jamrud (where the railway will end) to Kabul.

IV. The road leads *via* Jellalabad through the country of the important eastern Ghilzais, and is a direct line of communication with Badakshan and the western confines of Kashmir, the command of which routes some few years hence may be of considerable importance to us.

V.—It enables us to get behind the Mohmands, Bajouris, Swatis, and Afridis; and, lastly, it is the old historical road to India by which former invasions have swept, and the great commercial highway between Hindustan and Central Asia, along which trade has passed for centuries, and from which nothing will divert it.

10. The disadvantages of this line are—

I.—The great heat in the summer months, which renders it most unhealthy from Jamrud to Gandamak, and to a great extent closes it at the very period most suited for military operations in Afghanistan.

II.—The almost entire absence of supplies between Gandamak and Butkhak, and the fact that the road traverses for its entire length a country inhabited by warlike and fanatical tribes who possess both the will and the means to give considerable trouble in the event of an organized and combined disturbance.

III.—The very large force required to keep open communications, and the numerous defiles and positions ready made for defensive action.

11. Comparing, then, the two routes from a military and sanitary point of view, I think there can be little or no doubt that the Kurram line possesses most advantages, provided that the troops are located principally at the upper end of the valley, that is, at Peiwar Kotal, Shalozan, and the Hariab. But for political and commercial reasons there can be no question as to the Khyber line being preferable; indeed, I am of opinion that, for political reasons alone, it is a point of paramount importance to hold it, if communication with Kabul is to be kept open at all.

12. I now approach a subject the importance of which I do not underrate, viz., whether any necessity will really exist for the maintenance of a road from the north-western frontier of India to Kabul after the retirement of our force from Afghanistan has been effected.

The Afghanistan of to-day is very different from the Afghanistan which existed at the time that the Treaty of Gandamak was made. Ruled by a strong Amir, possessed of a large standing army, and equipped with a numerous artillery and vast munitions of war, Afghanistan was a power which it became absolutely necessary for India to have access to and some control over. Kabul, the seat of government, had become a huge arsenal and barrack, and it was inexpedient that her ruler should be permitted to hold direct communication with Russia, receiving a Russian whilst declining a British Envoy, and neglecting all offers of friendly intercourse with India.

Afghanistan is but a wreck of her former self, and, though no doubt still capable of strong combinations and powerful for mischief, she no longer exists as a military power, and has practically ceased to be a menace to India.

13. The occupation of Kabul in October 1879 revealed to us much valuable information concerning the offensive power which the Amir possessed in his army, his well stocked arsenal, and his skilful artisans. With such means at his disposal for good or evil, it is easy to foresee what serious complications might at any time have arisen were he assisted by Russia either with men, money, or officers.

14. This unmasking of the Amir's considerable warlike preparations, hitherto carefully concealed from us, is surely in itself a sufficient justification of the line of action taken by the Indian Government when it declared war against Afghanistan in 1878. Moreover, these revelations prove the wisdom of that portion of the Gandamak Treaty which insisted on the rectification of our own frontier and the location of British troops in the Khyber and Kurram. So long as Afghanistan continued to be a formidable and ill disposed neighbour, it was all important that we should be within striking distance of the capital.

15. Were the Afghan nation in the same condition now that it was a year, or even less, ago, no one thoroughly conversant with the policy of the north-west frontier of India would hesitate to recommend that either the Kurram or Khyber, or both routes, should be held in such strength as would admit of a considerable force being moved

rapidly on Kabul. But, as I have stated above, these conditions are quite altered, and it is open to consideration whether there is any real necessity for us now to incur the expense and responsibility of occupying with troops either the Kurram or Khyber line.

16. The first point to decide is, what probable use in the future would be made of these routes, and to what extent would they contribute to the security of our Indian empire, considered either in an offensive or a defensive sense.

17. This is a point, however, which cannot be decided, or even fairly discussed, without, at the same time, carefully considering a route which is now, I venture to think, of even more importance than either the Khyber or Kurram. I mean the line *via* Sukkur, Jacobabad, and the Bolan to Kandahar and Western Afghanistan.

Kandahar, where we can, if we so desire, permanently station a garrison of British troops, is being rapidly brought into communication with the main railway system of India, and will soon be (as regards time) within a comparatively short journey of the rising and important seaport of Karachi. This port must inevitably be the base of all military operations undertaken in the direction of Kandahar-Herat, which line, unless I am much mistaken, will henceforth be the theatre of any war carried on by us against the Afghans or Russians in Central Asia.

The Kandahar-Herat line certainly presents to us fewer difficulties than any other line, and, with the completion of the railway to Kandahar, that place would be our starting-point. Thence Herat is distant only 350 or 400 miles according as the northern or southern route is adopted. The road is quite practicable for wheeled guns, and for some part of the way a fair amount of grain and forage is procurable.

18. It is of course impossible to predict what may be Russia's future objective, but, looking to the altered conditions of Kabul, I think it probable that Herat and Kandahar would be the points to which her efforts would be directed, whether an invasion of India were seriously contemplated, or merely a demonstration to contain our troops and prevent their despatch from India to Persia or Asia Minor. Under any circumstances, I am of opinion that it is by this line that all offensive operations on our part could most advantageously be carried on.

19. We have learnt by experience what a very considerable force is required to occupy Kabul and to maintain our communications with India by the Khyber route. There is no denying the fact that, if the ruler of Kabul should at any future time be assisted by Russian officers, the army of 25,000 men which we now find it necessary to employ on the Khyber line alone would have to be very considerably increased. Nor do I think that, even if the Afghans themselves were on our side, we could deal as effectually with Russia in Eastern as in Western Afghanistan.

20. I may briefly summarize these remarks by expressing it as my opinion that, in future, considering the very altered circumstances under which the Afghan nation now exists, we should make up our minds to refuse our right and act offensively from our left; in other words, that we should decide to remain merely on the defensive in our north-west frontier, and devote all our energies to striking vigorously on the Kandahar side. We have neither sufficient men nor material to warrant our operating on more than one line.

To what extent those offensive measures might be pressed in Southern or Western Afghanistan scarcely comes within the scope of this paper, depending, as they assuredly would, on numerous and complicated eventualities, such as the attitude of Persia, the object and strength of Russia, and the state of Afghanistan generally. It might be found necessary to make a rapid advance on Herat and mass a considerable army there, or it might, on the other hand, be deemed desirable to confine operations to Kandahar itself, or to Sistan, and the valley of the Helmand. It will be sufficient for our present purpose if we can come to the conclusion that the Kandahar line will be the one by which all offensive movements against Russia would be carried on. If this point be admitted, it only remains for us to consider to what extent communication should be maintained between the north-west frontier of India and Kabul.

My own opinion, which I offer with considerable diffidence, is that the Kurram line should be given up altogether, and that the responsibilities which we ought to incur on the Khyber route should be limited to such as would ensure the execution and integrity of any guarantees we have given to the rulers of Lalpura and Kuner.

21. Viewing Kabul in the altered and powerless condition in which we shall leave it, with a ruler quite unable to cause us trouble or even anxiety in India, and knowing

(as we now do) with what ease and quickness we can again at any time make ourselves masters of Kabul by either of the two roads under consideration, I can see no reason why regular troops should be kept either in the Kurram or the Khyber.

We are now also fully aware of the extraordinary difficulties which Russia would have to encounter were she at any time to advance upon India *via* Kabul, and to how great an extent we could injure and harass her by raising the tribes along the line of communications which it would be necessary for her to maintain, or by taking the initiative from our advanced, yet secure, base at Kandahar. The longer and more difficult the line of communication is, the more numerous and greater the obstacles which Russia would have to overcome, and, so far from shortening one mile of the road, I would let the web of difficulties extend to the very mouth of the Khyber Pass.

22. On political grounds it would probably be necessary for us to have control of the Khyber, or perhaps as far as Lundi Kotal, Pesh Bolak, or any other selected place. To secure this I would make use of Hazara or Afridi levies, but I would strongly deprecate the employment of any regular troops beyond Peshawur.

It seems to me very unlikely that we shall for many years to come enter sufficiently far into the hills to the south and west of the Khyber to enable us to find a suitable and healthy cantonment for British and Native troops; and as it is scarcely possible to continue the occupation of such stations as Jamrud, Ali Masjid, or even Lundi Kotal, without a greater exposure of life and health than the result warrants, my recommendation is to withdraw our troops altogether from the Khyber, and to place them in such situations *cis*-Indus as will ensure our having a healthy and serviceable force, fit to take the field at any time of the year.

23. To attain this result, I would go as far as to withdrawing all, or nearly all, the European troops from Peshawur, and reducing the garrison to the lowest possible strength.

The present seems to me to be a most favourable opportunity for carrying out this project, which has long been considered and recommended by many who know the Peshawur valley well. We have humbled Afghanistan and destroyed the power of the Amir of Kabul. We have taught the Afghans and the tribes between Kabul and India that we accept no denial, that we can go where we will, that it is possible for us, whenever we may so desire, to advance rapidly on Kabul, and, what is even more important, to remain there as long as we wish. This was deemed impossible by all the tribes, even as far down as the Afridis, and it was implicitly believed that the inclemency of the winter, backed up by a powerful combination of the Afghans, must result in our destruction. The reduction of the garrison at Peshawur would not, therefore, now be attributed to either fear or weakness; it would be regarded as part of the general scheme determined upon by us after the total overthrow of the Afghan power.

So long as our troops are located in the Khyber, a large garrison must be maintained at Peshawur. The occupation of these places cannot but be expensive, and will make the military service of Government distasteful to the classes from which the Native army is recruited. This is a most serious matter, and ought not to be dealt with theoretically; only persons who live amongst soldiers know the effect of quartering them in unhealthy places.

24. When Afghanistan was governed by an able man like Sher Ali, who, whatever the cause, had become bitterly hostile to the British Government, and had under him an army of at least 50,000 men in fair order, with some 300 guns and any amount of ammunition, Peshawur was a place of great importance. Nor was it possible to ignore the Khyber when there was an Afghan garrison in Ali Masjid, and when the Afridis were, as they said, weighing in the balance the fortunes of the British Government and of the ruler of Kabul. But, as I have already explained, this state of affairs has passed away. The Afghans are no longer a united nation; their army has been defeated and dispersed, and most of their guns are in our possession.

25. If I am right in supposing that our next struggle will be on the Kandahar line, it would be very inconvenient to have 10,000 or 12,000 troops locked up in the Khyber and at Peshawur. An advance, or even a demonstration, through the Khyber would be of very doubtful advantage, and we should certainly not create difficulties for ourselves at such a time by stirring up the tribes that live near the Kabul river.

It must also be remembered that, if the commencement of a third campaign finds us in military occupation of the Khyber, we shall not then be able to retire from it. We must either give it up at the close of this campaign, or continue to hold it at all hazards. What would be an act of prudence, wisdom, and moderation at a time when we are successful, would certainly be considered by the tribes on our border as an act of weakness if undertaken at the commencement of a war.

26. The political authorities, I understand, agree that arrangements might be made with the Afridis to hold the Khyber with levies, and that the greater portion of the Peshawur garrison might be withdrawn to the left bank of the Indus, and stationed on the high land to the south of the trunk road, near the line of railway, and probably not far from Campbellpore.

Such a disposition, provided we have a proper system of transport, would make us far stronger for offensive purposes than we have been hitherto. The garrison of Peshawur has only been formidable on paper: the unhealthiness of the place, and the necessity of providing for the safety of a straggling cantonment close to the hills, have on many occasions proved this.

27. I have had five years' experience of Peshawur, and can therefore bear reliable testimony to its unhealthiness; and it is a fact that, on visiting the station in the autumn of 1878, and again in 1879, I found the troops so sickly that it was with difficulty the ordinary guards could be relieved. I have also observed that regiments which have come on service, after having been quartered at Peshawur for some time, are invariably more sickly than corps from other cantonments.

28. Troops stationed at Campbellpore would have the following advantages over the Peshawur garrison:—

- (1) They would have healthy quarters.
- (2) They would not be harassed by excessive sentry duty.
- (3) They could march in any direction at a few hours' notice, without having to leave strong detachments to guard their cantonments.

The completion of the railway to Peshawur, perhaps even to Jamrud; the bridging of the Indus at or near Attock; and the maintenance of a sufficient number of transport animals with the troops at Campbellpore, are necessary conditions of the proposed changes.

29. While I strongly advocate the complete withdrawal of troops from the Kuram valley, I must here record my earnest hope that this district will, under no circumstances, be again restored to the Duranis. On behalf of the Government of India, the Turis were distinctly informed by me that this should never happen.

No better arrangement could, I think, be made than to confer the district of Kuram upon some Native gentleman of approved loyalty, such as, for instance, Nawab Sir Ghulam Hussein Khan, K.C.S.I. It would be practically held in our interests, and would be a fitting reward for a border chieftain whose family have faithfully and devotedly served the British Government upwards of thirty years.

30. The district of Khost might be made over in life-jagir to Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, who, joining me in the Kuram Valley early in 1879, has, it may be said, thrown in his lot with us, and it is very doubtful whether he would be able to stay in Kabul after our departure.

The Sirdar and Nawab Sir Ghulam Hussein Khan are fast friends, and would doubtless be able to afford each other mutual assistance and protection while ruling the adjoining districts of Kuram and Khost.

I am inclined to think that it would be better to include the Jaji country with Khost, and make it over in jagir to Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan. It would prevent the important position of the Peiwar Kotal falling into the possession of the ruler of Kabul, and would keep the Kabul authorities away from the neighbourhood of Kuram.

31. As to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan: None of the leading nobles or Sirdars of Afghanistan that I have come across have sufficient power or influence to hold their own, without such a measure of support as I am convinced no British Government would be willing to promise or supply. Abdul Rahman alone amongst them will probably be able to do so; even he would certainly be dependent on our

Government for considerable monetary aid at the first start, but, if the accounts of him are to be believed, he is the one man in the country capable of ruling it and firmly establishing his power.

32. No other arrangements appearing practicable, I would recommend that Herat and Turkistan should be comprised in the principality of Kabul. In fact, with the exception of Kandahar (on which I maintain our grasp should never be loosened), the Kurram valley, the Khyber Pass, and the proposed life-interest of Wali Muhammad in Khost, Kabul would retain all her original possessions.

33. In venturing thus freely to express my views as to the relations which we should entertain in future towards Afghanistan, I trust I shall not be considered inconsistent in advocating a policy so opposed to that which I, for one, have hitherto held advisable, and to enforce which the Government of India have deemed it necessary to incur a long and expensive war.

I would ask His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General to bear in mind that no one has been a more zealous supporter of the present policy, and that no one has more strongly advocated an unsparing reduction of the military power of Afghanistan, than I have. The objects of this policy have, I consider, been most thoroughly attained. Nearly a year's residence at Kabul has convinced me of the truth of this, and manifested how completely Afghanistan has ceased to be a cause of danger to our Indian empire.

34. The state of affairs which brought about the Treaty of Gandamak has completely changed. In place of our being obliged to occupy the advanced strategic positions secured to us by that treaty, and which the safety of our Indian empire forced us to hold as long as Kabul was the centre of a great political and military power, we can now afford to withdraw our troops within our original frontier. We have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself.

35. It may not be very flattering to our *amour propre*, but I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us.

Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan, or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interests if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime.

The military occupation of Kandahar is, as I have before stated, of vital importance; even there we should make our presence but little felt, merely controlling the foreign policy of the ruler of that province.

36. If the present negotiations with Abdul Rahman succeed, I should hamper him with the fewest possible conditions; if they fail, I would be inclined to let the tribes of Eastern Afghanistan please themselves about an Amir. In course of time some strong man would win his way to power, and meanwhile it would be wiser not to force a ruler upon them. Any nominee of ours would certainly not be acceptable, and in all probability would not be able to hold his own after our departure.

37. Under any circumstances I am strongly in favour of not remaining at Kabul after the great heat of the Indian summer has passed and travelling through the Khyber is possible. If we cannot settle matters with the Afghans at this season of the year, when everything is in our favour, we shall certainly not be able to do so in the winter, when the difficulties of an occupation are immeasurably increased.

38. Moreover, I cannot too strongly urge upon the consideration of the Government of India the desirability of not leaving the Native portion of the army in the field after the ensuing autumn. Many of the regiments will then have been on service since October 1878; they have done admirably,—indeed, I doubt if at any former period the Native army has ever behaved more loyally or gallantly; all ranks are in good heart, and will cheerfully carry out any work they may be called upon to perform. There is, however, a limit beyond which it would be impolitic to require them to remain away from India. This limit I place at two years.

It would be found difficult, if not impracticable, to relieve the troops now on service. All the Goorkhas, and nearly all the Punjab corps, are in the first line. This is another strong argument in favour of an early withdrawal.

39. On their return to India I earnestly hope that Native officers and men will have every facility afforded them of visiting their homes, and be treated liberally in every respect. They deserve all that the Government can do for them, and, though a

prolonged absence from India has already affected recruiting, I feel sure that the men have only to show themselves in their districts for recruits to come forward in sufficient numbers. After two years' rest the Native army should be even better than it is now. I confidently predict that this will be the case, and that it will be fit and willing for another campaign, if required.

40. I trust I may be excused for broaching a subject somewhat foreign to the original purport of this paper, but the fact is that the condition, welfare, and loyalty of the Native army must always be important factors in determining questions of Indian foreign policy.

Enclosure 4 in No. 25.

MEMORANDUM, dated 2nd July 1880.

From General Sir D. M. STEWART, K.C.B., Commanding Forces, Northern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN submitting my views on Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts' Memorandum of the 29th May, on the subject of the lines of communication connecting India with Afghanistan, it seems necessary at the outset to explain that I do not propose to enter into a detailed criticism of General Roberts' paper, with the drift of which I heartily agree.

Though some difference of opinion may be allowed in the arguments set up in General Roberts' Memorandum, they are sufficiently strong to satisfy my mind that the political and military necessities of our frontier do not, under existing circumstances, require us to maintain garrisons either in Kurram or the Khyber.

We do not require any greater facilities for the invasion of Afghanistan than are secured to us by our position in the south, and our control of the Khyber in the north; and the objections put forward by General Roberts to the permanent location of the troops either in Kurram or the Khyber seem to me to be absolutely conclusive, whether viewed from the stand-points of strategy, policy, or economy.

I also concur with General Roberts in thinking that our frontier would, in reality, be stronger if the moveable troops maintained for its security were quartered in healthy positions on the eastern side of the Indus, from which they could at any time be withdrawn without inconvenience, instead of being quartered, as they now are, trans-Indus, in advanced and unhealthy stations, which are strong only in name.

As Peshawur will probably be the terminus of the railway now in progress, it will not be possible to denude it entirely of its European garrison, but the general idea suggested in this paper can, I think, be consistently maintained by completing the entrenched position, commenced at that station some twelve or thirteen years ago, to such extent as may be considered necessary for a garrison that can hold its own for a time.

The entrenchment should be strong, but need not be extensive, as it could be reinforced at the shortest notice, and when the railway has been completed, the European garrison holding it might be relieved every two or three months.

This memorandum is submitted in accordance with Foreign Office telegram of the 28th ultimo.

Enclosure 5 in No. 25.

NOTE by the Honourable SIR R. E. EGERTON, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, upon SIR F. ROBERTS' Memorandum, dated Kabul, 12th May 1880, on the best permanent line of communication between India and Afghanistan.

IN this Memorandum Sir F. Roberts has examined, not only the question of the best permanent line of communication between India and Afghanistan, but he has also made proposals regarding the future military position which we should take up on the North-West frontier of India, which require some examination, as they involve many and weighty matters to which it appears that sufficient consideration has not been given.

2. In the conclusion stated in paragraph 11 of the Memorandum, that the route *viâ* Peshawur and the Khyber to Kabul is superior to that *viâ* Kurram and Shutargardan Pass, I entirely concur.

3. My opinion on this point was expressed in my letter in the Foreign Department, No. 868 C., dated 18th September 1879; and for the reasons therein stated, to which I adhere, I have no doubt whatever that the route *viâ* Khyber and Jellalabad is the best of the northern routes into Afghanistan. It is the main trade route; it is free from snow in winter, and is open at all seasons.

4. Peshawur, which has been and will always be the base of operations of any army advancing to Kabul, is 154 miles from that place; while, on the Kurram line, Rawal Pindi, which is 332 miles from Kabul, must be the permanent base, if this line is adopted.

5. Considering both the distance and the physical difficulties of each of these routes, I submit that the Khyber route is far the best.

6. Sir F. Roberts next reviews the question of the line of frontier which it is necessary for us to hold when we retire from Kabul.

7. He advocates* the retention of Kandahar, and considers that, if we hold Kandahar and complete the railway to that place, we may give up the Kurram line altogether, and incur only such responsibilities on the Khyber line as may be necessary to ensure the execution and integrity of any guarantees we may have given to the rulers of Kunar and Lalpura.

* Paras. 17, 20.

8. In this view he proposes to make over Kurram and Khost to Native Chiefs, and to withdraw all regular troops from places to the west of Peshawur on the Khyber line, holding the Khyber Pass and any selected place to the west of it with levies. He would also reduce the garrison of Peshawur to the lowest possible strength, and would withdraw all, or nearly all, European troops from Peshawur to more healthy stations east of the Indus.

9. I agree in all that General Roberts says regarding the importance of Kandahar and the necessity for holding it.

Kurram, if we are to give up the route through this valley to Kabul, is not a desirable possession. The revenue derivable from it is small and insignificant. The territory from Thal up to the Peiwar Kotal, which is all that need be held for any purpose, is a narrow slip, a few miles wide and about 65 miles long, exposed on both sides to incursions from independent tribes. There is no object in holding it except to secure a road, or to redeem pledges made to the people. We have made a distinct promise to the inhabitants that they shall not be replaced under Kabul; and I think this promise should be fulfilled. I see no objection to making over Kurram to a Native Chief who is well disposed to us, provided he can hold his own there without our help.

10. If, as I think probable, our nominee requires military force to assist him in holding the territory, we had better hold Kurram ourselves and reward the Chief in some other way. If Khost cannot be held by our nominee, I would abandon it. We are under no pledge to its people, and need not have any scruples about giving it up.

11. I am inclined to think that Khost and Kurram together would not be too large a territory for one man to hold; and if Sirdar Wali Muhammad is detached from Kabul influence, and made dependent upon us, both Kurram and Khost may be granted to him without violating our promise to the people of Kurram. There is this advantage in making over Khost to some friendly Chief, that we should thereby save Kurram from predatory attacks from the south from Wazirs and Dauris, which our experience of the last year leads us to think may be frequent. If we were under no pledges to the people, I would give up Kurram altogether; but if we are obliged by our promises to detach it from Kabul, no better plan than granting it with Khost to a friendly Chief can be followed. A plan for annexing Kurram and placing it under the Punjab as a frontier district is under consideration, but it is, I think, more advisable to make that territory over to a Native Chief, or to abandon it entirely, than to add it permanently to this province.

12. On the Khyber side the necessity of keeping the road open, and our promises and engagements to the Khyber Afridis, to the Mohmand Chief of Lalpura, and to the Syud Badshah of Kunar, and also the security of the Peshawur valley, have to be

considered in determining what extent of territory we should hold, and what should be the strength and composition of the Peshawur garrison.

13. General Roberts argues that, as we have nothing to fear from Kabul, and as any attack upon India from the north will be made along the Kandahar line, and not from the Kabul direction, it will be embarrassing to have troops locked up at Peshawur. We should take the present opportunity to reduce the Peshawur garrison, and withdraw all, or nearly all, our European troops to the healthy stations east of the Indus, holding the Khyber with levies and taking as little territory beyond the actual pass as possible.

14. If the engagements we have made with the Syud Badshah of Kunar do not require us to protect him against Kabul, one reason for holding territory beyond the end of the Khyber is removed, but if we are pledged to protect him, we must take up a position which will enable us to fulfil our promise, as we have reason to know from past experience that no treaty engagements will prevent the ruler of Kabul from injuring and oppressing those Chiefs and people who have been friendly to us when they come again into his power. Should our engagements with Kunar oblige us to take territory as far as Jellalabad, we must hold the line with troops. Should our promise to Kunar not necessitate so large an annexation, we have still to consider what is necessary to enable us to fulfil our engagements to the Mohmand Chief of Lalpura. This Chief, Muhammad Akbar Khan, has received distinct assurances from the Political Officer, under the sanction of the Government of India, that he will be maintained in his possessions, notwithstanding any change in the Government of Kabul. These promises were given when Muhammad Akbar's cousin, Muhammad Sadik Khan, who was Yakub Khan's nominee and cousin, turned against us in December 1879.

15. In order to protect the Lalpura Chief, it is necessary that we should have an open road through the Khyber as far as Dakka. I think that the Khyber may be held by levies raised as at present almost entirely from the Afridi tribes under the command of a British officer, provided that there is a force at Peshawur strong enough to hold that place and to keep up a moveable column properly equipped with transport, ready to operate on the border when required.

I would deprecate reducing the Peshawur garrison below the strength necessary to effect this object at all seasons. It is not necessary to keep a large force of Europeans at Peshawur, where they are extremely unhealthy. The garrison may be composed of Native troops. It is true that Native troops have hitherto been as sickly as European at Peshawur, but this is owing, I believe, in both cases, to the system of reliefs, which supplies the garrison with fresh men who have not time to become acclimatized. If the Native garrison of Peshawur were composed of local regiments, like those of the Punjab Frontier Force, I believe that the inefficiency arising from sickness would, in a great measure, disappear.

16. The danger of attack at Peshawur and along that frontier arises not so much from Kabul as from the independent tribes on the border, to whose attacks the Peshawur frontier is eminently exposed.

17. Although the military power of the ruler of Kabul has been broken, the danger from the tribes still remains and must not be overlooked. For some time to come the excitement, which our operations in Afghanistan have caused amongst the border tribes, will continue, and our retirement from that country will efface the impression caused by our successful advance, and will make the tribes more inclined for mischief than before.

18. I consider, therefore, that the garrison of Peshawur must not be weakened in numbers to much below the strength at which it stood before the Afghan war began. The number of European soldiers should be reduced, but the number should be replaced by Native troops, and I think the Peshawur Native garrison should be composed of local regiments which might, if necessary, form part of the Punjab Frontier Force. There was never anything in the position of Peshawur itself, in the nature of its border, and in the character of the tribes of independent Pathans, whose incursions have to be resisted, to distinguish Peshawur from other districts on the frontier. The sole difference lay in the proximity of Kabul and of the troops of that power. Now that the Kabul army has been disorganized, there is less reason than ever for maintaining at Peshawur a force differing from the Punjab Frontier Force, which, from being constantly changed, suffers so greatly from sickness.

19. I cannot recommend that the Peshawur garrison, whatever may be its composition, be placed within a fortified enclosure. Mobility and vigilance are most

important qualities for a force employed in border duties, and these are not promoted by accustoming the troops to live inside fortifications.

20. There is one thing which is apparent in the Memorandum of General Roberts,* and that is, the desire to move the army out of Afghanistan as quickly as possible. No doubt this is desirable for many reasons, if we do not intend to remain in the country; but I deprecate any display of eagerness to leave, because such display is sure to make the enemy anxious to delay and baffle us. It is by no means certain that the settlement which we now hope to make in Afghanistan is so final and complete that we shall not have to return to that country. It will be fortunate if the proposed settlement is made quickly, and our troops are able to withdraw from the country by the autumn. But should anything detain them, it may be necessary to relieve them, and I think it worth while to mention here that it is not so impracticable to relieve the Native troops of the force as it at first sight may seem.

21. I say this with much diffidence, and venture to put the following scheme forward, as a suggestion for relieving the Native Infantry and Cavalry. It has been proposed by Colonel Black, Secretary to this Government in the Military Department. The plan involves the abandonment of the Kurram line, which I think advisable in any case, if the occupation is prolonged. The Kurram force has done nothing since the Zaimusht expedition to coerce the Wazirs, who have given so much trouble on the south. It is unable to occupy the Shuturgardan and to co-operate with the army from Kabul; it has shown itself powerless to operate against other tribes, which have continually molested the line of communications. It is absolutely useless in its present position, and I can see no necessity to retain it in Kurram.

22. The scheme shows that the divisions in the front can be relieved, except the Artillery.

23. I trust that it will not be necessary to keep the troops in Afghanistan; but, if it is, I think the force can be relieved in the manner indicated. I may remark that it is only recently that the urgent necessity for relieving the regiments on service has become apparent. A few months ago, when I wished to relieve the 5th Punjab Infantry, the measure was not allowed by the military authorities, though the regiment had been on service almost continuously since October 1877.

24. I think it necessary to put forward my views of the possibility of relieving the army in Afghanistan, as it seems to me of much importance that the Government of India should not have its hand forced by the supposed necessity of withdrawing our army immediately, for reasons connected with the discipline and organization of that army. If such a view is entertained, we may possibly be induced, or think ourselves compelled by the exigencies of the case, to accept a hasty and partial adjustment of affairs, which will not last and will lead to fresh difficulties.

25. It follows from what I have said above, that I recommend the completion of the railway line to Peshawar as soon as possible. That line is necessary for the safety of our north-west frontier, whatever turn affairs in Afghanistan may take. The line from Rawul Pindi to Kohat will not, so far as I can foresee, be of much use for military purposes. A good road from Rawul Pindi to Thal, fit for wheeled traffic, will be sufficient for the wants of that line. For the portion of road between Rawul Pindi and Kohat, a line of road fit for carts, running through the Kohat Pass, may in time be substituted.

26. This last-named line will not exceed 42 miles in length, as against 106 miles from Rawul Pindi to Kohat. The Adam Khel Afridis are under obligations to permit the construction of the road from Peshawur to Kohat, through their territory. This line is one of much importance for controlling this division of the Afridi tribe, and for enabling us to enter their country, and also that of the Khyber Afridis, when we please.

27. I need hardly say that I concur heartily in all that General Roberts says regarding the good service performed by the Native troops of the Indian Army, and that I agree thoroughly in the opinion that they are deserving of every indulgence which can be granted to them on their return.

28. I have no doubt that their merits and deserts are fully appreciated by the Government of India.

21st July 1880.

(Signed) R. G. E.

Annexure A.

NOTE by Colonel S. BLACK, Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department, on the manner of effecting a relief of Native Cavalry and Infantry Regiments now in the front line at Kabul.

I HAVE in a former note stated how we could relieve the regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force, and I may as well repeat it here.

Cavalry.

4th Punjab Cavalry is the only regiment available to take the place of the Guides, 1st Punjab Cavalry, and 2nd Punjab Cavalry, so that, in this arm, the Generals in the front must consent to reduced numbers. I think this can be managed without incurring risk, as cavalry is not the arm required in Northern Afghanistan.

Infantry.

We have 5 regiments in the front, and these I would relieve as follows:—3 regiments in the autumn, and 2 in the spring.

Guides should be relieved by 1st Sikhs	-	} 1st relief in autumn.
5th Punjab Infantry should be relieved by 6th Punjab Infantry	-	
5th Goorkhas should be relieved by 4th Sikhs	-	
3rd Sikhs should be relieved by 4th Punjab Infantry	-	} 2nd relief in autumn.
2nd Sikhs should be relieved by 3rd Punjab Infantry	-	

But the regiments under the Commander-in-Chief are more difficult to replace.

I would, however, recommend withdrawal from the Kurram Valley, and this would give us 3 cavalry and 6 infantry regiments to take the places of regiments required for the relief of the front line.

In the front line there are 7 regiments of cavalry and 16 regiments of infantry. I would relieve 6 of the cavalry and the whole of the infantry (*see Tables A and B*).

The notes made on these Tables explain that we require (supposing 6 cavalry regiments will suffice for front line in Northern Afghanistan):—

In Cavalry.

4 regiments of those under His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.
1 regiment of the Punjab Frontier Force.

In Infantry.

8 regiments of those under His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.
5 regiments, Punjab Frontier Force.

A.

Cavalry, Native.

Front line:—

3rd B. C.	-	} 7 regiments, of which 4 belong to Punjab Frontier Force. All, except 3rd P. C., should be relieved.
17th B. C.	-	
3rd P. C.	-	
Guides	-	
19th B. C.	-	
1st P. C.	-	
2nd P. C.	-	

On communications:—

4th B. C.	-	} 3 regiments
5th B. C.	-	
C. I. H.	-	

In Kurram:—

1st B. C.	-	} 3 regiments
13th B. C.	-	
18th B. C.	-	

13 regiments on service.
By giving up Kurram, 10 would remain on service.
But relief required only for 6 regiments in the front line. Or, if the front line be reduced from 7 to 6 regiments, 9 regiments would be on service and 5 would be required for reliefs.

In India:—

2nd B. C.	-	-	} 13 regiments.
6th B. C.	-	-	
7th B. C.	-	-	
8th B. C.	-	-	
9th B. C.	-	-	
10th B. C.	-	-	
11th B. C.	-	-	
12th B. C.	-	-	
14th B. C.	-	-	
15th B. C.	-	-	
16th B. C.	-	-	
4th P. C.	-	-	
5th P. C.	-	-	

Total - 26 regiments, including Central India Horse.

In effecting the relief, I should propose to reduce the 7 regiments in front line to 6. The 3rd Punjab Cavalry should stand fast.

The 3 regiments on communications should go to the front, and the following 5 corps might be taken (2 for the front line and 3 for communications):—

2nd Bengal Cavalry.
6th ditto.
9th ditto.
16th ditto.
4th Punjab Cavalry.

We should then have 9 regiments on service; front line and communications.

I would bring the Kurram force back to India, and this would give, in India, 17 regiments.

B.

Native Infantry.

In front line, Kabul, 16 regiments:—

5 regiments, Punjab Frontier Force, viz., Guides, 3rd Sikhs, 5th Punjab Infantry, 2nd Sikhs, and 5th Goorkhas.
3 Goorkha regiments, viz., 2nd, 3rd, and 4th.
8 Native Infantry regiments, chiefly Punjabis.

16 regiments. Of these, 13 regiments should be relieved.

(The 3rd Sikhs, the 2nd Sikhs, and a Goorkha regiment might remain another year.)

On communications:—

8th N. I.	-	-	} 13 regiments. These should take the front line.
9th N. I.	-	-	
16th N. I.	-	-	
22nd N. I.	-	-	
27th N. I.	-	-	
30th N. I.	-	-	
31st N. I.	-	-	
32nd N. I.	-	-	
41st N. I.	-	-	
1st Goorkhas	-	-	
1st Madras	-	-	
4th ditto	-	-	
15th ditto	-	-	

In Kurram:—

5th N. I.	-	-	} 6 regiments. I would withdraw these regiments to India.
13th N. I.	-	-	
20th N. I.	-	-	
21st N. I.	-	-	
29th N. I.	-	-	
Deoli Infantry	-	-	

In India.

1st N. I., Peshawur*	-	If we withdraw from Kurram, we should get back 6 regiments, so that in effecting the relief of the 13 regiments in the front line, we should get back to India $13+6=19$ regiments. Amongst these, there are some good regiments. We can give 5 excellent regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force to take the place of 5 to be relieved, provided the relief is effected in autumn and in spring. This would require only 8 regiments from the regiments under the Commander-in-Chief, and I should take those marked.*
2nd N. I., Cawnpore	-	
4th N. I., Ferozepore*	-	
10th N. I., Cachar -	-	
12th N. I., Agra*	-	
17th N. I., Morar -	-	
26th N. I., Jhelum*	-	
34th N. I., Cachar -	-	
36th N. I., Barrackpore	-	
38th N. I., Meerut*	-	
40th N. I., Goraekpur	-	
43rd N. I., Assam -	-	
1st Sikhs, Kohat -	-	
1st P. I., Edwardesabad	-	
3rd P. I., Dera Ismail Khan	-	
6th P. I., Murdan -	-	
6th N. I., Peshawur	-	
3rd N. I., Dinapore	-	
7th N. I., Lucknow*	-	
11th N. I., Rawul Pindi and Kohat.	-	
14th N. I., Amballa*	-	
18th N. I., Buxar -	-	
33rd N. I., Delhi* -	-	
35th N. I., Allahabad	-	
37th N. I., Bareilly	-	
39th N. I., Nowshera	-	
42nd N. I., Assam -	-	
44th N. I., Assam -	-	
4th Sikhs, Dera Ismail Khan	-	
2nd P. I., Abbottabad	-	
4th P. I., Edwardesabad	-	

Enclosure 6 in No. 25.

LINES of COMMUNICATION between India and Afghanistan.

HAVING been invited to record my opinion on a Memorandum written by Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, K.C.B., V.C., C.I.E., on the above subject, and agreeing, for the most part, in that distinguished officer's views, I have only, as briefly as I can, to state the points on which I dissent from those views, and my reasons for doing so.

1st point. General Roberts does not, to my mind, give a sufficiently decided preference to the Khyber over the Kurram route, viewed as lines of advance for our troops.

2ndly. That he has not taken into calculation the relative value of these routes, as "Keys of India."

3rdly. He states that the power of Sher Ali has been broken, the Afghan nation humbled, and that therefore we have no more to fear from Afghanistan as a military power.

4th. That we may therefore now withdraw our troops, not only from the Khyber and Kurram, but also, with the exception of a small garrison, from Peshawur itself.

1st point. It is freely admitted on all sides that we cannot afford to keep up both routes in time of war, the one requiring, in round numbers, 15,000 and the other 12,000 troops to do so, and balancing the arguments in favour of each General Roberts says that, "from a military and sanitary point of view, the Kurram line possesses most advantages, but for political and commercial reasons the Khyber is preferable."

I am bound to challenge the military advantages of the Kurram route, because I consider that, owing to the height of the Shuturgardan and the extreme cold in winter

between that pass and the Peiwar Kotal, *it is no use at all as a single route*, and can never be looked upon but as an alternative summer route in case we should at any time have a very large army in Afghanistan and found it necessary to relieve the pressure on the Khyber line. General Roberts says (para. 7, Section III., of his memorandum), "An army in Kurram is practically cut off from Kabul for from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 months in the year;" but he concludes by saying that "practically troops can be pushed on to Kabul all the year round."

Now I have heard this latter assertion made by other distinguished officers; and I should be sorry to allow such an opinion to be placed on record unchallenged.

A selected band of Europeans without animals or camp followers might perform such a feat at certain times, but nothing in the shape of an Anglo-Indian army could attempt it in winter. We must remember that from the eastern side of the Peiwar Kotal to the western side of the Shutargardan is 45 miles of uninterrupted snow with the thermometer often below zero in the day time,—through this snow Native troops, camp followers, mules, and doolie-bearers would not struggle more than 8 or 10 miles a day,—they would therefore have to encamp three, if not four, nights in the snow, devoid of shelter, forage, or firewood; and, even if the weather overhead were fine, I am sure that the number that would die of cold or be crippled by frost-bite would completely destroy the force. I say that not practically only, but *positively*, this route is closed in ordinary winters for many weeks, in severe ones for many months. It is true that snow in the plains around Kabul prevents military operations being carried on in the winter months; but if we had any troops in Kabul in the winter, neither letters nor telegrams could reach them were the Kurram their only line of communication.

Passing from the cold to the heat, General Roberts lays much stress (Section 10) on the great heat between Jamrud and Gandamak. I am inclined to think that from Kohat to Kurram it is, though not quite so bad, yet nearly equal in temperature. Last year our troops, marching down the Khyber in June, suffered terribly. Our troops did not march down from Kurram, but the Punjab contingents did, suffered much from heat, and lost 50 sepoy's from cholera. On the Bolan line I suppose the heat to be greater than on either Khyber or Kurram and to last much longer in the year.

Railways.—It is said that a railway through the Khyber can only be laid at a prohibitive cost, whereas a rail to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal could easily be made and land the troops within 93 miles of Kabul, but I have not heard that the cost of a line, which, passing through the Khyber, would land troops 93 miles from Kabul, has been estimated for, this would be only 61 miles from Peshawur as against 134 miles from Kohat to Peiwar Kotal, the one rail being capable of extension to Kabul, the other absolutely incapable of extension, save by works such as are seen on the Alps.

For these reasons alone I am of opinion that there can be no comparison between the two routes, and if one is to be selected it must be the Khyber.

The 2nd point is the relative value of these routes to an invading army, in other words, as "the Keys of India."

I cannot speak particularly on the different defensive positions on the Khyber line. I have heard that there are many good ones, and Lundi Kotal among the best.

On the Kurram line there are four; 1st, the crest of the Shutargardan, too far from our base, and to hold which permanently would be tantamount to holding Kabul; 2ndly, Ali Khel, a very strong position, but according to modern strategists at the wrong end of the long defile in its front; 3rdly, Peiwar Kotal, strong towards the east, but very weak, almost useless, towards the west; 4thly, Thull, a position of great natural strength, completely commanding the Kurram route and holding Daour and Khost in check. Should an invading army ever attempt to enter India by the Kurram, I consider that Thull would be the place to meet him. It is not likely, however, that any strategist invading India from his base (as it must be) at Kabul would attempt to operate on a line 226 miles long while we held a parallel one only 164. There need be little fear of an invasion by the Kurram line.

3rd point. The military power of Sher Ali was built up in a dozen years, doubtless much by our aid, but should Abdul Rahman prove as able a ruler as Sher Ali, he may follow his example with equal success, and he will not have far to look for assistance; and if we withdraw our attention entirely from Kabul and the Khyber, the task will be all the easier to him.

4th point. I deprecate any withdrawal of troops from Peshawur, or any lessening

of our communications with, or influence over, the Afridi or Mohmand tribes. We have not got very far in this direction in the last 30 years; but it is absolutely necessary that we should go on increasing what we have gained, and the withdrawal of our troops or any portion of them from Peshawur will be a retrograde step.

The Afghan, either as an individual or a nation, is never humbled, and he is not humbled now. Twelve months hence it will be the boast of Kabul and the Khyber that the British were forced out of the country which they could take but could not hold. General Roberts, looking forward to future military operations in Afghanistan, thinks that Kandahar will be the chief scene and theatre of war; but the enemy may have something to say to this. Our troops at Kandahar might be held in check, and at all events, so distant a base in a foreign country as Kandahar would be a bad one to operate against Kabul; for history teaches us that an army invading India by the Khyber would bring all the tribes on its flank with it to the plunder of the plains; and we could not hope for a moment to raise them against a foe which could offer them such glorious loot. When that day comes, Afridis and Mohmands must be under our thumb, or we shall indeed have cause to rue it. The Khyber Pass has been a bugbear to us for 40 years. We have "laid the ghost" now, and we must make the pass our own. A railway at Peshawur will give us opportunities for relieving our troops rapidly and saving them to a great extent from the effects of the climate; but if we wish our political officers to increase their influence over Mohmands and Afridis, our troops must be seen on the spot.

I trust that General Roberts' valuable remarks on the Native army will be allowed full weight. It must be remembered that to a mercenary and Asiatic army the invasion of a foreign country conveys the idea of plunder and rapine; that under our civilized rule such expectations are seldom realized; and if long absence from home is coupled with this disappointment, service in Afghanistan can never be anything but unpopular.

(Singed) J. WATSON, Major-General,
Commanding Kurram Force.

24th July 1880.

Enclosure 7 in No. 25.

From MAJOR ARTHUR CONOLLY to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Simla. Dated Peiwar Kotal, 10th August 1880.

GENERAL WATSON'S telegram No. 1 of yesterday will have given you the pith of the information asked for in your demi-official of the 1st instant. What Sir F. Roberts' declarations to the Jajis at his Ali Khel Durbar amounted to I have not been able exactly to ascertain,* beyond the fact that he is believed to have told the Jajis that they would always remain our subjects.

2. So far the Jajis have said nothing to me (or as far as I can learn to either of the Native Assistants here and at Starkili) about any promises or declarations; and I think this abstention from any reference to what was said is very significant: in fact they have never thrown in their lot with us, or looked forward to our permanently occupying their country as the Turis had. From the fact of their being "Sunnis" too, there is naturally a sympathy and fellow-feeling between them and the surrounding tribes and also with the Kabul Government which could not exist with the "Shiah" Turis: and they are all the more ready to revert to Durani rule as Abdul Rahman has no quarrel with them,† and they can come under his rule with a "clean sheet," so to speak.

* As I never had a copy of his speech, nor does Christie appear to have one.

† As has (?) Yakub Khan (or even his brother Ayub), who, if in power, would retaliate on the Jajis for their plundering the Kabul troops after their defeat on the Peiwar Kotal.

3. A continuance of our rule would of course mean more money-making, redemption of mortgages, clearing off debts, and the purchase of many luxuries (including fresh matrimonial engagements), security of life and property, and exemption from the inevitable "squeezing" which will follow on the advent of a "Durani Hakim;" but these advantages, substantial as they are, are no doubt more than counterbalanced by

the satisfaction of being rid of the infidel invader and finding themselves once more under a ruler, who, in spite of his rapacity and licentiousness, is after all one of their own race and religion; one under whose sway they are more at liberty to carry out, in such

‡ Giving up a murderer to be killed in cold blood by the relatives of the victim.

§ Reprisal.

matters as revenge for murder, reprisal for raids and settlement of cases, their own time-honored customs of "Kisas,"‡ "baramta"§ and ordeal by fire or water, and last, not least, one who is

always open to bribes.

4. Moreover, the Jajis have always felt the taunts of their independent neighbours and co-religionists at their want of enterprise in not combining with them against the "Feringhee," and making at least one effort, as all the other tribes have done, to rid themselves of the foreign yoke, and it would be a relief to find this source of reproach removed.

5. As regards *our* interests in the matter, my own views are as follows:—That

* See paragraph 7.

whatever we do with Kurram,* it is not worth our while, and would be a mistake, to attempt to retain any hold over the Hariob. The proximity to, and sympathy with, the warlike tribes under the direct rule of Kabul (through whom it is approachable, by a Durani army, by the three highroads of the Tikrai, Shuturgardan and Spega passes); its inaccessibility to us, especially in winter, its distance from our furthest outpost (presumably Thal) and consequent difficulty of supporting a governor or reinforcing our troops; its inability to supply the wants of a force occupying it; and the source of irritation which its retention would certainly be to the Kabul Government—all combine to render it, to my mind, a very useless and undesirable acquisition.

6. Should it be necessary at any time to advance on Kabul again,† and were it

* Such a contingency, considering the uncertainty of Kabul politics, is always possible.

decided to take this route, the forcing of the Peiwar Kotal and Shuturgardan would, with our present knowledge of the country, be by no means the formidable task presented to us in

December 1878, and I think it likely enough that the Jajis, having learnt by experience the futility of resistance, and knowing the wealth which we bring into the country, would make a virtue of necessity and allow the passage of our troops readily enough after an empty show of fighting.

7. As to Kurram, I suppose it is only a choice of giving them as Governor one of

† From all I can learn Wali Muhammad Khan is loathed by the Turis and would very likely be assassinated. The post might be a fitting reward for Sir Ghulam Hossein Khan, who must know so much of Afghan politics, and would in point of loyalty and trustworthiness be worth a hundred Wali Muhammads.

our own men, or some Kabul Sirdar whom we may wish to reward.† Military occupation of the valley does not appear to be contemplated, nor would I advise it myself under present conditions, which it is pretty generally admitted involve a waste of troops and money. But it might, and I think in time would, repay the cost of occupation by appropriating the whole of the revenue

(of which none should be ceded to Kabul), both of Kurram and if possible of Khost. The latter is undoubtedly a fertile province, and its resources could in time be developed to our advantage, if we occupied Kurram; but on this head Christie, when you see him, will be able to give you better information than I can.

8. About the result of possible occupation of Ghazni by Ayub Khan and declaration of his independence, there is no doubt it would rally the Yakub party, and Abdul Rahman's power of opposing him would probably depend mainly on the support, moral or material, that we could afford him. The causes of the contending parties would be espoused and fought out, I think, by the tribes lying between Ghazni and Kabul; and the Jajis, who are well off that line of country would have but little to say to the struggle, merely throwing in their lot with the side which promised to be victorious, though they would prefer to see Abdul Rahman win.

9. There is nothing else in connection with the subject that I can think of at present: but will write if I do.

Enclosure 8 in No. 25.

From Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., Commanding Kurram Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (Dated Shalozan, 13th August 1880.)

YOUR telegram, as per margin, reached me on the 11th instant, and I directed Major Conolly to send in his opinion on the subject referred to, and I now proceed to offer mine.

"Your opinion with Conolly's, as to possible arrangements with the Turis, wanted soon."

2. A residence of nearly two years in the Kurram valley has convinced me that, from any point of view, the country is absolutely worthless to the British Government, and it only remains to get rid of it in such a manner as, while keeping it independent of the Kabul Government, we may ourselves be called upon to interfere as little as possible in its concerns. We are to a certain extent bound, I believe, by some more or less positive promises to the Turis, not to restore them to the Government of Kabul, and to do our best for their future welfare.

3. The present feeling of the people is that they would wish to remain entirely under our rule, but they have tasted nothing but the sweets of our rule, and I doubt if, after a little experience of regular British Government, they would not become restless and give us great trouble.

4. The Turis are divided into so many factions that any kind of independence or self-government would be impossible. During the greater part of Amir Dost Mahomed's reign there was no Governor in Kurram. An army visited it every two or three years to collect the revenue. I have heard that during those years the state of Kurram was a very unenviable one.

5. The valley should be given in free jagir to some one who, 1st, understands the art of governing Afghans; 2ndly, who has wealth and influence enough to raise some levies, and assert his power to govern; and, 3rdly, whose interests are bound up with the British Government, and who is not likely to court the friendship or suffer the interference of the Kabul Government. The Government of India knows best where such a man is to be found. The only one I know of is Sirdar Wali Muhammad.

6. On the 31st July I telegraphed as per margin. Further conversations with the Turis leads me to suppose that this feeling is not by any means universal, though strong in that faction which is united with the Tirah Syuds.

"Turis believe that they are to be made over to Wali Muhammad, and are much excited against him."

7. Sirdar Wali Muhammad, as the nominee of the British Government, and to a certain extent responsible to it, would be a very different man to Wali Muhammad, the Government deputed from Kabul, against whom was no appeal, and whose tenure of office being uncertain and expensive, was bound to squeeze the people to the utmost. He had no interest in the welfare of the country, no inducement to withhold his exactions. The Government may, however, have better men for the jagir. I know of none at present. Khost should go with Kurram, and in time a small independent State might be formed, which the Kabul Government would fear to touch, but which could be conquered and annexed, if necessary, by a single division of the frontier army.

8. I agree with Mr. Christie in his views generally, but I cannot believe with him that the Turis could be left without a Governor, to manage for themselves. Their management would be disastrous; they would soon come entirely under the influence of Kabul.

9. With Major Conolly's views regarding the Hariob I concur, but I cannot agree with him regarding Kurram, "that military occupation could ever, in any period of time, become remunerative," nor that his scheme for taking hostages from surrounding tribes for the safety of a paid Governor of our own could ever be carried out.

10. If the Hariob be restored to Kabul, and Kurram and Khost given to a jaghirdar of our own, the Peiwar Kotal should be considered neutral ground, and no customs or taxes taken on either side. The rights of wood and grass should be with the Paiwar Mangals, the Kabul rule extending only over Zubburdust Killa and Goondy Kheyl.

Enclosure 9 in No. 25.

MINUTE by His Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF on the Khyber line, dated
27th August 1880.

As we are to hold no advanced position beyond the Khyber, such as Safed Sang with the line of the Surkhab for instance, I do not think the Khyber alone worth holding by means of a considerable garrison located between Jamrud and Lundi Kotal.

The object to be attained is, therefore, an arrangement with the Afridis, under which they shall hold for us, and strictly in our interests, the line of the Khyber. The Shinwaris and Mohmunds being dealt with in like manner wherever the road touches their territory. If this can be arrived at in the manner suggested by Colonel Waterfield, through the intervention of Jirgahs and Maliks, so much the better.

As regards the posts to be left to the Afridis, I would suggest that Ali Musjid should be thoroughly dismantled. It would only be useful to those who would hold the pass against us. The Afridis could make no military use of it as a work. The buildings, not part and parcel of the fortifications, which could be used as dwellings, I would leave to them, also those on the bluff (51st hill) and near the river. The towers, such as that at Kalu Khusutia, might be left standing, but Fort Maude and Mackeson's work (improved) should be destroyed, as these works command important points on the road, and, like Ali Musjid, could only be used to our detriment. If required at any future time, we can easily reconstruct them.

(Signed) F. P. HAINES.

27th August 1880.

Enclosure 10 in No. 25.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th August 1880.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to General J. WATSON, Kurram.

You are instructed to assemble the maliks, or representatives, of the Turi tribe in the Kurram valley, on this side of the Peiwar Kotal, and to declare to them that the British Government understands they desire their country to be made independent; that, consequently, the British Government recognizes their independence, and will maintain it, if necessary, against any interference from the Kabul Government; that no Governor will be appointed by us, but that they will be left free to make their own arrangements for the management of their country and for its protection against neighbouring independent tribes. They must be warned to be careful to do nothing that might afford the Kabul Government a pretext for disputes or encroachment, and they must comply with the wishes of the British Government in regard to matters affecting the tranquillity of the frontier.

In regard to the Tajis, if our intentions are asked, you should reply that we do not desire to retain any authority over them after the withdrawal of our troops, but that if they wish to be independent of Kabul we are willing to recognize their independence, although we can undertake no obligation to maintain it, and have no intention to interfere in their affairs.

Enclosure 11 in No. 25.

From the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the OFFICIATING SECRETARY
to the GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB.

Foreign Department.

Political.

SIR,

Simla, the 31st August 1880.

THE orders under which the Kabul Field Force is now being withdrawn from North Afghanistan, instruct the military authorities to retain for the present the advanced military positions in the Khyber Pass. It has now become necessary to

determine without delay our permanent political relations for the future with the tribes immediately connected with the Pass; and upon this subject I am to communicate to His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor the decision of the Government of India.

2. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council has resolved that the arrangements with the Khyber tribes for keeping open the Pass, and the maintenance of their relations with the British Government, to the exclusion of all other influence or interference, shall be continued. With this object it is of importance to assemble as speedily as possible, at Peshawur, the representatives of the tribes, to inform them that their independence is, as heretofore, recognised, and to explain to them that the Government intend to maintain in force, subject to such modification as events and circumstances may require, the existing arrangements with the tribes for holding charge of the Khyber Pass, and for keeping it open and free of interference. In consideration of their proper performance of these duties, the Government of India are prepared to settle with the tribes the compensation allowances that should be paid for tolls in the Khyber; although the permanent adjustment of these allowances will probably involve some modification of the present rate of compensation. If, after the withdrawal of our troops, it is still found advisable, for the protection and tranquillity of the Pass, to retain some of the Jezailchis, or to keep up any similar levies, there will be no objection to this arrangement or to any other measure of the kind that may be found, upon discussion, to be just and reasonable. It may be explained to the tribes, that although our troops will remain for the present at their stations in the Pass, they will in all probability be soon withdrawn; and it may also be of advantage to intimate that the British Government has no desire to station troops in the Khyber, so long as the Pass is kept open, under the independent and exclusive charge of the tribes, and so long as it is managed in accordance with the agreements that may be made with the British Government.

3. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council considers that it is very important to make known to the tribes, as soon as possible, the intentions of the Government of India. I am therefore to request that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor may have the goodness to cause the necessary preliminary instructions for carrying into effect these arrangements to be issued, by telegram, to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

4. His Excellency in Council is fully aware that the completion of our permanent arrangements for the Khyber may be a work of some political difficulty, which will require careful and deliberate handling; since the experiment of inducing the tribes to combine upon systematic engagements for the independent management of the Pass has never yet been thoroughly tested. Various material questions of detail will come up for consideration,—such as whether our officers should collect the transit dues for which compensation is to be paid, and, if so, at what place; in what way we should, after withdrawal of our troops, dispose of the fortifications and other buildings in the Khyber belonging to the British Government; whether, and under what conditions, a British officer should occasionally visit the tribal levies and posts in the Pass; and up to what limit westward we should extend our arrangements with the tribes for their independent charge of the road. In regard to this last mentioned question, I am to observe that the western limit of the Khyber Pass was carefully demarcated, for the purpose of determining the range of independent tribal responsibility, in a Memorandum by Major Cavagnari, dated 1st July 1879; and that the Government of India have no intention of extending the present arrangements for protection of the road beyond the limit therein laid down; while it may be worth considering whether Lundikhana should be permanently included. But upon these and all other subsidiary points, which do not at this moment seem to need immediate decision, His Excellency in Council will await the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant Governor.

5. In regard to our relations with the Mohmand tribe immediately adjoining the British border, and with the Khan of Lalpura, any necessary instructions will be communicated separately.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. C. LYALL,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 12 in No. 25.

MINUTE by His Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF on the Kurram Valley.

1. PARAGRAPHS 2 to 13 of this Minute were recorded as a memorandum on the comparative value of the Khyber and Kurram lines, under date the 2nd of June 1880. I now convert that paper into a Minute, offering some further remarks on the question more immediately before us.

2. Regarding the comparative value of the Khyber and Kurram routes, I hold the opinion expressed in my Minute of the 25th August 1879, on frontier communications. Further, in this opinion I find myself fortified by the events, then undreamt of, but which have occurred since.

3. In paragraphs* 6, 7, and 8 of that Minute I attempted to show under what

* "6. The Shuturgardan must ever be considered a bad line of military communications. From Habib Killa, upwards, the road passes through a difficult country over the Peiwar Kotal (8,500 feet) onward to the narrow defile of Hazar Darakat, attaining on the crest of the Shuturgardan an elevation of 11,200 feet. The descent to Dobundi and Kushi is extremely difficult and steep; for wheeled carriages it is impracticable, and it would take a vast expenditure of money to make it passible. The variation of altitude in the short distance which separates Habib Killa from Kushi is surely in itself prohibitory of all thought of a railway beyond Kurram.

"7. The above features indicate enormous difficulties for those who may have to provide such continued transport of munitions of war and food supply, as the advance of an army by this route would imply.

"8. Unless a transport train far more extensive and more efficiently organized than any we have seen in the last campaign, were available for him, a commander who would advance to Kabul by this line would find enormous difficulties in his way, for, having expended the limited number of days' supply he could hope to carry with him, he must, of necessity, become dependent on the means of some other column operating either by the Ghazni or by the Jellalabad road. This would have been General Roberts' condition had he been called upon to advance in March or April last. With a thoroughly friendly Afghanistan, and with supplies prepared at Kabul, such a movement might be made by the line on to the Bamian Pass, as would prohibit the use of it to troops advancing from the Oxus. The base in Kurram must be abandoned, and the operation becomes more that of a flying column than that of an army acting on an independent and an assured line of communications.

conditions a column operating from Kurram towards Kabul would have found itself, had we been called upon to advance by that line in March or April 1879.

4. In September—October 1879, General Roberts was called upon to advance upon Kabul over the Shuturgardan, and his operations have been carried out under the exact

conditions anticipated by me, as applying to the preceding campaign. For as he passed over the Shuturgardan, and advanced towards Kabul, his communications could not be maintained, and the posts established on the Shuturgardan were attacked by Ghilzais and others, as was that at Ali Khel subsequently.

5. Sir F. Robert's communications were re-established temporarily by Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, sent back from Kabul, by which means the last of the troops destined for the column and the last convoy were enabled to join the Kabul force. Since that, there has been no communication by the Kurram line, and the supply of the Kabul force has been entirely dependent on local resources, or on the Khyber line. Sir F. Roberts' force in fact became a flying column without any assured communications with India, until the Khyber was opened.

6. I do not in any way wish to detract from the value of a strong force located in the Kurram valley as a means of controlling Kabul. By such a force at a most critical period, we were enabled to take Kabul by a *coup de main*, and to maintain ourselves there until the Khyber route was opened. Since that time we have had in Kurram a large force, which has virtually been in a *cul de sac*, contributing in no sense towards the success of the main operations in the neighbourhood of Ghazni and Kabul. As yet we know, of a certainty, of no outlet by which we may be enabled to turn the Shuturgardan. There are reports of two passes giving out by Girdez and Kosein, but how far these may prove more practicable than the Shuturgardan, exploration alone will show; moreover, they are in Khost, and not available unless we occupy that province.

7. The line of communication between Kohat and Kurram is essentially weak, requiring strong posts at short intervals, and even these subject to continual raids, and a large number of troops is required to meet these demands. So much is this the case that Major-General Watson, with a force of 8,000 men under his command, cannot hold his communications and, at the same time, operate even with a light column, upon the crest of the Shuturgardan. The whole line is menaced by hostile and predatory tribes, so situated as to be able to bring pressure to bear with effect on almost any point of it they may desire. The Kurram river, fordable at almost any part, gives them facility for their guerilla operations.

8. I agree with His Excellency the Viceroy* in thinking that a light rail to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal would vastly improve the state of things in Kurram, but, even with that aid, a good and safe communication with Kabul open all the year round remains, according to our knowledge of to-day, unattained.

* The Earl of Lytton.

9. I cannot affirm that the valley of Kurram affords altogether healthy sites for the occupation of troops, the lower part of the valley is distinctly unhealthy, both for Europeans and Natives; Thull, an obligatory post, is especially so. The Peiwar Kotal gives every promise of affording healthy sites for stations.

10. I quite admit that the Khyber has many drawbacks; no place in Kurram is so unhealthy as Ali Masjid has been found to be; Lundi Kotal is not as favourable to health as we expected to find it; Jellalabad would probably be totally unsuited for troops in the hot weather. Gandamak and the slopes of the Safed Koh would, no doubt, afford sites equally good with those to be found on the Peiwar Kotal, but we shall probably not be allowed to occupy these, however desirable it might be from a military point of view.

11. Whatever our frontier of the future may be, there can be but little doubt that the problem we had to solve last September will be presented afresh some day to our successors, and I am inclined to think that it will be found then, as we have found it in our day, that whatever may be done from the Kurram line, in the first instance, the Khyber will be the main line of operations in the end; for, with all its drawbacks, it has the merit of being open all the year round and available for wheeled traffic.

12. On these grounds I think it necessary to maintain a strong position in advance of the Khyber. If we can trust the Khyber section of the road to tribal guards it will greatly lighten our task.

13. I propose to raise the question of the readjustment of the Peshawur cantonment and garrison on the selection of a site for the railway station. This is a most important element in the defence of the place, and I think the matter should be referred to the Permanent Defence Committee.

14. Perhaps the value of our early operations in Kurram (great as it really was) was somewhat overrated, as balanced with that assigned to the capture of Ali Masjid and our subsequent advance on Dakka and Jellalabad; and a somewhat fictitious value may for a time have been assigned to this route, as a line of operations against Kabul. But, in considering the question of the final withdrawal from Kurram, and our assumption of the responsibility of maintaining the independence of the Turi tribes, I wish to point out the two salient military features which have given value to the hold we have maintained of the valley. First, the power of delivering a sudden blow to Kabul. Secondly, the strong and dominating position afforded to those who hold the Peiwar Kotal.

15. The first has stood us in good stead in the early days of the second phase of the Afghan War, when General Roberts was enabled to capture Kabul almost by a *coup de main*. But, as a line of military communications, experience has condemned it, and I abandon it as such without the slightest regret.

16. The second point affects our recognition of the independence of the Turis, and our determination to maintain it under certain conditions.

17. I am not sure that in order to carry out this guarantee it may not be necessary to maintain a force, for a time at least, in the neighbourhood of Thull, for otherwise nature seems to me to decree that the Turis should fall under the government of the power which holds military possession of the Peiwar Kotal.

18. The garrison of the Kotal would naturally draw its supplies from the valley, and in the valley the garrison would naturally seek a winter residence.

19. To garrison the Kotal merely for the purpose of assuring the independence of the Turis would be an intolerable burden to us, as it would entail the same long line of communications which we have found to be so onerous throughout the operations in the two phases of the war, and so wasteful of human and animal life.

20. The day will probably come when the Turis, influenced by the close relations which must spring up between them and the garrison of the Peiwar Kotal, will gravitate towards Kabul, as the Jajis have already done. Their relations with those

who hold the Peiwar must of necessity be far more intimate than any we could establish or maintain with them from Thull, Kohat, or Bunnu, in spite of religious animosities, or the recollection of the previous grinding oppression of the Barakzaies.

21. I would repeat here what I have often previously affirmed, that Kurram without Khost could give us but an unsatisfactory frontier at best.

(Signed) F. P. HAINES.

Simla, 7th September 1880.

Enclosure 13 in No. 25.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th September 1880.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to Major-General WATSON, Kurram.

IN regard to a Governor, we are quite willing to consider any proposal that is practicable, acceptable to majority of tribe, and consistent with withdrawal of our troops from valley before long. If you wish to submit such proposal, you have discretion to postpone the announcement ordered by my telegram, 28th August, which need not, in any case, be formal proclamation, but should be communicated to Turis after discussion and explanation. Reply early as to postponement.

Enclosure 14 in No. 25.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th September 1880.

From General WATSON, Kurram, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

11th September 1880. Your telegram of 7th September. I have not yet issued formal proclamation to Turis, but have assured them of the Government guarantee to maintain their independence of Kabul. There is no one here who could be made Governor of the district, but the Punjab Government must know of many men fit for it. Meanwhile, I am endeavouring to ascertain if, by any arrangement, the Turis could carry on without a head of some kind.

Enclosure 15 in No. 25.

MINUTE by His Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

I SHOULD, with Sir F. Roberts, wish to assert that my view of the propriety of the withdrawal from Kabul and from Gandamak is based on the supposition that Kandahar will be held in force. This is the keystone of the whole military situation as modified by our withdrawal from Kabul.

To insure an effective advance from the southward against an enemy in the interior of the country, as contemplated in this despatch, the retention of Kandahar is a necessity.

Further, it appears to me that to ensure the acquisition of some knowledge of the Amir's foreign relations, over which we have so recently asserted some power of control, and to give us some real power of influencing them, we must hold Kandahar.

If we decide all the points referred to in this despatch, without reference to Kandahar, we may some day be told that, when we were engaged in the settlement of our relations with Afghanistan, there was no evidence of our having considered Kandahar of any value.

10th September 1880.

(Signed) F. P. HAINES.

I CONCUR in the above Minute.

18th September 1880.

(Signed) W. STOKES.

No. 26.

To HIS EXCELLENCY the Most Honourable the GOVERNOR GENERAL
OF INDIA in COUNCIL.

No. 40.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 30th September 1880.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 191, dated the 24th August last, reporting the evacuation of the city of Kabul by Her Majesty's forces, and your decision to withdraw the British troops from Northern Afghanistan to the line of frontier that has been occupied since the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879.

2. Of both these measures I have already expressed to your Excellency by telegraph the cordial approval of Her Majesty's Government. At the close of the month of July, the political and military situation at Kabul was highly favourable to that early withdrawal from the city and neighbouring districts for which arrangements had been for some time in preparation. In spite of excitement amongst the tribes, which naturally followed from a protracted political crisis, the military supremacy of the British Government was complete and unchallenged; while Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, who, at the close of negotiations, in regard to which I shall address you hereafter, had been recognized as Amir of Kabul, was awaiting our retirement to enter the capital and assume the administration. The decision of your Excellency in Council, under these circumstances, not to delay the movement in consequence of the reverse which was suffered near Kandahar on the 27th July, has been completely justified by the event, the march of the army having, as Her Majesty's Government learned with great satisfaction from your Excellency's telegrams, been accomplished without opposition or untoward incident of any kind.

3. The further question whether the army should be halted for a time at Gandamak, or be at once withdrawn within the Indian frontier, was one which your Excellency in Council properly referred to the judgment of the Lieutenant-General commanding the forces in Northern Afghanistan. The reasons, stated by Sir D. Stewart in his letter of 10th August, in favour of a continuous withdrawal of the troops, were extremely cogent; and as it appeared that the character of the season was such as to render delay above the passes unnecessary, and even inexpedient, on sanitary grounds, your Excellency in Council was at liberty to allow their full weight to the political and military considerations advanced by the General in support of the course which he recommended. Her Majesty's Government have not yet received details of the movement, but, from the tenour of the telegraphic reports, they trust they may infer that it has been effected with no less success than was the march to Gandamak, and without grave sickness amongst the troops.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 27.

No. 225 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 19th October 1880.

WITH our Secret Despatch, No. 164, dated the 20th July 1880, we forwarded the draft of a letter which Sir D. Stewart had been authorized to deliver to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan after his recognition as Amir, if he should ask for a formal written statement of the views of the British Government upon certain questions regarding his future position.

2. We have now the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* from Mr. Griffin, reporting the delivery to the Amir of a translation of this paper.

* No. 440, dated 4th October 1880.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) RIPON.
 " F. P. HAINES.
 " JOHN STRACHEY.
 " WHITLEY STOKES.
 " JAMES GIBBS.
 " D. M. STEWART.
 " C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure in No. 27.

From LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., late Chief Political Officer, Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (No. 440, dated Simla, 4th October 1880.)

YOUR confidential letter, No. 2431 E.P., dated the 20th July 1880, forwarded a draft Memorandum, containing a recognition by the British Government of Abdul Rahman Khan as Amir of Kabul, to be presented to His Highness if he appeared anxious to obtain a formal document of this nature.

2. I think it necessary to report, even though late, for the information of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, that at the first interview which I had with the Amir at Zimma, His Highness pressed so earnestly for some agreement on the part of the British Government that I considered myself justified, in accordance with the instructions contained in the letter above quoted, to deliver to him a translation of the paper therewith received, duly sealed with the seal of the representative of the British Government in Kabul.

3. This document was intended to form the subject of further discussion with the Amir after he should have perused it at his leisure; but His Highness was apparently satisfied with the paper as it stood, and suggested no alterations, which, in any case, would have been out of place, seeing that the document was not an agreement between two States, but merely a memorandum of obligation granted to the Amir by the British Government.

No. 28.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY the Most Honourable the GOVERNOR GENERAL
OF INDIA in COUNCIL.

No. 45.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 11th November 1880.

IN my Despatch of 21st May, I drew your Excellency's attention to the measures which had been taken by the Government of your predecessor for providing a Government for Kandahar and the adjacent province. I informed your Excellency that while Her Majesty's Government admitted the existence of some arguments in favour of the subdivision or disintegration of the kingdom of Afghanistan as established under the rule of the late Amir, Shere Ali, and his father, Dost Mahomed, they also recognize the objections to that policy, and I especially pointed out to your Excellency that it seemed likely to entail the necessity of a permanent military occupation of Kandahar by a British force, a measure to which Her Majesty's Government would entertain the strongest objection. Holding these opinions, I requested your Excellency carefully to examine the nature and extent of the engagements which had been entered into with the Wali, Sher Ali Khan, with the view of enabling Her Majesty's Government to determine how far they were of a permanently binding character, or how far it might be possible, consistently with a strict adherence to pledges and engagements to which the honour of Her Majesty had been committed, to reconsider the policy which had been adopted. The events which almost immediately followed your Excellency's assumption of the Government dispensed with the necessity of any detailed inquiry into the engagements which had been entered into with Shere Ali Khan, into the sense in which he regarded them, or into his capacity to maintain himself, with or without our assistance, in the position in which we had placed him.

2. The advance of Ayub Khan from Herat, and the arrival of his advanced guard on the border of the province of Kandahar, were sufficient to detach from their allegiance almost the whole of the Wali's troops, and to cause serious symptoms of disaffection in several districts of the country. The Wali himself, who is described as having been "much depressed," took refuge with the British force, and, neither during the operations which preceded the reverse sustained at Maiwand, nor during the siege of Kandahar, nor in the subsequent movements which led to the complete defeat and dispersion of Ayub Khan's army, has he been able to take any part whatever, or to give the slightest assistance to the British troops. It does not appear in the least probable that his position, difficult as it has been from the outset, as a mere nominee of the Indian Government, and fatally weakened as it must have been by the events of July and August, and his complete helplessness and inaction during that period, can ever be re-established; or that, if restored to the Government, he can ever become anything more than a nominal ruler, absolutely dependent on the support of the British troops. I do not conceive that it can possibly be held that we are any longer bound by any promises of support which have been given to the Wali, or that either our own interests or those of the inhabitants of the country can be served, by the restoration of a Government which possesses no element of strength or permanence. The time appears, therefore, to have arrived when it is possible for the Government to consider the question of the future government of Kandahar, without any reference to arrangements which have already failed, under circumstances which do not invite a repetition of the experiment.

3. Her Majesty's Government see no reason to change the opinion expressed in the Despatch to which I have referred, that any measure which would make necessary a permanent military occupation of Kandahar would be considered by them as open to the gravest objection. I am aware that there are many persons, whose opinion is entitled to much respect, who consider that the events to which I have referred, instead of affording to us a most favourable opportunity of relieving ourselves from onerous and unnecessary engagements, only prove the necessity of adopting as a permanent and settled policy, a measure which was only an incident, possibly temporary in its character, in the arrangement adopted by your predecessor, viz., the military occupation of Kandahar.

4. The arguments on which that opinion is formed are in the main those which have been urged, and which have been controverted, for more than forty years, ever since the question of our relations with Afghanistan have assumed a prominent position in Indian politics. I will not attempt in this Despatch either to repeat them or to summarize them. They have been stated with so much ability and force in numerous State papers that it is impossible to add anything to what has already been said. The question is one on which those who are responsible for the government of India must form their own judgment upon two absolutely conflicting lines of policy, between which there is no room for compromise. It is not contended that there is now, more than in the past, anything in our relations with the tribes on our frontier, or the more powerful tribes which inhabit Kandahar and the surrounding province, which makes it necessary for us to establish a military post or a military protectorate at Kandahar. It is as a measure of defence against some power far more formidable than any Afghan race that the extension of our military frontier is recommended; and it is both as to the existence of such a danger, and as to the expediency of this mode of resisting it, if it does exist, that it is deprecated.

5. Her Majesty's Government, sharing the opinions of some of the most eminent Indian statesmen of past and present times, and, up to a very recent date, of every Minister of the Crown responsible for Indian policy, consider that there exists no such danger or apprehension of danger to the security of India from possible foreign invasion as would justify the Government in taking measures which must certainly lead immediately to very heavy additions to their large military expenditure, which will cause a constant strain on the organization of the Native Army, and which will almost certainly involve us in future complications and difficulties, the nature of which it is easy to anticipate, though their exact form cannot be predicted. They are of opinion that recent experience has done nothing to strengthen the arguments of those who desire, as a military measure, to advance the Indian frontier, and much to verify the forebodings of those who were opposed to that policy. The advances of the Russian frontier which have taken place in recent years were foreseen, and their influence upon our position in India was deliberately considered, by Lord Lawrence

and other Indian statesmen, on whose advice the Home Government repeatedly declined to permit itself to be committed to a policy of military extension. Those advances, although they have been continuous and steady, have not been effected without great difficulties, both of a military and administrative character. They have secured to Russia no position of formidable strength; they have added nothing to her military resources; and they have been and are still attended by all the disadvantages which had been anticipated, as the result of an indefinite extension of her military position in an unproductive region inhabited by uncivilized and hostile tribes.

6. Her Majesty's Government are unable to admit that the mere fact of the existence of Russian military positions some hundred miles nearer to the North-Western frontier of India constitutes in itself any cause for anxiety, or for apprehending the possibility of an invasion of India from that quarter. On the other hand, the consequences of any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan have been precisely those which had been foreseen and apprehended by the opponents of this policy. It has been proved that there existed no organized military power in Afghanistan which could resist the advance of the British army, or prevent the occupation of any position in that country. But the difficulties of permanent occupation, or of supporting by a military force any Government imposed on the people by the British power, have been exemplified to the fullest extent. The large force which recently occupied Kabul and the neighbouring country, and the line of communication through the Khyber Pass, was found to be barely sufficient to enforce the administration of a temporary government over a comparatively small portion of the country. The experiment of supporting a Native Government by military assistance at Kandahar has been found to entail equally onerous sacrifices, and it has been, in fact, so far discredited that most of those who still desire the maintenance of direct British influence in that quarter openly advocate its annexation and administration by the Government of India. It must be remembered, when the annexation of Kandahar is advocated on account of its strategic importance, that it is not merely a question of the occupation of that position. The boundaries of the province over which it was intended Sher Ali should rule have never been defined, but it is clear that the extent of territory which must be governed by any authority which may be established at Kandahar must be very large. Unless the districts which extend in one direction towards the dominions of the Amir of Kabul, and in others towards Persia and Herat, be reduced under some settled form of Government, the power which occupies Kandahar must be involved in continual embarrassments and complications on every side. The occupation of Kandahar, would, therefore, certainly involve the administration and the military occupation of Kelat-i-Ghilzai on the one side, Farah on the other, and an undefined territory in the direction of Herat.

Your Excellency's military advisers would be able to form a more precise estimate of the force which would be required permanently to hold these positions, with their lines of communication, and to provide an adequate reserve; but I conceive that recent events have proved that it would not be safe to estimate that less than 20,000 men would be required for this purpose.

7. But it is not only on the ground of its risk and costliness that Her Majesty's Government are strongly opposed to this policy. The expedition against the late Amir Sher Ali was undertaken with the object of punishing an act committed by him, which was held to be of an unfriendly and even insulting character. It was expressly declared that the British Government had no quarrel with the Afghan people, and that their treatment would depend on their own conduct. It is true that the Afghans have, notwithstanding these assurances, resisted the advance of our forces, and, in accordance with their semi-barbarous character, have frequently committed acts of cruelty and treachery totally inconsistent with the usages of civilized nations in war, even in the defence of their own country. But Her Majesty's Government cannot admit that such acts,—acts which must have been anticipated when the invasion was undertaken,—release them from the declarations which were made. They hold that nothing but the most imperative necessity of self-preservation would justify them after such declarations in the annexation, against the will of the people, of Afghan territory. Attempts have been made to prove that the rule of the British Government would be willingly accepted by the inhabitants of Kandahar; but it is admitted by almost all those who are most competent to form an opinion, that the mass of the inhabitants of the territory which it would be necessary to annex would be bitterly opposed to the loss of their independence, and to the Government of a power alien in race and religion.

8. Apprehensions are entertained by some that the retirement from Kandahar would be regarded by the people of Afghanistan and of India as a confession of weakness, and such a result may be one of the inevitable results of a policy which Her Majesty's present advisers have from the outset deplored. But in their opinion, the moral effect of a scrupulous adherence to declarations which have been made, and a striking and convincing proof given to the people and princes of India that the British Government have no desire for further annexation of territory, could not fail to produce a most salutary effect in removing the apprehensions and strengthening the attachment of our Native allies throughout India and on our frontiers.

9. Others, again, who have never shared the apprehensions which are entertained as to the military weakness of the Indian frontier, who would have done everything in their power to avert the late war, and who perhaps even now do not attach a high importance to the position of Kandahar, nevertheless deprecate its abandonment, because its possession or military occupation might satisfy those who are now disposed to apprehend danger from foreign invasion, and might prevent the recurrence of popular excitement on this subject both in India and at home. The Government are convinced of the grave evils which result from this cause, and from its tendency to distract the minds of those who are engaged in the administration of the Government of India from the important questions of internal policy, of finance, of the construction of necessary public works, and, above all, of the agrarian condition of the people, which are so closely connected with the prosperity, and even the security, of our Indian empire. Nor can they feel any confidence that the experience which has been gained during the last two years will have any more lasting effect than that which had been acquired 40 years ago, or that a similar combination of circumstances may not again lead the Government of India into a similar policy and be attended with similar results. Any means, therefore, which could reasonably be expected to lay to rest these apprehensions would have a great attraction for Her Majesty's Government.

10. But they cannot believe that the measure which is now advocated would really satisfy the demands of those who propose it. They are inclined rather to believe that it would only be the first step towards still more extensive enterprise. In the Despatch of your predecessor's Government of the 7th July 1879, they said, in discussing the question of the retention of Kandahar, "The local experience recently acquired by our expedition into Western Afghanistan has fully confirmed our previous impression that the strategic value of Kandahar exists only in connection with a system of frontier defence, much more extensive than any we now require or have ever contemplated." Whether this be an accurate statement of the strategic value of Kandahar or not, it cannot, I think, be doubted that its acquisition as a permanent military post would quickly be followed by fresh apprehensions as to its security, and further demands for the completion of a system of defence of which it would be represented to constitute only a part.

11. Although Her Majesty's Government have been influenced in the decision at which they have arrived, mainly by considerations of a broad political character, they are not insensible to the weight of the military opinions which attach great importance to the value of Kandahar as a strategic position. For the reasons I have indicated they do not consider the question of the military defence of the frontier against invasion by a formidable power, as an urgent one, but admitting its possible importance at some future time, they are of opinion that the military occupation of Kandahar, should it ever become necessary for the defence of the Indian empire, would be far more advantageously undertaken when an advance of some hostile power should have made it clear that not only the safety of India but the independence of Afghanistan is threatened. Whatever strategic advantages may be looked for from the occupation of Kandahar, they must be immensely increased by its occupation with the assent and good will of the Afghan people, as a measure needful, not only for the defence of our own dominions, but for the protection of their independence. If the Afghans have ever been disposed to look with more friendship on either their Russian or Persian than their British neighbour, it is not an unnatural result of the fear for the loss of their freedom which our past policy has been calculated to inspire. There is nothing in the character of the Afghan people which would lead to the belief that they would welcome invasion or subjection by any power whatever, and it appears to Her Majesty's Government not unreasonable to hope that a policy of complete withdrawal from Afghan territory, coupled with a steady abstinence from interference in their internal affairs, adopted after the signal vindication of our military superiority, will, if

publicly announced and steadily adhered to, have the effect of converting these semi-civilized but brave tribes into useful allies of the British power.

12. These are some of the considerations by which Her Majesty's Government desire that your Excellency in Council should be guided in the policy now to be adopted in Southern and Western Afghanistan. They regret that it has not hitherto appeared possible to withdraw the troops immediately from Kandahar, not only because the occupation must involve the continuance of a heavy military expenditure, but because they apprehend that, so long as it is maintained, local disturbances or renewed hostile combinations may make ultimate retirement more difficult than it would have been during the present temporary condition of tranquillity which has followed the total defeat of Ayub Khan.

They, however, desire that your Excellency should steadily keep in view the paramount importance of effecting such withdrawal on the earliest suitable occasion.

They recognize that it is as desirable in the province of Kandahar as it was in Northern Afghanistan to assist, if this be found possible in a limited time, in the establishment of some settled Government in the place of that which has been destroyed by the events of the recent campaign.

The restoration of Kandahar to the dominions of Afghanistan under a powerful ruler would be the arrangement which Her Majesty's Government would prefer, as offering the best guarantees for permanence, and for the avoidance of internal dissensions. That solution would also probably be the only one which would enable the Amir of Kabul to establish his authority at Herat, and thus prevent the constant intrigues and conflicts for the possession of that place which, in the present disorganized condition of Afghanistan, appear inevitable. But it appears doubtful whether the position of Abdul Rahman is yet sufficiently established to enable him to assume the government of Kandahar, nor do I possess sufficient information to be able to judge whether the people of that province are prepared generally to accept his authority.

13. If it should appear impossible at present to reunite Afghanistan under the rule of the Amir Abdul Rahman, an endeavour should be made to ascertain under what form, temporary or permanent, and under which of the Sirdars, provision may be made for the restoration of Native government. In any event, Her Majesty's Government consider it essential that, as in the case of Kabul, having assisted in the establishment of that form of government which appears to offer the best prospects of permanence, and to be most in conformity with the wishes of the people, the Government of India should make it clearly understood that the future ruler should be left to rely on his own resources, and that it is not their intention to interfere further in the internal affairs of Afghanistan in a manner which would involve the employment of Her Majesty's forces beyond the frontier.

14. The mission of Mr. Lyall to Kandahar, and the information which your Excellency has at your disposal, will enable you to form a more accurate judgment on the details of the policy to be adopted than can possibly be in my power. These, as well as the time for the final withdrawal of the troops from Afghan territory, Her Majesty's Government leave with confidence to the decision of your Excellency in Council; but I have felt it my duty to place on record, for the information of your Excellency, in the plainest and strongest terms, the opinions which they entertain on the important question at issue, and the expression of the disapprobation with which they would view any measure involving the permanent occupation of Kandahar by British troops.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 29.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, dated 12th November 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

WALI sent to Lyall, Kandahar, following letter, addressed to Viceroy. *Abbreviation begins.* I have understood from conversations here that arrangements for affairs of this country, after recent events, are still undetermined, and may require some time for settlement. The British Government is, of course, entitled to act upon its own interests. I agree, under any circumstances, with any views British Government may entertain regarding future arrangements, but from my knowledge of the people I fear lest, during present uncertainty, they may do evil which may, by displeasing British Government, ruin me; therefore, with permission of Government, I, with

family, will proceed to Kurrachee, which also is British territory. If, in future arrangements, my services are required, I shall be ready there, but if other arrangements are made British Government can act as it pleases. I shall be always its sincere friend.
Letter ends.

No. 30.

No. 233 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, 16th November 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 208, dated the 14th September 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the papers noted in the accompanying abstract of contents, regarding the arrangements finally made with the Turi and Bangash tribes of the Kurram valley for their self-government after the departure of the British troops from the valley.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) J. STRACHEY.
„ C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, No. 3299 E.-P., dated 1st October 1880.

FROM OFFICIATING FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL WATSON, Shalozan.

MILITARY Department represent importance of very early evacuation of Kuram Valley in connection with question of supplying winter clothing for troops. What is your opinion as to earliest date on which movement could begin consistently with due regard for our political interests and obligations? Is there any present likelihood of the Turis coming to a settlement, and if not, do you see any strong objection to retirement of our troops before definite arrangements have been made for government of tribe?

Please answer very early.

Enclosure 2 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM dated 2nd October 1880.

FROM GENERAL WATSON, Shalozan, to FOREIGN UNDER-SECRETARY, Simla.

YOUR telegram of yesterday. I know of no reason for keeping troops any longer in Kuram. I understand that we have no political interest in the valley, and with regard to our obligations to the Turis, as Government declines to give them a Governor, and they cannot elect one for themselves, I will divide the country into districts under leading maliks, giving each set one of our forts for their protection. Districts will administer their own affairs locally, but will all unite to resist a common enemy. I will now issue the Proclamation forwarded under your telegram of 28th August. Can you send me some printed copies? Turis attach great importance to this, and if widely circulated, the Kabul Government will know that we are in earnest. These arrangements can be made in a few days.

Enclosure 3 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th October 1880.

FROM OFFICIATING FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to Lieutenant Governor's Camp, Punjab.

It has been determined, on military grounds, to evacuate Kurram with the least possible delay. Announcement will be made to Turis that we recognize their inde-

pendence, and will maintain it against Kabul. No Governor will be appointed, and they will be left to make their own arrangements for internal administration and protection against neighbouring independent tribes. Evacuation expected to begin 15th. Amir has been told he can have Khost. Please arrange with Watson for any necessary rectification of boundaries.

Enclosure 4 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th October, 1880.

From General WATSON, Kurram, to OFFICIATING FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

I HELD a durbar this afternoon, and read Government Proclamation to Turis. We have united the hitherto hostile factions under their respective leaders, Badshah Gul and Mir Muhammad Khan, and, by the voice of the people, these two men are appointed to administer the general affairs of the country. Arrangements for local and district management progressing. Full report will be shortly submitted.

Enclosure 5 in No. 30.

From Captain J. W. RIDGEWAY, Officiating Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., Shalozan. (No. 3338 E. P., dated Simla, 7th October 1880.)

I AM directed to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of the 2nd October, regarding the proposed evacuation of the Kurram valley.

2. As there is no prospect of the Turi tribe electing a Governor, you propose to divide the Turi country into districts under leading maliks. These districts will administer their own affairs locally, but will unite against a common enemy. The necessary arrangements can, you think, be made in a few days, and you therefore see no reason for prolonging the military occupation of the valley.

3. I am to say that the Governor General in Council, under the circumstances stated in your communications, accepts your proposals, and that the troops under your command will very shortly be withdrawn to the British border. In the meantime it is desirable that you should assemble the representatives of the Turi tribe, and announce to them the final intentions of the British Government regarding their future position. It is unnecessary to give you detailed instructions upon this point, as the enclosed copies of a proclamation to the Turis, which are sent at your request, sufficiently indicate the views of Government. But I am to observe that the Governor General in Council would be disposed to issue no written proclamation on the subject if it were not for the fact that you appear to consider the measure an important one; and you are authorized, if you think there would be no serious objection, to retain the written proclamation now sent you, substituting for it a verbal announcement to the Turi Maliks. This matter the Governor General in Council leaves to your discretion.

4. In conclusion, I am to say that the Turis should be warned to do nothing which might afford the Kabul Government a pretext for disputes or encroachments.

Enclosure 6 in No. 30.

PROCLAMATION issued to the MALIKS and PEOPLE of the TURI TRIBE in Kurram.

I, Major-General John Watson, commanding the British troops in the Kurram valley, am instructed to announce to the maliks and people of the Turi tribe that the British Government intends to withdraw its forces very shortly across the border.

Under these circumstances, it has become necessary to make some arrangement for the future administration of the district, and the matter has been considered with an earnest desire to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the people. The British Government understands that the Turi tribe desire their country to be made independent. Consequently, I have now to announce that the British Government recognizes their independence, and, so long as the Turis desire it, will regard their country as having no connection with the Amir of Kabul.

Regarding the internal administration of the district and its protection against neighbouring independent tribes, the British Government does not wish to interfere, and the Turis will be left free to make their own arrangements. In this matter also the British Government believes that it is consulting the interests of the tribe.

In return for its recognition and support the British Government requires that the Turi tribe shall conform in all respects to any advice which may be given them at any time on behalf of that Government.

JOHN WATSON, Major-General.

Enclosure 7 in No. 30.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (No. 1508, dated Lahore, 6th October 1880.)

I AM desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 3198 P., dated 18th September, asking for the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant Governor on the proposal to place a Governor over the Turis of the Kurram valley.

2. The Lieutenant Governor understands that the Government is under a pledge to protect the Turis from interference from Kabul, but not to preserve them from internal dissensions, nor to protect them from predatory tribes in their vicinity. Sir Robert Egerton considers that one of the main objects to be kept in view is to avoid holding Kurram with a military force. If a Governor is nominated by the British Government, it is more than probable that at no distant period of time we shall be called upon to support him, against his own people, or against his neighbours, or the Kabul Government. It is certain that no Punjab chief or noble would accept the governorship, unless he were assured that the Government was prepared to render him substantial support in such contingencies. Without such a guarantee the Lieutenant Governor does not know of any one to whom it would be possible to make over the governorship with any hope of success. Even if any chief or Native gentleman of distinction were induced to accept the offer, on the understanding that he must stand or fall on his own responsibility and on his own resources, it would be hardly possible, on the grounds of friendship, to refuse assistance to him, if he became hard pressed. For these reasons, Sir Robert Egerton considers it unadvisable to appoint a Governor at all. His Honour would give the Turis their independence, making them understand plainly that interference from Kabul is the only contingency under which the British Government is prepared to render them assistance. We should thus incur liability only in one event, instead of three, any one of which might occur if a Governor were appointed.

3. In expressing this opinion, Sir Robert Egerton is well aware that the position of the Turis is one of some difficulty. They are surrounded by tribes who are independent, and some of whom are only too ready to harass them; but it is by no means certain that they cannot create a good government of their own if they desire to do so; and, at all events, it will be quite possible, if at any future time necessity arises for forcible interference in their affairs, to render such support as circumstances may indicate, without, in the first instance, committing the Government to a policy which would most probably render such interference obligatory.

4. The Lieutenant Governor has omitted the consideration of another alternative which has been discussed in previous correspondence, namely, to include the Kurram valley in British territory, and bring it under British administration, because he understands that the only proposal under consideration is to appoint a Governor over the Turis. For the reasons above stated, the Lieutenant Governor is unable to recommend such an appointment being made.

Enclosure 8 in No. 30.

From Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., in Political Charge, Kurram, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (Dated Kurram, 14th October 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to enclose a detailed report of the final arrangements made with the Turi and Bungesh tribes of the Kurram valley for their self-government after the departure of the British troops from the valley.

1. My first proposal, to divide the country into districts, as telegraphed on the 2nd October, met with many difficulties, and finding, on the 7th October, that the exertions of Mr. Anderson and Shahzada Sultan Jan to unite the two factions under their two heads had been very successful, and that the scheme appeared to be the best suited to the requirements of the people, I ratified in durbar the election of Muhammad Nur Khan and Badshah Gul to be the leaders and rulers of the whole community.

2. I impressed upon them that they were not to consider themselves as in any way owners of the country, but as the nominees of the people, as administrators of the public money, and guardians of the public weal; that they were not to interfere in any village matters, which would, as heretofore, be managed by the village elders after the laws and customs of their fathers.

3. They have been advanced the sum of two thousand rupees to commence the enrolment of a levy for the protection of the forts and posts along the line of road, and I have asked permission by telegraph to make this sum five thousand before I leave.

4. A few Enfield rifles, matchlocks, and ammunition captured from the Afghans at Peiwur Kotal will also be made over to them.

5. How long the arrangement may exist it is impossible to say, for the Turis are Afghans, but the chief danger of a rupture is, as Mr. Anderson points out, to be looked for from the secret intrigues of the Amir of Kabul's agents in the Hariob and Khost.

6. I do not say that the Amir himself will authorize such proceedings, but his agents, who long for a residence in Kurram, with all its opportunities for enriching themselves, will leave no stone unturned to embroil the Turis with the British Government, and I think that the Government of India might well address a letter to His Highness, calling upon him to warn his agents to desist from all interference with the Turis. These latter I have cautioned never to give the Amir any excuse for interfering, and pointed out that, to avoid this, they must be extremely careful to grant no shelter or protection to fugitives from the Hariob or Khost.

7. The Chukmunis, who are Sunnis, I do not consider to come within the scope of General Roberts' promises of independence, and their behaviour last year in giving passage to the Munguls to attack our position at Ali Kheyl, although punished afterwards by a fine of Rs. 5,000, would release us from any obligations if we had any. Their Governor, Shere Mahomed, a Khuttuck exile, who has hitherto received a salary of Rs. 250 a month from us, will cease to receive it when we leave, and is, I believe, already making his arrangements with Kabul.

8. Several influential maliks will accompany me to Thal, where I hope that the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat will meet us, and if any further points for discussion or settlement arise, they can be dealt with there.

Enclosure 9 in No. 30.

From H. A. ANDERSON, Esq., Assistant Political Officer, Kurram, to Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., in Political Charge, Kurram. (No. 716 O., dated Kurram, 15th October 1880.)

I HAVE the honour to submit a report on the measures adopted to effect the settlement of the affairs of the Turi and Bangash tribes of the Kurram valley, in accordance with the instructions of the Government of India.

The policy of the Government as regards the future of the Kurram valley is set forth in the proclamation telegraphed to you on the 28th August, which was announced to the people of the valley in the durbar held by you on the 7th instant. So far as the administration of the country was concerned, the proclamation announced that the Government of India was not prepared to provide the valley with a Governor. Immediately, however, you informed me that the Government of India had authorized you to submit any practicable scheme for the appointment of a Governor. And subsequent to these instructions the Government of India intimated that it would have no objection to recognizing a Governor elected by the Turis and Bangashis, whether himself an inhabitant of the valley or a stranger.

As you are aware, I have throughout been of opinion that the future welfare of this valley and of its inhabitants would be best secured by the appointment of a Governor

nominated by the Government of India. And I have submitted to you evidence showing that a very large number of the influential men of the valley desired this arrangement. As, however, this course has not been approved by the Government of India, it is unnecessary to discuss it further here.

I propose to explain at some length the reasons which have led me to come to the conclusion that the proposal to leave the choice of an individual Governor to the people of the valley themselves was absolutely impracticable.

The Turi tribe consists of five sections,—

- (1.) The Hamza Kheyl.
- (2.) The Mastu Kheyl.
- (3.) The Dapurzai.
- (4.) The Ghundi Kheyl.
- (5.) The Alizai.

The Bangash of the valley in point of numbers and importance rank with each of these sections, and may for convenience sake be classed with them as a sixth section; while, however, the sectional divisions of the tribe are scrupulously maintained and respected, and their existence cannot be disregarded in any matter concerning the tribe, still it cannot be too strongly insisted, that by far the most potent factor in all matters concerning the tribe as a whole is that of faction. The Turi tribe in this characteristic resembles most of the Pathan tribes of the frontier; and as it was the policy of the Durani rulers to administer by fomenting factious differences, the faction spirit moving the Turis is perhaps keener than elsewhere. I mention this to show that this peculiarity to which I attribute so much working power is not confined to a tribe with whom we have a limited acquaintance, but is also shared by tribes with whom we have long been familiar. I believe that the experience of frontier officers and the records of the offices of frontier districts will confirm what I advance regarding the potency of faction in determining the action of most Pathan tribes. The inhabitants of the Kurram valley are divided into two factions—the Dravandi and the Myan Sayad, popularly characterized as the Sust and Tuig Gundis. The adherents of the former are distinguished as being the disciples of the local Sayads, the adherents of the latter as being disciples of the Shiah Sayads of Torah. It would be out of place here to analyze the effects of this element of discord on the sectional and tribal relations of the people; and I must ask that the assumption be granted that the effects are most potent. But I would point attention to the fact that, in almost every collection of hamlets which constitute a Kurram village, there are representatives of each faction. It may be inferred from this that the village, the section and the tribe are one and all penetrated by the spirit of faction.

It may be gathered from the above description of the state of parties in the Kurram valley that unity in any important matter, such as that of the election of a tribal Governor, was not to be looked for. In accordance with your instructions, however, both personally and through my Native assistant, Shahzada Sultan Jan, I ascertained the wishes of the people as regards this question.

The result of my inquiries showed that the notion of electing an individual resident of the valley as a Governor was not entertained by any one. Such a course was considered as beyond the range of the possible. On the other hand, I found that the names of four persons, not permanent residents of the valley, were in people's mouths. Some people named my Native assistant Shahzada Sultan Jan, and as he is singularly popular in the valley, he might have found some supporters, but he could by no means have secured the votes of a majority. This he acknowledged himself, and at the same time he knew that without assistance from Government he would be unable to undertake the governorship and maintain his position. Further, he had no wish to accept the post and would have refused it if offered to him. My tahsildar here, Akbar Khan, son of Mahomed Amir Khan of the Kohat district, and my Superintendent of Settlement, Mirza Sultan Hasan, were, I believe, at one time anxious to accept the governorship, and so became talked about; but I ascertained that neither commanded general appreciation. The fourth proposal was that the leading Sayad of Tirah should be elected Governor. Whatever approval this proposal may have received among the Turis of the Sayad's own faction, it was obvious that it would meet with a corresponding degree of disapproval from the Turis of the opposing faction, and events justified this conclusion. As, therefore, I was compelled to dismiss the proposal that the Turis should elect a man from among themselves to rule their tribe as impracticable, so was I compelled to conclude that the nomination of any of

the strangers named above would be unpopular with the majority of the tribe, and their election would be of no effect.

It will be clearly seen, I trust, from what I have written above, that I endeavoured to give effect to the instructions of the Government of India, sanctioning the election of a Governor by the people of the Kurram valley, but that this course was unsuited to the constitution of the tribe, and could not be adopted under its existing condition. While I was engaged in ascertaining the wishes of the people of this valley, I was informed that the two leading and most influential men of each faction, namely, Sayad Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan, were quietly and with united aim consulting with the influential representatives of each tribe with the view of organizing a form of government of a popular nature, in case the Government of India did not deem it advisable to appoint a Governor for the valley. This project was secretly announced to you in a petition, which I submitted to you together with a petition from a very large number of the representatives of the tribe, asking that Government would give them a Governor.

When it was definitely announced that the Government were not prepared to nominate and appoint a Governor in accordance with your instructions, I had it announced throughout the valley that the time was now come for the whole tribe to arrange for its future administration, and every one was invited to come and give expression to his wishes. For three or four days a very large, in fact complete, tribal council was assembled at Kurram, and debated on the policy to be adopted. The results of those debates are contained in the two petitions sealed by the complete body of representatives of every tribe of the valley, forming Annexure No. I. to this Report.

The petitions, it will be noted, are two in number,—one on behalf of each faction—but are identical in wording. They express the unanimous agreement of the people of the valley to carry on their affairs, both internal and external, by means of their general tribal council under the leadership of the heads of their factions, Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan; and they contain the further expressions of the intention of the people to contribute one rupee per jarib of cultivated land to defray the expenses necessarily incurred in maintaining the arrangements proposed to be instituted for the government of the tribe.

As soon as I had ascertained that the tribe was unanimous in preferring this solution of the difficult question of providing for the government of the valley, I communicated the fact to you, and expressed the opinion that the arrangements now proposed should be adopted, and I further recommended that no time should be lost in holding a public durbar for the purpose of finally announcing the orders of Government regarding the future of the valley, and to announce that the arrangements now proposed by the people themselves for their own government were acceptable to Government, and would be recognized by the Government of India. You instructed me accordingly to announce throughout the valley that you would hold a public durbar on the 7th October; and at the same time you directed me to elicit from the representatives of the tribes in more detail the arrangements which they proposed to make for the maintenance of the forts and Government buildings in the valley, and for the distribution among themselves of the duties of internal government and external defence. These details, so far as could be ascertained, are contained in the papers forming Annexure No. II. to this Report.

In the afternoon of the 7th October you opened the durbar, which was attended by representatives from every part of the valley and of every section. After you had explained the orders of Government to the assembled crowd, the Proclamation of Government was read out to them in Persian and in Pushtu. This was followed by the presentation to you by representatives of the two factions of the two petitions containing the proposals of the people for their government.

Those who had attached their seals to these petitions were then questioned as to whether they agreed to the contents; and generally the whole of the assemblage were invited to express their assent or dissent. I think that you were satisfied that, with the exception of Sayad Hanif, an influential Sayad of Kurman, and his nephew Shah Hasan, who were discontented with the preference given to Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan, the whole assemblage expressed its acquiescence in the scheme of Government contained in the petition. In accordance with this expression of acquiescence you intimated that their proposal was acceptable to Government. A choga and lungi were then delivered to representatives of each faction, who were directed to deliver them to Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan, respectively, as an intimation that they were accepted by their factions as the leading men, through

whose leadership the affairs of the tribe were to be managed through the tribal Jirgah. The assemblage was then dismissed, and the durbar broke up.

It will, I think, be hardly necessary to adduce argument to show that the scheme of self-administration thus adopted by the tribe of its own free will is the best that could have been adopted under existing circumstances. The fact that the tribe was unanimous in proposing and accepting the arrangement furnishes justification for its being accepted by the Government of India. However, I may express the opinion that, looking at the existing state of the Turi tribe, as described in a previous part of the report, the arrangement is the one of all others possible under the instructions of the Government of India which commends itself to me as being best adapted to secure the welfare of the tribe in the new state of independence into which it will pass on the evacuation of the country by the British troops.

While, however, the general arrangement may meet with approval, exception may be taken to the fact that the details of the scheme of administration are not filled in. The scheme provides generally for matters concerning the tribe as a whole, but it does not provide for matters of local and petty interests, and the other influential men of the valley who may be expected to take part in the public concern are not named nor assigned a place. The answer to this is that, like other Pathan tribes, the Turis have their own customary law, civil and criminal, and their own tribunals, the council of elders and the respected Sayads for the decision of all minor matters. And further, the Turis resemble other Pathans in this respect, that no one can bear to see his neighbour placed higher than himself. Acting on these considerations, I have deemed it unnecessary to attempt to formulate what is already familiar to the people, and unadvisable to particularize where the effect could only be to produce dissension. While, however, I believe that the explanation tendered above will be considered as satisfactory, I feel that you will require a special explanation of the reasons which have prevented me from carrying into effect, according to my original proposal, the portion of the scheme of administration which contemplated a division of the valley into districts for the purposes of internal administration. I was led to believe at one time that it would be possible, to a certain extent, to introduce this division. I hoped that, taking the forts as a basis, it would be possible to assign one to each tribe or locality, and that a certain number of the leading men of the tribe or locality might be specially named and appointed custodians of the fort with certain jurisdiction attaching to the office. I found out, however, on inquiring further into the question, that the latter portion of this plan was impracticable, as there were too many claimants, and that any attempt to select individuals would produce dissensions of the most bitter kind. I found a further objection in the fact that no one of the Turi section inhabits any one district of the valley. A portion of each section holds lands and villages in each district. The sections are broken up and scattered to an extraordinary extent throughout the length and breadth of the country. This being so, it is obvious that any district now constituted as such would of necessity be controlled by representatives of each tribe. To organize an entirely new district administration out of such sectionally heterogeneous materials was impracticable. While, however, I have to confess that I erred on this matter, I think that the scheme for the maintenance of a garrison for each fort, to be furnished by the locality which is approved by the tribe, will, if carried out, prove a source of great strength to the tribe as a whole, and will be considered satisfactory. I have devoted a great deal of trouble to this portion of the scheme. It will be difficult, for the tribesmen suddenly made independent, to realize the value of combining for the purpose of maintaining the forts. They have been accustomed, while under the Durani Government, to attack and burn the Government forts at each change of ruler. They have no taste of service away from their homes, and they look upon their villages as their natural forts. While, therefore, on paper, the maintenance of the forts is provided for, and the influential men of the valley appreciate their value, I am bound to state my opinion that they will have great difficulties to face in carrying out their present proposals. I consider, however, that the matter is extremely important for the welfare of the people, and have given all assistance in my power towards the enlisting of tribal levies. The hands of the leading maliks, however, would be materially strengthened by a present of money to accelerate their enlistment. All the sections are prepared to furnish the complement allotted to them; but it will be difficult to retain the services of the men supplied without some remuneration. In time, no doubt, if all goes well, and the tribesmen contribute to the general fund, it will be possible to enlist regular garrisons. The difficulty is to start the special arrangements before the general scheme of Government has been set to work.

I need not give at length here the strength of the garrison proposed for the forts, nor the other details contained in Annexure No. II. to this Report. The arrangements proposed, if carried out in their entirety, are excellent. Before concluding this report, I would desire to offer a few remarks on the probable results of the arrangements for the future independent government of the valley which I have described.

The success of any arrangements for the self-government of a Pathan tribe, such as the Turis are, suddenly made independent, cannot be predicted absolutely. The tendency of a tribe, under such circumstances, is to break loose from the control of those who would, under ordinary circumstances, exercise restraint on its members. Old animosities and feuds between individuals and between tribes have to be settled, and not without blood-shedding, to be followed by retaliation. Persons who, under the former *régimé*, acquired influence and popularity, provoke aggression, and strangers who acquired land under the protection of foreign rulers invite attack. There is a general tendency of the strong to be aggressive, so that the weak are compelled to form new alliances and enlist under new factions. In fact, a general social ferment has to be expected, and a general straining of old social safeguards has to be anticipated.

To a large extent, the Turi tribe may be expected to exhibit these symptoms. There are ancient feuds, such as that between the villages of Malana and Zeran, between the Maddi Khel Norad, sub-section of the Hamza Khel, and the Sunni Bangash of Haji Khel, and there are a hundred and one well known family feuds of tribal note which will surely burst out now. There are also foreign settlers in the land who, unless they pay heavily for support, will be expelled. But the Turis live in the midst of an almost unbroken circle of hostile tribes, whose hostility is heightened by differences of religious belief. For tribal safety, union is absolutely necessary; and it may be hoped that the danger from without will serve to extinguish minor differences within, and will tend to encourage a state of order. The arrangements now to be adopted furnish few novelties, and the tribe should find no insuperable difficulty in setting them to work. The scheme of administration is of their own choice, and is well adapted for the existing conditions of the tribe and the characters of the people. Further, though one or two of the influential men may from time to time have shown signs of a leaning to the Kabul Government, the body of the people, the "Kishars," who have grown rich and powerful during our occupation, while the former respectabilities and influential men have been standing still, are heart and soul determined to maintain the state of independency and self-government now set on foot.

As far as the tribe is concerned, and so far as we conceive its relation with the tribes encircling it, there is some hope that the arrangement now set on foot will work well and will last some time. The great dangers to which the independent welfare of the tribe is now exposed are two, first, insidious interferences from Kabul, and secondly, the treachery of the leading men of the valley. Both these dangers must be faced, for they are certain. Ever since the Amir's deputies have occupied the Hariob, they have spared no effort to embroil the Turis with us, and have sedulously promoted the Amir's interests throughout the valley, though without great success. The Turi maliks drew stipends under the Kabul Governor, and were flattered and honoured when necessary at the expense of the common people. Under the new arrangement they are placed on an equality, and will regret the fleshpots of the Durani. The Turis, however, are a strong, self-dependent, vigorous race, well prepared to face future pent from their numerous enemies, as they know that the Government of India has guaranteed them against encroachments of the Kabul Government. For the time being this assurance seems to have bound them together. When the British forces evacuate the valley, some internal disturbances and bloodshed may be expected, and I cannot confidently give the assurance that the settlement now made will stand in its integrity.

Much will depend on the maintenance of the cordiality now professed to exist between Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan, and much will depend on the manner in which they discharge their trust to the tribe. If only they will honestly work in concert for the interests of the tribe, if they will work through the other head and influential men of the sections, and not attempt to act independently of them, the valley should soon enjoy tranquillity. Whether or not at a later stage external intrigue and internal treachery may not disturb the present agreement, it is difficult to say. It is quite possible that this will happen, but if it should happen under existing arrangements, the tribe will have to accept the blame, for the Government of India

has treated it with kindness and consideration. The tribe desires independence at present, and has agreed to a form of self government of its own choice. It has received all possible assistance towards setting the desired form of government on foot. It alone must be held responsible if its own approved institution fails through the incapacity of those subject to it bear the self-imposed burden.

Annexure No. I.

TRANSLATION of the Petitions presented on behalf of the Turi and Bangash tribes of the Kurram valley at the public durbar held on the 7th October 1880, by Major-General JOHN WATSON, C.B., V.C.

INASMUCH as strong enmity and hatred exists between us and the Duranis owing to their tyranny, so that if our flesh and bones and their flesh and bones were boiled together in one pot, the water would not unite; therefore we have always desired to be freed from the oppression of the Duranis and enjoy repose.

By the kindness of Government we have been delivered from this tyranny, and have recently lived in peace and comfort. As regards the future we have previously made two petitions to the Government: First, we asked that we should be freed from the Durani's rule; and, secondly, we asked that the Government would give us a sanad. We still desire that a Governor be granted to us by the Government; but as there appears to be delay in granting us a Governor, therefore, because we are two factions, one Drewandi, of which the head is Sayad Badshah Gul, and the other Myan, of which the head is Mahomed Nur Khan, therefore, we two factions agreeing together have this confident hope and desire that we shall, with greater unanimity than any other frontier tribes can show, by means of general tribal jirga under the leadership of Badshah Gul and Mahomed Nur Khan by paying as revenue one rupee per jarib, defray the expenses of these two leading men, the malikana of maliks, and other necessary expenses of administration, and shall provide for the maintenance of internal order and the means of internal defence to the common advantage and peace.

For these reasons, in accordance with the desire of our hearts, approving the arrangements of a tribal jirga as given above, we petition accepting all responsibility, that Government will approve our request and will acknowledge the two men we have chosen as our leaders. Whatever kindness is shown to them will be shown to the tribe.

Annexure No. II.

ARRANGEMENTS contemplated by the Turi and Bangash Tribes of the Kurram Valley for Tribal Defence and for the Maintenance of Garrisons in the Forts of the Valley.

I.—EACH of the six tribes will furnish 100 men, in all 600 men, to be employed for service. For each body of 100 men a Sad-bashi will be appointed on Rs. 30 per mensem, and 10 Dabashi to receive Rs. 12 per mensem. Each private will receive Rs. 6 per mensem. Each tribe will be responsible for supplying its own complement.

II.—*The Shalozan Fort and Cantonment.*—Only the Kara Kheyl or southern fort will be maintained in it, composed as follows:—

10 men of the Kara Kheyl, subjection of the Gundi Kheyl.
30 men of the Bangash of Shalozan.

40

The land now occupied by the cantonments will be cultivated, as the land is well watered and valuable.

III.—Habib Killa shall be knocked down, as it cannot be occupied. The three Turi tribes of the Peiwar, Dapurzai, Ghundi Kheyl, and Alizai will provide a complement

of 30 men to garrison the road towers on the Peiwar road. Each tribe will supply 10 men.

IV.—A garrison of 10 men will be provided for Kharlasi, as it is exposed to the attack of enemies. The garrison will be supplied from the people of Kharlasi.

V.—*The Kurram Forts and Cantonments.*—The lines and northern fort will be knocked down after two months have elapsed, and the land will be cultivated by the landowners. The southern fort, the dāk bungalow, and the baradari of Wali Mahomed Khan will be occupied. A garrison of 300 men, 100 Mastu Kheyl, 100 Dapurzi, 100 Bangash, will be maintained.

VI.—*The Vangyan Fort.*—This fort belongs to Wali Mahomed Khan. If the Ghundi Kheyl, who are the proprietors of the land, buy it from him, they shall hold the fort. If it remains unsold, the people of Bangyan will hold it.

VI.—*Ibrahimzai Fort.*—The people of the Ibrahimzai village will leave it and occupy the fort.

VIII.—*Balesh Kheyl.*—The new fort will be occupied by a garrison of 200 men of the neighbourhood to protect the neighbouring villages against the Massozais. The old fort will be occupied, if possible, by the neighbouring villages.

IX.—The Shinak Gor will be occupied by the villages of Shinak.

X.—The Alizai fort will similarly be occupied by the five Alizai villages.

XI.—To maintain these levies and these garrisons a portion of the revenue paid by the people will be set aside. Muafidars will enjoy their former privilege of exemption, and the bhalsa lands will pay revenue at the ordinary rate of one rupee per jarib.

Enclosure 10 in No. 30.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th October 1880.

From General WATSON, B. Kheyl, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KURRAM evacuated this morning. All well.

Enclosure 11 in No. 30.

From Captain J. W. RIDGEWAY, Officiating Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Major-General J. WATSON, C.B., V.C., commanding Kurram Field Force. (No. 3526 E/P., dated 3rd November 1880.)

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 14th October 1880, with enclosure, reporting the fiscal arrangements made with the Turi and Bangash tribes of the Kurram valley for their self-government after the departure of the British troops from the valley.

2. In reply, I am to say that your proceedings in connection with the settlement are approved by the Government of India.

No. 31.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 17th November 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

I have accepted Wali's proposal, and promised liberal provision.

No. 32.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY the MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

No. 46.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 19th November 1880.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of Letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 208, dated the 14th of September last, reporting the decision at which you have

arrived in regard to the maintenance of the advanced military positions in the Khyber Pass and the Kurram valley, which have been held since the conclusion of the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879.

2. As regards the Khyber, your Excellency in Council has decided to recognize the independence of the tribes who inhabit and border on the pass, and to make such arrangements with their representatives as shall ensure that the road is kept open and free from interference. When these arrangements are concluded, the garrisons now in the pass will be withdrawn, but its occupation by Afghan regular troops, without the consent of the British Government, will not be permitted.

3. Similarly, it has been determined that the British forces shall leave the Kurram district so soon as certain questions connected with the future political position of the Turi tribe, occupying the Lower Valley from the eastern slopes of the Peiwar Kotal, have been arranged. You have already intimated to the Amir of Kabul that, while the independence of that tribe will be maintained against any interference, in accordance with positive assurances given to it by representatives of the Indian Government, you are ready to allow the Jajis, who inhabit the country beyond the Kotal, to pass under his jurisdiction; and you have authorized Major-General Watson, your Chief Political Officer in Kurram, to satisfy himself as to the real needs and wishes of the Turis in respect to their future self-government, in view to some practicable settlement which may be satisfactory to a substantial majority of the tribe, and compatible with the early withdrawal of the troops.

4. The arrangements above summarized have been determined on by your Excellency in Council after receiving the opinions of the political and military officers who, during recent operations, have gained personal experience of the localities in question. As regards the Kurram district, your policy has necessarily been influenced by consideration of "the repeated assurances received by the Turi tribe from your officers that they "will not be replaced without their consent under the power of the Barakzai dynasty "at Kabul." Similar promises had been given to the Jaji tribe, inhabiting the Hariob country, beyond the Peiwar Kotal; but, as explained in the 9th paragraph of your Despatch, you have not thought yourselves at present under any obligation to guarantee the independence of that tribe, which appears content to revert to its former state of subordination to Kabul.

5. Accepting and adopting the reasons you have assigned, Her Majesty's Government assent to your proceedings, as reported in your present Despatch, and leave the details of the arrangements with entire confidence in the hands of your Excellency in Council. They will, however, be glad to be informed in whose possession the Peiwar Kotal remains, as the papers before them do not indicate with clearness whether that position is within the territories of the Jajis or those of the Turis.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 33.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 30th November 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

SEE my telegram 17th November. Following, dated 29th, from St. John,—
"Viceroy's letter delivered to Sirdar Shere Ali this afternoon. He cheerfully
"acquiesces in decision, chooses Karachi as place of residence, and will leave as soon
"as arrangements for his journey can be made."

No. 34.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 30th November 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

FOLLOWING, dated 30th, received from Colonel St. John.—"30th November. Sirdar
"Shere Ali Khan this morning read the Viceroy's letter in public, and announced his
"approaching departure to India, fixing date at 12 days hence."

No. 35.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL
OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

No. 48.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 3rd December 1880.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 225, dated the 19th October, reporting the delivery to Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, after his recognition as Amir of Kabul, of a written statement of the views of the British Government upon certain questions regarding his future position; and I propose now, in pursuance of the intention intimated in my Despatch of the 30th of September last, to offer such observations as appear to be called for, on the negotiations of which the incident now reported may be regarded as the conclusion.

2. When in the spring of this year the early evacuation of Kabul by the British forces was resolved upon, and it became advisable to find some Native authority competent to assume the administration of Northern Afghanistan, the claims and qualifications of Sirdar Abdul Rahman necessarily forced themselves upon the attention of the Government. The arrival of the Sirdar in Balkh, and the establishment of his authority in that province, were events which could not be disregarded. As one of the senior grandsons of Dost Mahomed, and a chief who had shown capacity in the troubled times which followed the succession of the late Amir Shere Ali, he was believed to have a strong party amongst the Afghans, and a variety of considerations pointed to the establishment of friendly relations with him, as likely to be advantageous to British interests.

3. The communications with the Sirdar which were authorized by your Excellency's predecessor in Council had not, at the date when Her Majesty's present advisers assumed office, led to any definite result; but the Native gentlemen who had been sent to his camp in order to ascertain his views and intentions had been received with courtesy, and there appeared to be a fair prospect of arriving eventually at a satisfactory understanding with him.

4. Such being the case, Her Majesty's Government had no desire to deviate from the policy which had received the approval of their predecessors; and they deemed it only necessary to impress upon your Excellency in Council* that, assuming a satisfactory result of the negotiations with the Sirdar, it was desirable that his authority should be established with as little assistance as possible from Her Majesty's agents or troops, and that he should be left after his accession to power to rely upon his own resources. Whilst, however, Her Majesty's Government were unable to undertake liabilities on behalf of a future Afghan Government, the character of which would necessarily, for some time to come, be uncertain, they authorized the renewal to Abdul Rahman Khan of those assurances of support against unprovoked external attack which had been given in 1873 by Lord Northbrook to Shere Ali, as well as an intimation that his reception of a British Resident would not be required.

5. Although during the progress of the negotiations with the Sirdar he gave cause on more than one occasion for mistrust of his sincerity, your Excellency in Council exercised a wise discretion in placing a liberal interpretation on his acts, and in hesitating to accept the unfavourable view of his intentions which his conduct at one time was calculated to inspire. I have already intimated to you the approval of Her Majesty's Government of your proceedings in this respect, and I may therefore pass to a review of the instructions furnished on the 20th of July last to Sir D. Stewart, under which the Sirdar was finally recognized as Amir of Kabul.

6. These instructions, while clearly expressing the views of the Government of India on the various questions which might be expected to be raised by the Sirdar, duly provided against the contingency of failure to arrive at an understanding with him. You reminded Sir D. Stewart and Mr. Griffin that the Government of India had from the first decided that the assumption of power at Kabul by Abdul Rahman was not to be made a matter of negotiation or bargain with the Sirdar, and that their arrangements for withdrawal from Northern Afghanistan were to be completed without reference to the result of the correspondence with him. In the event of the Sirdar manifesting good faith and a friendly spirit, you authorized his recognition under the title of Amir of Kabul, and the subsequent extension to him of full countenance and political support, but not of co-operation of British troops in the establishment of

his authority. Whilst you were willing to provide him with some artillery, and with sufficient money to meet his immediate wants, he was to be made to understand not only that the Government of India could not engage to furnish him with any regular subsidy or continuous supply of either money or arms, but that after he had taken possession of the capital he was to rely for holding it on his own resources. The necessity before evacuating Kabul of ensuring, as far as practicable, the protection from injury in consequence of their friendly conduct, of the tribes and individuals who had assisted the British cause, was duly impressed upon Sir D. Stewart, and you instructed him to address a fitting admonition on this subject to the Sirdar.

7. Whilst adhering to the line of policy which had from the beginning of the correspondence excluded any question of a treaty, you furnished Sir D. Stewart with a formal statement embodying the views of the Government of India as to the future position of the Sirdar, which might be delivered to him, if necessary. This document, which I now learn has been presented, assures the Sirdar of the desire of the British Government not to interfere in the internal government of the territories in his possession, nor to require an English Resident to be stationed anywhere within them. It further provides for ordinary friendly intercourse between the two Governments by the residence at Kabul, under agreement, of a Mahomedan Agent of the British Government. It defines plainly what must be the position of the ruler of Kabul in relation to foreign powers other than the British Government, declaring that since that Government admits of no right of interference by such powers within Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all interference with the affairs of that country, it is obvious that the Amir can have no political relations with any foreign power, except with the British Government. It promises him, finally, assistance to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government to be necessary in repelling unprovoked aggression on his dominions, on the understanding that His Highness follows unreservedly the advice of that Government in regard to his external relations.

8. These instructions, and the subsequent proceedings of your Excellency in Council, meet with the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government. Although, as was natural, the expectations of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan on many points proved to be larger than your Government was prepared to satisfy, he has obtained all the present assistance that he could reasonably have hoped for. The consideration of so serious a question as that of entering into treaty relations with the Sirdar, cannot with prudence be taken up, until he has to some extent consolidated his administration in Northern Afghanistan, and manifested, more plainly than has yet been possible, his real disposition towards the British Government. Meanwhile, it is satisfactory to find that the Amir in his conversations with Mr. Lepel Griffin did not urge with any discourteous insistence wishes which could not at present be gratified, and that before the British forces withdrew from Kabul he expressed his obligation to the British Government for the favour it had shown to him. It having been determined that no treaty should be contracted with Abdul Rahman, no positive engagement could be taken from him for the protection of the tribes and individuals who have assisted the British authorities during recent events. But Her Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction that the Amir has shown every disposition to treat well those in this category who have remained behind at Kabul, and that your Excellency's Government have been able to offer, within Indian limits, an asylum and a proper provision to others who deemed themselves too much compromised so to remain with safety.

9. Her Majesty's Government are not disposed to take an exaggerated view of the advantage to British interests of the recognition of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan as Amir of Kabul, nor to anticipate in too sanguine a spirit the course which events may take in Northern Afghanistan. But they consider that there are reasonable grounds for expecting satisfactory results from the policy which has been pursued. Peace has, at any rate, been restored at Kabul, and the greater portion of the British army operating beyond your North-Western frontier has been enabled to return to India. It is not to be expected that the Amir should establish undisputed authority over the country without difficulty, delay, and perhaps disturbance. But Her Majesty's Government entertain the hope that the ability of Abdul Rahman, and the countenance which has been accorded to him by the Government of India, may, in course of time, ensure his success as a ruler, and enable him to maintain and strengthen, as time goes on, peaceful and amicable relations between the two Governments. Her Majesty's Government cannot but think that the deputation to Kabul of a Native representative

of your Government would be conducive to this end, and they will be glad to hear that you have been able to carry out this measure at an early date.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 36.

To HIS EXCELLENCY the MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL
OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

No. 53.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, 17th December 1880.

I HAVE received and considered the letter from Your Excellency's Government, No. 233, of the 16th ultimo, reporting the arrangements finally made with the Turi and Bangash tribes of Kuram for their self-government after the departure of the British troops from that valley.

2. My despatch of the 19th ultimo will have already conveyed to Your Excellency in Council the assent of Her Majesty's Government to the preliminary measures initiated by you in this matter. It is only necessary, therefore, on the present occasion, to record their approval of your further proceedings as now reported.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

His Excellency the Most Honourable
the Governor General of India in Council.

No. 37.

From PRESIDENT IN COUNCIL, Calcutta, 29th December 1880, to
SECRETARY OF STATE.

SIRDAK SHERE ALI KHAN has arrived at Kurrachee.

Suitable arrangements, with which he expresses himself quite satisfied, have been made.

LONDON :
Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

AFGHANISTAN (1881) No. 2.



P A P E R S

RELATING TO THE

OCCUPATION OF KANDAHAR.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



L O N D O N :

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

[C.—2811.] Price 11d.

LIST OF PAPERS.

No.	Date.	Document.	By whom.	Subject.	Page.
1	Sept. 9, 1878	Letter - With two enclosures.	Government of India, (No. 79).	Deputation of Sir N. Chamberlain on Special Mission to Kabul. Minute by Lord Lytton. Instructions to the Envoy.	3
2	Dec. 30, 1878	Memorandum -	Major-General Sir H. Green.	Rectification of the North-west frontier of India.	24
3	April 18, 1879	„ -	Lieut.-General Sir D. Stewart.	Strategical and political value of Kandahar.	27
4	Jan. 10, 1880	„ -	Sir E. Perry -	Future policy towards Afghanistan.	28
5	May 10, 1880	Note -	„ -	Occupation of Kandahar -	33
6	June 26, 1880	„ -	Lieut.-General Sir H. Norman.	North-west Frontier of India -	34
7	Aug. 16, 1880	Memorandum - With endorsements by	Colonel East - Major-General Sir A. Alison and Lieut.-General Sir G. Wolseley.	Future policy in Afghanistan -	42
8	Aug. 31, 1880	Memorandum -	F. M. H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge.	Colonel East's memorandum -	46
9	Sept. 20, 1880	Note -	Lieut.-General Sir H. Norman.	Question of retention of Kandahar.	48
10	Sept. 24, 1880	Memorandum -	Sir W. Merewether -	Importance of Kandahar -	56
11	Sept. 24, 1880	„ -	Sir E. Perry -	Question of retention of Kandahar.	59
12	Sept. 25, 1880	„ -	Major-General Sir H. Rawlinson.	„ „ „	61
13	Sept. 28, 1880	Note -	Sir R. Montgomery -	„ „ „	66
14	Oct. 7, 1880	Memorandum -	Major E. Baring -	„ „ „	67
15	Oct. 12, 1880	Note -	General Lord Napier of Magdala.	„ „ „	77
16	Nov. 20, 1880	Memorandum -	Lieut.-General Sir G. Wolseley.	„ „ „	80
17	Jan. 26, 1881	Letter - With enclosure.	Government of India (No. 13).	Minute by the Commander-in-Chief in India on the retention of Kandahar.	81

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

No. 79 of 1878.*

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 9th September 1878.

IN our letter of the 19th August, we reported to your Lordship our preparations for the deputation of General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., early in September, upon a special mission to the Amir of Kabul. His departure has been adjourned, as was explained in our subsequent letter of the 26th August, in consequence of the death of the Heir-Apparent to the Kabul throne, but the Mission will now leave Peshawar about the 16th instant.

2. We inclose copy of our Resolution formally appointing Sir Neville Chamberlain; and detailing the officers and gentlemen who will accompany him, on political duty and upon his personal staff. It will be seen that two gentlemen belonging respectively to Hindu and Muhammadan families of the first rank in India, have joined the Mission. We considered that it would be politically advantageous to attach them to it; and our offer to do so was accepted by them at once and very willingly.

3. We also inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a Minute recorded by the Viceroy upon the relative positions of England and Russia in Central Asia, upon the course of events in those regions which has brought about the present important conjuncture of affairs, and upon the various possible solutions of the problem which is now before the British Government. In general accordance with that part of the Viceroy's Minute which has special reference to the despatch of a British Mission to Kabul, the instructions to our Envoy have been framed, after careful deliberation over the actual situation, and after examining the measures and lines of policy best calculated to secure a durable and satisfactory settlement of our relations with Afghanistan. It is to be understood that the remainder of the Minute expresses only the personal views of the Viceroy.

4. These instructions [which are contained in a letter to Sir Neville Chamberlain, of which a copy is inclosed] may be summarized as follows:—We have directed our Envoy to ascertain what misunderstandings exist between the British Government and the Amir, and to endeavour to clear them up. If these misunderstandings cannot be removed, or if the Amir is unmistakeably and of set purpose unfriendly, the Envoy will return. If the Amir is found to be not ill-disposed, the Envoy will intimate that the British Government are prepared to place their political connexions with Kabul upon an improved footing; and that there are two essential conditions of an alliance. The first is the withdrawal of any Russian Agency that may be still in Afghanistan, and the complete exclusion, henceforward, of Russian Agents from His Highness' dominions: and the second condition is the establishment within the Amir's territories of English officers accredited to him by our Government. Upon this basis, if it is accepted, the Envoy may concede to the Amir a subsidy; a promise to recognize the successor whom His Highness may formally name in his lifetime; and also an engagement on the part of the British Government to defend the Amir's present territories, if Russia, or any State under Russian influence, attempts to take possession of any part of them.

5. It will be understood by your Lordship that these terms represent the extreme limit up to which we have authorised our Envoy to grant concessions to the Amir; and that he is not instructed to offer or agree to make them in their entirety, unless he judges this to be necessary. Upon such points, and in the whole conduct of the negotiations, we have intrusted a very wide discretion to Sir Neville Chamberlain, who possesses our full confidence, and who is peculiarly qualified for this important Mission by his long

* NOTE.—Extract of this despatch, with the enclosures referred to in paras. 2 and 6, was published in the papers relating to the affairs of Afghanistan which were presented to Parliament in November 1878.

experience of the Afghan border, by his personal acquaintance, in former days, with the Amir Sher Ali, and by his distinguished reputation upon our North-West Frontier.

6. A copy of the letter from the Viceroy, which Sir Neville Chamberlain will deliver to the Amir, is also inclosed.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

MINUTE BY THE VICEROY (LORD LYTTON).

A mission, under the charge of General Sir Neville Chamberlain, is about to proceed to Cabul to confer with the Ameer; thus affording us our first, and possibly last, opportunity of entering into personal explanations with the Ruler of Afghanistan, in his own capital, regarding the relations between his country and the British Empire.

Resulting, as this mission does, from Russia's recent action in Central Asia, it cannot but raise the whole question of the relative positions of Russia and England in those regions, and may not improbably lead to a final settlement of that long vexed question. It is, therefore, desirable that we should very carefully examine, in the light of recent events and disclosures, the problem of our future in Asia; with a view to arriving at such broad and definite lines of policy as may serve to guide our Envoys in their difficult task, and to direct our efforts for the consolidation of our dominion and due influence in the East.

In the present Minute I shall endeavour first, to define clearly the nature of the problem before us, and show how it has arisen; and then, to examine the various possible solutions which present themselves:—

Progress of England and Russia in the East.

1. At the beginning of last century Russia's most advanced posts, at Orenburg and Petropaulovsk, were nearly 2,500 miles distant from the insignificant British settlements in India. Our only rivals there were the French. The advance of Russia southwards seemed practically bounded by the vast and almost impassable deserts of the Kirghiz Steppes. For a century past her progress and conquests had been entirely in an easterly direction; and no one could at that time foresee that England and Russia would ever come into collision in Asia.

2. About 1730, Russia commenced the absorption of the hordes of the Kirghiz Steppes, and the gradual occupation of those arid deserts,—a task which occupied her for more than a hundred years; and her outposts began to draw nearer to India. England, meanwhile, had not been idle. Bengal had been conquered, or ceded to us, the Madras Presidency established, and Bombay become an important settlement; and at the close of last century less than 2,000 miles intervened between English and Russian possessions.

3. In the beginning of this century the more rapid progress was made on our side. While Russia was laboriously crossing the great Desert, and slowly consolidating her power in the Kirghiz Steppes, England was advancing with great strides over India. The North-Western Provinces, the Carnatic, the territories of the Peishwa, Sind, and the Punjab, successively came under our rule; and by 1850 we had extended our dominion to the foot of the mountains beyond the Indus. Thus, during the first half of this century, the distance between the outposts of England and Russia had been reduced, almost entirely by advances on our side, from 2,000 to less than 1,000 miles.

4. In 1854–56, the Crimean War temporarily checked the designs of Russia in Europe; but this seems rather to have stimulated her progress in Asia. The great Desert once crossed, Russia found herself in presence of fertile and settled countries, whose provinces fell under her control as rapidly as those of India had fallen under ours. Twenty-five years have not yet elapsed since that war; and, during this period, the

distance between England and Russia in the East has been reduced, this time entirely by advances on Russia's side, from 1,000 to less than 400 miles.

5. It might seem unnecessary to recall such well-known facts, were it not that there are those who argue, even now, that there is no imminent risk of contact with Russia in Asia; that we have no reason to anticipate further advance on her part; and that the dread of such advance is groundless, since we are still separated from her by vast distances and almost impassable obstacles. It is, therefore, well to show how little vast distances and impassable obstacles have hitherto stayed the advance of the British and Russian Empires towards each other in the East; and, by measuring the past, to attempt to estimate the probable future, rate of progress.

6. It appears, then, that the approach of the two Powers has, for nearly two centuries, been a steady continuous movement; undiverted by any obstacles, whether purely physical or of human origin,—most rapid on our side during the first half of this century, and recently on the side of Russia—never ceasing, however, but, on the contrary, constantly increasing in rapidity. The progress towards contact made in the first half of this century was greater than during the whole preceding one; and during the last quarter of the century it has been proportionately greater than during the first half century.

7. We have also been told, however, that the further advance of Russia cannot prove formidable, because further advance and conquest means greater weakness. But conquest and extension of dominion do not necessarily weaken a great Power. Is the British Empire less powerful, now that England has extended her rule to Peshawur, 1,500 miles from Bombay and Calcutta, than when she was painfully struggling for a foothold round her factories? Doubtless there is a measure of extension which cannot be passed without danger; but what proof have we that Russia has reached that limit? *Has* Russia been weakened by the extension of her power over 1,000 miles, from Orenburg to the Oxus? On the contrary, all that we know as a fact is that she has put more forces in the field, and shown more energy, in her latest and most distant expeditions in Asia than in any former ones. And I shall, I think, be able to show hereafter that Russia will actually gain in strength by further progress.*

8. We know, then, that the approach of the two great rival Powers in Central Asia has continued uninterruptedly for two centuries, and has made progress at an ever accelerating rate, as if governed by the laws of attraction that rule material bodies. We know that the conditions which govern the relations between civilization and barbarism are unchangeable, and that every cause which has acted in past times to compel the advance of ourselves and of Russia continues to act with undiminished force; and we know that neither Power has yet shown signs of failing strength or vitality. Therefore we can calculate, as certainly as we calculate on the succession of the seasons, that the same causes will continue to act, and to produce the same results; and that within a time which can almost with certainty be computed as less than a generation, and which may prove much shorter, England and Russia will be conterminous in the East. Accepting this as certain and unavoidable, it remains for us now to determine where that contact shall take place.

Present position of Russia and England.

9. Assuming, as we may with certainty, that neither Russia nor England will recede from any position they now occupy, it follows that the line of ultimate contact must be either the present frontier of one of the two countries, or some intermediate line; and these possible lines I will now proceed to examine.

British Frontier.

10. The present north-west frontier of India has been the subject of much discussion, and high authorities have recorded opinions in favour of it. Many of these opinions, however, were given when Russia was 600 miles further distant than she now is, when Afghanistan was looked upon as a certain ally, and when, consequently, the whole

* NOTE.—I am aware that there are those who say that Russia, threatened with bankruptcy and socialism, is now formidable only to herself. I would remind these prophets that precisely the same language was held, with equal plausibility, at the time of the Crimean War; since which time Russia has largely developed her railways and increased her military strength, has carried her armies to the walls of Constantinople, has permanently acquired the most important harbour and fortress in Asia Minor, and has added the Khanates to her conquests in Central Asia—instructive commentaries on the predictions of 20 years ago. I would further remind them that it was not France the prosperous monarchy, but France of the Revolution, bankrupt and socially convulsed, which overran Europe, and crushed every well-established monarchy in turn. It is strange to what little practical purpose history is studied by some of our political prophets.

conditions were different. Had these high authorities lived to this day they would probably have seen reason to modify their opinions, as Lord Napier, the most distinguished living Indian military authority, has done. No one who has studied the question can doubt that a rapid change is taking place in public opinion on the subject,—a change especially remarkable during the time I have been in India. Two years ago the opponents to an occupation of Quetta, or to any extension of our military frontier, were numerous and powerful; now they have dwindled to a comparatively small minority.

11. Our present frontier dates from the annexation of the Punjab. It was not a chosen line, accepted after careful study and with far-seeing prevision; but was adopted because it represented, approximately, the points to which the Sikhs had at that time pushed their power. Had the annexation of the Punjab taken place a little earlier or a little later we should have had a different frontier. It would be strange if a line thus taken by chance should combine more advantages than can be found in any line selected by human ingenuity; and yet that is the contention of some of its advocates.

12. Undoubtedly, at the time, this frontier had much to recommend it. It is natural for a Government, looking to the interests of the moment, to carry its conquests to the foot of a mountain tract, and stop at the point where military operations become more difficult and results less satisfactory. Rich plains are easily overrun and held, and they respond to the benefits conferred by improved administration. Wild mountain tracts are difficult to traverse and subdue; and, when subdued, their administration presents a still more ungrateful task. The foot of the hills also offers a well-defined line; whereas once the hills are entered it is difficult to know where to stop. So long, therefore, as we had only the rude hill tribes to consider there was much to be said in favour of the line we found drawn. It was not a strong line, except in the sense that a prison wall is strong to the prisoner; and it was not a favourable line, as it left our boundary peculiarly exposed to inroads and insult, while limiting our power of external influence or chastisement. But, on the whole, it might fairly be argued that the inconveniences of advancing beyond it exceeded those of remaining there; and, in that sense, and that sense alone, it was a good line.

13. Regarded, however, as a great strategical line, it is dangerously and fatally defective. The theory of awaiting attack behind a mountain range belongs to the pre-Napoleonic period of military science, and to the time of wars of position, when armies manœuvred opposite each other for months, and the capture of one town was considered a sufficient result of a year's campaign. Napoleon shattered this theory, with many others; and in every instance where such defective strategy has since been adopted it has resulted in utter defeat and ruin. Modern military authorities are agreed that the value of an obstacle, such as a great river, or a mountain range, depends upon the command, on both sides, of the points of passage, and on the power of operating at will on either side of the obstacle. To the combatant who securely holds the passes it is of incalculable value, enabling him to mask his movements, to concentrate his force in safety, and to strike at will; or to hold his adversary in check while maturing his defence or preparing his counterstroke. To him who does not command the passes, it is, on the other hand, a barrier which hampers his movements, and a screen which masks and protects his enemy. Hence the value of the great German fortresses on the Rhine and of the former Austrian fortresses in the Italian Quadrilateral; and hence the value to France of Nice and Savoy, which give her the command of the passes of the Alps.

14. But along our existing frontier every pass is in the hands of tribes independent, if not hostile; and who, if we elect to remain permanently within our present border, must ultimately become allies and subjects of our great rival. And whenever the time of actual collision arrives we should have to choose between forcing passes, defended against us as they have never yet been defended, to seek our adversary in a hostile country, far from our base and from all friendly support; or awaiting him along a frontier line of 1,000 miles, pierced at all points by passes which are open to him, and with a river at our back.

15. It is true that the recent occupation of Quetta has materially improved our position. The command of the southern passes is now in our hands; and from Multan to the sea, a distance of 500 miles, our frontier is well guarded. While we, securely established at Quetta, can at any moment descend on the plains of Candahar, or advance to meet our adversary in the open field, no enemy can debouch on our plains without first besieging and taking Quetta—a task of no slight difficulty, and involving much loss of precious time—and then forcing a long and difficult pass held by us. But on the northern, and more directly exposed, portions of our frontier our line is as fatally defective as ever.

16. I conceive, then, that it would be simply suicidal to allow Russia to establish herself peaceably and securely at Cabul, and extend her authority to our present borders and over the passes leading into India. She would gain fresh and almost inexhaustible sources of military strength in the wild warriors who inhabit the countries round Cabul and Herat; and who, in her ranks, would rival the best native troops we have in India. She would add enormously to her prestige, a factor never to be lightly thought of in war, and of almost magic power in Eastern warfare. Her dream of a railway from the Caspian to Herat, and of a new and shorter line of communication with her Central Asian possessions, would soon become a reality; and all her present difficulties of distances and communications would disappear. We cannot rely on her friendship; and the rich plains of India might prove a too alluring bait to the occupiers of the barren and profitless mountains of Afghanistan. To attack Russia, securely established in such a position, would be a task that might prove beyond even our military resources; to await her in the plains below would be to court defeat. Russia could offer the plunder of the plains, and the conquest of regions once their own, to the Afghans and hill tribes who join her ranks; we have nothing to offer them in return. Even Lord Lawrence, the great advocate of our present frontier, says, "I feel no shadow of a doubt that if a formidable invasion of India from the west were imminent, the Afghans, *en masse*, from the Ameer of the day to the domestic slave of the household, would readily join it." And though he believes that such hordes would make no impression on the troops we could oppose to them, the conditions would be different were these hordes armed, drilled, and led by European officers, and supported by European troops.

Russian Frontier.

17. The Russian frontier, from the Caspian to the Pamir Steppe, is about 1,200 miles long; 200 miles longer than our north-west frontier. Of this, however, less than half is open to attack, as from the Caspian to Samarcand it is covered by the great Khivan desert. But the fatal defect in this line is its want of inter-communication, and its distance from support. While every part of our frontier is within 200 miles of railway communication, and most of it much nearer, Tashkend, the centre of Russian power in Turkistan, is more than 1,000 miles from the nearest railway; and many of the frontier posts are 1,500 miles distant from such support.

18. The difficulties attending a military occupation under such conditions are necessarily great: and the entire force that Russia, with her vast military resources, can maintain in Turkistan does not exceed that which we maintain in the Punjab alone. It would be easier for us to collect 100,000 men at any point in our frontier than for Russia to collect 25,000 on hers. This heavy drawback has been long felt, and has led to various schemes for connecting the distant provinces of Turkistan with the centres of Russian power—among which may be mentioned Romanoffsky's Oxus-Caspian Canal, and Aral-Caspian Railway; and a proposed railway from Orenburg to Tashkend, 1,350 miles long.

19. Russian Statesmen and Generals have long perceived that the true base for their Central Asian possessions is on the Caspian. From Samarcand by Tashkend to Orenburg is about 1,500 miles. From Samarcand to the Caspian by Merv is about half that distance; and the disproportion is greater in the case of the Russian stations on the Oxus. It was with a view to opening a new and shorter line of communication with the Khanates that the military settlement of Krasnovodsk was established. Owing to the difficulties of the desert between Krasnovodsk and Khiva this scheme has failed; and, though projects for a railway are still discussed, Russian attention is now mainly directed to a more southern and fertile route along the Persian frontier.

20. In an able paper by Colonel Veniukoff on the Russian position in Central Asia, he indicates a railway from the Caspian to Herat, and thence northwards to Kunduz and southwards to Shikarpur, as the great natural line of communication between Western Europe and the British and Russian possessions in the East. That Russia accepts this view as regards her possessions we have abundant evidence. The maintenance and increase of her establishments at Krasnovodsk and Chikislar, and her recent advance to Kizil Arvat, can have no object but that of opening communication with Turkistan; and we have already explained the almost overpowering necessity which forces Russia towards Merv, in furtherance of this object.

21. Colonel Veniukoff, in the paper above quoted, further draws attention to the importance to Russia of Badakhshan, and of the minor Usbeg States of And Khui, Sir-i-pul, and Maimena; and to the fatal error which he conceives Russia to have committed in acknowledging the rights of Afghanistan over them. "These small Usbeg

"States," he says, "form the last oases in the southern borders of the Turan Steppe, at the very foot of the Paropamisus. To replace them by any other localities favourable to sedentary life in our future frontier on the south is impossible." "Russia cannot halt in her progressive movement till she encloses on the south the steppes extending to Khorassan and the Hindu-Kush." And of Badakhshan he says, "Without possessing it and colonising it we can never guarantee peace in Turkistan, or even the solidity of our rule there. It occupies the most flourishing district in the basin of the Oxus, and feeds a numerous population," and "without Badakhshan the Russians must consider themselves in Central Asia as guests without any settled habitation, and unable to form one."

22. Nor is this an exaggerated picture of the necessity she is under. Were England securely established at Cabul, with the passes of the Hindu-Kush in her possession, and outposts at Faizabad, Kunduz, Balkh, and Herat; while Russia still occupied her weak and extended line, severed by the Khivan desert from her military establishments on the Caspian, her position would be indeed insecure. Peshawur and Tashkend are about equally distant from the passages of the Oxus; but, while Peshawur is only 150 miles from a railway, and can be rapidly re-inforced by the whole military resources of India, and of England, Tashkend is practically isolated, and can only slowly, and with infinite trouble, receive small re-inforcements from Russia. The result of a contest on the Oxus, under such conditions, cannot be doubted; and the loss of a battle there might entail on Russia the loss of most of her Central Asian possessions.

23. Thus it appears that both Russia and England have, now, weak frontiers, at which they cannot willingly accept contact with a great rival Power; and are both equally urged forward by considerations of military and political expediency, and by the instinct of self-preservation, towards the Hindu-Kush, the great natural boundary between India and Central Asia. Long continued inaction under such conditions is impossible; and I will now examine the intermediate regions into which both are thus impelled, and where the ultimate boundary line may possibly be found.

Country between British and Russian Frontiers.

24. The wild country intervening between the present Indian and Russian frontiers contains the key to both India and Turkistan. It comprises that great range of mountains which, under various names, extends from Herat in the west, past Cabul, to the extreme northern boundary of Cashmere; and forms the watershed dividing the waters running south towards the Persian Gulf and Indian Seas from those running north into the great inland seas and deserts. Such a vast natural barrier has always a high influence and significance in the ultimate demarcation of empires and of races, beyond its mere strategical value; and I believe it destined to become a great line of national demarcation in the present case.

25. The routes crossing or turning this barrier, and connecting the Asiatic possessions of Russia and England, may be roughly classed in three groups. The first or eastern one comprises those leading from Kashgaria, over the Karakorum and other passes, through Ladak and Cashmere. The second or centre group comprises the roads from Kashgar, Khokand, and the Pamir Steppe by Chitral; from Bokhara and Samarcand by the Bamian and other passes; and from Herat and Merv, by Maimena and the Bamian Pass; all meeting about Cabul and Jellalabad. The third or western group comprises the roads leading from Persia and the Caspian, by Herat or Birjand, on Candahar and the lower Indus.

26. Of these groups, the eastern is the least important, owing to the length and difficulties of the roads, the rugged and inhospitable country they traverse, and their distance from the centre of Russia's power. The centre group comprises the shortest and most direct routes connecting the two countries. The distance between Peshawur and Tashkend, the most important garrisons of India and Turkistan respectively, is little more than half that from the Caspian to the lower Indus; but the roads connecting them cross a double chain of mountains, with difficult passes, before emerging on India. The western group presents the easiest roads and those best adapted for military operations. But they are the longest, and debouch at one end on a desert line backed by a broad river, the Indus, at the other on the Caspian, where Russia has a secure base, and insignificant military settlements only to strike at.

27. We shall not willingly be the aggressors in any contest with Russia. We have no desire to extend our conquests further; and our object being confined to the defence of India, ours will naturally be essentially a defensive policy. But theory and experience alike prove that a strategy purely defensive almost certainly ends in disaster; and if

this principle holds good where an army is defending its own soil, surrounded by a friendly and sympathising people, it applies with tenfold force in India, where we have no such advantages, and where retreat or inaction would probably raise us even more dangerous enemies in rear. When the occasion arises India must be defended by a vigorous offensive; and in choosing our line of contact with Russia, we have to consider what facilities it offers for striking quick and hard, even more than what protection it affords.

28. Bearing this in mind, a study of the map will show the immense importance to us of the triangle formed by Cabul, Ghuznee, and Jellalabad, with the possession of the passes over the Hindu-Kush. Defensively, this position, entrenched behind a rampart of mountains, and with its communications unassailable, directly commands the central group of roads, while indirectly threatening both the eastern and western group. Offensively, it gives the power of debouching at will on the plains of the Oxus, and threatens every point of Russia's extended frontier. It is difficult to imagine a more commanding strategical position; and whenever the moment of collision with Russia arrives it must find us in possession of it, as friends and allies of the Afghans if possible, but firmly established there in any case.

Eastern Group of Roads.

29. With this as our great central bastion and line of defence, it remains to determine the flanks and outposts of our position. To the east our line may be easily defined. I cannot anticipate much danger to India from operations undertaken by Russia on this side; and I can hardly conceive any circumstances in which we should wish to engage a force in the long and difficult passes of Cashmere, for the sake of debouching on Kashgar, and striking at Russia in that direction. Except for this purpose there would be little use in holding the northern debouches of the passes; and it would be difficult to cross the ridge and establish ourselves in Sarikol and the valleys leading to Kashgaria without being gradually drawn further into regions where we have no interests to defend. Beyond these mountains we should meet Russia at a disadvantage; while the passes leading into India are so few, so long, and so difficult, that they could easily be stopped if occasion required. From the Karakorum to the Baroghil Passes, therefore, our ultimate boundary should be the great mountain range or watershed; and our officers in Cashmere have accordingly been instructed, whilst endeavouring to extend our influence over the petty chieftoms along the southern slopes of this ridge, to avoid interference with the tribes beyond it.

Western Group.

30. On the left or western group of roads our position is eminently satisfactory. Our flank is covered by the Arabian Sea and the sandy deserts of Western Beloochistan; while the roads and passes leading into India are commanded by Quetta. From a military point of view, our position here leaves little to be desired, beyond the improvement of our communications between Quetta and the Indus: and though we can never allow Candahar to fall into the hands of a rival Power, and political or special military considerations may make it necessary for us to occupy that town, I do not consider that such occupation would actually strengthen our western frontier.

Central Group.

31. But the central group, between the Chitral Valley and Quetta, presents a much more difficult problem. Two lines here naturally suggest themselves—an inner and an outer one; the inner following the Hindu-Kush to the head of the Helmund, and thence down that river to Girishk and Candahar; the outer one following the recognised frontier of Afghanistan along the Oxus from Wakhan to Kojah Saleh, and thence across to Herat and the Persian frontier.

32. Of these, the inner line would probably, from a military point of view, most recommend itself. From the Pamir to the Caspian by this line is 1,200 miles. But the assailable points on this frontier are practically confined to three,—Chitral, Cabul, and Candahar,—of which the two last only are important. The Chitral passes might, perhaps, be best defended by closing the debouches at Chitral or Jellalabad. But the Bamian and Khawak or Panjsher passes are the great high roads between India and Turkistan, and of these it would be necessary to hold the northern debouches to secure the full advantages of the position. Between Cabul and Candahar our information is very imperfect, but the line is not, so far as we know, pierced by any important passes, while on our side

there is good inter-communication, except in the depth of winter, by the Ghuznee and Khelat-i-Ghilzai Valley. Finally, the communications with all parts of the line are good and well covered.

33. The outer line is 1,700 miles long, and includes Wakhan, Badakhshan, Balkh, and other provinces subject to Afghanistan lying in the basin of the Oxus. It may be necessary on grounds of policy—such as to secure an alliance with Afghanistan—to include these in our sphere; but, militarily and financially, we should suffer by advancing into the valley of the Oxus. We should gain no accession of strength, for the Oxus offers no good military line, and we should be withdrawing further from our base, and increasing the strain on our military and financial resources. These provinces, also belonging to the great basin of the Oxus, are by race and interests more closely allied to Bokhara than to Cabul, and we should there become involved in interests which might make it difficult to stop even at the Oxus.

34. I am aware that great stress has been laid on our retention of Wakhan, through which lies the only high road of commerce between Eastern and Western Central Asia. If we are prepared boldly to cross the great mountain range, occupy the valleys of the Oxus on one side, and of Kashgaria on the other, and contest Central and Northern Asia with Russia, then, undoubtedly, we should never allow Wakhan to pass out of our hands. But if, as I hold, we should in the main confine ourselves to the south of the great mountain range, only occupying such points beyond it as are absolutely necessary for the protection of India, then I think Wakhan should naturally pass into the hands of the Power that spreads over the country north of the mountains. To oppose an obstacle to a trade which we cannot ourselves develop or control, would neither be generous nor wise, and on the other hand, the more we stop Russia's southern advance, the more desirable it seems to be to give her every facility for expanding eastwards.

Herat.

35. The real point of difficulty in the choice of our line—the point where military, political, and financial considerations have to be most carefully weighed—is Herat. The objections to a military occupation of Herat are obvious. It lengthens our communications by 360 miles, and our frontier by 500 miles. To garrison it properly, and hold its long line of communications, would require a considerable increase to our army and to our already heavy military expenditure. It draws us away from a naturally strong and compact line, and creates a weak and exposed salient, with bad communications, one road exposed to Persia, the other to the Turkomans and Russians on the Oxus, and it entails on us the ultimate subjugation and pacification of a wild and unremunerative tract of mountain land, occupied by hitherto unsubdued tribes. But the political and strategical importance of Herat is so commanding, and its probable influence on Russian progress in Central Asia so great, that Imperial considerations may well outweigh all such objections.

36. The importance of Herat, both as a fortress and as the capital of Western Afghanistan, long an independent State, is well known. It is also in a peculiar degree associated with our name and reputation in the East. We have made an attack on it a *casus belli* with Persia, and have successfully fought for it; on one occasion it was defended by a British officer. To yield it now to Russia would be to falsify all past policy, to declare wasted the lives and money expended in the Persian war, and to proclaim to the eastern world that, while prepared to fight Persia, we are not prepared to fight Russia, for this point.

37. But Herat has also a special importance from its geographical position. Without acknowledging its right to the title of "key" of India, of which empire it is only a distant and rather inconveniently situated outpost, it is undoubtedly the key to Eastern Persia and Western Afghanistan, and to the roads from the Russian possessions in Central Asia to the Persian Gulf. It is also the centre of the most fertile region, and of some of the most powerful tribes of Afghanistan, and we may well hesitate before surrendering to a rival power such a source of strength.

38. In the natural progress of civilised and civilising powers, which I have already dwelt upon, wherever we leave a vacuum, Russia will assuredly fill it up, and if we leave Herat outside our sphere Russia will sooner or later occupy it, and extend her power southwards through Western Afghanistan and Seistan, and probably to the Persian Gulf. Thus ultimately we should be conterminous with, and enveloped by, Russia along the whole of our frontier from the Pamir Steppe to the Arabian Sea, and the increased military expenditure entailed on us by such contact would fall little short of that entailed by an occupation of Herat.

39. But if we securely hold Herat, I believe its command of position to be so great that it will definitely and finally stop the southern progress of Russia, not only in Afghanistan but in Eastern Persia, and probably divert her expansion permanently eastwards. Our contact with Russia on this side would then be restricted to the space between Herat and the Pamir; an influence equal to or greater than that of Russia might be regained in Persia, and we might watch without anxiety Russia's efforts to open a new line of communication from the Caspian through Merv to Turkistan. The scheme of a railway from the Caspian to Herat, and thence southwards to India, and northwards to Central Asia, would no longer be a mere visionary dream, but an idea which might become an accomplished fact within the next generation, and, instead of a source of danger, might prove an element of stability and of development and commercial prosperity alike to Persia, England, and Russia, in the East. Lastly, our frontier, though in appearance lengthened, would really be shortened, for so long as we hold Herat, our western frontier between that and the sea will never be seriously menaced.

40. To sum up then. As a purely military line, the strongest frontier we could take up would be along the Hindu-Kush from the Pamir to Bamian, holding the northern debouches of the principal passes; and thence southwards by the Helmund, Girishk, and Candahar to the Arabian Sea. Though political considerations of the moment may compel and justify an extension of our line to the northern frontier of Afghanistan, this would weaken rather than strengthen our general position. But the political and strategical importance of Herat is so great that, though it lies beyond our natural frontier, it cannot be excluded from our line of defence. This line, therefore, should ultimately run from the Hindu-Kush along the Paropamisus to Herat, and thence down the western frontier of Afghanistan and Beloochistan to the Arabian Sea.

Present Situation.

41. It will be seen, then, that the Frontier problem which has ever pressed for solution is this:—Granted that Russia and England are steadily drawing nearer to one another in the East; and that there are certain points necessary to the safety of India, which we must secure against absorption by Russia; how can these be secured with least danger, disturbance, responsibilities, and expense?

42. I do not here discuss whether the contact which is ultimately inevitable between Russia and England will be beneficial to us, or the reverse. While, on the one hand, such contact will doubtless tend towards the civilization of Central Asia and the development of commerce, it is equally certain that it will gravely increase our anxieties in India, expose our Empire in the East to the influence of every political disturbance in Europe, and render necessary the maintenance of armaments on a very different footing to that which has hitherto sufficed, and on a scale more proportionate to those of the great European military Powers. But this question seems to me to be outside the actual problem before us; for no one, so far as I know, has ever maintained that we should let Russia touch us at a line of *her* choosing.

43. The solution hitherto sought has been to maintain Afghanistan as a friendly, but independent, State, between Russia and ourselves; guarding those points which we deem necessary to India's security. No one will question the wisdom of the policy, though we may disapprove the system of absolute non-intervention which was thought necessary to give effect to it. The error which vitiated this policy was an assumption that Russia would appear in Afghanistan in the character of an enemy, as an invading and conquering Power; and that if we only held aloof and gave no cause for offence, Afghanistan, when the time came, would certainly throw herself into our arms. Even before landing in India I drew attention to this most dangerous fallacy. I pointed out that Russia was too far-seeing and wary to shipwreck her cause by a wild premature invasion; that she would first appear at Cabul in friendly guise; and that what we had really to fear was the gradual establishment there, by friendly means and by a policy more active than our own, of an influence hostile to us. This is precisely what has happened. While British officers have been rigorously excluded from all parts of Afghanistan, Russian officers have been permitted to visit Maimena and other points on her northern frontier; a Russian mission has been received, and hospitably entertained at Cabul, where it still remains; and proposals have been openly made to the Ameer to receive Russian workmen to aid in the improvement of his manufactures, among which arms and soldiers would doubtless be included. This is the situation with which we have now to deal, and which has forced on us the somewhat undignified course of hurriedly despatching a rival mission, without even waiting to learn how it will be received.

44. So long as the ruler of Afghanistan was, in appearance at least, on good terms with us, and Russia abstained from interference, the system of maintaining an indepen-

dent State as a barrier could be adhered to. But this policy necessarily requires that the intermediate State should be friendly to us, and not subject to the influence of our rival. These conditions being reversed, such a State becomes a source of very real danger, and one of two alternatives is forced on us; an immediate and definite understanding with that State, adverse to a rival, or an immediate and definite understanding with our rival, adverse to that State. Either we must re-establish a preponderating influence in Afghanistan and exclude Russia, or, disregarding Afghanistan, we must endeavour to effect with Russia some mutually satisfactory arrangement by which we shall be secured from the dangers to which our present weak frontier exposes us.

45. There is, indeed, a third course, but it is one which is surrounded with difficulties and dangers, while leading to no practical final solution, and could only be justified were our position here too weak to be defended in any other way. It is to attempt to stay Russia's progress in Asia by making any further advance on her part a *casus belli*. To do so, a definite line must be drawn somewhere—at Kizil Arvat, or Merv, or Herat, or Candahar. But in reality such line would be variable, and dependent on the views and temperament of the Ministry in power; and Russia would thus be ever tempted to trespass. She will doubtless give any required assurances, and a distinct declaration on our part would probably delay her advance for a time. Its immediate effect, therefore, would be to allay alarm, and so defer the measures necessary to our permanent security. But, unless we undertake the control of the countries which we forbid her to meddle with, the position would soon become impossible, and we could hardly avoid ultimately accepting all the responsibilities of a guarantee without securing the advantages we might originally have gained from it. It is also certain that Russia would disregard all her assurances when an opportunity seemed to offer the means of doing so with impunity. One of two results must then follow—either we should have to withdraw from our declarations, and allow Russia to continue an advance, against which her assurances have prevented our properly securing ourselves; or else go to war with her at the time selected by her as most disadvantageous to us.

46. War with Russia is not a thing to be lightly undertaken. The obligation to undertake it for an object which might have been attained by other means would be most discreditable to our statesmanship. A British statesman, remembering the American war, and the lasting effect which a few hostile cruisers have had on America's commercial prosperity, may well hesitate before exposing British commerce to the same risks. The contemplation of war with Russia in Central Asia has been forced on my mind in the study of the anxious question now under consideration. But the more closely I contemplate such a catastrophe, the greater is the repugnance with which I regard it—a repugnance amounting almost to horror. In such a war we should doubtless be successful, for we can meet Russia with far superior forces on the Oxus. But it is the consequences of success that we have to consider. We should probably stir up a Mahomedan rising throughout the Khanates, and we can realize the horrors of such a rising if we picture to ourselves another Indian mutiny, in which the mutineers would be supported by a victorious European army. As we advance, and drive the Russians out of Central Asia, and perhaps back to Orenburg, our difficulties and responsibilities would increase. We cannot undertake the whole administration of Central Asia, nor prevent Russia stepping in again to restore order in the countries which, by our withdrawal, we have abandoned to the wildest anarchy. And, when she does this, she will assuredly take signal vengeance on all who sided with us during the war.

47. Nor has such a war ever finally stopped the progress of a great advancing Power. We spent thousands of lives, and 80 millions of money, on the Crimean War; and within 20 years the results of that war have been lost, and the interests for which we then fought have been still more seriously endangered. While, therefore, to secure a peaceful solution, war must always be kept in view as a possible ultimate measure, it is one to be resorted to only when all others have failed; and threats of war held over Russia will only be effective if accompanied by, and subordinate to, not substituted for, such direct action in Afghanistan as I now propose to consider.

48. Of the two courses indicated in para. 44, that of a direct understanding with Afghanistan presents the greatest advantages. It would be in accord with our old policy, and would involve no undignified withdrawal from long asserted positions. It has the advantage of avoiding the delay and complication of European references and diplomacy, and of requiring action in India alone; and it could, in all probability be more promptly and effectively carried out than any arrangements requiring negotiation with Russia.

49. If this course be selected, we should, in the first place, endeavour to establish our influence in Afghanistan through the present Ameer. There is no man in Afghanistan

his equal in character and ability. He has firmly established his rule, and secured it by disposing of all who might be dangerous rivals; and no successor could, for many years to come, wield the power that he now wields. Whether we can win him to our side is questionable. He has become estranged; he has learnt thoroughly to mistrust us; and all recent information confirms the belief that, of his two great neighbours, he hates the Russians the least. On the other hand, he knows that we are nearer, and more powerful for good or harm, than is Russia; and that no assistance from her could preserve his country or his throne against us.

50. But, if we wish to bind the Ameer to us, we must appeal to something besides his fears; we must hold out hope of advantage to him as well. He will probably demand a subsidy; though he seems latterly to have extracted from his subjects a revenue sufficient for his wants, and to be comparatively indifferent to money. In the next place, he will require some territorial guarantee. To expect him, for our convenience, to agree to any arrangement by which he might lose part of his territories, would be absurd; nor would it be less manifestly unjust to interfere with his making his own terms with the Russians, and yet not protect him from them. Lastly, he will probably seek some sort of dynastic guarantee. What guarantees to require from the Ameer, and what to grant him, are the points requiring the most careful consideration in framing the instructions for the present mission.

51. In the first place, then, it is evident that we cannot simply return to the *status quo ante*. Neither the withdrawal of the Russian mission, nor any assurances on the part of Russia, will cancel the fact that a Russian mission has been well received at Cabul, after one from us had been refused; and the Russian officers have had full opportunities of instilling into the minds of the Ameer and his councillors distrust and dislike towards England, belief in Russia's power and destiny, and hopes of assistance against us from that country. And, as Russian promises have not kept Russian missions out of Cabul in the past, to accept them as guarantees for the future would be blind folly. Some visible proof of England's supremacy in Afghanistan is, therefore, essential; and the terms which it seems necessary to demand on our part, as the conditions of a friendly alliance with the Ameer, are; 1st, the dismissal of the Russian mission if still at Cabul, and the exclusion of Russian agents from Afghanistan for the future; 2nd, an engagement on the part of the Ameer to enter into no diplomatic relations with foreign Powers without first consulting us; 3rd, the establishment of a British representative at the Ameer's Court, or free access for British missions to Cabul and to the Ameer when considered necessary; 4th, failing the establishment of a permanent mission at Cabul, the location of agents at Balkh and Herat, or at any frontier towns where the presence of such agents may seem necessary to anticipate and frustrate foreign intrigue.

52. The question that then presents itself is, What inducements can we hold out to the Ameer that shall be sufficient, when coupled with his fears, to induce him to accept these terms, and identify his interest with ours? A reasonable subsidy may be granted; but the question of guarantees is more difficult. The objections that exist to giving territorial guarantees have been often and fully urged. By any such guarantee we shall in a manner become conterminous with Russia along the northern border of Afghanistan, and hasten that contact which it is our avowed policy to delay. It will further bind us to the distant and inconvenient line of the Oxus. Many and weighty objections can also be raised to rendering ourselves responsible for the protection of a country over whose administration we have no control; and incurring responsibilities which may ultimately entail interference in, and control over, the interior administration of Afghanistan. But we must keep clearly in view the problem before us; *viz.*, to secure certain points necessary for the safety of India, and to do this with least possible danger, disturbance, or expense? Would a war with Russia, or an internal revolution brought about by us, or an invasion with a view to a forcible occupation of the points we require, attain our end with more certainty and with less danger, disturbance, or expense? Could we, indeed, confidently depend on any of these alternative courses to secure for us all the points we require—Herat for instance?

53. It is true that such territorial guarantee practically hastens contact between England and Russia. But it brings it about under conditions the most favorable to us, and at a line the least favourable to Russia. It is true that it compels us permanently to adopt a line exposed to disadvantages already pointed out; but that line is far more disadvantageous to Russia. It is true that such a guarantee exposes the guarantor to risks and demands which it is difficult fully to measure or foresee; and to guarantee a weak State against a near and overwhelmingly powerful neighbour, as we have done in the case of Belgium and of Asia Minor, is indeed to accept grave responsibilities. But the risks of the guarantee depend on the relative power of the guaranteeing State, and of that against which the

guarantee is directed; and when the guaranteeing State is relatively powerful, as we should be against Russia on the Oxus, the risks are comparatively slight, because the guarantee is not likely to be defied. Moreover, in the case of Afghanistan, it may well be questioned whether such a guarantee *does* increase our responsibilities. I have already pointed out that to declare a *casus belli* against Russia would involve us in responsibilities still wider, and more dangerous because more vague; and it is difficult to imagine the circumstances in which, if we have made any sort of friendly arrangement with Afghanistan, we could allow Russia to invade its territory. Lastly, it is true that a territorial guarantee will probably entail some ultimate control over the administration of Afghanistan. But it has been already shown that such control *must* be ultimately exercised either by Russia or by England. Unless we are prepared to yield it to Russia, we must be prepared to assume it ourselves; and there is no way in which it can be more gradually and advantageously introduced.

54. We ought, therefore, to be prepared to give a territorial guarantee to the Ameer if it is pressed for, and if other circumstances, such as the prospects of securing the Ameer's alliance, and of the stability of his throne, make it desirable to enter into close relations with him. Such guarantee will not materially add to our necessary responsibilities regarding Afghanistan: while it affords the easiest, and only reasonably certain means of securing the positions we require there. The conditions likely to be asked by the Ameer may be inferred from the negotiations of 1873, and seem to be such as we can in the main reasonably assent to, and as would be covered by a guarantee against *annexation*. This, therefore, is the form I conceive our guarantee should take; being made dependent, of course, on the location of British agents at exposed points of the frontier, and free access to the Ameer.

55. The question of dynastic guarantee is less difficult. We should be prepared to recognize any heir whom the Ameer, with the concurrence of his principal nobles, nominates and proclaims. Further, we should be prepared to acknowledge his succession on the death of the Ameer; and to continue to him whatever subsidy the Ameer has received so long as he proves himself generally acceptable to the Afghan people, and able to maintain his throne. But we should distinctly decline to enter into any engagement to support him by force of arms. It is probable that the Ameer will seek a promise that we will not interfere in the internal administration of Afghanistan: and this promise would be a sufficient reply to any such proposal on the part of His Highness.

56. But, in thus determining the basis of an acceptable agreement with the Ameer, much must necessarily be left to the discretion of the Envoy. He must be careful to make it clear that we do not seek to ally ourselves with the Ameer alone, but with the people of Afghanistan; and that we will not sacrifice either our interests or those of Afghanistan to the personal interests of the Ameer. He must also assure himself, as far as possible, that the Ameer is in a position to carry out any promises he makes, and that his throne shows such reasonable promises of stability as to make it desirable to enter into close relations with him.

57. If the Ameer proves hopelessly estranged, and we fail in all efforts to win him; or if the Envoy considers that, from any cause, it is not desirable to involve ourselves in engagements with him, we must take immediate steps to neutralize his hostility, and to secure our interests. The best course then open to us would probably be to aim at dethroning him, and replacing him by a candidate more favourable to ourselves. There seems little doubt that we could easily dethrone him, but the results of such action must be well considered. The candidate whose prospects were fairest, and whose interests seemed most allied with ours—the only candidate who could reasonably hope to succeed to all his father's possessions—has just died. Were Yakub Khan abroad, and could we secure him to our interests, he might prove even a better candidate. But this we have no right to anticipate; though the Envoy, if opportunity offers, might endeavour to open relations with him. What the result of a free contest for the throne, in present circumstances, would be, may perhaps be guessed. Abdul Rahman, supported by Russian influence, would establish himself in the trans-Hindu-Kush provinces as a feudatory of Russia. Herat would probably fall to Persia; Candahar and Southern Afghanistan to us; while Cabul would remain a centre of disturbances, struggles for power, and bigoted fanaticism, hostile and dangerous to all neighbours alike, and ultimately we should be obliged to forcibly pacify and hold it. We should, doubtless, after fighting and much trouble, gain our necessary mountain frontier; but it is not so certain that we should secure the passes and their debouches, and Herat might be lost to us for ever.

58. Meanwhile, the measures which should be immediately adopted on the failure of our mission are, 1st, an armed occupation of the Koorum valley; 2nd, the concentra-

tion of a force at Quetta sufficient to threaten Candahar; 3rd, the opening of direct negotiations with the various semi-independent tribes along the border, with a view to detaching them from the Ameer's cause. The occupation of the Koorum would be an easy task. It is a comparatively open and fertile valley, with a peaceful and agricultural population, who have been much oppressed by the Ameer, and have long sought to come under our rule. By this route the Khyber Pass and Jellalabad are turned; and a force located at the head of the valley would equally threaten Cabul, Ghuznee, and Jellalabad.

59. As the results of our Khelat policy, the concentration of a force at Quetta can now be effected with the same ease and certainty as at any point in the interior of India, while we should find useful auxiliaries in the Brahuīs, who have already offered to join our standards in the event of a rupture with the Ameer. The Ghilzais, the most important Afghan tribe between Ghuznee and Quetta, have recently sent in a deputation to Quetta, offering their services against the Ameer, and requesting the presence of a British officer; and there can be little doubt that the Khyber tribes, the Kakars, and others would gladly separate themselves from the Ameer, and ally themselves with us. With the high road to Cabul thus open, with the principal cities of Eastern and Southern Afghanistan directly threatened, and the communication between Cabul and Candahar closed by the Ghilzais, the Ameer's power could not stand long. So long as we maintain our threatening position in the Koorum, no candidate hostile to us could establish himself in Cabul; and it is probable that our mere presence there, without further action on our part, would secure the throne for the candidate whom we favour. If we could thereby secure an overwhelming influence at Cabul, giving us at the same time the command of Herat, and of the passes of the Hindu-Kush, while not involving us in responsibilities regarding the Oxus provinces, this would probably be the best solution of all for us. But it may be doubted whether a candidate thus enthroned at Cabul would be able to establish his authority at Herat; where Persia would appear on the scene with decisive effect long before we could approach it. And to recover Herat from Persia, abetted, and perhaps actively aided, by Russia, would be no light task.

60. There still remains the course indicated, of coming to an amicable arrangement with Russia. Russia has before this suggested a partition of Afghanistan; and, whatever views Russian enthusiasts may have on India, there can be little doubt but that she would consent to our occupation of Cabul and Southern Afghanistan, if thereby she could secure the Oxus provinces. That we must offer her some such terms, if the arrangement is to be a pacific and amicable one, is evident; for it is not to be expected that Russia will willingly accept any arrangement so prejudicial to her interests, and incompatible with the realisation of her long cherished hopes, as final and absolute exclusion from the northern provinces of Afghanistan.

61. An arrangement with Russia might be a not undesirable final solution of the Central Asian question, if concluded on the terms already indicated as necessary to our security on this side, viz., the possession by us of the debouches of the Cabul passes, and of Herat. As regards the former, it is probable that Russia, in return for the cession of the Oxus valley, and having regard to the difficulties attending any advance beyond the Hindu-Kush, would accept these conditions; but it is more doubtful whether she would willingly abandon Herat to England, and so finally renounce all hopes of seeing it either in her own hands, or in those of a vassal ally.

62. A most important point to be considered in any such understanding with Russia is, that we must be prepared to *act* on it immediately. For if, while Russia is left free to advance to the Hindu-Kush, England remains quiet, and content with assurances that the rest of Afghanistan is beyond her sphere of action, we should soon see renewed, and under conditions much more unfavourable to us, the difficulties we are now contending with. Any such treaty with Russia, therefore, must be promptly followed up by the actual and visible occupation of the tract necessary to us. The nature of such occupation would depend on the circumstances under which the agreement with Russia was made, and may be considered later.

63. I conceive, therefore, that our first object should be to use every endeavour to re-establish such relations with the Ameer as will give us due influence in Afghanistan, and for ever exclude Russia therefrom; and that, to effect this, we must appeal both to his fears and to his hopes. Failing in all efforts for this purpose, we shall have to take such steps as may be necessary to protect our own interests, irrespective of his, either by action in Afghanistan, or by direct arrangements with Russia, or both. It remains now to determine the nature of the instructions to be given to the Envoy, and the further measures to be taken, should the mission fail.

Instructions to Envoy.

64. The general character of the instructions to be given to our Envoy may be deduced from what has been said in paras. 51-56. He should, in the first place, condole with the Ameer on his recent heavy loss, and declare the friendly character of the mission, having for its object to clear up the mutual misunderstandings which have arisen since the Ameer last conferred personally with the Viceroy. In proof of the friendly character of the mission, he will point to the selection made of an officer personally known to the Ameer, and whose deputation might be supposed to be specially agreeable to him.

65. If the Russian mission is still at Cabul he will insist on its withdrawal, or, at least, on the Ameer requesting it to withdraw, and renouncing all further communication with it, before entering on the immediate subjects of negotiation. To this condition I attach the highest importance. I think it alike inconsistent with the dignity of our Government, with the line hitherto pursued towards Afghanistan, and with the respect due to the high officer selected as our Envoy, that he should appear in the character of a rival suing for the Ameer's favour; nor could I anticipate any satisfactory results from negotiations conducted under such conditions. It is essential that the Ameer should, from the outset, understand that he must make a definite choice in his alliance; and that he will not be again permitted to play off one Power against another, or prolong a chronic state of uneasiness and uncertainty. The Envoy will, therefore, explain to the Ameer the circumstances of the negotiations entered into by us with Russia, on behalf of Afghanistan, in 1869; and the assurances given, and repeatedly renewed, by Russia regarding non-intervention in Afghanistan; and he will demand the dismissal of the Russian mission.

66. If the Ameer hesitates, the Envoy will place very distinctly before His Highness, and before the principal chiefs and councillors of the kingdom, the probable consequences of a refusal. It would, perhaps, be desirable to communicate this representation to the Russian mission also. But he will discuss no other subject with the Ameer: and if, after reasonable time allowed, the Russian mission still remains in communication with the Ameer, and entertained by the Court of Cabul, our mission will withdraw.

67. If the Russian mission has left before the arrival of our Envoy, or withdraws on his representations, he will then proceed to set forth, but in conciliatory tone, the various unfriendly acts of the Ameer, culminating in the reception of a Russian mission after the rejection of ours; and will ask explanations of this last open affront. The refusal to admit Sir D. Forsyth, and the terms in which that refusal was couched, should be especially emphasized.

68. The Ameer's reply to this will probably be a long indictment against England, and a recapitulation of alleged acts of unfriendliness on our part; to which the Envoy can reply that those misunderstandings are entirely due to the policy of seclusion adopted by the Ameer, and might have been avoided by freer intercourse between his Government and ours. If the Ameer endeavours to fix the discussion on those points the Envoy will say that he has not been informed on them, and that his deputation has for its object the future relations between the two Powers, and the prevention of such misunderstandings hereafter.

69. In opening the actual negotiations it should be assumed that all past promises or engagements on our part were abrogated by the Peshawur Conference, and the discovery then made of the different and irreconcilable interpretations put on these verbal engagements by the parties to them; as well as by the Ameer's subsequent unfriendly conduct.

70. The conditions which the Ameer will be required to accept as the basis of future amicable relations are broadly—

1st.—An engagement not to receive Russian agents, nor to enter into relations with any Powers under the political influence of Russia, without first consulting us.

2nd.—Free access for British missions on special and suitable occasions to Cabul, and to the presence of the Ameer.

3rd.—The reception of permanent British agents at Herat and Balkh, or at any points which may be exposed to danger from without. Or else the reception of a permanent British agent at Cabul, with free access for British officers, on special and suitable occasions, to Herat, Balkh, or any other exposed points of the Afghan frontier.

The precise terms of all such engagements must, however, be left to the discretion of the Envoy; provided that no arrangement can be accepted as satisfactory which does not exclude the agents of Russia, and give to us a real and visible preponderance, and recognised position of authority, in Afghanistan. The reception of a permanent British

representative at Cabul has not been put prominently forward, because of the repugnance which the Ameer has, on several occasions, shown to such a proposal. But, if the Envoy finds His Highness not unwilling to accede to it, such an arrangement, coupled with the above-mentioned condition of occasional access to the frontier localities, would be preferable to any other, and might be advantageously substituted for Nos. 2 and 3.

In addition to the above, some satisfactory and effective arrangements should be entered into for keeping open the Khyber Pass; either through the agency of the Ameer, or by our personally dealing with the Khyberees, and relieving the Ameer of all responsibility on their behalf.

71. In return the Envoy may promise as follows:—

1st.—An annual subsidy, not, for the present, exceeding in amount twelve lakhs of rupees.

2nd.—The recognition, by the Indian Government, of the heir formally named by the Ameer with the concurrence of his Sirdars; and the continuance to such heir, on succession, of the subsidy granted to the Ameer.

3rd.—A territorial guarantee against *annexation*.

Much must be left to the discretion of the Envoy in regard to these terms also; but the following indication of the views of Government on the subject may serve to guide him in the negotiations.

72. The Government is prepared to recognize the heir of the Ameer's choice, provided such choice is not distinctly opposed to the national will, and is accepted by the chief nobles of Afghanistan. The Government will formally recognize such heir as successor on the death of the Ameer, and will pay him at once one year's subsidy, to assist him in establishing himself on the throne. But if he proves incapable, and, with these advantages in his favour, cannot maintain his throne, the Indian Government will not interfere by force of arms to reinstate him. It is our earnest desire to abstain from all direct intervention in Afghan affairs, and to maintain the friendly independence of the Afghan State; and it will be pointed out to the Ameer that an armed intervention in favour of any candidate would be inconsistent with these views.

73. The arguments in favour of a territorial guarantee have already been explained. Such guarantee should not be unnecessarily offered by the Envoy; and, if asked for by the Ameer, the Envoy should, in the first place, make him understand that it may entail our exercising a certain control over his foreign policy. But if the Ameer distinctly desires it, it should be frankly and unhesitatingly given; for it is better that it should be refused by the Ameer, on the grounds of the future pretext for interference which it may offer, than that he should be rendered suspicious and distrustful by the provisos under which we endeavour to guard ourselves. The guarantee desired by the Ameer in 1873 was that we should aid him, by arms, money, or troops, to *repel* any invasion of his territory; and this guarantee we may give.

74. It will be evident, however, that this guarantee must directly depend on the admission of officers to the exposed points of the Afghan frontier; and that whatever modifications of the conditions may, in the discretion of the Envoy, be made, these two must stand or fall together. It would perhaps, be to our interest not to ask for an agent at Balkh if the Ameer does not ask for a territorial guarantee; but an agent at Herat is of the highest importance; and some arrangement giving adequate expression to our undisputed influence at Herat must, in any case, be insisted on, whether the territorial guarantee be given or withheld.

75. If the Ameer refers to Quetta, and our action in Beloochistan, he must be distinctly informed that we can recognize no right on his part to question our dealings in that country. He may be told that the troops at Quetta were stationed there in accordance with a treaty of more than 20 years' standing with the Ruler of Khelat, renewed two years ago; and in pursuance of the policy determined on, in accord with the Khan and his Sirdars, for the pacification of the country and the protection of the trade of the Bolan Pass. Assurances may further be given him against any hostile intentions in that direction; and the Envoy, if he thinks fit, may inform the Ameer that the mission to Cabul, proposed two years ago and rejected by His Highness, was to explain to the Ameer, beforehand and unreservedly, the nature and objects of our policy in Beloochistan, and its thoroughly friendly and unaggressive character. In fact, the presence of British troops at Quetta, so far from being *intended* as a menace to the Ameer's *real* interests, practically increased our means of assisting His Highness in the defence of those interests against designs on the part of Russia, which, though probably unknown to the Ameer, were not unknown to the Viceroy before that measure was adopted. If, therefore, the presence of British troops at Quetta has been to His Highness a cause of apprehension, this is entirely due to his own conduct in refusing us

the opportunity we sought of removing every cause of apprehension; and not to any unfriendly or inconsiderate disregard of it on the part of the British Government. Our Envoy, however, must at once disallow, and decline to discuss, any claim advanced by the Ameer to a voice in the affairs of Beloochistan.

76. If the Ameer asks for arms he must be informed that such assistance will be considered in connexion with the arrangements for the defence of his frontiers.

77. On minor questions of opening the country to the English, and removing trade restrictions, it will not be desirable to press the Ameer; though it will be extremely advantageous to secure such concessions if the Ameer seems not unwilling to grant them.

78. Lastly, the Envoy may most emphatically assure the Ameer, and impress on His Highness by every means in his power, that, so long as he proves himself friendly and loyal to us, it is our desire to see him prosperous and independent; and to promote and confirm his power alike against internal troubles and external dangers.

79. But if it appears that we cannot find, in a friendly alliance with the Ameer, the necessary security for our north-western frontier, we must then be prepared to take immediate steps for making the security of that frontier independent of him. The military measures proposed for this purpose have already been indicated; viz., the advance of a column to the head of the Koorum Valley, and the assembling at Quetta of a force sufficient to threaten, and, if necessary, occupy, Candahar. For the first purpose 4,000 men might suffice, and for the second about 10,000, exclusive of the present garrison of Quetta. Orders have already been issued to detail these forces. But, as it is indispensable, both for the security of the mission, and for the full trial of the pacific policy which is its object, that nothing should now be done which could in any way be interpreted to indicate hostile intentions on our part, I have withheld my sanction from any active preparations.

80. It will be seen, from what has been already said, as well as from the smallness of the proposed military preparations, that no invasion and subjugation of Afghanistan is contemplated. Such a measure would at once rekindle the animosities of that fanatical people, and probably destroy any party we may now have there, uniting the whole nation against us. It would require military operations on a very different scale from that now contemplated, with a proportionately heavy expenditure; and it would probably entail a permanent military occupation of the country;—a step which, however feasible from a military point of view, would involve financial burdens we could hardly bear.

81. Moreover, remembering always the object in view, which is to secure certain points necessary to our safety in India, we must consider whether these points, and Herat especially, *would* be certainly secured by such a measure. If we invade Afghanistan she will immediately throw herself into the arms of Russia; and even if Russia, unwilling to involve herself at this moment in a great European war, does not assist her, she will certainly assist her with money, arms, officers, and advice. At the Court of Persia, according to the reports of our Minister, Russian influence is paramount, and British influence *nil*. Persia has always coveted Herat, and asserted a claim to it: and it is more than probable that, if instigated and supported by Russia, she would be prepared to resist our occupation of it by force of arms. It may be doubted whether any force we can put in the field would be strong enough to march from the Indus to Herat, a distance of 750 miles, carrying with it heavy artillery, and all the necessary appurtenances for a difficult siege; to cover its flanks along the whole of this long and exposed line against the Afghans on one side, and the Persians on the other; and, finally to undertake, in the presence of an equal or superior Persian force, the siege of an important fortress defended by European arms, officers, and skill.

82. For these reasons I view an invasion of Afghanistan, like a war with Russia, as a measure which may become unavoidable, and must, therefore, be taken into consideration in our forecast; but which is only to be resorted to in case of absolute necessity, when all others have failed. Our immediate object should be to apply such pressure only as may be necessary, either to bring the Ameer to a truer sense of his interest, or to dethrone him and give an opportunity to the party which still remains favourable to us at Cabul. And such pressure should be applied in the directions, and in the manner, which seem least likely to bring us into collision with the Afghans, or arouse their fanatical spirit of independence.

83. It is possible that the evidence, which the action proposed in *paras. 58-9* would afford the Ameer, of our own earnestness, and of his powerlessness to oppose us, might lead him to re-consider his position and make overtures to us. In that case we should be most favourably placed to dictate our terms. As a preliminary, we should require

the Ameer to come personally to our head-quarters, or into British territory, to negotiate; and we should insist on the retention of a British force in the Koorum Valley. Thus firmly established, in close proximity to his capital, we should be in a position to renew or modify our previous proposals, under conditions far more favourable to us.

84. If the Ameer still remains hostile, we should take no further action against him, beyond entering into negotiations with all the tribes and parties in Afghanistan who are unfriendly to him; and there is little doubt that his kingdom would fall to pieces of itself. Nor could any candidate, hostile to us, maintain himself on the throne of Cabul; which would thus necessarily fall to a successor friendly to us. To such successor we should endeavour, by every means in our power, to secure the whole of Southern and Western Afghanistan; but we should decline to incur any responsibilities for the northern provinces; and we should insist on maintaining our position in the Koorum, and on having representatives at Cabul, Candahar, and Herat.

85. If, in the course of the convulsions which may be expected to precede and follow the fall of the Ameer, Herat should fall into the hands of Persia,—a contingency already indicated as probable, we should then, as the ally of the Ruler of Cabul, insist on its immediate restoration. This, however, is to be attained, not by an expedition marched across the whole breadth of Afghanistan, but by pressure applied to the exposed southern provinces of Persia, as in 1857. Russia cannot there help her; and Persia must either submit to the loss of some of her most important provinces, or resign Herat. Nor could we establish ourselves in Herat under more favourable conditions than those created by a treaty, in which we appear as the friends of Afghanistan, and the recognized liberators and guardians of Herat against Persia.

86. Thus far, I have practically left Russia out of consideration, and considered Afghanistan alone. We must now consider what will probably be Russia's action, and what should be our relations with her. In the first contingency, *viz.*, that our mission succeeds in displacing the Russian mission and securing the cordial alliance of the Ameer, it is not likely that Russia will venture on any direct hostile action. England and Afghanistan united would be far too powerful for Russia on the Oxus, as the latter well knows; and any hostile action on her part would risk the loss of the Khanates and her expulsion from Central Asia. When the treaty has been completed, it might be desirable to communicate it to Russia, and obtain her concurrence in the guarantee undertaken; but rather as a matter of diplomatic courtesy, than for any strength or security we should gain by her concurrence.

87. If the mission fails, and our troops advance to the Koorum, it is probable that Russia's reply will be to advance her columns to the Oxus, and, perhaps, across into Balkh and Badakhshan. It would undoubtedly be advantageous to interpose at once between Cabul and Russia, by seizing the Bamian Pass, but considering the distance of Bamian from Peshawur and Tashkend respectively, I cannot think this point likely to be gravely threatened. On the other hand, I consider it above all things desirable that we should not engage in an open invasion of Afghanistan, and thus give Russia the chance of appearing as her ally and guardian. I conceive, therefore, that we should not attempt any hostile advance on Cabul, but should still confine our action to strengthening our position in the Koorum, and detaching the neighbouring tribes from the cause of the Ameer.

88. The Russian column assembled at Djam can hardly exceed, and probably falls short of, 5,000 men. Such a force could hardly, in any circumstances, dare to push on to Bamian, 500 miles from all possible support, with the probability of there meeting a superior British force. But, even if it does, before it reaches the pass, one of the two contingencies discussed in paras. 83 and 84 will probably have occurred—either the Ameer will have changed his tone, and accepted our alliance; or he will have lost his throne, and been succeeded by a ruler friendly to us. In either case, we shall then be in a position to repel a Russian advance, without involving ourselves in a hostile invasion of Afghanistan.

89. But, in any case, the time will have come for opening negotiations with Russia and determining the future line of demarcation in Central Asia. Russia is not now in a position to contest supremacy with us on the Oxus, unless we commit the fatal mistake of driving Afghanistan bodily into her arms by an invasion. Russia knows this, and knows also that, if once our troops come into collision with hers, our advance is not likely to stop at the Oxus. It will, therefore, in effect remain with us to determine our ultimate boundary; and I would practically draw it at the Hindu-Kush, while requiring, however, the withdrawal of Russian troops behind the Oxus. The terms I would, in this case, offer Russia are the acknowledgment by us of her protectorate over

Bokhara, and all the country north of the Oxus, on the understanding that she acknowledges a similar protectorate on our part over Afghanistan proper; and that the limit of advance for the troops on the two sides should be the Oxus and the Hindu-Kush (including Bamian) respectively—either Power reserving to itself full liberty of action, should the other pass these bounds.

90. There remains the all-important question of Herat—the turning point of all negotiation and all action in Central Asia. It may be doubted whether Russia, weak as she now is in Central Asia, would go to war for Herat, unless with the assured support of Afghanistan, as well as Persia. The arrangement above proposed would still hold out hopes to her of ultimately gaining the line of communication between the Caspian and Turkistan, and the frontier of the Hindu-Kush Mountains—the avowed objects of her Central Asian policy; and it is, therefore, probable that she would not break off negotiations on this point.

91. Lastly, it remains for us to consider the military and financial bearings of the policy now discussed. If the mission succeeds, our frontier will be stronger, and safer, than it has been at any previous time. Russia will have received an open check, and the relations between the Ameer and ourselves will be closer than they have yet been; and this, coupled with our most satisfactory position in Khelat, cannot but react favourably throughout the frontier. An agent, with a small escort, will be located at Cabul or Herat, and possibly others at Balkh and Fyzabad, but the cost of such agencies will be small; and no increase of military expenditure need be contemplated in this case.

92. If the mission fails a force will be moved to the head of the Koorum Valley, and that valley occupied: and, whether the Ameer subsequently accepts our alliance, or whether another ruler, under our auspices, succeeds him at Cabul, this force should never be withdrawn. It is probable that 6,000 men will suffice, both to form the necessary cantonment at the head of the valley, and to protect its communications with our present frontier. But, as a force so placed will relieve the pressure on Peshawur, and in other ways strengthen our frontier line, a large part of it might be drawn from Peshawur, and from its support Rawul Pindi; and such occupation need add little, if at all, to the permanent establishment maintained in India.

93. The force to be collected at Quetta, and possibly to move on Candahar, is intended as a demonstration only, and its functions will have ceased when either contingency above discussed has been brought about. The force might consequently be then withdrawn. But the opportunity thus offered should be taken to permanently strengthen our garrison there. This also might be done at little, if any, additional cost, by drawing troops from stations further inland, where their presence is no longer specially required.

94. To advance our garrisons further, and occupy Candahar and Herat, would doubtless entail a large increase of force, and consequently of military expenditure. But I anticipate no necessity for such permanent occupation, even of Candahar, unless we should unfortunately find ourselves embarked in a great war with Afghanistan. This contingency we may reasonably hope to avoid. If, as the result of amicable arrangements with Afghanistan, or with Russia, or with both, we find it necessary to establish ourselves visibly at Herat and the Hindu-Kush passes, we should do so by the location of agencies, with small escorts only, at those points, supported, under certain contingencies, by locally raised corps, paid from British funds. But such local forces should in no case exceed two or three thousand men in all, and being less costly than regular troops, the additional charge would not be great.

95. It is not by a military occupation of Afghanistan that our position there is best won and secured; nor do I conceive that it would be desirable, even if possible, to undertake to garrison Herat for many years to come. Against Persia it is best secured by our known power to invade her southern coasts; against Russia, by the risks which a war would entail on her exposed frontier in Turkistan.

96. I have thus endeavoured to carry out the task I originally set before myself, *viz.*, “to define clearly the nature of the problem before us, showing how it has arisen, and “to examine the various possible solutions which present themselves.” In doing so, I have necessarily looked a long way ahead, and speculated, perhaps rashly, on the future, for many contingencies, not foreseen in this Minute, may and probably will arise. But I conceive that such forecasts, however defective, have their use in guiding our general lines of policy. Above all, I have endeavoured to show that war, whether with Russia or with Afghanistan, would be the most expensive, as it would probably be the least satisfactory and least statesmanlike solution. I recognise fully the necessity that may arise for referring to the arbitration of the sword; but I earnestly hope and trust that

we shall be able to attain by peaceable means a settlement of the questions considered in this Minute, which shall be alike becoming to the dignity of the great British Empire, conducive to the security of that part of it specially committed to our charge, and beneficial to the neighbouring States concerned.

LYTTON.

4-9-78.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

No. 1912P.

From the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to His Excellency SIR NEVILLE BOWLES CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

SIR,

Simla, the 7th September 1878.

I AM directed to inclose to your Excellency a copy of a Resolution of the Government of India, appointing you to proceed upon a Special Mission to the Amir of Kabul and its dependencies, as Envoy-Extraordinary on the part of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India. The officers who have been attached to your Embassy, and to your personal staff, are named in the Resolution.

2. I am to request that your Excellency will have the goodness to arrange for your departure for Kabul from Peshawar, where the requisite preparations for your equipment and escort will have been made, so soon after the 16th September as may be practicable; and that you will travel to Kabul by the route of the Khaibar Pass and Jelalabad. The Government of India have no information leading to the belief that your journey through Afghanistan may be interrupted or opposed; but it is now many years since English officers have traversed that part of the country; while political exigencies may make it necessary that you should cross the frontier before any formal reply can be received from the Amir to the Viceroy's letter which notified that an Envoy would be sent. And the same exigencies, with the general importance of your Mission, require that your Excellency should reach Kabul speedily. If, therefore, any attempt is made by the local officers or authorities upon the road to delay or dispute your passage, you will be justified in disregarding dilatory excuses, expostulations, or refusals to authorise your advance, made on the pretext that orders are wanting, or are adverse. You will assume the responsibility of overstepping such opposition, and you will continue your march, with your escort, unless you are met by serious resistance. In such a contingency his Excellency the Viceroy leaves everything to your discretion; though if arms are used or any hostile demonstration is made in earnest by persons responsible to the Kabul Government, your Excellency is instructed to return.

3. His Excellency the Viceroy has directed me to communicate to your Excellency the following instructions for your guidance in the exercise, upon your arrival at Kabul, of the full powers with which you have been invested. It is only necessary to trace in outline the general policy of the British Government in regard to the present state of affairs in Afghanistan; and to fix the essential points toward which negotiations, if you enter into any, should be directed. All details, and all questions as to the ways and means toward the accomplishment of the general objects of your Mission, are left entirely to your Excellency's judgment and decision. Very much will obviously depend upon the actual condition of parties and internal politics at Kabul, and upon the position and behaviour of the Amir himself. Upon all these matters the information now before the Government of India is still very imperfect, and it will be part of your Excellency's commission to ascertain fully and precisely how these matters stand.

4. Your Excellency's reception in full durbar by His Highness will afford an opportunity for declaring publicly the friendly character of your Mission, and of announcing that its object is to clear up the mutual misunderstandings which have arisen since the Amir conferred personally with the Earl of Mayo at Umballa. In the less formal interviews which may be expected to follow, your Excellency will be able to impress upon the Amir and his Ministers the necessity of bringing to an end these misunderstandings, which are leading to serious political complications, by a frank and outspoken exchange of views. The immediate cause of your Excellency's deputation to Kabul may be stated plainly to be the arrival at the Amir's capital of a Russian Mission, and its reception by His Highness soon after his persistent refusal to receive British officers. According to international usages throughout the world, this must be regarded by the Government of India as an affront, which requires explanation and remedy. The fact

(which must be known to the Amir) that the Russians have entered Afghanistan in open contravention of promises made by their Government to England, gives to their presence at Kabul a specially ambiguous import. In short, your Excellency will show that these proceedings, and the whole course of recent events in Central Asia, in the vicinity of the Afghan frontiers, have materially affected the political situation; insomuch that the British Government is now very closely interested in ascertaining without delay what interpretation is to be placed upon the new aspect of affairs, and what are to be henceforward its relations with the Amir. On recent occasions the conduct and demeanour of the Amir toward this Government have been far from satisfactory; and this latest incident has brought the proceedings of His Highness to a point at which they can be no longer treated by His Excellency the Viceroy with indifference. The highest interests of both countries demand that the question of their future reciprocal relations shall be brought to a definite understanding: and this, it may be said, is the object of your Excellency's Mission.

5. It is possible that the Amir may be found disinclined to explain or to make any conciliatory reply; and that he and his Ministers may assume a tone decisively significant of unfriendly resolutions. Your Excellency may thus be given to understand, or may gather from other quarters, that the Kabul Government is already pledged to a policy adverse to British interests. The Amir, his advisers, and sirdars, should in that case be desired to consider very earnestly the grave consequences which must flow out of a complete and open estrangement and separation of interests between India and Afghanistan. If nevertheless it becomes clear that the Amir has views or engagements incompatible with the revival of satisfactory relations with the British Government, then your Excellency's Mission is terminated, and you will return to India. The test of the Amir's real disposition and intentions will be his agreement or refusal to require any Russian Agency that may at the time be in Afghanistan, to leave his territory.

6. If your Excellency finds that the Amir is disposed to realize the value of a reconciliation with this Government, and the risks of a rupture, and to negotiate for the restoration of political connections; His Highness may then be moved to examine the actual situation in all its bearings, and to appreciate the urgent necessity of some definite and comprehensive arrangement. No arrangement, it may be observed, can be satisfactory, which does not accord to the British Government a recognized position of diplomatic authority in regard to the external relations of Afghanistan, to the exclusion of the political action or influence of Russia in the country. The primary basis, therefore, of an alliance is that the Amir shall engage not to admit within his dominions any Russian envoy or emissary. It will accordingly be an essential preliminary to any negotiations that the Amir shall agree to take such steps as may be necessary for the withdrawal from his capital of any Russian officers or agents actually at Kabul, having due regard to their personal safety and dignity; that he shall desire them to leave his territory, and that, in case of their demur or refusal to comply, he shall break off all communications with them, direct or indirect. And your Excellency is authorised to assure the Amir that in taking this step he may rely upon the support of the British Government, and upon their complete protection of him from any injurious consequences which he may apprehend.

7. The second essential condition is that the Amir shall agree to permit the residence within his dominions of English officers accredited to him by the British Government. Experience has proved that for the prevention of misunderstandings in future, and in order that the British alliance may be recognized and made manifest in an indisputable manner, it is absolutely necessary that the British Government shall be adequately represented within Afghanistan. It would be in accordance with the general diplomatic usage among States, and it would be for several reasons advantageous, if the British representative were stationed at the Amir's capital or head-quarters, where he might have ready access to His Highness as occasion might require. But previous discussions of this point have elicited from the Amir expressions of particular disinclination to an English Resident at Kabul: and if these objections are repeated and adhered to, the alternative of placing agents at Herat and Balkh may be accepted. Under this latter arrangement, however, your Excellency will stipulate for free access to Kabul, and to the Amir's presence, of special Envoys from India, whenever this may be thought necessary by the British Government. If, on the other hand, a Resident is placed at the capital only, he must be at liberty to detach officers to visit any points upon the Afghan frontier at which their temporary presence may be rendered necessary by the condition, at the time, of external affairs. Thus the establishment of a single Resident at the capital will necessitate free access, for specific reasons, to the frontier; while the location of officers upon the frontier will necessitate free access, upon special occasions

to the capital. The precise terms of these arrangements are left to Your Excellency's discretion, upon the understanding that they will provide for the complete exclusion of the Agents of Russia, and for securing to the British Government a real and visible preponderance in Afghanistan, by the establishment of British representatives in the country.

8. If the Amir accepts the foregoing essential conditions of an alliance with the British Government, the principal concessions which Your Excellency is empowered to make in return are as follow:—

- (1) An annual subsidy—not exceeding, for the present, twelve lakhs—may be promised.
- (2) The British Government will undertake to recognize the heir-presumptive to the rulership of Kabul and its dependencies, who shall be formally named, as such, by the Amir Sher Ali during his lifetime. And the subsidy will be continued to the Amir's successor thus recognized, so long as he shall continue to fulfil the conditions of the Treaty of Alliance in its entirety.
- (3) If any attempt be made at any future time, by Russia or by any State under Russian influence, to take possession of any part of the territories now under the acknowledged jurisdiction of the Amir of Kabul, the British Government engages to join the Amir in defending his territories by force of arms.

9. Here, again, much must be left to the discretion of Your Excellency in regard to the terms and form of these concessions; but the following indication of the views of the Government of India on the subject may serve to guide you in the negotiations:—

The Government are prepared to recognize the heir of the Amir's choice, provided such choice is not distinctly opposed to the national will; or to the known rules and principles which have always governed successions in the Amir's dynasty. But if the heir chosen prove, with the advantages of our recognition in his favour, unable to maintain his throne, the Indian Government will not interfere by force of arms to reinstate him. It is our earnest desire to abstain from all direct intervention in Afghan affairs, and to maintain the friendly independence of the Afghan State; and Your Excellency will point out to the Amir that armed intervention in the event of a contest for the rulership, would be inconsistent with these views.

The engagement to defend the Amir's territory should not be unnecessarily offered to him, since a preferable arrangement would be the conclusion of an alliance upon more general terms, so long as the essential conditions already specified are included. If, however, the guarantee is asked for by the Amir, or if Your Excellency judges that to offer it is necessary, Your Excellency will in the first place explain to the Amir that it may unavoidably entail our exercising a certain additional degree of control over his foreign policy. If the Amir still distinctly desires the guarantee, it should be frankly and unreservedly given. But the guarantee must directly depend on, and be linked with, the admission of British officers to reside, as political representatives, either at Kabul or at certain important points upon the Afghan frontier. Of these points Herat is the most important.

10. If the Amir alludes to Quetta, and to our action in Biluchistan, he should be distinctly informed that we can recognize no right on his part to question our dealings in that country. He may be told that the troops at Quetta have been stationed there in accordance with a treaty of more than twenty years' standing, renewed two years ago, with the Khan of Khelat, and in pursuance of the policy adopted, in concert with the Khan and his Sirdars, for the pacification of the country and the protection of trade. And Your Excellency may see fit to add that one of the objects of the British mission to Kabul which was proposed to, and declined by, the Amir in 1876, was to explain our intentions regarding Biluchistan, and to give the Amir satisfactory assurances on these points, before taking the action of which His Highness is now understood to complain. But it should be intimated that the time for discussion of these affairs is now past.

11. If the Amir asks to be supplied with arms, Your Excellency will reply that the British Government does not consider necessary any separate or immediate stipulation upon this head; and that the point is reserved as falling within the general question of the military dispositions to be taken for the defence of Afghan territory in case of war.

12. On minor questions of opening the country to the English, and of allowing free transit of commerce through the Khaibar Pass, it may not be desirable to press the Amir; though some agreement for improving the existing state of things would be advantageous, and may be proposed to the Amir if the opportunity appears favourable. The subject may be brought forward in connection with any discussion that may be raised regarding the amount of the annual subsidy.

13. I am directed to send herewith a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General to the Amir, which I am to request your Excellency to deliver personally. A copy is also inclosed, for your Excellency's information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. C. LYALL,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 2.

MEMORANDUM on the RECTIFICATION of the NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA.

In giving an opinion on the question of the rectification of the North-west frontier of India, it is necessary to suppose the existence of some cause demanding such a rectification; it is likewise difficult to make such a subject intelligible without entering into political as well as strategical reasons. In what follows I have, therefore, ventured to deal with the matter from both points of view.

If, for instance, we were in friendly relationship with Afghanistan, and we had merely to guard our frontier from the occasional raids of the independent mountain tribes located in the mountains running parallel to it, then a very limited rectification would, in my opinion, be required either for political or strategical reasons, but recent events which have occurred in Afghanistan have shown beyond the possibility of a doubt that we must be prepared to protect our North-west frontier against a powerful European nation, which unless prevented could place a formidable army, complete in all the scientific warlike appliances of the present day, in a position from which she could make an attack upon our Indian empire.

This position is the valley of Herat; and I think it is now generally admitted that from such a base only could Russia collect an army of sufficient strength to seriously menace our Eastern empire. Such being granted, I consider that any rectification of our North-west frontier must allow of our occupying a position in advance of our present one which would, in case of war, permit of our obtaining possession of Herat before a Russian force could do so.

I do not think, however, that that Power could attempt such an enterprise until she had gained possession of Merv, which, however, may, I think, be anticipated at no distant date both from the direction of the valley of the Attrek and from the Oxus.

I will, therefore, suppose Russia in possession of the Turkoman country, including Merv, and that the rectification of our present North-west frontier is to be based upon that hypothesis. Under such conditions, Russia would be about 220 miles from Herat, which must of course be assumed to be garrisoned by a friendly Afghan force, advised by British officers. We must, therefore, find some good strategical position beyond our present border that would enable us to arrive before that city in time to prevent it from falling into the hands of the above Power in case of sudden war.

Such a position, in my opinion, can only be found at Kandahar, from which we should command strategically and politically the whole of Afghanistan, and the causes which have led to the late complications with that country certainly render such a command essentially necessary to us.

Kandahar possesses all the requirements for forming a strong military position; its situation is easily defensible, it has a plentiful supply of water, the climate is salubrious, and what is of the greatest importance, the inhabitants are less fanatical and hostile to us than are any others to be found in Afghanistan. It further commands all the principal roads leading towards India; it is 350 miles from Herat (by a road along which a carriage has been driven), 230 from Kabul, and about 150 from Quetta. It is also generally understood that there exists no road by which an army could reach Kabul from Merv, except through Herat and Kandahar, or via the Oxus and Balkh; the Oxus via the latter city is 220 miles distant from Kabul, and the road leads over the Bamian Pass, one of the worst in Afghanistan. A force from Kandahar could, therefore, arrive at Kabul as soon as one from the banks of the Oxus, having a far easier road to march.

Again, a force stationed at Candahar would command the north-west entrance of all the passes leading into British India and situated between the Bolan and the Khyber.

If, therefore, it is admitted for the above principally strategical reasons, that the occupation of Kandahar by a British force is necessary for the future defence of our Indian Empire, the first considerations will be its communication with that country.

Starting from our frontier town of Jacobabad, and passing through the province of Cutch Gundava, we reach at a distance of 90 miles, the town of Dadur, at the southern entrance of the Bolan Pass; the above town it is to be hoped will soon be connected

with Jacobabad by rail. A further distance of about 60 miles brings us to the summit of the Bolan Pass, from whence to Quetta is a distance of about 25 miles, over a level plain. A tramway should at once be constructed across this.

As, in the event of Kandahar being occupied, the position of Quetta would become most important, a strongly entrenched camp should there be formed, containing an arsenal, storehouses, and barracks. Fortunately the configuration of the surrounding country is such that a very little engineering skill would render such a position impregnable. The force stationed here would form the main support of the garrison of Kandahar.

The great deficiency at Quetta is fuel and forage during the winter, but as coal has been found near the Bolan it is to be hoped that it may soon be utilized; as for forage, the only means of meeting the want is to store chopped straw and dried lucerne, and to keep as small a force of cavalry as is possible during the winter months.

From Quetta to Kandahar a good bridged road should be constructed, the distance being about 150 miles, and on it fortified stations for its protection. The Kojuk Pass, over which the road would be carried, is the only physical difficulty to be met with, but is not of a serious nature.

On the whole of this line from Jacobabad to Kandahar, of about 325 miles, it would be necessary to liberally subsidize the tribes for police purposes. From our own border to Quetta there would, I conceive, be no difficulty in doing so, owing to the great foresight of the late General Jacob, and to the admirable system of frontier administration which he established, and which is now showing such favourable results. From Quetta to Kandahar I am less acquainted with the character of the people. I should, however, imagine that a policy of liberality, firmness, and justice would have the same effect upon them as it has had upon the Balooch.

In the above I have sketched briefly the communications between our frontier post of Jacobabad and Kandahar, and which are situated beyond Indian limits. Those within our territory are under as favourable conditions as could be wished. I take for granted that the railway between Sukkur on the Indus, one of the termini of the Indus Valley Railway, and Jacobabad is completed; this will place the latter frontier station in direct railway communication with the seaport of Kurrachee, and as the improvements made in the harbour of that port allow of vessels of a draught of 28 feet crossing the bar, the Indian troop ships would find no difficulty in entering it. Supposing, therefore, that each of these five vessels could convey 1,500 men (infantry), these 7,500 men would be landed at Kurrachee, via the Suez Canal, in about 18 days, from Malta.

From Kurrachee to Dadur, a distance of about 500 miles, ought not to exceed 48 hours in transit; from thence to Quetta would be a march of six days; and on to Kandahar, at an average rate of 10 miles per diem, would take 15 days more; in fact, a regiment leaving Malta ought to arrive in six weeks at Kandahar. Such a rapid means of reinforcement would be of essential service should political circumstances at any time render it unadvisable to weaken the garrison of British troops in India. It must also be borne in mind that the River Indus has a powerful steam flotilla at the disposal of the State, the steamers of which run between Kotree, Sukkur, and Mooltan.

Having thus shown that no very great difficulties are to be encountered in maintaining the communications between Kandahar and British territory, I am most strongly of opinion that no further rectification of the North-west frontier would be required so far as placing any other military posts in advance of that frontier.

Several passes between the Bolan and Khyber are known to debouch into the valley of the Indus, but with the exception of the latter, the exact value of each as a practicable route for an invading army is unknown, but whatever their advantages for such a purpose may be, their north-west entrances are to be found in Afghanistan, and a force stationed at Kandahar, and able to be reinforced to any strength, would command them all. At Peshawur we know that the Khyber is practicable, although an invading army of any strength would find extreme difficulty in debouching; nevertheless, a strongly entrenched camp might here be formed to meet every emergency.

The same precaution might be adopted with reference to the other passes I have mentioned, and the nature of the defences would depend upon the practicability of the passes whose debouchures they would have to guard.

Any attempt to push forward military posts into those passes with a view either to defence, or to overawing the independent mountain tribes, would only, I believe, lead to constant irritation, and to frequent punitive expeditions.

It might be asked, if such is my opinion, why I have advocated the occupation of such a distant post as Kandahar. My reply is that, in addition to political reasons demanding it, the Belooch tribes through which the greater part of our communication

would lie are essentially different in character from those on the Punjab frontier. The Belooch, although a Mahomedan, is not a religious fanatic, and he bears no hostile feeling towards Europeans. Further, in dealing with these tribes, we have in the Khan of Khelat a central authority to whom we can look, and to whom all Belooch tribes acknowledge an allegiance. British officers composing the Sind Frontier Force have for years been in the habit of traversing all parts of Beloochistan, either on patrolling duty or in search of sport, and they have never met with anything but kindness at the hands of the inhabitants. An experience of 20 years has, indeed, proved to me that under good management the Belooch can be trusted under any circumstances, their loyalty and devotion having on many occasions been remarkable towards those by whom they have been well treated and in whom they have confidence.

But can such be said of the Patan tribes? They have no acknowledged head; even their tribal chiefs receive only a nominal obedience; they are, as a rule, fanatics in religion, treacherous, revengeful, and totally untrustworthy; they hate all Europeans, and the life of a British officer entering their mountains is as insecure now as it was 30 years ago. Their only virtue is personal courage. Such races are, I consider, one of the best defences that we could have in the rear and flanks of an invading army, while the best plan that we can adopt towards them is to keep them at a distance.

In dealing with the defences of our frontier under any condition, I would urge the absolute necessity of good lateral communications; I look to these as most essential, and I consider it beyond dispute that much of the success of the guarding of the Sind frontier was due to General Jacob's foresight in at once connecting his outposts by good bridged roads, so that the patrols from each post could meet each other at all seasons, as well as allowing of one post supporting the other in cases of emergency.

These frontier roads also exert a considerable moral effect over the robber tribes. Many a party of marauding horsemen has been stopped on coming across a made road; they know that if they cross this well marked line they are committing themselves, and once across they never know when they may not meet with British troops, or whether their retreat may not be cut off. I would therefore consider it an essential condition in the defence of the frontier that a good bridged road of not less than 40 feet in breadth should be constructed the whole length of the border from Jacobabad to Peshawur, and that this road should, if possible, mark the limits of our boundary, and on which our outposts should be built.

I would add it as my opinion that this line of outposts should be entrusted to the charge of the regular army only, and that the Native police should act within this line solely for civil purposes; that what is now called the Native militia should be disbanded; and that all the inhabitants, instead of being permitted to bear arms, should be disarmed and encouraged to turn their energies to agricultural pursuits.

I would likewise do away with all local forces, excepting the Guide Corps, placing the entire frontier under the Commander-in-Chief, and making the whole Native army take its turn of frontier duty; no better school for soldiers could be found, and I see no reason why the whole army should not partake of the advantage of such teaching.

The mountain tribes beyond our outposts should be informed that we had no wish to injure them so long as they left us alone, and that we would allow no armed man to cross our frontier, and that anyone who attempted to do so would be treated as an enemy; unarmed they should be allowed to pass for all purposes, in fact, encouraged to do so.

Such a system would, no doubt, at first be expensive on account of the number of troops it would require to maintain it, but if carried out systematically and with firmness, the cost would in the end, by securing peace, be amply repaid.

In the above remarks, I have not ventured upon any suggestion as to what number of troops would be required to hold Kandahar and its communication with India, because such a question could only be decided by political considerations, and the terms on which we occupied a position in Afghanistan.

Before concluding, I should wish to glance at the political conditions of the occupation I have advocated.

I have hitherto in every way deprecated any interference in the affairs of, or any advance into, Afghanistan, and I should have continued to do so, had not the undisguised hostile action of Russia in that country forced upon me the conviction that the time had come when we must take precautionary measures in some form; but I am still of opinion that the most limited occupation that will meet the circumstances of the case will be the best for all parties.

I have, however, no doubt in my mind that, for the future, we must hold such a position in Afghanistan as will render our influence supreme, and any other power impossible,

and I believe that by such means only can we secure ourselves against Russian intrigue, and prevent the two nations from drifting into war at some future time.

The very fact of taking up such a position as will ensure that supremacy beyond discussion will tend more to prevent the chance of war than anything else.

But to accomplish this, I think all our experience of Asiatics teaches us that we must be amongst the people whom we wish to influence, and that such influence in Afghanistan can no longer be exerted from Calcutta or from Simla.

As an example of this, we may take Beloochistan, conterminous since 1843 with our Sind frontier. Forty years ago, nowhere could a country more unfriendly disposed towards us have been found, as was proved in the conduct of its ruler towards our troops during the last Afghan war.

Yet, at the present moment, it would be difficult to show a country more loyally inclined towards us; and this change has been accomplished gradually and without any show of violence on our part, but, on the contrary, by a policy which, viewed as a whole, has been firm and generous both towards the ruler and the people. There has been no necessity for annexation, although we occupy a military position within the country by right of treaty, but also with the full concurrence of both its ruler and its people.

I see no reason why the application of similar principles should not prove equally successful in Afghanistan.

I consider the annexation of Afghanistan to be quite uncalled for under existing circumstances, and that it should be avoided by every means, both for financial as well as political reasons.

At the same time, it is an essential condition to our holding a position in the country that the ruler and people of the country should be in the most friendly relations with us.

I assume that the time is fast approaching when a ruler of some sort must be found to occupy the throne of Kabul, in which case a treaty, such as that we now possess with Khelat, might form the basis of our new relations with the Afghans.

By a clause in this treaty, we might hold Kandahar as we now do Quetta in Beloochistan, and it is to be hoped that from such a position we may gradually but surely exert such an influence over the whole country as will make the inhabitants our friends.

That considerable difficulties would have to be encountered at first there can be no doubt, but as we have won our position in India by overcoming such difficulties, I see no reason to despair in this case.

I would add, in addition to the political reasons I have already given for advocating the presence of a British force at Kandahar, that the influence exerted by it would not be confined to Afghanistan, but would extend throughout Persia, and materially strengthen our position in that country. All who are acquainted with the subject are well aware that our influence at Teheran has long been waning, not from any dislike to England, but from a feeling that we were unable, or perhaps unwilling, to assist her in case she resisted the demands of Russia.

I have not touched on commercial topics, yet there can be no doubt of their vast importance in the consideration of such a question; the very fact of maintaining a safe line of road direct from Kandahar to the seaport of Kurrachee, free from all vexatious transit duties, will give a great impetus to trade between Europe and Central Asia, and as this trade increases year by year, so will the civilisation of the people amongst whom it spreads.

(Signed) HENRY GREEN, Major-General
(retired).

30th December 1878.

No. 3.

MEMORANDUM ON THE STRATEGICAL AND POLITICAL value of KANDAHAR as a POSITION.

COVERING as it does the roads from Eastern Persia and Herat, as well as that from Kabul and Ghazni, Kandahar is no doubt a position of much importance. The features of the country in the immediate vicinity of the city are favourable for defence; but its occupation by us would entail the establishment of strong posts on the Helmand and at Khelat-i-Ghilzai *at least*, bringing the intervening districts under our control. Assuming.

however, the retention of the country embraced within the limits here indicated, we do not thereby obtain a satisfactory frontier, because it would be impossible to guard such a long and exposed line without a series of military or police posts as connecting links. While recognising the strategical importance of Kandahar, its occupation now would, in my opinion, be a mistake even from a military point of view, seeing we could at any moment lay our hands on it from our base in Pishin; I am aware that military critics of high authority consider the retention of Kandahar to be essential to the security of our frontier, on the ground apparently that the Afghans might some-day construct works at that place, which would neutralise the advantages which our proximity to it would give us; this is, no doubt, a possible contingency, but it does not counterbalance the immediate and very patent disadvantage of a premature occupation, and our engagements with the Afghan State will be on a very unsatisfactory footing, if they do not make due provision to meet contingencies of this character. As a purely military question, therefore, the possession of Kandahar would, in my opinion, place us in a false position, and in point of fact be a source of great weakness to us. The political objections to the retention of Kandahar in opposition to the wishes of the Afghans seem to me to be very strong. For many years our policy in India has ceased to be an aggressive one, and this policy has been avowed in the utterances of Government during the present war; it follows, therefore, that on principle we ought not to annex a rood of land that is not really essential to the security of our frontier; to do otherwise would be to discredit us in the estimation of the world. It has been suggested that we might hold Kandahar by an amicable agreement with the Afghan Government, and if this could be arranged it would be unobjectionable; but I am inclined to think that this is the last thing the Afghans would be disposed to accede to. Though the people of this province profess to be tired of the Barakzai rule it must not be assumed that they are prepared to receive us with favour; so far as I am in a position to judge they detest us cordially, and I am under the impression that our immunity from anything like organised opposition is largely due to the fact that our dealings with the people are taken as an indication that our occupation is a temporary one only. As regards the unpopularity of the Barakzai regime, it should be recollected that the military force employed in the province for many years has been of insignificant strength, a fact that discredits the idea of an oppressive or very obnoxious system of government. It has been further alleged, by high authority, that the occupation of Kandahar would be a final settlement of the frontier question; but if there is one point more than another on which it would be safe to venture a prophesy, it is that circumstances would necessitate further movements at no distant date, until some natural boundary has been reached; indeed, the most fatal of the objections to Kandahar as a frontier is its want of defined and defensible boundaries. By restricting our advance to Pishin we have a strong and, in most respects, a satisfactory frontier, and in that position we can lay our hands on Kandahar at any moment, and this being so, I fail to see why we should anticipate events by undertaking a costly, onerous, and troublesome charge, involving, as it must do, the government of a large province inhabited by a warlike, fanatical, and turbulent population, whose independence it is our interest to support and foster, and whose friendship we should do our utmost to secure.

D. M. STEWART.

Kandahar, 18th April 1879.

No. 4.

MEMORANDUM on the Policy to be adopted towards AFGHANISTAN.

THE late successes of General Roberts, and the season of the year precluding for some time any more military operations,—the opinion also (which Lord Lytton seems to share) that sufficient retribution has been obtained for the massacre of our Envoy,—all these circumstances seem to show that the time has come when Government should lay down peremptorily to the authorities in India their views as to the sound policy to be adopted towards Afghanistan.

Sir Donald Stewart, writing from the head of his army in Kandahar, puts the question very pithily,—“Now that we have got Afghanistan, what are we to do with it?”

If I were asked for an opinion as to the instructions to be issued to the Indian authorities by the Secretary of State, I should, after having consulted those of my colleagues whom I consider the best authorities on Indian policy, and after refreshing my memory by reperusing all the political records of the last few years, reply as follows:—

Adhere to the main policy announced by Lord Salisbury in February 1876, and abandon all notions of conquest or annexation in Afghanistan; proclaim to the people of Afghanistan at once that the British have no desire or intention to annex any portion of Afghan territory; secure sufficient order in the country to enable the Afghans to replace the present anarchy by order under one ruler or several, as best suits themselves; and promise them all assistance in arms, money, and counsel, on the sole condition that they acknowledge our suzerainty and conduct all their relations with foreign powers through us. These conditions being secured, return to your ancient boundaries in India.

Unfortunately for the interests of India, the Afghan question has become a party one. Without knowing much about the matter, the people of England are divided into two hostile camps, and neither side will listen to any argument, however temperate and however much unbiassed by party views, which at all clashes with those adopted by Government or by the Liberal party.

But there is a more serious difficulty arising out of our Government by party as respects India. In an ordinary Indian case, if Government desires to retrace or remodel its policy, or to check the Indian authorities in any course adopted by them, nothing is so easy. Like despotic Governments elsewhere, it can displace or remove imprudent agents at will, and if the matter should chance to come before Parliament, any Government such as exists now-a-days in England would be able to furnish well reasoned well written justification of their proceedings in a form certain to disarm all criticism. But when once party is seized of an Indian question, it is most difficult for the Government of the day to abandon any iota of the policy they have enunciated, or to surrender any position (however much they may disapprove of it) which their agents in India have taken up.

Nevertheless, it is incumbent on Government and on parties of both sides, when any great crisis occurs, to lay aside all minor questions on which struggles for power usually occur, to accept the past as irrevocable, whether good or bad, and, as wise statesmen, to deal with the present state of things in such manner as shall best secure the welfare of the future.

I think I speak the sense of all Indian politicians when I say that the pending question as to the treatment of Afghanistan does form such a crisis in the history of our Eastern Empire.

When I have said above that Lord Salisbury's main policy of February 1876* ought to be maintained, the expression will, no doubt be cavilled at, for the controversy whether Lord Lawrence's "masterly inactivity," or Sir Bartle Frere's bland but decided intervention† (which latter view seems to have been adopted by Lord Salisbury) is the sound policy has been raging for years, and has called forth volumes, and additional volumes might still be produced in favour of either view.

This policy as to the choice of means is eminently a question for party debate, but it does not affect the more important question of what is to be done now; I, therefore, pass it by without notice. And I contend that an impartial critic now, and history hereafter, will recognise that the main policy of Lord Salisbury, as announced in the Despatch above mentioned, is exactly the same as that of all previous Governments, namely, to maintain an independent and friendly Afghanistan.

If that Despatch is looked through as well as Sir B. Frere's long letter, not a trace will be found of any desire to annex or occupy any part of Afghanistan; no indication of an opinion that the existing frontier of India was a weak one, and ought to be extended; on the contrary, as I shall show presently, Lord Salisbury lays down most distinctly in subsequent Despatches,‡ when the fears of his Council had been raised, that the policy of conquest was quite at variance with the instructions to Lord Lytton of Her Majesty's Government.

The fact is, and it cannot be too distinctly noted, that the idea of an extended frontier emanated not from Government, but from the authorities in India, and this idea, it may be clearly established, has led us into all our present troubles, and, if not dis-

* Parliamentary Papers, Afghanistan, 1878.

† No. 18, Political Despatch, 29th November 1877, para. 4.

‡ The private letter of Sir B. Frere of 3rd March 1876, subsequently published, setting forth a full scheme of frontier administration, had been (as it states) preceded by others.

tinctly repudiated by the Home Government, may lead us into still greater troubles and perhaps involve our Indian possessions in financial and political ruin.

It is necessary to maintain this view by proofs, and for this purpose it is essential to attend carefully to dates.

Lord Salisbury delivered his celebrated Despatch of February 1876 to Lord Lytton in London, and his Lordship took his seat in Council as Viceroy on 17th April following.

* Notification to Envoy, 5th May 1876.

Command Papers, Afghanistan, 1878.

A few days after his arrival, he notified* to the Amir his intention to send to him his friend Sir Lewis Pelly as Envoy; the Amir demurred to receiving an Envoy on the well known Afghan objections, which clearly are that the residence of an English functionary would lead, as

in India, to the destruction of his power as an independent Prince. But he consented to send an agent to meet the Viceroy's Envoy in India. The Agent accordingly appeared at Simla,† where the Viceroy himself took part in the conference. It was here that Lord Lytton used the famous illustration of the earthen pipkin (which, by

the by, he borrowed from Sir B. Frere's private letter, whose expressions as well as whose views appear to have deeply impressed themselves on his Lordship), and the conference ended by the Agent being commissioned to intimate to the Amir the terms of a new treaty, a *sine quâ non* of which was to be the establishment of English Agents in Afghanistan.

The Agent proceeded from Simla to Kabul,‡ and intimated to the Amir the proposals of the Viceroy. The Sirdars at first unanimously rejected the proposal of British Residents. Many durbars (which are quasi privy councils) were held, one of them lasting 16 hours, but ultimately Lord Lytton's Native Agent seems to have talked over the Amir, and he gave his consent to the proposal.§

† 7th October 1876. Simla Conferences, *ib.*

‡ 26th November 1876. Kabul Discussions, *ib.*

§ 21st December, *ib.*

Assent of Amir to treaty, *ib.*

|| Peshawur Conferences, 8th February 1877.

¶ Despatch of Government of India, para. 36, *ib.* p. 170.

** 30th March 1877, *ib.*, page 222.

But during the period when all these discussions between the Indian Government and the Amir were proceeding, at Simla, at Cabul, and at Peshawur, Lord Lytton was maturing another scheme, the principle of which had been already sanctioned by the Home Government, for the better administration of the North-western frontier, a line extending for 1,100 miles from Peshawur to Karachi.†† In the course of the Viceroy's inquiries, his Military Secretary, Colonel Colley (an able Officer recently from the Staff College at Sandhurst) laid a paper before him, denouncing the existing mountain frontier as an extremely bad one, and maintaining that, according to modern notions of military science, India could only be safely defended against an enemy advancing from the west by the British occupation of the whole mountain mass of Afghanistan, that is, by securing the western passes leading into the valley of the Oxus, as well as those debouching on India. Similar views to these had been propounded in India 50 years ago by a frontier officer, General Jacob, and have been reiterated by other soldiers and eminent men, such as Sir H. Green, Sir Henry Rawlinson, and Sir B. Frere. But, after repeated investigations into the whole question by the highest military authorities in India, these proposals had been unanimously rejected by successive Governments. The Blue Books giving the proceedings of Lord Canning's Government in 1857, and especially of Lord Lawrence's Government in 1867†† afford the fullest information on the subject, and the papers of Lord Lawrence, Major-General Durand, Sir Henry Norman, and the late Lord Sandhurst exhaust the subject on the side of the impolicy of extending our frontier. Lord Lytton, however, adopted the views of Colonel Colley.

Now of these two grave subjects, which were maturing simultaneously in India, only one came to the notice of the Council of India. The discussions which were taking place between the Viceroy and the Amir in 1876 and the early part of

†† This scheme had also been shadowed forth in Sir B. Frere's letter.

1877 were not reported home till the 10th May 1877, and then only in the Secret Department. But the views of Lord Lytton as to the reorganization of the North-

* No. 3, Beloochistan, Parliamentary Paper, 1878.

west frontier were necessarily laid before Council,* and the Despatch from India, 17th May 1877, and other Despatches of Lord Lytton, disclosed to the Council of India the views of Lord Lytton as to Afghanistan.

Contemporaneously with the above-mentioned Despatch, another arrived in England

† Parliamentary Paper, 46 of 1878.

from the Viceroy, dated 23rd March 1877,† announcing a new treaty with the Khan of Khelat, by which the occupation of Quetta by British troops was secured. These Despatches and the other, referred to caused great alarm amongst members of Council,‡ who, with the exception of one or two voices, unanimously deprecated any extension of the frontier. They pointed out that the occupation of Quetta was the first step which had been perseveringly urged for forty years, as the indispensable preliminary to a successful aggressive policy, and they dwelt mainly on the consideration that, if once the frontier line is extended into the mass of mountains west of the Indus, it will be impossible to avoid the necessity sooner or later of annexing the whole of Afghanistan.

Lord Salisbury deemed these fears groundless, though he entirely concurred in the deprecation of an extended frontier line, and he justly remarked that whatever the views of the Government of India might be, they were only a subordinate Government, and that the Home Government was quite strong enough to restrain any inclinations of a too bellicose character, even if they existed.

The two Despatches, however, underwent great discussion, and were not replied to for many months after their arrival.

In deference to the views expressed by members of Council, Lord Salisbury, in approving of the occupation of Quetta,‡ expressly enjoined on the Government of India to carefully abstain from any measures which can be held to indicate on the part of Her Majesty's Government, a resolution permanently to maintain British troops in that town.

§ Parliamentary Paper, No. 3, Beloochistan, 1878.

In his Despatch on the proposed North-western frontier he expressed himself as follows:—§

“Fears have been expressed, that administrative modifications of this kind might carry with them a change in the pacific policy which has for many years guided the Indian Government in its dealings with neighbouring tribes and States. It is almost superfluous for me to draw your Excellency's attention to these apprehensions, for they are as much at variance with your own views as they are with the instructions which the Indian Government has uniformly received from the Government of Her Majesty. Your Excellency as plainly perceives as Her Majesty's Government that a policy of conquest on your North-west frontier would lead to no advantage which would in any degree counteract the certain financial and political embarrassment it would cause. The changes now under consideration have no such object. They are measures of defence and security, not of aggression. *They will operate as a guarantee for the maintenance of existing territorial limits.*”

The Council was entirely satisfied with this emphatic declaration of policy, but it is submitted that the above references and these quotations completely make out my point, that the idea of an improved military frontier emanated not from Her Majesty's Government but from the authorities in India.

I have now to show—and it is another important consideration which has been hitherto overlooked, or has not been sufficiently adverted to—the effect which this notion of an improved frontier extending into Afghanistan produced on the mind of the Amir in resisting the British proposals for more intimate relations between the two Courts.

Up to the period of the conference with the Amir instituted by Lord Lytton, the Afghans entertained no fears that we had any desire to annex their country. Dost Mahomed significantly told Lord Lawrence that his country contained nothing but rocks and men, but plenty of both. Shir Ali, in the same sense, remarked that he had no fears on the score of annexation by the British, for his country produced barely a million sterling of revenue, and it would cost India ten millions to occupy it.

But when the Amir's Agent appeared at Simla in 1876, the views and intentions of the Viceroy as to an improved frontier had apparently oozed out, as things do in India. Lord Salisbury, in one of his Despatches, had cautioned the Viceroy that all publications and political statements relating to Afghanistan were at once translated and made known to the Amir; and, in point of fact, when the Kabul Agent, in October

1876, was describing to the Viceroy the Amir's state of mind, he used some remarkable words, to the effect that "the Amir is just now in great fear of Russia on the one side, and of India on the other. He sees the continued acquisitions of Russia year by year, and he has Sir Henry Rawlinson's book in his hands." In fact, he already felt himself in the position of the earthen pipkin, without being told so.

His apprehensions of annexation were thus aroused in October 1876, but, when his Agent met the English Envoy at Peshawur in March 1877,* the first step of probable annexation, the occupation of Quetta, had been already taken, and the Amir's repugnance to accept Lord Lytton's proposals is completely accounted for.

Further evidence as to the deeply ingrained repugnance of the Afghans to Europeans (Russians or English) obtaining any political footing in their country might be accumulated en masse, but the two following extracts deserve careful attention at the present moment.

On 7th February 1877, when Dr. Bellew assured the Kabul Envoy that the British Agents were to be posted in Afghanistan for the Amir's advantage, he shook his head negatively, and said, "We mistrust you, and fear you will write all sorts of reports about us, which will some day be brought forward against us, and lead to your taking the control of our affairs out of our hands."—*Command Papers, Afghanistan*, p. 202.

The Envoy also stated on the day following, "The people of Afghanistan have it deeply rooted in their hearts that if Englishmen or other Europeans once set foot in their country, it will sooner or later pass out of their hands."—*Ib.*, p. 208.

The above retrospect has shown that the deliberate policy of our Government against annexations or conquest is to be found in Lord Salisbury's Despatches, and, therefore, even in a party sense, the casual expression of Lord Beaconsfield in an after-dinner speech as to a scientific frontier cannot be tortured into any binding obligation on our Government.

The question is still open, not only as to what is the most scientific frontier, but, more important still, what is the best political frontier for India. On the first question it would be presumptuous for any civilian to offer a remark if there existed a *consensus* of military opinion upon the subject. But they are all at loggerheads respecting it. Some advocate the western face of the Hindu Kush; others the abandonment of Kabul, and the occupation of Kandahar and possibly Herat.

† The "Times," 5th January. Lord Lytton, in his recent speech† at Calcutta on New Year's day, strongly recommends the retention of "the established military line of defence which the present year has given us," whatever that may be, but Sir Henry Norman, who has both fought on the frontier, and for 20 years, both as War Secretary and as Member of the Governor-General's Council, has had more to do with the military policy of the Government than any man in India, now, with all the additional information that the campaigns of the last two years has supplied, is decidedly of opinion that, both on military and political grounds, it is far wiser to retire altogether from the mountains so soon as military exigencies and political considerations will allow.

What is apparent to every eye, whether civil or military, is this, that wherever we draw the scientific line in the mountain range we cannot stop there, but must advance.

‡ The "Times," 4th January. Already we hear from the well informed correspondent of the "Times" (General Vaughan?)‡ what the prevailing policy in high places in India is, viz., to break up Afghanistan into a number of quasi-independent principalities, to extend the frontier to Kandahar, and to make over Herat to the Persians.

It is to be feared that the Cabinet will be inundated with numerous proposals of this kind from Indian theorists, and that Government has but little opportunity of ascertaining what the calm views are of men who have been studying this class of questions all their lives, and who adhere with conservative tenacity to opposite doctrines which in their opinion have been tested by time and good results.

I have no hesitation in recording, after what I may call a complete judicial investigation of the subject, my entire adhesion to Lord Salisbury's views, that conquest and annexation in Afghanistan will lead to political and financial embarrassment in India, which no possible advantage can countervail, and that speedy retirement from Afghanistan should be insisted on.

Ready objections to any proposal of withdrawal can, of course, be made, and loss of prestige will figure in the argument. The all-sufficient answer to this objection is that

we did retire under very similar circumstances more than 30 years ago, without the slightest injury to that very untranslatable word *prestige*, and that, during the whole of that period, both Afghanistan and British India have flourished as they never did before, and, on the whole, there has been very little to complain of in our mutual relations.

The campaigns of 1878 and 1879 have demonstrated to the Eastern world what Sir Henry Durand foretold in 1867, that the Afghans are not able to offer the least effective resistance to a British force whenever it thinks fit to enter their country. They also show that the Russian interference so much bruited abroad as the real danger to India when an Indian difficulty occurs is an entire delusion. These facts having been so clearly proved, the English army will return to India with a greatly increased sense of their power diffused through Asia.

A much more serious objection occurs, arising out of the anarchy in which we should leave the country were we to retire now. This constitutes the great difficulty of our position; but it is much more an Afghan question than an English one. If the Afghans were left to themselves, they would undoubtedly constitute some form or other of government, probably not without fighting, and the survival of the fittest would occur. It would be repugnant to British feeling to leave the country a prey to civil war, with the self-reproach that it was ourselves who had produced it; on the other hand, the alternative of administering the country, with the certainty that, however temporary we might intend our rule to be, it would undoubtedly become permanent, presents such a formidable prospect for British interests in the East that the most strenuous efforts of statesmanship should be directed to avert it. The position requires all the wisdom of Government and all the tact of our best administrators, but I am sanguine enough to believe that if, by the promulgation of large and liberal views such as statesmen on both sides entertain, the Afghans can be brought to see that the independence of their country is as much desired by England as by themselves, and that the British Government will render them all the assistance in their power to accomplish it, a happy solution of our present difficulties might be effected.

E. PERRY.

10th January 1880.

No. 5.

OCCUPATION OF KANDAHAR.

LORD HARTINGTON,

YOUR remark of yesterday as to the possible necessity of occupying Kandahar induces me to lay before you the rough copy of a note (the only one I have) which I submitted to Lord Cranbrook in January last.*

Its value, if any, consists in this, that it sums up the deliberate opinions of my colleagues Sir H. Norman, Sir R. Montgomery, and Sir F. Halliday, whom I consulted before committing myself to paper.

I was disposed to think Lord Cranbrook did not much dissent from these views, and he seemed to concur in the opinion that it was not desirable to maintain the permanent occupation of Afghanistan.

But the notions which emanated from India, or possibly from England, about the same period, that it was good policy to break up Afghanistan, found favour with Lord Beaconsfield's Government, and Shir Ali was hailed as Wali of Kandahar with promises of assistance.

I have not seen anywhere the exact terms by which Her Majesty's name has been pledged to this arrangement, but I observe that Lord Lytton states we are pledged; and we have Mr. Lepel Griffin's speech to the Afghans, in which he announces Her Majesty's decision.

The extent to which Her Majesty is committed remains, of course, a considerable factor in the question under discussion.

But the consequences likely to result from this arrangement are so serious that it appears to me all the efforts of statesmanship should be directed to avert it.

Whether Afghanistan shall remain under one ruler, or be broken up into two or three petty principalities time alone can decide. But if it is sound policy to resist the permanent occupation of Afghanistan, and to revert to the notion of an independent

* No. 4.

Afghanistan, many times asserted by the late Government, is it possible to do so if we fetter ourselves with any pledge to support the ruler of Kandahar?

We may take for granted that if we leave, as we ought, to the Afghans themselves to determine whether they will live under one ruler or several, the issue will be determined in Afghan fashion, not without a struggle. So it was with Dost Mahomed, so with the late Shir Ali, and so also will it probably be with Abdul Rahman, whom Lord Lytton contemplates and desires to see ruler of Kabul.

But if *our* ruler is established at Kandahar, we shall have another Shah Soojah on our hands, and success will lead to the permanent occupation of the whole country.

I would throw out for Lord Hartington's consideration whether it would not be expedient to address to the new Viceroy a Despatch to be made public by him on his arrival in India.

Opportunity might be taken to express Her Majesty's strong determination to make no annexations of territory beyond the frontiers of India, and of her desire to see established an independent and flourishing Afghanistan. All that England requires is that that country shall not be made the seat of any intrigues or disturbances which may affect our Indian empire, and to this end ample guarantees may be obtained without affecting the real independence of Afghanistan.

Various passages from the Despatches of the late Government may be cited to show that the above policy is quite in accordance with what they frequently announced, and in particular the Despatch of Lord Salisbury may be cited with respect to the occupation of Quetta, which was the first step in the aggressive policy of the last four years, and in which he distinctly held that the occupation was to be only temporary.

May 10, 1880.

E. PERRY.

No. 6.

NOTE ON THE LINE TO BE OCCUPIED ON THE NORTH-WESTERN FRONTIER OF INDIA.

ON the assumption that the question of the best line of frontier to be occupied by us on the north-western border of India will shortly be reconsidered, in anticipation of the withdrawal of our forces from Kabul and its neighbourhood, I venture to submit a few observations for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India. In making these observations I assume that the provisions of the treaty of Gundamuk are entirely at an end, and that we are at perfect liberty to arrange our frontier solely with reference to what may be considered our own interests.

I will also assume that we shall not continue to occupy Kandahar. If we retain a force at Kandahar any arguments I may use adverse to the tenure of positions in the direction of Pisheen or the Bolan fall to the ground, for if we hold Kandahar we must doubtless hold in ample strength our line of communication with that city. I have no knowledge as to the reasons which may have led to the alleged agreement with Shere Ali that he should have the province of Kandahar, or as to any stipulation that we should support him in his government, either by having a garrison at his capital or its neighbourhood, or at Pisheen, nor have I any knowledge as to there being any binding agreement of the kind. If there is such a binding agreement of course it will be adhered to, but I must say that the creation of such an engagement is to be lamented, and I am quite unaware of any necessity that has arisen for making such an engagement, while I am sure that it would be well, even at a very great sacrifice, to induce Shere Ali to consent to its modification.

To occupy Kandahar at all will be very expensive, and no one, I suppose, really believes that the province will be for any long time left undisturbed if through our action it is separated from Kabul. To occupy it means to continue to occupy Khelat-i-Ghilzai, to be involved from time to time in the directions of Girishk and of Ghuznee, and eventually probably to be led on towards Furrah and Herat in the one direction and Kabul in the other, without really adding one iota to the security of our possession of India. Bad as it would be to occupy Kandahar ourselves, even this would be better than to remain there to support a Chief, the justice of whose rule could not be depended upon, whose very existence as a ruler would provoke trouble, and whose presence would be rather a weakness than a strength to our occupying force.

Our occupation of Kandahar, or its being held by a ruler under our guarantee, would infallibly land us, and speedily land us, in renewed difficulties such as our recent experience should lead us to avoid. It seems to me, indeed, pretty certain that if we remain at Kandahar we shall be again embarked on the troubled sea of Afghan politics, and may

anticipate that before long we shall again have a large army in the field for no object that can benefit us.

As I trust that Kandahar will not be occupied, and that it will turn out that we are not obliged to maintain Shere Ali in the government of that province, and as I am writing rather about the frontier intended to be occupied under the Treaty of Gundamuk than about Kandahar, I will refrain from saying more on this point, and I will only add that the arguments I shall hereafter use against advancing our old frontier in view to being strong against Russia are, in my opinion, applicable to the occupation of Kandahar, but that if we feel ourselves compelled for any reason to hold Kandahar we must, as I have before said, hold Pisheen and other points between it and India.

In considering the best line for our North-western frontier, I desire first to point out that no rectification of the old frontier has ever been advocated, as far as I know, in view to resisting the Afghans. Any contention to such an effect would, I submit, be absurd. The greatest alarmist can hardly apprehend danger to India from a mere Afghan invasion unless our military power was so broken or so feeble as to render our whole position in that country insecure, and in such a contingency any extension of our old border would be a source of much additional weakness. The Afghans very wisely and naturally have never shown any desire to molest us since we took up the line of frontier occupied in 1849, and the conviction often expressed by myself and by others of far greater authority that the very largest force of Afghans which could possibly be brought against us would, in the plains on our border, be speedily shattered by a moderate number of our troops of all arms, has been well borne out by the experiences of the late war in the territory of the Afghans themselves.

The old frontier, too, has this advantage with respect to Afghanistan, that it is for the most part separated from the territory heretofore under the direct rule of the Ameer of Kabul, and we have thus during a long series of years been spared many causes of irritation and disagreement likely to arise if our subjects and our officers had been constantly in direct contact with the subjects of Afghanistan.

I would therefore urge that, as respects the Afghans, no advantage is to be gained by us from extending our frontier, even if the extension did not bring with it very serious disadvantages, which I shall hereafter state.

Apart from the Afghans proper, however, it has been sometimes alleged that an advance of frontier will place us in a stronger position with respect to the border tribes who either own a very slack allegiance to Kabul or own no allegiance at all. I can understand that this might be asserted with some show of plausibility, and might even find acceptance with impartial persons ignorant of the physical peculiarities of the frontier hills, if we were really proposing to take up a new line of frontier beyond the hills which these tribes occupy, but no one who speaks with any sort of authority has ever ventured to recommend such a measure. It would be one of the most difficult extensions of territory that could be conceived, involving the employment of an army even larger than that maintained at present in Afghanistan with so much strain on our resources. The results would certainly be very inadequate, but this is not what has been proposed or what was adopted in the Gundamuk Treaty, putting Kandahar aside, and it is not now, I presume, to be thought that we should desire to go beyond the arrangements of that treaty. By it we were to occupy Pisheen, Kurrum, and the Khyber Pass, three isolated forward positions having no military communication with each other, and the first separated from the second and third by some hundreds of miles of difficult country inhabited by more or less warlike tribes. Can any adequate benefit, as respects the tribes along our frontier, result from the occupation of these three separate forward positions?

In the Sind direction anything deserving the name of an inroad in force into our territory has not taken place for many years, and in this direction any advance to secure our subjects from molestation in future seems unnecessary.

The occupation of Kurrum has rather created than lessened difficulties with the tribes beyond our old border in that direction, and notwithstanding the very strong force in that district, raids have taken place in its rear and outrages been committed entailing, I believe, a greater loss on our own people than ever took place in a much longer period formerly, when the Kohat and Bunnoo frontier was held without a European soldier, and by a force certainly not a third as strong as that which now holds those places and Kurrum.

The placing troops in the Khyber, too, can be of little use as a protection to our territory. Half a dozen regiments may hold the pass in the way it has been held during the past 18 months, with the aid of money payments to the tribes and local levies, though not without outrages in the pass and destruction of telegraph wires from time to

time, but these very Pass Afreedies have never by their conduct during the last 30 years rendered it necessary to organise an expedition to punish them. Their offences have been robberies or murders by individuals or small gangs, the prevention of which is a matter of police, and even these offences have sensibly diminished of late years, and have never been so numerous as to warrant such a costly measure, both in life and money, as the occupation of the line from Jumrood to Lundi Kotul. It is doubtful, indeed, whether placing garrisons in the Khyber would have any sensible effect in checking such offences as I have referred to, while, for the exercise of any influence on border tribes a few miles away from the Khyber, such occupation would be absolutely useless.

In truth, none of the three forward positions arranged to be occupied after the Treaty of Gundamak can possibly exercise any real influence over the border tribes with whom we have had serious trouble, namely, the Mahsood Wuzurees, and the tribes on the Yusufzai border. It is only with these people that, since 1849, we have had any real fighting on a large scale, and it is only on the two expeditions in these respective directions, in 1860 and 1863, that we have sustained a loss of over a hundred men killed and wounded. A reference to a map which shows the nature of the country as well as the distances will convince any one how little use troops placed in the Khyber would be to exert any influence on the border tribes of Yusufzai, and nothing but an overpowering force in Kurrum could afford to detach troops for the coercion of the Mahsood Wuzurees, while a much smaller body of troops than that now in Kurrum, if within our old territory, could not only check inroads by these people, but, if necessary, chastise them, as was done on a previous occasion.

In reality there is little call for any re-arrangement of our frontier line as respects the border tribes. The only point at which it occurs to me we might perhaps advantageously now obtain control is over the line of pass between Kohat and Peshawur. Undoubtedly it is a disadvantage to have a piece of independent territory on the direct and shortest road between two important frontier garrisons, and if the Punjab Government thought it expedient and were assured that it was practicable to assume direct control without entailing on us extensive or prolonged military operations, I think the measure should be allowed; but any actual advance seems to me injudicious, and certain to entail upon us inconveniences out of all proportion to the advantages which any one has assumed could be gained with respect to the tribes by such advances.

There remains to consider how far our occupation of Pisheen, Kurrum, and the Khyber would strengthen us against that European Power of which, as I think, such unreasonable alarm has been expressed.

Is it possible for anyone to say that we now really dread a Russian invasion of India? Has not our experience during recent operations in Afghanistan, comparatively close to the magnificent resources of India, and the accounts we read of Russian difficulties when operating against undisciplined tribes in Central Asia, dissipated the apprehensions of the most inveterate of Russophobists? A policy started to place an English Agent in Afghan territory has step by step involved us in operations which have lasted for two years, and which we shall be fortunate if we conclude without an expenditure, present and prospective, of 20 millions sterling, and then we shall probably not have achieved the object with which we began. With this experience is it possible to apprehend that Russia is likely to subjugate or to influence Afghanistan so as to make it a base for operations against India? At all events, it is more than ever evident that any Russian advance, if indeed it is possible, would be made at great risk, and that it must be effected with so much slowness and deliberation as to give us leisure, 20 times over, to occupy any or all the posts on the scientific frontier, and also Kabul and Kandahar, before a Russian advance could have made itself felt.

The question is sometimes put as to whether the advocates for adhering to the old frontier line would defend India from Russian attack on or beyond that frontier. To that I would reply, that a good General acting on the defensive usually strikes blows in advance, but how far counter advances should be made in the case in question, I think, would have to be determined by the responsible authorities of the day, when the time came. Much would depend upon the condition of India at the time, upon the popularity of our rule, and upon our military strength. Any great forward movement would necessitate large European reinforcements, which England might not be able to send, while, if the defence was, in the main, confined to our old frontier, large reinforcements might not be necessary. It seems to me useless now to discuss how we would act under a contingency which will probably never arise, or which, if it arises, must be attended by circumstances which we cannot foresee. The most eminent scientific authority who has spoken on the subject of our Indian frontier, General Hamley, has

admitted that we can readily defend our old frontier and give a good account of any enemy in the valley of the Indus, and he deprecated advance beyond our Peshawur border.

The sum of the whole is, that we should be content with the old frontier and gradually strengthen it, and not commit the folly of prematurely thrusting forward troops in anticipation of invasions which may never come. To do so is to waste troops and resources, and perhaps, after much money has been spent in a particular direction, we may find that invasion may be more readily accomplished in a different direction. Let us not forget, either, our position in India, and that dangers worse than a Russian invasion are possible. We might have bitterly to repent some day the absence of several thousand troops in positions beyond the frontier, whence at the moment of need elsewhere it might be impossible to withdraw them, and where they themselves might be in great need of support.

Taking in succession the three forward positions named in the Gundamuk Treaty, how would they affect Russian invasion.

Beyond Peshawur the extreme point to be held by us was distant four marches from that garrison. It is obvious that if desired the Khyber can be traversed and the forward positions occupied in the course of a few days. When the railway is completed to the Indus or Peshawur, with a permanent bridge at Attock, it may be possible, if we have no troops in advance requiring support, to have even a smaller garrison than heretofore, and certainly there can be no need to increase that garrison. What is needed is to maintain at Peshawur and its neighbourhood transport for a strong division of all arms, and as troops could be brought in a day by railway from Rawul Pindie and Jhelum, and from several other stations within two days, we should have the means of at once pushing into the Khyber, if we needed to do so, a body of troops fresh from healthy stations, and provided with efficient and untired transport.

The next point retained by us under the treaty was the valley of Kurrum. Leaving the general disadvantages of this as of the other positions for future remark, I would observe that its occupation cannot be needed as a defence against Russia. The force in Kurrum has, since October last, been of no use whatever to General Roberts at Kabul, and has itself suffered much trouble at the hands of the surrounding tribes. For six months communication from Kurrum into Afghanistan is, for military purposes, quite closed, and of all these forward positions this seems the most absolutely useless. If circumstances render any advance by the Khyber necessary, an advance might be usefully made by Kurrum as a diversion, but this can be done when the time comes. It is unjustifiable to lock up a large force in Kurrum on the remote contingency of a Russian invasion, especially as, if that invasion came, it might be in quite a different direction, and yet those troops could not be withdrawn from their useless position.

It is hardly possible to conceive a European force attempting to invade India by the Shuturguridan, even if the attacking power could at the same time force us to use bodies of troops to repel invasion in other quarters, but if such a hazardous enterprise was to be attempted there would, as in the case of the Khyber, be ample time to bring up troops from garrisons in our old territory.

The occupation of Pisheen and Quetta seems as unnecessary as that of the Khyber and Kurrum. An advance of Russia on Herat would be a serious undertaking on the part of that power, and despite what has been lately written about the resources of the Herat district, I have most excellent authority for saying that it could not support the most moderate European army. How then could Russia hold it if she ever reached there, still less how could she cover the 400 miles of difficult country between Herat and Kandahar? If she could do this, still what influence could be exercised against such an advance by a division divided between Pisheen and Quetta? And if we proposed to fight Russia at Herat or Kandahar, the occupation of Pisheen would not very materially lessen the time it would take us to place at either of these towns the large army necessary to cope with the considerable force with which Russia alone would dare to advance troops, and transport animals would have to be brought in large numbers from the rear before any move counter to Russian advance could be attempted, while according to the best information obtainable by me there are no resources at Pisheen or Quetta which are of sufficient importance to an army to justify our holding those places in order to secure their resources.

I do not forget that a railway is in progress towards Pisheen, and it may be said that if we maintained transport at Pisheen for troops to be brought up from the rear when wanted, as I have proposed for Peshawur, it would greatly strengthen us against a Russian advance to do so, and this, of course, would be impossible, unless we kept troops there also. I would reply that Peshawur has been ours for 30 years, that it is a large

city with great resources, in a fertile district, and that no question can now be raised of our not holding it. None of these reasons apply to holding Pisheen. Again, cattle can easily be maintained in large numbers at and about Peshawur, and with a bridge over the Indus those kept at Rawul Pindee can be at Peshawur in a week. No similar advantage is to be found at Pisheen, and to bring transport sufficient for an army to Pisheen by a railway like that under construction, with a break of gauge in the middle of it, would be so tedious as to render the railway next to useless for the purpose. The railway would have quite enough to do to take up the troops needed for active operations with their provisions and stores, and, until their transport came, no advance could be made. Such an advance, I suppose, is contemplated by those who advocate the occupation of this and other forward positions, for I presume it is not desired to lock up troops at any of them or at any places beyond them to stand a siege in garrisons liable to be cut off by an invading foe.

As to the railway, no argument whatever should be based upon it. Constructed as it has been, there seems every probability that large parts of it will be destroyed when floods come, and when this occurs, it may possibly be thought not worth while to renew it. It will prove a very ruinous work from a financial point of view, any predictions of its paying being to my mind fallacious. When we consider the cost of keeping up a railway in such a country, it is difficult to conceive that the requirements of a few thousand troops and the trade that can ever be expected from Kandahar can afford any set-off equal to the expenses of working and maintenance. Having gone so far with the railway, if we keep troops at Pisheen it may be well to maintain it, at all events as far as it has gone, but it will involve heavy cost, and in the end it would save much pecuniary loss if, by withdrawal from Pisheen and Quetta, we could dismantle the railway and use the rails, sleepers, and rolling stock elsewhere.

Quetta offers no more advantage than Pisheen for opposing Russian advance, and in addition it has proved, as was predicted, very unhealthy for our troops. By treaty with the Khan of Khelat, no doubt we may keep troops there, apart from any provisions of the treaty of Gundamak, but I am not aware that there is any use in doing this. We went there originally to restore order in the territories of the Khan of Khelat. Having done this let us honourably come away, or at all events propose to leave whenever the Khan thinks he can hold his own against his Chiefs without us, and when we are satisfied that disorder will not follow our withdrawal. We might, however, reasonably revert to an arrangement formerly in force by which a political officer remained with the Khan, and had with him an escort of suitable strength. The Khan's territories so match with ours that this arrangement may be desirable after our withdrawal.

Having sufficiently adverted to the negative advantages of occupying Pisheen, Kurram, and the Khyber, I would turn to a consideration of the positive disadvantages attending such a measure.

Politically the disadvantage would be that we should be extending, so to speak, our sphere of irritation, and placing ourselves in positions where it would be difficult to keep still. Either from the front of these advanced positions, on their flanks, or in their rear, constant trouble may be expected, entailing operations which will almost certainly end in further advances and occupations. We also irritate the people, who would as a rule like us better at a distance than at hand, and very probably we destroy any hope of a friendship which would be valuable if the improbable event of a Russian advance really took place. I have seen it stated in more than one letter from Kabul that the people dislike us and the Russians alike, but that our occupation of Kabul has led them to desire nothing more than a Russian advance which should rid them of us. This feeling will no doubt disappear when we leave, for the Afghans certainly do not desire to be interfered with by Russia, but the statements I have quoted illustrate what has often before been said, namely, that our best plan to ensure having the Afghans on our side as against Russia is to leave them alone. Our occupying forward positions has an exactly contrary tendency.

One great military disadvantage of the provisions of the Treaty of Gundamak arises from the unpopularity of the service beyond our frontier. The Native soldier likes a campaign, but he objects strongly to a prolonged absence from his country, especially when, as in the Khyber and at Quetta, he is placed in most unhealthy and disagreeable positions. He cannot obtain leave of absence, a privilege which, if constantly withheld, as it has been of late, would end in the loss of our Native army, and this and the frequent deaths and invaliding of soldiers beyond our frontier are serious obstacles to recruiting. We know, indeed, that recruiting is now so difficult that most extraordinary and expensive measures have been resorted to to complete the ranks, and, as far as we know, these measures have not been successful. No doubt with a withdrawal from

Kabul and Kandahar the number of troops beyond our frontier will sensibly diminish, but as long as we maintain a certain force beyond the frontier there will be a disinclination to enlist. This will not seem strange to those who know the Native soldier, especially if they read the lamentable accounts of the state to which some regiments were reduced by sickness last year.

The cost of holding forward positions is the third objection, and here there is scope for discussion, not as to the fact that there must be considerable expense, but as to the amount. It is impossible that any estimate can be exact, for certain elements for calculation are wanting. These must be assumed, and I will give my reasons, of course, for such assumption. I would, however, remark that in 1857 and 1873 I prepared the estimates of the probable cost of moving troops into Afghanistan under certain assumed conditions. I endeavoured to be moderate, but I believe was charged with exaggerating the probable cost. In point of fact, we have not done nearly as much as I assumed would be done in the way of occupation, and my supposition that all the troops sent into Afghanistan would be replaced in India has only been carried out to an extent, perhaps, of one third. Yet the actual expenditure has far exceeded any estimate I then made. I mention this to show that my predictions were not formed in an exaggerated spirit, and I shall observe the same desire to be moderate now.

The first point to settle is the amount and description of force needed to hold the advanced positions, and, as respects the Khyber and Kurrum, I think it is reasonable to accept as appropriate a force similar to that left last year after the conclusion of the Treaty of Gundamak.

After the troops had been withdrawn, there remained in the Khyber and in Kurrum respectively the following troops, on the 1st August 1879 :—

In the Khyber.

One field battery of Royal Artillery,
One Native mountain battery,
Two companies of Sappers and Miners,
Two regiments of British Infantry,
One regiment of Native Cavalry,
Five regiments of Native Infantry,

and there were present, excluding all absentees, 111 British officers, 1,600 British and 3,660 Native soldiers. In August, when there was much sickness, one regiment of British Infantry was withdrawn, reducing the European troops to 872 men.

In Kurrum.

One battery, Royal Horse Artillery,
One and a half field batteries, Royal Artillery,
Two mountain batteries, Native Artillery,
One company of Sappers and Miners,
One squadron of British Cavalry,
Three regiments of Native Cavalry,
Four regiments of British Infantry (less two companies),
Six regiments of Native Infantry,

and the numbers present were 223 British officers, 3,555 British and 6,265 Native soldiers. This number of men continued there, subject to the ordinary fluctuations, until the war broke out again in September. The numbers here given do not include more than 1,200 Native soldiers, a half field battery of Royal Artillery, and two companies of British Infantry at Kohat.

There is no reason to suppose that the force allotted to the Khyber and Kurrum was excessive, and we know that it was supplemented in the former by a local levy, and that subsidies were given to the tribes. Whether this was the case in Kurrum I do not know, but here from October to the present time a force of about 8,000 men has been locked up, though, as far as aid to our troops at Kabul was concerned, they have been useless.

The Indian Army Commission have allotted to the Khyber and to Kurrum, in their scheme for the garrisons of India, the following troops :—

Khyber.

1 Native Mountain Battery.
1 Company Sappers and Miners.
1 Troop Native Cavalry.
3 Regiments Native Infantry.

Kurrum, including Thull.

- 1 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 2 Guns, Native Mountain Artillery.
- 1 Company Sappers and Miners.
- 2 Regiments British Infantry.
- 2 Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 4 Regiments Native Infantry.

Making allowance for the fact that the Indian Army Commission contemplate an addition to the strength of regiments, their estimate is considerably below the force actually employed in the Khyber and Kurrum after the conclusion of peace in 1879. Under favourable circumstances, the force they have proposed for Kurrum might suffice, but I believe that a prudent commander would consider that the least force that could properly hold the Khyber would be that actually serving there on the 1st September 1879, namely,—

- 1 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 1 Native Mountain Battery.
- 1 Company of Sappers and Miners.
- 1 Regiment Native Cavalry.
- 1 Regiment British Infantry.
- 5 Regiments Native Infantry.

For Pisheen and the country in its rear we cannot refer to actual experience, for instead of being our most advanced position, Pisheen has hitherto simply been a post on the line of communication with a strong division at Kandahar, but the Indian Army Commission, on the assumption that Kandahar would be given up, have allotted to Pisheen and the posts between it and Dadur inclusive,—

- 1 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 2½ Mountain Batteries, Artillery.*
- 1 Garrison Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 2 Companies of Sappers and Miners.
- 1 Regiment British Infantry.
- 4 Regiments Native Infantry.

This force seems to me too small, considering that it has to hold a most important forward position, and to guard Quetta and a long line of communications, flanked by independent tribes who might give infinite trouble. I doubt a prudent Commander being satisfied without at least another British Infantry regiment and one and a half regiments of Native Cavalry, so as to bring up his force to a brigade of Cavalry and two brigades of Infantry. Recent experience has shown how unexpectedly our communications are assailed, and how suddenly large forces appear against us in the field. Forgotten lessons have indeed sharply repeated themselves to us since the Indian Army Commission closed its proceedings, and we should benefit by them. I therefore assume that the addition just stated is accepted. This would bring up the troops in positions beyond our old frontier to—

- 3 Field Batteries, Royal Artillery.
- 2 Mountain Batteries, Royal Artillery.
- 2½ Native Mountain Batteries.
- 1 Garrison Battery.
- 4 Companies of Sappers and Miners.
- 6 Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 5 Regiments British Infantry.
- 13 Regiments Native Infantry.

On the present establishment of Corps in India, which is, as respects British Corps, the ordinary peace complement of men, but which has given an increase of 96 and 200 men respectively to every Native regiment of Cavalry and Infantry beyond the frontier, the force I have detailed would comprise about 5,000 British and 15,000 Native soldiers.

The effective charge for these corps in time of peace, and on the peace establishment, as calculated from data of the cost of each unit of the Indian Army, made by Sir G. Kellner in 1879, would be somewhat over 750,000*l.* per annum. If to this we add a hundred per

* I am not certain what proportion of this is intended to be Native, but in my calculations I provide for two mountain batteries here, one European and one Native.

cent., I am sure we shall not do more than provide for the additional charge on account of the increased establishments of Native regiments, the extra charges for staff for a complete transport, for provisions, for extra allowances and for rations to Natives, for the greatly increased cost of Native Cavalry, for depots in India, for increased non-effective charges owing to pensions being given to the heirs of all Native soldiers who die beyond our frontier, for works and roads, for civil and political charges, and for subsidies to Native Chiefs and others.

Against this it is impossible to assume that any material set-off can be looked for from revenue. The whole revenue of the Khyber, Kurrum, and Pisheen could not, under the most favourable circumstances, appreciably reduce the foregoing large military charge, while the revenue of the Quetta territory will, of course, go to its own ruler.

I have assumed that these troops are in excess of the old establishment of the army, or that if reductions could be effected the reductions would be *pro tanto* so much less than they otherwise might be. I cannot think that we had too large an army in India before the Afghan war, and our occupying forward positions, which are much more likely to need support than any frontier garrisons previously occupied, seems to me a strong reason for not diminishing the force in India. If this view was accepted, and it may be forced on us, the extra cost of the forward positions would be something like a million and a half a year. If only half the troops beyond our frontier were in excess of the old peace garrison of India, then the extra charge of the whole and the normal charge of half would be due to the advanced positions, or 1,125,000*l.* per annum, and in the very improbable contingency of no addition being made to the old establishment to replace the force beyond the frontier the extra charge would still amount to 750,000*l.* per annum. Even if my estimate of the extra cost of the troops is unduly large, and may be reduced by a fourth or a third, it will still be seen that a heavy pecuniary burden will be thrown on India, but I believe my estimate of the troops costing double as much as they would in peace in India is not excessive. I would add that, of the 750,000*l.* stated now to be spent monthly on the Afghan war, exclusive of home charges and cost of frontier railways, a very considerable proportion must be due to the troops in the Khyber, in Kurrum, and between our frontier and Pisheen, or that would be placed at Pisheen if Kandahar was given up.

In conclusion, I urge, for all the reasons I have set forth, an entire withdrawal within our own frontier. On the line of the Khyber or in Kurrum no time will be so appropriate for this withdrawal as when our troops return from Kabul. There is no object to be gained in remaining longer, and in fact it will be easier to come away then than later on. But I advocate no precipitation. Leisurely marches and frequent halts of a day or two should be made, not only in view of allowing the impedimenta to get well away, but also to show the Afghans that our withdrawal is in no respect like a retirement before an enemy. Some may think it undesirable to relinquish control of the Khyber Pass. If this control can be maintained, so as to secure a safe transit for trade and travellers, by the subsidizing of the Chiefs or by any arrangement not very expensive, and which will not involve the employment of our troops or any obligation to send those troops from time to time to restore order in the pass, possibly there is no objection to our, to this extent, controlling the Khyber, but I do not think we should go beyond this. Kurrum should be made over to whoever is left as the ruler of Kabul, as before, a measure which will greatly strengthen his hands with his subjects.

On the Kandahar side the retirement might be more deliberate, and be made first to Pisheen and then to Quetta. The withdrawal from Pisheen, however, should not be much delayed, or trouble may arise which would be urged as a reason for again advancing to Kandahar. It should be understood that once we came away, our officers and troops had no concern with what took place at the points given up, and the halt at Pisheen should not be understood as being made to enable us to see whether matters were going to be well managed or not at Kandahar. I think, therefore, a halt at Pisheen of a fortnight or three weeks would be ample, and all troops, except those for Quetta, should then return to India in a leisurely manner.

We went to Quetta for a purpose quite different from that which took us to Kandahar, and the former place should be held until the conditions are fulfilled, as I have before suggested, but the Political Officer should be told that he is to encourage the Khan to exert himself to do without our aid, so as to allow of our troops leaving. If necessary, however, they might remain until the season following that in which Pisheen was given up.

Having urged strongly that these retirements should take place, I must avow my belief that they would produce no injurious political effect in India. That we have

made a great mistake in going into Afghanistan no doubt is felt by Natives of intelligence, but this mischief is done, and is not to be repaired by stopping there. The Natives know that on every occasion we have defeated the Afghans, and they will also certainly know that we shall be stronger in India when we come away than it is possible for us to be when we have the strain of an Afghan war on our hands. Further, I am fain to believe that they will feel it is on the whole more just on our part to leave the Afghans to themselves than to occupy certain positions in their country on the plea that we must do so to protect ourselves against the improbable contingency of Russian invasion.

(Signed) H. W. NORMAN.

26th June 1880.

No. 7.

MEMORANDUM ON OUR FUTURE POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN.

THE present war in Afghanistan has, in many respects, closely followed the various phases of our first operations in that country.

We have easily beaten the enemy in the open field; we have overrun the country without serious difficulty; we have met with reverses in Southern Afghanistan and had to take refuge within the fortifications of Kandahar, and the only ruler we have as yet set up and helped to provide with an efficient native army has been deserted by his troops at the first opportunity. The disaster of the retreat from Kabul in 1842 has been imitated, although fortunately on a much smaller scale, in the defeat at and flight from Khushk-i-Nakhud.

The point, however, where the parallel ceases is in the utter collapse of the native army.* This had certainly not been generally foreseen, and must have been most unexpected by those who had looked forward to the early encounter of the Sepoy and the Cossack on the banks of the Oxus. A little consideration will, however, show that there is nothing extraordinary in this collapse. Perhaps the most prosperous provinces in India at the present time, or at all events those whose prosperity has progressed most rapidly, are those from which we have hitherto drawn our best recruits. The natives of Oude and the Punjab, as their riches and civilization increase, lose their taste and aptitude for a military life, and are disinclined to exchange the ease and plenty of their homes for prolonged garrison duty in a severe climate and amongst a treacherous and hostile population. Another cause has also been at work in lessening our recruiting field in India. Many duties which before the mutiny used to be entrusted to the native army are now carried out by the police, and although the police and army together may employ as many men as were formerly required for the army alone, still the number of native troops has, for the last 20 years, been considerably below the number maintained in the days of the East India Company. The demand for soldiers having been less, many men who would formerly have served in the army have turned their attention to other pursuits.

The present state of affairs shows conclusively that the native army is not capable, as at present recruited and organised, of undertaking operations on a large scale for an extended period beyond the frontiers of India.

If one result of the present war is to cause judicious improvements in our Indian army and the formation of an efficient reserve, it will not have been altogether unprofitable to this country.

Another matter which has become painfully evident is the complete failure of our means of transport. Our expenditure of baggage animals has been so ruinous that some years must elapse before we shall be able to provide transport for a large body of troops for prolonged operations on the north-west of India. During that time, it is true, our railway communication will be carried to our frontier and probably beyond it, and in our next advance into Afghanistan our camel and cattle transport will not be required until points very much further in advance are reached than has been the case during the present war. It must, however, be borne in mind that as our system of railways becomes extended in India, the supply of camels for transport purposes will gradually diminish. This fact became apparent some few years ago in carrying out the yearly reliefs of troops, when it was discovered that in those districts well provided with railways the natives no longer found it profitable to breed camels for transport purposes.

* The absolute failure in the supply of recruits is not confined to the Bengal Presidency, but extends to the whole of India.

In discussing our future policy with reference to Afghanistan, it is necessary to bear clearly in mind these two well established facts ; first, that the native army is no longer to be reckoned on for extended operations in that country ; and second, that our means of transport have been exhausted.

The points for consideration as regards our immediate policy in Afghanistan appear to be the following :—

1. How far the attitude and power of Russia in Central Asia should influence our proceedings.
2. Should Afghanistan be united under one ruler, or divided into separate provinces.
3. The line of frontier we should take up and the positions, if any, that we should occupy in the country.

With regard to the first question we may consider it a certainty that Russia will subdue the Tekke Turcomans, and, if necessary to effect this thoroughly, her troops will occupy Merv. But we may confidentially anticipate that she will not be able to advance beyond Merv, or even to hold that place permanently. From Merv to Herat is 230 miles, through a more or less desert country the whole way.

We may safely judge of the difficulties Russia must encounter in her progress in Central Asia from the experience we have gained in Afghanistan during the last three years. We have advanced from Sukkur to Kandahar, some 400 miles, and from Peshawur to a short distance beyond Kabul, some 200 miles, and, having done so much, we are exhausted and incapable of moving further. The march of detached brigades beyond these points were on a small scale, and are not here taken into consideration. We have had the resources of the whole of India at our disposal for transport animals, and we have used them up. Russia has to move all her troops and stores by sea, and to land them on the difficult shores of the Caspian, and has then to collect from the scattered and generally unfriendly Turkoman tribes the camels necessary for transport purposes. So difficult is it found to collect a sufficient number of these, that the main advance probably will not be undertaken until a line of rails has been laid down for part of the distance. The distance of Merv from the Caspian is considerably greater than the distance of Kandahar from the Indus. In the country to be traversed, Russia can obtain no supplies whatever for the men, and but scanty forage for the horses and cattle. So that she has not only to contend against enormous difficulties in providing transport, but also against very great difficulties in obtaining sufficient forage. She may be better off for men than we are at the present moment, but this will be no great advantage if she has not the means to move their baggage and supplies. A march on Merv will severely tax the powers of Russia, and it may be seriously doubted if she will attempt to undertake it.

Russia has always been content in her advances in Central Asia to take one step at a time, and to secure her advanced position before attempting a further movement. She will be content now to re-establish her reputation in Central Asia by a successful expedition against the Tekke Turkomans, and will then be prepared to wait patiently before making any further advance. Russia knows she need take no step to checkmate any movement of ours, as she is well aware of our intention to evacuate Afghanistan, and of the strain in men and money the present war is to us. She is besides now busied with arrangements for a war with China, and on this account alone will be glad to forego any operations against the Turkomans beyond what may be absolutely necessary.

We may therefore conclude that Russia will not now undertake any operation in Central Asia beyond those necessary to chastise the Tekke Turkomans.

We can then leave Russia altogether out of our calculations in any arrangements we may make in Afghanistan, and whilst firmly maintaining the principle that Afghanistan is beyond the sphere of Russian influence, we may feel assured that for *the present* Russia has no wish to exert her influence in that country. We must not, however, expect that this will always be the case.

Although we may have no cause to feel uneasy at present regarding the advance of Russia in Central Asia, that is no reason we should not at all times keep ourselves acquainted with her movements and designs in that part of the world. It is extremely unfortunate that, owing to the Consulship at Asterabad having been so long vacant, we have now no means of learning the progress of the Russian expedition against the Tekke Turkomans. Not only does it appear advisable to fill up the vacancy at Asterabad without further delay, but it might also be judicious, until affairs at Herat and in Western Afghanistan are settled, to detach an officer as Consul to Meshed.

If we were kept accurately informed of the state of affairs in those regions the Government would be at once able to dispel the discreditable state of alarm into which

this country is periodically thrown by rumours of Russian expeditions against Herat or Northern Afghanistan. If knowledge is power, ignorance is weakness, and this weakness we constantly show by the undignified fear displayed at every report or threat of Russian movements. It is frequently said, and occasionally truly so, that our military disasters are attributable to the defective information obtained by our Generals. It is probably safe to say that in the conduct of foreign affairs the same cause is at work, and that when we are outwitted by foreign powers, it is owing to our being deficient in the necessary information.

As regards the question of Afghanistan remaining one united kingdom, or being divided into separate provinces, it may be urged that, by having a united Afghanistan, our influence would be exerted over the whole country through one ruler, who would be responsible to us for the behaviour of all minor chiefs, instead of our having to control them separately. The difficulty of establishing a Resident, with a sufficient escort, could, if necessary, be confined to Kabul or its neighbourhood, instead of being multiplied by the number of separate chiefships that might be formed; the field of Russian intrigue, which will, sooner or later, make itself felt again, would be narrowed, and we should be continuing the policy of maintaining an independent and united Afghanistan closely allied to England, which policy we have hitherto proclaimed it our intention to follow. Russia has not openly disputed the principle we have laid down, that Afghanistan is beyond her influence, and if she has tacitly accepted it, we may presume she has done so on the understanding that the country remains united and independent. If Afghanistan is to be dismembered, she will claim her share of the spoil. With the revenue of the whole of Afghanistan at his disposal, and able to draw recruits from the entire kingdom, the ruler of the country will be in a position to hold the outlying provinces of Herat and Turkestan in subjection, and to consolidate his power as successfully as was done by Shere Ali. Deprived of the revenues and resources of the province of Kandahar, his hold on the outlying provinces would be feeble, and they would soon offer a favourable field for native intriguers supported by Russian influence.

Two principal reasons have been put forward by various authorities for the maintenance of Kandahar as an independent province, and for the retention of a British garrison at that town. The first is, that Kandahar is a place of great strategical importance as regards any further operations we may have to undertake against Afghanistan, and the second is, that it will be an important stage gained on the road to Herat, and will enable us, when the struggle takes place with Russia, for the possession of that town, to forestall her there. To maintain our influence at Kandahar without interference with the ruler at Kabul, it is contended by many eminent authorities, that the province should be separated from the rest of Afghanistan, and governed by a Chief, who would be advised by a British Resident. The limits of the province of Kandahar have not been officially defined; it is probably intended that they should extend to and include Farrah.

Kandahar is undoubtedly a point of great strategical importance, but it possesses this importance only in time of war. If we occupy such a position as will enable us to seize Kandahar on the first symptom of war, we obtain practically all the strategical advantages of the place itself, and at the same time avoid all the inconveniences which its permanent occupation would entail. If instead of Kandahar, we hold the Pishin Valley, we shall shorten our line of communication with India by over 100 miles, and at the same time be near enough to Kandahar to seize it when the necessity arises, and near enough to avail ourselves of the resources of the valley of the Arghandab.

There is no reason if we give up Kandahar, why the railway already in progress should not be continued to that place from Pishin. One of the conditions of making over the province to Abdul Rahman might be that he should furnish labour and funds towards the construction of the line within his territory, and that when our troops are finally withdrawn, he should be responsible for the protection of the line within his dominions.

As regards the value of Kandahar as a *point d'appui* against a Russian advance from Herat, or as an advanced base for a British advance on that town, it is contended that Russia is not now in a position, and will not be so for years to come, to undertake any offensive operations in Afghanistan, and we ourselves are incapable of advancing on and occupying Herat in the face of Russian opposition, and many years will probably elapse before we are in a position to do so.

The formation of the province of Kandahar into an independent Chiefship will practically cut off the district of Herat from Kabul, for the line of communication between those two places will then be restricted to the road over the Bamian Pass and through Afghan Turkestan, the mountain portion of which is closed by snow for at least two

months in the year. The advocates of the formation of an independent province of Kandahar do not appear to have put forward any proposal for the future of Herat, beyond the suggestion, which has happily been found impracticable, of handing it over to Persia. Herat is not strong enough, with reference to its powerful and aggressive neighbours, to be independent, and if weakly held by the ruler at Kabul it will become a source of constant trouble to Russia, Persia, and ourselves.

The establishment of an independent province of Kandahar under our protection, means, in fact, the dismemberment of Afghanistan, for the ruler at Kabul would then no longer be able to retain an efficient hold over Afghan Turkestan and Herat. The former would eventually fall to Russia and the latter to Persia, and would remain in the hands of that power so long only as it might suit Russian policy that it should do so.

We should then find ourselves at Kandahar, ready, it is true, to oppose an advance of Russia from Herat, but Russia meantime will be at the Hindu Kush, a few marches only from Kabul, and we should in no way have increased our power or means of opposing a Russian advance from that direction. When the Russian Agent went to Kabul in 1878, he did not proceed *viâ* Herat but *viâ* Bamian; when a body of Russian troops was moved to Djam in 1878, there was no intention of sending it to Herat to help the Afghans against us, but it was to have proceeded to Kabul. Kabul has for years been the seat of political and military power in Afghanistan, and the ruler at that place has been master of the country.

In our dealings with Native Princes in India we have maintained our supremacy over them by making our power felt at their capital, as is now done at Morar in Gwalior, at Hyderabad in the Deccan, &c. The same principle should apply in Afghanistan. Our occupation of Kandahar, as regards any influence it will exercise over the ruler at Kabul, is futile; he will remain as open to Russian intrigue as he has ever been, and we shall continue as heretofore, ignorant of what may be taking place at his capital until the mischief has been done. In fact, we shall in no way improve our means of counteracting a danger which has already been experienced, although we may be better able to guard against a Russian advance from Herat, which is a danger which has not yet occurred and cannot be experienced for many years to come. We shall provide against an improbable and remote contingency, but shall gain no advantage against one of daily and immediate occurrence.

To make our influence and power felt in the country, it must be exerted at or near the capital, and for the reasons put forward on a previous occasion, the formation of a fortified cantonment at Kushi, with a British Resident, who could thence proceed to Kabul when necessary, is again strongly urged. If this proposal cannot be carried out, then it is suggested that a strong brigade of all arms, with carriage complete, should be cantoned in the highest part of the Kuram valley, which is suitable for occupation all the year round, and that the road thence across the Shutur-Gurdam Pass should be improved by our troops before they completely evacuate Northern Afghanistan. The knowledge that this force is ready for an advance at any moment on Kabul would have a very powerful influence on the conduct of affairs in that town.

The Government have decided that a British Resident is not in future to be stationed at Kabul, but it will probably be necessary to appoint an agent especially entrusted with Afghan affairs to reside on the frontier. This officer should be at the cantonment in the Kuram valley in the summer, and at Peshawur during the cold weather, and it should be his duty to pay periodical visits to Kabul.

The serious difficulty undoubtedly exists of our having bound ourselves to support the independence of the Wali of Kandahar, but this support, it is supposed, has not been promised unconditionally. His inability to maintain his position and rule has already been proved by the wholesale desertion of his troops, and this alone would appear sufficient reason for releasing us from our engagements.

Kandahar under a Native Prince but with a British garrison, would be independent in name only; in a very short time the administration would of necessity pass into our hands. It is impossible to disguise the fact that the independence of Kandahar, under the conditions proposed, means the annexation of the province to the British dominions.

What then becomes of our declaration that we had no intention of annexing any portion of Afghanistan beyond what might be absolutely necessary for the safety of our own frontiers? What faith will the Afghan nation in future place in British promises? They will say that in our first expedition against Afghanistan we suffered a serious disaster and were driven out of the country. In our second war, that we found it impossible to conquer the country, but, nevertheless annexed that part where the inhabitants are the least warlike, and where alone we could hope to retain our hold, and that we did this in spite of promises that the integrity of the country should be maintained.

In any future war between this country and Russia, Afghanistan will play a very important part, and it is as well we should consider what effect any arrangements we may now make may then have. The Afghans will not then look with favour upon those who have destroyed their independence and broken up their empire; they will rather side with the power that has shown them unvarying friendship, and which has not attempted to rob them of territory. A few Russian officers and a supply of arms would render the northern Afghans such a formidable enemy that they would seriously cripple any offensive operations we might undertake at the same time in Europe.

It is not recommended that Kandahar should be at once evacuated. This should not be done until Abdul Rahman has shown that he is firmly established in power, and is faithful to the promises he has made to the British Government; and Kandahar must also necessarily remain in our hands until the defeat inflicted by Ayoub Khan has been thoroughly avenged.

Lastly, as regards the frontier line we should occupy, there appears to be no reason why any alterations should be made from that contemplated in the treaty of Gandamak. By occupying Kushi, or the Upper Kuram Valley, we are in a position to enter Kabul, either as a friend or an enemy, whenever we may wish to do so, and from Pishin we can advance in a few days on Kandahar whenever the necessity arises.

Whether under any circumstances it will, at some future time, be advisable for us to advance beyond Kandahar, or Kabul, it is impossible at present to say; but, from a military point of view, it appears rather judicious to allow an enemy the difficulty and the risk of a long march, through a poorly supplied country, with the chance of having his army completely destroyed in case of a defeat, when he reaches his first objective point, than to undertake this march and risk ourselves, and relinquish to him the advantage of fighting a decisive battle near his base of operations.

(Signed) C. J. EAST,
A.Q.M.G.

Intelligence Branch,
Quartermaster-General's Department,
War Office, 16th August 1880.

Endorsements on the above.

Quartermaster-General,

I submit the within paper on "Our future Policy in Afghanistan," by Colonel East, A.Q.M.G.

I consider the views therein so ably put forward, of the greatest interest and importance at the present time.

I concur generally in the conclusions at which Colonel East has arrived.

(Signed) A. ALISON,
D.Q.M.G.

18th August 1880.

I think this a very good minute upon the present condition of affairs in Afghanistan, and I fully concur in the views expressed regarding the desirability of our leaving Kandahar, and retiring upon Pishin, as soon as political events will allow us to do so.

(Signed) G. J. WOLSELEY.

23rd August 1880.

No. 8.

MEMORANDUM by Field Marshal His Royal Highness the DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE on Colonel EAST's PAPER on our future POLICY in AFGHANISTAN.

WHILST admitting to the fullest extent the value of this paper, I confess I am not in the least convinced by it of the advisability of giving up Kandahar as the result of the great struggle we have been and are still engaged upon in Afghanistan. On the contrary, I feel more and more satisfied from all that is now going on, that upon the retention of Kandahar largely depends our general position and influence in the East, and more particularly in Central Asia; and even our hold on India will be shaken should we not have the boldness to maintain what we have so dearly purchased.

I firmly believe, that with a good line of communication by railroad, which is now in progress and considerably advanced to Kandahar, that city might and would in time become a great emporium for commercial purposes, and that the trade of Persia and Central Asia might in this way be very considerably diverted from passing, as it now

does, through the provinces of Russia, and that then our power would be largely increased in those parts, besides securing to us those commercial advantages which now fall to the share of our rivals. The railroad, in connecting Kandahar with India, would bring the trade down to Kurrachee, whence it would be shipped in perfect security to any portion of the world. Again, as a military position, I am strongly in favour of Kandahar. We know, by recent experience, that the march thence to Herat is not by any means difficult of accomplishment, and as Herat must ever be looked upon as the key to any advance on the part of Russia to India, the facility of reaching it before the Russians could attain it from Merv would, in itself, be of immense importance. That Russia is bent upon reaching Merv is palpable from all their movements, and is hardly denied by them. We cannot, if we would, prevent their attaining it, and I do not think we shall make any effort to do so, consequently I feel satisfied their object will ere long be accomplished. To us this would be a heavy blow, but for our occupation of Kandahar. But with Kandahar in our possession—and we are actually there now—I think we might look on with perfect calmness to Russia's occupying and holding Merv.

Such being my views, I ask myself what are the chief arguments against it as contained in Colonel East's paper. The first is the collapse of our native armies, the second the breakdown of our transport. I think too much importance is attached by him to both these incidents. I do not believe in the utter collapse of the native armies. No doubt native troops cannot be too long kept in the field or away from their native habits, as must be the case when the troops are in the field. It must be remembered that the army in Afghanistan has been for *two years* consecutively in the field. This would be a severe strain upon the best European troops, how much more so with natives deprived of all their usual habits and comforts. The native armies have fought faithfully and admirably and have never flinched. Give them rest and time to recover themselves, and there is no reason to doubt that they would be found as ready and willing again to go wherever ordered. Very probably recruiting has been checked and suspended by what has been required of the troops in so protracted a campaign. But there are many other causes which have added to the difficulty of obtaining recruits, and which are referred to in Colonel East's paper, and in other communications I have received from India. The severity of military duties in India has been very great, the facility of employment is far greater than what it was, and the labour market has now to be watched in India, as it has to be even at home. In fact, the price of the military article, in the shape of men, has greatly increased in value, and there has not been any sufficient rise in the remuneration offered to induce men to enlist as freely as in former times. So that I think we must not ascribe to the unpopularity of the war alone the difficulties with which we are contending.

Then as regards transport, there is no doubt that at the present moment this has seriously broken down, and hampered our movements. But this has been chiefly caused by the want of preparedness at the outset of the contest, and the consequent overworking of such animals as could hastily be collected, bad or inferior in themselves, and rendered totally inefficient by the vast amount of work they were called upon to perform from the deficiency in their numbers. But as regards the retention of Kandahar, I do not think this ought to cause any uneasiness, for with the railroad once completed to Kandahar, the traffic will be conducted mainly on this line, and transport animals will only be required in reduced numbers, and as auxiliaries to the great line of communication by rail.

I hold, therefore, that the objections chiefly raised by Colonel East to the retention of Kandahar ought to be, and would be, met by judicious measures, and as I feel satisfied that our prestige would receive a vital blow by retrograde movement in that direction, I adhere strongly to my conviction, that Kandahar ought, on no account, ever again to pass out of our hands.

As regards the question of expenditure, I firmly believe that, in the long run, it will be found much less costly to retain our hold of the advantageous position we have acquired, both in a commercial and in a military point of view, than to have to fight for our very existence in India should our interests and prestige suffer, as I am persuaded they would were we now to withdraw to Pishin as suggested.

GEORGE.

Kissingen,
August 31st, 1880.

NOTE ON THE RETENTION OF KANDAHAR.

MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON,

ON the 26th June last I submitted to your Lordship a note on the subject of our line of frontier on the north-western border of India; but in that note I confined my observations in the main to the questions connected with the line of frontier to be occupied under the Treaty of Gundamak, that is, the Khyber Pass up to Lundi Kotul, the Kuram Valley, and the country beyond the old frontier of Sind up to Pisheen. I did not touch on the question of occupying Kandahar, for, as far as I knew, there was then no proposal that we should occupy it. Under the provisions of the Treaty of Gundamak we were entirely to withdraw from it, and under a more recent arrangement made by Lord Lytton, with the details of which I was imperfectly informed, Kandahar was to be made over to the Wali Shere Ali, who was to be supported by us, but to what extent I did not know.

Recent events, however, have made it important that some other arrangement should be made, and any sort of notion that may have been entertained of the power of Shere Ali to hold Kandahar must be discarded. Few believed in his power to do so at any time, but it is now conclusively proved that, except under the immediate support of our troops, he is quite incapable of retaining the position of ruler of Kandahar.

In my note of the 26th June, on the North-western frontier, I made the following allusion to Kandahar:—

“I will also assume that we shall not continue to occupy Kandahar. If we retain a force at Kandahar, any arguments I may use adverse to the tenure of positions in the direction of Pisheen or the Bolan fall to the ground; for if we hold Kandahar we must doubtless hold in ample strength our line of communication with that city. I have no knowledge as to the reasons which may have led to the alleged agreement with Shere Ali that he should have the province of Kandahar, or as to any stipulation that we should support him in his government, either by having a garrison at his capital or its neighbourhood, or at Pisheen, nor have I any knowledge as to there being any binding agreement of the kind. If there is such a binding agreement of course it will be adhered to, but I must say that the creation of such an engagement is to be lamented, and I am quite unaware of any necessity that has arisen for making such an engagement, while I am sure that it would be well, even at a very great sacrifice, to induce Shere Ali to consent to its modification.

“To occupy Kandahar at all will be very expensive, and no one, I suppose, really believes that the province will be for any long time left undisturbed if through our action it is separated from Kabul. To occupy it means to continue to occupy Khelat-i-Ghilzai, to be involved from time to time in the directions of Girishk and of Ghuznee, and eventually probably to be led on towards Furrak and Herat in the one direction and Kabul in the other, without really adding one iota to the security of our possession of India. Bad as it would be to occupy Kandahar ourselves, even this would be better than to remain there to support a Chief the justice of whose rule could not be depended upon, whose very existence as a ruler would provoke trouble, and whose presence would be rather a weakness than a strength to our occupying force.

“Our occupation of Kandahar, or its being held by a ruler under our guarantee, would infallibly land us, and speedily land us, in renewed difficulties such as our recent experience should lead us to avoid. It seems to me indeed pretty certain that if we remain at Kandahar we shall be again embarked on the troubled sea of Afghan politics, and may anticipate that before long we shall again have a large army in the field for no object that can benefit us.

“As I trust that Kandahar will not be occupied, and that it will turn out that we are not obliged to maintain Shere Ali in the government of that province, and as I am writing rather about the frontier intended to be occupied under the Treaty of Gundamak than about Kandahar, I will refrain from saying more on this point, and I will only add that the arguments I shall hereafter use against advancing our old frontier in view to being strong against Russia are, in my opinion, applicable to the occupation of Kandahar, but that if we feel ourselves compelled for any reason to hold Kandahar we must, as I have before said, hold Pisheen and other points between it and India.

“In considering the best line for our north-western frontier, I desire first to point out that no rectification of the old frontier has ever been advocated, as far as know, in view to resisting the Afghans.”

Very important events have occurred since I wrote the above, but I think it will be admitted that these events have not weakened the force of what I urged. Ayoub Khan

came from Herat to the Helmund, very much incited to do so, it would seem probable, by our having set up Shere Ali as ruler of Kandahar. The troops of the latter either wholly deserted his cause or became unreliable, and we had the mortification of suffering a disastrous defeat, and of seeing a considerable body of our troops shut up in Kandahar. It is difficult indeed to speak with respect of an arrangement which forced us to support at Kandahar a ruler who was evidently quite incapable of holding so important a province. We may, hope, however, that the arrangement which we entered into of our own accord with Shere Ali is at an end, and that we shall not attempt a similar experiment at Kandahar with any other chieftain. If this is admitted it remains to consider whether we shall permanently occupy the place as a British possession, a course which is being strenuously urged by those who have incited and applauded the policy which took us into Afghanistan two years ago, and some of whom at least would gladly see us remain at Kandahar as a sure step towards the eventual annexation of all Afghanistan.

At the outset of the discussion, the question of what is meant by the occupation of Kandahar must be raised, and the reply at first sight, I presume, would be that we should take over the province of Kandahar as recently allotted, or intended to have been allotted to Shere Ali. Few of those who write so readily about annexing Kandahar really know what such an annexation means, while others who are better informed and who desire the entire annexation of the Afghan kingdom must smile at the innocence with which taking Kandahar to ourselves is described as a small matter, when they know that it means a most gigantic step towards achieving the annexation they wish for.

The territory to be given to Shere Ali was described by Sir Donald Stewart, in a Despatch to the Government of India, dated 16th February 1880, as the province of Kandahar proper, excluding the assigned districts of Pisheen and Sibi, with possibly that part of Seistan watered by the Helmund; the district of Khelat-i-Ghilzai, separated from Kandahar in 1855; the districts of Pusht-i-rud and Zemindawar, separated about nine years ago, and the district of Furrak originally belonging to Herat, but which was formed into a separate province since the capture of that city by the Ameer of Kabul in 1863. This is stated by General Stewart to be the minimum already practically fixed, and he enclosed a cutting from a map showing the extent and approximate limits of the territory. It is there shown by "an irregular figure not far removed from an equilateral triangle, with sides nearly 400 miles in length and covering about 70,000 square miles. A very small portion of this is cultivated, or indeed cultivable." Sir D. Stewart estimated the number of inhabitants at between half a million and a million, three-fourths being Dooranees, according to their own account, the only true Afghans, and Colonel St. John estimated the revenue at 20½ lacs, which sum he assumed, might "be largely increased by a settled government and by the construction of a railway from India to Kandahar."

Judging by the map, the province thus comprised would extend forty or fifty miles beyond Khelat-i-Ghilzai, or say 130 from Kandahar in all, in the direction of Ghuznee and Kabul. It would reach a point about 30 miles beyond Furrak, or 260 miles from Kandahar in the direction of Herat, and within 130 miles of the last-named place. Due west it would extend to the Persian frontier beyond Lash Jawain, a distance of 300 miles from Kandahar, and it would extend 120 miles to the eastward, and about 300 miles to the southward of Kandahar. This is a tract of country one fifth larger than England and Wales combined, and about the same size as the Punjab territory annexed by Lord Dalhousie after the war of 1848-9, while it is so placed as to hold forth a sure prospect of discord with the rulers of Persia, Herat, and Kabul. The people too, General Stewart says, comprise a large majority of Dooranees, the class which we are told has chieftains most inclined to be hostile to us, and whose expulsion from the city of Kandahar was deemed essential after the defeat of General Burrows and advance of Ayoub Khan.

To take upon ourselves the responsibility of this large and unprofitable territory cannot, I think, be contemplated. If it is contemplated, then we had better prepare to maintain at least 20,000 troops in Southern Afghanistan, with the prospect of having to send a good many more. If we take Kandahar with only a moderate territory round, including the tract between it and Pisheen, so as to guard our communications and command sufficient supplies, still difficulties will arise as to who is to have the territory of the province of Kandahar, and many troubles may be caused by various claimants for different portions of territory, and we ourselves from time to time be involved in these troubles.

Putting this aside, and supposing the smaller tract only is taken, that is the country between Pisheen and Kandahar, and a tract of 50 to 70 miles in other directions, I will ask what advantage accrues to us?

Taking the military arguments first, we see it broadly stated by anonymous newspaper correspondents that military men quartered at Kandahar were unanimously of opinion that we ought to retain the place. I have good grounds for doubting that this assertion is correct, and though I am unaware of General Stewart's opinions at present, I certainly understood that he at one time considered Kandahar useless as a military position. But after all what does the military opinion amount to? We do not know what attention these military officers may have given to the various considerations which must be borne in mind by a responsible Government. They could not say that service there was popular, for such a statement would be directly opposed to facts; they could not say that by holding Kandahar we would require fewer troops in the army of India than if we did not take Kandahar, for not only would a large force be required for Kandahar and the communications, but the presence of this force beyond our frontier could in no way enable us to weaken Sind by having less than the very small garrison which has sufficed for it for many years prior to 1878.

In short it comes to this, that some authorities consider Kandahar to be a good military position while others disagree with this opinion, but if the former view is correct, we have to ask for what purpose is it a good military position and necessary for us to hold. We have had no trouble in India from the Afghans, and assuredly need anticipate no trouble from them to warrant our undertaking the occupation as against them, nor can it be believed that we are in danger from Persia, and must therefore take this forward position permanently. It must be the old story of Russia invading India, and to oppose her it is deemed by the advocates of this policy necessary to keep a force at Kandahar, which, of course, necessitates other troops on the line of communication and in reserve. But are we to undertake serious and immediate responsibilities and difficulties merely in the prospect of a contingency, such as the advance of Russia to Herat? Our being at Kandahar would not prevent Russia from advancing to Herat if she desired to do so. An occupation of Herat could only be prevented by our sending a considerable army there, and not by remaining at Kandahar. The contingency is remote, and if Russia really intends to injure us in India, which, of course, would involve war in Europe, my impression is that she is at least as likely to make an advance from the direction of Tashkend towards Afghan-Turkistan and Kabul, as to move forward by Herat.

Our real danger of Russia taking possession of Herat, without giving us a cause of war, would arise if Persia had the place, as, I understand, was at one time contemplated as a good arrangement for England. Then, indeed, Russia might, under some plausible pretext of a quarrel with Persia, find reasons, with which we could hardly quarrel, for taking Herat. I trust we shall entirely discourage any occupation of Herat by Persia, and without such occupation it does not seem likely that Russia could find grounds to take Herat, even if she desired to do so. My contention is that the probability of our having to struggle for Herat, or to defend India from Kandahar, is so remote that its possibility is hardly worth considering as an argument for an inconvenient and costly occupation. I think such an occupation would involve too large a charge for the small extra facility it might afford us in bringing up at some future day the 30,000 or 40,000 men it might be requisite to use if we had to fight Russia at Herat or at Kandahar, or between those two places.

The military reasons, therefore, seem to me to be of little force, while financial reasons must assuredly be *nil*. Holding Kandahar with a moderate *entourage*, it is hardly to be supposed that we could realize 10 lacs of rupees a year, even under the favourable circumstances anticipated by Colonel St. John, and this sum would leave us heavy losers. A railway, which would be almost a necessity of our occupation, would never recoup us for the outlay of construction and maintenance. Its first cost would be very heavy, and establishments would require handsome pay to induce them to serve. Is it possible to believe, after our experience of railways in fertile, thickly populated parts of British India, that a railway across the desert of Sind, and passing over mountain ranges in a sparsely populated country like Beloochistan and Southern Afghanistan, is likely to pay its heavy working expenses, maintenance, and interest on money laid out? It would be the wildest assumption to suppose that any occupation of Kandahar could ever result pecuniarily in anything but a heavy loss.

The political reasons urged in favour of occupation or annexation, as far as I understand them, are as follows:—

- I. That we shall influence Afghanistan and Central Asia generally from Kandahar in a way favourable to our views.
- II. That we shall introduce good government where otherwise there would be bad government.

III. That annexation is desired by the people or by a majority of them.

IV. That our prestige will suffer by retirement, especially in the eyes of the people of India.

V. That it is advisable to remain at Kandahar in order that we may have something to show in return for our heavy loss in lives and treasure in Afghanistan during the last two years.

As to the first reason it appears to me that our presence at Kandahar, so far as it exerts any influence, will be unfavourable to us. Every one engaged in the recent war whose opinion I have read, and I have read many opinions, from those of the two most distinguished Generals the war has produced down to that of an intelligent Native Officer has expressed himself to the effect that the less we have to say to the Afghans the better for our influence over them. For many reasons they dislike our presence, and though we lavish money on them and treat them with justice and kindness they are in no degree reconciled to our being in their country. They are an independent people and do not like us in the position of conquerors, the only position in which we can remain among them, and apart from this our ways and our religion are so different from that of the Afghans that we can never expect them to tolerate us in their country unless it may be to aid them to repel or to expel some other invader.

It is to be hoped that we may so far flatter ourselves as to believe that the second reason urged is, in a sense, true. No doubt, so far as our means extended, our Government would be far better than that of any Afghan, but it is a Government not desired by the Afghans; and we have no right to take territory without the consent of those to whom it belongs, merely to enable us to bring into play our system of good government.

The third reason, namely, that our rule is desired, is absolutely opposed to all our experience. There may be a certain number of Hindoo traders and others who think we would protect or favour them, but can anyone suppose that the Afghans themselves wish for our rule? Who of them has lost an opportunity, when such opportunity offered, of injuring us? No place ought to appreciate us more than Kandahar, where our money had been lavished, most strict discipline maintained, as was indeed the case everywhere with our troops in Afghanistan, and where we had very scrupulously abstained from everything calculated to annoy the natives, and yet, how did they behave? A full inquiry into recent events at and near Kandahar will, I think, show that the behaviour of the Afghans of the city and neighbourhood was the reverse of friendly directly we fell into trouble, and we are told that the villagers not far from Kandahar murdered our fugitive soldiers after the defeat of Khosk-i-Nakhud. These people cannot desire our rule; on the contrary, they detest it, and have availed themselves of every good opportunity to show this feeling.

Fourthly, it is alleged that our prestige in India will suffer by retirement. I do not see why this should be alleged of Kandahar more than of Kabul, the retirement from which place seems to have been followed by no such result. On the contrary India seems to have accepted the retirement as a wise and just measure. I feel sure the same sentiment would follow a retirement from Kandahar, and we should further know that, prestige or no prestige, we should be far stronger in India after the retirement, and would be so in long years to come when any recollection of a temporary or partial loss of prestige would be forgotten.

The last argument, though it appeals to national feelings, seems to me one that can hardly be pressed. It amounts to this,—that we have made a very bad bargain of this Afghan war, but it is so painful to admit this that we must cling to a part of our bad bargain. If the portion we retained would cost us nothing hereafter, there might be a show of sense in the argument, but if it can be shown that our remaining at Kandahar simply means a perpetuation of a bad bargain, surely we had better, like sensible people, admit we have made a mistake, and let our first loss be a final one. Let us not condemn others to die in Afghanistan, because we have already lost many valuable lives, or lavish millions in addition to those millions that have already gone past recall, merely because we are unwilling to admit that we have been led into grievous error.

I have thus noted a few observations on the reasons assigned for holding Kandahar. It hardly seems worth while to allude to the argument that we should create and improve trade. I am sceptical as to trade receiving any considerable development because we establish our guns and bayonets at Kandahar, but if this result was certain, and if every one of the other reasons assigned for holding the place was true, I would say they were immeasurably outbalanced by the evils of any such occupation, and I will now detail those evils, though I shall be far indeed from exhausting the catalogue.

First, as to political evils. One of these, of most importance in my mind, is that we should be guilty of injustice. No doubt we may have taken territory in India under circumstances now considered not creditable according to strict rules of justice and right. It might be hoped that our sense of justice had improved in these latter years, but, if we annex a portion of Afghanistan we shall, I think, commit a great wrong, and a great wrong is a political error in any country, but most of all so in India, where our supreme position gives us so heavy a responsibility, and where, as Christian rulers, we should set an example of Christian justice to our subjects. Necessity cannot fairly be alleged, as it was alleged, rightly or wrongly, in some of the cases of annexation, that are now condemned. Our greatest annexation during the last fifty years was that of the Punjab, but this annexation only took place after an actual invasion of our territory by the formidable army of the Punjab, and after the failure of our attempt, subsequent to the defeat of the Sikh army, to maintain the lawful sovereign of the country peaceably on his throne. We annexed Oudh in 1856, and though individually I think the measure was wrong, our title to do so was, under the circumstances, incomparably greater than anything that can be alleged in favour of annexing Kandahar. I feel certain that the real political effect of such annexation will be injurious to us in India, as it will impress upon the Chiefs and people the notion that a mere cry that we should be the better for possessing certain territory is sufficient to justify us in seizing it.

If it is stated that the wishes of the population justify our annexation, I would say that the evidence seems to me to tend in the opposite direction. On what occasion have the people given practical proofs of friendship for us? I have already shown what they did when we were in trouble last July and August, and it is notorious that then everywhere our communications were stopped or threatened. It is not likely that a province, three fourths of the population of which are Dooranee Afghans, the people who, it is said, General Primrose had to expel from the city directly after the defeat of Burrows, is much in favour of annexation by the British. Our well-wishers are probably confined to a few of those who make money out of us, and the friendship even of these is not to be relied on whenever circumstances stop their gaining profit out of us. It seems to me that we have no grounds for evading the charge of injustice in annexing, by the plea that we are acting in accord with the wishes of the bulk of the people.

Then, assuredly, the political effect of burdening India with the inevitable cost of the annexation would be bad. It is not likely that the English taxpayer will approve of an annual charge to meet that cost, wholly or in part, and it is evident that if we hold Kandahar taxes must be added in India, or imposts maintained that otherwise might be abolished to the great contentment of our subjects. If we stop all charges for Afghanistan, we may enter on a settled course to improve our financial position; but if we remain in that country, not only are extra charges inevitable, but these charges must be so uncertain, and, I fear, with a constant tendency to increase, that a state of things will continue which is highly undesirable from a political point of view.

Remaining in Afghanistan means a continual simmering of trouble with real troubles from time to time. Hence there will be a constant excitement in India. We can never be quit of Afghan difficulties while we remain in the country. Disputes of one kind or another are certain to arise, in which we shall be involved, and when any reverse or check takes place we see how readily panics arise in India, and such panics may at any time be taken advantage of by those classes of our subjects or feudatories who do not wish us well. Nothing can have a better effect politically in India than for the people to know that we are very strong within our borders, and that we have ceased to have the constant anxieties which arise from our troops being thrust forward into advanced positions in an inhospitable country, full of unfriendly and warlike people.

Our object is always said to be to have a friendly and strong Afghanistan. Breaking up the country, as we must do by holding Kandahar, ensures us enemies, and certainly cannot make Afghanistan strong. It is difficult to conceive that the ruler of Kabul could conquer and hold the Herat province if we held Kandahar, and it is difficult also to conceive, looking to past history, as recently quoted in a memorandum submitted to your Lordship by Sir Erskine Perry, and also judging by common sense, that a ruler at Kabul can feel himself powerful and contented if he does not hold Kandahar. I have already alluded to the difficulties which beset us as to territorial jurisdiction if we hold Kandahar. They seem to me almost insuperable, but it is quite certain that whether we take the whole Kandahar province or only a limited part of it, a series of struggles must take place among the chieftains, of which it would be difficult for us to keep clear,

and which certainly would place in the far distance any hope of a united or friendly Afghanistan.

Turning to the military financial aspect of the question, it must be observed what a great misfortune it will be if we have to maintain troops in excess of the real requirements of India. Apart from what I look upon as a weak and unfounded fear of Russia, I suppose few now assert that we have a better frontier by advancing than we had previously. At all events on the Sind frontier, which alone can be affected by our advance on Kandahar, we have had no military trouble for many years, and a most moderate garrison, not 5,000 men for all Sind, has amply sufficed. A force placed at Kandahar may be considered entirely in excess of Indian requirements, and so far from enabling us to do with fewer troops in Sind it would necessitate, I think, an addition so as to have a reserve at hand ready to come up.

The amount of force required at Kandahar depends, first, upon the territory we take, and secondly, upon the supposed object of holding Kandahar. If we occupy the whole province and hold Kelat-i-Ghilzai, Girishk, Furrah, and other necessary places, besides Quetta and our lines of communication, I do not see that less than 20,000 or 22,000 men would be sufficient, and this force would have to be very thoroughly equipped for movement, and require a strong reserve to be brought from Sind and India if ever operations were to be extended towards Herat, for I need hardly remark that our being at Kandahar would not hinder Russia, if so minded, from occupying Herat, unless we are prepared to bring up a large force to that place. No doubt many of the advocates of annexation look upon a move to Herat as a necessary sequence to the occupation of Kandahar, though I have very high military authority for saying that if we are to oppose Russia we ought not to advance to Herat to do so.

Assuming, however, that we only hold Kandahar, the country between it and India, and a territory extending to that unsatisfactory line of frontier, the Helmund, and for 40 or 50 miles in other directions, and also assuming that the present army in India generally is looked upon as sufficient to afford a body of troops to move up speedily if extended operations become necessary, I cannot think that, judging by past experience, we could prudently keep less than 15,000 men beyond the old frontier. When Ayub Khan advanced from Herat last July, General Primrose had rather more than 12,000 men under his orders, or deducting the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, he had about 11,000 men, all of them beyond the old frontier. We have seen how inadequate this force proved, and I should hope that we should in future have at least 15,000 men to compose the Kandahar division thus distributed.

Kandahar, including the adjacent territory to the west, north, and east :—

- 4 Batteries of Artillery.
- 1 Regiment of British Cavalry.
- 3 Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 2 Companies Sappers and Miners.
- 2 Regiments British Infantry.
- 5 Regiments Native Infantry.

On the communications, extending 250 miles, and excluding the garrison of Quetta and reserve at that place :—

- 1 Battery Native Artillery.
- 1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 3 Regiments Native Infantry.

Reserve Brigade at Quetta and garrison for that place :—

- 2 Batteries Artillery.
- 1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 1 Regiment British Infantry.
- 3 Regiments Native Infantry.

This force is in reality only in excess of that which General Primrose had to the following extent, viz. :—

- 1 Field Battery retained at Quetta in 1879, but returned to India without relief when General Stewart left Kandahar.
- 1 Mountain Battery taken on by General Stewart from Kandahar, and not replaced last July, though intended to be so.
- 1 Regiment British Cavalry.
- 1 Regiment British Infantry.
- 1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 1 Regiment Native Infantry.

This seems a moderate addition, and assuming that the additional corps were about the same strength as those serving in Afghanistan last year, would bring that force up to about the 15,000 men I have put down as necessary.

In Artillery it will be seen that I have only brought up the strength to the scale of 1879. A British Cavalry regiment has been added for Kandahar, and this I look on as important. A regiment of this arm accompanied General Stewart to Kandahar, and was most useful, but was withdrawn in April 1879, to be hurried up again, from a distance of more than a thousand miles, directly General Burrows was defeated. No doubt Native Cavalry are excellent, and for general purposes are more useful than British Cavalry, but the latter are, in my humble opinion, an essential component part of a well constituted force in India. It was accepted as an established rule in India, after experience of the Mutiny and Sikh wars, that British Cavalry were, in all practicable cases, to be a part of any considerable force of all arms, especially if there was Horse Artillery. That was a wholesome rule, and had it not been departed from at Kandahar we might have had a different result to General Burrows' action. No doubt the presence of British Cavalry, inaccessible to those influences which may be brought to bear on our Native Cavalry, and possessing superb discipline, adds enormously to the moral strength of a force, and I am quite sure that Sir F. Roberts would readily acknowledge the advantage he has experienced during the last twelve months from the presence of the 9th Lancers.

The only other addition I have made is that of a regiment of British Infantry, a regiment and a half of Native Cavalry and a regiment of Native Infantry, just sufficient to enable the General Commanding to bring up a reserve brigade of 3,000 men of all arms to Kandahar whenever wanted, without unduly weakening Quetta or his posts of communication. That such a reserve should be maintained at or near Quetta, completely equipped with transport, however expensive it may be to keep transport at Quetta, seems to me essential. Had any proper moveable reserve been maintained, such as I propose, and General Phayre, instead of only being able to send forward to Kandahar dribbles of Native Infantry prior to Burrows' defeat, been able to move forward with a strong brigade when first reinforcements were called for, that brigade would have reached Kandahar a fortnight before Burrows' reverse, and might have entirely prevented it.

Let us not suppose that trouble is ended because Sir F. Roberts has defeated Ayub and captured his guns. That distinguished Officer captured all the Kabul artillery in October 1879, and yet his splendid force was compelled to retire behind the walls of Sherpur in December. In fact, the Afghans are stronger when the uncongenial discipline to which their forces have been subjected of late years is destroyed, and they are at liberty to fight in their own fashion. If, therefore, we are capable of learning by experience, we shall not leave Kandahar in future without a strong reserve above the passes.

It may be urged that if we make a railway a more moderate force will answer. I doubt this. The railway, for about 250 miles, will have to be strongly guarded, and it is not only liable to attacks but also to interruptions from floods, of which instances occurred this year, although the rainfall was not excessive. No doubt a railway is useful in bringing reinforcements and stores, but it must not be implicitly relied on, and at all events the force I have specified is the least that I think should be maintained above the passes, completely equipped for movement and quite independent of the railway.

The entire cost of the occupation of Kandahar, according to the foregoing view, and by calculations based on the plan adopted in my note of the 26th June 1880, would be about 1,400,000*l.* per annum.* I think this is fairly and entirely chargeable to the cost of occupation, for I am not aware that the occupation of Kandahar would strengthen us in India or on any other part of our northern frontiers, while certainly some reserves would have to be held in constant readiness to support Kandahar and Quetta.

Besides this large charge, no doubt much would have to be done in the way of constructing permanent shelter for the troops and in improving or constructing fortified posts, and these, together with the completion of the railway from Sibi to Kandahar

* That is taking the ordinary cost of the troops in India and adding 100 per cent. to cover the increased cost of supplies for European troops, larger establishment, of Native regiments (96 men in the Cavalry and 200 in the Infantry), staff, transport, rations, and extra payments to Natives, increased cost of Native Cavalry, depôts in India, heavy non-effective charges owing to pensions being given to heirs of all Native soldiers who die beyond the frontier, rations to families of British soldiers allowed during absence of troops in Afghanistan, for works and roads, and for civil and political charges and payments.

(250 miles), and the probable improvement that will be necessary to the railway up to Sibi, could hardly take less than 2,000,000*l.* sterling.

For all this what return can be expected? It can hardly be supposed that the territory I have assumed round Kandahar would give a net revenue of 100,000*l.* a year, while the prospect of the railway covering its working expenses and cost of maintenance in a difficult country, and necessarily high cost of establishments, and probably, in parts, of fuel, is doubtful. That it could also cover the interest on capital seems impossible, when we recollect the sparse population and sterile nature generally of the country through which it passes and to which it leads.

On the other hand, if we frankly put aside our Russian bugbear and give up Kandahar, we may discontinue the railway, and save a great outlay, and by bringing back our troops to India, even if we do not reduce regiments or batteries, we might save all the additional expenditure consequent on foreign service and increased establishments.

Entire withdrawal from Afghanistan would be hailed with joy by our Native Army. Nothing short of this will restore the old popularity of our service. We know that recruiting, even though a bounty is given, has been practically stopped, and this to those who know the Native Army is not surprising. Good and loyal soldiers as they are, and always anxious for a campaign, prolonged service out of India, and especially in Afghanistan, is hateful to them. No device of a reserve will remedy this defect, for neither army nor reserve can exist without recruiting, and I can conceive nothing more disastrous to the popularity of the service than a continuance of the liability to be sent to Afghanistan, combined with the formation of a reserve which should give the State a claim to re-enrol a man when he had left active service and settled down at his home. We cannot do without our Native Army, so let us not tamper with it. It serves our purpose for all really necessary objects connected with the defence of India, but it will not serve us if we condemn a large part of it to duty in Afghanistan. We cannot replace this army in Afghanistan by Afghan levies, for they would eventually turn against us, and to replace them by Europeans would be too heavy a burden.

The mere fact of our making Kandahar British territory would in no way reconcile our sepoys to service there, nor would the extra advantages given them on the ground that service at Kandahar is foreign service be prudently withdrawn. In Burmah, which has been ours since 1852, the sepoys still receive all the advantages of foreign service, and the heirs of those who die there receive pension, and this undoubtedly would still have to be allowed at Kandahar if we annexed it.

Doubts, too, have been expressed as to the suitability of all portions of our Native Army for service in Afghanistan. Loyal, well-disciplined, and brave as those troops are, many of our soldiers are physically inferior to the Afghans. A determined attack by fanatical Afghans tries the best troops, and there is an opinion among officers who have recently served that the result of such attacks if really carried home may be doubtful, unless our forces were in the main British, Sikhs, Pathans, and Goorkhahs, elements of the Army which, for many reasons, it is impossible to largely increase. We are only likely to see such attacks when we meet the Afghans on their own ground, for it is not the disciplined soldier, but the fanatical Ghazee, who makes such attacks, and these people usually have neither the inclination nor the means to enable them to proceed to distances in a body.

I trust I have made clear some objections to holding Kandahar. I have already urged that we should not permanently hold Pisheen and Quetta. I think I can add little to what I said on that subject in my note of the 26th June. It is to me doubtful whether holding Pisheen would be much of an improvement over the occupation of Kandahar. We might require less troops and have fewer sources of trouble around us, but in all probability being near to Kandahar something would soon draw us back there. Further, by all accounts, Pisheen possesses few resources. It is also distinctly Afghan territory. As to Quetta, it is impossible to see any justification for our permanent occupation of the place. A treaty empowering us to send troops into the territory does not warrant our permanently taking Quetta, and our doing so is opposed to Lord Salisbury's Despatch of 1877. Quetta is hateful to our troops, and very sickly. It is folly to suppose that it is necessary to hold Quetta in order to secure ourselves against Russia, and the wise and just course is to give it back to the Khan, and, with it, to give the district of Sibi, taken by us from Kabul in 1879. My urgent contention is that we should come back altogether,—not hurriedly, but deliberately, and with a determination henceforth to leave the Afghans to settle their own affairs, and with

a. resolve not to interfere with them unless they are actually allying themselves with Russia for unfriendly purposes towards ourselves.

If we retain Kandahar, or if we retain Pisheen, I venture to predict that we shall have an army in the field before a year is over engaged in opposing those with whom we ought to have no cause of quarrel.

I feel deeply the momentous issues that hang upon the decision as to the retention or abandonment of Kandahar. To my apprehension a judicious withdrawal will be for the great and lasting benefit of India, while a continuance there will be productive of endless evil, and be a measure which, once formally decided on by Her Majesty's Government, can hardly be revoked save under circumstances of dishonour and disaster.

As a humble contribution to the facts and arguments already before your Lordship on the subject, I venture to submit the foregoing remarks.

H. W. NORMAN.

20th September 1880.

No. 10.

MEMORANDUM ON KANDAHAR.

THE importance of Kandahar strategically is generally allowed by military authorities as to the following:—

It covers *all* the lines of communication between Southern Afghanistan and the Indus.

It commands the easiest westerly approach from Herat, which will infallibly be used by any hostile body coming from that direction. This route presents no physical difficulties; the absence of such has been well proved lately by Ayoob Khan bringing with him a large force of artillery, 30 guns, not particularly well mounted.

It commands the roads to Northern Afghanistan and powerfully flanks the Kabul line. No force designing to reach India from the Oxus would dare venture on advance through Kabul and the Khyber, Kandahar being held in force by the troops of India.

From Herat to Kabul there is no direct road practicable for wheeled artillery. The only other such route than by Kandahar is the roundabout one *viâ* Maimana, Balkh, and Bamian.

For supplies for an army Kandahar is the next best situation to Herat. It is a real emporium to which the products of the surrounding valleys, some of them very rich, readily flow in, and where everything required for soldiers, except European necessities, can be obtained in ample sufficiency.

Being a trade centre the inhabitants generally are very peaceably disposed, and in the first part of this war, as well as in 1839-42, showed themselves very ready to keep on good terms with us. The adverse display after the disaster of Maiwand was mainly from surrounding tribes led away by the temptation of expected easy plunder.

Politically, the advantages resulting from retention of Kandahar are very great. The establishment of a good order and fixed system of government promoting peace and prosperity in Southern Afghanistan would have a wide-spreading effect, helping to civilise the tribes, and to gradually induce them to forego their clan animosities, while by our influence steadily gaining ground, we should easily become acquainted with all that went on in Afghanistan and adjacent countries.

If the present arrangement with Abdool Rahman is to bear real fruit, his being relieved of the trammels attendant on the administration of Kandahar from Kabul will be a great help to him rather than an injury.* He has quite as much as he can manage to consolidate his power in Northern Afghanistan, and aid in money given him there will be far more useful to him than being saddled with a distant charge. In the arrangements lately entered into, Kandahar was excluded from what he was to receive, and there is not the slightest necessity for altering that rôle. It should be borne in mind that an united Afghanistan under one ruler was only revived by Dost Mahomed towards the end of his reign. In the settlement of the country amongst the Barukzye family, Kabul and Ghazni were Dost Mahomed's portion. Kandahar was allotted to his five half brothers, Pardil Khan, Sheredil Khan, Kohundil Khan, Rehimdil Khan, and Mehrdil Khan, while a Suddoozye Prince still ruled at Herat. Separation now is therefore but a return to the "*status quo ante*." Dost Mahomed only took possession of Kandahar in 1854, and of Herat just before his death. His youngest son, Shere Ali, succeeded to these possessions, but throughout his reign there were constant disturbances in all

* Recent papers show he has expressed himself to this effect.

parts, no stable rule or improving government, and of all places the one that suffered most was Kandahar. It was regarded as a sort of milch cow, and whenever the Ameer was pressed hard for money, a demand was made on Kandahar, to be squeezed out of the people as the Governor thereof best could, and as he well knew the tenure of his office depended on prompt obedience he used the screw freely. Then he had to meet his own wants besides, and it is only natural that government from Kabul and by its officials finds no favour with the Kandaharis. They are weary of oppression and disorder, and would most gladly welcome a firm regular rule.

In a commercial point of view the security given to trade by a strong government at Kandahar cannot be otherwise than most advantageous to the Afghans as well as to ourselves, and should have full consideration. It will insure that trade safe and speedy transit to and from our sea ports, causing a very largely increased demand for our home fabrics, especially cotton goods, which are greatly desired in Afghanistan and Central Asia, while the exports from those parts will proportionally increase. There has always been a certain amount of trade from Kandahar down the Bolan Pass into Sind, bringing the products of Kandahar, Ghuzni, Kabul, Herat, and even from countries beyond, such as wool, excellent woollen stuffs, silks, carpets, dyes, fruits, &c. for the Indian markets. Before disturbances were stirred up in Beluchistan the flow of this trade was very regular. For the ten years, 1863-73, the records show that the average value of the wool alone brought down annually by the Kafilahs amounted to 60,000*l*. The journey then took up the whole of one cold season, so that the merchants could only make one trip a year. With railway communication the trips may be repeated more than once and the trade expand accordingly.

The extension of influence gained by means of such a trade would be quiet, certain, and steady. No government understands the value of such action better than Russia. Her most effective pioneer has ever been, and still is, commercial intercourse, and large sacrifices are unhesitatingly made to promote it. Her most strenuous efforts have been devoted to keeping the trade in Central Asia in her own hands. British goods from India are completely barred from the Khanates, owing to the heavy duties imposed on them by the Russian authorities. Assistance, and with no sparing hand, is given to merchants by the Russian Government to enable the former to push their goods to most distant markets, and, sending the best, to sell them there at greater advantage than like goods conveyed by a nearer and cheaper route. That this has been done for a long time past in the direction of India may be proved by the following fact:—Thirty years ago the collector of Shikarpore reported that Russian fabrics brought down by Kafilahs through Afghanistan were being sold at fair prices in the bazaars of that city, and much approved of by the people. Specimens were ordered to be sent to England to ascertain the nature of the superiority. They were forwarded to a firm at Manchester, who readily testified to the excellence of the articles, for they found their own trade mark on them; they were of their own making. These goods imported into Russia had been transmitted from there over the long land journey, and were made to compete successfully with articles from the same manufactory that had reached the same place mainly by water carriage. This was not simple commercial enterprise of merchants, but the powerful lever of trade influence promoted and largely aided by a government that knew its value.

Why should we not extend our influence and commerce, but in a fair and legitimate way, when the opportunity is presented to us? Why should not our merchants be able to compete rightfully with those of Russia in the various markets of Afghanistan, Khorassan, and Persia, if not in the Khanates, and what more favourable position for such competition could there be than Kandahar.

Russia is using every effort to draw the trade through Armenia and by the Caspian on to the routes under her own special guidance and command. Why should we not avail ourselves of alternative routes yet left open to us.

The above remarks refer to the advantages following the retention of Kandahar. It should now be considered whether retention would be costly and draw unduly on the revenues of India. It has been hastily assumed by some that the cost must be very heavy, and that occupation of Kandahar must entail a large increase in the Indian army. More careful consideration will, however, show this assumption to be entirely wrong; that no increase to our army is required, and that any extra expenditure incurred in the administration and management of the occupied country will be more than covered by the returns on the spot.

The disciplined force necessary to hold Kandahar would be two strong brigades of infantry, each consisting of one full British and three native regiments, with artillery and cavalry in proportion, in all about 8,000 men, supported in Pishin and on the line of com-

munication by a third brigade with cavalry and artillery, 4,000 more, making a total of 12,000 men in advance of the old Sind frontier. Up to Sibi might be held from Sind.

Now, it has always been decided that there should be in India a body of at least 30,000 men over and above ordinary garrison requirements to be used and moved in any direction from which danger threatened, and especially with an eye to necessary operations in or towards Afghanistan. The commission which lately sat at Simla went much further than this. They state that under their proposed distribution of the troops, it would be possible with comparative ease, and without any demand from England, to put into the field 12,674 cavalry and 55,272 infantry, with 240 guns, besides siege artillery and sappers, leaving at the same time for the preservation of internal order in India a force of British and native troops numbering over 96,000 men and 160 guns.

Garrisoning Kandahar then, and maintaining proper communications with our old frontier line, would only employ 12,000 men, who would otherwise have to be kept ready for service in India, mobile in a strict sense, that is with the same means of transport as they would have in Afghanistan, and this would be taking only a small portion of the old recognised available body, leaving enough for regular relief and a margin besides.

With the railway completed the reliefs could be carried out as often and as systematically as in any other part of our possessions, and the present objections raised to long service in Afghanistan would entirely disappear.

The brigade on the line between Kandahar and Sibi should not be frittered away in small detachments, but divided into strong bodies, located in central positions, from which suitable parties could be sent when required to put down with promptness any disturbances that might arise. The intermediate portions would be watched and protected by local levies taken from the neighbouring tribes, properly enrolled, regularly paid, and held strictly responsible for faithful and efficient performance of the duties assigned to them. There would be no difficulty in getting the services of any number of men well fitted for the purpose, and at a rate of pay much below that of regular troops.

The extra military expenditure then on account of occupation of Kandahar would only be certain field allowances to the troops, the transmission of stores not procurable in the country (ordinary supplies, such as grain, meat, and forage, can be obtained in plenty and at cheap rates), and providing shelter for the force. This latter could be easily managed at Kandahar for no great outlay; indeed, it already exists to a considerable extent. The cost of the levies on the line would also be debitable to the same head.

The civil management of the district would be placed in the hands of a well chosen British Agency, supervising and controlling the establishments already existing, with the least possible alteration in the arrangements for collection of revenue, tenures of land and general administration.

For police purposes and ordinary maintenance of order a sufficient body of local levies should be entertained on the old irregular system under select British officers, similar to the mounted and armed foot police in Sind.

The cost of the above (also that of the small body of local levies required for military purposes) should be fully met from the revenue derived from the Kandahar District, from Pishin, and the so called assigned districts down to Sibi, all of which would be most justly applicable to the expenditure which brought good government, and established peace and order in the country.

Under the rule of the late Ameer the revenues of the Kandahar district only were reckoned at 7 lakhs of rupees (Indian) per annum. During the year of our occupation, though some duties were abolished as obnoxious, a return has been received showing that the above amount had been more than doubled, reaching 15 lakhs, and this, with continuance of regular government ensuring safety of person and security of property, will certainly be still further increased without pressure on the people.

It has been suggested to hold Pishin, that is the line of the Khoja Amran range, some 80 miles south of Kandahar, with Chaman on the northern face as the most advanced post. This would be a very far inferior position to Kandahar. It would be equally in Afghanistan, among Afghan tribes, but no real beneficial influence could be exercised from it over the city of Kandahar where everything in this part of Afghanistan is concentrated. Indeed, standing aloof from it, as it were, would have a most injurious effect for us on all around, by making it appear we were afraid to undertake the responsibilities which as a great power we ought to assume for the protection of our own possessions, and for the well-being of those we had been brought amongst. The force required for this position would be quite as large as that for Kandahar, without having as a set-off the advantages the latter plainly affords. Supplies in Pishin and its immediate neighbourhood are very limited, especially forage for cavalry and transport animals, and would

only suffice for a small portion of the troops. The deficiency would have to be sent up from below the passes, to assure its being forthcoming. Accommodation for the troops would call for a large outlay, having to be entirely freshly constructed on some new site to be fixed upon as suitable.

If it was ever necessary to re-advance to Kandahar, it would take at least a week for the force to reach, with the not unlikely probability of finding it in possession of opponents.

To briefly summarise what it has been endeavoured to show in the above remarks—

That Kandahar has particular advantages in a strategical point of view.

That ordinary necessary supplies for a force garrisoning it can be obtained on the spot in ample sufficiency.

That the inhabitants generally are peacefully disposed, and occupation would thus be easy, and free from the friction likely to be found in other places.

That politically our being established at Kandahar would be most advantageous.

It would be no help—indeed a weakness to him—handing it over to the new Ameer of Kabul.*

That commercially Afghanistan and India would benefit by our establishing a settled form of Government and security at Kandahar, in the rapid increase and expansion of trade, which again would benefit merchants generally.

That we have a just right to endeavour to compete on fair grounds in Afghanistan, Khorassan, &c. with the trade which for many years past Russia has been vigorously and cleverly pushing in that direction.

That no addition to the present army of India would be called for in consequence of the occupation of Kandahar.

That the extra military expense of such occupation would be comparatively trifling.

That the cost of administering the district of Kandahar, including Pishin and the assigned territory down to Sibi, would be more than covered by the revenues received and realised, without pressing at all on the people.

That Pishin as a position is in every respect far inferior to Kandahar—wanting in the advantages of the latter—and having disadvantages which the other has not.

(Signed) W. MEREWETHER.

24th September 1880.

No. 11.

MEMORANDUM ON KANDAHAR.

LORD HARTINGTON,

YOUR Lordship will probably by this time have in your hands the Memorandum relating to Kandahar of Sir Henry Norman, than whom as (virtually) Minister of War in India for so many years, and as having served on the Afghan frontier, there is no higher military authority. I will endeavour to consider the question solely as a politician, premising that as military authorities differ among themselves as to the best frontier for India in case of a Russian invasion, the whole question has to be decided by statesmen, and on large political grounds.

After our first invasion of Afghanistan in 1840, General Jacob sounded in 1856 the note of alarm against Russia, and contended that with her hold over Persia she could whenever she pleased take possession of Herat and Kandahar, and thus find an easy entrance to the plains of India. His remedy was first of all to occupy Quetta with a strong force and then to place a garrison of 20,000 troops in Herat. Lord Canning's Government maturely considered this scheme and rejected it. The outlines of Jacob's policy have been persistently maintained ever since by Bombay officers, Sir B. Frere, Sir H. Rawlinson, Sir W. Merewether, Sir H. Green, not one of whom has ever been in Afghanistan proper, with the exception of Sir H. Green and Sir H. Rawlinson, whose experience of the country was founded on political service there 40 years ago.

Eleven years later Sir B. Frere (then Governor of Bombay) brought to the notice of the Supreme Government the same policy in a somewhat different form. Sir H. Rawlinson at about the same time in two articles in the "Quarterly Review" and in a confidential Memorandum (which he afterwards published) to the Government of India reiterated Jacob's arguments. But the Government of India (then exceedingly strong, Lord Lawrence, Lord Sandhurst, Sir H. Maine, Sir H. Durand, Mr. Massey) peremp-

* He has said he would rather not have it.

torily rejected the scheme, and the military Minutes of Lord Sandhurst and Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Durand, and the political one of Lord Lawrence in 1868, are eminently worthy of reperusal at the present moment.

When Lord Salisbury subsequently sanctioned the occupation of Quetta, which was much opposed in Council as the first step of Jacob's policy towards annexation, he inserted a paragraph (to satisfy the fears of the Council, see paragraph 25, Biluchistan Blue Book, 1878, p. 10) ordering Lord Lytton "to abstain from any measures which " could be held to indicate the resolution of Government permanently to maintain " British troops in that town." The advocates of annexation were entirely satisfied with this clause, being satisfied that once at Quetta the British would never come away.

Thus then the first step of Jacob's policy was adopted; now comes on the second, the occupation of Kandahar.

The military force required for holding this province, its cost, and its effect on the native army of India will no doubt be fully discussed by Sir H. Norman. But it is well to point out that Sir H. Rawlinson maintained that 10,000 men would be sufficient to hold Quetta, Kandahar, and Herat.

But if Kandahar is occupied and annexed (for no one now advocates the setting up of another Wali) what reasonable ground can there be for supposing that we shall stop there. Herat and Kandahar are most intimately connected, and within easy marching distance, and inhabited by the same warlike Durani race (I speak not of the commercial and trading Hindus, and Parsiovars of the towns, a most insignificant lot), and Herat till lately has been held by the annexationists to be the key of India. Now they go much further afield, and after the Treaty of Gündamuk it has been deliberately recommended that we must occupy Maimena, and from thence it is but a step to the whole valley of the Oxus. When I see how successful the arguments and advocacy of the annexationists have been, in spite of the declared counter policy of the home Government, I feel little doubt that, unless such a strong Government as we have at present seizes the golden opportunity which the collapse of the puppet Wali affords to return to our ancient frontier, the annexation of all Afghanistan is inevitable, and with it a shock to the Indian empire which sooner or later may prove fatal.

Then what do all these arguments which we see in many public organs amount to? They are the same that might have been used for annexing Naboth's vineyard. But that vineyard was at all events a desirable possession. Afghanistan, on the other hand, consists of rocks and men. The English public is always prone to applaud vigorous blows and occupations of new lands, but no one who studies the temper of the times can fail to see that the sentiment of public morality is strengthening from day to day. Assuming for the moment that Kandahar is a useful strategic point, and likely to be, on the authority of men calling themselves patriots, but with no local knowledge of Afghanistan, a "great emporium of trade," could not Louis Napoleon say the same for the annexation of Belgium and Bismarck for that of Holland? But Europe unanimously condemned such filibustering proposals.

But lastly, whilst we are urged in the name of civilisation to advance the British standards, are we quite sure that when we destroy the independence of a nation we are not sapping the very elements on which true progress depends? It is a moot question to the present time whether there is not more happiness under a native state in India than under our own rule. And I am quite satisfied that the difficult problems arising for us as to the mode of governing well 200,000,000 of Indians are sufficiently numerous without attempting to draw within our sway many millions of other races, especially when they are so warlike and intractable as the inhabitants of the Afghan mountains.

Public opinion is probably now on the balance between giving up and holding Kandahar, but after many years' study of the subject, and with no prepossession in favour of Afghans, I am satisfied that both justice and the interests of India require that we should leave that turbulent race to govern themselves in their own rude independent method.

(Signed) E. PERRY.

24th September 1880.

MEMORANDUM ON KANDAHAR.

THE time has now come for deciding on the future policy to be adopted in regard to Kandahar. It has been generally assumed that there are but four courses among which to make our election, which have been thus formulated :—

1. We may continue to support the Wali Shir Ali as an independent ruler.
2. We may remove him, as utterly inefficient and unpopular, and appoint some stronger Sirdar, in whom we have confidence, in his place.
3. We may reunite Kandahar and Kabul, leaving both provinces in absolute possession of Abdur Rahman, undisturbed by our presence; or
4. We may annex Kandahar to our Indian Empire.

But I venture to add two other alternatives :—

5. We may retire from Kandahar to Pishin, or further south (as we did in 1842), without making any local arrangement, and let the Kandaharis elect their own ruler; or
6. We may continue our military occupation, but leave the civil administration in the hands of any Government whom Abdur Rahman may appoint.

I will now briefly consider each of these proposals.

1. There can be no doubt that in equity any pledges we may have given to the Wali Shir Ali are as binding now as at any former period. There has been no imputation on his loyalty, nor indeed on his sincerity, for he never professed to be able to govern without our strong armed support. He has merely shown himself to be thoroughly incapable, thus convicting us of a gross blunder in placing him in power, and promising him protection against his enemies. If he should now seek to hold us to our promises which, however, under the circumstances, he will probably not attempt, we should find ourselves very awkwardly placed. We could not fulfil our engagements, and should be obliged, therefore, to pay forfeit, however highly he might assess his damages.

2. With regard to finding another Chief to replace Shir Ali, and carry out the policy entrusted to the former Wali, I do not think the prospect would be hopeless, in so far as character and position were concerned. If it had so happened, indeed, that Mir Afzal Khan, the former governor of Kandahar, had accepted our friendly overtures, instead of flying into Persia at the approach of our troops, we should have had an instrument ready to our hand, fully as well qualified personally to govern Kandahar as is Abdur Rahman to govern Kabul, for Mir Afzal is the senior representative of the old Kandahar Sirdars, and has the highest reputation for ability, firmness, and local knowledge. His fanaticism, however, renders almost impossible any friendly arrangement between himself and the British authorities, and even if it were not so, if he were still uncommitted, and were now disposed to coalesce with us, it is hardly likely that, having just escaped the perils of pledging our protection to one Afghan Chief, we should commit a similar imprudence with another. The establishment, therefore, of a "puppet" King at Kandahar, be it Shir Ali, or Mir Afzal Khan, or any one else, under our auspices, may be considered at present beyond the field of debate.

3. The third proposal, to make over Kandahar to Abdur Rahman, and to withdraw our troops from Western, as we have already from Eastern, Afghanistan, presents perhaps the readiest solution of the pending difficulty, and is the course, moreover, to which it may be inferred from their language the Government is most inclined; but there are grave impediments in the way, to which I proceed briefly to refer. In the first place, Abdur Rahman has no wish to possess Kandahar, nor, if he coveted its possession ever so much, has he the power, unaided, to conquer the province or to retain it. A great deal has been written about the sin of disintegrating Afghanistan, or interfering with the hereditary claims of the Amir of Kabul, but the fact is, that Abdur Rahman has personally no more to do with Kandahar and Herat than he has with Peshawur or Lahore. He has no hold upon these provinces whatever, either in virtue of his birth or conquests, or family connexions. He stated distinctly to Mr. Lepel Griffin, at their last interview, that "he had no hankering for Herat or Kandahar," that "If he was not interfered with from those provinces, he certainly should not interfere with them," that "he declined to be responsible for tracts where he had no power," &c., &c. And when we consider that Dost Mahomed Khan ruled for 25 years at Kabul before he ventured on the conquest of Kandahar, while the feeling at the latter place against the Kabulis has been deepening year by year ever since, we may well understand the reluctance with which, at the very outset of

his career, and while still struggling for power at Kabul, Abdur Rahman would see himself committed, at our dictation, but without our aid, to the forcible occupation of Western Afghanistan. It is my firm belief that Abdur Rahman would decline the responsibility of governing Kandahar unless promised a large British support, either in men or money, in excess of his Kabul requirements; and I am further sure that, to thrust him on this enterprise with inadequate means would raise against him a host of enemies and endanger his position as Amir. But these are mere local considerations, interesting because practical, but not of any large political significance. The really important questions involved in the proposal to abandon Kandahar to Abdur Rahman and to retire precipitately to Pishin or Sinde, refer to the effects which such a proceeding would have upon our general position in Europe and in Asia. To say that we should be stultified would very imperfectly represent the situation. In real truth, we should abdicate our position as a first-class Asiatic power, and must be content hereafter to play a very subordinate part in the history of the world. Already the first result of our vacillating Afghan policy has shown itself at Teheran, where our staunch supporter, the late Prime Minister, has been driven from office to be replaced by a notorious Russian partizan, and where accordingly we may expect to see Russian influence completely dominant in the future. The natural results, indeed of our retirement from Afghanistan under present circumstances, which are, in truth, not favourable to our military reputation, and which will assuredly be magnified by report to our disadvantage, would be to leave the field completely open to Russian ambition and intrigue. Assisted actively by Persia, she would have no difficulty in occupying Merv in the course of one or, at most, two more campaigns. Bokhara, at the same time, would be absorbed and the Russian would march with the Afghan frontier along the line of the Oxus. At the same time, Persian nominees would be established at Herat and Kandahar, Ayub probably, or one of the Meshed refugees, at the former, and Mir Afzal at the latter; and Abdur Rahman, whether he wished it or not, would be obliged, in order to maintain his position, to enter into friendly relations with his old friends at Tashkend and Samarcand. Whether all this would constitute any real danger to India must be a matter of opinion. According to my present lights, without anticipating any attempt at immediate invasion, or even any serious offensive demonstration, I think that the evidence of our recoil before the advancing power of Russia, such as our withdrawal from Kandahar would be considered to be, would have a most disquieting effect on the Native mind in India, and would predispose many of our large feudatories to listen to intrigues against the stability of our rule; and it is further important to remember that difficulties in India, any popular discontent or show of weakness upon our part, would react on the position at home, and seriously diminish our influence in the Councils of Europe.

4. *Annexation.*—It may be inferred from the arguments made use of in the preceding section that I am in favour of annexation, but such is not the case. I have never advocated annexation *pur et simple*, nor would I give my adhesion to such a doctrine at the present crisis, except as a last resort. I have no superstitious abhorrence of the principle of annexation, as some writers appear to have, nor do I question the validity of our title to annex, a title acquired by the blood shed at Maiwand and Kandahar; but I do very much question the expediency of such a course. I look with extreme apprehension at the prospect of introducing among the wild tribes of Kandahar, without previous training, our tax gatherers and police, our law courts, our vagaries of over-education and over-civilization, and above all our missionaries. We have no experience in India, or at any rate a very limited experience, of the difficulty of administering the affairs of a province inhabited exclusively by Mahomedans. The Duranis of Kandahar, though a good deal under the influence of the priesthood, are not, as a rule fanatical; yet they would, I feel satisfied, offer the most determined opposition to the interference of Europeans in their domestic affairs; and it would require the nicest care to reconcile them even with the limited control of our non-regulation system of government. If we are driven by force of circumstances to annex, we must, I submit,—at any rate at first,—employ a full Native machinery for all details of administration, keeping our European official supervision entirely in the background. Otherwise the friction will be insupportable.

But why should we gratuitously face the difficulties when we can obtain all the advantages derivable from annexation by other means? All that we require at present at Kandahar is a strong military position, giving us a complete control over the resources and communications of Western Afghanistan, presenting a bold front to the north-west and enabling us to devote our undivided attention to the railway, this last-named undertaking being in truth the germ of the whole matter, the only factor in the Afghan

question which is worthy of very serious consideration. Our best course then, as it seems to me, would be simply to hold on, as at present, leaving the civil government of the province to be provided for as I shall presently suggest, and waiting on events. It is not likely that the public mind, either in Europe or in Asia, would appreciate the distinction between annexation and a continued armed occupation. The palpable result, that is the impression produced on the public, would be that we were holding our ground in a most admirable strategical position, covering the whole Indian frontier, for the Kabul line equally with the Bolan is controlled from Kandahar, and so improving our communications with our base as to promise shortly to render our advanced *place d'armes* unassailable. When the railway to Kandahar might be completed and the Central Asian trade had fairly taken possession of the line, working, as it certainly would, an entire revolution in the feelings and habits of the population of the province; then, and not till then, might we begin to think of incorporating Western Afghanistan in our Indian Empire.

5. *Retirement without arrangement.*—I have ventured to supplement the list with this proposal, not because I in any way approve of it, but because, if Abdur Rahman decline the responsibility of attempting without our aid to coerce the Kandaharis, and if the Indian Government still adhere to its resolve to withdraw its forces before the winter, there will positively be no alternative but to repeat the unsatisfactory procedure of 1842. On that occasion we simply marched out of Kandahar in two columns, one bound for Kabul, the other for Sinde, neither asking for further aid, nor granting protection, but rather proclaiming our indifference as to consequences. The result was that although Prince Sufder Jung, as a Suddozye and the titular head of the Duranis, was able to hold the town for a brief period after our departure, he was compelled to fly to India on the re-appearance of the old Sirdars from their refuge in Persia, the former Baruckzye rule being at once restored, and our partizans in the place, those who had provisioned Kandahar throughout the troubles of the preceding year and had supplied carriage for our march to Kabul, being plundered and maltreated, and in some cases murdered. In the present instance, if Abdur Rahman held aloof, we should probably have no resource but to leave the town in charge of the municipal authorities, who would remain at their posts until it suited Mir Afzul Khan to return from Persia, when he would naturally resume his government and avenge himself on those who had supported the British occupation. We have made an effort at Kabul in friendly communication with Abdur Rahman to shield our adherents against the presumed hostility of the party now in power, and it is to be hoped that our effort may be successful, but it is not easy to see how such a course could be followed at Kandahar if we retired behind the Khojak range without providing any regular government for the upper country, or entering into any definite understanding with the local ruler. Perhaps the difficulty of finding a “strong, friendly, and independent” governor for Kandahar, coupled with the impossibility of leaving the province a prey to complete anarchy and sacrificing our friends to the vengeance of the anti-English party, who are, no doubt, as far as rank and influence are concerned, in the majority, may compel us after all to adopt the extreme measure of annexation, but I should hope that this very hazardous step might for the present be avoided, and would suggest in the meantime a middle course, which, if it could be carried out, might relieve us from our embarrassment.

6. I would propose, then to offer the sovereignty of Kandahar to Abdur Rahman on very much the same terms that we offered it to Wali Shir Ali, that is coupled with the condition of our retaining a strong British garrison in the province for military purposes, but entirely unconnected with the civil government, and also providing for our completion of the railway to Kandahar, in two years, say from the date of agreement; Abdur Rahman might thus delegate any officer in whose loyalty and ability he had sufficient confidence to administer the province. The governor appointed from Kabul would receive the full moral support of the British garrison, whose presence again would testify to the cordial relations existing between Abdur Rahman and the British Government. He would realise annually the full surplus revenue, estimated by Colonel St. John to amount at present to about six lakhs of company's rupees, contributing perhaps a moiety of this sum, in grain, for the use of the British troops. These troops, again, would not be employed in collecting revenue, nor even in quelling local disturbances, but would be reserved for the higher duty of protection against external foes, and would serve the main purpose of giving weight and consistency to the government.

Sir Donald Stewart has already well observed that if a permanent British garrison were maintained at Kandahar the troops should be located, not in the city or in the immediate neighbourhood, but at the distance of 10 or 15 miles, adding that “the position of the troops should be, *mutatis mutandis*, that of the garrison of Secunderabad

“ in the Deccan.” I entirely agree with this recommendation, and have no doubt that a suitable locality might be found for the camp on the Arghandab at a distance of about 10 miles from the city.

And now let us consider practically the various interests concerned in this proposed arrangement:—

(a.) Would Abdur Rahman agree to it? Would he so far identify himself with the British as to be a party to a sort of joint government at Kandahar? His late anxiety to obtain from us a treaty guaranteeing to him our support, renders it probable that he would not object to the principle of association, but the partnership might compromise him with the anti-English party at Ghazni and Kabul, and thence arises a certain element of uncertainty as to the practicability of the arrangement. In so far as Kandahar is concerned I should anticipate no serious difficulty, for though Abdur Rahman may be personally unpopular in the south, and would thus probably be unable to coerce the Duranis if he merely trusted to his position as Amir of Kabul, yet backed up by an efficient British force, and represented by a governor, whom, if wise, he would select from a popular local family, the case would be widely different. Abdur Rahman's Baruckzye Lieutenant would be at least as competent as Wali Shir Ali to govern the Kandaharis on all ordinary occasions, and on extraordinary occasions, such as possible invasion from Herat or Ghazni, the British garrison might be relied on, notwithstanding recent experience, to clear the way. It is possible, of course, that jealousies might arise between the British authorities in camp and the Afghan governor in the city. It is possible that this officer might abuse his power and burthen us with the odium of his tyranny, but these are minor evils which might easily be borne and remedied, provided only that Abdur Rahman, the responsible head of the government, were strong and loyal at Kabul.

(b.) What would be the real effect upon British interests of this compromise between annexation and withdrawal? It may be conceded that it would be an object of much value to obtain the full moral effects of annexation, in regard to prestige, military strength, security of frontier, extension of trade, &c., without encountering the evils of friction, national irritation, and risk attendant on the larger measure, but the question still remains for consideration whether, in the present state of the finances of India, those moral effects would be worth the expenditure of money and strain on our resources which would be necessary to secure them? I do not pretend to be able to estimate the difference of cost between a continued military occupation of Kandahar and the alternative of partial or complete withdrawal. Of course, if we decided on retiring within our ancient line of frontier, not only abandoning the Kurram Valley, but evacuating all Western Afghanistan as far as the mouth of the Bolan, the immediate relief to our military expenditure would be enormous, but if alarmed at the almost certain political consequences of such a wholesale surrender, we merely proposed to withdraw behind the Khojak range, I doubt if the pecuniary relief would be perceptible. It has not, I think, been sufficiently considered that to create a large station in Pishin which shall in any way compensate for Kandahar, either as a military barrier or as a focus of political influence, is almost impossible. At any rate such an undertaking would be prodigiously costly, both in its inception and its maintenance, for the country south of the Khojak is a wilderness, without inhabitants, without cultivation, almost without water, and, moreover, the position is strategically of quite second rate importance, for it can be turned on either flank, both from Kabul and Herat. I have discussed this question repeatedly with Sir R. Temple, Sir M. Biddulph, and others well acquainted with the localities, and I have found the universal impression to be that it would be more costly to hold Pishin in strength than to hold Kandahar, the saving in distance from our Indian base not compensating for the dearth of carriage and supplies. The alternative, therefore, may be considered to be practically reduced to remaining at Kandahar or withdrawing to Sinde.

(c.) Among the drawbacks to our maintaining a force above the passes has been often quoted the unpopularity of the service with our Native soldiery. To such an extent, indeed, has this feeling, it is said, prevailed recently at Kabul that it has seriously interfered with our recruiting powers in India. I cannot, however, look upon this as a permanent difficulty in so far as Kandahar is concerned, for the climate is there of the Indian type, the bazaars are well supplied, the troops, European as well as Native, could be economically and comfortably housed in the new cantonments, and the communication with India would be rapid and constant. As soon, indeed, as the railway were completed the regular relief of regiments would be accomplished with the same ease and celerity as in India, and if all service above the passes were regarded as foreign service, entitling to batta or free rations and extra warm clothing, we should probably

soon see a revulsion of feeling on the subject in the Native Army. What the strength of the Kandahar garrison should be the military experts must decide. I would suggest a regular force of about 5,000 men of all arms; together with local levies of the same strength, Hazarehs for choice, if their enlistment would not too violently excite the animosity of the Afghans.

Other objections have been raised to this scheme, which may be briefly noticed. It has been said on one side that the presence of our troops at Kandahar would keep open a festering sore; on the other, that it would not be fair to Abdur Rahman, as it would show our distrust of him and would discredit him with his own people. These are delicate topics on which the less is said the better. There is an Eastern proverb that "a wise man treats his best friend as if he would one day become his enemy." I have no wish to endorse this cynical maxim to its full extent, but undoubtedly we are bound, after our past experience, to exercise due caution in all our dealings with the Afghans, and to consult our own interests in the first place rather than their wayward feelings of pride. The presence of a British garrison at Kandahar, over and above the support it might yield to our foreign policy, would be our best guarantee for the permanence of the Kabul arrangement, and cannot, therefore, be too strongly insisted on as a measure of proper, and only proper, precaution.

I have only now to say a few words in conclusion on the subject of the Kandahar railway.

Of all possible political short comings connected with Afghanistan, the most fatal, as it seems to me, would be the abandonment of this most promising undertaking. The railway was the most efficient arm of defence hitherto devised against Russian aggression, far more efficient than the conquest of Kabul, or the establishment in power of a friendly Amir, for its effect when completed would have been to transfer our military base from the Indus to within 350 miles of the threatened point of attack, namely, Herat. If we now abandon the work as a sequel to the withdrawal of our troops from the upper country, it must be remembered that we virtually deprive ourselves of the power of protecting the Afghan frontier from Russian aggression, and that the promises accordingly of assistance against external attack, which we recently volunteered to Abdur Rahman at Kabul, are rendered impossible of performance, for we could not and should not, whatever the emergency, march troops again from the Indus to the Oxus.

But the political were among the least of the advantages to be expected from the railway. Commercially it would have revolutionized Central Asia, changing the trade routes, and superseding by direct train from the seaboard at Karachi the present supply through Russia and Persia of European goods to the various countries watered by the Oxus and its tributaries.

That it would have stimulated in a like degree the productive and manufacturing industries of the Afghans, and all the populations in their neighbourhood, can hardly be doubted, and the gain thus accruing to peace and order, and social prosperity would have been immense. Hitherto the British occupation has impeded trade, the whole available carriage of the country being required for military purposes; and if the occupation be maintained, as above suggested, this dislocation of the normal course of supply and demand will no doubt be continued, and will even increase in intensity as the means of transport become exhausted, unless the iron horse steps in to relieve the pressure. Should the Government, however, decide to resume the railway works, and continue the line to Kandahar, as a subsidiary measure appertaining to the prolonged occupation, I feel satisfied that the result would be most beneficial. This is not the place perhaps to dissect statistical tables and calculate financial results, but I have seen reliable data which seem to show that the railway, merely as a commercial concern, would yield a fair return on the capital outlay; while I make bold to say that its general effects would be of a far greater and more extended value. The opening of the railway, indeed,—the true pioneer of civilization—would inaugurate a new era for Kandahar. The Western Afghans, who are essentially a trading race, meeting the British in the caravanserai and bazar, instead of on the battle field, would soon lose their national antipathy, and would fraternize with us in the paths of peace and commerce. Common interests would produce common sympathies, and a way would thus be gradually paved for the amalgamation of the tribes of Kandahar with the other subjects of our Indian Empire.

H. C. RAWLINSON.

25th September 1880.

P.S.—It may be only proper to notice that as I am closing this Memorandum, intelligence arrives from Persia of the Russian Government having despatched Colonel Grodekoff with three officers to the Khorassan-Afghan frontier, laden with presents, but

charged with what is called an "exclusively commercial mission." As Colonel Grodekoff knows nothing whatever of commerce, but knows a good deal of Afghan politics, being the officer who very recently published a very interesting account of his journey from Samarcand by Sir-i-pul and Mymeneh to Herat, there can be no reasonable doubt that his present mission is connected with the pending settlement of Western Afghanistan. Can it be prudent, then, to obliterate all traces of our Kandahar occupation, and even cancel our means of acquiring information as to current events upon the frontier, just as Russia is showing signs of renewed activity in that direction, and the opportunity seems to be now offering for the realization of her long-cherished scheme of exerting a direct influence at Herat?

H. C. R.

No. 13.

NOTE ON KANDAHAR.

LORD HARTINGTON,

I AM very strongly impressed with the danger of a prolonged occupation of Kandahar by our troops. This will plead my apology for a brief statement of my views on the subject, in the hope it may aid you in your decision.

Should our troops remain at Kandahar for any time, entanglements are likely to arise; and it may be afterwards difficult to withdraw. There will be hostile gatherings, and threats from tribes. Assassinations will be continued as before, and a bitter spirit will be stirred up.

There are many parties in Afghanistan, and beyond its limits, who, from various motives, will encourage and foment disturbances with the view of embarrassing us.

I assume of course that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to retire from Kandahar; and that we no longer consider ourselves bound to support the Wali, who has proved himself to be so incapable. He can retire to India with a suitable provision.

Kandahar formed a portion of the territory of the late Ameer of Kabul, and therefore should form a portion of the territory of the present ruler.

Now that we have acknowledged Abdool Rahman, the natural and common sense view is to place him in possession.

Were a communication at once made to him, he would depute a governor to take charge of it, as he did successfully at Ghazni, when he was not so strong as he is now. Our troops could then retire to India.

The occupation of Kandahar by Abdool Rahman would greatly strengthen his position at Kabul, and give him a greater hope of his being able to establish his authority over the whole kingdom.

And when an opportune time came he would settle matters with Herat.

I feel convinced that no ruler of Kabul, shorn of Kandahar, could hold his position long there. This is an additional reason for strengthening him.

Supposing the line I have suggested carried out, our troops could return in November. We should be relieved from an enormous expenditure, and from the probability of great future embarrassments.

I have heard it rumoured that Lord Ripon contemplates holding Pisheen. In my opinion no greater error could be committed. Pisheen is a portion of Afghanistan which we have no right to occupy. And further, the influential families residing there are Syuds as well as Afghans, and are held in great esteem by the leading families of Kandahar and Kabul.

The retention of Pisheen by us, or our bestowal of it on any one but the Ameer of Kabul, will lead to great future difficulties, and would be most impolitic.

The Princes and Chiefs of India watch closely all we do. It will be a relief to them when they find we are not resuming the policy of annexation. It is what they dread, naturally feeling that their turn may come next.

And the Mahomedan subjects of our Indian Empire, numbering over 50 millions, and whose sympathy has been entirely with their Afghan co-religionists, will rejoice when they learn that, though conquerors, we have not curtailed the possession of the only great Mahomedan power bordering on India. We shall gain credit for moderation at a time when they have seen that there is no army to oppose us.

With a British agent as heretofore with the Khan of Khelat, our influence will be paramount through the whole of that territory. There is no need for any garrison of our troops at Quettah. It will only keep up a sore on the Afghan frontier and launch us into troubled waters. Besides being costly, the place is unhealthy and disliked by our native troops.

In conclusion, I would only again repeat, withdraw as soon as possible. There should be little resting to see what may turn up. Time is precious. All is quiet at present. This may not last.

Abdool Rahman, as the ruler of Kabul, has a right to Kandahar, and he will gladly take it off our hands.

R. MONTGOMERY.

September 28, 1880.

No. 14.

MEMORANDUM on the RETENTION of KANDAHAR and PISHEEN.

I AM loth to add to the volume of the documents which have been already written on this vexed question. Almost all that can be said in support of their views by the rival schools of Indian politicians has been already stated with far greater ability and authority than any to which I can aspire. Yet I feel so strongly the gravity of the issues which are involved, and the formidable nature of the forces marshalled in support of what I consider a mistaken policy, that I am glad of the opportunity which has been afforded to me of expressing to Lord Hartington those views which, had I already taken my seat on the Viceroy's Council, I should have submitted to Lord Ripon.

My opinions on this subject have not been hastily formed. I had ample opportunities of becoming acquainted with the circumstances which attended the inception of Lord Salisbury's Afghan policy. I have carefully watched the development of that policy since the day when Lord Lytton assumed the office of Viceroy. Its history has been told with admirable force and accuracy by the Duke of Argyll, to whose stringent criticisms no attempt has as yet been made to return an adequate answer. I compare the results of the policy with the previous utterances of the rival schools of Indian politicians. I find that, on the one side, not one of the advantages, which, according to the advocates of a "forward" policy, were to have been reaped by a departure from the time-honoured traditions of India's greatest statesmen have as yet been obtained. It appears, Lord Hartington said in a Despatch to the Government of India of 21st May 1880, "that, as the result of two successful campaigns, of the employment of an "enormous force, and of the expenditure of large sums of money, all that has yet been "accomplished has been the disintegration of the State which it was desired to see "strong, friendly, and independent, the assumption of fresh and unwelcome liabilities "in regard to one of its provinces, and a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder "of the country." On the other hand, I find that the gloomy predictions of the opposite school have been realised to a very remarkable extent. History, I conceive, scarcely furnishes another so striking example of the speedy and complete fulfilment of political prophecy. With these facts before me, I ask myself which of the two rival schools is likely to prove the safer guide for the future? Are we still to follow those who, like Sir Henry Rawlinson, are the advocates of a policy discredited by the logic of accomplished facts, or should we not turn for guidance to those who, like Sir Henry Norman, have shown a statesmanlike foresight justified by subsequent events?

It would, indeed, be too much to expect that the advocates of a "forward" policy should confess their errors. There may to this day be living protectionists who steadily adhere to the views they expressed prior to the repeal of the Corn Laws. Each supporter of the late Government may have his own explanation to account for the ill success of its Afghan policy. As must always happen in such matters, a number of minor incidents cluster round the broad lines of the policy in respect to which it is conceivable that this or that accident, different conduct on the part of this or that individual actor in the scene, or other adventitious circumstances, might have given a different turn to the current of events. But it is difficult to believe that to those who are unfettered by preconceived opinions, and who look more to the leading features of the policy than to its details, the inference as to the relative value and authority of the two schools can be doubtful.

Nothing would be easier than to quote numerous passages from the abundant literature on this subject in support of these views. I content myself with one example from the writings of each school.

Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Gundamuk, Sir Henry Rawlinson commenced an article in the "Nineteenth Century" in the following words:—"The curtain has

"fallen on the second Afghan war almost as suddenly as it rose, and the public, in so far as it is represented by the London press and the London world, seems almost ashamed at having been deluded into taking an interest in so small and ephemeral a matter. A reaction of this nature is perhaps the natural consequence of the exaggerated tone which was taken at the outset by the opponents of the war, in regard to its character and the risks that it involved. The late Lord Sandhurst, it is well known, affirmed a few years back that it would not be safe to advance on Kandahar with a less force than 30,000 men, and the expense of such an enterprise was popularly estimated at twenty millions of money. We were told, indeed, that our so-called 'Jingoism in the East' would inevitably lead either to national disaster or national bankruptcy, and now, because these sinister predictions have not been realized, but, on the contrary, a short, inexpensive, and not inglorious campaign, skilfully conducted and bravely supported, has been crowned with a peace promising substantial political results, we are taunted with having made a mountain of a molehill, with having raised a hobgoblin for the mere purpose of laying it, and, in fact, with having betrayed the nation into a needless and unseemly exhibition of alarm."

Compare this jubilant statement with subsequent events. When the "curtain had fallen on the second Afghan war," no long interlude was allowed to elapse before it rose again on the third, and again, a little later on an episode which may almost be dignified by the name of a fourth war. For a considerable time we had a force across the frontier largely in excess of the 30,000 men of which Lord Sandhurst spoke. The popular estimate of the cost of the war is, I fear, not far wrong. Two incidents,—the murder of the British Envoy and the defeat of General Burrows;—have occurred, which come nearly within the category of "national disasters." We are, I believe, free from any danger of "national bankruptcy," but Sir Henry Rawlinson's policy has taken us as far along the road to the bankruptcy of India as it was well possible to travel in two years. The most "sinister predictions" of the adverse school have been too truly realized. A war which has lasted for two years can scarcely be called "short." It has certainly not been "inexpensive." It has had its inglorious as well as its glorious incidents. It has not always been "skilfully conducted." The "peace," with which we were "crowned" when Sir Henry Rawlinson wrote, was of the most ephemeral description. Its "political results" can certainly not be termed "substantial." The Afghan difficulty bears, I fear, in allegorical language, a far greater resemblance to "a mountain" than to "a molehill." The "hobgoblin" has indeed been raised, but has not yet been laid. The nation, or at all events a large section of it, so far from exhibiting a "needless and unseemly alarm," is, I fear, far too prone to forget the true history of this Afghan business, and still to turn for guidance to those frontier politicians who have in the past led it astray.

Compare, by the light of our present knowledge, these utterances of Sir Henry Rawlinson with the opinion expressed by the Government of India on January 28th, 1876. After reviewing the probable results of forcing a British Resident on the Amir,—results which were all subsequently brought about,—the Government of India went on to say, "A condition of things like this could not exist for any length of time without leading to altered relations, and possibly even in the long run to a rupture with Afghanistan, and thereby defeating the object which Her Majesty's Government have in view." We are convinced that a patient adherence to the policy adopted towards Afghanistan by Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo, which it has been our earnest endeavour to maintain, presents the greatest promise of the eventual establishment of our relations with the Amir on a satisfactory footing, and we deprecate, as involving serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan, and to the interests of the British Empire in India, the execution, under present circumstances, of the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's Despatch."

If I dwell on the previous utterances of the two schools, it is because Indian questions are often,—in my opinion too often,—decided by an appeal to the authority of experts, and I submit that, if any such appeal is to be made, it is essential to bear in mind, in deciding on the policy of the future, the relative claims to inspire confidence which each of the two schools can adduce by an appeal to the past.

I turn now to the arguments in support of keeping Kandahar and Pisheen, considered on their own merits. I wish, however, in the first instance, to observe that I deprecate any compromise between annexation and withdrawal. Sir Henry Rawlinson's proposal that we should "continue our military occupation, but leave the civil administration in the hands of any Governor whom Abdur Rahman may appoint," can only be considered as a half-way house towards annexation. Indeed, Sir Henry Rawlinson recognizes as much himself. In his article in the "Nineteenth Century" of August

1879, he makes use of the following phrase:—"Practically, no doubt, we shall do pretty much as we please throughout the entire region, and, indeed, I can only look on the present nominal reservation of rights as the transition stage between independence and annexation." He was then speaking of the state of affairs as they existed subsequent to the signing of the Treaty of Gundamak, but there can be no doubt that the opinion he then expressed applies equally well to the actual condition of things, for in his note of 25th September he says, "When the railway to Kandahar might be completed, and the Central Asian trade had fairly taken possession of the line, working, as it certainly would, an entire revolution in the feelings and habits of the population of the province, then, and not till then, might we begin to think of incorporating Western Afghanistan in our Indian Empire." It is as well to call things by their real names. The question we have to consider is whether we shall withdraw from Kandahar, or whether we shall annex the province, either at once or after a transition period of "military occupation."

I would also dispose of one further preliminary point. Almost every argument which may be advanced against remaining at Kandahar appears to me to hold equally good against remaining at Pisheen. I can add nothing to the excellent remarks made by Sir Henry Norman on this subject. Moreover, on this point the authority of Sir Henry Rawlinson himself may be evoked. "I have discussed this question," he says, "repeatedly with Sir R. Temple, Sir M. Biddulph, and others well acquainted with the localities, and I have found the universal impression to be that it would be more costly to hold Pisheen in strength than to hold Kandahar, the saving in distance from our Indian base not compensating for the dearth of carriage and supplies. The alternative, therefore, may be considered to be practically reduced to remaining at Kandahar or withdrawing to Sinde." That is the real question. Are we to remain at Kandahar, or are we to go back to our old natural and common-sense frontier?

Some of the arguments urged in favour of annexation may, I think, be speedily disposed of.

The first is that the people themselves desire our rule. The same argument was used in respect to Oudh before the mutiny. There may be a few traders who have expressed opinions favourable to annexation. Under the rule of the late Khedive there would have been no difficulty in finding a few individuals at Cairo or Alexandria who would have expressed views favourable to the annexation of Egypt by England; but if anyone had hastily inferred that their ideas represented the general feeling of the people, he would have fallen into a great error. *Prima facie* there is every reason to suppose that Sir Henry Norman is right when he says, "These people (the inhabitants about Kandahar) cannot desire our rule; on the contrary, they detest it, and have availed themselves of every good opportunity to show this feeling." It would take much stronger evidence than I have as yet seen adduced to make me believe that this does not represent the true state of the case.

Another argument is based on the commercial advantages of annexation. Even if the commerce to be opened up were much more considerable than I conceive it will be, it could afford no sufficient justification for so sweeping a measure.

Next there is the argument based on "prestige." I am not one of those who attach no importance to prestige; but I object to its becoming a bugbear, which is to hurry us against our will along a road which we do not wish to travel. Sir Henry Rawlinson says that if we were to retire to Pisheen or Sinde it would "very imperfectly represent the situation to say that we should be stultified." In real truth we should abdicate our position as a first class Asiatic power, and must be content hereafter to play a very subordinate part in the history of the world." Surely this is exaggerated language. Our retirement from Afghanistan under present circumstances would, he goes on to say, "be magnified by report to our disadvantage," and would "leave the field completely open to Russian ambition and intrigue. It would have a most disquieting effect on the Native mind in India, and would predispose many of our large feudatories to listen to intrigues against the stability of our rule, and it is further important to remember that difficulties in India, any popular discontent or show of weakness on our part, would react on the position at home, and seriously diminish our influence in the Councils of Europe."

Now to what does all this amount? It amounts simply to this, that we are to be debarred from pursuing a line of conduct which is dictated by sound policy for fear of what ill-informed and ignorant people will say; everything is to be sacrificed in order to preserve a semblance of continuity between the policy of the late and the present Government. It is perfectly true that withdrawal to our original frontier will stultify those who were primarily responsible for our advance beyond it. And it is equally true

that in the eyes of a considerable section of the British public, whose opinions also have to be considered as well as those of Afghans or Persians, the present Government would be stultified by a decision not to withdraw. But these are not the points at issue. The real point at issue is which course is most conducive to the public interests. Even supposing that it were brought home to the minds of some Asiatics that it is difficult to ensure a continuity of foreign policy under the English form of Government, can any one suppose seriously that the expression of this very trite sentiment would oblige us to "abdicate our position as a first-class Asiatic power" and "hereafter play a very subordinate part in the history of the world?" We surely need not be so very much alarmed at every false report circulated to our disadvantage, or at the movements of every Russian colonel in Central Asia, or at every article in the Native or Continental press which proclaims that the power of England is on the wane. We have shown our strength in the field, and we can now afford to pursue whatever policy may, on its own merits, commend itself to us.*

As to the effect which withdrawal would exert on the Native mind in India, this, as Sir Henry Rawlinson observes, must be a matter of opinion. My own view is that, so far from "predisposing many of our large feudatories to listen to intrigues against the stability of our rule," it would inspire them with additional confidence in our intentions; they would regard it as a sign that a policy of territorial annexation found no favour with us. As regards the effect on natives of British India, I maintain that those of them who are in a position to form any opinion on the subject will not be slow to perceive that the retention of Kandahar is synonymous with a high rate of military expenditure, and, therefore, with burdensome taxes. In fact, those who, like Sir Henry Rawlinson, have for years studied this great question from one point of view only, are too prone to forget that the first and cardinal point of our policy in India is to administer such territory as we already possess in a manner conducive to the welfare of its population. "We are too apt to fall back on the abstract and theoretical splendour of the Indian Empire," Mr. Gladstone said, with perfect truth, in the House of Commons, on 12th June 1879, "and we do not sufficiently recollect that the administration of that Empire, in the final judgment of history, will bring no advantage or glory to us, except in the exact and precise proportion that that administration confers benefit upon that Empire, and renders India prosperous and happy." I maintain that the retention of Kandahar necessarily involves discontent in India by reason of the high taxes which will have to be maintained. And, moreover, that it not improbably involves an indefinite adjournment of many of the fiscal and other reforms of which India stands so much in need.

As to the influence which our withdrawal may exert on our position in "the Councils of Europe," I will only say that it appears to me that our position would be considerably strengthened by the knowledge that we were no longer embarrassed by complications beyond our Indian frontier.

I turn to another argument of greater importance than those to which I have so far alluded. It is alleged that the strategical advantages of the Kandahar position render it imperative on us to retain it in our own hands.

In dealing with this question I would, in the first instance, observe that it is the business of politicians and not of soldiers to arrange the terms of peace when the fighting is over. I am far from saying that strategical considerations should not be allowed their due weight, but the opinions of strategists should be corrected and checked by the light of broader and more general views. It is the special business of the strategist to ensure the retention of such a position at the close of a war that in the event of another war he may enter the field with a decided advantage. In securing this position he not unfrequently lays the seeds of a future quarrel;—witness the Franco-German peace of 1871, based to a great extent on strategical grounds, with the result that for the last ten years there has been a constant expectation of war in Europe. On the other hand, it is the business of a politician to ensure, so far as is possible, a lasting peace, even at the expense of some apparent military advantage. I deprecate, therefore, too unreserved an acceptance of the views of the strategists.

* Lord Wellesley, who was not likely to under-estimate the value of prestige, wrote thus to Lord Ellenborough on July 4th, 1842, under circumstances which bear a striking analogy to the present condition of affairs:—"Your Lordships, I am satisfied, would reject Afghanistan and Kabul with their rocks, sands, deserts, ice, and snow, even if Shah Soojah had bequeathed them as a peace offering to England."—"The Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough," p. 175.) The Duke of Wellington, also, on September 3rd, 1842, said that the press were beginning to "discuss national disgrace, unburied bones, vengeance, &c." But, he adds, "I recommend to you to leave out of the question all this stuff."—(*Ibid.*, p. 290.)

Another preliminary point on which it would be well to have some clear idea is this, is it against Russian invasion or Russian intrigue that we are now exhorted to advance our frontier? It used to be a favourite argument of the advocates of the forward policy, when the difficulties which a Russian invading force would have to encounter were pointed out to them, to reply, that they did not fear actual invasion, but that what they feared was Russian intrigue, which would disquiet the minds of the natives of India. It is clear that if intrigue is all that is to be feared, the question to be argued is not one of pure strategy, but I think I shall be correctly stating the views of the forward school if I assume that although, in Sir Henry Rawlinson's words, "no attempt at immediate invasion, or even any serious offensive demonstration" on the part of the Russians, is to be anticipated, and although, in the words of Major East (Memorandum of August 16th, 1880), "Russia is not now in a position, and will not be so for years to come, to undertake offensive operations in Afghanistan," at the same time that invasion is a contingency which, although remote, is of sufficient present practical importance as to necessitate some measures being taken to guard against it, that Russia may attempt to establish a "dominant position at the Court of Kabul," from whence "a preliminary skirmishing array of intrigue and agitation might be directed against the Indian frontier" (Sir H. Rawlinson. "Nineteenth Century," August 1879), and that she may then gradually advance, and so occupy outworks which shall eventually serve as a base for future invasion. It is, therefore, on this assumption that I proceed to discuss the question, merely observing that other means besides those involving territorial annexation may be employed to prevent Russia establishing "a dominant position at the Court of Kabul," and that, in my own opinion, the invasion of India by Russia, although just within the bounds of practicability as a military operation, is not a question of sufficient present practical importance as to necessitate any precautionary measures beyond such as are involved in consolidating our position in such territory as we already hold.

I have had the advantage of reading the opinions of those high military authorities who, although sometimes differing as to the precise nature of the frontier line which it is desirable to hold, agree in advocating some advance beyond the base of the mountains. I do not discuss the proposal of the Intelligence Branch of the Quartermaster-General's Department to occupy Kushi, for I conceive that there is no intention to adopt it. Neither do I discuss the desirability of occupying permanently the Khyber and the Kuram lines, for there appears to be a tolerable agreement of opinion that they should be abandoned. I confine my remarks to the Kandahar line, and I take, as the text of what I have to say, Sir Frederick Roberts' Memorandum of May 12th, 1880, and Sir Edward Hamley's lecture delivered at the United Service Institution. Both are authorities entitled to be heard with the utmost respect. Sir F. Roberts speaks with a special knowledge of the topography of Afghanistan, and with all the well-deserved prestige acquired from his recent brilliant feat of arms. Sir E. Hamley has studied strategy as a science perhaps more profoundly than any other officer of the British Army.

I infer from what Sir F. Roberts says that he was formerly an advocate of the frontier which was dubbed "scientific" by Lord Beaconsfield, but which is now universally recognised as being very faulty. I must confess to some surprise in reading the reasons which have induced him to alter his opinions. "No one," he says, "has more strongly advocated an unsparing reduction of the military power of Afghanistan than I have," and he adds that "nearly a year's residence at Kabul has . . . manifested how completely Afghanistan has ceased to be a cause of danger to our Indian Empire. . . . So long as Afghanistan continued to be a formidable and ill-disposed neighbour, it was all important that we should be within striking distance of the capital (Kabul)," but now "Afghanistan is but a wreck of her former self, and though, no doubt, still capable of strong combinations and powerful for mischief, she no longer exists as a military power, and has practically ceased to be a menace to India." It is, I confess something quite new to me to hear Afghanistan spoken of as a "military power" capable of offensive operations against India. I had always understood that the Russians, and not the Afghans, might be the possible invaders of India, and that the whole object of the war was to prevent Russian influence, and still more Russian soldiers, from establishing themselves in Afghanistan. Had any doubts existed as to the slight capacity of the latter country unaided to adopt an offensive attitude, they must, I should imagine, have been thoroughly dispelled by the events of the late war.

Turning to Sir F. Roberts' arguments in favour of the retention of Kandahar, I find that they are entirely based on the desirability of our assuming the offensive, and fighting the Russians somewhere in Western Afghanistan. "It is, of course, impossible," he says, "to predict what may be Russia's future objective, but looking to the altered con-

ditions of Kabul, I think it probable that Herat and Kandahar would be the points to which her efforts would be directed, whether an invasion of India were seriously contemplated, or merely a demonstration to contain our troops and prevent their despatch from India to Persia and Asia Minor. Under any circumstances, I am of opinion that it is by this line (the Kandahar-Herat line) that all offensive operations on our part would most advantageously be carried out. . . . We should decide to remain merely on the defensive in our north-west frontier, and devote all our energies to striking vigorously on the Kandahar side. . . . To what extent these offensive measures might be pressed in southern and western Afghanistan scarcely comes within the scope of this paper, depending, as they assuredly would, on numerous and complicated eventualities, such as the attitude of Persia, the object and strength of Russia, and the state of Afghanistan generally. It might be found necessary to make a rapid advance on Herat and mass a considerable army there, or it might, on the other hand, be deemed desirable to confine operations to Kandahar itself, or to Sistan and the valley of the Helmund. It will be sufficient for our present purpose if we can come to the conclusion that the Kandahar line will be the one by which all offensive movements against Russia would be carried on." I postpone answering these arguments until I come to deal with Sir E. Hamley's opinions, but before leaving Sir F. Roberts' Memorandum, I would point out that there is some apparent inconsistency in his views. "The longer and more difficult the line of communication is," he says, "the more numerous and greater the obstacles which Russia would have to overcome, and, so far from shortening one mile of road, I would let the web of difficulties extend to the very mouth of the Khyber." Why, I would ask, does this argument apply only in the case of the Khyber? Why does it not equally apply to a Russian advance by the Bolan? * And this inconsistency becomes still more apparent when Sir F. Roberts, leaving purely strategical grounds, touches on the political aspects of the question. Whatever others may think, Sir F. Roberts has been far too intelligent an observer of the events passing round him to be under any delusion as to the sentiments which the Afghans entertain towards us. "It may not," he says, "be very flattering to our *amour propre*, but I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us. Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan, or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interests if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime." Quite so. That has always been one of the main arguments of those who advocate a non-interference policy. But then, Sir F. Roberts adds, "the military occupation of Kandahar is, as I have before stated, of vital importance. Even then we should make our presence but little felt, merely controlling the foreign policy of the ruler of that province." This is virtually the same policy as that advocated by Sir Henry Rawlinson. I submit that it is one which is wholly impossible of execution. We cannot occupy Kandahar, and at the same time "make our presence but little felt," any more than the Prussians could occupy Paris or the French Berlin without their presence being felt. We cannot obtain the political advantages of non-interference, and at the same time the alleged military advantages of occupation. We must choose between one and the other.

I turn to Sir E. Hamley's lecture. Although I cannot agree in his conclusions, I fully recognize that his paper is the most forcible which has been written on the strategical view of this question. Sir E. Hamley has far too profound a knowledge of the principles of strategy to be under any delusion as to the true value of the so-called scientific frontier. He advocates giving up the Kuram and the Khyber. He dwells on the fact that "an English army corps, say 24,000 strong, with artillery, extends with its combatant forces only, on a European road about 16 miles in length, and with its trains 27 miles. Allowing only a slight increase in the nature of the road, the combatants of a similar force in the pass would stretch 18 miles, the total, with trains, 30. Thus, when the head of the combatant column issued from the pass, its rear would be nearly two days' march behind; and, considering the host of animals required for the necessary supplies on such an expedition, the rear of the trains could then scarcely be less than six days behind the head of the column, that is to say, only about two

* The same inconsistency appears, I may observe, in Major East's proposals. "Whether under any circumstances," he says, "it will, at some future time, be advisable for us to advance beyond Kandahar or Kabul, it is impossible at present to say, but from a military point of view, it appears rather judicious to allow an enemy the difficulty and the risk of a long march through a poorly supplied country, with the chance of having his army completely destroyed in case of a defeat, when he reaches his first objective point, than to undertake this march and risk ourselves, and relinquish to him the advantage of fighting a decisive battle near his base of operations." Nevertheless, Major East advocates an advance to Kushi.

"marches beyond Jellalabad." He then points out the great difference which exists between the narrow mountain chains of Europe, which have been successfully passed by great armies, and the deep ranges which border India. "In a couple of marches," he says, "the Prussian armies were through the Bohemian mountains, and presently combined in the attack at Sadowa. But here, the shortest pass through the barrier, that between Kabul and the Indus Valley, is 190 miles long, the Gomal nearly 300 miles, and not days, but weeks, are occupied in the isolated march." Sir E. Hamley, however, advocates the retention of Kandahar, but what are the conditions under which he discusses the question? They are as follows:—"Let me pause," he says, "to say what I understand by an invading army. Not all the assembled forces of the Afghans,—not such a Russian force as we saw lately assembling on the frontier of Bokhara,—not such an army as Persia can at present send forth,—any or all of these would fall far short of the requirements of such an enterprise. But I will suppose that Russia has completed those improvements in her communications which we know she persistently contemplates; that she has united the Caspian with the Aral by a railway; or that, combining with Persia, she has made a convenient way from the southern shore of the Caspian to Herat; that the ruler of Afghanistan has thrown in his lot with them; and that within the fortified triangle Herat Kandahar Kabul, the dispositions for this great undertaking have been brought deliberately, with all the aids of military science, to completion. We may be assured that an invading army of India, such as we cannot afford to despise, will be no improvised force, no barbarous horde, but truly formidable in numbers, organization, and leadership." Now, it is conceivable that if the actual condition of affairs were such as is assumed by Sir E. Hamley, it might give us a strategical advantage to be at Kandahar. That is a matter of opinion which I will discuss presently; but in the meanwhile I would observe that the case he puts is purely hypothetical. Not only does it not represent the actual condition of affairs, but it represents a state of things which could not possibly be brought about except after a long lapse of time, during which we should have ample opportunity of deciding on our course of action, for it is scarcely to be supposed that, whilst the Russian dispositions for invasion were being "brought deliberately, with all the aids of military science, to completion," we should remain perfectly quiescent, and not take such steps as the circumstances of the time required to repel the attack. Russia cannot certainly be said to have "completed those improvements in her communications" which she without doubt contemplates. The Caspian and the Aral are not united by a railway. She has not as yet succeeded in "combining with Persia" to make "a convenient way from the southern shore of the Caspian to Herat." The ruler of Afghanistan shows no special predilection to "throw in his lot" with the Russians, and, after what we know of the promises given to Shere Ali and the manner in which he was subsequently thrown over, it is hardly too much to assume that the Court of Kabul will not be very favourably disposed to trust to Russian support in the immediate future at all events. The Russians are not established "within the fortified triangle of Herat, Kandahar, Kabul," nor is it at all probable that they will be established there for a long time to come. In fact, the actual condition of affairs is so wholly different to that which Sir E. Hamley supposes, that it might fairly be deemed a sufficient answer to his argument to say that he does not touch the immediate point at issue. That point is whether at present, when Russia has not taken any one of the preliminary steps which, it is admitted, must be the forerunners of invasion, and when invasion is regarded as a remote, although possible, contingency, it is desirable to take up a position which will almost necessarily oblige us to assume the offensive, and to fight a decisive battle under circumstances in which defeat would, in all probability, involve irreparable disaster. For it is to be remembered that, if we occupy Kandahar, we shall stand pledged to an offensive attitude, and we shall fight at a great distance from our ultimate base, to which we shall be connected by only a single line of communications.

Now, what do the text-books on strategy say as to the best way of defending a mountain frontier? I quote from Sir E. Hamley's own able work "The Operations of War." What he says is quite in harmony with the views of other writers on strategy. After pointing out the grave objections to attempting to defend many passes—objections which appear to have been lost sight of by those who formerly advocated the so-called "scientific" frontier—he goes on to say (p. 221),—"If, then, the defensive army, seeing the danger and futility of occupying all the passes, concentrates in the chief of them, the enemy would the more easily break through the front at unguarded points and descend upon the rear; and the fate of a body of troops attacked in front, and dependent on a single intercepted issue in rear, would generally be the same as that of

"the Austrians at the Monte Legino.* It is more usual therefore, and more consonant with prudence, to hold the principal passes,—that is to say, those which lie most directly in the line of operation, and have the best communications with the rear,—with advanced guards, keeping the mass of the army disposable at points in rear where many valleys and passes unite; thus securing the retreat of the advanced posts, supporting them if necessary, and opposing with a formidable force the first hostile troops that cross." The advanced guards are not meant to offer serious opposition to the invaders; they are merely meant to give timely warning to the main defensive body of the direction in which the invader is advancing, and retard his advance. They may be sent when we are on the eve of war. They do not require any special preparation now. This is a very different military operation from that involved in deciding at once to hold the outposts of one road to India in strength. Applying, therefore, these general principles to the case of our Indian frontier it might appear, at first sight, advisable to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Sir E. Hamley discusses this view of the question, and finds much to be said in its favour. "There is," he says, "no spot in the world where we could make such a military display of strength at short notice as on the Lower Indus. Thus, with the passes suitably guarded, the army of the Lower Indus assembled beyond the river, the reserves at Lahore and Mooltan ready to reinforce either of our two armies (*i.e.*, the army opposite the Kyber and that opposite the Bolan), we should be in a situation full of promise, and it was the consideration of it which caused me to express elsewhere the opinion that we ought, with good management, to give an excellent account of any foe who should attack us in the valley of the Indus." Our position would, indeed, as it appears to me, be even more promising than Sir E. Hamley supposes, for I venture to think that he under-estimates the difficulties which an invading army would have to encounter when once it had crossed the Bolan. It would have to traverse a country described by Sir A. Alison as "a waste land extending for 96 miles, including 28 of howling desert, and abutting on a wide and bridgeless river." (Memorandum of December 16th, 1878.) However this may be, Sir E. Hamley discards the idea of assuming a strictly defensive attitude. "It is not," he says, "always judicious to await invasion. . . . It is sometimes a judicious course, sometimes not." In this particular instance he thinks we would be injudicious, because there is "a concurrent testimony of all Indians that there is no territory on which it could be more perilous to give an enemy the chance of winning a battle than our Indian Empire."

Now, I am far from denying that there is a great deal of force in this argument. When the time comes, or even at some time before war has been declared and the march of the invading columns commenced, it may be desirable to put ourselves in a position whence we may more conveniently assume an offensive attitude than we could from our present frontier. What I object to is pledging ourselves at present to such a course of action. In answer both to Sir F. Roberts and Sir E. Hamley, I maintain that, on strategic as well as on political grounds, it is wiser to preserve complete liberty of action. Sir Henry Norman's argument on this head appears to me to be quite unanswerable. In his Memorandum of June 26th, he says:—"A good General, acting on the defensive, usually strikes blows in advance, but how far counter-advances should be made in the case in question, I think, would have to be determined by the responsible authorities of the day, when the time comes. Much would depend upon the condition of India at the time, upon the popularity of our rule, and upon our military strength. Any great forward movement would necessitate large European reinforcements, which England might not be able to send,† while, if the defence was, in the main, confined to our old frontier, large reinforcements might not be necessary. It seems to me useless now to discuss how we would act under a contingency which will probably never arise, or which, if it arises, must be attended by circumstances which we cannot foresee."‡

* This refers to Napoleon's campaign in 1796 against General Beaulieu. It is described in Adam's "Great Campaigns of Europe, 1796-1870," pp. 1-12.

† I would observe on this point that the advocates of the forward policy always appear to me to forget how necessary it is, with our limited supply of European soldiers, to husband our resources. We have to deal with a Power which, whatever other difficulties it may have to encounter, has at its command an almost unlimited supply of recruits.

‡ The argument against going too far in the direction of a policy of natural insurance against all possible risks was well stated by Sir George Cornwall Lewis in writing to Lord Palmerston on November 23rd, 1860, in connection with the expenditure on fortifications to guard against a French invasion. "If," he said, "the evil is remote and uncertain, I think it is better not to resort to preventive measures, which insure a proximate and certain mischief."—Ashley's "Palmerston," vol. ii., p. 323.

For these reasons, therefore, I maintain that on strategical grounds it is undesirable to keep possession of Kandahar or Pisheen.

Another argument in favour of annexation is based on our moral obligation not to leave anarchy behind us. I admit this obligation. We are bound before we retire to make the best arrangement of which the circumstances admit for securing to the people of Kandahar whatever Government gives the best chances of stability. I do not, however, admit that having once established such a Government we are bound to secure its permanency. I think we should retire with the distinct understanding that, in so far as internal dissension is concerned, the new ruler of Kandahar must look to his own resources and expect no aid from us. This is a point of very great importance, as to which it is most desirable to have some definite opinions. After all that has occurred it would be almost hopeless to expect that internal disturbances in Afghanistan will not be even more rife in the future than they have been in the past; and when they occur there will very probably be an outcry both in England and from the Europeans in India against the Government. Opinions may be expressed that we should repair our mistake, as it will be considered, in retiring by undertaking fresh military operations. It will be said that our prestige will suffer severely if we remain inactive, that we are leaving the field open to Russian intrigue, &c. Nothing would, of course, be worse than to retire, and then to be obliged to advance again after no great interval of time. Unless, therefore, the Government is fully determined to withstand any such outcry, and to resist the powerful influences which may very probably be brought to its support, it will be better at once to adopt the views of the "forward" politicians, and to remain at Kandahar or Pisheen.

Assuming, however, that the Government has quite made up its mind on this point, the alternative courses which present themselves in view of carrying out the policy of withdrawal may be considered. I assume that we shall not again commit what Sir H. Rawlinson terms the "gross blunder" of setting up the Wali Shir Ali. There remains the question of incorporating Kandahar into Abdur Rahman's dominions. This would be the best solution, if it be practicable. Sir Henry Rawlinson says that Abdur Rahman "has no wish to possess Kandahar," and that he "would decline the responsibility of governing Kandahar unless promised a large British support." I cannot say how far these statements may be correct, but a reference to Abdur Rahman himself would speedily solve the question. If, as Sir Henry Rawlinson supposes, Abdur Rahman does not want to govern the people of Kandahar, and the people of Kandahar do not want Abdur Rahman to govern them, the only other solution is for the Government of India to take steps, through its officers on the spot, to find out on whom the choice of the people falls, and, having installed him in power, to retire.

Another argument in favour of retaining Kandahar is based upon the condition of public opinion in England. Although there may now be a sufficiently strong party in this country opposed to the policy of annexation, who can say that, in the future, when the Russians advance to Merv, or some other obscure town in Central Asia, a new wave of Russophobia will not pass over the country and drive the Government into the adoption of a forward policy?

After the instructive experience of the last two years who can rely on the sagacity and self-command of the British people in resisting plausible appeals to their pride or their prejudices on questions so little understood, and so remote from their political experiences? I admit the force of this argument, but the conclusion I draw from it is, not that we should occupy Kandahar, but that we should come to terms with the Russians, and discover some *modus vivendi* with them in Central Asia. I will only add that, if any treaty be made with the Russians, it should, in my opinion, be published to the world, and that care should be taken in framing it that no conditions are imposed on either side which, so far as can be foreseen, there would be any strong temptation to evade.

To sum up, therefore, I think that no attempt at a compromise between the two rival schools of policy should be made. We should simply return to the policy of Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook, at the same time coming, if possible, to a general arrangement with Russia on Central Asian affairs. That policy was well stated by Lord Lawrence, on 4th January 1879, in the following terms:—

"We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move (*i.e.*, a permanent advance of the frontier) might require, and we protest against the necessity of having

to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling as it is to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control."

"Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security, would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Kabul, Kandahar, or any similar outpost, in full reliance on a compact, highly-equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories, or on our own border, in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses, in the sense of security of title and possession with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal chiefs and the native aristocracy, in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political and military strength, in husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying our resources, in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard, and in a trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt."

This, therefore, is the general policy which I should like to see adopted and publicly avowed by Her Majesty's Government. The time and method of carrying it into effect must necessarily be to a great extent left to the Government of India. I would only on this point observe that, as it appears to me, the longer the delay, the greater will be the difficulty of carrying it into execution. Already the effect of Sir F. Roberts' victory over Ayub is beginning to wear off, and it is not impossible that before we can retire, fresh military operations will have to be undertaken, for I agree with those who think that our withdrawal should on no account have the appearance of a forced retreat. The longer, however, we remain within what Sir Henry Norman calls the "sphere of irritation," the more shall we increase the power of whatever party there may be in Afghanistan favourable to Russian influence rather than to British, the more hated shall we become, the heavier will be the charges which the Indian taxpayers will have to pay, and the greater will be the danger that we shall be driven forward against our will to extend our frontier to Herat or even further. Sir A. Hobhouse ("Fortnightly Review," September 1880) has, not without reason, drawn attention to the fact that, in the eyes of the extreme Russophobists, not even the possession of Kandahar affords sufficient security to our Indian possessions, but that further extension northward and westward is contemplated as a very possible contingency.

I have said that, in my opinion, the Government of India must judge how and when the withdrawal from Kandahar is to be effected. The withdrawal from Quettah calls for some special remarks. It should, I think, be the aim of our policy to hand over Quettah eventually to the Khan of Khelat, but I doubt whether it would be expedient to do so yet awhile. The reasons, or at all events the ostensible reasons, which took us to Quettah are different from those which have led to the occupation of Kandahar. They were explained by Lord Salisbury (Despatch to the Government of India of December 13th, 1877), in the following words:—"The existing force has been placed there for the purpose of preserving the peace of the Khan's dominions, the security of commerce in the Bolan Pass and the plain which lies below it, and the safety of your Agent."

The annexation of Kandahar would necessarily involve the permanent occupation of Quettah, although Lord Salisbury was careful to explain in the Despatch, quoted above, that its occupation was intended to be a purely temporary measure. I submit that to annex Quettah without the consent of the Khan of Khelat would be an arbitrary and impolitic act, even if it did not constitute an absolute breach of faith. We have a certain right to annex Kandahar; we have the same right—that of conquest—by which we hold the whole of India, although the original injustice of the war affords a strong moral plea for not exacting the right in this case. But we have not even this right in the case of Quettah. The Khan has done us no harm; he has, I believe, on the contrary, shown a friendly disposition to us throughout the recent troubles. I have not

the text of the Treaty of 1854 by me to which to refer, but I believe that under that treaty we have the right to locate British troops in the Khan's territory. On the other hand, we are bound by Art. 3 of the Supplementary Treaty of December 8th, 1876, to "respect the independence of Khelat," and Art. 6 of the same Treaty expressly declares that the location of British troops at Quettah was in consequence of the desire expressed by the Khan and his Sirdars for their presence there. Moreover, in his conversation with Lord Lytton on December 8th, 1876, the Khan expressed some anxiety lest troops should be stationed in his dominions without his permission, and was formally reassured by the Viceroy on this point. Under these circumstances I do not think it would be justifiable to give permanency to our occupation of Quettah without consulting the Khan. It may be that he would not object, but the tone of his recorded conversation with Lord Lytton, and facts reported in respect to alleged intrigues between the Khan and the late Amir Shere Ali, lead me to suppose that the location of British troops at Quettah, even as a temporary measure, was not altogether so pleasing to him as might be inferred from the terms of the Supplementary Treaty.

I will only add that, when we withdraw altogether from Afghanistan, I trust we shall do so without making any treaty either with Abdur Rahman or the ruler of Kandahar, whoever he may be. If any treaty is to be made it should be with Russia.

E. BARING.

London, 7th October 1880.

No. 15.

NOTE ON KANDAHAR by GENERAL LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

What are the several courses open to us regarding Kandahar?

1. We may abandon it to any chance ruler.
2. We may remain in occupation in support of some native ruler.
3. We may deliver it to Abdul Rahman.
4. We may annex the district, or such portion of it, together with the town and fortress, as considerations of military and political necessity may lead us to determine on.

The *first course* would throw the district open to competition and leave it liable to become the scene of sanguinary struggles between rival candidates, and abandon the peaceful inhabitants to the mercy of any of the turbulent chiefs who could command a following out of the wrecks of the Kabul army and other disorganised bodies.

In case of the return of Ayub Khan, or the establishment of any of the cleverer or more powerful leaders of the party of the late Ameer Shere Ali or his sons, the nucleus of an opposition to Abdul Rahman would be formed and the settlement of the Kabul Government very possibly overturned.

The return and successful re-establishment of Ayub Khan at Kandahar would be the greatest possible discredit to us. He would claim to have driven us away by his victory over General Burrows, and would be believed. It would be partly true.

Second course.—The occupation of Kandahar by a British garrison in support of or in alliance with a native ruler would be of all measures the worst. It has often been tried; hardly ever with success; and our recent experience of it should put it out of the question.

Third course.—We might deliver Kandahar to Abdul Rahman, but its people and its interests are separate and distinct from those of North-Eastern Afghanistan. Kandahar has constantly tried to be independent of the domination of Kabul and has only been retained by superior force.

There would certainly be a struggle for its possession, which might probably end in unseating our recently elected Ameer, and entailing an additional disgrace to those which our retreating policy would inflict on us.

According to the best authorities our first announcement of our intention to retire was received by the inhabitants of the town with great regret.

Whatever assurances may be given of immunity for those who have been friendly to us, or have assisted us, it is certain that they will never be ultimately fulfilled by Afghans.

We may try and justify our abandonment of our obligations to those who have befriended us, by declaring our belief in their future good treatment, but we shall do so in the face of our fullest experience to the contrary.

Fourth course.—For the security of British India and the welfare of the district of Kandahar, the permanent annexation to India of the fortress and its surrounding territory appears to me to be the best course we could adopt.

The extent of territory to be so annexed must depend on considerations of military and political expediency, and can be referred for the opinions of the experienced officers who know thoroughly the country and the race affinities of its populations.

It is urged against the retention of Kandahar that it will require a large force for its defence and the maintenance of its communications, and that the expense will bear heavily on the resources of India.

The expense of repeated expeditions, with their contingencies of transport, which will be the certain consequences of our retreating within our old frontier, will undoubtedly be as heavy without the compensation of the revenue of the annexed province and the profits of extended commerce.

The question of expense is an Imperial one. Let us consider what England would lose with the loss of her power and influence in India.

The whole of her mercantile affairs connected with the trade of the East hang on our possession of India. There is hardly a mercantile house in Great Britain that is not deeply interested in commerce with India. Hardly a family that has not a vital interest through some of its members in the security of our Indian possessions.

Certainly, at least half the expense of the occupation of Kandahar should fall upon England.

If the Russians in Central Asia are a reality, if they have possessed themselves of Bokhara, Samarcand, and Tashkent, if they are about to occupy Merv, of which they make no secret, if they have an easy road to Herat, which is a fact well known, and a fortress there before them in a fertile country, held by a people without unity and without leaders,—who that regards the course of Russian progress can doubt that, if we are timid, apathetic, or consenting, a few years will see them in possession of a fortress which, in their hands, will be rendered impregnable, and will command the road to India with a facility for aggression which may be measured by Ayub Khan's rapid march to Kandahar?

It is difficult to believe that any one can be really blind to the danger to India which a little extension of the alliance which actually existed between the Russians and the Ameer Shere Ali would have matured.

The difficulties of the march of an army through a rugged and mountainous or desert country are relied on by some people as a protection; they may afford protection against sudden predatory invasion, though India has too often succumbed to such visitations, but to those who know what skill and science can do to remove difficulties, when there is a base to work from, and when there are men, means, and time, backed by a steady will and unflinching purpose, the protection of a difficult country vanishes.

For more than 800 years the Afghans have looked on Hindustan as a fair ground for conquest and plunder. Whenever they were at all powerful, even within the time of the British possession of India, they were always contemplating an invasion of Hindustan, and the recovery of the dominion which they once held, of which the decline of the Mogul dynasty, and the warlike prowess of the Mahrattas and Sikhs, gradually dispossessed them.

No sooner had the Ameer Shere Ali become strong, through our assistance, than, on his failing to obtain the concession of all his demands, he at once closed with Russia, and proclaimed to his people the prospect of a religious war against us.

Let the tone of his later communications with us, his great military preparations at Kabul, his alliance with Russia when war between that country and England was so imminent that Russia was moving a force to be ready to co-operate with Afghan allies,—let his public and honourable reception of a Russian ambassador, combined with his public and insulting rejection of Sir N. Chamberlain's mission,—speak for the necessity of our proceeding against him as an act of self-defence.

To those who know the whole of the circumstances that occurred before, and have been discovered since, our capture of Kabul, it seems impossible that any one approaching the subject in a fair and unbiassed spirit, free from party and political feeling, could deny that our war with Afghanistan was an act of self-defence.

It is true that we at first announced that we made war on the Ameer and not on the Afghan people. We had driven away Shere Ali, and were leaving the country peaceably under the Treaty of Gundamak, when the treacherous massacre of our Embassy and the defence of that act by the mass of the Afghan people placed the war on a new footing and gave us the right of conquest to dispose of Kandahar in satisfaction for the injury done to us.

After our proclamation of the permanent annexation of Koorum, our declaration to the Khyber chiefs that they should never again fall under the dominion of Kabul, and our establishment of Kandahar as a separate State, the abandonment of Kandahar or the retreat from the frontier of the Treaty of Gundamak will be misunderstood and attributed in the East to the prowess of the Afghans.

The misfortunes of the first Kabul war have made a greater impression than the subsequent victories of the British commanders. Even the English press, in times of anxiety, refer more to the destruction of Elphinstone's force than to the victims of Pollock, Nott, and Sale. If we now retire, the memory of the defeat of Burrows will outlive the splendid victory of Roberts and his army. One of the difficulties arrayed against remaining in Afghanistan is the alleged dislike of the Native army to serve in that country, and the consequent difficulties of recruiting. The same comparatively liberal payment that has filled the colonies of Great Britain and France with coolies, and has provided bodies of Sikh police for Shanghai and Singapore will fill a Kandahar *corps d'armée*. Let the soldiers be sufficiently paid for the hardships and dangers of exile in Afghanistan and there will be no difficulty in filling the ranks.

If the Kandahar corps is composed of troops of Southern India, who have not had war training for a long time, half the force should consist of Europeans, until the Native regiments have become familiar with the Afghan style of warfare, and as able to beat them as they were on former occasions.

If the annexation of Kandahar is determined on, it should be carried out as an Imperial measure in the most complete manner; nothing should be left to chance.

The most important points are the selection of proved officers for the military command and for the political administration. The best science and skill should be devoted to fortifying the positions taken up.

The city must be made secure against attack, otherwise it will never have confidence or rise to the prosperity which it should attain. The citadel for the command of the city and the security of our magazines should be made as perfect as possible, and the force for their occupation should be separate from the field force, which should be ever ready to move at the shortest notice.

The line of communication should be secured by proper forts, amply provisioned at all times.

The railway should be advanced to Kandahar as rapidly as possible; if properly protected, in a new line of country, where negligences are sure to be punished, it will do more to promote the peace and prosperity of the country than any other measure, provided that the military occupation of the country be efficiently carried out. The completion of the railway will allow of the reserve of the British force being placed wherever it will be most healthy and easily fed, but it must ever be remembered that Kandahar will be a frontier post, which must be maintained in sufficient strength.

The government of the country should be adapted to the spirit and habits of the people, and should be conducted as much as possible by the employment of native Afghans, who will soon identify themselves with the Government, if it is made to their interest to do so.

The cumbrous regulations of India, with their indispensable tribe of foreign agents, should be excluded.

If the annexation is carried out on wise and liberal principles, the district of Kandahar will become prosperous and valuable. The inherent vitality of the trade between India and Central Asia has enabled it to struggle on in spite of the perils and exactions to which it has been subject. A safe road to Kandahar will give it a clear start, and instead of purchasing Russian articles at Peshawur, we shall deliver British manufactures to Central Asia.

(Signed) NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

Gibraltar, 12th October 1880.

No. 16.

MEMORANDUM ON THE RETENTION OF KANDAHAR.

Bearing in mind the tenure upon which we hold possession of India, I would for military reasons deplore our permanent retention of Kandahar. Many of those who now urge us to keep possession of that place know little of the difficulties we had to face in 1857. Having served through the Indian Mutiny, I remember them well, and looking back at them now, it is difficult to understand how others who had the same experience can wish to add to the responsibilities which then nearly crushed us. What should we have done in 1857, 1858, and 1859 if we had had a garrison at Kandahar? So hard were we then pressed that even a clear-headed governor like the late Lord Lawrence was only prevented from falling back behind the Indus by the persuasion of his military advisers. To occupy a point so far removed beyond our frontier would be a serious financial burden even in times of profound peace, and in time of any great trial its possession would indeed be a white elephant, capable of ruining our Indian Empire by the cost which the necessity of supporting it would entail upon us. In my humble opinion, the question of the retention of Kandahar is not a military one, for I can see no possible strategical advantage in its present occupation. Its retention will certainly cripple our military resources, and it would seriously hamper our strategical operations in the event of any great internal disturbance in India. My opinions on this point are somewhat influenced by the conviction that if we determine to keep a garrison at Kandahar the annexation of the surrounding district, and of the country between it and our frontier would sooner or later be forced upon us, and I feel that any such extension would be an increasing source of weakness to us.

Our recent operations in Afghanistan have taught us the true value of the Afghan military power. We can now afford to smile at the superstitious horror with which we have hitherto contemplated all idea of military operations in that country, a horror which has come down to us from the disasters of 1840. We have now learnt to appreciate the Afghan troops at their proper value, and to realise the fact that any well appointed column of our troops, if ably commanded, can march from one end of the land to the other. The English people have begun to see that our military disasters in 1840, as indeed all the disasters that have ever befallen us, are the result of the incompetence of the commanders employed. There is no Afghan army that could prevent an English division from marching from Quetta to Kandahar whenever it might become advisable to do so. If, therefore, we can at all times occupy Kandahar when we wish, why go there until the necessity for doing so has arisen?

The previous occupation of that place would do little to facilitate our march there with the large force we should be obliged to send through the Bolan in the event of difficulties with Russia, whilst it would, I conceive, have the effect of embittering Afghan sentiment against us, and by doing so would increase our difficulties when the time does come for us to measure swords with our great northern rival in those regions.

According to my reading of the military problem involved in this question, we secure no military advantage by the retention of Kandahar, whilst we incur considerable military risks by remaining there.

The objections to its retention on financial grounds are so evident that I shall not attempt to dwell upon them.

Whenever the Russians march upon Herat we must certainly occupy Kandahar, unless we intend to give up India or to allow it to be taken from us, but the longer we can postpone that occupation the better we shall be able to incur the vast expenditure it will necessarily entail upon us. As we can always get there with the greatest ease, I would deprecate in the strongest terms our going there until the necessity for doing so actually arises, and I am therefore of opinion that the sooner the troops now there can be withdrawn from it with safety and honour the better it will be for the true interests of our Indian Empire.

November 20, 1880.

G. J. WOLSELEY,
Lieutenant-General.

No. 17.

(No. 13 of 1881.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, January 26, 1881.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a Minute by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 25th November 1880, on the subject of the retention of Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure in No. 16.

MINUTE by His Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA on the Retention of
Kandahar, dated Umbala, 25th November 1880.

1. The retention of Kandahar is in my opinion necessary on political, military, and commercial grounds.

2. If we retire from it we shall indeed have lost all hold whatever of Afghanistan, and forfeited every shadow of influence over that country which our victories have conferred upon us. We have one after another abandoned every point which had been advanced as a reason for going to war with Afghanistan. The first and perhaps the most important of these was the right to send a British Envoy to Kabul, and to maintain him there with a small escort. Our Envoy went, and he, together with his escort, was massacred a year ago.

3. We have now evacuated Kabul and the whole line of country back to Lundi Kotal, making way for a new Amir; but we explicitly avow a determination to maintain no British officer at his court, and only a native official when it may be quite convenient to the Amir to receive him. Even when that time may come, can we trust implicitly to the reports he may render? Are our previous experiences of native agents at Kabul satisfactory? I imagine not entirely so.

4. This want of supervision leaves the Amir free to exercise such Russian sympathies as he may retain, or failing these leaves him exposed to all the well known wiles and activity of Russian intrigue and diplomacy. Of all this we shall know nothing, or at all events no more than the Amir may choose to let us know.

5. In our early discussions regarding the evacuation of Kabul, it was always assumed that the retention of Kandahar would enable us better to dispense with the services of a British Envoy at Kabul; and up to the time when the withdrawal from Kabul was agreed to, there was no such dissent from this proposition as in any way alarmed me as to the future of Kandahar; but the moment the withdrawal from Kabul became an accomplished fact, there arose a tendency to isolate the Kandahar question, and to declare that the one did not in any way depend upon the other.

6. Our late colleague Sir Edwin Johnson explicitly avowed on all occasions that such assent as he gave to the policy of withdrawal was based on the condition of retaining Kandahar.

7. I have throughout viewed with regret the abandonment of our position at Kabul, and have merely accepted circumstances as day by day we, by our own acts, made the place untenable, by the reduction of our stores, of our ammunition, and lastly, by our arrangements with Abdul Rahman.

8. But when the inevitable came, there still remained to us Kandahar as something of a make-weight against the abandonment of Kabul and the loss of our political influence over Kunar and the Momunds. It was and is an assertion of our might, a manifestation of our power and determination to retain a strong influence over the destinies of Afghanistan and over its foreign policy.

9. In the course of the discussion on the draft Despatch to the Secretary of State, regarding the abandonment of the Khyber and Kuram lines, I first became alarmed for the fate of Kandahar; for the putting aside of all mention of it as bearing on these matters seemed to indicate that these measures were in the minds of many but a prelude to the abandonment of Kandahar. I trust that in this I may be mistaken, and that my honourable colleagues may be found willing to admit the vast importance of this possession, not only to India but to the British nation. I am bound to say that his Excellency the Viceroy has always declared that he held himself free from any sort of compromise regarding Kandahar, when he advocated the policy we have pursued regarding the Kuram and Khyber lines.

10. Whether the holding of Kandahar will enable us to tap Kabul more effectually for political information, than can be done from Peshawur, may be open to doubt; but I think that by good political arrangements it may be made to serve this purpose. At Kandahar we must be brought into contact with members of the ruling family and Sirdars of influence, who would be ready to assist us in this for a consideration. At Peshawur we meet the mercantile rather than the governing classes.

11. I think it will be found that Kandahar has ever been a province which has been easily governed and administered, furnishing revenue for imperial purposes at Kabul and Herat, over and above the expenditure necessary for its own purposes. If this has been the case under Afghan rule, how much more may it be expected to prove so under our more enlightened sway.

12. Our occupation of Kandahar must be of a much more costly kind than that which was necessary under the Amirs, and the revenue which probably does not exceed 23 lakhs of rupees at present, would fall far short of our expenditure; but I have no doubt that under the influence of our rule trade would so increase, and agriculture so prosper, as to largely augment the public revenue under both these heads.

13. The garrison we are bound to maintain at Kandahar must for some years be out of all proportion to the revenue, but this garrison will supply us with all the force which may be necessary for the collection of that revenue. I have reason to believe that there is no part of Asia which can be so easily and so cheaply governed as the province of Kandahar.

14. The existing system of government is purely patriarchal; the area of land under cultivation in every village is perfectly defined and the Government dues perfectly well known. The police, revenue, and judicial work is done by the village maliks, elders, and kazis; no complicated and expensive system of administration is at all necessary. All that is required is a strong, personal, central government, ready to enforce its decrees and to punish offenders with a strong hand. The stronger this class of government may be, and the more the strength of the individual selected to administer it may be known and acknowledged, the better the Afghan will understand and the better he will like it. There are two things for which the country is not fit—first, our regulations, secondly, legislation. Hold it free from these for the next 20 years, and the material prosperity of the country will advance, and its population become as noted for obedience under our rule as that of the Punjab. All the elements of prosperity are to be found in the Kandahar districts, and with a strong, just system of government, such as that we are bound to introduce, and with a cheap fiscal system, such as that we find ready to our hand, there is no reason why (apart from political vicissitudes and external influences,) the country should not eventually pay for the maintenance of the force necessary for its retention.

15. Kandahar is for every purpose a strategic position of first-class importance. The movements of Sir Donald Stewart and of Sir Frederick Roberts to and from Kabul via Ghazni, show how easily the route can be traversed, and how completely Ghazni and Kabul are commanded from it. But whilst we recognise this, we must also admit that these movements prove that Kandahar itself is liable to sudden attack from Kabul, and that the temporary success of Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan's recent expedition proves it to be easily assailable from Herat.

16. I cannot pretend to believe that the ruler of Kabul, be he who he may, even our own nominee, will calmly and for ever accept the partition of the country which involves the alienation of Kandahar from Kabul. There are many circumstances which might induce Abdul Rahman to seek to disturb this settlement of affairs. Russia intervening, the price she would be prepared to pay Abdul Rahman for his active support and assistance would be the restoration of Kandahar. Kandahar will always be the objective of the Shere Ali faction under Ayub Khan, or whoever may hold

supreme power in Herat. Complications under these heads are bound to arise, and all those who advocate the retention of Kandahar, as I do, must acknowledge and be prepared to face them. This is the richest province of Afghanistan. It is therefore an object well worthy of a struggle to possess on the part of the rulers of Kabul and Herat; but it being necessary for us in a political and in a military sense, its comparative wealth may well be acknowledged as an additional reason for our retention of it. We are therefore bound to hold Kandahar in strength, not merely to garrison it, as was the case up to a very recent period. I have already submitted a proposal* for the force I consider absolutely necessary to this end; and in addition to the troops a large depôt should be formed there, well supplied with stores and all sorts of munitions of war, calculated for the supply of a considerably larger force than that now allotted to it; for it is impossible not to foresee the probability of a concentration of troops on this spot, either for aggressive or for defensive purposes. We should so fortify, and so supply Kandahar as to make it a strong place d'armes, affording us a base for possible offensive movements against Herat, or a certain barrier against any power that can assail us from Central Asia.

17. The value of Kandahar cannot be fully understood until we come to consider the significance of its possession by us, in connexion with the advance of Russia in Central Asia. Kandahar is an important strategic point on the line by which alone a serious attack on India can be delivered by Russia. It is the only line by which an organised Russian army could reach Kabul. It is also the direct route to India. The true base for this movement is the Caucasus and the Caspian. This is clearly indicated by the movements now taking place along the slopes of the Kopet Dag towards Merv or Herat, as the case may be. I suppose no one will for one moment believe that the ostensible object of Skobelev's expedition, viz., the punishment of the Akhal Tekes, is the true one; the true intent of this expedition is scarcely veiled, and this is the securing of a base from which to attack India. Merv has some significance in this sense, but it is secondary to Herat; and I have no doubt that Herat is the real object of the expedition. Askabat is often mentioned in Russian papers as a place of great significance, notably in some which came before the Government of India in 1876. It was then named as a point to be reached by one of their expeditions, partly military, partly scientific. At this point it would be easy to change the direction of an army from Merv to Herat. The distance of Askabat from Herat is much the same as from Herat to Kandahar. The importance of this point on the Russian line of advance can hardly be overrated. In the face of General Skobelev's movements along the skirt of the Kopet Dag, it is incumbent on us to retain Kandahar. This indeed appears to me to be an obligatory point, so long as Russia shows the slightest indication of advancing eastward from the Caspian. The object of this expedition, organized in great force, with great care, entrusted to a specially able commander, and supported by the construction of telegraphs and railroads, is not an aimless one. We may rest assured that Merv and Herat are the only points worthy of the attention of Russia on that line. Askabat leads either to the one or the other with equal facility. As to her asseverations regarding these districts, we have a clear measure of the value to be attached to them, by contrasting with her words, her acts in the matter of Khiva.

18. It may be worthy of note that Russia is now far stronger in the Turkoman provinces than she was in 1878, when she was able to threaten the line of the Oxus by the assembly of three separate columns, the main and central one at Djam, the left on the Alai towards Kashmir, and the right column on Charjui, a valuable support to a movement on Merv or Herat from the Caspian. If, as we are informed, Russia stands relieved of her difficulty with China, she will be able to divert to the Oxus much of the extra strength gathered for the purpose of dealing with that country, in the province of Ili and on the Amur. Russia is pressing forward the construction of a railway which undoubtedly will become the Caspian-Askabat-Herat line, whilst we hesitate about the continuance of the Sukkur-Sibi and Kandahar line.

19. I believe that fertile as many of the valleys of the Kandahar province are, cultivation is capable of great extension. It is a wool producing country, abounding in fruit and grain of all sorts. The vine flourishes, so does the mulberry; it might become a great silk-producing country likewise.

20. Let us not be frightened into the abandonment of Kandahar or induced to occupy it weakly on account of the difficulties of supply which have momentarily beset us. I can easily imagine this being made a handle of to bring about either end. This is not the normal state of things, but one that has been brought about by purely adventitious circumstances. There have been two seasons of drought, and consequently of short produce; but short produce for these two years could not have affected the question so

* See papers appended.

seriously, had not Ayub's advent brought with it a host to eat up supplies, and at the same time so disturbed the tribes in the rear as to have rendered the movement of supplies from the base extremely difficult. This was aggravated by the arrival of Sir F. Roberts' army with its attendant followers and transport animals, all causing an immense consumption of grain and forage. The resources of the country are abundantly sufficient, under normal circumstances, for the supply of any force we may desire to maintain, or which we may have occasion to send there hereafter. I believe that the productive powers of the soil of the district of Kandahar have been greatly undervalued by many who have had personal opportunities of seeing the land. It is not every observer who observes correctly, but it is a fact that whilst some will say that the limit of productive cultivation has been reached, and that all else is barren, there are those who declare that there are large tracts of country possessing a rich brown loam soil, an eighth of which is habitually cultivated, one fourth being brought under cultivation in favourable years, but the whole of which is cultivable being well within reach of irrigation from the Argandab. Even the hills, which from a distance appear to be so rocky, are declared to have a fair proportion of this rich brown loam distributed over them. We know how fertile the orchards in the immediate neighbourhood of the villages are, and how valuable are their products. Why should we imagine that this fruitfulness is confined to these very limited spaces? Before we give up Kandahar on account of its limited production of supplies, let us have the country agriculturally examined by some expert in soils, one who knows how to recognise the indications of fertility as yet latent and undeveloped.

21. In connexion with this question of supply, the resources on the line of communication should be considered. With reference to Pishin, where I propose to station the first reserve for Kandahar, Sir Robert Sandeman writes:—

"Now it is undoubtedly true, that owing to the extraordinary drought of the last two years, grass in large quantities could not be obtained from local sources, but it is equally true that the armies under Generals Stewart, Biddulph, and Phayre were at first entirely supplied with forage obtained in Pishin and Quetta. Few people can be aware of the very heavy demands for food supplies for man and beast this country has had to meet since the outbreak of the Afghan war, and it was not until we had explored the Lora, Kowas, Arambi, and other valleys that we properly appreciated the fertility of Pishin. To the traveller marching through the Bolan Pass, and along the direct caravan route to Gulistan, the country may appear barren and unproductive; but had your correspondent travelled off from Gulistan towards the Lora River, he would have found the intermediate plain green with cultivation, and that the wheat crops in Pishin contrasted favourably with those growing in the most favoured parts of India."

He goes on to speak of the broad and fertile plains of Sibi and Kuch Gundawa, as being rapidly brought under cultivation under the influence of our protecting power; and of the Marri hills as a great grazing country, whence a considerable cattle trade with Sind and the Punjab has already been developed. This does not look as if we should be precluded from keeping troops in Pishin on account of its barrenness, or being obliged thereby either to increase the whole force in Kandahar itself, or to draw the support back upon Sind. Indeed, were it otherwise, I do not see how the advocates of the Kojuck Amram, as the line of frontier for the future, could in any way justify their scheme, for the country they propose to occupy could not support the troops necessary to that object.

22. I have no trade statistics which would enable me to put forward an estimate of the value of the trade which now passes between India and Kandahar; but the wool produced in Zamindawar and between the Helmand and Herat, is well known in the wool marts of England under the name of "Kandahari." This is a trade capable of vast extension, for hitherto it has been carried on in the face of every conceivable difficulty, the outcome of an unsettled and extortionate Government, of tribal exactions and most defective transport. We may imagine how trade would improve under a settled Government firmly established at Kandahar, and a railway connecting that place with Karachi, and the Indian railway system. Then as regards British exports, Manchester goods could be delivered at Kandahar at the rate at which similar goods are now laid down at Lahore. By this route, too, a valuable outlet for Indian teas could be established. This, I take it, means the absolute control of the trade with northern and eastern Persia, and of that with Central Asia. Commercially, Kandahar, the natural emporium of this trade, appears to be necessary to us.

23. Kandahar like India itself is ours by right of conquest. *It matters little to us whether the inhabitants desire our presence or not. If it is desirable that we should keep it from a political, a military, and a commercial point of view, there in the interests of the nation we are bound to remain. We cannot recede without our motives being*

misunderstood; not only in Kandahar and in Afghanistan generally would this be the case, but in India itself. No Asiatics can be conciliated by concessions, for these are looked upon as signs of weakness, whether it be weakness of will or of military power. Putting aside, therefore, all pretence of acting for the benefit of the people or for the aggrandisement of any native potentate, I would frankly annex the province of Kandahar, and that promptly, as a matter vitally affecting our own interests. The province, I contemplate, would embrace Kelat-i-Ghilzai, the line of the Helmand, and back to Shorawak and Pishin; Zamindawar and Bukwa, up to the Kashrud, being declared independent of Herat and kept strongly under our influence.

(Signed) F. P. HAINES.

PAPERS referring to the Proposal mentioned in paragraph 16 of the foregoing Minute, being Extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Military Department, October 20, 1880.

Afghanistan.

MEMORANDUM from Captain T. DEANE, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, No. 8,611-K., dated 7th October 1880, Kabul—Special.

Forwards, for information, a copy of the following letter addressed by Colonel Allen Johnson, Secretary to the Government of India, to the Quartermaster-General in India, No. 8,610-K., dated 7th instant:—

"I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter No. 7,839,* dated the 20th September 1880, submitting, for the consideration of the Government of India, certain proposals for the garrison to be retained at Kandahar and along the lines of communications.

"2. These proposals involve the retention at Kandahar of a large proportion of European infantry, and will permit of a force consisting of a cavalry brigade and two infantry brigades, with a full proportion of artillery, taking the field, leaving at the same time a strong garrison at Kandahar.

"3. It is proposed also that a brigade of Bengal troops should be kept in reserve in Pishin for a forward movement, should such be necessary, or for operations in the vicinity of the railway line.

"4. The lines of communication to be held as they were previous to the withdrawal of the troops.

"5. The tabular statement forwarded with your letter under reply shows the force his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief recommends should remain at Kandahar, and the troops which are to return.

"6. It is observed that his Excellency strongly recommends that a British cavalry regiment should form portion of the Kandahar force; that the 15th Hussars should return at once for embarkation for England, the 13th Hussars being sent up to relieve the 9th Lancers, and the 10th Hussars being railed from Mian Mir to Lucknow after the Durbar camp is broken up.

"7. In your letter marginally quoted (replied to by Military Department, No. 8,548-K. of the 4th October 1880), his Excellency modifies the arrangements recommended, to the extent of

No. 8,036, dated the 27th September 1880. the Bengal cavalry regiment and the Bengal infantry regiments, which were recently sent up, being sent on to Kandahar to relieve a similar number of Bombay regiments, the reserve brigade by this change being composed of Bombay troops.

"8. In reply, I am to state for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the Government of India having duly considered the Commander-in-Chief's proposals, consider that although the force proposed for Southern Afghanistan is a very large one, and contains an unusual proportion of British to Native troops, in deference to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's strongly expressed opinion that the force named is absolutely necessary for the safe occupation of Southern Afghanistan, the Governor-General in Council sanctions the whole of the proposals in the correspondence referred to.

"9. I am, however, to express the hope of the Governor-General in Council, that as the tribes settle down along the lines of communication, and as the railway line is opened out, Sir Frederick Haines will find it possible to reduce the very large force at Kandahar, as well as that in support in Pishin."

* This letter is not on record in the India Office.

GARRISON at KANDAHAR and on LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

Posts.	British Cavalry.	British Infantry.	Horse Artillery.	Field Artillery.	Mountain.		Garrison.	Sappers.	Native Cavalry.	Native Infantry.	
					Europeans.	Natives.					
Kandahar Garrison -	1	4	1	2	1	—	1	1	2 regts.	6 regts.	
On communication Mundi Hissar -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	2 cos.	
Total -	1	4	1	2	1	—	1	1	2 regts.	6 regts.	
On communications :											
Abdul Rahman -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	2 cos.	
Melkarez -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Dubrai -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Gatai -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Total -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 sq.	1 regt.	
Chaman -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	—	—	1 troop	4 cos.	Hd.-qrs.
South Kojak Post -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det.	2 cos.	
Killa Abdoola -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	"	
Total -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	—	—	1 sq.	1 regt.	
Kushdil-Khan-ka-hilla -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 sq.	2 cos.	
Gulistan Karez -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	1 coy.	
Segi -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det. 12	$\frac{1}{3}$ "	
Dina Karez -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Meturzai -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Kassim Killa -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	
Gurkai -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{2}{3}$ "	
Kuch -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ troop	3 cos.	Hd.-qrs.
Total -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ troops	1 regt.	
North Chappar -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	2 cos.	
Dargi -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det. 12	
Shor -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 cos.	Hd.-qrs.
Sharigh -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	det. 16	
Nassak -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det. 16	det. 12	
Harnai -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ troop	2 cos.	
Total -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ troop	1 regt.	
Thal -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ regt.	5 cos.	Hd.-qrs.
Kuriak -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det.	2 "	
Sinnerai -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Spin Kuch -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	1 coy.	
Spin Tangi -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Total -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ regt.	1 regt.	
Sangan -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ troop	2 cos.	
Dullojal -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	1 coy.	
Zindigi-ab -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Kuchali -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Gunda -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{2}{3}$ coy.	
Khelati Killa -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 coy.	
Thuli -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	$\frac{1}{4}$ "	
Nari mouth -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det.	3 cos.	
Sibi -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4 troops	—	
Total -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 regt.	1 regt.	
Quetta and Bolan -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	1	—	2 sq.	2 regts.	
GRAND TOTAL -	1	4	1	2	1	1	2	4	6 regts.	14 regts.	

Garrison at Kandahar on Lines of Communications—continued.

Posts.	British Cavalry.	British Infantry.	Horse Artillery.	Field Artillery	Mountain.		Garrison.	Sappers.	Native Cavalry.	Native Infantry.	
					Europeans.	Natives.					
Brought forward -	1	4	1	2	1	1	2	4	6	14	
Moveable column, Pishin (Bengal Native Troops) -	—	1	—	1	1	—	—	—	1	2	
Total required -	1	5	1	3	2	1	2	4	7	16	
Kabul-Kandahar Force -	1	3	—	—	2	1	—	—	3	9	
Bombay troops (including 1st Madras Cavalry) -	—	5	2	4	1	1 $\frac{1}{3}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	6	16	
Bengal troops sent up -	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	
Total -	2	9	2	4	3	2 $\frac{1}{3}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	11	28	
Deduct required -	1	5	1	3	2	1	2	4	7	16	
Troops to return -	1	4	1	1	1	1 $\frac{1}{3}$	1*	—	4	12	

NOTE.—Troops to return :—

15th Hussars -	England.	15th Native Infantry.	9th Lancers on relief by 13th Hussars.
66th Foot -	England.	23rd Pioneers.	8th Bengal Cavalry on relief by 7th Bengal Cavalry.
2-60th Rifles -	England.	24th Native Infantry.	
72nd Highlanders -	Lucknow.	25th Native Infantry.	
92nd Highlanders -	England.	2nd Goorkhas.	
E-B Royal Horse Artillery -	Bombay Presidency.	4th Goorkhas.	
C-2nd Royal Artillery	Bombay Presidency.	5th Goorkhas.	
11-9th Royal Artillery	Jutogh.	2nd Sikhs.	
*5-11th Royal Artillery	Mhow.	3rd Sikhs.	
($\frac{1}{2}$ 15-9th to move up) to	Quetta.	17th Native Infantry.	
3rd Bengal Cavalry.		2 Bombay regiments.	
3rd Punjab Cavalry.		3rd Hyderabad Cavalry.	
		Central India Horse.	

RESOLUTION.—To be communicated to the departments concerned.

LONDON:

Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

AFGHANISTAN (1881) No. 3.

FURTHER PAPERS

RELATING TO THE

OCCUPATION OF KANDAHAR.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.




LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

[C. 2852.] *Price 2d.*



LIST OF PAPERS.

No.	Date.	Document.	From .	To.	Subject.	Page.
1	1880. 3 Dec.	Despatch (No. 49.)	Secretary of State	Government of India	Occupation of Pishin	3
2	1881. 2 Feb.	Letter (No. 21.)	Government of India	Secretary of State	Arrangements for the evacuation of Kan- dahar and Pishin.	4
3	28 Feb.	Letter (No. 40.)	Government of India with 2 Enclosures.	Secretary of State	Minutes by Mr. Rivers Thompson and Major E. Baring.	6

No. 1.

(No. 49.)

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF
INDIA IN COUNCIL.

India Office, London,
3rd December 1880.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Para. 1. In my secret Despatch, No. 23 of the 21st May, relative to affairs in Afghanistan, I divided the questions then requiring decision into three categories. I expressed, in the first place, the strong desire of Her Majesty's Government for the withdrawal of the British forces from Northern Afghanistan, subject only to such delay as might be necessary to avoid serious risk to the health of the troops on their march through the passes, and as might enable an attempt to be made to reconstitute the Government of Kabul under a Native ruler. I then stated that Her Majesty's Government viewed with dislike the occupation of Kandahar, in support of a Native ruler placed there for the purpose of securing the disintegration of Afghanistan; but that they admitted the possible necessity of adhering to this arrangement in consequence of pledges which had been given to the Wali Shere Ali Khan. Lastly, I intimated the desire of Her Majesty's Government that your Excellency in Council should consider the question of the retention of the positions acquired under the Treaty of Gundamuk, mainly from the military point of view, leaving it open to you to recommend their retention should they be thought valuable, but also free to relinquish them if that course should appear desirable, without any reference to the consideration that their abandonment would be a departure from the policy of the Treaty of Gundamuk.

2. The intentions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the first point have been completely and satisfactorily accomplished. I have expressed in separate despatches their approval of the measures taken for the withdrawal of the army from Kabul, of the recognition of Abdul Rahman Khan as Amir of Kabul, and of the language which has been held to him on the subject of his future relations to the British Government and to foreign powers.

3. In my Despatch, No. 45, dated the 11th November, I have stated fully the policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to Kandahar. While leaving to the Government of India discretion as to the time and manner of withdrawing from that province, and as to the arrangements for its future administration preliminary to withdrawal, Her Majesty's Government hope that it may be found unnecessary to prolong the occupation of it by British forces beyond the winter.

4. As to the retention of those positions beyond the old frontier which were acquired under the Treaty of Gundamuk, your Excellency in Council has decided, with the full approval of Her Majesty's Government, on the withdrawal of British troops from the Khyber Pass and the Kurram Valley. But no official information of the views of the Government of India as to Pishin and Sibi has yet been received, and, until the question of the retention of Kandahar had been determined, a full expression of those views could scarcely be expected. As, however, further delay in the consideration of this subject may be inconvenient, especially in reference to the question of further expenditure on the extension or completion of the railway, I think it desirable to furnish you with some indication of the opinions of Her Majesty's Government on the subject.

5. All the arguments for and against the retention of Kandahar seem to apply with somewhat less force to the occupation of Pishin. It does not appear that such a measure would give the Indian Government commanding influence in Afghanistan, or a strategic position of importance in view of a possible invasion by some formidable power, or that it would result in the development of a great and civilizing trade—advantages which some anticipate would accrue from the annexation or occupation of Kandahar. On the other hand, its retention, even as an assigned district as provided by the Treaty of Gundamuk, would be a virtual annexation of territory. Its possession would keep the Government of India involved in the complications of Afghan politics, and be a constant temptation and pretext for interference in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan, though

the inducement and the necessity might be somewhat less than it would be if Kandahar were annexed to the Indian empire.

6. To hold Pishin would require a force which, though not so strong as that which would be requisite at Kandahar, would still be considerable; and the consequence would be a prolongation of the military and financial difficulties which are inseparable from the employment of British and Native troops beyond the frontier. From the information at present in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, it appears that the district of Pishin is less productive than had been supposed, and that the climate is unhealthy. If this be so, there would be much difficulty in supplying a force of the strength necessary to secure the objects of occupation, while the strain upon the efficiency of the army would be constant.

7. On the whole, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the case is not one in which a compromise between two conflicting lines of policy is desirable or possible. Her Majesty's Government have deliberately adopted the view that the true defence of India consists, not in the acquisition of strategic positions at a greater or less distance from the frontier, nor in a competition with any other Power for influence in Central Asia, but in the good government of India, the development of her resources, and the perfecting of the military organisation and efficiency of her army. It is desirable that this should be known and understood, and Her Majesty's Government deprecate in the strongest manner the continuance of any part of an alternative policy which is not distinctly justified on its own merits, or of which the only recommendation consists in its forming a part of a larger scheme, the more essential points in which have been rejected by Her Majesty's present advisers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 2.

No. 21 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, HER MAJESTY'S
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

Fort William,

February 2, 1881.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Lordship's despatches, dated 11th November* and 3rd December† 1880, respectively relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

2. The former despatch contains an exposition of the considerations which should guide the Government of India in the policy to be adopted in Southern and Western Afghanistan, and communicates the wishes and instructions of Her Majesty's Government regarding the military positions now occupied by British troops beyond the Afghan frontier. It is noticed with regret that the immediate withdrawal of our forces from Kandahar has not hitherto been found possible, and Her Majesty's Government desire that we should keep steadily in view the paramount importance of effecting such withdrawal on the earliest suitable occasion. They recognize, moreover, the desirability of assisting, if this be found possible within a limited time, the establishment of some settled Government at Kandahar. In the despatch of December 3rd, your Lordship recapitulates briefly the instructions already issued upon the questions requiring decision in connexion with our position in Afghanistan, particularly with regard to the withdrawal of British troops from Kandahar. Her Majesty's Government, while leaving to the Government of India discretion as to the time and manner of withdrawal, and as to the arrangements for the future administration of the province, express their hope that it may be unnecessary to prolong the occupation of Kandahar beyond the winter. This despatch conveys to us further a very distinct and direct intimation of your Lordship's opinion that the retention of Pishin would be contrary to the policy deliberately adopted by Her Majesty's Government.

3. Upon a full consideration of these instructions we have decided that, since the importance of withdrawing from Kandahar on the earliest suitable occasion is paramount, the movement of our forces must necessarily be so timed as to enable the greater part of them to reach stations in India before the extreme heats set in. Our choice of time

* No. 45.

† No. 49.

is thus very closely limited; and this limitation must inevitably affect and govern the conditions of any plans we may be able to entertain for the future administration of Kandahar after our forces shall have left it. With regard to this latter question we have already reported to your Lordship the preliminary steps that have been taken for communicating with the Amir Abdul Rahman, and we propose to address your Lordship again on this subject in a separate letter. In the meantime we have the honour to report that preliminary instructions for the withdrawal of our troops from South Afghanistan have been sent to the military authorities, with the request that proposals for carrying out the necessary operations may be submitted without delay.

4. The concluding paragraph of your Lordship's despatch of December 3rd intimates clearly that Her Majesty's Government have decided to withdraw altogether from Pishin. In respect, however, to the time and manner of relinquishing that district, we desire to state our views clearly to your Lordship.

5. It is to be recollected that the Pishin district has already been for two years under the political authority of British officers, who have collected the revenue, established a police, and availed themselves in various ways of the resources of the country, and the good-will and services of the principal residents. Since the beginning of 1879 our dealings with the settled population of the Pishin valley have been upon the understanding that the territory had been assigned for an indefinite period to the British Government. Our position, military as well as political, in Pishin, differs from that which we hold in and around Kandahar sufficiently to require that the measures for withdrawing from the Pishin district should be separately considered and carried out. In Kandahar, and beyond the Kojuk range generally, our endeavours to arrange for some government which may assume authority after our military occupation shall have terminated, are necessarily limited by and subordinated to the military and political exigencies inseparable from the primary condition of early evacuation. In Pishin these exigencies are by no means so imperative; while on the other hand, we have incurred liabilities toward the population of this particular district. If any period of confusion intervenes before a regular government establishes itself at Kandahar, the knowledge that Pishin has been left unprotected and masterless, and that as soon as our retiring troops have crossed the valley there is nothing more to fear from the British garrison at Quetta, may very possibly invite plundering incursions from various quarters.

6. In this situation and prospect of affairs, we are of opinion that the instructions of Her Majesty's Government may be interpreted as leaving to the Government of India considerable discretion in arranging the time and manner of the final relinquishment of Pishin. We propose to instruct our political officers that the assignment will be given up, that this must be frankly explained to the people, and that all their arrangements must be determined toward that end; but that the dissolution of our connexion with the district should be managed, as a political measure, with circumspection and with regard to the future interests of the classes concerned. We do not anticipate that this policy will entail upon us any material degree of additional expenditure, or risk of complications with Afghanistan. It may be necessary to maintain, for some short period after the evacuation of Kandahar shall have terminated, a detachment at some place in Pishin, within support from Quetta, for the assertion of so much political authority as may be required for gradually completing our arrangements. But the former Afghan governors did not keep regular military stations in the valley, so that there will be no need or pretext for the Afghans attempting immediately to place garrisons there; nor is it likely that any ruler in South Afghanistan, whatever might be his attitude towards us, will commit the imprudence of crossing the Kojuk range to interfere with our provisional dispositions for the peace of this outlying district, so long as the object and intentions of the British Government are clearly explained and understood.

7. The Minutes which are being recorded on the subject-matter of this despatch by some of our honourable colleagues, will be forwarded by a subsequent mail.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

No. 3.

No. 40 of 1881.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS, Fort William, the 28th February 1881.
IN continuation of our Despatch,* dated the 21st February 1881, we have the
honour to forward the remaining Minutes† of our honour-
able colleagues.
* No. 35.
† By Mr. Rivers Thompson, C.S.I.
By Major E. Baring, C.S.I.

* Not yet
received.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" W. STOKES.
" RIVERS THOMPSON.
" JAMES GIBBS.
" D. M. STEWART.
" E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

MINUTE by the HON. RIVERS THOMPSON, C.S.I.

HER Majesty's Government, acting on their own responsibility, and "influenced mainly by considerations of a broad political character," have ordered the withdrawal of the British forces from Kandahar on the earliest suitable occasion. In the despatch which contains these orders, it is indicated, as the wish of Her Majesty's Government, that if it be found possible within a limited time to establish some settled form of government in the place, it should be our endeavour to secure it; but whatever settlement may be arrived at, we are to make it clearly understood that the future ruler of the country will be left entirely to his own resources, and that it is not our intention to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan in a manner which would involve the employment of British troops beyond our frontier. These orders apply not only to Kandahar, but extend under very distinct and definite terms to the final relinquishment of Pishin, "the retention of which would be contrary to the policy deliberately adopted." Briefly, it may be said that a united Afghanistan under a ruler friendly to ourselves is the object which Her Majesty's Government wish to secure—an object which, thus broadly stated, every one probably in England or India would desire to promote—though from the precipitate action which Her Majesty's Government have taken in the matter, and the peremptory manner in which, without waiting for the advice of those responsible for the government of India, this decision has been promulgated, there is too great reason to fear results of a very different character.

It has been affirmed that there can be no compromise between the two lines of action which contemplate, on the one side, the complete abandonment of Kandahar with our return to our original borders; and on the other, the annexation of Kandahar to British territory. The instructions of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India definitely and irrevocably adopt the first of these alternatives; and though in words Her Majesty's Government leave with confidence to His Excellency the Viceroy in Council the responsibility of fixing the date of the recall of our troops from Kandahar, the very plain and strong terms in which the orders are conveyed, and the evident desire that no time should be lost in giving effect to this intention, scarcely leave to the Government of India the smallest discretion in the matter. The problem is easy enough if we accept the responsibility of quitting Kandahar on a fixed date, regardless of its fate and of the consequences to the people, many of whom were our faithful adherents during the late

war ; but the problem is a very difficult one, if we are to attempt to reconcile the urgent orders for an early evacuation with any endeavour to see the establishment of some form of government upon our withdrawal. I deprecate therefore the peremptory character of the despatch which forces our action in a matter which necessarily demanded very delicate handling ; and I regret the premature publicity which, by exciting the ambition of every aspirant to the vacancy will, upon our unconditional retreat, inevitably lead to civil war and confusion in every part of the country which we surrender.

As an argument for our withdrawal from Kandahar has been based upon our previous policy in connection with that place, I would revert briefly to the circumstances under which the administration of Kandahar was intended to be vested in Sher Ali Khan, with the open support of British troops. It is well known that this arrangement formed no part of our plans when the first campaign was concluded and the Treaty of Gandamak was made. Indeed, with the return of Yakub Khan to Kabul, and the appointment of a British Resident at that capital, the maintenance of any control or supervision in the direction of Kandahar was as unnecessary as it would have been impolitic. It was unnecessary because seven-eighths of the population in Kandahar being Durani, the rooted dislike of Kabul domination was in itself a safeguard against formidable intrigues in opposition to ourselves in Kandahar ; and the acquiescence of the Kandaharis in our temporary occupation, with the commercial prosperity which our occupation had brought, had shown to us the strong improbability of any active hostility against us in that quarter. It is obvious, however, that when upon the events which followed the massacre of September 1878, Yakub Khan abdicated, and Abdul Rahman succeeded to the vacant throne at Kabul, without obligations of any kind of allegiance towards us, we had to look elsewhere for those material guarantees for peace and order which, from our past experiences of Afghan misconduct, were essential to our own security in India. The arrangement adopted in these circumstances was that of a native administration for the separated province of Kandahar under our own direct supervision. It was a system of administration which had been under long discussion by Lord Lytton's Government, and was accepted, I believe, very much in the desire to avoid the necessity of annexation, while obtaining for ourselves as complete a security as possible against foreign intervention in Afghan politics. On this understanding we recognized and admitted Abdul Rahman to the throne of Kabul : and on this understanding we abandoned the right to maintain at Kabul a European Residency. It may be allowed that the failure of the Wali's administration at Kandahar was conspicuous even before the military disaster of Maiwand ; but it became obvious to most people who gave a thought to the subject that if, or when, the arrangement of a nominal native ruler at Kandahar under the protection of British bayonets broke down, it must lead either to the annexation of the Kandahar territory by the Government of India, or to its restoration under a consolidated rule to the Amir at Kabul. I always entertained the opinion that the latter might have been quite a possible alternative ; and that time, if it had been allowed to us, might have worked out this solution. Evidently, however, two conditions were essential to its accomplishment : first, that Abdul Rahman should succeed in establishing himself in Kabul, and should prove himself a reasonable and friendly neighbour to the British Government ; and, secondly, that Russia should show by her acts and not by her words merely, a permanent and honourable adherence to her voluntary promises to abstain from all interference with Afghanistan. On these terms we might have seen our way some day to an eventual cession of Kandahar to Abdul Rahman or to his successor. But it is not unreasonable to assert that such a hope is against all the facts of the position as they now appear. Abdul Rahman is in no sense master of the situation in his new kingdom ; and we are yet in uncertainty as to whether even the offer of Kandahar is one which he is prepared to accept without such extensive guarantees from us as would be gravely embarrassing ; while the condition, as it applies to the acts and intentions and promises of Russia, seems, in the face of recent events, putting aside the whole history of her relations with Central Asia, to be absolutely illusory. I regret, therefore, the precipitancy of Her Majesty's Government, because even if our negotiations with Abdul Rahman succeed, they expose us, in the attitude of Russia and with Abdul Rahman's undisguised leanings towards that power, to a very perilous future ; and if, as is almost certain, Abdul Rahman after accepting Kandahar from us is unable to hold it, the whole of Afghanistan will become the scene of prolonged hostilities, with the result (very discreditable to ourselves) of Ayub Khan's acquisition not only of Kandahar but of Kabul. On either alternative I venture to say the interference of the British power would be imperative in its own interests, and we should have

to regain, at the sacrifice of another costly war, all those advantages of our present position which we are now proposing unconditionally to relinquish.

If I speak of British interests in India and the security of its north-west frontier against foreign aggression, I shall be understood as meaning that the importance attaching to these objects is the measure of our belief in the good faith of Russia. I share the opinion of most of those who consider the question from an Indian standpoint, that the dangers and risks which menace us from the progress of this power eastwards are real and positive dangers, which cannot be set aside by mere calculations of still long intervening distances. Even if all the past could be ignored of the steady advance of Russia to the banks of the Oxus, where its power is paramount at this day, and if we could remain satisfied in the security of a barrier such as the range of the Hindu Kush affords—delusive and dangerous as such a confidence would manifestly be—there are many other circumstances, which our recent operations in Afghanistan have clearly brought out, which justify us in taking precautions in our own behalf. Look at the origin of this last war. Whatever may have been the cause which induced Sher Ali to seek a Russian alliance in preference to our own (I attribute it myself entirely to the so-called policy of “masterly inactivity,” which alienated Sher Ali by its persistent disregard of reasonable claims and reasonable fears), I venture to repeat what I have before asserted, that no Government, whether in England or India, could have hesitated for a moment to repel the action which the Amir of Afghanistan adopted in September 1878, when, against warning, expostulations, and earnest endeavours on our part to maintain peace and amity, he wilfully chose to cast in his lot with a power which we are obliged to recognize as a rival quite as much as a neighbour. The policy of Russia in Central Asia, and especially as it approaches Afghanistan, must always be an object of the keenest anxiety to any one responsible for the safety and good government of India; and when we found that Sher Ali had been led on by intrigues and promises to reject our advances with ill-disguised hostility, at the very time that an embassy from Russia was welcomed, “*not only without hindrance but with much ceremony,” and with open demonstrations of salutes and illuminations at Kabul, we had no option but to resent by force the open attempt of Russia to establish her influence in Afghanistan. The fact that this mission started from Tashkend at the end of May 1878, that it took nearly four months in its deliberate progress without the slightest intimation to the Government of India, shows not only the secrecy with which the whole business was organized, but the facility with which such operations could be repeated. There can be no shadow of doubt that, if we had not interfered actively, the permanent establishment of that influence would have been attained; and if we might entertain the hope that the lessons of the war which followed will not be soon forgotten in Afghanistan, we can scarcely expect that the success of her schemes, in embroiling us in the Afghan difficulties of the last two years, will prevent Russia, whenever the occasion suits her, from renewing her intrigues with a power which, as far as we are concerned, we propose now to leave in a position of complete isolation. The contention that the results of our recent military operations in Afghanistan, involving the loss to Sher Ali of his kingdom, the exclusion of his son and heir from the throne, and the sufferings of the people from the war, will operate to diminish the chances of any Afghan prince ever again entertaining insidious proposals, seems to me opposed to all our past experience of the Afghan people. The miseries of the war will soon be forgotten. Indeed, if reliance can be placed upon statements often made to our officers during the war, the flood of money poured into the country during our military occupation of Kabul was held by many to be more than a compensation for the troubles which the war brought upon them. And as for the rest, while we know now better than we ever did before that Afghanistan as a State can never stand by itself, but must lean upon some external support; if it is not to India she can look, she will as certainly as before turn her looks to Russia. The probabilities of such a dependence will be assuredly confirmed if Abdul Rahman is, in the eventualities of the future, to emerge with our aid as the ruler of a united Afghanistan. Already we are not without indications of the kind of pressure he is intending to put upon us in his need of support of men and material; and further he has never disguised from us, even from the earliest days of his negotiations, the debt he owes to Russian hospitality during his exile of twelve years, and the obligation by which he is bound to recognise those services.

There is another consideration which seems to me to deserve prominent attention in connection with the proposal for an immediate withdrawal from Kandahar. It is one to

* The quotation is from a Russian official despatch.

which I have little excuse for referring, because, as a strictly military question, it has already been the subject of discussion by the highest military authorities, many of whom could bring to bear upon it a practical knowledge of the place, the people, and the surrounding country. If we may not rely upon the now well known opinion of Lord Napier of Magdala regarding the necessity of holding Kandahar, "because he is an officer who during recent years has had no connection with the political or military affairs of India," we may at least have the advantage of the professional opinion of nearly all the military advisers of the Government of India, as pronouncing warmly in favor of Kandahar as a strategic position of great importance; and not only so, but we also have the fact that everyone whose opinion has been taken only consented to the abandonment of the Khyber and Kuram routes on the express understanding that Kandahar was to be retained. This discovery of the importance of Kandahar is one which comes upon us in India with something like a surprise; for hitherto, not without reason, from the activity manifested by Russia on the line of the Oxus, the thoughts of our statesmen and military experts have been directed mainly to the progress of Russia beyond the Hindu Kush with Kabul as its objective. Our recent experiences in Southern Afghanistan as to the advantages of Kandahar as a military position, its capability of easy communication with our base at Kurrachee, its accessibility from Herat, always contested and denied till Ayub Khan's march and defeat of our troops at Maiwand showed the futility of the objections—and more than all the advance of Russia from the Caspian eastwards and her latest achievements, in the cause of civilization and commerce, against the Turkomans—must indicate to all unprejudiced minds the certainty that it is by this direct route from Herat to India that Russia aims in the conflict with us, which she at least knows to be inevitable. We have heard of them within the last few days at Geok Tepe, at Askabat, on the Tajend—places which a glance at even the largest maps will show to mean the practical occupation of all that part of the country of which Merv is the centre. No one, I suppose, will contest the fact that Merv is now as much at the mercy of Russia as any other Central Asia, dependency which she dominates, or that the seizure by her of Herat is a question only of time and convenience. Now, on our part, it may be allowed that we have been effusive in our indignation, as far as words are concerned, at the open violation of Russia's promises on the subject, and have very precisely intimated to Amirs of Kabul on more than one occasion that Russia's interference with Afghan affairs will not be tolerated; but our action when the emergency has arisen has always belied our language, and we remain idle spectators of the determined extension which Russia is, step by step, making of her dominion towards Herat. I discredit altogether, because it has failed us in the past, the assurance which is given to us on such occasions that when the real crisis comes England will deal with Russia in the matter as a European question. As we too well know to our cost from the past, it will be just as simple and easy for England to acquiesce a few years hence in the occupation of Herat as it is for England now to accept the practical occupation by Russia of the Merv territory. Then, as now, Indian opinion will be subordinated to party politics at home. Then, as now, the excuses in favour of Russian ambition will be equally ready and be equally deserving of respectful consideration. India, as before, will be left to indifference, amid the wrangles of political parties, as to the side which was the first to give cause of offence to Russia; and this is the more to be dreaded because we know as a fact that the movements of Russia are not regulated by promises, but by the exigencies of her policy; and that that policy is dictated more by the irresponsible ambition of Central Asian officers than by the authority which makes the vows and protestations at St. Petersburg.

The only argument which for a moment seems to me tenable, to justify the precipitate orders which Her Majesty's Government have issued, is that which is based on the expenditure involved in the retention of Kandahar. It is estimated to amount to 2,000,000*l.* annually, and though the details of the estimate are not before us, we have reason to suppose that the large expenditure thus indicated is calculated on the exaggerated alarms of the few partizans in favour of our retirement. Assuming, as we may rightly do, that India will have to bear an increased expenditure (whatever it may be) for the security of our frontiers and the safety of our Indian Empire, the question is simply whether it is worth our while to spend this money as an insurance against risks of very serious magnitude. I concur with the many who think that the outlay is necessary in our interests, because the withdrawal from an advantageous position which our arms have gained, and which as a military position we can easily fortify, will inevitably involve

complications and difficulties which the retention of Kandahar would avert; and because any retreat now to our original limits, with the policy which it proclaims of absolute non-interference, will in the end entail a much heavier expenditure than the measures advocated in the cause primarily of our self-preservation. Besides we have often before, with every addition of territory that has been forced upon us in India, heard these financial forebodings of failure; though fortunately they have never been realised. I think it will be found, looking back to the acquisition of Sind and of the Punjab after the wars on the Sutlej, that similar alarms of its uselessness and costliness found public expression; and when Lord Dalhousie annexed Lower Burmah in 1850, there were not wanting signs of disapproval that we were adding to the burdens and risks of our empire by extending it beyond the proper limits of British India. In the first case there were the stock arguments which now prevail of sterile sands and barren deserts, of a fierce people with strong warlike instincts with whom no truce could ever be made. And we find it after 30 years the most peaceful and loyal of our Indian provinces, supplying the best material for our military services, and with a revenue which compensates for all the risks incurred. While in Burmah, the most prosperous and promising of our Indian dependencies, the solution of the problem has been all the more remarkable from the fact of the more rapid development of successful administration. It would be foolish to ignore, from a financial point of view, the difficulties which an extension of territory beyond the Indus may involve; but that neither the financial nor the administrative difficulties are insurmountable has in a manner been proved already by the success achieved in a part of this very country in the assigned districts of Sibi, and by the prospects held out up to this time of the profitable occupation of Pishin. If any doubts are entertained upon this

* Not yet received.

point I would refer to recent memoranda* upon the subject by Sir R. Sandeman, the Agent to the Governor-General in Biluchistan, which show conclusively the fatuity of proposals which, in violation of the obligations which we have publicly and officially assumed, would abandon to anarchy and confusion the peace and prosperity now established throughout the whole tract of country under our control.

But perhaps the most grievous and humiliating part of the orders in this connection is that which affects not only the stoppage of the railway works now under construction at the Nari Gorge, but the dismantling of the rails and the destruction of the earthworks completed to a considerable distance towards Quetta. We certainly are not here exactly without precedent, for we can all remember the case in which the Government recently having got possession of a railway proceeded at once to demolish it and to break up its rolling stock. There is, however, this difference between the two cases, and it scarcely tells in our favour. The Chinese Government had never seen a railway before, and may have had just that kind of excuse for its folly which ignorance and superstition would excite. We on our side cannot plead such excuses, and least of all in places where we come in contact with barbarism. This wilful and deliberate surrender of advantages, gained after a vast expenditure of time and thought and money, and which would subserve peaceful administration much more than they would supply the military requirements of our position at Quetta, may be intelligible, by a stretch of imagination, to some people who fancy that there is a high moral motive concealed in our proceedings; but, as far as they affect India, they are absolutely beyond the comprehension of any native in the country.

In conclusion, I wish to say that I believe that a large majority in either Kandahar or Pishin would not now accept the continuance of the British occupation of those provinces. I am certain at least that a few months of native government, be it under Abdul Rahman, Ayub Khan, or any other chief, would vastly increase the number "of the already powerful party who prefer British

* Not yet received.

rule to any other." I am supported in this opinion by a very remarkable paper* by Colonel St. John upon the subject; and admittedly there is no one who can speak with the authority and personal experience with which he can speak upon the position of affairs at Kandahar.

The 24th February 1881.

(Signed) RIVERS THOMPSON.

Enclosure 2. in No. 3.

MINUTE by the Hon. E. BARING.

1. After the very full discussions which have taken place during the last two or three years, it is unnecessary that I should give my reasons for considering that the determination of Her Majesty's Government to evacuate the whole of Afghanistan is eminently wise and statesmanlike. I will only say that, ever since I have given any attention to Indian affairs, I have been an advocate of the frontier policy adopted by Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook,* that I consider a political error of the first magnitude was made in departing from that policy, and that I welcome a return to it. I should have been content to add nothing to what has been already stated by others of far greater ability and authority than myself,† had it not been that, as the Member of the Governor General's Council primarily responsible for the conduct of the finances of India, I am desirous that the very important financial aspects of this question should receive due consideration.

2. I am of opinion that, in addition to the general political reasons which may be given in favour of evacuating Afghanistan, it may be shown that it would be highly inadvisable to subject the finances of India to the strain which would be involved upon them by continued occupation.

3. It is, I believe, held by competent military authority that it would require about 6,000 British and 15,000 native troops to garrison Kandahar and to maintain the line of communications. The extra cost consequent on the service of these troops out of India is estimated at 1,000,000%. [100 lakhs of rupees] a year. This estimate, however, makes no allowance for the expenditure on barracks, fortified posts, &c., which would necessarily be very high. It is based, moreover, on the assumption that the troops would belong to the ordinary establishments of India, and includes only extra charges beyond those which would be incurred were the troops serving in India. If, as is more than probable, the force in India had to be increased, the ordinary pay, rations, and other charges of as many corps and batteries as were added, would of course form part of the extra cost consequent on occupation. I cannot doubt that the cost of occupying Kandahar would eventually prove to be considerably in excess of 1,000,000%. a year.

4. The cost of occupying Pishin would no doubt be less, but I cannot help think that it would still be very heavy. I observe that my honourable colleague, Sir Donald Stewart, who speaks on this subject with the weight of unquestionable authority, says that—

“The retention of our authority over Pishin does not necessarily involve the grave disadvantages and heavy charges contemplated in the Secretary of State's Despatch of the 3rd of December last, No. 49. Those who know the district best believe that it could be held at very insignificant cost by a detachment from the Quetta garrison.”

Sir R. Sandeman says that “it could be ordinarily held by less than a single regiment.” On the other hand, the Indian Army Commission (Report, p. 26), proceeding on the

* That policy was well stated by Lord Lawrence in a Despatch, dated January 4th, 1869, in the following terms:—“We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move (*i.e.*, a permanent advance of the frontier) might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is, to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control.

“Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or, what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security, would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Kabul, Kandahar, or any similar outpost, in full reliance on a compact, highly equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories or on our own border, in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses, in the sense of security of title and possession with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal chiefs and the native aristocracy, in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political and military strength, in husbanding our finances, and consolidating and multiplying our resources, in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard, and in a trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt.”

† Notably by the Duke of Argyll in *The Eastern Question*, vol. II., pages 215 to 455. So far as I am aware, no adequate attempt has as yet been made to answer the arguments contained in this volume.

assumption that Kandahar would be given up, allotted a very considerable force* to Pishin and the posts between it and Dadur, and it is within my personal knowledge that Sir Henry Norman, who also speaks with high authority on this subject, considered that the force proposed by the Commission erred on the side of inadequacy. After the experience we have gained in Afghan affairs, I think it not unreasonable to incline to the pessimist, rather than to the optimist, view of possible expenditure.

5. I will endeavour to state very briefly my reasons for thinking that the finances of India are not in a sufficiently prosperous condition to justify the Government in imposing upon them the additional charges to which I have alluded above.

6. The first essential condition of sound finance exists in India. The revenue exceeds the ordinary expenditure. In the year 1879-80, for which the accounts are now complete, there was a deficit of only 1,183,000*l.* after

	£	£
EXPENDITURE—		
Ordinary -	63,543,000	
War -	6,125,000	
		69,668,000
REVENUE -		68,485,000
DEFICIT -		1,183,000

treating as ordinary expenditure a sum of 6,125,000*l.* on account of the war. The expenditure on productive public works is now limited to 2½ millions a year. Although I would very gladly see private enterprise substituted for State agency in the construction of many of those works, I am amongst those who consider that the capital outlay by Government

on works which are strictly productive may properly be excluded from the account of ordinary expenditure.

7. The actual financial condition of India is therefore prosperous. I am glad of an opportunity of expressing this opinion, because the recent failure in the war estimates has naturally tended to induce a belief that the present financial condition of India affords ground for serious alarm. This is not the case. We need be under no serious anxiety in respect to our current finances. The difficulties with which we have to deal, considerable though they be, are different from those which obtained at the time when Mr. Wilson came to India in 1860. India is not in a state of chronic deficit. She can not only pay her way, but provide a large surplus of receipts over expenditure. More than this, the different branches of revenue show a fair degree of elasticity. Thus, if we compare the net receipts of 1869-70 with those of 1879-80, we find that the land revenue has increased from 20,812,000*l.* to 22,199,000*l.* Excise has increased from 1,991,000*l.* to 2,697,000*l.* Customs, which in 1869-70 yielded 2,168,000*l.* yielded in 1879-80, in spite of considerable reductions of duty in the interim, a sum of 2,022,000*l.* The salt revenue has risen from 5,462,000*l.* to 6,867,000*l.* Stamps and registration have increased from 2,281,000*l.* to 3,149,000*l.*

On July 1st, 1880, a return was presented to Parliament showing the net charge on the revenues of India for interest on debt, interest, and other charges for guaranteed companies, and working expenses and maintenance of State railways and irrigation works, classed as Productive Public Works from 1868-1869 to 1880-81 (Budget Estimate). This return shows a reduction in 12 years of 3,558,000*l.* in the net charge on the revenues of India, which is accounted for by an improvement in the net result of the guaranteed and State railways and other productive works of 4,041,000*l.* (including 703,000*l.* from land revenue due to irrigation works), while the net charge for interest on debt has increased by 483,000*l.*

8. Are we therefore justified in saying that the condition of Indian finance is thoroughly prosperous? I think not. However encouraging may be the aspect of the present, the possibilities of the future are at all events sufficiently grave to render severe thrift and economy a paramount necessity.

9. I cannot think that the financial condition of that country is free from anxiety whose main source of revenue is derived from payments in silver, either fixed in perpetuity or only capable of increase at long intervals, whilst at the same time it owes a large sum annually in gold. The home charges have of late years been gradually increasing. In 1881-82 they will amount to no less than 18 millions sterling. This charge is abnormally high, and moreover includes many remittances which are merely in the nature of banking transactions; but when all reasonable deductions have been made,

* 1 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
2½ Mountain Batteries, Royal Artillery.
1 Garrison Battery, Royal Artillery.
1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
2 Companies Sappers and Miners.
1 Regiment British Infantry.
4 Regiments Native Infantry.

the amount which India must send home to meet her current wants is still very large. Obviously under such conditions one essential element of State finance—stability—must be wanting. We can never feel any certainty of the sum to which the item “Loss by Exchange” may not amount.

10. No less than $8\frac{1}{4}$ millions of our net revenue is derived from opium. It is true that whilst the revenue from opium has of late years been steadily increasing, it has been decided to rely on opium only to the extent of $6\frac{1}{2}$ millions net in framing the estimates. But I cannot, on this account, consider that the force of the arguments based upon the precarious nature of this revenue are

	£
Opium receipts, 1879-80	- 10,319,000
„ expenditure, 1879-80	- 2,067,000
Net revenue	- 8,252,000

diminished. Six and a half millions is a very large sum of money, and there will always be a tendency to discount the anticipated receipts above that amount. It may reasonably be argued that the degree of embarrassment which would be caused by the whole or partial loss of the opium revenue increases in the direct proportion of the sums which the Indian Treasury derives from this source. The anomalies and inconsistencies attendant upon the present system are year by year being brought into more prominent notice. Only a short time ago, the Government of India, alarmed at the increasing export of opium from Persia to China, placed a duty upon all Persian opium transhipped at Bombay, and subsequently moved the Government of the free port of Singapore to adopt a similar measure. The Colonial Office in London declined to accede to this request. I mention the circumstance merely as an instance of the expedients to which India is driven by reason of her reliance upon the opium revenue.

11. Nearly seven millions of the total net revenue is derived from salt. I believe salt to be a legitimate source of revenue, and I think that it may properly constitute the financial reserve upon which the Government of India should fall back in times of emergency. But in order that our salt policy should be sound, and that the salt revenue should constitute a real reserve, it is essential that

	£
Salt receipts, 1879-80	- 7,266,000
„ expenditure, 1879-80	- 341,000
Net revenue	- 6,925,000

the duty should not be too high. There is good reason for supposing that over a large part of Southern India the recent increase of duty has diminished consumption, or has at all events stimulated illicit manufacture. Much has of late years been done towards the equalisation of the salt duties, but I cannot think that our fiscal policy in respect to salt can be considered thoroughly sound until we have arrived at a uniform rate of Rs. 2 per maund. I need hardly point out that to arrive at this rate would involve a considerable sacrifice of revenue, and, although we may no doubt look to a certain steady growth of revenue, I cannot think that there is much hope of giving practical effect to the policy for a long time to come unless we reduce our expenditure.

12. The time cannot be far distant when almost the whole of our sea customs duty will have to be abandoned. I will not now attempt to discuss the advisability or otherwise of the partial repeal of the cotton duties. My own opinion is that the measure, however desirable in itself, was financially and politically premature; financially, because I think that India can with difficulty afford the loss of revenue; politically, because I think it would have been wiser to have postponed a change of this nature until the time, which cannot now be far distant, when the natives of India will be to a greater extent associated with us in the government of the country. However that may be, the partial repeal of the cotton duties must inevitably, sooner or later, lead to their total repeal, and eventually, in all probability, to the repeal of the duty on other imported goods. Here again the necessity of a reduction rather than an increase of expenditure is forced upon us.

13. I need not repeat the statements which have been so frequently made, to show that we cannot rely upon new sources of revenue to make good any increased expenditure. Indeed, in the face of the strong opposition which the income or license tax excites in India, it is doubtful whether we shall be able to hold to any system of direct taxation.

14. It has been determined, and I think wisely determined, to provide 1,500,000% a year as an insurance against famine.

15. Lastly, the pressure of the population upon the soil, which year by year increases in intensity, presents an economic difficulty of the first magnitude, with which, indeed, I doubt the capability of Government to cope by any direct means, but which renders it imperative upon us to reduce in every possible way the pressure of taxation.

16. On these grounds I consider not only that it would be in the highest degree unwise to take any steps which would have for their result a large increase of expendi-

ture of a wholly unproductive nature, but I entertain a strong opinion that the reduction of present military expenditure is of all others the financial question which most deserves the earnest attention of the Government of India.

17. I am aware that it is sometimes argued that the expenditure consequent on the occupation of Southern Afghanistan is only in the nature of an insurance which will guard us against political and financial evils at some future date. Leaving out of account the political arguments, which in my opinion invalidate this plea, I consider that, on purely financial grounds, the argument involves a fallacy. When on analogous grounds Lord Palmerston wished to spend a large sum of money on fortifications, Sir George Lewis objected that in such matters prevention was not better than cure. A precisely similar argument applies in my opinion to the occupation of Southern Afghanistan as an insurance against Russian invasion. The dangers from the side of Russia, even if they be not altogether imaginary, are uncertain and remote. The political and financial evils of occupation are certain and proximate. By the occupation of Southern Afghanistan a stimulus will be given to that spirit of territorial aggrandisement which it is, in my opinion, the duty of English statesmen to check; whilst the immediate result must be to adjourn indefinitely the fiscal reforms of which India stands so much in need, if indeed it be not to necessitate the imposition of burdensome and unpopular taxes. I submit that the interests of the natives of India, to which alone we should look, do not justify us in expending the money derived from the taxes which they pay upon the occupation of Southern Afghanistan.

18. I should add that the surplus revenue of Southern Afghanistan is insignificant compared to the estimated cost of occupation. Colonel St. John estimated the revenue of the provinces of Kandahar, Pusht-i-Rud and Zamindawar, Farah and Kelat-i-Ghilizai for 1880-81 at Rs. 20,50,000, and the expenditure at Rs. 14,50,000, leaving a surplus of only Rs. 6,00,000. The revenue of Pishin Colonel St. John estimated at about Rs. 62,500. Sir Robert Sandeman's estimate is Rs. 45,000. The resources of these provinces would, without doubt, be to some extent developed under British rule, but it is clear that the revenue could not within any appreciable time increase in such proportions as would make good any considerable portion of the cost of occupation. Moreover, all experience has shown that increased expenditure under our costly system of administration generally swallows up any progressive increments of revenue.

19. Allusion has occasionally been made to the commercial advantages of occupying Kandahar. I give in the margin figures showing the trade between Kandahar and British India during the last three years. The imports consist principally of wool; the exports of European piece-goods. No doubt the result of British administration and the construction of a railway would be to develop the trade; to what extent is a matter of conjecture. I cannot, however, think that the indirect financial advantages to be derived on this account could ever seriously counterbalance the direct disadvantages of the expenditure which would be the result of occupation.

20. On these grounds I am of opinion that, independently of other reasons, the necessity of retiring from Southern Afghanistan is, on financial grounds, forced upon us.

E. BARING.

February 19th, 1881.

LONDON:

Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty,
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

AFGHANISTAN (1881) No. 4.

FURTHER PAPERS

RELATING TO THE

OCCUPATION OF KANDAHAR.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

[C.—2865.] *Price 1d.*

BOMBAY BRANCH

OF THE

Royal Asiatic Society

CLASS

FURTHER PAPERS.

No. 35 of 1881.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 21, 1881.

WITH reference to paragraph 7 of our Despatch, dated 2nd February 1881,* we have the honour to forward the minutes† of our honourable colleagues, which have been already recorded. Any other minutes which may be under preparation will be forwarded subsequently.

* No. 21.

† By Mr. Whitley Stokes, C.S.I., dated 31st January 1881.

By Mr. J. Gibbs, C.S.I., dated 31st January 1881.

By Lieut.-General Sir D. M. Stewart, G.C.B., dated 31st January 1881.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord Marquis,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servants,

(Signed) RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

JAMES GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

Enclosure 1.

MINUTE.

THE present Secretary of State for India has directed us to withdraw our troops from Kandahar on the earliest suitable occasion. Though this order affects, in a high degree, the military, political, and commercial interests of an empire for which the Government of India is primarily responsible, his Lordship has issued it without giving us a chance of remonstrating against a measure to which he must know that all the members of Lord Lytton's Government, and most of the members of Lord Ripon's, are strenuously opposed. To argue at length against a foregone conclusion would be mere waste of words, and I shall therefore confine myself to setting down briefly the reasons which render me unable to assent to the policy which our Despatch of the 2nd of February 1881 accepts without demur.

Those reasons are, first, that in the opinion of strategists, such as Lord Napier of Magdala, Sir F. Roberts, and Colonel Hamley, the retention of Kandahar, with a small space beyond* is desirable for the defence of India against an invading army. I myself know nothing of strategy, but anyone can see the advantage of holding a strong city situate on the only road from Central Asia to India along which wheeled carriages and heavy guns can be moved, the only road on which a railway can be made connecting India with the Caspian or Asia Minor.† Recent events have made it as certain as anything of the kind can be that the Russians will soon be established within a few days' march of the northern frontier of Afghanistan, in a position communicating with the Caspian by a light line of railway; and when this is effected the invasion referred to may almost be said to have already begun.

Secondly, because Abd-ur-Rahman, to whom the Secretary of State proposes to make over Kandahar, seems by recent accounts to be a *roi fainéant*, and is, at all events, not

* Including a portion of the Helmund river with the command of the passage at Girishk.

† See in *The Times* for September 10, 1880, a letter signed "Kandahari," the statements of fact in which are, according to two high authorities whom I have consulted, quite trustworthy.

strong enough to hold it. He cannot even control his own part of the country, though he has had six months to seat himself in the saddle, has been strengthened by our friendly presence at Kandahar, and has been largely helped with money and arms. Our withdrawal will therefore in all probability lead to anarchy and a long civil war in Afghanistan. For these calamities we shall be, and ought to be, held morally responsible. Moreover, as the Secretary of State himself remarks, protracted war in that country will probably cause uneasiness and disquiet in our own dominions and in the States of our Native feudatories and allies.

Thirdly, the result of this civil war will apparently be that Ayub, our bitter enemy, who defeated us at Maiwand, and who has already gathered a considerable force at Herat, will succeed in establishing himself at Kandahar, and ultimately at Kabul, and that we shall then have to enter on another costly war in which, if our relations with St. Petersburg happen to be at all strained, Ayub will be directly or indirectly helped by Russia. Now that General Skobelev has vanquished the Turkomans and taken Geuk Tépé, Russia will soon be at Merv, and then, unless we show an unflinching front, she will occupy Herat, which, as we know to our cost, is within striking distance of Kandahar.

Fourthly, the surrender of the sole prize which we have gained in the late Afghan war will be regarded, not only by the Afghans, but by the people of India, as a confession of weakness, fear, and instability of purpose; and, however glad they may be, individually, to leave Kandahar, the wilful relinquishment of their solitary trophy will disgust and dishearten the men of our native armies. To say, as has been said, that this result will be counterbalanced by the "moral effect" on our native allies "of a scrupulous adherence to declarations" which were made under circumstances totally different from those that now exist, is to use a phrase which will seldom be understood by Orientals, and which, when understood, will, I fear, be received with a smile of derision. The coincidence of the surrender with Skobelev's victory and with the unhappy state of affairs in Ireland and at the Cape, will not, to the native mind, appear a mere accident.

Fifthly, because the withdrawal from Kandahar, opposed, as it is, to the policy of Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet, will create a belief in this country that our action in matters vitally affecting India is subject to the vicissitudes of English party politics. Nothing can be so destructive of the local influence of the Government of India, except, I would add, the hasty determination of such questions as the present one, without reference to the opinions of the members of that Government.

Sixthly, because, according to many competent persons, our commerce would gain largely by a permanent occupation of Kandahar. This, of course, would involve the completion of the railway from Sibi, and Kandahar would then be only two days' journey from Karáchi. As Kandahar commands the chief trade-routes from India to Persia and Central Asia, it is needless to point out the opening which would thus be made for what some authorities call a great and civilising trade,—for what would, at all events, be a mutually advantageous exchange of British manufactures and Indian teas for Asiatic carpets, wool, silk, dye, and other produce.

These, stated very briefly, are my reasons for wishing to retain Kandahar, as an assigned district, administered mainly by Afghans, if it is thought impolitic to annex it to the Empire.

I shall now mention the reasons given for surrendering Kandahar. They appear to admit of easy answers. It is, in the first place, said that the financial burthen of retaining Kandahar would be more than we could conveniently bear. I believe that this is a mistake. I know that the late Financial Minister thought so; and Lord Napier of Magdala is probably right in holding that if we retreat, the savings thus effected will soon be spent in costly punitive expeditions like those which, down to the commencement of the war with the Amír Sher Ali, we had to send so constantly against the Afghan borderers. Then, with a strong garrison at Kandahar, we might safely diminish our force on the Pesháwar frontier. Besides, as irrigation and agriculture would at once extend under our rule, we should soon derive a fair revenue from Kandahar and its fertile environs, and the financial benefit of increasing our trade with Persia and Central Asia would, no doubt, be ultimately considerable.

It is, again, alleged that our sepoys are unwilling to serve so far from India, and that the occupation of Kandahar will therefore cause what is called "a constant strain on the organisation of the native army." But according to competent judges, this is a mere question of abolishing stoppages and granting a little extra pay. Pay the sepoys, says Lord Napier of Magdala, with sufficient liberality to compensate them for exile in Afghanistan, and there will be no difficulty in getting recruits for a Kandahar force.

Then it is said that we must give up Kandahar, because at the outset of the war which ended with the treaty of Gandamak, we declared that we had no quarrel with the Afghan people, and that their treatment would depend on their own conduct. But, as every one knows, after this declaration was made, Cavagnari was murdered, and a third war broke out, in which the Afghan people, both of the South and of the North, sided with his murderers. In this war we have been victors, and may righteously retain any portion of our vanquished enemy's territory. There is contradictory evidence as to whether, at present, our rule would be popular, or the reverse, with the people of Kandahar. To my mind, this matters little. Our rule would rapidly enrich the citizens, who are mostly traders, and the villagers of the neighbouring valleys, and would therefore soon become popular enough. In any case it seems that if the Kandaharis dislike us, they dislike still more the Kabulis to whom the Secretary of State proposes to deliver them.

It has, lastly, been urged that the military occupation of Kandahar would be more advantageously taken when the advance of Russia makes it clear that not only the safety of India, but the independence of Afghanistan, is threatened. But supposing that we are not then at war with the Afghans, on what pretext are we to occupy Kandahar? Are we to set aside the ordinary rules of international law and seize a neutral's territory for our own defence? Even supposing that the Afghans, also dreading a Russian attack, voluntarily allowed us to occupy Kandahar, we should have no time to make the city and the citadel secure. That, I understand, would be a long business, especially as it ought, I am assured, to be combined with the erection of forts along our line of communication. But this latter supposition is untenable, for when Russia advances against India, she will take care to have the Afghans on her side, bribing them with the promise of the plunder of a country which they have so often looted.

On the whole, the general effect of the arguments in favour of the surrender of Kandahar is (if I may venture to say so) to confirm the conclusion that we should retain it. But if this be not done, it seems to me that the only reasonable course open to us is to restore Yakub Khan to the Amirship, and make Kandahar over to him. I am one of the few persons who have read the mass of so-called evidence against that Amir. I say now, as I have always said, that it does not establish his complicity in the murder of our Envoy, and I therefore think that we should not treat his abdication as irrevocable.

For the reasons stated by Sir Donald Stewart, in his minute of this date, I am also opposed to the surrender of Peshin and the Amran Range, which, in his Despatch of the 3rd December 1880, the Secretary of State has recommended. In fact, with the Sibi Railway prolonged to Gulistan Karez, and a line on this side of the Range from Gulistan Karez to Kila Abdulla, connecting the Gwaja and the Khójak passes, we should have a defensive position almost as strong as Kandahar itself.

WHITELEY STOKES.

Calcutta, 31st January 1881.

Enclosure No. 2.

MINUTE by the HON. J. GIBBS.

HER Majesty's Government have decided on the withdrawal of our forces from Kandahar, and the relinquishment of that city and district, leaving it, if possible, in the hands of some settled government.

Abdul Rahman has been offered it, but it seems doubtful if he will be able to take advantage of our offer, or, if he does, to be able to take charge by the middle of April, by which time our troops are to be withdrawn, so as to avoid the great heats on their return march.

Although leaving under such circumstances recalls to one's mind the old saying "*après moi le deluge*," I can quite understand why the order has been passed, and we have only to obey it. Nevertheless, I must confess it does not shake my faith in the opinion I have long formed that sooner or later we shall hold Kandahar and Herat also, and for similar reasons to those put on record some 30 years ago by the then Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces—"It may be wrong, it may seem highly immoral to advance our frontier, but the 'red line' must and will extend, do what we may;" and this I believe will prove to be as true in regard to Southern Afghanistan as it was formerly to the Punjab.

I see many objections to our holding Kandahar now, and many good reasons why we may retire from it with comparative ease, and I do not therefore oppose such a course.

I only trust that we may not, by our retiring in April, throw the country into a more active state of anarchy than generally exists in those parts.

But with regard to Pishin and the territories which lie to the south of the Kojak range, I must say I cannot allow the proposed reply to the Despatch, No. 49, from the Secretary of State, to go without placing on record my dissent from the view taken by Her Majesty's Government at home.

The country within the Kojak range is geographically separated from Kandahar proper by the Kojak Amrum range, and a desert of 80 miles wide, its inhabitants are not numerous, and there are reasons for supposing that amongst them we are more likely to introduce a settled government than any power which may rule at Kandahar. While as regards the country marked on the maps as part of Afghanistan, and which lies to the north-east of Biluchistan proper, although a portion of the Kandahar State, that Government has had less direct hold over it than it had over the other portions of its territory. While as regards Sibi and the territory round it, which was shown in our maps from 1850 to 1870 as an oasis about 20 by 18 miles, coloured green and marked "Kandahar territory," as far as my memory serves me, since 1854, the hold over it was even less direct than over Pishin.*

I think, therefore, that from a geographical point of view, Pishin, and certainly Sibi, do not stand on the same position as Kandahar.

Then our position as regards these parts is from another aspect peculiar. Not long ago it was included in the territory ceded to us under the Treaty of Gandamak, and we informed the people we were going to occupy it, and we have done so, and taken the measures regarding its settlement, which are set out in the fifth paragraph of the reply to Her Majesty's Secretary of State. I feel assured that it will only lead to strife and confusion if we now withdraw from our present position; we should certainly, by so doing, damage our prestige in Biluchistan, not improbably place our ally the Khan of Kelat in a difficult, if not dangerous, position, while our action will be viewed in India in the undesirable light of the natural result of one government succeeding another, and by the inhabitants of the district as the result of minds as unstable as their own, if not as a breach of faith.

I do not want to annex it, but strongly protest against giving it up now. We are holding it "for an indefinite period,"—let us continue to do so. The time may come when we may, with credit to ourselves, add it to a combined and friendly Afghanistan, but the present is certainly not the time for deserting it. We should only add thereby to the confusion which must arise when we leave Kandahar, nor even if Abdul Rahman does take possession, we cannot expect him to do so with the good-will of the people, while to expect Ayub Khan to keep quiet and abstain from trying to regain what he thinks is his own, cannot, for a moment, be expected.

So far from thinking, as the Secretary of State's Despatch lays down, that by holding Pishin as we do now we should keep the Government of India involved in the complications of Afghan politics, and have a temptation or pretext for interfering with its domestic affairs, the contrary in my opinion would be the result—it would be a position easily held, a stand-point from which we could calmly view all that is going on beyond without any need or desire to be mixed up in it, not likely to be interfered with by the Kandaharis, who would have to cross a wide desert and a heavy mountain range to come near us, staying where we are, strengthened by the possession of the good-will of the inhabitants, who will be only too glad of the security our presence affords them.


As to the troops required to hold it, it is of course a military question, but from what I learn, especially from Sir R. Sandeman, our agent at Kelat, I apprehend a very small addition to the force we shall be obliged to keep for some time at Quetta will suffice. It was not a district which used to be held by Kandahar troops; and the knowledge of our force at Quetta will suffice, with a few small detachments, to do all that is required.

This subject also involves the question of the railway. Believing, as I do, that a railroad is one of the greatest of civilisers, and knowing that already the kafila merchants are making their inquiries regarding it, and remembering how strongly such a line for commercial purposes has been urged on Government from time to time since 1857, and looking at what we have spent and how very little extra will be needed to make it useful as far as Hurnai, while its safety will be provided for by the tribes themselves, many of whom are anxious for it, I think it would be a great mistake not to finish it, at all events up to that point.

31st January 1881.

(Signed) J. GIBBS.

* Note.—I notice that Sir Robert Sandeman puts forward a claim of Kelat to Pishin, on the ground that it was once formally granted to that State, but of this I have no detailed information.—J. G.



Enclosure 3

MINUTE.

WHEN the question of the occupation of Kandahar was discussed in Council in September last, it will be in the recollection of those who were present at that discussion, that my objection to our retirement from that place was based on the engagements which had been formally entered into with the ruler and people of Kandahar, and from which it appeared to me that we could not honourably withdraw.

Though I am bound to say that some of my colleagues did not appear to attach much importance to these alleged obligations, the point was admitted to be one which required the fullest consideration, and it was eventually decided that the further discussion of that and of the general question should be deferred till Mr. Lyall's return from Kandahar, when the Council hoped to be in a position to come to a satisfactory settlement of them.

Owing, however, to the removal of the Government from Simla to Calcutta and the unfortunate illness of the Viceroy, the Council has not had an opportunity of continuing the discussion of these questions till quite recently.

This is the position in which we find ourselves to-day with regard to the question of the occupation of Kandahar.

I do not myself consider Kandahar to be a place of great strategical value, nor am I an advocate of annexation for any purpose, not even if it could be demonstrated without a shadow of doubt that our frontier would be improved and strengthened by such a measure.

My objection, therefore, to the action of Her Majesty's present Government in regard to Southern Afghanistan is based, not on a disapproval of the effect of that action, but on their disregard of obligations which were formally and publicly undertaken by their predecessors in office in the name of Her Majesty the Queen.

My contention is that whether the policy of the late Government was good or bad, it ought not to be disturbed without the clearest necessity, for nothing can be so destructive of our influence in this country as the creation of a belief that the policy of its Government is subject to the vicissitudes of English parties.

To guard myself from misconstruction, I would desire it to be understood that I do not for a moment pretend to argue that our policy is never to be subjected to change. But I must repeat that the complete reversal of a deliberate policy recognises a principle that must be always inconvenient and sometimes dangerous.

Whether the necessity for a change of policy is or is not in the present instance capable of demonstration it is not my intention here to discuss, because it would serve no useful purpose to enter into a barren disputation on a subject which has not only been finally disposed of by Her Majesty's Government, but which will certainly receive, if it has not already received, the sanction of Parliament, and is therefore beyond the stage of practical criticism.

But the question of the evacuation of Peshin seems to me to stand on a totally different footing. That district has been assigned to us by treaty; and although that instrument may now be considered inoperative, it has led us into obligations with regard to the population of the assigned districts, from which we cannot retreat without discredit, and as I think humiliation, and on this ground I protest against the immediate, or even early rendition of Peshin to any Afghan Government.

The time may come when the district can be restored to Afghanistan with the full consent of the people and without detriment to the interests of the empire; but till that time arrives we are bound to guard those interests by continuing to acknowledge our obligations before the world.

However opinions may differ about the value of Pishin, no one can doubt that the possession of the Amran Range is a very important acquisition to our frontier, and it will not be easy to justify to the country any sacrifice of the advantages which accrue to us from the possession of that mountain barrier.

The retention of our authority over Peshin does not necessarily involve the grave disadvantages and heavy charges, contemplated in the Secretary of State's Despatch of the 3rd December last, No. 49. Those who know the district best believe that it could be held at a very insignificant cost* by a detachment from the Quetta garrison.

* Sir R. Sandeman says it could be ordinarily held by less than a single regiment.

If Her Majesty's Government consider that the conditions of assignment are practically identical with annexation, it would be easy to stipulate that the entire revenues of the district after payment of the civil charges be surrendered to the Afghan Government.

I would ask that this minute be sent home with our reply to the Secretary of State's Despatches Nos. 45 and 49 of 11th November and 3rd December last, respectively.

(Signed) D. M. STEWART.

Calcutta, January 31, 1881.

L O N D O N :

Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.

For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

AFGHANISTAN (1881) No. 5.



FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN,

INCLUDING

THE TRANSFER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF KANDAHAR TO AMIR ABDUL-RAHMAN KHAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

[C.—3090.] Price 1s. 4d.

LIST OF PAPERS.

No.	Date.	Document.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
1	1881. Jan. 12 -	Letter No. 3 - With 5 enclo- sures.	Government of India.	Secretary of State	Retirement to India of Wali Sher Ali Khan Kandahari.	5
2	Jan 19 -	Letter No. 10 - With 16 enclo- sures.	" "	" "	Correspondence with Amir Abdul-Rahman Khan, respecting occupation of Khelat- i-Ghilzai, &c.	7
3	Jan. 26 -	Letter No. 12 - With 4 enclo- sures.	" "	" "	Memoranda on position of affairs in Kandahar in October, 1880.	15
4	Feb. 2 -	Letter No. 17 -	" "	" "	Information respecting the Jaji and Turi tribes of the Kurram valley. Possession of the Peiwar Kotal by the former.	29
5	Feb. 2 -	Letter No. 22 - With 1 enclo- sure.	" "	" "	Arrangements for mak- ing over Kandahar to Amir Abdul-Rahman Khan.	29
6	Feb. 11 -	Despatch No. 10	Secretary of State	Government of India.	Retirement to India of Wali Sher Ali Khan Kandahari.	31
7	Feb. 14 -	Letter No. 27 - With 7 enclo- sures.	Government of India	Secretary of State	Correspondence with Amir of Kabul. De- putation of an Agent to India.	31
8	Feb. 28 -	Letter No. 39 - With 13 enclo- sures.	" "	" "	Arrangements for main- taining the security of the Khyber Pass.	34
9	Mar. 14 -	Letter No. 44 - With 9 enclo- sures.	" "	" "	Measures for withdrawal from Kandahar. De- putation to India of an Agent from the Amir of Kabul.	61
10	Mar. 27 -	Letter No. 50 - With 3 enclo- sures.	" "	" "	Arrangements for mak- ing over Kandahar to Amir of Kabul. Communications with envoys from Ayub Khan.	71
11	Mar. 27 -	Letter No. 51 - With 3 enclo- sures.	" "	" "	Arrangements for main- taining the security of the Khyber Pass.	74
12	April 3 -	Letter No. 54 - With 3 enclo- sures.	" "	" "	Correspondence with Amir Abdul-Rahman. Supply of arms and arrangements for tak- ing over Kandahar.	78
13	April 8 -	Despatch No. 13	Secretary of State	Government of India.	Arrangements for main- taining the security of the Khyber Pass.	79
14	April 10 -	Letter No. 57 - With 7 enclo- sures.	Government of India.	Secretary of State	Correspondence with Amir of Kabul and Ayub Khan. Arrange- ments for transfer of Kandahar.	80

No.	Date.	Document.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
15	1881. April 17-	Letter No. 60 - With 4 enclo- sures.	Government of India.	Secretary of State	Correspondence with Amir of Kabul. Sub- sidy, transfer of Kandahar, &c.	84
16	April 24-	Letter No. 64 - With 1 enclo- sure.	" "	" "	Assurances by Amir as to considerate treat- ment of Kandahari Sirdars.	87
17	April 29-	Despatch No. 20	Secretary of State	Government of India.	Question of retention of Pishin and Sibi.	88
18	May 1 -	Letter No. 68 - With 2 enclo- sures.	Government of India.	Secretary of State	Measures for protection of British adherents remaining in Kanda- har.	90
19	May 22 -	Letter No. 80 - With 3 enclo- sures.	" "	" "	Correspondence with Amir of Kabul. Sup- plies of money and arms.	92
20	June 3 -	Letter No. 84 -	" "	" "	Question of retention of Pishin and Sibi.	94
21	" 10 -	Letter No. 88 - With 2 enclo- sures.	" "	" "	Kandahar news.	98
22	" 17 -	Letter No. 92 - With 3 enclo- sures.	" "	" "	Kandahar Diary, 15th to 27th April.	101
23	" 24 -	Letter No. 94 - With 1 enclo- sure.	" "	" "	Kandahar news.	106
24	July 15 -	Letter No. 105 - With 2 enclo- sures.	" "	" "	" " Fighting at Girishk.	107
25	" " -	Letter No. 107 - With 1 enclo- sure.	" "	" "	Kandahar news.	111
26	" 22 -	Letter No. 109 - With 1 enclo- sure.	" "	" "	" "	113
27	" 29 -	Letter No. 111 - With 11 enclo- sures.	" "	" "	Advance of Ayub Khan on Kandahar. Defeat of the Ameer's troops.	115
28	" " -	Letter No. 113 - With 2 enclo- sures.]	" "	" "	Letter from General Kolpakofsky to the Amir of Kabul.	118
29	" " -	Letter No. 114 - With 1 enclo- sure.	" "	" "	Kandahar news.	119
30	" " -	Letter No. 115 - With 1 enclo- sure.	" "	" "	Affairs at Kabul.	121
31	" " -	Letter No. 116 - With 2 enclo- sures.	" "	" "	Kandahar news.	122

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

No. 3 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, January 12, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding Sirdar Sher Ali Khan of Kandahar.

2. Your Lordship is aware of the circumstances under which the Sirdar was recognized in March last as independent ruler of the Kandahar province. The authority then assumed by him was lost four months later, when Sirdar Ayub Khan advanced from Herat; and Sher Ali Khan afterwards showed little inclination to resume it. Immediately after the relief of Kandahar by General Roberts, Sher Ali Khan informed Colonel St. John that, while willing to give all the aid in his power for the restoration of tranquillity, he desired to be permitted to retire to India, as he had lost confidence in the people, and as he felt little hope of restoring a good understanding between them and himself. On the 30th October he addressed a letter to the Viceroy in which he stated that, since no immediate settlement of the affairs of the country could be expected, he proposed to withdraw with his family to Kurrachee.

3. Before this letter was received the situation of affairs in Southern Afghanistan had been very carefully considered, and it seemed on the whole advisable that the Sirdar's offer should be accepted. Recent events in this part of Afghanistan had left no doubt that, except with the active and unreserved support of the British Government, Sher Ali Khan was altogether unable to maintain his position as independent ruler of Kandahar. The greater part of his regular military force had deserted him on the approach of Ayub Khan; while the people of the province showed no disposition whatever to assist him, but on the contrary turned with the greatest animosity against the British troops with whom he was acting in the field. It may be admitted that the hostility of the Duranis, who form by far the majority of the population of South Afghanistan, was inspired mainly by their fanaticism, and by the dislike with which they regarded the occupation of Kandahar by foreign troops. But all the circumstances of the outbreak tended to prove that the Sirdar's government had not been popular, and had acquired no intrinsic strength apart from the support which might be given by British arms. His government, if restored in the districts adjacent to the capital, could be maintained only by a general undertaking to defend and uphold the Sirdar's authority against foreign invasion. It is manifest, however, that we could not have entered upon obligations of this nature and extent without embarking upon a course of policy leading towards the indefinite, if not the permanent, military occupation of Kandahar by a British force—a measure to which Her Majesty's Government (as we had been informed by your Lordship's Despatch of the 21st May) entertains the strongest objection. Accordingly, the Sirdar was informed that the Government of India were fully prepared to accord him an honourable reception in British territory, and that nothing should be wanting to ensure his comfort and security so long as he might reside under British protection. On the 29th of November Colonel St. John telegraphed that Sher Ali Khan cheerfully acquiesced in this decision; that he chose Kurrachee as his place of residence; and that he would start as soon as arrangements could be made for his journey. A fortnight later he left Kandahar, and on the 27th of December arrived at Kurrachee. An allowance of Rupees 5,000 per mensem has been settled upon him, and suitable arrangements have been made for his accommodation and that of his family. The

Sirdar has expressed himself much gratified at all that has been done; nor is there any reason to suppose that he is not in fact very well satisfied with the treatment that he has received.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kandahar, to His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR GENERAL of INDIA, dated Kandahar, the 30th October 1880.

After compliments.—Now that the Foreign Secretary has come here, and that I have had several interviews with him, I have understood from him, after much conversation regarding the affairs of this country, that arrangements for it, after recent events, are still undetermined. Some time is required to decide them. Of course the British Government is entitled to act according to its own interests. Under any circumstances I am of one opinion with and agree with the Government in any views they may entertain regarding future arrangements. But since both in former times and recently I have for a long space of time administered the affairs of this Government, and know most of the people thoroughly, (I fear) that, perchance, in this time of uncertainty, some persons may do evil, which may cause the British Government to become cold-hearted towards me, and thus I may be ruined. Therefore, with the permission of the British Government, I, with my family, will proceed to the port of Kurrachee, for is not it also a possession of the British Government? If ever in the future arrangements for this country my services should be required, I shall be ready in the territory of the British Government. But if some other arrangement is come to, no doubt the British Government is entitled to act as it pleases, and I shall always consider myself its sincere friend. Also I heartily assure your Excellency that the British Government may always consider me its sincere friend.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Dated CAMP JACOBABAD, 19th November 1880.

LETTER from His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA, to SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kandahar.

I HAVE received the letter addressed to me on the 30th of October by your Highness, and I have given full consideration to its contents.

Your Highness has rightly perceived that recent events have necessarily unsettled the arrangements previously made with respect to the government of Kandahar, and that some time may elapse before the future relations of the British Government with that country shall have been finally determined. And since your Highness has conveyed to me your desire to proceed, under these circumstances, to British India, I reply that I am fully prepared to accord you an honourable reception in British territory, and to make every provision for the entertainment of yourself and family, according to your high rank and dignity, so long as you may reside under the protection of the British Government. Be assured that you will be treated as a friend, and a distinguished guest, and that nothing shall be wanting to ensure your comfort and security.

Whatever arrangements you may wish made regarding your journey and your place of residence, whether at Kurrachee, or elsewhere, should be communicated to my officers at Kandahar; and they will receive early and ample consideration whenever they are laid before me.

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

TELEGRAM, dated 15th December 1880.

From COLONEL ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

Sirdar Sher Ali Khan left Kandahar this morning. Troops lined the streets from his house to the city gate, where a guard of honour was stationed, and a salute fired. I accompanied him for two miles beyond the city. Very few people were in the street. Major Heyland, of the Quarter-Master-General's Department, accompanied him to Quetta, where Major Conolly meets him. He should arrive on nineteenth or twentieth. His family start to-morrow.

Enclosure 4 in No. 1.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th December 1880.

From MAJOR ARTHUR CONOLLY, Kurrachee, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

SIRDAR expresses himself most grateful for handsome allowance, rupees five thousand monthly, and satisfied to settle here or elsewhere, making a pilgrimage perhaps, or visit to Calcutta, or some point of interest in India. The house accommodation here is ample, but space round limited. I hope to obtain sufficient ground for a garden which the Sirdar is anxious to have. I consider an eligible native gentleman quite capable of taking my place, and Sher Ali names Gholam Nukshband Khan as a person he would like. The Sirdar's position as an entirely free agent distinctly intimated to the local authorities.

Enclosure 5 in No. 1.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN to the ADDRESS of the FOREIGN SECRETARY, dated 28th December 1880.

After compliments.—WHEREAS my request was, through your kindness, granted and complied with, I, in pursuance of the command of His Excellency the Viceroy, which I had the honour of receiving at Kandahar, started without delay and ahead of my family for Kurrachee, where I arrived yesterday, Monday, the 27th December 1880, and I hope my family will also arrive here in ten days.

My honoured friend, I am and shall always be thankful for the honourable treatment which I received at the hands of the representatives of the most powerful Government from the time I quitted Kandahar up to the day of my arrival at Kurrachee. I confidently hope that, if my transient life is prolonged, I shall pass my remaining days with great ease and comfort under the shadow of the glorious Government. I feel certain that this honourable reception has been accorded to me by Government solely through your kindness, and I trust you will also use your best endeavours to better my position in future.

As I think it my imperative duty to inform you of my arrival at my destination, I write this friendly letter to you, trusting that you will always gratify me by the glad news of your good health.

No. 2.

No. 10 of 1881. (Extract)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, January 19, 1881.

WE have the honour to transmit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of correspondence that has taken place with His Highness the Amir Abdul Rahman Khan of Kabul.

2. It will be seen that on the 13th of October last the Amir wrote to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, stating that he had been invited to send governors to the district of Khost and to Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and inquiring whether he could do so with the assent of the British Government. Mr. Lyall was absent at Kandahar when the letter reached India, and only received it at Lahore on his return in November. From Lahore a reply was sent assenting to the Amir sending a governor to Khost, but the question of Kelat-i-Ghilzai was deferred. The opportunity was taken to inform the Amir that the British Government were disposed to reconsider the arrange-

ments that had been made in Southern Afghanistan, and to suggest that the Amir should send a confidential agent to whom these arrangements might be communicated, especially in regard to questions affecting Kandahar. The messenger who took this letter reached Kabul after some delay. He left Kabul with the reply, but it seems that he was way-laid on his return journey, nor is the cause of his disappearance yet known, though enquiry on the matter is still being made. The consequence of this miscarriage has been that some time was lost in obtaining from the Amir a duplicate of his letter which was not received by the Viceroy at Allahabad until early in the present month.

3. The object of this correspondence with the Amir is indicated by Mr. Lyall's letter to him of the 18th November; it is to ascertain whether any, and if so what, arrangements can be negotiated with the Amir for placing Kandahar under his government, whenever the British troops are prepared to withdraw from that city. Your Lordship's despatch of the 21st of May last left no doubt of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to this withdrawal; while its general tenor leant substantially towards the policy of restoring Kandahar to Kabul, and against any measures directed towards perpetuating the disintegration of Afghanistan. Under these instructions it became necessary to consider without delay some definite course of action for the establishment of a native government in South Afghanistan; and the problem appeared to offer no other practical solution than some arrangement, as suggested by Her Majesty's Government, for replacing the country under the dominion of Kabul. Upon these considerations it was thought expedient, in order to obtain an opening for preliminary discussions, to invite the Amir to depute a confidential agent to whom the views and intentions of the Government of India might be communicated.

4. Since the correspondence with the Amir was thus initiated, we have received your Lordship's despatch* of the 11th of November, which states much more distinctly the policy of Her Majesty's Government. The concluding three paragraphs contain positive injunctions that Kandahar must be evacuated as early as possible, and express a plain opinion that Kandahar and, if possible, all Afghanistan should pass under the dominion of the Amir Abdul Rahman. When, therefore, the Amir's letter of the 28th of December reached Allahabad, it seemed necessary, as much delay had accidentally intervened, to lose no more time in advancing upon the line of policy prescribed by these despatches. The Amir asked for a personal interview; but the difficulties in arranging immediately so important a business as a formal meeting in India with the Amir of Kabul were obvious, while there is great doubt whether it is judicious to agree to such a meeting, before the basis of a discussion shall have been fixed, and especially before the Amir shall have understood within what general limits the British Government is actually prepared to assist him.

5. The reply, therefore, which has been sent to the Amir postpones the question of an interview, but agrees to his sending a governor to Kelat-i-Ghilzai, a place which, it is to be remembered, formed part of Kabul territory under the Amir Dost Muhammad at a time when Kandahar was still under a separate government, and to which the Amir of Kabul can therefore fairly lay claim. Moreover, its occupation by the Amir Abdul Rahman will place him on the road toward Kandahar, and will test his power and inclination to advance further, if the subsequent course of events facilitates the extension of his dominion in South Afghanistan. And as all accounts represent the Amir to be in straits for money, the sum of five lakhs of rupees has been offered him for his immediate expenses.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

JAMES GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

Khureeta, dated Simla, 10th September 1880.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

I HAVE already instructed my officers on the frontier to inform your Highness of the success which has attended the march of Sir F. Roberts to Kandahar, and of the complete dispersion by him of the army of Sirdar Ayub Khan. The knowledge that this victory will assist in the consolidation and strengthening of your Highness' Government, by relieving your Highness from any danger of attack from without by the discontented persons who followed Sirdar Ayub Khan, has caused me additional pleasure.

I rejoice to learn, through my officers, and especially from your Highness' letters to Mr. Griffin, that your Highness is establishing yourself firmly at Kabul, and that you are consolidating your Government there.

Accept my congratulations and rest assured that I shall always be glad to hear of your welfare.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated Kabul, 28th September 1880.

After compliments.—I beg to inform your Excellency that I received and perused, on the 25th September 1880, your Excellency's kind letter, dated the 10th idem, containing the happy news of the success and victory gained by General Roberts and of the signal defeat suffered by Muhammad Ayub Khan at Kandahar, and giving expression to your Excellency's wishes for the prosperity and advancement of my rule in Afghanistan. I was exceedingly gratified by the particularly benign sentiments which your Excellency has given expression to. I confidently hope that, by the grace of the Everlasting Sovereign, so long as I live my heart will be cheered and gladdened by the display of conspicuous favours and befitting kindness of the powerful British Government, and that I shall win its perfect confidence day after day by my honest dealings and good deeds.

As regards my children and dependants residing at Tashkend, I wish them to come to the capital, Kabul. Therefore, I request your Excellency to let me know what your Excellency thinks advisable and proper to do in the matter, so that I, acting upon your Excellency's suggestion and advice, may make arrangements for them to proceed to Kabul.

Enclosure 3 in No. 2.

Khureeta, dated Simla, 25th October 1880.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

I HAVE received your letter, dated the 28th September, and fully appreciate the friendly sentiments which you have expressed. It is unnecessary for me to write at length in this matter, for you are well aware of the good-will which the British Government entertains for your Highness. But I desire to assure your Highness that it gives me much pleasure to receive your letters, and to be informed of your sincere desire to maintain and strengthen the friendship which now happily exists between the British Government and the Kabul State.

As regards what you have written about your children and dependants, I think your Highness' wishes are natural. Now that your Government has become firmly established, it is fitting that your family should be collected around you; and I have already caused your Highness to be informed that I shall be glad to do anything in my power to facilitate the journey of those members of it now in Kandahar.

Enclosure 4 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of
LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., C.S.I., dated Kabul, the 13th October 1880.

After compliments.—I write to apprise you that whereas I have not for some time past addressed a friendly letter to you, I beg to write this to give expression to the most affectionate and cordial sentiments I entertain (towards you), as well as to mention that previous to this I alluded to the matter of Khost in my letter to the illustrious (British) Government. But I have not received an answer yet. The Maliks of Khost have just waited upon me and entreated for a governor. The Tokhi Maliks, too, having come to the capital (Kabul), asked for regulations, rules, and a governor for Kelat-i-Tokhi. Whereas I, having in view the sincere friendship and perfect affection, cannot venture upon such matters without the consent and permission of the representatives of the sublime British Government. I have re-assured and cheered the Tokhi Maliks, and for the present left the affairs of Kelat to them to manage after the usage of their tribe, and having promised them to nominate a governor in a few days, I have dismissed them. I, therefore, write to ask you to inform me, as speedily as possible, of the intention of the representatives of the illustrious Government in regard to the matter of Kelat and Khost, so that, agreeably to the advice and suggestion of the representatives of the illustrious Government, I may assume the administration of those two districts. And whereas seven months have already elapsed of the current year, and their affairs are still in confusion and disorder, the sooner they are arranged and put in order, the more beneficial it will prove to the two allied States.

What more can I write beyond the professions of affection and concord.

Enclosure 5 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of
the FOREIGN SECRETARY, dated 1st November 1880.

After compliments.—I beg to inform you that I have recently received and perused a letter from my worthy friend, Mr. Lepel Henry Griffin, intimating that he is going to England for a few months, and that in his absence I should communicate with, and address my letters to, his Excellency the Viceroy, or to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. Therefore, agreeably to the wishes of that officer, I always remember and gratify you by addressing friendly letters to you; and in this cordial epistle I beg to state that on the 22nd Shawal (28th September 1880) I wrote to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and also to my worthy friend, Mr. Lepel Griffin, regarding my children and dependants, who are in Tashkend, stating that I wished them to come to the capital, Kabul, and soliciting to be informed what his Excellency deemed advisable to do in the matter, so that, acting upon his Excellency's suggestion and advice, I might make arrangements for their journey to Kabul.

It is now 35 days since I wrote, but I have not been informed in reply on the subject by his Excellency the Governor-General, or by Mr. Griffin as yet, so that I may have made arrangements for their departure from Tashkend. As the cold weather has set in, and the roads and passes will be shortly blocked on account of snow and cold, I request you to get a reply from his Excellency the Viceroy as speedily as possible and communicate it to me, so that I may make the arrangements early. Should any delay take place, it is evident that the matter will have to be put off till next year, and this would be the cause of uneasiness and anxiety to me.

Enclosure 6 in No. 2.

Dated 18th November 1880.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department, to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

YOUR friendly letter of the 13th of October, addressed to Mr. Lepel Griffin, has been delivered to me, because before its arrival Mr. Griffin had departed from India to Europe.

In his absence I trust that your Highness, in accordance with the very kind and friendly letter addressed to me by your Highness on the 1st November, considering me

as your sincere friend, will not fail to write to me on matters in which it may appear to your Highness that private communications with the Government of India may be convenient and desirable.

With regard to what your Highness has written about Khost, there is on the part of the British Government no objection to your making the necessary arrangements for the administration of that district, though on the subject of Kuram the views of the British Government have already been explained to your Highness separately.

With regard to Kelat, the Government is not yet prepared to give a definite reply, but in all probability some satisfactory conclusion may by discussion be found. I am authorised to inform your Highness that the course of recent events in Afghanistan has led the British Government to consider whether the general arrangements made in South Afghanistan may not require some modification, and that the Government is desirous that any future necessary changes in these arrangements may be made in communication and consultation with yourself, particularly in regard to questions which affect Kandahar. In this way it is most probable that a satisfactory settlement which may tend to the peace of Afghanistan and to the strengthening of your Highness' power may be arrived at in the interests of both States. But in order that this may be accomplished without inconvenient delay, and with a full knowledge of your Highness' views and wishes, it is of much importance that, if your Highness sees no material impediment, you should lose no time in deputing to India a confidential agent, well acquainted with your Highness' affairs, with whom the whole matter can be discussed, and to whom the intentions of the Government, which are in the direction of your Highness' advantage, and for the confirmation of friendship between the two States, may be explained. These matters cannot easily be transacted by correspondence, and as delay is inadvisable, the coming of your Highness' confidential representative is very expedient for the acceleration of conclusions. If, indeed, your Highness should prefer that a confidential Mahomedan agent should instead be sent to Kabul, this will be done on hearing from you, but for various reasons it is supposed that the preferable course is for your Highness to send an agent here with a letter to myself, though on this your Highness will judge.

The bearer of this letter, Haji Atta-ulla, has not been made acquainted with the precise contents or purport of my communication to your Highness, nor is it necessary that he should know them.

Enclosure 7 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 10th December 1880.

After compliments.—Be it known to your Excellency that I received and perused, at a most auspicious hour, your Excellency's kind and friendly letter, dated the 25th October 1880, in reply to my cordial epistle on the subject of the departure and return of my children and dependants from Tashkend. My heart (warm in affection) was exceedingly rejoiced and gratified at the manifestation of the benign sentiments and esteem by your Excellency. By the perusal of a sentence which occurs in your Excellency's kind letter, *viz.*, "now that your Government has become firmly established "it is fitting that your family should be collected around you," I feel greatly indebted and thankful to your Excellency for the fellow-feeling and good-will thus shown by your Excellency. I beg to write that, as the collection of my children and dependants, who are at Tashkend and Kandahar around me, would expand the bud of my benevolent heart and compose my senses (mind), so the dispersion of the evil-wishers and the scattering of the enemies of the two allied States, whether they be of my own or any other family, will tend to the security of the empire, to the advancement of the country, and to my own personal welfare.

Under all circumstances, I sincerely hope that, as long as I live, by the grace of the Omnipotent God, my friendship with the illustrious Government will remain firm and strong, and that, through the friendly attentions and good offices of the most glorious British Government, no doors of commotion and injury, whether domestic or foreign, will be opened to the face of this God-granted Government. Copies of the two letters, one to the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan, requesting him, as a matter of necessity, to allow my children and dependants to leave Tashkend, and another to General Ivanoff, asking him to send Sirdar Muhammad Mohsin Khan from Samarkand, are enclosed in this friendly letter for your Excellency's perusal.

Enclosure 8 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to General VON KAUFMANN, Governor-General of Turkistan, dated 23rd November 1880, sent by hand of Khwaja Ahmadi Jan.

After compliments.—Be it known to your Excellency that since the day I set foot in Afghan Turkistan, whence, with the help of God, I proceeded by regular marches in the direction of the capital, Kabul, I was, through the kindness and good offices of the illustrious British Government, nominated to, and I succeeded in obtaining, the Amirship of this country, and I directed my attention wholly, both day and night, to the administration of public affairs and to the protection and security of the borders and confines. Till now I had no time to address a friendly letter to your Excellency regarding the dismissal of my sons and of those whom I left behind at Tashkend; but now that I have a little leisure from the organization of the State, and as the cold weather is approaching, I write that, during the period of 13 years which I passed in the dominions of his Imperial Majesty the Czar, and under your Excellency's kind protection, I was treated with the utmost honour and respect, and that I returned to my native country and motherland of my own free will and of my own accord. Whereas it is necessary that my sons and those whom I left behind should also return to their mother country and join me, I expect, as a friend, that your Excellency will, on the arrival of the bearer of this letter, namely, my trusted agent, be pleased to give leave to my sons, Sirdars Habibulla Khan, Nasrulla Khan, Muhammad Afzal Khan, and my other dependants, to quit Tashkend, and to Sirdar Muhammad Mohsin to leave Samarkand and to return to the capital, Kabul, so that, before the weather gets cold and the rigor of the atmosphere prevents travelling, they may cross the Amu and set foot on their own soil.

Enclosure 9 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to General IVANOFF, Governor of Samarkand, dated 23rd November 1880, sent by hand of Khwaja Ahmadi Jan.

After compliments.—I have at this moment written a letter to General Von Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkistan, and despatched it by the hand of my confidential agent,* regarding the dismissal of my children and those whom I left behind from Tashkend, and the dismissal of Sirdar Muhammad Mohsin Khan from Samarkand to the capital, Kabul. I hope that his Excellency will be so good as to give them leave to return to their native country and motherland before the cold weather sets in.

No doubt, after the perusal of my letter, the authorities of the sublime (Russian) Government will not delay in dismissing them. I also write to ask you to allow Sirdar Muhammad Mohsin Khan to leave Samarkand as soon as this letter reaches you, so that he may accompany my sons, Habibulla Khan, Nasrulla Khan, Muhammad Afzal Khan, and other dependants of mine, to these quarters.

Enclosure 10 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of the FOREIGN SECRETARY, dated 11th December 1880.

After compliments.—Be it known to you that previous to this, when my valuable and esteemed friend, Mr. Lepel Griffin, was going to England, he gratified me by a letter intimating that, in the event of my having anything to represent or wanting anything to be done, it would be fitting and desirable that I should write to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India or to the Foreign Secretary. Accordingly, I therefore write this friendly letter to you, unreservedly stating what I have in my mind, viz., that the disturbed state of Afghanistan and the embarrassed affairs of this country are apparent and well known to all the representatives of the sublime Government. When I had an interview with Mr. Griffin at Zimma in the Kohistan district, and we talked on the confusion of the affairs of Afghanistan and, on the welfare of the two States, that officer gave me the promise and good tidings of a grant of 100 lakhs of rupees by Her Imperial Majesty's Government, (saying) that shortly and in a little while the above-mentioned sum would reach the Afghan Government from the Imperial Treasury, so that the breaches made in the empire may be closed up as before, and that advantages may soon accrue from it (the grant) to the two allied States. But four months have now elapsed since my arrival at the capital, Kabul, and I have received only 17 lakhs in all out of the subsidy promised by Government. The whole of the amount

received has been applied to the necessary expenses of the troops and to the improvement of the country, but not one-tenth of the ravages brought on the country has yet been repaired. Undoubtedly large sums of money are indispensably necessary for the conduct of the affairs of the State and for the maintenance of the army, the payment of the troops being one of the imperative duties. I therefore write and ask that, if the British Government intends paying and remitting the sum promised for the promotion of the interests of Afghanistan, the sooner it is remitted the more advantageous it will prove. Should there be any delay in transmitting the same, please inform me, so that I should disperse (dismiss) the soldiers who have collected and be content with a few only; for out of the revenues of the country nothing has come or will come to my hand that may be applied to the payment of the troops. Those who have appropriated the revenues to their own use would not disgorge it in any way. They would not pay it willingly, nor can it be realised from them by pressure or force. After I have deliberately and minutely weighed and examined the income and expenditure of Afghanistan I find that (after paying all the income) there will be still due by me a large sum on account of the pay of troops and other necessary expenses.

The degree and extent of the desolation of the country and the destruction of the materials of the Afghan Empire are such that they cannot be restored and replaced with little money and small funds. Reparation of all this waste depends upon immense sums of money and upon the kindness and favour of the glorious British Government; and in demanding the promised subsidy I have not and will not have any other object in view than to organise the affairs of this State and to strengthen the basis of the friendship subsisting between the two allied States.

Enclosure 11 in No. 2.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th December 1880.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

News has reached me which appears fairly trustworthy, that Haji* left Kabul about

* The bearer of the letter of 18th November to Amir. 16th, and something has happened on the road. Haji not heard of as yet beyond Gandamak.

Enclosure 12 in No. 2.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th December 1880.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

I am of opinion that the Haji is probably dead. His followers arrived at Gandamak have no trace of him. Have written to Jellalabad directing information to be sent to Amir, and requesting recovery and forwarding of any papers.

Enclosure 13 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR, dated 25th Moharram 1298 (=28th December 1880).

After Compliments.—Be it known to you that Haji Atta-ulla Khan, who was deputed to me by the British Government, brought a friendly letter from the Government of India (to my address) which I received and perused. Two or three days afterwards I wrote a reply to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy, and handed it over to the Haji, who started in that direction on Wednesday, the 15th December 1880. Now, from the letter received from Sirdar Abdul Rasul Khan, Governor of Jellalabad, on Monday, the 21st idem, I learn that the Haji has not reached his destination, and that nothing is known as to his whereabouts, or about the Government letter. I have, therefore, sent you Sirdar Abdul Rasul Khan's letter in original, so that you may be fully informed of the Haji's state.

I have written a second reply to the Government of India, to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, in the sense of the first letter, without any addition or diminution, and forwarded by the post of this God-granted Government. The second reply bears date Tuesday, the 28th December 1880. It is hoped that you will acknowledge its receipt as soon as it reaches you.

Enclosure 14 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 28th December 1880. (Extract.)

After compliments.—Your Excellency's gratifying and sublime letter, dated the 16th November 1880, which shows that your Excellency kindly bears me in mind and sympathises with me and the people of Afghanistan, reached me and was perused by me at an auspicious moment. I have fully and thoroughly understood the matters mentioned therein. With regard to Khost, your Excellency has been pleased to say that it should be organized and administered by me. With respect to Kuram, this matter was referred to in a previous correspondence. Regarding Kelat-i-Tokhi, your Excellency wrote that this matter required consideration. The above points (matters) which your Excellency has deemed it advisable and expedient to communicate have caused me much pleasure. As regards what your Excellency wrote, that certain changes in the administration of the affairs of Afghanistan are under your Excellency's consideration, it is clear and evident that the representatives of the illustrious British Government are striving hard day and night to set the affairs of myself and of the people of Afghanistan on a permanent footing, so that it may advance, and that its affairs may be properly and well administered. What your Excellency may have in contemplation for the well-being of Afghanistan cannot but be appropriate and good.

As for Kandahar, whatever arrangement may be considered beneficial to the interests of the two States would also be approved by me. But I will state a few things which I have in my mind—

First, that I desire to have an interview with your Excellency and wish to confer personally with you. The affairs of Afghanistan are in such a deranged state that they cannot be properly represented through the lips of another person, and that, unless I represent them myself, my affairs will remain unaccomplished, and I shall incur loss of reputation.

Secondly, that there is no qualified man in Afghanistan to whom I could impart the secrets of my heart, and who has such an insight into public matters that he could know and give suitable answers to questions relating to State affairs and thus bring matters to a conclusion with your Excellency, without the necessity of a personal interview between myself and your Excellency.

I have myself set on foot the work and given it direction; after this some one (else?) may be appointed to complete it. I have, therefore, written this letter, so that your Excellency may be made fully aware of the real situation of affairs in this country. When I have an interview with your Excellency, then, as soon as every kind of question susceptible of discussion has been determined, I will pass from possibilities into action. I have adduced and brought forward so many arguments simply because I am afraid lest some unworthy act may again be committed by the people of Afghanistan, whereby I, who am sincere and straightforward in my dealings with the illustrious British Government, and who devote my time both day and night to endeavouring with all my heart and soul to improve Afghanistan, should be brought thus into everlasting disgrace.

The foundation of the government of Afghanistan has been laid anew, and I apprehend and fear lest some untoward circumstance should supervene to cause a change among the people of Afghanistan.

I have written what has occurred to me, and if your Excellency wishes me in any case to depute an agent, please God he shall be sent without delay.

I have not even communicated anything to Haji Ata-ulla Khan, and why should I do it?

Enclosure 15 in No. 2.

Khureeta, dated 7th January 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA to His Highness the AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN of KABUL.

Your Highness' friendly letter to me, dated 28th December 1880, reached me yesterday, after some accidental delay in Afghanistan; and I have much pleasure in sending a speedy reply.

It is a matter of great gratification to me that your Highness should have so clearly appreciated the desire of the British Government to lend its aid toward concerting arrangements for the restoration of permanent tranquillity in Afghanistan, and for the

strengthening of your Highness' authority in a manner that may be acceptable to your Highness, and in conformity with the wishes of the people. I observe also, with satisfaction, that your Highness declares yourself fully prepared to enter into the views of my Government upon the subject.

With regard to your Highness' kind expression of anxiety for a personal interview with me, I recognize thoroughly the advantages that might follow free and confidential conversation upon these matters at a meeting between your Highness and myself. I look forward to the prospect of meeting your Highness before long; and I will certainly endeavour so to form my plans that, upon my return to Northern India, this desirable object may be fulfilled at an early opportunity. But there are various reasons connected with the affairs of my Government and with the present state of my health which make it impossible to avoid delay in arranging for such an interview. On the other hand, it is essential to expedite the consideration of sundry matters that may become important and urgent; while it is manifest that by some preliminary discussions with, and explanations to, a confidential agent of your Highness, the ground may be cleared for an understanding of the general views and intentions of the two Governments. For these reasons I earnestly advise your Highness to lose no time in deputing to India some confidential agent, through whom I may transmit with security the communications which I desire to make to your Highness.

It is possible, however, that in the matter of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, to which your Highness referred in your letter of the 13th October, to Mr. Griffin, the interest of your Government may suffer by further delay. I therefore acquaint you that the British Government sees no objection to your nominating a governor to that place, according to the request of the Tokhi tribe. On receiving information of the approach of your governor, with a sufficient force, my officers in Kandahar will use their influence in aiding him to establish himself in Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and will declare that he has come with the assent and countenance of the British Government.

Enclosure 16 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of the purport of a Letter addressed by the Commissioner of Peshawur to the Amir of Kabul on the 11th January 1881.

I HAVE just received a kharita from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to your Highness' address. I beg to forward it with this friendly letter.

Further orders have been issued to me by the Government of India that five lakhs of rupees should be kept in readiness at Peshawur for your Highness' necessary and immediate expenses; and accordingly the sum has been kept in readiness at the Peshawur Treasury. Your Highness should warn and inform me in what manner the aforesaid sum may be remitted (*lit.* made over).

No. 3.

(No. 12 of 1881.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, January 26, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch, dated the 12th January 1881, we have the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information copies of memoranda upon the position of affairs at Kandahar in October last, submitted by Mr. A. C. Lyall, Secretary to Government, Foreign Department, and Sir R. Sandeman, Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM regarding the PRESENT POSITION of AFFAIRS at KANDAHAR, dated Camp Kandahar, 31st October 1880.

I UNDERSTAND that the chief military reasons, brought forward by military men in favour of the retention of Kandahar, are briefly as follows:—The recent marches of General Stewart from Kandahar to Ghazni and Kabul, and of General Roberts from Kabul to Kandahar, and of Sirdar Ayub Khan from Herat to Kandahar, have shown the possibility of moving considerable armies through Afghanistan. It is argued that, were the British to hold Kandahar with an army, the power of the future Amirs of Kabul would be hopelessly destroyed, and as I heard an officer, who was arguing for the retention of the country, express it, the backbone of the country would for ever be broken. It is further considered desirable to keep a strong force within striking distance of Kabul and Herat, for it is believed that, were the Afghans to feel themselves within our power, they would cease to be a dangerous enemy, and by degrees we should overcome the determined hostility they have everywhere, from Kandahar to Kabul, shown towards us. Finally, it is said that the retention of Kandahar by the Liberal Cabinet would satisfy the Conservative party, and put a stop for ever to the chances of the Afghan war again breaking out with a change of ministry.

Whatever may be the value of these arguments, one thing is certain. The British Government cannot now, lightly, give up the possession of Kandahar, and, if it does surrender it, this ought only to be done after such arrangements have been made with the Afghans themselves as will secure to the British Government much that it has fought for, and for which it has expended much blood and treasure. I would, therefore, be in no hurry to evacuate Kandahar, although I would endeavour to arrange a programme that would enable me finally to give to the Amir Abdul Rahman the richest portion of his late grandfather's kingdom, which he must feel is needful to secure his hold upon his throne, and to place his alliance with the British Government in the eyes of his countrymen on a sound footing. It should not be forgotten, in considering this, that the people of Afghanistan did not object to the Amirs, Dost Muhammad and Sher Ali, receiving a substantial subsidy at the hands of the British Government. Friendship, accompanied by substantial material aid, the country would not reject.

The Amir himself, whoever he may be, can never be our friend so long as the most valuable portion of the Afghan kingdom is in our possession. It is, therefore, from every point of view desirable, if we intend Abdul Rahman to be a strong and successful ruler, and one acceptable to his people, to place his power on such a foundation as would enable him really to feel that we are the true friends we profess to be of himself and country.

With this object it seems necessary to maintain our hold on Kandahar until the chance of further attempts on the part of Sirdar Ayub Khan to regain his brother's lost kingdom are over. We should certainly lose no time in making Muhammad Ayub Khan feel that his hold on Herat is a most insecure one. I would begin this by encouraging the present Amir, by every means in our power, to make a bold attempt to recover Herat. It would doubtless be very necessary to break our views, with regard to the restoration of Herat and Kandahar, cautiously to the Amir, but if he is worthy of our support I would certainly give it heartily, and introduce a policy that would have for its aim the placing of our relations with the Afghans on such a footing that we would secure their friendship instead of their hostility.

With our improved military position at Quetta and in Pishin, and with Kandahar in our possession, to be disposed of at our will, we ourselves, as well as the Afghans, must be different from other races if we fail to come to an arrangement that will secure to both sides what they have so determinedly fought for.

The English Government, whether Conservative or Liberal, has declared that Afghanistan must be friendly to England, or cease to exist as an independent kingdom. The other power has shown, by great sacrifices, its determination to be independent. A great many will say the friendship of the Afghans is impossible, that we have gone too far, and can never make them our friends. I can only say, in reply to this argument, that I do not agree with them. The people showed no determined hostility towards us until we deported their Amir, Yakub Khan, and created a ruling prince at Kandahar. Since then, at the latter place, the change in the attitude of the people towards us has been so marked that there can be no longer a doubt as to Wali Sher Ali having been unanimously rejected by the people as their ruler. Late events, in addition to this unpopularity, have doubtless convinced the Government of India of the impossibility of re-establishing, with any chance of success, the late Government.

If this supposition is correct, as a preliminary step and before surrendering, on a fixed agreement, the country to Amir Abdul Rahman, I would summon the principal chiefs of the three most important clans, namely, the chiefs of the Barakzais, Popalzais, and Alkozais, and consult them as to the future, but I would do it in such a way as to leave no doubt of our intention to support the Amir we have recognised. I would also employ them, where possible, as long as we remain at Kandahar, in administering the country.

I have heard it argued that there are no leading chiefs to summon. The facts are, however, the reverse of this. In no country are there so many leading chiefs and heads of families as in South Afghanistan, as is shown by the list which accompanies this note. When Sirdar Sher Ali was created, from being Governor under the ex-Amir Yakub Khan, to be a despotic prince, the chiefs and heads of the great families were never consulted. A prince was thrust upon them. There were many reasons why Sher Ali was distasteful to the Popalzais as well as to Barakzais, and only those who wilfully blind themselves to this most unpopular act of our Government wonder at the whole country crying out against it, and calling in Ayub Khan to aid them to drive Wali Sher Ali and our small contingent of troops from the country, for one and all believed that the force left at Kandahar by the British Government was given to Sher Ali to enable him to rule over them, and was not a British army of occupation in the proper sense of the word.

Directly the Amir becomes strong enough, I would make over the country to him on terms to be fixed between his Government and the British. The real difficulty in surrendering Kandahar to the Amir Abdul Rahman is the almost certainty, under present circumstances, that directly we had marched from Kandahar Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan would make another effort to possess himself of the country. Until he is driven from Herat by Abdul Rahman, or, at all events, until the extent of his power becomes known, it seems to me almost impossible to surrender our military hold on Kandahar.

It is now necessary for me to say a few words with reference to the carrying on of the government of the province until affairs are ripe to enable the British Government to hand it over. I have already shown the undesirability of again placing the Wali Sher Ali in power. Without examining too closely into the motives that induced Sher Ali, the late Governor under Amir Yakub Khan, to accept the province as a gift from the British Government, we may well here consider briefly past events from the time of his assuming the government until now. These events have shown, and at the time of the Wali's instalment there were many who prognosticated that they would do so, that the country was greatly startled by what we had done. Outrages at once became frequent along the line of communication, culminating in the brutal murder of Major Waudby, the Road Commandant, who had gone to Dubrai to meet certain Maliks who had been heavily fined by the Wali for having been concerned in an outrage. Some said that the fine imposed by the Wali was so heavy that the people had become desperate, and many had joined the enemies of the British Government who took the opportunity offered of murdering a British officer. We, however, continued to trust the Wali implicitly, and bestowed on him arms and munitions of war, besides a battery of guns and some money.

Having raised an army, he proceeded with it to Girishk to meet and repel the advance of Muhammad Ayub Khan from Herat. It soon, however, became evident that he was entirely unable to cope in the field with Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, and the next demand the Wali made on our Government was for assistance in troops, which we gave.

I need hardly allude to the fact that, by complying with the demand of the Wali for the support of our troops, we split into two bodies the Kandahar garrison. One portion was sent to the Helmand to support the Wali, the other portion being retained at Kandahar, thus offering to Muhammad Ayub Khan the opportunity of defeating our troops in detail. As the Helmand was fordable at many places, it is difficult to understand why our troops went there at all, and why the Wali did not, instead, retire from Girishk on finding this to be the case. I have seen no explanation of the causes that led to our action in this matter.

I pass over briefly the disastrous results of these moves; suffice it to say, the Wali's troops mutinied, were attacked by our troops, and a number killed, the guns (our gift) captured, and it was believed the Wali's army had, to a great extent, dispersed; subsequent events have shown that this was not the case. Our force then retired to a position some distance from the Helmand, fought Ayub Khan at Maiwand, and was defeated. The Wali fled from the field, and on reaching Kandahar visited General Primrose, and advised that officer to retreat at once, and surrender the country to Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan.

Under present circumstances it is surely very desirable to consider carefully these occurrences and the true value we are able to place on the Wali as a ruler, before we

again restore him to power. It is well known that the whole of the surrounding country, in addition to the Wali's army, took part in the battle of Maiwand, and it is generally admitted that the leading men of Kandahar had, for months, been in correspondence with

* Surteep Nur Muhammad headed a large party. Had such Chiefs joined the Wali, the heads of the Popalzai and other families might have been induced to do so also. Muhammad Ayub was only induced to march on Kandahar on hearing that the country was ready to join him. I was, however, told at the time that the Kabul troops would not fight for Ayub Khan for reasons given me, and the result proved the truth of the statement made.

(Signed) R. G. SANDEMAN.

Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, who had been invited by them* to advance from Herat with the object of overthrowing the Wali's government. In short, the rising in the country amounted to a general insurrection.

The military situation at Kandahar, after the defeat of Maiwand, would have been very serious indeed, had it not been for the alarm previously taken by General Phayre at the state of affairs in the country. He had despatched from the line of communications, some days previous to the defeat at Maiwand, the 4th and 28th Bombay Native Infantry to Kandahar, where they arrived just in time to replace those killed at Maiwand.

To finish my short narrative of events it is desirable to add that General Primrose did not adopt Wali Sher Ali's advice. He was besieged by Muhammad Ayub Khan until the arrival of General Roberts' force within a short distance of Kandahar. After the battle of Mazra, in which Ayub Khan's forces were defeated and dispersed, the Wali asked to be relieved of his Waliship. I am informed that he was requested to take charge of the city, but refused to do so, and that Major Protheroe was appointed to carry on the duty of provisional governor of the town.

The events here briefly recorded should, of themselves, teach us the great danger of again putting up Wali Sher Ali. But in restoring him there would be also an entirely different danger to be met, if we care to examine and probe deeper into the politics of the country. Wali Sher Ali is not only an old adherent of the late Amir Yakub Khan, but it is well known that he and the present Amir Abdul Rahman are, for reasons unnecessary to record, bitter enemies. It is to be presumed that Sher Ali and the Amir, to some extent, know our views and intentions with regard to the permanent retention or not of Kandahar, the wealthiest province of the Afghan kingdom. Both fully know the past. Our action at the present time is, therefore, of vital importance. If we restore Wali Sher Ali, with a view to leaving the province in his hands when we retire, it amounts to placing the country actually at the disposal of Ayub Khan; for there can be little doubt that this would be the result of such a step. The present Amir will then have to meet in the field his enemies, Sher Ali and Ayub Khan, the former strengthened by the influence and money he must have accumulated during the time we have placed the country and its revenues at his disposal. Should the result prove fatal to Amir Abdul Rahman, we will have the knowledge that through our own acts we have destroyed our own work at Kabul. The position is not an enviable one in whatever way we may consider it, but common justice to the Amir whom we have recognised, if not care for our own interests, should prevent us from again trusting to the broken reed the late Wali Sher Ali has proved himself to be. If not very careful, we may destroy Abdul Rahman, and injure, in consequence, our own influence and position in the country, as it was injured during the first Afghan war. Moreover, to put it mildly, justice towards the Amir should prevent our committing an act that must, of itself, weaken him, and may possibly result in ultimately driving him from Kabul.

In the interests of all concerned, I think it very desirable that the Government of India should lose no more time in announcing to the country at large, from a general point of view, their intentions with regard to the disposal of Southern Afghanistan. I believe the continued reticence of our Government as to what their ultimate intentions really are with regard to the disposal of the province must prove detrimental to the very important interests at stake.

(Signed) R. G. SANDEMAN, Major,
Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

NAMES of the SIRDARS of the DURANI CLANS of KANDAHAR and their different sections.

Name of Clan.	Name of Section.	Names of the Sirdars of Clans and Malik of Sections.	Remarks.
BARAKZAI	Muhammadzai	(1) Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, son of Sirdar Mehrdil Khan. (2) Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan, son of Sirdar Purdil Khan. (3) Sirdar Gholam Mohiyuddin Khan, son of Sirdar Kondil Khan.	These three are the chief Sirdars of the Barakzai clan. Sirdars Mir Afzal Khan and Gholam Mohiyuddin Khan are refugees in Persia. Sirdar Sher Ali Khan is the Wali of Kandahar.
			* Note.—For three years during Amir Sher Ali's reign Sirdar Sher Ali was the recognised Civil Governor of Kandahar, but two other Sirdars were associated with and watched over him, namely, Sirdar Saftar Ali, Pharseewan, who was Commandant of the army, and Sultan Muhammad Khan, Pharseewan, Chief of Finance and Collector of the Government Revenue. Sher Ali was removed by the Amir and deported to Kabul for corrupt practices.
			(Sd.) R. G. S.
		(4) Sirdar Muhammad Hossein Khan.	This Sirdar is the brother of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, and is at Kandahar.
		(5) Sirdar Muhammad Hossein Khan.	These Sirdars are the sons of Sirdar Khushdil Khan, and nephews of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, and are living in Kandahar.
		(6) Sirdar Shirindil Khan.	
		(7) Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan.	This Sirdar is the nephew of Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, and is now at Herat.
		(8) Sirdar Ahmed Khan -	
		(9) Sirdar Abdulla Khan -	Is the son of Sirdar Sultan Ahmed Khan, and is now at Herat with Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan.
		(10) Sirdar Abdul Wahab Khan -	The sons of Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan, now at Herat with Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan.
		(11) Sirdar Abdulla Khan -	
	Sherzai	(1) Atta Khan - (2) Bhaodin Khan -	These two men are the Malik of the Sherzai section. They are living in the village of Chaplani, about eight miles from Kandahar.
	Angezhai	(1) Abdulzahir Khan - (2) Muhammad Umar Khan -	The headmen of the Angezhai section, and are living in the village of Chaplani.
	Malikdinzhai	(1) Gholam Muhammad Khan - (2) Syud Muhammad Khan -	These two men are the Malik of the Malikdinzhai section, and are living in the village of Rawani, about eight miles from Kandahar.
	Nasratzai	(1) Muhammad Sadik Khan - (2) Muhammad Jan Khan - (3) Sher Ali Khan, son of Lal Khan. (4) Gholam Muhammad Khan -	These four men are the Malik of the Nasratzai section. Muhammad Sadik Khan is living at Gundi Mansoor, Muhammad Jan and Sher Ali Khan at Robat, and Gholam Muhammad Khan at Khaja Ali.
	Umarkhanzai	(1) Saifulla Khan - (2) Mir Adam Khan - (3) Shahghassi Sarwar Khan -	These three men are the Malik of the Umarkhanzai section. Saifulla Khan is living at Maroof, Mir Adam Khan at Mard Killa, and Shahghassi Sarwar Khan at Tirri.
	Khwanchezai	(1) Akram Akhundzada - (2) Muhammad Naeem Akhundzada. (3) Haji Khushdil -	These three men are the Malik of the Khwanchezai section. Akram Akhundzada and Muhammad Naeem live in the town of Kandahar, and Haji Khushdil resides at Deh Gholaman, about six miles from Kandahar.
	Garjezhai	(1) Azizulla Khan - (2) Aminulla Khan -	These are the Malik of the Garjezhai section, and live at Rawani.
	Bahlolzhai	(1) Sher Muhammad Khan -	The headman of Bahlolzhai section, and is living at Karezak, about four miles from Kandahar.
	Sarpayai	(1) Dost Muhammad Khan -	Malik of the Sarpayai section, and is living at Deh Gholaman, about six miles from Kandahar.
	Gaibizai	(1) Mir Afzul Khan -	Malik of Gaibizai, and lives at Timran, about six miles from Kandahar.

Name of Clan.	Name of Section.	Names of the Sirdars of Clans and Malik of Section.	Remarks.
POPALZAI	Ayubzai -	(1) Taj Muhammad Khan (2) Gholam Muhammad Khan (3) Amir Khan (4) Jan Muhammad (5) Sirdar Khan	These are the Maliks of the Ayubzai section. Taj Muhammad Khan and Gholam Muhammad Khan live at Kandahar, Amir Khan at Zakir, Jan Muhammad at Karz, and Sirdar Khan at Kulchabad. Taj Muhammad Khan is also the chief Sirdar of the Popalzai clan.
	Bamazai -	(1) Kalandar Khan	This man is the Malik of the Bamazai section. He resides at Kandahar, but is now at Tirri.
	Badozai	(1) Gholam Muhammad Khan (2) Attaulla Khan (3) Akhtar and Muhammad Akbar Khan. (4) Fakrudin Khan	These are the Maliks of the Badozai section. Gholam Muhammad Khan lives at Killa Azam, Akhtar, Muhammad Akbar Khan, and Fakrudin Khan at Bilandi, and Attaulla Khan at Mashore.
	Ismailzai -	(1) Shah Muhammad Khan	Malik of the Ismailzai section, lives at Mashore.
ALKOZAI	Khalozai -	(1) Habbo Khan (2) Paind Khan (3) Abdul Hakim Khan (4) Akram Khan (5) Zakriya Khan (6) Saadat Khan	These are the Maliks of the Khalozai section. Habbo Khan and Paind Khan are also the chief Sirdars of the whole Alkozai clan. All these Maliks live at Jaldak.
	Panazai	(1) Pir Muhammad (2) Sartip Saleh Muhammad Khan (3) Muhammad Halim Khan (4) Majid Khan (5) Karim Khan (6) Nur Muhammad Khan (7) Amir Khan (8) Muhammad Sadik (9) Dost Muhammad Khan (10) Pir Muhammad Khan and Dost Muhammad Khan. (11) Azad Khan and Muhammad Azim Khan.	Resident of Sardah. Do. of Chargolbah. Do. of do. Do. of Manara. Do. of do. Do. of Panjwahi. Do. of do. Do. of Rambasi. Do. of do. Do. of Deh Bagh. Do. of do.
	Zedan -	(1) Shahgassi Muhammad Jan	This man is the Malik of Zedan, and lives at Kandahar.
	Kotezai -	(1) Makko Khan	Malik of Kotezai, lives at Naghan.
	Talokzai	(1) Abu Saeed Khan (2) Son of Adam Khan (3) Muhammad Usman Khan, 1st (4) Muhammad Usman Khan, 2nd (5) Abdul Aziz Khan (6) Majadulla Khan (7) Shah Hussein (8) Jehangir	Resident of Kadni. Do. of do. Do. of Washir. Do. of do. Do. of do. Do. of do. Do. of do. Do. of do.
			These are the Maliks of the Talokzai section. Abu Saeed Khan is the chief Sirdar of the Nurzai clan.
NURZAI		(1) Jumna Khan (2) Muhammad Akram Khan (3) Son of Sherdil Khan (4) Nizamuddin Khan (5) Faizu Khan	Resident of Kadni. Do. of Dherawat. Do. of do. Do. of do. Do. of do.
	Jamalzai -	(1) Shah Passand Khan	Malik of the Jamalzai section, lives at Kadni.
	Pirakzai -	(1) Akbar Muhammad Khan	Malik of the Pirakzai section, lives at Kadni.
	Gurg -	(1) Faizu Khan (2) Shah Passand	Headmen of the Gurg section, live at Robot.
ALAZAI	Alazai -	(1) Son of Majid Khan (2) Dost Muhammad Khan (3) Najibulla Khan (4) Abdul Hakeem Khan (5) Sahib Khan (6) Mukhtiyar Khan (7) Timur Shah Khan (8) Muhammad Akbar Khan (9) Muhammad Faikm Khan	The son of Majid Khan is the chief Sirdar of the Alazai clan. The others are minor Chiefs of the clan. All these chiefs live in Zamindawar.

(Signed) THOMAS HOPE,
for Agent, Governor-General, Beluchistan.

Quetta, the 4th November 1880.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM ON KANDAHAR.—(Extract.)

I UNDERSTOOD that the chief object of my visit to Kandahar would be to acquaint myself generally with the actual situation of affairs in South Afghanistan, by personal consultation with the British officers at Kandahar and at Quetta, and by availing myself of the opportunity of meeting Sirdar Sher Ali Khan and any other Afghans of note belonging to the place. It was not possible, by a rapid journey and a short stay at Kandahar, to obtain much information at first hand from the people, or to make any wide observation of the feelings of the country. Not two months had passed since the whole neighbourhood had been in arms against us, and since our troops had been besieged in the city. The principal persons of the Durani tribe—which includes by far the greater majority of the population of the country, and almost every man of influence—had joined the rising in support of Ayub's advance, and most of these had fled or were keeping aloof. The people close round Kandahar had signalized themselves by the massacre, at the end of July, of every British soldier or camp-follower who fell into their hands, and by fighting against us throughout August. The town and district adjoining were more or less under military occupation; there was no regular government beyond the suburbs of Kandahar; and the complete uncertainty among Afghans of every class as to the intentions of the British Government regarding their country made them very cautious about speaking their mind. All these circumstances added to the difficulty of getting at the real state of affairs. Nevertheless, it was of much use to be able to discuss everything with our officers on the spot; while there were at Kandahar a certain number of Afghans with whom it was useful to talk, and I had several long interviews with Sirdar Sher Ali Khan. I proceed to state my general conclusions upon what I saw and heard.

In the first place, it appeared evident that the movement of the Duranis in favour of Ayub Khan had been considerable and widespread. It seems to have been preconcerted by correspondence between his party at Herat and a number of the leading men of the tribe in the Kandahar country and in Zamindawar, who encouraged him to endeavour to expel the English and to upset Sher Ali Khan. I was told that Ayub Khan had long been meditating the advance, and that he would probably in any case have marched at harvest time; but that, as a matter of fact, he had received numerous invitations, promises of support on his arrival, and assurances that the English garrison was very weak. Sher Ali Khan had lost his popularity in the country by his open acceptance, from us, of the rulership of Kandahar as a separate State, which associated him with the foreigner, and placed him in direct conflict with the hereditary claims of the late Amir's family. He incurred the odium of having made a compact which kept us in Afghanistan, and enabled him to usurp the place of the sons of the Amir. His administration was probably as good as any Afghan Sirdar's rule usually is; but he is said to have taken no special pains to conciliate the jealousy of the other Sirdars, or to make himself acceptable to the people; and any Sirdar in his position, surrounded by foreign bayonets, would have become equally unpopular. The consequence was that on the appearance of Ayub Khan the whole country fell away rapidly from the Wali; his authority beyond the Helmund, where he had been attempting to collect the revenue (an unpopular function of government), collapsed at once; and his troops, except 500 cavalry, deserted to the enemy. When we retired into Kandahar after the Maiwand rout most of his cavalry broke up and withdrew for the time to their homes; and for the week before Ayub arrived the British Army was besieged in Kandahar by hordes of ghazis and armed peasantry. Sher Ali represents, not unreasonably, that he never expected to keep the country in hand under such an unforeseen contingency as the total defeat by Ayub of a British force in the field; and he told me distinctly that the rising was, in his opinion, more against us than against him—that it was the *ghazá*, or religious hostility to infidels, that raised the people. Nevertheless, although nothing has been proved against his good faith, and though he undoubtedly kept our force on the Helmund well supplied until it broke up, while the country was fairly quiet until we were defeated—yet it has been made clear that he could give us no help whatever in a crisis, and that he failed even to keep his troops together in the face of Ayub. Our alliance seems to have been materially damaging to both parties. The Wali suffered from the odium of adhering to foreigners and infidels, and of abetting their occupation of the country. On the other hand, we became responsible both for his civil administration (without exercising any control over it) and for his political antagonism to the late ruling family; while so far was the Wali from helping us in the field (except as to

supplies) that we might have fared better against Ayub Khan had we relied altogether on our own resources.

Since Kandahar has been relieved, and Ayub defeated, affairs in the country round have remained in much political confusion.

It is to be remembered that, when the separation of the Kandahar State from the rest of Afghanistan was originally contemplated, it was supposed that this province would, by the transfer of Herat to Persia, become conterminous on the west and north-west with Persian territory, which would manifestly have made the frontier much less liable to foreign invasion. The policy of the British Government was so to manage the constitution of the new State as to avoid unnecessary interference with its internal affairs, and this, it was thought, might be effected by continuing in power an Afghan Sirdar of the Kandahari family, who had before governed the place successfully, and who had been sent there as governor by Yakub Khan.

But the projected transfer of Herat to Persia fell through; and at this moment we have, instead, that place in the hands of an influential Sirdar, the rival of Abdul Rahman, who has crossed swords with us twice, and who, it is openly said at Kandahar, has only to appear again on the Helmund to be joined by the country side. All my information leads me to the conclusion that at this moment Ayub is by far the most popular candidate for rule in South Afghanistan, and that Sher Ali weighs little or nothing against him. In these circumstances Sher Ali would have little or no prospect of consolidating any authority at Kandahar, except under our complete protection, and unless we undertook the preservation of order and the guard of his frontiers. But this would inevitably involve a far greater degree of interference with the internal administration of the province than was originally proposed; and would imply much more direct and constant support than is compatible with independent rulership. Such a system would be of no advantage to us, and would please nobody, not even the Sirdar himself. We should be holding Kandahar against the will of the Duranis, and much to the dissatisfaction of the old ruling family, whether Herat were united under Kabul, or separate. The political objections to such a position seem to me sufficiently strong to outweigh any advantage that may be attached to the strategical position of Kandahar, or to the weakening of Afghanistan by dismemberment. I believe that the Duranis of Kandahar are now much opposed to our occupation, either indirectly through Sher Ali or any other nominee, or directly through our own officers. They have been for generations the dominant class, although the Amirs of Kabul latterly did their best to weaken the local power of the Sirdars, so that very few men of influence or wealth are now left, and our presence in the country is very unwelcome to them. They have a very distinct leaning toward the family of the late Amir Sher Ali; but I could not make out that they held any very deep objection to returning again under the Kabul Amirship. I mention this last point because it has been more than once argued that the Duranis of South Afghanistan would favour any arrangement that should release them from the yoke of Kabul. I may be wrong, but my impression is that no such feeling prevails among them to any degree worth setting against their dislike of foreign domination or interference; though toward the end of the Amir Sher Ali's rule they had become very sore at his despotic rule through the Kabul soldiery, and at his revenue exactions. At this moment, there is no civil government worth the name outside the Kandahar suburbs. Under the orders contained in my letter to Colonel St. John of the 3rd August, all questions concerning our future relations with South Afghanistan were, and still are, reserved. The Sirdar has not resumed the authority which he lost in July and August last; he has now no regular troops, no arms or munitions of war. He has some 500 horsemen of his own clan at his disposal, and could, with money, raise a much larger number. The surrounding districts, east of the Helmund, are only so far under control that collections of revenue grain and the purchase of supplies go on under a sort of joint acquisition signed by Colonel St. John and the Sirdar. Across the Helmund there is no kind of government; Seistan is under its local chiefs, and Kelat-i-Ghilzai has been intrusted to the Tokhi Ghilzais. Thus the Sirdar only exercised about four months (from March to July) the authority which we recognized in March last. As soon as the Kandahar siege was ended he told Colonel St. John that, while willing to give all aid in his power to the restoration of tranquillity, he desired to be permitted to retire to India. Colonel St. John was instructed, in reply, that the Sirdar's wish to retire should not be discouraged, but should be treated as matter reserved for subsequent consideration.

During my stay in Kandahar, I had several confidential interviews with the Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, in which the state of the country, and the Sirdar's own position, were discussed. I admitted to the Sirdar—what was, indeed, a plain inference from the fact

that he had not been asked to resume the government of the country after Ayub had been driven off—that recent events, and particularly the behaviour of the Duranis, had led the Government of India to review their position at Kandahar. I referred to the Sirdar's expression, in September, of his desire to retire to India, and I said that the Government had reserved their reply until the whole situation could be deliberately considered. I added that I was now empowered to speak with the Sirdar on the subject, and to report the result to the Government of India, by whom he would be treated, in any case, with friendship and liberality.

The tenor of the Sirdar's answer was that he held himself entirely at the disposition of the British Government, that he had kept faith and done what he could during the recent disturbances; but that, whatever might be the future plans of the British Government, he was quite ready to acquiesce in them. The British Government, he said, had incurred vast expense and trouble in Afghanistan, and, having now gained at least long and varied experience of the country, should be able to judge what was best for its interests to do now. If the British Government wished him to leave Kandahar, he was prepared to withdraw—or to stay, if this were desired; and he intimated that he would have no objection to stay, with our protection and active support to his governorship. He gave me to understand that his policy would be to rely upon us for holding Kandahar as a secure basis for his operations, and then to push westward with his own resources and friends, so as to extend his authority beyond the Helmund, and even, he hinted, to Herat. This, he seemed to think (and probably he was right), would be necessary to the permanent consolidation of his authority at Kandahar and in the adjacent districts. Being asked whether he felt able to deal with the Duranis, who had so recently betrayed and attacked him, he rejoined that the country rose, out of fanaticism, against us more than against him; and that by a severe régime he could keep the people in order. He was naturally anxious to discover the intentions of the British Government regarding Kandahar before committing himself finally to any declaration regarding himself; and he wished to find out whether we were likely to annex the country ourselves. He was informed, in reply, that no definite decision had been taken, that some time might pass before our final arrangements were determined; but that his own future position should receive ample consideration. He repeated that he should make no sort of objection to the wishes, whatever they might be, of the British Government.

Throughout our interviews the Sirdar used no expression indicating that he held the British Government to be under any obligation to remain in Kandahar merely in order to restore and uphold his authority; nor did he appear to have any argument of this nature in his mind. His object appeared to be to discover what course the Government were likely to take; and he supposed, as most of the Kandahari people supposed, that I had come with authority to decide and declare what should be done with Kandahar. Pending this decision, the Sirdar was naturally averse to stating explicitly what he himself would prefer; since his conclusions must necessarily depend much on our line of action; nor was he prepared to admit that he had failed in his government, or that he could not resume it until he should have learnt as much as possible of what might be the effect on his own prospects of such an admission. At a later interview, however, I explained that the Government might still require some time before coming to a decision on Kandahar affairs, and determining what might be best for the interests of all concerned. I asked the Sirdar whether I should report to the Government that he left the whole question, so far as he was concerned personally, in the hands of the British Government, always understanding that he was himself sure of liberal treatment. The Sirdar answered that this might be stated; that he had placed himself unreservedly in the hands of the British Government, but that if the Government were to ask him to do anything beyond his power, and he were to ask to be excused, he hoped the Government would not be annoyed, and would accept his excuses as made through inability, not through unwillingness, to comply. He proceeded to make some remarks as to the general condition of the country. He said that it was suffering from want of administration and the general political uncertainty that prevailed—his meaning being evidently that we ought to waste no time in making up our minds as to the country's future. I told him that I must report in person to his Excellency the Viceroy the result of my visit to Kandahar, but that a settlement would be made as soon as possible. Hitherto the Sirdar had not been pressed in regard to his request, in September, to be allowed to retire to India; nor had he expressly repeated it. But it is probable that, when he clearly understood that I was not empowered to settle anything, and that I was returning very speedily to make a report to the Government, he thought it wise to secure his retirement on good terms. He informed me, through Nawab Hassan Ali, that he was prepared to write a letter to the Viceroy, and he made some allusion to the subject of his retirement. When

I met the Sirdar on the day before my departure, I told him that I thought a letter would be a convenient record of his own wishes and of the general result of our conversation. He said that such a letter would be written; and he went on to say that he had now no will or power of his own apart from the will of the British Government, and that the Government should look upon him as their sincere friend. With regard to the future arrangements for the country, if the Government wished him to do any service, he was ready to undertake that service as he had done before, and to administer the affairs of the country with the support of the British Government. If, however, some time must elapse before Government could come to a decision, he begged to be allowed to proceed to Kurrachee with his family until that decision was come to. If afterwards the Government wanted his services for the country he would undertake the service and come back from Kurrachee. Should, however, the British Government not require his services, he begged for a pension and for leave to enjoy it in any country he might choose to live, either here or in India, or any other country.

I told the Wali that these conversations would be submitted to the Viceroy at Lahore, and that in any case he might rely on the friendship of the British Government.

I asked the Wali why he wished to go to Kurrachee until the Government came to a decision. He replied that during the interval, if he remained here and were not Governor, the people might do something that might get him into trouble.

He said he would never turn his face away from the British, and that he was not afraid that they would do him any harm, but that he was afraid of his own people, who had already brought him into trouble, and might do so again, that it was simply a precaution, and that he did not wish to remain in the country during the interval. He said, "Until now I have served the British Government with loyalty, and I am afraid that the people may do something that may be the cause of a bad name and grief to me."

The letter was delivered to me on the evening of the same day; and on the next morning I left Kandahar.

The general impression that I formed of the Wali's position at Kandahar was that it had become untenable without our active and unreserved support. He had probably relied too much on us from the beginning, and had thus neglected to conciliate the Sirdars; but under the circumstances he can hardly be blamed for the failure of the experiment which placed him in charge of the government. Any Afghan Sirdar, situated as was Sher Ali Khan, would have incurred unpopularity; and in the present condition of Afghanistan the independent ruler of Kandahar would be exposed to intrigues and attack both from Herat and from Kabul. Against such opponents, who appeal both to fanaticism and to the loyalty of the Duranis to the old ruling family, Sher Ali Khan has no standing ground whatever; nor is it to be wondered that he has no independent hold upon the country. I much doubt whether he could secure the allegiance of any considerable body among the people by promising to protect them from the Kabul domination. He could only succeed by our subduing, in his name, the whole country which we might desire him to govern, and by our undertaking to repel foreign invasion and to put down insurrections; and to this extent I do not think we can, consistently with our own interests, pledge ourselves to support him. It may have been represented at Kandahar, as one advantage of a separate State, that the separation would free them from Kabul; but the people of Kandahar have themselves turned, at the first opportunity, so violently and treacherously against the British and Sher Ali that no room is left for supposing that they preferred his rule (which of course they consider inseparable, as it is, from foreign occupation of Kandahar) to being replaced under an Amir of Kabul. I believe that, as a matter of fact, they would again join any leader of an attack upon us and upon him, if he were restored to power at Kandahar; nor do I think they would do otherwise to any other Sirdar in his situation.

I append a memorandum, prepared at my request by Colonel St. John, upon the principal Durani Chiefs in and about Kandahar. It shows what men of influence there are in the country, and what has been their conduct during the late disturbances. There are, it will be seen, very few prominent men of considerable wealth and rank; and some of the leading personages joined Ayub, or have absented themselves permanently from the place. The paucity of influential Sirdars indicates the difficulty of joining any strong party for separate rule in South Afghanistan, and even of ascertaining clearly the wishes of the people generally. I have impressed upon Colonel St. John the importance of establishing, as soon as possible, a wider range of communication with the representatives, such as are to be found, of the Duranis. So far as I could judge at Kandahar, we needed larger information as to their general feelings and disposition, with more extensive intelligence as to what was going on in the

outlying districts. We are likely also to require the co-operation of the headmen of the clans and districts in the matter of procuring supplies during the winter. I instructed Colonel St. John that any persons who had not specially compromised themselves in the late attacks upon us, and whose presence at Kandahar might be useful, should be induced to come in, or to communicate with him. He was empowered to explain that they would not be molested, so long as they abstained, directly and indirectly, from attempts to molest us; and that their interest lay in aiding the British officers to preserve the tranquillity of the country, and to introduce such permanent arrangements as might hereafter be decided upon.

(Signed) A. C. LYALL.

November 1880.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

No. 554, dated Kandahar, 3rd November 1880.

From Lieut.-Col. ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

As requested by you, I have the honour to enclose a memorandum on the principal Durani chiefs in and about Kandahar.

MEMORANDUM ON, and TABULAR LIST OF, PRINCIPAL PERSONAGES in, or connected with, the PROVINCE OF KANDAHAR.

WITH one or two exceptions, all the offshoots of the reigning family resident in Kandahar are descendants of the five Kandahari brothers, Purdil Khan, Kuhndil Khan, Shirdil Khan, Rahmdil Khan, and Mihrdil Khan. Of these, Shirdil Khan left no offspring; and Rahmdil Khan's children took to mercantile pursuits, dropped the title of Sirdar, and so faded into comparative obscurity, though their mother, the Walidah, Bibi Hawa, a first-cousin of the Amir Dost Muhammad and his brothers, is still alive and enjoys a high consideration. Muhammad Sadik, the eldest son of Kuhndil Khan, the most eminent of the five brothers, died before his father, leaving a son, Gul Muhammad Khan. Another son of Kuhndil, Gholam Muhaiuddin Khan, is still alive; but he is a person of little importance, the wealth and power of the Kandahari branch of the Muhammadzais having passed to the families of Purdil Khan and Mihrdil Khan.

The son of the first, Mir Afzal Khan, is now a man of sixty-five or seventy, and enjoyed great influence in the province till he became Governor about eight years ago; but he had little power, the revenue being collected independently of him by officers deputed specially from Kabul. The exactions carried on by these men made Mir Afzal's government most unpopular, and his efforts to raise the country against us in January 1879 met with no success. He fled to Farrah when we arrived before the city; waited there till he heard of the deportation of Yakub, when he retired to Persia, where he has since been.

He is said to be of a kindly disposition, though very fanatical, and has a large number of wives and concubines. He had but little landed property in Kandahar. His daughter, as is well known, married the late Amir, by whom she had the Waliahd, Abdullah Jan. She is now in Farrah with Hashim Khan; but it is said intends to join her father at Meshed.

Mir Afzal has several sons, all of whom retired with him to Persia; but one, Abdul Wahab Khan, returned to Herat at Ayub Khan's invitation, and governed the city during that Sirdar's absence on his Kandahar campaign.

Sirdar Mihrdil Khan, the youngest of the Kandahari brothers, left several sons. The eldest, Khushdil Khan, died two years ago, leaving four sons, all of whom are men of some weight, though none have shown much signs of capacity. They are—

Muhammad Hasan Khan.	Shirindil Khan.
Muhammad Anwar Khan.	Roshdil Khan.

The first three returned to Kandahar a few days after our arrival in January 1879; they have always professed themselves faithful adherents of the British Government, and I have had no reason to doubt their sincerity. Shirindil Khan is a man of more capacity than the others, and has some talent for business, but has no more backbone than the

majority of the family. Roshndil Khan was in Kabul during the earlier part of our occupation, but followed his uncle, Sher Ali, down to Kandahar.

Of the Wali Sher Ali Khan it is unnecessary to speak.

His brother, Muhammad Husain Khan, is, I believe, the ablest of the family; but is no favourite in the country generally, and is certainly not to be trusted too far.

The Wali's eldest son, Haidar Ali Khan, is a lunatic, but has a son of eighteen or twenty, by name Ahmad Ali Khan. He ought, I suppose, to be the heir, but it is evident that the Wali's favourite is his second son, Nur Ali Khan, a young man of six or eight and twenty. He has pleasant manners and is certainly intelligent, but does not seem to have much force of character.

Of the Muhammadzai Sirdars not belonging to the Kandahar branch, but resident in the province, the principal was the Sartip, Nur Muhammad Khan, son of Talmur Khan. He had been on bad terms with the Kabul party for many years, and had no pension from the late Amir; nevertheless, he led the tribal cavalry to resist our advance and commanded at the affair near Takht-i-Pul on the 4th January 1879. He fled to Farrah with Mir Afzal Khan, but returned when Sirdar Sher Ali came down from Kabul, and was apparently one of his warmest supporters. His treachery in going over to Ayub was quite unexpected, and a great blow to the Wali, who had trusted him implicitly. He has a numerous family, including one very able son, Sher Muhammad Khan.

Sirdar Ghulam Muhaiuddin Khan, son of Kuhndil Khan, is a debauchee prematurely aged. He had little influence or property in the province, but enjoyed a very large pension, nearly Rupees 50,000 per annum. He fled with Mir Afzal to Farrah, and returned with the Sartip towards Kandahar; but, instead of coming into the town, halted at a village a few miles distant, and sent in to Sirdar Sher Ali demanding the order (barat) for his pension. This, he was told, would not be given unless he came for it, on which he retired again to Farrah, which he left with Mir Afzal for Persia. He has two grown-up sons. One, Dastgir Khan, deserted the Wali and went over to Ayub. The other, Nasir Jan, frightened at a demonstration made against him by the military authorities on some false information, fled to the hills, whence he went to Ayub Khan's camp; but he took no active part against us, and is only waiting my permission to come in to Kandahar.

Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, son of Muhammad Sadik Khan, and grandson of Kuhndil Khan, is our sincerest partizan out of the Wali's family. He has large property and considerable influence on the Helmand. I put him at Girishk in March 1879 as a sort of Governor, and he was very useful in keeping the country quiet and in obtaining information. He is not a very warm friend of the Wali, and would, I believe, prefer our annexing the country to any other arrangement.

The paucity of influential chiefs among the Duranis of Kandahar has often been a matter of wonder to me, and I have spoken much on the subject to such leading men as there are. They admit that all the tribes and subdivisions of tribes had recognised heads under the Sadozais, and say that the *Khan Khels*, as they were called, are still known. In many cases, however, they have fallen into obscurity, and in one only have retained their old position. This solitary exception is Ahmad Khan of Lash-Jowain, head of the Ishakzai clan, who is allowed the title of Sirdar and enjoys semi-independence at Lash Jowain. No doubt the strength of their fortified capital and its vicinity to the Persian frontier have alone enabled the family to retain its position. The present chief Sirdar, Ahmad Khan, is not an old man, but is paralyzed. The family have always been well affected towards the British Government, and I have been in constant friendly communication with the Sirdar and his eldest son, Shamsuddin Khan. A younger son was sent by him to the Wali with a few sowars in June last, and was in Kandahar during the siege. Another son, either of his own accord or to keep up relations with both parties, joined Ayub Khan, and was present at Maiwand and Kandahar. After the battle of Mazra he returned to Lash Jowain, where he had a quarrel with his eldest brother, Shamsuddin Khan, and shot him dead. Not long afterwards I received a letter from Sirdar Ahmad Khan informing me of Shamsuddin's death, and of his having made his uncle, Muhammad Hasan Khan, his heir, to the exclusion of his younger sons.

In Kandahar and the neighbourhood the most important and influential man among the Duranis of late years was no doubt Fathi Khan, Achakzai. The family have been actively employed in the service of the reigning family, whether Sadozai or Muhammadzai, for more than a century, and have taken a leading part in events. Fathi Khan was Governor of his native province for about two years under the late Amir, having succeeded in procuring the disgrace of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, the present Wali, who had held it for many years. He was disgraced in his turn and kept under open arrest at

Kabul till the British occupation. He made frequent requests to be allowed to return to Kandahar, but at the Wali's request I asked General Stewart to retain him in Kabul. His son, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and nephew, Haidar Khan, took an active part against us during the siege, and are still in hiding on the Helmand. Fathi Khan's object in wishing to return to Kandahar was no doubt to intrigue in favour of the sons of the late Amir. He was an unpopular Governor, less from what he did than from having been the first under whom nominees from Kabul managed the revenue of the province.

Other members of the same family are Muhammad Aslam Khan of Kalah Abdullah, now under arrest at Jacobabad; and Haji Sarbuland Khan, who has done us good service throughout our occupation.

A second family of great importance is known as the Shahghassi Khel; they are Barakzais, but not of the reigning family, and have large estates in Tirin. Having, however, been generally employed at Kabul and in Turkistan, they are not much known in Kandahar. Their chief is the Luinab Khushdil Khan, formerly Governor of Balkh. He is about thirty years of age, and said to be a great debauchee. He is now in Herat with Ayub Khan. His younger brother, Yusuf Khan, was sent by Ayub to Farrah after Mir Afzal Khan left it, and is said to have been a man of talent and character. He was killed on the 12th August during a sortie.

A first-cousin of these is the Shahghassi Sarwar Khan. As is so common in Afghanistan, he was on very bad terms with his relation, the Luinab, and entered the Wali's service. He was not in Kandahar during the siege, but took no part against us, and is now in Tirin making arrangements for sending in supplies.

The most influential family resident in Kandahar is, perhaps, that of Taj Muhammad Khan, Popalzai, and his brothers, Ghulam Muhammad Khan and Fathi Muhammad Khan. The two latter have been in Kandahar since our arrival, and took measures to protect the arsenal from the mob during the two days that elapsed between Mir Afzal's flight and our entry. Ghulam Muhammad Khan is in Kandahar, and Fathi Muhammad has been for the last six weeks in Khakrez, collecting and grinding wheat, and sending it in to me here.

Taj Muhammad Khan, the eldest brother, is a man of considerable capacity, and accompanied Sirdar Sher Ali Khan from Kabul as principal adviser. They are not on such good terms now, Taj Muhammad's advice not having been taken on two occasions, in both of which he was certainly in the right. He would not take employment under us unless he knew we were going to remain in the country.

This really concludes the list of prominent Durani Chiefs in Kandahar proper. Across the Helmand there are several in Zamindawar, on the Helmand and in Farrah. The first-named district is almost exclusively inhabited by Alizais, but none of their chiefs have the same paramount authority that was enjoyed by Akhtar Khan forty years ago. His son, Dost Muhammad Khan, head of the Hasan-zai sept, has comparatively little influence. Majid Khan, Chief of the Khaluzais, last of the three septs of the Alizais, rebelled against the Wali in May last, was defeated, and died on the way to Herat. The most influential man after him is Sahib Khan, head of the Pirzais, who sent his brother in to me two days ago, offering his services. He has been asked to come in to Kandahar, bringing as many others as possible. Najibullah Khan, though his relation, Dost Muhammad, is the head of the Hasan-zais, enjoys greater influence. Abdul Rahim Khan, also a Hasan-zai, is a man of importance, Mukhtar Khan, Pirzai, and Taimur Shah Khan, Khaluzai, are said to be influential chiefs. These are the only men of rank and influence in Zamindawar, though there are a number of minor chiefs who accompanied them to Kandahar in the two visits they paid to General Stewart. All are now in Zamindawar, but may shortly be expected in Kandahar.

It may be noted, however, that, though the Alizai Chiefs of Zamindawar hold a high position among the Duranis, they have notoriously little real power over their clansmen, the most turbulent race in this part of the country. Abubekr, popularly known as "the thief" (dozd), has become a very prominent personage in the last two years. He is an Alizai, but of low origin, and until March 1879 was only known by his exploits on the high road. In that month he murdered Colonel Moore's Munshi at Haidarabad on the Helmand, and shortly afterwards followed General Biddulph's rear guard to Kushk-i-Nakhud, with a mob of 1,500 ghazis and villagers. After the defeat by Colonel Malcolmson he hung about Kandahar for some time; but when the Alizai chiefs gave in their submission returned to Zamindawar, where he was falsely reported to have been killed by a fall from his horse. He took part in the rebellion against the Wali in May, and was very active against us in July and August. He is said to be about 40 years of age, and is no doubt an enterprising partisan leader. After the battle of Mazra he

collected a band of Ayub's dispersed regulars and began his old trade of highway robbery, but was forced to leave the country by the Alizai Chiefs, unwilling to do anything to bring an army on them. He has now gone to Herat.

The minor chiefs among the Duranis on this side of the Helmand are very numerous. On reference to a transcript from the Amir's pay list for the year 1878, made when I first arrived, I find that 48 Barakzais, nine Achakzais, 26 Alikozais, two Ishakzais, two Alizais, 15 Popalzais, and six Nurzais, drew pay for tribal sowars from the treasury. Of these the principal are the following:—

Barakzai-Muhammadzais—Hasanuddin Khan, the brother of Saifuddin Khan, who while alive was the most influential man in Maruf, where Hasanuddin has still some authority. Is a man of 45, and has not been to Kandahar since our arrival.

Habibullah Khan, nephew of the Sartip Nur Muhammad, took an active part against us lately, but more from enmity to the Wali and affection for his uncle, who is also his father-in-law, than dislike to us. He is in Tirin, and has written asking for pardon and orders. He is a man of capacity. I have told him to remain quietly in his home and send us supplies.

Abdul Kadir Khan lives near Kandahar, where he still is.

Muhammad Alan Khan, formerly Kotwal of the city, a clever man, and made himself very useful to us. Being suspected of intriguing with Ayub's party, both before and after the siege, he was placed in arrest. No proof being forthcoming, he has been released.

Barakzai-Umarkhanzai—Saifullah Khan, a man of some influence at Maruf.

Barakzai-Malikdinzai—Saifuddin Khan, also at Maruf, where he is the most influential man.

Barakzai-Angozai—Amir Muhammad Khan and Muhammad Umar Khan reside near Kandahar, and have occasionally been employed in Government service.

Alikozai tribe—Shahghassi Muhammad Jan, a man of 70, and of considerable influence amongst his fellow tribesmen, who are very numerous about Kandahar, lives in Kandahar.

Nur Muhammad Khan, a man of 50, lives at Panjwai, 15 miles from Kandahar down the Arghandab.

Majid Khan, about 60 years of age, lives at Minara, six miles from Kandahar.

Nurzai—Muhammad Umar Khan, son of Sirdar Ahmad Khan, is about 45 years old, lives for the most part in the city.

The only remaining notables among the Duranis of Southern Afghanistan are on the Helmund and in Farrah. A considerable section of the Barakzais is located on the banks of the former at and below Girishk. Its Chiefs are—

Yar Muhammad Khan, Angizai, a man of 40, possessed of considerable influence; he paid me a visit last year, but joined Ayub Khan after Maiwand. He has left his home on the Helmund and gone towards Khash. Agha Jan Khan, Angizai, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and Muhammad Husain Khan, brothers, Malikdinzais, are also men of consideration. Sultan Muhammad Khan, Khanchehzai about 45 years old, is the principal man of his sept. He visited me in Kandahar last year and is now at his village on the Helmund near Kalah-i-Bist.

Fathi Muhammad Khan, also a Khanchehzai, has nearly, if not quite, as much influence as the last.

Minor chiefs of the same sept are—

Musa Khan and Ahmad Khan.

At Naozad, a place not shown on any of our maps, but which is on the north-west border of Zamindawar, and appears to be the most important in that part of the country, a Barakzai named Jabar Khan is said to be a man of wealth and importance.

The most numerous tribe of Duranis beyond the Helmund are the Nurzais; their principal man is Muhammad Umar Khan, who resides at Farrah, where he has more influence than any other chief. He accompanied Ayub to Kandahar, and has, I believe, returned to his home.

Kandahar, 3rd November 1880.

(Signed) O. St. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

No. 4.

No. 17 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India,

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 2, 1881.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch, No. 46, of the 19th November last, regarding the withdrawal of British troops from Kuram and the Khyber Pass.

2. Her Majesty's Government, in assenting to the proceedings of the Government of India, reported by our former despatch, desire to be informed in whose possession the Peiwar Kotal remains, as the papers before them do not indicate with clearness whether that position is within the lands of the Jajis or those of the Turis.

3. We have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Kotal is within the lands of the Jajis. The Turis used to hold the valley to a point a little above the village of Peiwar, and there has always been a strong feeling of antagonism between the two tribes in regard to the upper portion of the Pass, so much so that at one time the posts upon the Kotal were held for both by a small body of independent Mangals located there for this express purpose. But there can be no question that the Kotal is within the recognised nominal limits of Jaji territory, and as a matter of fact the Jajis at once took possession when our troops left it. We have no information to show whether the posts are now held by the local levies or by the Amir's regular troops, but the ridge is believed to be in the possession of the Kabul Government, and is certainly not held by the Turis.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

JAMES GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

No. 5.

No. 22 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE the MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 2, 1881.

IN our despatch of the 19th January last,* we reported the correspondence which had taken place, up to that date, with the Amir Abdul Rahman in connexion with the affairs of Kandahar.

* No. 10.

2. The Amir did not reply immediately to the Viceroy's letter to him of the 7th January; and information received from Kabul indicated that he had been disappointed by the adjournment of the interview proposed by him. But it appeared to the Government of India to be important that His Highness should be placed, without delay, in possession of the general views and intentions of the British Government with regard to Kandahar; since the time for discussing them is materially limited by the prospect of an early withdrawal of the British forces from South Afghanistan. On the 30th January, therefore, the Viceroy addressed to the Amir the letter, of which a copy is herewith inclosed, explaining the basis upon which the Government of India are prepared to enter into arrangements for making over the Kandahar province, at the departure of the British troops, to the Government of the Amir of Kabul.

3. This letter had scarcely issued when a telegram was received from Peshawur, communicating the substance of a reply sent by the Amir to the Viceroy's letter of

the 7th January. There appears, however, to be in this letter, so far as can be judged from the abbreviation, nothing which might require the Viceroy's last letter to His Highness to be detained or modified.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure in No. 5.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of India to His Highness AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, Amir of Kabul.

Fort William, January 30, 1881.

In my letter of the 7th January to your Highness, I explained the reasons which constrained me to consider advisable the adjournment of the personal interview proposed to me by your Highness' friendly letter of the 28th December. And I repeated my earnest recommendation that, if there were no great objection, a confidential agent should be sent by your Highness to my Government in India.

2. There has as yet been scarcely time for the arrival of your Highness' answer. But it is clear that correspondence with Kabul is uncertain, and in a former letter your Highness mentioned the difficulty of selecting a perfectly competent representative. And since it has become necessary that the British troops should move out of Kandahar in the early spring, any further delay in acquainting your Highness with the policy and wishes of the British Government might be prejudicial to your Highness' interests. I therefore address your Highness again without waiting for a reply to my last letter, and I desire to place you, as fully as is possible through the medium of a letter, in possession of the views of the British Government with regard to the future government of Kandahar.

3. The Government of Her Majesty the Queen Empress recognize that it is desirable, in the province of Kandahar as it was in Northern Afghanistan, to assist, if this be found possible within a limited time, in the establishment, before the departure of the British troops from Kandahar, of some settled administration in that province. They would contemplate with satisfaction the restoration of Kandahar to the dominions of Afghanistan, and they will agree to the extension over the province of your Highness' authority. If, therefore, your Highness is willing at once to undertake measures for receiving from the British officers at Kandahar, as last year at Kabul, the charge of the administration, it is important that your Highness should lose no time in completing preparations necessary for occupying Kandahar and establishing your government there. The British Government are, on their side, ready to admit your officers, to declare their recognition of your government when established, and generally to assist your Highness, in the same manner as they assisted you at Kabul, by a subsidy of money at Kandahar, and by the present of some artillery and other munitions of war. They will also exert influence with the Sirdars of the country to induce them to adhere to your Government.

4. If on receipt of this letter your Highness determines, as I hope, to accept and act upon this offer, you should take measures for moving toward Kandahar whatever forces you may think necessary; and Colonel St. John, my resident at Kandahar, should receive direct information by an agent of your plans and movements. It is also manifestly expedient that your Highness should send me very early notice of your intentions.

No. 6.

To His Excellency the Most Honourable THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA
IN COUNCIL.

No. 10.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, February 11, 1881.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of the letter from your Excellency's Government, No. 3 of 12th ultimo, explaining the circumstances under which Sirdar Shere Ali Khan has retired from his position of Wali of Kandahar, and the arrangements sanctioned by your Excellency in Council for the accommodation and sustenance of the Sirdar and his family at Kurrachee.

2. Having so recently laid before you in my despatch of the 11th November last the views of Her Majesty's Government on the general question of the disposition of Kandahar and the future administration of the province, it is sufficient now to say that they entirely approve the proceedings of your Government in the matters under report.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 7.

No. 27 of 1881. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 14, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch of the 2nd February,* we have the honour to enclose, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the reply, referred to in the 3rd paragraph of that despatch, sent by the Amir of Kabul to the Viceroy's letter, dated 7th January. The Amir's reply is dated January 26th, and it will be seen that His Highness agrees to depute an agent to confer with the Government of India, although no authority is given to him to decide or settle anything. The agent named is General Amir Ahmad Khan, of whose arrival on the frontier of India we have not yet heard.

2. We also enclose copies of telegraphic correspondence with the Resident at Kandahar on the subject of the transfer of Kelat-i-Ghilzai to the Government of the Amir of Kabul. It will be seen that Muhammad Sadik Khan, the Ghilzai Chief, who now holds Kelat-i-Ghilzai temporarily on our behalf, has written that he has been ordered by the Amir to leave a representative in the place, and to go himself to Kabul. But as it seemed inadvisable that the fortress should be made over to any one not specially nominated or appointed by the Amir, Muhammad Sadik Khan has been instructed to reply to the Amir that he will await the arrival of the Amir's officer; and the Viceroy has addressed a letter direct to the Amir of Kabul in explanation of the orders which have been issued.

3. We enclose also copy of a telegram received from Kandahar informing us that Sirdar Ayub Khan is sending messengers to our Resident there. We have instructed Colonel St. John to receive them civilly, but to inform them that no overtures on their part concerning Kandahar can be entertained.

We have, &c.

* (Signed) RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

JAMES GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the Address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 26th January 1881.

After compliments.—I have received your Excellency's very kind letter, dated the 7th January 1881, and mastered its contents from the beginning to the end. The friendly sentiments expressed in your Excellency's letter with a view to consolidate the basis of friendship and concord between the two sublime Governments, and your Excellency's good wishes for the prosperity of my State and the permanence of my government, have indeed afforded me great pleasure and comfort, and caused me both inward and outward satisfaction. I highly appreciate the divers kindnesses of the illustrious Imperial Government, and most gratefully acknowledge its daily increasing favours, and confidently hope that as long as I live I shall not, please God, propose, think of, or determine anything which may be against the will and wish of the representatives of the illustrious Government.

As regards the postponement of the proposed interview between your Excellency and me, for the several reasons explained by your Excellency, to some other time and to a favourable opportunity, and with respect to your Excellency's wishing me to depute an agent to India for the purpose of preliminary discussions regarding Afghanistan, I have, agreeably to the wishes of the representatives of the sublime Government, appointed to this service General Amir Ahmad Khan, whom I thought a loyal, truthful, proper, and worthy man. But he is authorised and empowered only to carefully listen to the proposals of the representatives of the sublime Government, and to report to me the facts and the substance of the discussions, but not to settle and decide anything with the representatives of the sublime Government according to his own opinion, since the affairs of Afghanistan are embarrassed to such an extent and degree that they cannot be set to rights through anyone but myself. The reason why I asked with urgency for, and insisted on, an interview, and why I still do so, is that I wish that the first stone of the foundation of the structure of sincere friendship between the two Governments be so firmly and strongly laid that it should not, for hundreds of years, see the face of destruction or suffer desolation. I still confidently hope that a friendly interview will take place between your Excellency and myself at some convenient time and on a suitable occasion, and that our affairs will be arranged according to our wishes. I am exceedingly thankful to the sublime British Government for their allowing me to take in hand the administration of Khelat-i-Ghilzai, which act of kindness they have done for the advancement of my State, and I sincerely hope that they take great interest in my welfare and prosperity.

Regarding the arms and ammunition, which had been plundered or destroyed, I had a talk with Mr. Lepel Griffin during the interview I had with him at Zimma. I feel certain that he has made your Excellency fully aware of the circumstance. Since the last six months I have been endeavouring to collect the guns, and I have succeeded in procuring some, which, after being repaired, will prove useful.

As regards the ammunition, I have none. The two lead mines in the neighbourhood of Kabul have not been worked during the last two years of confusion and anarchy, and the people have no lead in store which might be taken. This being the winter season, no gunpowder can be manufactured; and the little ammunition I require I procure with the greatest difficulty. I therefore expect, as a friend, that your Excellency will be pleased to grant me whatever quantity of ammunition your Excellency may think proper, and to strengthen me as soon as possible.

I am resolved upon two things, from which I will never swerve. *First*, I will never undertake anything without the consent of the British Government. *Second*, I will keep the British Government informed at all times of the state of affairs in Afghanistan, whether good or bad, exactly as it is, without any addition or diminution.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

From Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. WATERFIELD, C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 4th February 1881.

FORWARDS a memorandum regarding General Amir Ahmad Khan.

AMIR AHMAD KHAN is the son of Shahabuddin Khan, who went from Hindustan to Kabul in 1830, and there took service with Dost Muhammad Khan, at that time a Sirdar in Kabul. When Dost Muhammad was sent to India, Shahabuddin Khan remained in Kabul. On Dost Muhammad's return as Amir he appointed each of Shahabuddin's two sons to offices in the artillery, sending Amir Ahmad Khan, whom the present memorandum concerns, to Turkistan to serve as General of artillery under Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, father of the present Amir, and then in charge of Turkistan. Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, however, became displeased with Amir Ahmad Khan, having heard that he was teaching Abdul Rahman, the present Amir, to smoke opium, &c.; Amir Ahmad Khan, therefore, left for Kabul. Shere Ali Khan, who, though only heir-apparent, had considerable power, then appointed him to a post in the artillery. Subsequently, during his contest with Afzal Khan for power, Shere Ali Khan became suspicious of the two brothers, and on his return from India gave them no office, but made them some small allowance.

Since then Amir Ahmad Khan and his brother do not appear to have been heard of, and have, perhaps, lived in obscurity.

Peshawur, the 4th February 1881.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD,
Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawur Division.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th February 1881.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

MUHAMMAD SADIK KHAN writes from Kelat-i-Ghilzai that a letter has reached him from Amir (that) that place has been given to him by (the) English, and ordering him to leave a representative there and come himself to Kabul. Muhammad Sadik asks for orders.

I propose to tell him that it is true we have given Kelat-i-Ghilzai to Amir, and that if he thinks he can safely leave fort in charge of any one else he had better go to Kabul, but, if not, to write that if he leaves before Amir sends a governor and troops there fort may be taken possession of by Ayub's party.

Enclosure 4 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th February 1881.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar.

Your telegram 7th. Muhammad Sadik should be instructed to reply to Amir that British authorities have directed him to make over Kelat-i-Ghilzai only to a governor nominated by Amir; therefore, pending receipt of Amir's further orders, or arrival of governor, he will hold the place for Amir. Letter in this sense goes direct from hence to Amir.

Enclosure 5 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th February 1881.

From Colonel St. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

A MESSENGER has just arrived from Herat, in six days, bringing letter from Ayub, dated 31st January, announcing departure on that day for (Kandahar?) of Abdulla Khan, Nasiri, and Omar Jan, Sahibzāda, as envoys.

Enclosure 6 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th February 1881.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to Colonel St. JOHN, Kandahar.

YOUR telegram 7th. Ayub's envoys may have civil reception, but should be informed that you can entertain no negotiations about Kandahar, and Viceroy desires you to be strictly careful that your language shall hold out no hope to them present or prospective thereupon. You will consider how long envoys can be safely permitted in interests of our present policy to stay at Kandahar.

Enclosure 7 in No. 7.

Dated, Fort William, 11th February 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL in India to His Highness AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, the Amir of Kabul.

THE British Resident at Kandahar has reported to me by telegraph that a letter from your Highness has reached Muhammad Sadik Khan, who is now holding charge of the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzai. It is understood to be your Highness' wish that Muhammad Sadik Khan should place a representative in charge of the fort, and should himself proceed to Kabul.

I am glad that your Highness has taken such early steps for assuming charge of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and it is the desire of the British Government that your Highness should be established there as soon as possible.

But for this object, and to prevent accidents or mistakes, or the danger of the place falling into the hands of your Highness' enemies, it seems advisable that the person who should receive charge of the fortress from Sadik Khan should be nominated or approved by your Highness; and Muhammad Sadik Khan has been directed, accordingly, to await your Highness' further orders on this point. He has been told that, as soon as he is informed of the person to whom your Highness would be willing that the fortress should be entrusted, he should immediately deliver charge to that person.

No. 8.

No. 39 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 28, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding the arrangements which have been sanctioned for the future security of the Khyber Pass.

2. In the despatch from the Government of India, No. 208, of the 14th September last, your Lordship was informed that we proposed to withdraw all British garrisons from the Pass, and to entrust the protection of the road to the Khyber tribes, whose independence was to be formally recognized. This proposal was accepted in your

Lordship's despatch, No. 46, dated 19th November 1880. The whole of the arrangements necessary to carry it into effect have now been completed, after long and careful negotiations with the tribal representatives, and we trust that they will be approved by Her Majesty's Government. The total cost to the British revenues will be under two lakhs of rupees per annum—the sum of Rupees 87,540 being given in allowances to the different sections of the Afridis, and Rupees 87,392 being allotted to the payment of a corps of Jezailchis which the tribes desire to maintain. In consideration of these payments the Afridis have covenanted to undertake entire and exclusive responsibility for the freedom and security of the road, and to occupy with the Jezailchis Ali Masjid and other important posts as far as Lundikhana. Beyond this point their responsibility does not extend, Lundikhana being the defined western limit of the independent tribal territory in which, for the purpose of keeping open and free of interruption the passes into India, the authority of the Kabul Government is not recognized.

3. It will be observed that the right of levying tolls upon traffic passing through the Khyber is specially reserved, by the agreement with the tribes, to the British Government. The Commissioner would defer for a few months the collection of these tolls or transit dues, but the Lieutenant-Governor is unable to see any sufficient reason for not levying them at once, upon the ground that the public will in any case look to our Government for the protection of convoys, and that the levying of tolls indicates that this responsibility (which cannot, in Sir R. Egerton's opinion, be disavowed) is accepted. There can be no doubt that a regular collection of dues by the British Government will induce the toll-payers to believe that they have secured our protection; while, conversely, to abstain from the demand may be interpreted as an admission, on our part, of some uncertainty as to whether our arrangements will effectually provide for the safety of convoys. It is, moreover, obviously desirable that the entire scheme shall be introduced and put on its trial from the beginning; nor is it improbable that if the British Government waives, even for a time, its acknowledged right to collect the tolls, they will be levied by the Afridis themselves, or by some authority beyond the territorial limits of these arrangements. We have therefore instructed the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab that on this point his opinion is accepted, and that he should issue the requisite orders, at his discretion, to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

4. With regard, however, to the question of responsibility for particular robberies committed within the Pass, our opinion does not altogether coincide with the views expressed in the 4th paragraph of the letter of the 14th February from the Punjab Government. The Commissioner, it will be observed, would at once throw upon the tribal union all responsibility for the safety of convoys traversing the pass, would decline, on the part of the Government, any direct liability to the traders in the event of losses, and would insist that the tribes must be left to protect the convoys and to award compensation for depredations. If robberies occur, the complaints are to be referred to the headmen for their remedy; the British officers assisting by their influence and advice, and holding in reserve the power, in the contingency of failure by the tribes to act up to their agreement, of stopping the allowances, disbanding the Jezailchis, and closing the pass. His Honour, the Lieutenant-Governor, on the contrary, would authorise the political officer to inquire into individual complaints, and to award the proper compensation. The view taken by the Government of India is that it is preferable, at the beginning, to follow strictly the procedure laid down by the agreement, and to refer all complaints, in the first instance, to the jirgahs. The 8th clause of the agreement appears to entrust the jirgahs with the power of award and of levying penalty, and they should have full discretion in exercising this power. If in any particular case they fail in the performance of their duty, it will be time to bring pressure to bear upon the united jirgahs of the tribes, reminding them that they have undertaken to award compensation which (when awarded) may be deducted from the allowances, and that the maintenance of the whole agreement may depend on their fulfilment of an essential condition belonging to it.

5. All these arrangements must, in our opinion, be regarded for the present as experimental, until they have undergone trial, and the result shall have been practically ascertained. If the system works well, and the tolls are regularly collected, the annual cost of securing the proper fulfilment of Colonel Waterfield's agreement with the tribes will, we submit, have been well and advantageously expended. To keep the Khyber Pass safe and open, to encourage traffic and intercourse with Afghanistan, to establish our political influence over the Afridis, and to exclude the authority of Kabul from the independent border lands, are all objects for which the money payment, if by it they can be secured, is well worth making. It is known that the Afridis have been subsidized from time immemorial by all governments to whom the management and

political control of these passes have been a matter of importance; and that the tribes consider their services to be due to the authority that undertakes payment of these subsidies.

6. The Lieutenant-Governor, in his letter to the Commissioner of the 13th December (paragraphs 4-5), lays stress on the importance of trying the system of holding the pass through Jezailchis. In that letter, and the correspondence accompanying it, all the arguments for and against the employment of Jezailchis will be found very fairly stated. The special advantage of the plan is understood to be that it will preserve unity of action among the tribes, will give a frame-work and cohesion to the intertribal arrangements, and will provide with regular employ and duties five hundred men, who might otherwise be disposed to plunder and disorder. It appears to be, moreover, the decided opinion of the frontier officers that, unless the tribes are in this manner encouraged and assisted by us in their attempts at self-organization, they must inevitably fail in combining to fulfil their joint responsibilities. We have therefore determined that the assent of the British Government may be given to the establishment of the Jezailchi corps and to the agreement that our officers shall engage to pay the men and to do what may be practicable in the way of aiding the headmen to equip and organize it. But we have stipulated that the tribal headmen must take actual charge of the corps, and of its recruiting and ordinary management; the British political officers merely assisting by advice and by their general influence, supported, of course, in this case by the understanding that the allowances are liable to be forfeited or suspended if the arrangements break down. The essential principle of the whole agreement is distinctly declared to be that the tribes undertake certain specified duties and responsibilities in exchange for certain stipulated payments.

7. The British troops now in the Khyber will be withdrawn with the least possible delay; though it is considered desirable that an alternative route between Lundikhana and Dakka, lying entirely in independent tribal territory, should be opened up before the pass is finally evacuated. We have also ordered the survey of another route through the Mohmand country, which could, in case of necessity, be used as an alternative to the whole Khyber line. But there is no reason to apprehend that these operations will retard the withdrawal of the troops beyond the close of the cold season.

8. The question of the political establishments permanently necessary for the conduct of our relations with the Khyber tribes has not been finally settled; but the estimates submitted by the Punjab Government appear to be capable of reduction.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

No. 412 S., dated 6th September 1880.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

In my telegrams of the 1st and 2nd September preliminary instructions were conveyed to you regarding the measures immediately necessary for giving effect to the orders of the Government of India, on the relations which will, in future, be observed with the Afridi tribes of the Khyber Pass for maintaining the road through the pass open and free of interference. I am now desirous to forward copy of a letter No. 2980 E.P., dated 31st August, from the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, and to communicate in detail the orders of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor in pursuance of the instructions therein contained.

2. In the first place, as explained in my telegram, Sir Robert Egerton desires that you will take the earliest opportunity of summoning the headmen of the Khyber tribes to Peshawur and explaining to them the intentions of the Government of India, so far as they are definitely communicated in the Foreign Secretary's letter. You will observe that the wording of the second paragraph of this letter differs in a few details from that of my telegram, and in so far as this difference exists you will be guided by the letter,

which is herewith forwarded in supersession of the instructions conveyed by telegram. The *Id-ul-fits*, Muhammadan festival, falls on the 7th September, and it will probably be convenient to choose an early date thereafter for assembling the Maliks in Peshawur. The summons should extend to that portion of the Shinwari tribe which holds Loargai and Lundikotal, but not to the Shinwari tribe generally, or to any of the tribes connected with the upper portion of the Khyber between Lundikotal and Dakka. In regard to this portion of the pass, the management of which is intimately affected by our relations with the Mohmands and the Mohmand Chief, the Khan of Lalpura, instructions will be separately communicated as mentioned in paragraph 5 of the Government of India letter.

3. The main facts which it will be your duty to communicate to the headmen of the tribes are contained in paragraph 2 of the letter enclosed. The British Government has determined upon keeping the pass open, and ensuring securing of life and property to travellers. In effecting this object, relations are to be maintained with the tribes to the exclusion of all other influence or interference. The independence of the tribes is at the same time to be recognised and maintained. With them will rest the responsibility of preserving order and affording security on the road, and when the Government is satisfied that their arrangements for doing so are sufficient, the troops at present located in the Khyber will be withdrawn.

4. On these points the intentions of the Government are clear, and you will have no difficulty in communicating them to the assembled Maliks. On other matters mentioned in the second paragraph of the Foreign Secretary's letter, you will not be able to proclaim the intentions of Government with equal definiteness, and on these subjects I am to convey, in some detail, Sir Robert Egerton's views, in order that your communications with the tribal representatives may be as re-assuring to them as the circumstances will permit without unduly pledging the Government to specific promises which, in the course of the discussion, may have to be somewhat modified.

5. It is stated in the letter which accompanies this reference that, in consideration of the proper performance of the duty of preserving the Khyber road open and undisturbed, the Government of India are prepared to settle with the tribes the compensation allowances that should be paid for tolls in the Khyber, although the permanent adjustment of these allowances will probably involve some modification of the present rate of compensation. In regard to this subject care will be required to avoid any misapprehension. During the occupation of Kabul by the British Government in the first Afghan war, an allowance of Rupees 1,25,000 was made to the Khyberis in consideration of their keeping the pass open. All duties levied on merchandise were realised and appropriated by the Government. After the withdrawal of the British from Afghanistan, the Amir Dost Muhammad assigned Rupees 25,000 as allowances to the heads of the tribes, but this allowance, about three years before the death of the Amir, was discontinued owing to the misconduct of the Khyberis, who did not allow free passage to all travellers. In reporting the arrangements made in 1878 for the management of the pass, the late Sir Louis Cavagnari adverted to the arrangements above described, and appears to some extent to have accepted the subsidy of Rupees 1,25,000 paid in the first Afghan war by the British Government, as the basis of his negotiations with the Afridi Maliks. The subsidy finally arranged for distribution among the tribes, adjoining the Khyber between Jamrud and Lundikotal, amounted to Rupees 87,540, of which a detail was given in my No. 1143, dated 29th October 1879, to the address of the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. In consideration of this subsidy, the elders of each tribe signed a written deed, appointing their representative Chiefs, and set themselves to protect the Khyber road and the telegraph wire, declaring that none of the tribe should commit dacoity, or robbery, or murder in the Pass or in British territory, and expressing their willingness to pay compensation for such offences, and to restore stolen property.

6. In the measures which have been adopted at different times to induce the Khyber Maliks to guarantee the safety of the Pass, the right of the Khyber Maliks to levy tolls has never been admitted to co-exist with their receipt of the subsidy. It is necessary to keep this fact carefully in mind in giving effect to the orders of the Government of India conveyed in this letter. The claim to compensation allowances on account of tolls could only be put forward by the Khyber tribes, in the event of the subsidy being withdrawn which was intended to compensate them for the abandonment of the levy of such duties, as well as for ensuring the safety of travellers. So long as the subsidy is paid to the tribes, the right of collecting tolls, if it exists at all, rests with the British Government. In regard to the question of subsidy, you are authorised by the instructions of the Government of India to inform the tribal representatives that the arrangements under which they have engaged to maintain the security of the Pass remain intact, and the

allowances of which they are at present in receipt will be granted to them in future as long as, and provided that, they are able to secure the Pass for the passage of travellers. But it rests with the British Government to decide whether in future the right of levying tolls, which belongs to it alone in virtue of such arrangements, shall be put into exercise or not. This is one of the subjects upon which your opinion is desired, and the communications which you make to the tribes should not pledge the Government in any way in regard to its action in this matter. Sir R. Egerton is inclined upon the whole to think that, if the Government abstain from exercising its right of levying tolls, the only result will be that traffic passing through the Khyber will be taxed in other places to the full extent of the burden which the trade is capable of surviving, and that to forego the levy of tolls in the lower Khyber would only be to increase indirectly the profits of those who collect such imports further westward. If the tolls are re-imposed, a further matter for consideration will be whether the collection of them should be made over to the Afridi tribes, a corresponding reduction being made in their subsidy, or whether they should be levied by means of their agency. On these questions also the Lieutenant-Governor will be glad to receive your opinion.

7. The next point which calls for some remarks is the allusion made by the Government of India to the possible retention of Jezailchis, or similar levies for the protection and tranquillity of the Pass. You are aware that throughout the correspondence which has taken place on Khyber management, the principle has been recognised that the Afridi tribes are bound, in consideration of the subsidy which they receive, to provide for the safety of travellers, and that the entertainment of a Jezailchi corps with officers was devised as a temporary expedient, on the distinct understanding that it would be possible greatly to reduce, if not entirely to put a stop to, this charge when the arrangements entered into with the tribes should be proved sufficient for their object, and brought into full working order. In considering, therefore, what arrangements should be made by the British Government to provide levies for the future security of the Pass, this fact must be kept prominently in view, and you cannot too firmly impress upon the Afridi representatives that this duty properly falls upon them, in virtue of the obligations incurred by the receipt of handsome allowances from the Government.

The cost of the Jezailchis which is now defrayed by Government was fixed in the letter above quoted at Rupees 72,100 per annum. The late Sir Louis Cavagnari apparently contemplated that Rupees 1,25,000, the traditional sum said to have been paid as subsidy during the first Afghan war, would be the extreme limit of expenditure required to subsidize the Pass, and was of opinion that a portion of the pay of the Jezailchi corps raised during the former British occupation of Afghanistan must have been included in this amount. But the aggregate amount, which has been paid by the Government on account of Pass allowances and Jezailchis, is Rupees 1,59,640 per annum. The Government has taken upon itself the duties of safe conduct (*badagga*), which it was entitled to claim from the tribes as one of the results of the subsidy. This has been done as a temporary measure, and your aim should be to secure the full equivalent for the allowances paid in the future. To what extent it may be necessary to provide for the retention of Jezailchis or similar levies, the precise mode in which they shall be paid, and their discipline,—these are points upon which it will be your duty to report fully to Government. The question, whether it may be possible entirely to withdraw the troops from the Khyber at an early date, is one on the decision of which this subject hinges; probably for a time a more or less organized militia will be indispensable in the absence of military garrison.

8. The foregoing portion of this letter deals with subjects on which you will have either definitely or indirectly to address the Khyber Maliks when they are assembled at Peshawur. Other points noted in the Government of India letter will call for deliberation and decision as time goes on, and according as circumstances shall indicate. The first of these is the question as to the time at which it may be possible for the troops to be entirely withdrawn from the Khyber. This is a question which will depend upon the completeness of the arrangements, which you may be able to effect with the tribes for the safety of the road after their withdrawal, and upon the time which it will take to give effect to such arrangements. Upon this question the Lieutenant-Governor desires to have your opinion.

9. All other questions noted in paragraph 4 of the Government of India letter will also require your careful consideration—how the fortifications and other buildings in the Khyber shall be disposed of. It will be desirable to obtain a list of the former buildings from the military authorities, and to record your opinion regarding each.

10. As regards the westward limit to which we should extend our arrangements with the tribes for their independent charge of the road, the Lieutenant-Governor has no

doubt that Lundikhana must be included within the boundary, as otherwise the water-supply of Lundikotal will be deficient.

11. It remains to consider in what manner the political relations of the Government with the Khyber tribes shall be conducted in future. The Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that for the present, at all events, there must be a political officer as heretofore under the orders of the Commissioner of Peshawur, whose residence it will probably be convenient to fix at Jamrud, and who should be instructed, as long as he can do so with safety, to visit the Pass from time to time, and ascertain that the arrangements for maintaining tranquillity and a free passage to travellers are sufficient.

12. Should you find it necessary to ask for further instructions in regard to the matters mentioned in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this letter with a view to explaining these matters to the tribal assemblage, I am to suggest that the telegraph may be freely used for this purpose, as an immediate solution of all doubt on these subjects is necessary. On the other points you will be able to report at more leisure when you have formed your opinion.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

No. 76 C.P., dated 14th September 1880.

From COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division, to W. M. YOUNG, Esq.,
Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

IN reply to your No. 412 S., dated 6th instant, forwarding a copy of letter, No. 2980 E.P., dated 31st August 1880, from the Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to your address, I have the honour to state that, in accordance with your telegram of the 1st instant, I at once summoned the full jirgahs of the tribes concerned, to meet me at Peshawur on the 14th instant. I may note here incidentally that this summons will prove to some extent a test of the influence exercised among the Khyber Afridis by Sayad Mir Bashir, who has lately been agitating in Tirah, and of his position towards us; should the latter be, now, one of declared hostility, and should full jirgahs of every clan come to Peshawur in defiance of his attempts to prevent their compliance with my summons, it may be presumed that his authority is on the wane.

Upon arrival of the representatives of the tribes, the wishes of Government will be communicated to them as indicated in the instructions received from the Government of India.

2. My telegram, however, of the 11th instant to your address will have explained how the objects, that have to be attained, concurrent with the relinquishment by our troops of the Khyber Pass seem to me to be two—the first being the maintenance of our relations with the Khyber Afridis to the exclusion of influence or interference from any other quarter, while at the same time their independence continues recognised as heretofore; and the second being the continuance of the existing arrangements with them for keeping the Khyber Pass open for trade, modified as circumstances may now require owing to the withdrawal of our troops.

3. The Government is, I know, aware of the difficulties attendant upon the attempt to effect a coalition of the Afridi tribes concerned, in a systematic engagement for the independent management of the Pass.

Of the strength and stability of the tribal combination and of the measures proposed by the Afridis for the management of the Pass, we shall scarcely be able to form an accurate opinion until our troops have actually quitted the Khyber, and the system has been put to the test of practical working. Having regard to this element of uncertainty I am inclined to think that it may be advisable to disconnect the question of maintenance of exclusive relations with the Afridis from a matter that may assume various phases and the arrangements regarding which may be liable to change. The permanence of our relations with the Afridis is of essential importance, yet it cannot fail to be injuriously affected, if interlated with the question of Pass management by the tribes alone. For this reason, and in order to separate the two objects to be attained, I intended to suggest that the Government assuming the former position of the Amirs of Kabul with the Afridis should grant to them certain comparatively small subsidies quite irrespective of, and distinct from, any sum to be paid to the tribes as compensation allowance for keeping open the Khyber.

Thus whatever vicissitudes befall the management of the Pass and the compensation allowance, the maintenance of exclusive relations would remain unaffected.

4. It seemed to me that should the Afridis perceive the withdrawal of our troops from the Khyber to be conditional upon their decision regarding arrangements for the Pass, it was to be apprehended that they might endeavour to make capital, for party purposes, out of this fact, and that it would materially bias their decision. Yet to construct the durable tribal combination which is to work the object in view, it would seem important to exclude such influences, leaving the tribes to be guided by their pecuniary interests. Another possible aspect of the question seemed to be that the Afridis believing us desirous of quitting the Pass might stand out, trading on our supposed anxiety for retirement, and endeavour to dictate terms.

5. I considered that it would materially conduce to the possible success of the negotiations, if the tribes understood that our movements were not dependent upon their conduct, and that although it would be most desirable for purposes of trade, to keep open the Pass, yet that failure on their part to effect this need not necessarily lead to a re-occupation of the Pass, but might, according to circumstances, perhaps cause the total and permanent extinction of their compensation allowance, and the closing of the Khyber and the opening of other and parallel trade routes with Afghanistan such as through the Mohmand country in which they have no interests, and from which they can derive no benefits. The hand of Government would not then be tied in any way, no party among the Afridis could work on our relinquishment or re-occupation of the Pass for its own ends, and the only forces capable of producing coherence among the tribes after withdrawal of our troops, *viz.*, doubts as to the action we should under these circumstances take, and self-interest in retaining the compensation allowance in preference to other tribes profiting by the opening of parallel trade routes, would be appealed to.

6. The reply of the Government by telegram, does not, I think, meet my view of possible difficulties, but the instructions given will be of course carefully adhered to.

It seems to me possible that the Maliks, with the object of retaining troops in the Pass, and their present position and allowances, may plead difficulties in exclusive tribal management, or that under pressure from those who are not profiting by and are not interested in our occupation, they may declare their ability and willingness to keep the Pass open and safe as we desire, with the object of securing our departure in the belief that we shall not return, or that influenced by our supposed anxiety to withdraw from the Pass, they may bid for more favourable terms. The presence of our troops suffices to keep open the Pass, and until they have actually withdrawn, the tribal arrangements cannot come into working order. Should they fail, the Pass may become unsafe. The Government should, I think, consider now what it will do under contingencies that may not impossibly arise.

Quite agreeing with his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor that the tribes may be anxious to make satisfactory arrangements and may start them, we must reflect how we shall act in the possible event of failure.

7. It was on this account that I suggested in my telegram that we should keep separate two matters, which perhaps it may be better to call independent of each other. If difficulties arise in the Pass, and we have to withhold the compensation allowance, it might be still wise and very advisable to continue the tribal subsidies, and hold the tribes to us; we should thus keep up continuous influence in the tribe, through which the Pass arrangements might be again brought straight.

8. It will be a matter of some time and trouble for such a large body as the Afridis to work out a system that will have to meet with the approval of a preponderating section of the tribe, and it was on this account that it seemed to me advisable to think now whether it would not be better to give them a sufficient period within which to complete their arrangements, and then to withdraw the troops, throwing the entire responsibility of the road upon them, and leaving them to be guided by their own interests (as I have little doubt they will be) in doing their best to keep open the trade route and secure the compensation for transit dues. We should test their capabilities, humour their spirit of independence, and yet be able at any time to act as we may find convenient.

Enclosure 3 in No. 8.

No. 486 S., dated 20th September 1880.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to
COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

I AM desired to acknowledge receipt of your No. 76 C.P., dated 14th September, on Khyber Pass arrangements.

2. Your telegram of the 18th current announces the arrival and reception in Durbar at Peshawur of 180 Khyber Maliks, from which fact his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor gathers that full jirgahs of every clan have come in to receive the communications of Government, and that no adverse influence has availed to hinder them.

3. On the subject to which reference is made in paragraphs 4 and 5 of your letter, the instructions of his Honour conveyed in my No. 412, dated 6th instant, will have sufficiently informed you. It was never intended that the Khyber Maliks should be given to understand that, in default of their making satisfactory arrangements for the safety of the Pass, the troops would be retained there. But any doubt which may have existed in your mind on this subject after a perusal of my letter of the 6th September, will have been removed by the Government of India letter conveyed with my No. 475 S., dated 18th September, and there is no need to dwell further on the subject than to state that Sir Robert Egerton concurs with your views as expressed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of your letter under reply, which are in accordance with the test of the instructions contained in paragraph 2 of the Government of India letter No. 2980 E.P., dated 31st August last.

4. With your proposals regarding the treatment of the allowances to the tribesmen, the Lieutenant-Governor is not able to agree. His Honour understands that you would propose to pay small subsidies, equivalent in amount, or nearly so, to those paid by the Amirs of Kabul in former times to the headmen, as a sort of retaining fee for their allegiance, independent of their success in keeping open the Pass and protecting traffic, and that the further payment of tribal subsidies should depend on these last-named considerations. The Lieutenant-Governor is not prepared to accept this arrangement. His Honour is not aware of any advantage to be gained by payments to the Afridis, except the security of the Pass road, and unless this is effected, there appears to be no excuse for making such payments. The headmen who would receive their allowances, independently of the consideration whether they kept the Pass open, would no doubt maintain professions of friendship, while their tribesmen might be committing raids and making the road impassable.

5. On the subject, therefore, of the future subsidizing of the Khyber Afridis, I am to request that you will be guided by the above remarks, and by the line of policy laid down in my No. 412 S., dated 6th September last.

Enclosure 4 in No. 8.

No. 5030 P., dated 9th November 1880.

From Lieut.-Col. W. G. WATERFIELD, C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawar Division, to SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, Punjab.

IN continuation of my No. 76 C.P., dated 14th September 1880, to your address, I have the honour to report as follows upon the preliminary negotiations with the maliks and representatives of the Khyber Afridis in regard to the proposals for arrangements to keep the Pass open in independent charge of the tribes upon the withdrawal of British troops.

2. My telegram of the 18th September has acquainted you with the arrival at Peshawar on that date of 180 maliks and greybeards of the Khyber Afridis and Loargi Shinwaris. Subsequently their number was swelled to 314, by later arrivals from the more distant parts of Bara and Maidan. The summons to fetch them had been somewhat hurried, and not much time could be given to the Afridis, who are at present many miles distant in Tirah and busy with the autumn harvest, for the collecting of a large number of influential men. But for the purpose of being informed of the proposals of Government the tribes were adequately represented.

3. Shortly after arrival I met the maliks and representatives of the tribes, and after a few introductory remarks, informed them that they had been summoned to hear certain wishes of Government, which I then proceeded to explain. They were told that

their relations with the British Government, to the exclusion of all other influence or interference, would be continued, and their independence would, as heretofore, be recognised; that although British troops would, for the present, remain at their stations in the Pass, they might, and in all probability would, be soon withdrawn, independently of, and not in connexion with, any reply that they might now make to Government, and without any reference to their present or future attitude; that the action of Government in this matter was perfectly free and dependent upon weightier issues and broader considerations than the comparatively unimportant matters connected with the Khyber Pass; that should British troops be withdrawn, the Government intended to maintain in force, subject to such modification as might be required, the existing arrangements with the Afridis for holding the independent charge of the Khyber Pass and keeping it open and free of interference; and that, in consideration of proper performance of these duties, the Government was prepared to settle with the tribes compensation allowances for tolls reasonably chargeable on trade passing through the Khyber.

The proposals were stated to them at some length, and they were invited to discuss them and ask for explanation, where required, from me and the Political Officer in charge of the Khyber, and to meet me again a few days afterwards when they had thoroughly considered the new arrangements.

4. Before the meeting broke up, two or three of the leading maliks, especially Abdulla Nur Khan, Kuki Khel, spoke at some length touching upon the points I had mentioned. All stipulated that they should be permitted to return to their homes in order fully to discuss everything with their tribes. They had come more or less ignorant of the intentions of Government, and could not return a reply, binding upon the tribes or concurred in by all, without consultation with the main body; that, in fact, they were not prepared to give a definite answer on the spot. This request to be permitted to consult with their tribesmen present and absent being reasonable and proper, was conceded to. The speakers then proceeded to point out that it was impossible for the Afridis to keep open the Pass themselves, that therefore they could not undertake independent charge of the Khyber; in fact, that the proposals regarding Pass arrangements subsequent upon the withdrawal of troops were impracticable, and would not be accepted by them; that they could not, by reason of internal feuds and want of concord and the evil habits of Afridis as a nation, keep the Pass open for traffic themselves, and would not engage to do so; that failure in carrying out their engagements would cover them with shame and give rise to imputations of bad faith. Finally, they said if the Afridis were able to keep open the Pass themselves they would have done so long ago for the sake of the profits arising from transit dues, but that they had not been able to do this.

In reply, I told them to confer together and with me and the Khyber Political Officer in charge of the Khyber, and meet me a few days hence.

5. On the 26th September I again met the jirgas. In reply to my remarks that they had had full opportunity for clearing up doubtful points, they said that they continued to believe that it was impossible for them to hold the Pass, unless indeed with the assistance of Government. Questioning showed that by "assistance" they meant the forcible coercion by British troops of any recalcitrant tribe, interfering with tribal Pass arrangements, and punishment, by expeditions, of marauders and raiders. This was somewhat more satisfactory, as they had modified, in the interim, their former absolute refusal to accept independent charge of the Pass. They clearly had entertained the plan of forming a combination for the control of the tribes, which was to receive the active and forcible support of Government. The objection of course to that would be, with the proverbial instability of Afghan and particularly Afridi coalitions and combinations, the aid of Government might and probably would be constantly invoked. This was, to say the least, an undesirable arrangement. In reply, I told them that Government should be informed of their difficulties, but that the whole matter lay in their hands. To this Abdulla Nur Khan pointedly replied that the Afridis could never preserve concord in independent charge of the Pass, and for himself he would not undertake engagements he could not fulfil. At their request a month was given to the jirgas, after expiration of which they are to return to Peshawar with the final reply of the tribes.

This month it was anticipated would be very useful in ascertaining the currents of political feeling among the Afridis prior to their definite decision.

6. In my letter No. 76 C.P. of the 14th September, and in my telegram No. 996 of the 11th September, I anticipated that the proposals of Government would present themselves to the tribes as involving questions of considerable difficulty (*vide* paragraph 3

of above letter). The difficulties are no doubt of serious magnitude; but I think it was not alone the awkward problem of tribal management that induced the maliks and tribal representatives to give their categorical refusal. Partly no doubt by standing out the Afridis hoped to raise the amount of the compensation allowance, in the belief that the keeping open of the Pass was a matter of much solicitude to Government; but I am of opinion this motive was opened out and disposed of by pointing out to them that other trade routes existed from Dakka to Peshawar. A further motive lies no doubt in the earnest wish of the maliks and others, who monthly benefit by our occupation, to prevent our abandonment of the Khyber, and by refusing to hold the Pass themselves, the maliks may hope to keep the troops there; but this consideration, I think, weighed less than the one I am about to state.

The Afridis no doubt received with satisfaction the announcement of the maintenance of the Government relations with them, to the exclusion of other influence. But if their subsidies were to depend upon their holding the Pass open, which they suppose to be a matter of no certain success, they probably felt that the time might sooner or later come when their Pass arrangements would break down temporarily or permanently; that this would involve the stoppage of the compensation allowance, and that they, cut off from Kabul, would, as a nation, not only have lost the subsidies which they received from Kabul, but also their allowances from the British Government. They would have fallen between two stools.

It was this consideration that led me to make the proposals in paragraph 3 of my letter No. 76 C.P. of the 14th September. In fact, the more ignorant men in the jirgas at first rather suspected that Government, seeking some good excuse for stopping the Khyber allowances and thus saving money, was endeavouring to induce the Afridis to accept proposals of considerable difficulty, and to entrap them into entering upon engagements that they would be unable to fulfil.

These proposals to separate the two questions of the maintenance of our future exclusive relation with the Afridis, and the continuance of the existing arrangements for the keeping open of the Pass, were made with two objects—first of all to assist the present negotiation, and secondly, in order to secure those future exclusive relations with the tribes in the event of failure of the Pass arrangements.

Irrespective of the manner in which the present negotiations may have been affected by the amalgamation of the above two questions, I take it that our future relations can be better secured by the measure which I proposed.

I have already entered fully into the reasons, but regarding the advantages to be gained by payments to the Afridis beyond the security of the Pass road, and the excuse we may have for making any such payments, I think that, having been detached from Kabul and losing permanently the allowances formerly granted by the Amir, they will expect to receive an equivalent from us, and if they should not succeed in their endeavours to keep open the Pass, or if it were temporarily closed by the party in opposition, they, in forfeiting the compensation for tolls, would lose everything that connected them with the Government, and we should retain little hold upon them except through their dealings generally with British territory and their fear of possible coercion.

The maliks and jirgas would not unnaturally turn again to Kabul, and whether successful or not in recovering any of their lost position, we could scarcely expect them to assist us in our further dealings with the Afridis on our border.

I therefore think that, whether or no satisfactory arrangements regarding the Pass are brought about, it may be a question whether Government should not at the time grant certain small personal allowances to the headmen distinct from Pass compensation for tolls, also having in view possible failure in obtaining such arrangements, it may not be wiser to grant their allowances now in consideration of past services, as there may arise difficulties in making any such concessions hereafter.

8. To return to the progress of the Khyber Pass question. In my telegram No. 1077, of the 26th ultimo, reporting that a month's grace was required by the representatives present to discuss the whole question with the tribes in Tirah, I asked if it would suit Government, in support of the Pass maliks, to hold, perhaps but temporarily, Jamrud and Ali Masjid, and the intervening posts with two native regiments, the present Jezailchi force being maintained and the tribal posts. In reply, I was asked by your telegram of the 7th October whether the maliks wish this, and whether I consider it desirable, and whether I propose to make the retention of these posts one of the conditions of our arrangements with the maliks, or merely suggest it as a measure which may be desirable in our own interests apart from the compact. I would reply by referring to paragraph 4 of this letter.

9. I will explain that before leaving Peshawar, the headmen at separate interviews and also together expressed themselves to me personally as hopeful of effecting the necessary arrangements with their tribesmen for the keeping open of the Pass; more especially Abdulla Nur, Kuki Khel, who is by far the most energetic of the maliks, and takes the most prominent part in all discussions, assured me that they would do their utmost to bring about a combination against the Khusrogi and other malcontent sections, and in their own interests endeavour to satisfy the Government.

It seems to me that the objections raised by him at first in the presence of the rest of the tribe may have been made with the object of increasing his own importance in their eyes, as one capable of making terms with Government and assisting Afridi interests.

The maliks, however, suggested that they would require the support of the Government Jezailchi force, perhaps somewhat increased. They do not draw any distinction between Jezailchis and native troops. All they wished to obtain was the co-operation of Government in some visible form.

10. It may not, however, be advisable to rely entirely upon the Jezailchis for the purpose, and I would prefer to propose that native troops be employed. In a separate letter, which I hope shortly to despatch, I shall consider whether it is desirable to hold the posts referred to by troops or by Jezailchis, or whether, once the tribes have taken independent charge of the Pass, it may not be advisable and expedient to throw the entire onus and responsibility of keeping the Pass open on to their shoulders, and to preserve Government from a jointly responsible position with reference to the Khyber.

11. I saw at the departure of the jirga that there were reasons for anticipating possible difficulties which have since occurred. Sayad Mir Bashir, the Tirah leader, appears to have taken advantage of the absence of the headmen at Peshawar, and to have recovered some of his old influence, and, tampering with the Malikdin Khel tribe, to have made a bid for some share in Pass allowances. He also appears to have endeavoured to gain over Saleh Muhammad, the Qambar Khel Malik; but the latter, though willing to join Mir Bashir in any attack upon the Shiah Orakzais, is said to have adhered to his agreements with us, and to have warned Mir Bashir that he was not to be expected to act against the Government.

In this letter I have confined myself to a mere narrative of the course of events in the negotiations with the tribes, without considering what measures may be proposed for the future in the interests of Government, which I trust to do in the separate but accompanying letter to your address.

The last news then from Tirah is that considerable difficulty has been experienced in uniting all the Khyber clans, especially the Malikdin Khel and greater part of the Zakka Khel, to return a joint reply to Government, and in consequence the arrival of the jirgas will be delayed till after the Id-uz-zuha on the 15th instant. In the meanwhile I propose on the 7th to have an interview with the Afridi Maliks at Jamrud, and there to personally ascertain the position of affairs and the proposals the maliks are prepared to bring forward.

Enclosure 5 in No. 8.

No. 5030½, dated 9th November 1880.

From Lieut.-Col. W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of PUNJAB.

In continuation of my No. 5030 P., dated 9th November 1880, to your address, I have the honour further to lay before Government those proposals in regard to the future arrangements connected with the Khyber Pass, which may be appropriately submitted for consideration, before the receipt of the reply about to be made by the Afridi clans to the views of Government, as expressed in paragraph 2 of letter No. 2980 E.P., of the 31st August 1880, from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to your address.

2. In my letter No. 5030 P. of 9th November 1880, I have informed you that, at the last interview with the tribal representatives, they desired that the tribal management of the Pass should be aided by active Government assistance in the forcible coercion by our troops of evil-doers or recalcitrant clans, and in the form of a body of Government Jezailchis distributed throughout the Pass, as the garrisons of posts and escorts to caravans and travellers. In connexion therewith, in my telegram, No. 1077, of the 26th ultimo, I inquired if it would suit Government to hold, perhaps but temporarily, Jamrud and Ali Masjid and the intervening posts with troops; for in fact the request of

the Afridis for Government assistance in the form of troops or Jezailchis resolved itself into a demand that the road from Jamrud to Ali Musjid should be held by Government. It seems to me, therefore, that three practicable courses are open to Government, which I proceed to state together and to discuss *seriatim* :—

- (1.) The first plan would be to hold the road from Jamrud to Ali Musjid by troops and from Ali Musjid to Lündikotal by Jezailchis, or to hold the whole road by Jezailchis; in short, to divide with the tribes the task of guarding the Pass, and to assist the tribal coalition which is to work the Pass arrangements.
- (2.) A second course would be to throw entirely upon the tribes the responsibility of protecting a Pass of which they are to take independent charge, and continue to hold only the fort of Jamrud with a suitable garrison.
- (3.) A third proposal is to abandon the Khyber altogether, retaining our hold on Jamrud, and to open out routes parallel to the Khyber for trade purposes, upon which difficulties with the tribes concerned do not exist.

3. Before considering the first course that I have suggested, I would note that the Government of India apparently contemplates a complete retirement of British troops from the Pass, but leaves optional the retention of Jezailchis. It is, however, immaterial whether, as I have mentioned, native troops hold as far as Ali Musjid, or whether Jezailchis alone garrison all the posts; the fact would remain that a corps in the pay and uniform of Government would join the tribesmen in the protection of the road, *i.e.*, Government would visibly and really share with the tribes the duty of carrying out their engagements. Now, for reasons that I shall give below, grave difficulties present themselves in the purely tribal management of the Pass by a united committee, as it were, of the six clans composing the Khyber Afridis, so that Government might at any moment find itself pledged to assist and prop up a coalition of sometimes doubtful strength. And with the proverbially fickle and unstable character of Afridis, the undesirable necessity may frequently arise of the Government servants in the Pass having to defend themselves against the attacks of malcontent sections and clans, or of Government having to take active measures towards the support of its friends or the punishment of offenders. In short, so long as a man in direct Government pay and uniform continues in the Pass, any infringement of the Pass arrangements or attacks on the road would, by Afridi public opinion, be construed to be, and in effect would be actually, an act of hostility towards Government, though perhaps only personal and not necessarily tribal. And I need scarcely remark that the withdrawal of a strong brigade from the Pass and the substitution of a comparatively small and poorly-armed Jezailchi force (which in times of general tribal excitement cannot be safely relied upon) will strengthen and encourage any opposition to our proposals which may exist among the Afridis, and loosen the bonds now imposed on their rapacious instincts.

An entire withdrawal of all direct Government interference beyond Jamrud would keep Government free from being mixed up in the tribal Pass arrangements, and from being drawn into possible complications, from which it would seem highly desirable that we should stand aloof, unless we are prepared to enforce our position by arms if necessary. I will not enter into details, such as the question of preserving the efficiency of a Jezailchi force scattered through the independent territory of the Khyber up to a point (Lundi Khana) 20 miles distant from our nearest post of Jamrud. Were Government to decide to hold the Pass with regular troops as far as Ali Musjid, the Khyber would undoubtedly remain open, not, however, necessarily owing to tribal management, but more to the force and influence of Government. Whether, with a view to the considerations stated below, a half measure of this nature is worth the trouble and expense thereby incurred, is a question for Government to determine.

4. This leads me to the second issue, *i.e.*, the question of leaving the undivided and independent charge of the Pass in the hands of the tribe, unassisted by Government; as an instance in point, I would mention the manner in which the Kohat Pass (between Peshawar and Kohat) is held by the Gall Khel. There can be no doubt that it would be most desirable in the interests of trade and civilisation if the Afridis were to agree to keep open the Khyber (either themselves levying tolls or receiving compensation therefor from Government), and I have strong hopes that the manifest advantages of doing so, and their self-interest, may induce them to form engagements for this purpose. It cannot be denied that changes, even in the short space of two years, have come over them, and that they are now more amenable to control and more civilised than they were. That this process of improvement would be much accelerated by dealings with us, is certain. Still the problem is one fraught with much difficulty and requiring great consideration. The only manner in which it can be managed is by a tribal combination. But to effect a coalition, even for a temporary object, of six clans, of different interests,

different politics, and different strength, numbering in the aggregate about 13,000 or 14,000 fighting-men of notoriously lawless and wild character, is of itself a work of some magnitude. Trouble has been experienced in collecting representatives from all the tribes to bring a joint reply to Peshawar in answer to the proposals of Government.

It would be sanguine to hope, if the tribes accept the proposed arrangements, that dissensions will not break out within a year requiring careful handling; and our experience on the frontier shows that a resolute tribal minority can do much to thwart the wishes and bind the acts of a majority, who, from the fear of incurring personal and lasting blood-feuds, hesitate to resort to force. It must also be remembered that any proposal in the supposed interest of Government is sure to meet with the bitter opposition of fanatics and bigots, of whom there are many, even among the irreligious Afridis. To illustrate the state of affairs, I would refer to the history of the past summer, when a semi-religious leader arose in Tirah and was checked only by a timely display of force from attacking the Khyber; and, although the Pass is now being held by five regiments, yet a great part of the Zakka Khel has continued up to this in an attitude of hostility. When the troops retire from the Khyber, the Zakka Khel will be less capable of control by us. In the future there is no certainty that any section or tribe may not, for selfish purposes, or from the sheer love of robbery, infest the Pass and upset the tribal coalition; moreover, the tribes most likely to do so are those dwelling furthest from our border and least under our hand. Or again, a general religious agitation may at any time arise. It cannot, therefore, be predicted that tribal management of the Pass will enjoy an unshaken and sure career. Tribal coercion can only go to a certain length, and with the withdrawal of British troops, the overawing element compelling upon all the preservation of order will disappear. During our occupation of the Pass, fear, and love of gain, have united to restrain and influence the Afridis; in the future, self-interest alone will remain. Were there some central power in the clans that could force fickle or discontented factions to subordinate their inclinations to the interests of the whole, the matter would be easy; but, as I have said above, in the absence of such a *vis major* (which during the campaign has been supplied by our troops), we cannot reckon upon intertribal coercion as always, or even generally, effective to control the minority. It may be replied that, should a section misbehave, we would stop its allowances, and, enforcing joint responsibility, proceed to deal in the same manner with those of the other Khyber clans closing the Pass, and thus bring pressure on all to reduce the hostile section. But there is still some fear that the clans may be unable to cope vigorously and at once with the malcontent party, or may hesitate to involve themselves in complicated feuds on behalf of the British Government; or some other motives may stifle the suggestions of self-interest in keeping the Pass open; in that case the stoppage of allowances would be bitterly resented by the friendly sections, who might complain that, for not having effected an organization that could scarcely with reason have been expected from them, they had lost their subsidies. To this it may be replied that the clans had agreed to joint responsibility (for that condition is a *sine qua non* to any independent tribal management of the Pass), and they will answer that, with the best intentions, they had found themselves unable to perform their promises. At the present moment, with a large force in the Pass, I must still call it doubtful whether a tribal coalition will bring the malcontent Zakka Khel to give hostages and pay a fine. On the other hand, certainly those who benefit by the Pass arrangements, and especially the maliks, would do their utmost, as they told me [*vide* paragraph of my No. 5030 P. of 9th November 1880], to keep open the Khyber; but it may judiciously be doubted whether their influence is able to meet every emergency without extraneous aid from Government. I must admit, then, that independent tribal management of the Pass is a problem of doubtful success; that at uncertain periods the Pass may become closed by the failure of the system; and that, if Government were to pledge itself to assist the tribes or join in their responsibility for the Pass, it might at any time find itself involved in some complications, and, perhaps, be called upon to act decisively by a resort to force. My endeavours, then, will be to initiate and introduce a system which will satisfy the Afridis, give sufficient strength to the Government party, and yet save Government from any direct responsibility.

5. If our efforts were being made solely for the purposes of protecting trade, the risk and uncertainty attaching to the Khyber might be considered too great, and not worth the advantages to be gained, and it might seem advisable to select some parallel line of road which, though presenting greater physical difficulties to transport than the Khyber, entirely turns the Afridi question and relieves Government of dealings with the Khyber tribes. Such a one exists in the road leading from the Shagai police station in the Peshawar district, by the Shilman Valley to Kam Dakka and thence to Dakka; in regard

to which I would refer to the separate correspondence showing the advantages of this route, based on the reports of Mr. Scott, of the Survey Department, Mr. Merk, assistant political officer, and the officers of the engineer department, who made the Inzari Pass road from Dakka to Lundikotal in the Khyber. By adopting and improving this route, Government would cease to have any dealing with the Afridis of the Khyber, and would have need only to maintain such exclusive relations with them as have been already declared shall be continued.

6. But it is not merely a question of the protection of trade. The Government clearly sees the advantages attaching to permanent and close relations with the Afridi nation who overhang the Peshawar and Kohat districts, hold the Khyber and Kohat Passes, and give us the most dashing recruits for our best native regiments, and in war the most reliable among our native officers; and Government has most wisely determined to maintain a political hold upon them to the exclusion of all other influence or interference.

The Afridis themselves, knowing that we no longer require the Pass for our army communications, are perfectly well aware that our desire to retain it is as much to enhance our military repute and political influence as in the interests of trade. They openly speak of this, and say, "You want to do what has never been done yet, that which Dost Muhammad and Amir Sher Ali could not do, and it is your *namus* (renown) you think of, and for this you must pay." They know we shall not interfere with their independence, and that we do not look to the income from transit dues. The Government party in the Khyber does not resent this. It has received nothing but increased honour and consideration at our hands, and much wealth. Upon them the more distant Afridis, who do not enjoy the profits, look with jealousy and aversion, and they are taunted with entering the "service of the unbeliever."

Were Government from fear of future responsibilities to withdraw its support from the Khyber maliks and not to force them into the mutual organization they have so much difficulty in agreeing to, it would perhaps have to regret a breach in the relations we desire to maintain which it might be difficult to repair. The Afridis, however much they might be compelled to admit that they had failed in fulfilling their part in the contract, would, I believe, feel resentful of our throwing over the Pass arrangements, opening any other route, and withdrawing, as a matter of course, their compensation for tolls.

This, it is said by competent native judges, would lead at once to raids upon our border, and, perhaps, military expeditions to coerce. Recruiting would be interfered with, desertions would follow, and anxieties and discontentment would prevail among the Afridis in our regiments.

It is generally supposed that the gathering last summer around the fanatic leader in Tirah, Mir Bashir, would have assumed alarming proportions had it not been for the stronger counterinfluence of the Government party in the Khyber.

And even if we were able to efficiently protect our border and did threaten or use expeditions to coerce, not only should we be losing day by day the most beneficial effects upon the national character, and generally civilising results, of their constant intercommunications with ourselves, but we should certainly find the Afridis gravitating towards Kabul and bringing a strain upon our relations with the Amir himself.

Certainly, if personal tribal subsidies were separated from the compensation for tolls, as I have recommended on previous occasions, Government might still maintain exclusive relations with a certain party in the tribe, who have hitherto done us most excellent service; but our influence would be weak compared with that which we retain when we support them in holding their Pass open to trade, and manage for them the large income realisable as transit dues and paid as compensation in lieu; and our well-wishers would be bitterly disappointed.

We must also recollect two other important points. In retaining 500 of the young blood of the tribe in a tribal if not Government Jezailchi corps for the protection of tribal interests, we are withdrawing these men from lawless livelihood and robbery, and are not losing the opportunity of disciplining many of the rising generation.

Further, had we hereafter at any time to re-occupy the Pass, though doubtless we could not be prevented from doing so, still there are obvious advantages in being able to advance to Lundikotal without having to obtain again the permission and consent of tribes.

Thus my conclusions are that, although trade might filter down by other channels than the broad Khyber road, which it does not absolutely require, and though we might, from fear of possible responsibilities and owing to difficulties raised by the Afridis themselves, withdraw without any breach of faith from negotiations for the keeping open of the Pass, we should be unwise to do so, and short-sighted in our policy.

The difficulty is to prevail upon the Afridis to accept the entire responsibility, or rather to reduce that of Government to a minimum, and yet retain our hold upon the tribes and strong and permanent relations with them.

As I have before said, to effect this every effort will be made.

Enclosure 6 in No. 8.

No. 2140, dated Lahore, 13th December 1880.

FROM W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to Government of Punjab, to COMMISSIONER
and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

I AM desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letters, reporting on the progress of negotiations with the Khyber Pass Afridis for the maintenance of exclusive relations with the British Government, and for the protection of the Pass hereafter.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor fully appreciates the extreme difficulty of the subject on which you have given your opinion and advice in these letters, and shares with you the anxiety which your letters evince to place our relations with the Afridi tribes upon some permanent and satisfactory basis. If on some points his Honour has framed conclusions different from your own, he is not unaware that the success of the measures which he advocates must still be regarded as doubtful, and the preference which he has for these measures is due merely to the belief that they are more likely in the end to avoid complications and secure the object which you, in common with his Honour, desire to bring about.

3. The courses which you consider open to Government to follow, in order to effect the solution of this important question, are as follows:—

1st.—To hold the road from Jamrud to Ali Musjid by troops, and from Ali Musjid to Lundikotal by Jezailchis, or to hold the whole road by Jezailchis; in short, to divide with the tribes the task of guarding the Pass, and to assist the tribal coalition which is to work the Pass arrangements.

2nd.—To throw entirely upon the tribes the responsibility of protecting the Pass, of which they are to take independent charge, and to continue to hold only the fort of Jamrud with a suitable garrison.

3rd.—To abandon the Khyber altogether, retaining our hold on Jamrud, and to open out routes parallel to the Khyber for trade purposes, on which difficulties with the tribes concerned do not exist.

4. With reference to the question of retaining troops in the Khyber Pass, the Lieutenant-Governor would remark that what is required is the safety of the road through the Pass for our own purposes and for trade. The Government has no desire to occupy the lands of the Afridis, nor the road, for any other object. If, in order to secure the safety of traders in the Pass, it is necessary to occupy positions with troops, it would hardly be worth while to secure this end at so great a cost. In such a case, it would probably be more advisable to abandon the Khyber route altogether and resort to other and safer routes. The issue as to the best mode of securing safety in the Khyber Pass is therefore narrowed to the question how a protective force, not composed of British troops, can best be organized and maintained. The Jezailchi force, as at present constituted, is admirably suited for the purpose of such protection; and it is extremely desirable, if this force is to be maintained, that the present arrangements for its organization and disposition should be utilized, and the advantages likely to accrue from the continuousness of these arrangements fully secured. There would, of course, be no objection to our helping the Afridis to organize their own system of protection if they should determine to initiate an entirely new organization for the defence of the Pass; but the experience which has been afforded to them of the efficiency and good work done by the Jezailchi corps will probably lead them to desire no change of system, but rather to continue a method which has been adopted with so much success.

5. The Lieutenant-Governor therefore thinks it most important that some trial should be made of holding the Pass with Jezailchis. His Honour thinks that this should be done in a way which may be easily altered if necessary, and in the way which is least likely to embarrass our relations with the tribes. Sir Robert Egerton thinks that these objects may be secured by retaining the present Jezailchi force on a somewhat different footing. These levies would no longer be considered as Government servants, or representatives of Government authority, but rather as a superior kind of tribal badragga, such as used always to be furnished by the tribes on payment for the safe conduct of traders going through the

Pass. It will no doubt be necessary that the Political Officer should see that the men are paid; but this will not make them Government servants. The money given to the Jezailchis as wages would form part of what would otherwise be paid to the tribes as compensation for the tolls the levy of which they forego, and as an equivalent for the protection of the road which it is the object of Government to secure. It is only reasonable that the Government should distribute this amount in such a manner as to ensure the proper performance of escort duty by the tribes.

6. The Lieutenant-Governor has a few remarks to add regarding the details of the arrangements which in his opinion would facilitate the maintenance of the Jezailchi force conjointly by the tribes and the British Government. It has generally been assumed in the correspondence on the subject that a *sine quâ non* of Government interference in Pass arrangements is the maintenance of perfect security and immunity from attack at all portions of the road and at all times of the day. But the Lieutenant-Governor does not regard this as in any way imperatively necessary. The tribes may be informed that the traffic may be regulated in any way which may be convenient to themselves. Convoys may be collected and despatched once a day, or more or less often, under escort in such a manner as to minimize the trouble of guarding them, and the responsibility of the tribes will extend to the safety of such traffic as shall be so escorted. Cases might arise in which the tribes would still be held responsible, notwithstanding violation of the rules for traffic, but, generally speaking, the safety of convoys despatched under escort in accordance with arrangements definitely made and agreed upon would be all that need be demanded from the tribes who engage for the security of traffic.

If the Jezailchi guard is recruited solely from the tribal population, there will be less risk of escorts being attacked, for the reason given in paragraph 4 of your second letter, namely, the dread of incurring blood-feuds; while for offences committed by the escort the remedy will be to proceed against the tribal allowances.

7. For the above reasons, the Lieutenant-Governor would maintain the Jezailchi Corps on the terms and in the manner now described. If this Corps does not answer, it will still be possible to fall back upon the second plan which is proposed in your letter, and to leave the escort arrangements to be carried out solely by the tribes themselves. It will be easier to revert from the maintenance of the Jezailchi force to mere tribal escorts than, after abolishing the former and after the failure of the latter, to reorganize the Jezailchi Corps.

8. The opinion of Sir Robert Egerton upon the proposal to grant personal allowances to the maliks, independent of the consideration whether the Khyber Pass is kept open for traffic or no, has been already conveyed to you in a recent communication. His Honour does not think it would be prudent to grant such allowances unconditionally. It is doubtless advisable to keep men of influence in our interests, but, inasmuch as their influence is the consideration which Government requires in return for such payments, it must be exercised in the manner most useful to the British Government, namely, in the protection of the road through the Pass; and Sir Robert Egerton would not be willing to grant any allowances independently of the question whether the Pass were safe for traffic or not. The total amount of the allowances to be granted must depend upon the completeness of the arrangements which the maliks find it possible to make for the protection of the Pass during ordinary times for purposes of trade. The Lieutenant-Governor does not think that Government should be advised to subsidise the Afridis, or to pay personal or other allowances to any of their maliks, for abstaining from attacks upon British territory. It has not been the custom of the British Government to pay for such exemption, and his Honour would be sorry to see such a system inaugurated. Whatever sum may be fixed for the tribal allowances, over and above the amount payable to the Jezailchis, would be a payment in part for the same object as that effected by the maintenance of the Jezailchi Corps, *viz.*, the safety of the road and the protection of travellers. The payment of both of these items should be no doubt affected by the general conduct of the tribes, not only in the Khyber Pass, but also on the border, and within British territory; but neither of them should be fixed with any reference to immunity from attack, or from the commission of offences, as though the Afridis possessed an inherent right of raiding upon British territory or committing offences therein. Not long ago, while the Khyber was perfectly quiet, a gross outrage was committed by some of the Khyber tribes in British territory. The daughter of a Police officer was kidnapped, and was not recovered until a ransom had been paid. The Lieutenant-Governor has not received any report of the measures adopted in this case, which is only quoted as an example of what may be expected to occur in future if some condition is not attached to the Khyber allowances which will secure good behaviour, not only in the Pass itself, but

also on the border generally. This subject therefore should not be lost sight of in the present negotiations.

9. In regard to the third alternative mentioned in your letters, you have previously acquainted the Government with your views, and the Lieutenant-Governor, acting upon your suggestions, has recommended that, as a measure of precaution, the alternative route from Lundikotal to Dakka, through the Shilman country, should be put into repair, for use in the event of the Khyber route becoming unsafe. But no definite proposals have yet been received for the adoption of a route which will entirely avoid the Afridi country. Should it be necessary to resort to an alternative route which does not lie through territory held by the Afridis, the Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that they should no longer continue to reap the advantages which are contemplated in the event of their affording a safe road for traffic, and that their subsidy should be altogether withdrawn.

10. In conclusion, the Lieutenant-Governor considers that any agreement which may be made with the Afridi tribes should reserve to the British Government the power of occupying the Pass with troops, should the British authorities desire so to do, and should the protection of trade through Afridi agency be found to be impracticable.

Enclosure 7 in No. 8.

No. 5,767 P., dated 24th December 1880. (Extract.)

From Lieut.-Col. W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

In continuation of my No. 5030 $\frac{1}{2}$, dated 9th November, reporting the progress of negotiations with the Khyber Pass Afridis, and with reference to your No. 2,140 of the 13th December in reply, conveying the views of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor upon the above reports and his directions for the continuance of the negotiations:

2. I have the honour to state that I had to a very great extent anticipated the instructions of his Honour, and to my proposals I had asked sanction in telegrams in which I endeavoured to give the substance of the arrangements to which I found the headmen of the Khyber tribes were finally prepared to agree, and which also approved themselves to me as likely to be in accordance with the views and objects of Government, and I asked sanction to place them before the deputations of the tribes assembled in Peshawur and numbering about 700 men.

I will first explain at some length the arrangements abstracted in the above mentioned telegrams, and I will then consider the subsequent instructions of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.

3. The proposals embodied in the following paragraph were the result of discussions and consultations extending over some months, and to which I found the headmen were finally prepared to consent. The suggestions are partly ours and partly theirs. They were put before the headmen in the form of questions, and their answers and remarks were separately recorded, so that there might be no room for doubt as to their knowing what had been proposed and as to our being assured of what they understood and accepted.

It was supposed that these proposals would hereafter find their place in an agreement* duly drawn up, and would receive the seals and signatures of the headmen and, perhaps, also of the elders of the tribes. It was perfectly well understood that these proposals emanating from ourselves locally would be subject to modifications and alterations by the Government, but it was believed that little change would be found necessary.

4. The headmen expressed themselves as understanding the proposals to be much as follows:—

(1.) Relations will be maintained by Government with the tribes to the exclusion of all other influence or interference, while, at the same time, their independence is to be fully recognized.

(2.) In consideration of their receiving certain allowances, the amount and distribution of which will be fixed hereafter, the tribes undertake the responsibility of preserving order, and affording security on the road.

(3.) All matters affecting the Pass arrangements, and especially the security of the road, are to be submitted to a combined jirgah of all the Afridi tribes. This council will arrange for the safety of the lives and property of all travellers, who use the Khyber

* For agreement finally signed see page 74.

road, without distinction; local traffic, by which is meant the traffic of the Afridis, Shinwaris, and other tribes living in or near the Pass, being entitled to protection, no intertribal or personal feuds will be allowed to be pursued near the road.

(4.) No goods or travellers are to be permitted to enter the Pass from either direction without an order authorizing them to proceed which will be furnished to them with a sufficient guard of men. Should it be considered by the tribal jirgah or council at any time that owing to the existence or likelihood of a disturbance on or near the road, it would be hazardous to allow a passage to either goods or men, they are responsible for closing the road, notice to that effect being given to the Khan of Lalpura and to the Political Officer, Jamrud, while careful provision must be made for the safety of any passengers or traffic that are already inside the Pass.

(5.) The arrangements which the tribes are to make for the maintenance of security on the road will be wholly independent of any material aid in the way of Government troops, and Government is at liberty to retain its troops within the Pass, or to withdraw them and to re-occupy at pleasure.

(6.) The tribes urge that Government must maintain a certain number of Jezailchis, who will assist the tribal badraggas or escorts to preserve the road from attack. It has been considered that these Jezailchis must at present number about 531 men, including the mounted levies for escort, &c., the tribes being responsible for providing the men. This corps will have its head-quarters at Jamrud, and will be under the supervision of the Political Officer, whose approval of all arrangements for the distribution of their duties will be necessary. It is understood that these Jezailchis are not a Government force, but are maintained, although at Government expense, yet merely for the better enabling of the tribes to keep their engagements. When it is desired to employ them on any other duty than that of protecting the road, the permission of the political officer must be obtained.

(7.) The tribes will agree that so long as they are paid the Khyber allowances, the right of collecting tolls rests with the British Government, inasmuch as the receipt of a subsidy or allowances excludes all claim to any other payments.

(8.) All offences on the road will be dealt with by the united tribal jirgahs, whether committed by an individual or by a section of a tribe. Punishment will be inflicted according to the tribal customs, and compensation will be awarded to the injured party. The measures taken are to be reported to the Political Officer, Jamrud, through whom any money, which he and the jirgah have adjudged as compensation, will be paid. Such sums are liable to be deducted by him from the allowances made to the tribes.

(9.) The tribes will continue to bind themselves as hitherto not to commit dakoiti, highway robbery, or murder in British territory, will agree to restore stolen property and pay compensation for such offences, their allowances being liable to forfeiture on their account.

(10.) Subject to the foregoing conditions, all details of management by which the tribes will insure the fulfilment of the responsibility which they have undertaken, are left to the discretion of the tribes who will have to secure the approval of the Political Officer. The tribes will be informed that the traffic may be regulated in any way which may be convenient to themselves and the public. Convoys may be collected and despatched so as to minimise the trouble of guarding them, the responsibility of the tribes extending to the safety of all trade and travellers within the Pass.

(11.) With regard to the standing posts or chowkis hitherto kept up along the road by the tribes, and paid for from the allowances, these will be maintained; the tribal watchmen occupying them being still required either to guard certain localities or to form part of the escort of the periodical convoys.

(12.) Regarding the Government buildings in the Khyber the tribes will agree to take charge of some on behalf of Government, the remainder being dismantled.

With reference to Ali Musjid, the gate, as it were, or keep of the Pass; on the supposition that Government will be prepared to make a special allowance of 100 Jezailchis for the purpose of protecting and holding this fort, the tribes on their part agree to undertake this duty.

(13.) The tribes will also guarantee the safety of the Political Officers or any other official who may be required from time to time to visit the Khyber Pass; notice always being given previously of such proposed visit to the tribal jirgah who will have to make special arrangements for escort, &c.

(14.) They have been informed that the territory to which their responsibilities extend may be fixed from time to time by Government. For the present the boundary fixed by the Treaty of Gundamak, or a little west of Lundikhana, will be considered the limit.

(15.) Arrangements will be made by the tribal jirgah by which any expresses or posts will be conveyed through at all times night or day.

(16.) The tribes may be considered ready to take charge of the Khyber Pass in the manner above indicated from Lundikhana to Ali Musjid, and again from Ali Musjid to Jamrud, at once, or so soon as Government directs the withdrawal of its troops from the whole of this road or any part of it, meanwhile, until such withdrawal has been effected and any new arrangements have been introduced, the tribes will agree to preserve intact their present obligations regarding the Pass and their relations with Government.

5. Turning to the views and instructions of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, as contained in your letter, No. 2140, of the 13th December, it will be seen that it is proposed by me to retain the Jezailchi corps as at present existing, organised by the Political Officer, and paid through him, but recruited by, and, to some extent, under the control and management of the Khyber jirgahs.

The great advantage of this is that the Jezailchi force being representative of the various tribes responsible for the Khyber stands as the sign and perpetual reminder of their unity, combination, and mutual responsibility for maintaining the safety to all of the Khyber route. The corps will be placed on a different footing, and will be utilised in conjunction with the tribal watchmen as a special guard to convoys. This is understood to be what his Honour desires. The corps will further be almost entirely recruited from the tribes, a sufficient leaven of outsiders being perhaps maintained to make the organisation somewhat more reliable.

6. It had also been decided previous to the receipt of his Honour's suggestions that the convoys and caravans should be periodical; the details of their working can be laid down hereafter, but it seems at present advisable that general convoys proceeding westwards should only leave Jamrud about twice a week, halting one day in the Loargai Valley, and the next at or beyond Dakka. Return convoys eastwards in the same manner leaving the Loargai Valley for Jamrud twice a week only on fixed days. This will leave two bye-days to provide for accidents or possible delays, and will leave the Sundays as days of entire rest. This will be arranged in communication with the Khan of Lalpura, and is liable to alteration as found most convenient to the tribes and the public.

7. It will be always possible by not filling up the vacancies to reduce the numbers of the Jezailchi corps, when the system is in full working order, and if the force is found to be unnecessarily strong at first, a reduction can be made. The sudden withdrawal of all troops from the Khyber will give tribes and Jezailchis ample duties and responsibilities.

8. Regarding the personal allowances to the maliks and the separation of such allowances from the actual compensation for tolls, if the Government see objections to it, I admit that difficulties will not perhaps arise until the Pass arrangements fail, and this I do not anticipate. If the Pass should by any chance have to be closed, and the headmen are not held to be absolutely and personally responsible for their failure, there will not, perhaps, be any great difficulty in maintaining to them the personal allowances which they already enjoy in specified sums from the total amount now granted as the so-called compensation for tolls.

Government might still through such allowances be able to keep up their party among the Afridi tribes and retain sufficient influence to prevent the entire rupture of our political relations with the Afridis, although the Pass may be closed.

But it was never proposed by me that such personal allowances should be granted unconditionally, or in order to secure for British territory immunity from attack by the Afridis. In my opinion if our Pass arrangements were to fail, and the allowances were consequently forfeited, the tribes would at once become out of hand and would raid on British territory. The personal allowances might not save us entirely from this, but they would keep together in our interest the leading men and their immediate following and party, and facilitate the management of the Afridis generally, and the settlement of difficulties without recourse to coercion by the employment of military expeditions.

9. I have carefully considered whether it would be possible to make any reduction in the allowances to meet the charge for Jezailchis, and I am convinced that it is not so. The allowances are subdivided roughly under these heads: 1st, the personal allowances to the headmen for management for their services and expenditure on their followers; 2nd, the payments to the tribal watchmen and guards, representing each tribe within its local limits who protect the road and will have to assist in the guarding of caravans; 3rd, the balance that is distributed, at the discretion of the managing headmen, among the influential elders of the tribe who are neither headmen nor watchmen. These last-mentioned sums are all that fall to the majority of the tribesmen as compensation for their share in the profits from tolls and transit dues, not to say as their indemnity for abstention from plunder. There is no margin from which Jezailchis could be maintained. The share which any receive is exceedingly small and would not be reduced. And even if this deduction from the allowances hitherto received by them were forced upon the

tribes and they accepted the charge, I could not myself report that such an arrangement had my confidence, and that I considered it safe or satisfactory. The increased trade will offer too great temptations to Afridis holding the Pass without the restraining influence of British troops, and the tribes would begin to feel that the reduced allowances were no equivalent for the tolls and dues resigned. I do not believe that any arrangement which does not give the tribes their present allowances and also the Jezailchi force in support of their new tribal organisation could stand for a month. Nor do I allow that the Jezailchis so paid will have other than hard and harassing duties; but I believe that difficulties will be found in supplying the ranks.

10. I also assert that it would be far from wise to drive a hard bargain with the Afridis, and that it must still be our last recourse to throw them over and open up other routes to Afghanistan. The Afridis do not profess to enjoy any inherent right to raid or commit offences in British territory, but it is only the influence of their leading men that will prevent their offending, and these headmen require to be firmly attached to Government. They have no great fear of expeditions and retribution.

It has been a special condition attached to the Khyber allowances since my agreement with them in October 1879 that the tribes shall not commit murder, dacoitis, or robberies in British territory, and these conditions have been, in my opinion, so well observed as to give great promise for the future. The particular outrage alluded to by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, the kidnapping of the daughter of a police officer, was committed by the Khusrogi section of the Zaka Khel; to coerce this section the Khyber tribes are now proceeding from Peshawur, but rupees 3,920 out of the allowances have been held back pending the settlement of this case with the tribe. It has not been forgotten, and the conditions regarding good behaviour upon the border generally again find their place in the proposed as in the former agreements.

11. With regard to what is spoken of as the third alternative, the using of other routes than the Khyber. Definite proposals for preparing the Shilman route for adoption were submitted to Government with my No. 5025 of the 9th November. I recommended the rough survey of this route with a view to the expenditure upon it of a small sum of money which would render it passable for laden camels. It has been reported upon both by Mr. Scott of the Survey and Mr. Merk, late Assistant Political Officer, and their reports are before Government.

12. The final direction of his Honour had been also anticipated, and the Afridis expressed themselves as prepared for the re-occupation of the Pass at any time by troops should they be temporarily withdrawn.

13. I now proceed to the expenditure. I propose that the allowances already sanctioned by the Government of India in 1879 should be continued unaltered. I see no grounds for reduction. It is of great importance to introduce as little change as possible, as the tribes are ready at any moment to bring forward antiquated claims to a re-distribution, and this would at once lead to difficulties. They amount monthly to Rupees 7,155, and yearly to - - - - - Rupees 85,860 with special sums liable to fall in at the death of the grantees of - - - - - „ 1,680

87,540

14. I also propose that the sum expended hitherto upon Jezailchis and mounted levies should be continued. This was sanctioned in the same correspondence as follows:—

Per mensem - - - - - Rupees 6,009
or per annum about - - - - - „ 72,100

I am proposing some slight alteration in the organisation, viz., a reduction in the mounted levies and a slight increase among the footmen in order to allow 400 Jezailchis for the road and 100 for the garrison of Ali Musjid. But by substituting a Native Commandant on Rupees 500 a month for the British officer, Captain Gaisford, now in command, the proposed expenditure remains almost exactly the same, or about Rupees 7,267 a month, or Rupees 87,392 a year.

I have already given in this correspondence my reasons why it would not answer to reduce their expenditure. It costs less than one Native regiment, and besides having to escort caravans and convoys through the Pass; it is supposed that if the buildings at Ali Musjid can be saved by a company of 100 men, it will be but a small expenditure compared with the results. This plan will prevent the quarrels of the Khyber tribes over their asserted individual rights in the place itself. It will hold directly for Government the place of most historical importance in the Khyber, and I hope it will save the buildings. I could not advocate their demolition. The effect would be unsettling upon the tribes. For the escorts I do not consider that less than 400 men will suffice, and a

few mounted levies must be retained for escorts and expresses, and to convey information quickly from post to post. The pay of the mounted levies will probably have to be raised from Rupees 18 to Rupees 25 a month, as no rations will be available.

I fully anticipated that their numbers and expenditure may be hereafter somewhat reduced when the present arrangements are in full working order, but not now. For the Native Commandant I desire to employ Ressaldar-Major Mahomed Aslam Khan, at present Native Assistant Political Officer at Lundikotal, on the pay of Rupees 500 a month, consolidated.

Regarding the political expenditure. It is proposed that the present Political Officer Major Conolly, and the Native Assistant Political Officer, Mahomed Akbar Khan, on Rupees 400 or 500 a month, should stand fast at Jamrud, together with their office establishment. The expenditure on the above account will be about Rupees 2,500 per mensem, or Rupees 30,000 per annum, as the staff will have to be somewhat strengthened. This expenditure again is liable to reduction at any time, but at the outset the above will be required. There will be much to organise, and to weaken the hands of the Political Officer will be to court failure.

16. Regarding the buildings in the Pass I propose, after the Government sanction has been received, to consult the Brigadier-General and the Engineer Department regarding the demolition of any which it may be thought inadvisable to retain in the hands of the tribes, or the wood-work of which it may be worth while to remove.

I may mention here that I doubt if it will be wise to stipulate in any way for the protection of cemeteries or graves. If it were desired to do so, a special charge would be required of about Rupees 10 a month at Lundikotal, which might save the gates of the enclosure and the headstones, but it is doubtful. The tribes will not, I believe, guarantee their safety from damage by individuals.

17. Regarding transit dues, I believe these should be taken a few months hence at Jamrud, but I leave this for future settlement, and will submit proposals. I do not desire to take their tolls at present for the following reason: I cannot be certain of the security of caravans, and I intend to avoid the responsibility that would attach to Government if I were to take these tolls. On the withdrawal of troops all trade and travellers will be referred by the Political Officer to the Khyber maliks for information as to the safety of the road, and I intend that these maliks should satisfy the public. When the system has worked safely for a few months we can take the tolls and accept the responsibility.

18. As I am finishing this report I have received your telegram No. 26 C. of the 23rd instant. With reference thereto, and a suggestion that a sum of Rupees 1,25,000 per annum might suffice for the Khyber expenditure, including Jezailchis and allowances, I feel unable to say that I believe such a sum will suffice at starting for such arrangements as either I or the Government could consider worthy of confidence. The sum of Rupees 1,25,000 said to have been paid as a subsidy forty years ago, during the first Afghan war, is specially called "traditional," but the details have never been discovered. It is supposed by some to represent in Kabul coinage the equivalent of the allowance in British rupees. There are no good grounds for supposing that this sum included the payment of any Jezailchis; and I suggest that it can help little to the settlement of the present expenditure. At that time Colonel Mackeson and his establishment were engaged in the management of the Khyber, and to it their pay, as now, would be justly debitable. Also I suggest that when that sum was being paid to the Afridis a European officer and troops occupied Ali Musjid and Dakka or Peshbolak, also Jezailchis held Loargai.

I doubt if any comparison between the two periods and circumstances can be a safe guide in determining the present expenditure.

It seems to me very important that failure and the consequent complications should be avoided; and on this account I suggest that the new management should be so started as to satisfy the tribes and the Government that there is every chance of success. If it succeeds, reductions can follow, and meanwhile the income from tolls or transit dues can be tested. It is supposed that these will cover most of the expenditure.

19. I solicit the acknowledgments of Government for the work of the Political Officer, Major Conolly, and his Assistants. They have been in direct communication with the tribes, and have brought matters to this point in the negotiations.

I enclose Major Conolly's estimates of present and future expenditure in the Khyber.

If Government accept my proposals, there is no local reason why the withdrawal of troops from the Pass should not at once begin.

Enclosure 8 in No. 8.

PROPOSITION FOR THE REVISION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POLITICAL OFFICER,
KHYBER, INCLUDING JEZAILCHI CORPS.

Office to which Pro- position refers.	Authority.	PRESENT SCALE.		PROPOSED SCALE.	PERMANENT.		Grounds of Propo- sition.	
		Detail.			Increase per Mensem.	Decrease per Mensem.		
Political Officer, Khyber, under orders of Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division. Punjab Government, No. 1143 C, of 29th October 1879, and No. 1183 of 31st July 1880, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.		1 Political Officer	Rs. A. P. 1,616 0 0	1 Political Officer	Rs. A. P. 1,616 0 0	Rs. A. P. —	Required to suit new proposed Khyber arrangements. To take effect as soon as proposed arrangements with tribes receive the sanction of Government.	
		1 Native Political Assistant	400 0 0	1 Native Political Assistant	500 0 0	100 0 0*		
		1 English Clerk	80 0 0	1 English Clerk	100 0 0	20 0 0†		
		1 Reader to Political Officer	40 0 0	1 Reader to Political Officer	80 0 0	40 0 0		
		1 Mohurrir	—	1 Mohurrir	40 0 0	40 0 0		
		6 Orderlies	—	6 Orderlies	14 0 0	14 0 0‡		
		1 Mohurrir for Native Political Assistant	30 0 0	1 Mohurrir for Native Political Assistant	30 0 0	—		
		2 Mohurrirs to keep Jezailchi Accounts	—	2 Mohurrirs to keep Jezailchi Account	70 0 0	70 0 0§		
		Total Rs.	2,166 0 0	Total Rs.	2,450 0 0	284 0 0		
		JEZAILCHI CORPS.		JEZAILCHI CORPS.				
		1 Commandant	924 0 0	1 Commandant	500 0 0	—	424 0 0	
		1 Second in Command	100 0 0	1 Second in Command	100 0 0	—		
		2 Subadars at Rs. 60 per each	120 0 0	3 Subadars at Rs. 60 each	180 0 0	60 0 0		
		1 Jemadar " 35 " "	35 0 0	2 Jemadars " 35 " "	70 0 0	35 0 0		
		1 " 30 " "	30 0 0	1 Jemadar " 30 " "	30 0 0	—		
		2 Subadars " 40 " "	80 0 0	2 Subadars " 40 " "	80 0 0	—		
		2 Jemadars " 20 " "	40 0 0	2 Jemadars " 20 " "	40 0 0	—		
		20 Havildars " 13 " "	260 0 0	22 Havildars " 13 " "	286 0 0	26 0 0		
		20 Naiks " 11 " "	220 0 0	22 Naiks " 11 " "	242 0 0	22 0 0		
		452 Jezailchis " 9 " "	4,068 0 0	552 Jezailchis " 9 " "	4,968 0 0	900 0 0		
		6 Duffadars " 25 " "	150 0 0	4 Duffadars " 30 " "	120 0 0**	—	39 0 0	
		2 Lance do. at Rs. 21 each	42 0 0	2 Lance " 21 " "	—	—		
		48 Sowars at Rs. 48 each	2,304 0 0	26 Sowars " 25 " "	650 0 0††	—		
		Total Rs.	6,933 0 0	Total Rs.	7,206 0 0	1,043 0 0		
		MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES.		MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES.				
		1 Tent pitcher	7 0 0	1 Tent pitcher	7 0 0	—		—
		1 Sweeper	6 0 0	1 Sweeper	6 0 0	—		
		Stationery	30 0 0	Stationery	30 0 0	—		
		Office contingencies Jezailchi Corps	25 0 0	Office contingencies Jezailchi Corps	25 0 0	—		
		Total Rs.	68 0 0	Total Rs.	68 0 0	—		—
SAVINGS.		SAVINGS.						
		English Political Assistant	1,150 0 0	English Political Assistant	—	1,150 0 0		
		Native Assistant to Political Assistant	100 0 0	Native Assistant to Political Assistant	—	100 0 0		
		1 Thanadar	100 0 0	1 Thanadar	—	100 0 0		
		1 English Clerk	60 0 0	1 English Clerk	—	60 0 0		
		Stationery	10 0 0	Stationery	—	10 0 0		
Total Rs.	1,420 0 0	Total Rs.	—	1,420 0 0				
PRÉCIS.		PRÉCIS.						
		1 Political Officer's Establishment	2,166 0 0	Political Officer's Establishment	2,450 0 0	284 0 0		
		2 Jezailchi Corps	6,933 0 0	Jezailchi Corps	7,206 0 0	1,043 0 0		
		3 Miscellaneous Establishment	68 0 0	Miscellaneous Establishment	68 0 0	—		
		4 Political Assistants' Establishments	1,420 0 0	4 Political Assistants' Establishment	—	1,420 0 0		
		Total Rs.	10,587 0 0	Total Rs.	9,784 0 0	1,327 0 0		
Total Rs.		Total Rs.		2,130 0 0				
Nett savings Rs. 2,130—1,327=803, or deduct Rs. 300 for contingencies, leaves a nett saving of Rs. 503.								

Enclosure 9 in No. 8.

No. 11 C., dated Camp, 4th January 1881.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 2140, dated 13th December, regarding the progress of negotiations with the Khyber tribal representatives, I am now desired to address you with reference to a letter, No. 5767 P., dated 24th December, from the Commissioner of Peshawur, on the same subject, a copy of which has been sent to you direct by Colonel Waterfield.

2. This communication contains the result of negotiations which have been recently held at Peshawur, in regard to the most prominent matters, the determination of which was required in your No. 2980, dated 31st August 1880. The elaboration of these arrangements, as far as some of the minor details are concerned, still remains to be accomplished, and these will be reported in due time.

3. Colonel Waterfield's letter describes fully the proposals which are made by him with a view to establishing, in the future, security to travellers and convoys in the Pass, and it is unnecessary to repeat at length the substance of them. They are based primarily upon the instructions of the Government of India contained in your letter above quoted; and secondarily upon the instructions of the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor from time to time in letters and in various telegrams, of which copies have been furnished to the Government of India.

4. The points upon which Sir Robert Egerton has certain remarks to offer will be briefly noticed. The groundwork of the Commissioner's proposals has his entire approbation and concurrence. Colonel Waterfield's reasons for fixing the future subsidy at Rupees 87,540 per annum are, in his Honour's opinion, sufficient. The Lieutenant-Governor has never contemplated the possibility of reducing to any considerable extent the amount of these subsidies which are paid in cash. The reduction of the amount payable to each of the tribes or to sections of tribes would, without doubt, furnish to the minds of ignorant and grasping tribesmen abundant ground for seeking to overthrow the whole arrangement or for resorting to plunder in preference to a reduced maintenance obtainable by honest means. The alteration of the total amount would, moreover, involve a redistribution which, however closely it followed the proportions previously obtaining, would be likely to result in disputes and intertribal feuds. The amount, further, is not more than may fairly be held to represent the value of the tolls which are surrendered by the Afridis in virtue of the present agreement. This portion of the proposals is, therefore, recommended for sanction by the Lieutenant-Governor.

5. Regarding the establishment required for working Pass arrangements, and which comprises, first, the Political Officer's establishment, and, second, the Jezailchi force, the Lieutenant-Governor does not feel able to support in the same way the proposals made by the Commissioner. The office establishment of the Political Officer is, in his Honour's opinion, on too extravagant a scale. The duties of the appointment will be diminished, rather than increased, under present arrangements. The increase to the pay of the English clerk and reader, as well as the new appointment of a writer on Rupees 40, seem to be unnecessary. For the two writers on Rupees 35 each, who are to keep the accounts of the Jezailchi force, the Lieutenant-Governor would substitute pay Havildars enlisted in the force. To this extent the Lieutenant-Governor would reduce the establishment of the Political Officer, and an amended statement is accordingly attached to this letter, showing the strength proposed to be entertained.

6. The rate of pay of the Jezailchis themselves, Rupees 9 per mensem each, seems to be high for men serving so near their homes. It is more than the pay of a sepoy in a Native regiment, and there would ordinarily be no difficulty, his Honour believes, in obtaining recruits for this service on a lower rate of pay. The duties of the corps will be lighter than before, and the number of convoys, which will probably not exceed two in a week, will not give them much work beyond the duties of watch and ward. At the same time, considering that the pay of the Jezailchis is in reality a part of the subsidy granted to the tribes, and that some difficulty has no doubt been experienced during the past two years in retaining the men at their posts, on the pay originally sanctioned, in

so much that rations have had to be distributed for the past year on payment of a portion of the cost, similar to that levied from Native troops, the Lieutenant-Governor will not object to this part of the proposals; but for the present recommends that the rate, Rupees 9 per mensem, should be accepted as the pay of a sepoy of the Jezailchi force.

7. Sir Robert Egerton is unable to see any sufficient reason for not at once levying tolls on convoys escorted through the Khyber. Inasmuch as the British Government is now undertaking the regulation of the Khyber traffic, upon it must devolve the responsibility of safety of convoys, however impossible it may be to guarantee them against all attack. The headmen of the Afridi tribes are responsible to the Government, in virtue of their agreements, for the safety of this traffic; but the public will look to the Government through whose instrumentality these agreements have been procured, and the responsibility must be accepted. It would be better, in his Honour's opinion, to show from the first that this is the case, by levying tolls, and not to shake the confidence of the public in the new arrangements by referring traders to the headmen of the tribes, as is proposed by the Commissioner.

8. The views of the Lieutenant-Governor on the subject of the grant of personal allowances to the headmen have been expressed on previous occasions. Sir Robert Egerton thinks that those which have been hitherto paid should be continued; they are small in amount, and are doubtless looked upon by their recipients as a privilege which naturally results from any engagement which may be made with the British Government. But the Lieutenant-Governor is not disposed to recommend the extension of this system of personal allowances any further. Whether in case of failure of present arrangements the headmen should be absolved from responsibility, and whether it may be expedient in such an event to retain their influence on our side by continuing a portion of the subsidy to them as a personal allowance, are questions which, in his Honour's opinion, may well be left to be decided when the Pass arrangements shall prove to be deficient. It is undesirable at the outset of the new arrangements to do anything which will lead the headmen to suppose that they are separate from the tribe, either in their interests or their responsibilities. Every measure should be taken to promote tribal unity and cohesion, as it is upon this that the success of the arrangements must chiefly depend. Some malcontents there will be in every tribe, who can be kept in order only by the force of the general opinion of the tribe. The headmen are of use in leading such opinion, and for this purpose they must act with the tribes, and not separately. To allow the headmen to think that their allowances would be granted, even if the tribe misbehaved, would be to take away one of the most cogent motives which they have for working by means of their tribe, and in accordance with the general feeling entertained by the members of it.

9. The arrangements proposed by the Commissioner for the disposal of Government buildings are, his Honour considers, sufficient, and measures can be taken hereafter in accordance with his recommendations. As regards the cemeteries, which contain the graves of Europeans who have fallen during the campaign, it is probable that no engagement with the tribes will ensure their safe custody; and the result of a breach of such engagement could only be the infliction of a fine, which would be no real compensation for dishonouring the graves. Sir Robert Egerton, therefore, thinks that the gravestones should be moved to Jamrud or Peshawur, and the ground left without any memorial which could excite the fanaticism or cupidity of the ill-disposed; while the monuments would remain in a place of security as a record of the persons who have been buried in the Khyber Pass.

10. In conclusion, the Lieutenant-Governor desires to express his high sense of the ability with which Colonel Waterfield, C.S.I., has conducted these negotiations. He has shown the utmost patience and forethought throughout a settlement which the Lieutenant-Governor thinks will ensure the safety of the Khyber, and will enable the Government to withdraw its troops from the Pass. This settlement will also have the great advantage of bringing the Khyber tribes within our influence more even than before, and will tend gradually to promote civilization among them.

11. His Honour would also bring to the notice of the Government of India the services of Major Conolly, Political Officer in the Khyber, and his Assistants, who have been in direct communication with the tribes, and have acted in these negotiations under Colonel Waterfield's orders.

Enclosure 10 in No. 8.

No. 48.

(AMENDED.)

PROPOSITION FOR THE REVISION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POLITICAL OFFICER,
KHYBER, INCLUDING JEZAILCHI CORPS.

Office to which Proposition refers.	Authority.	PRESENT SCALE.		PROPOSED SCALE.	PERMANENT.		
		Detail.	Rs. A. P.		Increase per Menssem.	Decrease per Menssem.	
Political Officer, Khyber, under orders of Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.	Punjab Government No. 1143 C, dated 29th October 1879, and No. 1163 of 31st July 1880, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.	1 Political Officer	1,616 0 0	1 Political Officer	1,616 0 0		
		1 Native Political Assistant	400 0 0	1 Native Political Assistant	500 0 0	100 0 0	
		1 English clerk	80 0 0	1 English clerk	80 0 0		
		1 Reader to Political Officer	40 0 0	1 Reader to Political Officer	40 0 0		
		6 Orderlies		6 Orderlies	14 0 0	14 0 0	
		1 Mohurrir for Native Political Assistant	30 0 0	1 Mohurrir for Native Political Assistant	30 0 0		
		Total	2,166 0 0	Total	2,280 0 0	114 0 0	
		JEZAILCHI CORPS.		JEZAILCHI CORPS.			
		1 Commandant	924 0 0	1 Commandant	500 0 0		424 0 0
		1 Second in Command	100 0 0	1 Second in Command	100 0 0		
2 Subadars at 60 each	120 0 0	3 Subadars at 60 each	180 0 0	60 0 0			
1 Jemadar at 35	35 0 0	2 Jemadars at 35	70 0 0	35 0 0			
1 do. at 30	30 0 0	1 do. at 30	30 0 0				
2 Subadars at 40	80 0 0	2 Subadars at 40	80 0 0				
2 Jemadars at 20	40 0 0	2 Jemadars at 20	40 0 0				
20 Havildars at 13	260 0 0	22 Havildars at 13	286 0 0	26 0 0			
20 Naiks at 11	220 0 0	22 Naiks at 11	242 0 0	22 0 0			
452 Jezailchis at 9	4,068 0 0	552 Jezailchis at 9	4,968 0 0	900 0 0			
6 Duffadars at 25	150 0 0	4 Duffadars at 30	120 0 0		30 0 0		
2 Lance Duffadars at 21 each	42 0 0	2 Lance Duffadars at 21 each	42 0 0		42 0 0		
48 Sowars at 18 each	864 0 0	26 Sowars at 25 each	650 0 0		214 0 0		
Total	6,933 0 0	Total	7,266 0 0	1,043 0 0	710 0 0		
MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES.		MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES.					
1 Tent pitcher	7 0 0	1 Tent pitcher	7 0 0				
1 Sweeper	6 0 0	1 Sweeper	6 0 0				
Stationery	30 0 0	Stationery	30 0 0				
Office contingencies Jezailchi Corps	25 0 0	Office contingencies Jezailchi Corps	25 0 0				
Total	68 0 0	Total	68 0 0				
SAVINGS.		SAVINGS.					
English Political Assistant	1,150 0 0	English Political Assistant			1,150 0 0		
Native Assistant to Political Assistant	100 0 0	Native Assistant to Political Assistant			100 0 0		
1 Thanadar	100 0 0	1 Thanadar			100 0 0		
1 English clerk	60 0 0	1 English clerk			60 0 0		
Stationery	10 0 0	Stationery			10 0 0		
Total	1,420 0 0	Total			1,420 0 0		
PRÉCIS.		PRÉCIS.					
1 Political Officer's establishment	2,166 0 0	1 Political Officer's establishment	2,280 0 0	114 0 0			
2 Jezailchi Corps	6,933 0 0	2 Jezailchi Corps	7,266 0 0	1,043 0 0	710 0 0		
3 Miscellaneous establishment	68 0 0	3 Miscellaneous establishment	68 0 0				
4 Political Assistant's establishment	1,420 0 0	4 Political Assistant's establishment			1,420 0 0		
Total	10,587 0 0	Total	9,614 0 0	1,157 0 0	2,130 0 0		

Net saving Rs. 2,130 less 1,157=973 or deduct 300 for contingencies, leaves a net saving of Rs. 673.

Net saving Rs. 2,130 less 1,157=973 or deduct 300 for contingencies, leaves a net saving of Rs. 673.

(Signed) E. H. L. CLARKE,
Assistant in charge, Camp Office.

Enclosure 11 in No. 8.

Telegram, dated 9th February 1881.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN, Calcutta.

In accordance with instructions contained in Punjab telegram 98 of 6th instant, the agreement, a draft of which accompanied my 576 of 24th December, and which has been slightly modified under instructions received, has been duly signed on the 8th instant by the Afridi headmen without any demur. A final paragraph had been previously added to the agreement as follows:—We understand that we are exclusively responsible for the future management of the Khyber, and that Government in no way shares in this responsibility, and this position we accept.

Enclosure 12 in No. 8.

No. 284, dated Lahore, 14th February 1881.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM desired to forward, for the consideration of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, copy of a letter, No. 471 P., dated 25th January 1881, from the Commissioner, Peshawur.

2. The heavier portion of the work of the Political Officer, Khyber, hitherto has been the direct result of the actual occupation of the Pass by British troops and the presence therein of British camps, bazaars, and camp followers. It appears to his Honour self-evident that the duties of the Political Officer will of necessity be greatly lightened by the termination of the military occupation of the Khyber, and for similar reasons the work of the Jezailchi corps will be less than formerly, and the Lieutenant-Governor sees no reasons to alter the views expressed on this question in my letter above quoted.

3. Nor does Sir Robert Egerton consider that there is any force in the arguments adduced by the Commissioner of Peshawur against the speedy imposition of tolls upon traffic in the Pass. There seems to be no object in making to merchants and traders the concessions proposed by Colonel Waterfield; nor would it in reality be a very substantial boon, seeing that, if we refrain from taking transit dues for that portion of the Pass which is managed by independent tribes under our Political control, the difference will be levied by the Khan of Lalpura at Dakka or by the Amir at Jellalabad; the merchants will probably pay the same as heretofore, while the loss will fall on the British Government.

4. With regard to responsibility for robberies within the Pass, the Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that if traders suffer from raids in the Khyber, east of Lundikotal, they will naturally prefer their complaints to the British Government, which cannot be satisfied by referring them to the tribes, but should after the necessary enquiries award compensation out of the tribal subsidies. Unless some such arrangement is carried out, the Khyber may remain as insecure as in the days before the campaign of 1878, while the British Government will be paying for its safety.

Enclosure 13 in No. 8.

No. 471 P., dated 25th January 1881.

From Lieut.-Col. W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawur Division, to W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

I HAVE now received with your No. 11½ C., of the 4th January, a copy of your letter, No. 11 C., of the 4th January, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, forwarding my No. 5767, of the 24th December, regarding the progress of negotiations with the representatives of the Khyber tribes for the future management of the Pass.

2. With reference to paragraph 5, in which his Honour expresses an opinion that the office establishment proposed for the Political Officer is on too extravagant a scale, I would suggest that we are not yet aware of the amount of work that will fall upon the Political Officer when taking up his new duties at Jamrud. I would invite attention to the enclosures of this office, No. 35 of the 5th January and the Political Officer's, No. 88 of the 20th January, forwarded in original with my No. 475 P., dated 25th January

1881, I think Government would be wiser to allow temporarily and subject to report six months hence the scale proposed by me, than to reduce the establishment now, in anticipation of possible diminution of work. If office difficulties and arrears of work are added to the anxieties of the Political Officer at Jamrud, I think that his health will give way, and that the new tribal management will not receive the attention and care that it certainly will require. I cannot, therefore, advise that a saving should be effected at the present moment in the staff of the Political Officer, who has lost some strength in the abolition of his European assistant Political Officer and his European Commandant of Jezailchis. I also doubt if trustworthy and educated pay Havildars are to be found among the Khyber Afridi tribes.

3. Nor do I think that the Government can be justified in any supposition that the duties of the corps of Jezailchis will be lighter than before; on the contrary, I think they may be increased, certainly during the winter half of the year, for I am inclined to think that two convoys a week will not be nearly sufficient for the traffic as it increases.

4. Again I trust that his Honour will reconsider the views expressed regarding the immediate taking of the tolls, or transit dues, by the British Government. Difficulties might arise which I would be glad to avoid at starting. The tribes will be more reconciled to the new arrangement if they see that we do not at once begin to reap any direct profit from it. A great impetus may be given to trade by the fact that the Khyber is at present free. It would be a kindly concession on the part of Government to the merchants and carriers, whose trade and profits have no doubt suffered much during the last two or three years. It will have a widespread and favourable effect if these transit dues are not immediately levied, and give perhaps an exaggerated view of the generosity of the new rulers. I suggest, therefore, that the levy of tolls should be suspended until the affairs of Afghanistan are more settled, until a general reconsideration of the whole question of such transit dues has been brought about, and perhaps a commercial treaty has been negotiated with his Highness the Amir.

Also, as the winter has so far advanced I do not think it is worth while to introduce the Khyber duties until at all events the opening of a new season in the autumn of this year. During the summer there is little or no trade, and the income would be exceedingly small compared with that of the cold season following. The above reasons are irrespective of those adduced by me in my previous report, to which I now turn.

5. With the greatest deference to the views of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, I am not able to see that upon the British Government need devolve the responsibility for the safety of traffic through the Khyber, because it has undertaken to regulate the traffic on behalf of the Khyber Afridis. I would throw the entire responsibility upon the tribes, and they will be all the stronger and better for it. I am quite prepared for the merchants and traders endeavouring to force this responsibility upon the Government, but I would refuse it, and hold the tribes entirely responsible for satisfying the public. It is quite possible that some large caravans may at starting decline to be satisfied by the assurances of the tribes, and take the alternative routes, paying for the same, but some will use the free Khyber and will pass in safety, and others will at once follow the example. As the security of the convoys without doubt can be absolutely ensured by the headmen and the tribes, for instance by their accompanying any specially valuable convoy in person and in large numbers, or by their taking hostages from malcontents, I am unable to see why Government should accept any responsibility whatever. I would maintain to the tribes that Government had nothing whatever to say to the public, but were in the interests of trade, and the public, endeavouring to make with the Afridis such arrangements as would give them (the public) sufficient confidence in the route, and that the penalty of failure on the part of the Afridis might possibly be the stoppage of the allowances, disbandment of the Jezailchis, and closing of the Khyber. As it is impossible for the Government to be certain of Afridis, I would leave the public, who are much more likely to be able to form an accurate opinion, to judge for themselves.

6. I would confine the duties of the Political Officers entirely to other matters. They should be the referees in all points of dispute, should see that the tribes are carrying out their arrangements in accordance with their agreements, should endeavour to hold the tribes together, smoothing over difficulties and advising them regarding the system which the tribes themselves approve and adopt. The officer commanding the Jezailchis would have as his special duty to see that the force was maintained to full strength, equipped, organised, and fittingly officered and armed by the responsible tribes, that the men were present for duty, sufficiently drilled, and that they regularly received the sums allowed by Government to the tribes for the maintenance of the corps. Without some such supervising authority the tribes could not be safely entrusted to carry out the duties they had accepted.

The work of the Political Officers should be in fact confined to supervision of tribal arrangements. It was this that I endeavoured to bring about, and the tribes understand it so and accept it, and the agreement which they are prepared to execute is in accordance with this view of the entire responsibilities of the tribes and the limited control of the Government.

7. Regarding the personal allowances to headmen, I have admitted that what I consider to be the defect of the system that has been approved by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will not be apparent until difficulties arise. But suppose the Khyber closed on account of opposition in Tirah with which the headmen have not at the moment been able to cope, and suppose an alternative route adopted, the headmen and their party among the Khyber tribes honestly doing their best, and though unable to keep the Khyber open, yet desirous of maintaining exclusive relations with the Government, of keeping themselves detached from Kabul, and of refusing all other influence or interference. If the subsidies of the headmen and the tribes disappear in the forfeited compensation for transit dues, what hold would Government have over those who may be considered really at heart of their own party? The latter would be irritated, and instead of making honest and what might appear to them fruitless endeavours to recover their position, would probably join with the opposition who had lost nothing, and endeavour to bring pressure to bear upon the Government by active hostilities upon the border, appealing to the Kabul ruler to re-accept their allegiance. The Khyber arrangements failing, it will be exceedingly difficult to make allowances to the headmen and the Government party without their concluding that we were more actuated by fears of their opposition than by any desire to treat them at the moment of failure with consideration on account of past service. I admit that I have not latterly pressed this point, because I remembered that the present allowances are to some extent subdivided into personal allowances to the headmen of Rupees 300 a month and Rupees 1,000 subsidies to each tribe, and I have always felt that if the difficulty came, for which I would now provide, the Government might forfeit the tribal irrespective of the personal allowance, and probably would do so. Government can be no more bound to keep up the personal allowance than the tribal subsidies in the case of misbehaviour or neglect, and I myself do not understand that the headmen would be any the less inclined to carry through the present negotiations, if they saw that by the payment of personal allowances the British Government was desirous of securing their personal allegiance and good conduct, as well as the safety of traffic through the Khyber.

Believing however as I do in the stability of the present arrangements, in the future disinclination of the Government to close the Khyber and throw over the Afridis, and in the improbability of any such crisis arising, I admit that I am more defending my proposal than anxious to carry my view against that of the Government as if it were of vital importance to the scheme.

8. Regarding the cemetery at Lundikotal, I think that the tablets may be removed to Peshawur, and perhaps be attached to some memorial near the church; that a careful plan of the cemetery should be made by which hereafter the position of every grave could be at once ascertained with certainty. The Loargai Shinwaris are not likely to allow of the destruction of the monuments and graves which will be left to their care, a watchman being specially remunerated for this duty, and I would leave them as they stand.

No. 9.

No. 44 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, March 14, 1881.

WE have the honour to inclose, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of correspondence and other papers relating to the affairs of Afghanistan.

2. These papers show the measures that have been taken, or are in progress, in prosecution of the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government for the withdrawal of

the British troops from Kandahar at the earliest suitable opportunity, and for the establishment, if possible, within a limited time, of some settled government at Kandahar.

3. The substance of our correspondence with the Amir of Kabul has been transmitted to your Lordship, from time to time, by telegraph. On the 20th of February the Amir's letter, dated 10th February, from Kabul, was received in Calcutta. The Amir at last announced the departure of the confidential agent whom he had been repeatedly asked, since November last, to send to India; and from the tenor of his letter it is to be inferred that he has very willingly entertained the offer, made by the Viceroy in January, to place him in possession of Kandahar; but he represented that, owing to great deficiency in arms and material of war, his position, unless he should be aided in this respect by the British Government, would be very difficult. As the list of the different kinds of ammunition required, which accompanied this letter, was not easily intelligible, it was necessary to await the arrival of the Amir's agent, General Mir Ahmed, who reached Calcutta on the 25th February. It then appeared that Mir Ahmed's instructions were very simple and closely circumscribed; that upon the general political views and intentions of the Amir he was not empowered to deliver any message, and that his particular business was confined to obtaining the ammunition already asked for, and to receiving and transmitting any communications that the British Government might address to his master. In his conversation with the Viceroy the General declared his conviction that the Amir fully intended to send troops to Kandahar at once, but he admitted that this was his personal belief, and that he could state nothing on this point with authority. The result has been that the deputation of the envoy has effected little toward the removal of the manifold impediments by which, for the last five months, the progress of our arrangements with the Amir has been unavoidably hindered. The great delay inseparable from the interchange of letters between Kabul and India, and the consequent difficulty of establishing with the Amir the free and frequent communication so essential to a clear understanding upon an important and complicated subject, and to the speedy and accurate combination of plans and movements, had necessarily affected the conduct of our negotiations, which it had been hoped that the presence of a confidential agent would have much expedited. The ammunition required was, however, immediately supplied to the Amir's agency at Peshawar, so far as it could be given from the British arsenals (for much of it was of a kind not to be found in our military stores), and General Mir Ahmed has been informed that more will be placed at his disposal; but carriage is wanting beyond the frontier for the immediate conveyance of any large additional quantity to Kabul.

4. The particular business upon which the envoy had, apparently, been sent to India having been thus completed, there seemed to be no advantage in detaining him in Calcutta. On the other hand, as the Viceroy had been able, in two interviews, to explain to him the general wishes and intentions of the Government of India regarding the affairs of Afghanistan, especially the urgent importance, to the Amir, of an early despatch of troops from Kabul to Kandahar, it was advisable that the envoy should rejoin the Amir as speedily as possible. With this opinion the envoy himself altogether concurred; and he accordingly left Calcutta on the 8th March, carrying with him a letter for the Amir, of which a copy is herewith enclosed. We have taken, it will be seen, this opportunity of proposing to depute to Kabul a native representative of our Government, in accordance with the intimation conveyed to us by the last sentence of your Lordship's despatch, No. 48, of 3rd December, that Her Majesty's Government would be glad if this could be arranged.

5. In the expectation that the arrival of a confidential agent from Kabul would so far clear up and define the Amir's situation that the Government of India might be enabled to proceed with a full knowledge of his exact position and resources, we have, it will be seen, been disappointed. It became immediately manifest that we could risk the loss of no more time in ascertaining positively whether the Amir was able and prepared to act upon the Viceroy's letter to him of the 31st January, whereby Kandahar had been offered to Abdul Rahman, with assistance in money and munitions, but with the warning that he would be required to occupy it early in the spring. The Commissioner of Peshawar was therefore directed by telegram to despatch a letter by express courier to the Amir, informing His Highness that his agent had been received, that the ammunition asked for had been sent, and that troops from Kabul of sufficient strength for the establishment of the Amir's government should reach Kandahar some days before the 15th April next. The reply to this letter we are now awaiting. We have heard through private correspondence that the Amir is actually preparing a force for Kandahar, and that he hopes it may set off from Kabul about the middle of March. But we

thoroughly realize the difficulties of military equipment and organization against which the Amir has, in the present condition of his affairs, to contend; and we are ready and anxious to afford him every assistance. A sum of ten lakhs has been placed at his disposal for immediate expenses; and all possible measures will be taken to assist and strengthen his Governor and his troops on their arrival at Kandahar.

6. In the meantime Colonel St. John had been directed to consider carefully beforehand the ways and means of introducing the Amir's authority into Kandahar in the event of his accepting and acting effectually on our offer. Colonel St. John's two letters, which are inclosed with this despatch, present an interesting description of the state and prospects of parties in South Afghanistan, and of the probabilities of the establishment at Kandahar of some settled government after our departure. The general effect of these letters is to produce the impression that, if the Amir Abdul Rahman can succeed in placing at Kandahar, before the withdrawal of the British troops, a fairly equipped force of about 4,000 men, and if he acts with judgment, energy, and promptitude, the task of bringing the Kandahar Province under his authority, and of establishing his government in all the cis-Helmand district, should not be difficult. It is of course impossible to forecast the course of events after our evacuation, or to calculate what external attacks the Amir may have subsequently to encounter.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON

JAMES GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 9.

No. 27, dated Kandahar, 15th January 1881.

From Lieut.-Colonel O. B. ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

I REPORTED to you by telegram on the 10th instant that considerable excitement prevailed in the city in consequence of a rumour that orders had arrived for the immediate evacuation of Kandahar. This rumour was due to that passage in Reuter's telegraphic summary of Her Majesty's speech on opening Parliament which refers to Kandahar, and spread from the garrison through the Hindoos of the city to the population generally.

2. Your telegram of the 11th enabled me to inform the notables of the place at the usual morning public assembly yesterday that the report that orders had arrived for the evacuation was untrue, and that, though I could not assure them that we should not leave Kandahar, I could with truth declare my entire ignorance as to whether or not the army would be withdrawn before the coming hot weather, during which, as they knew, it was impossible for us to move troops to India. I further promised that all our friends should have ample notice in case of our quitting Kandahar, to enable them to make any arrangements they might desire for the convenience or safety of themselves or their families. This assurance allayed the excitement in the city, but the report of an immediate evacuation had gone abroad; and will, it may be taken for granted, increase the uneasy and excited feeling already existing in the Helmand districts. The despatch of a small force to Maiwand and its retention there for a few weeks, which I am to-day informed by General Hume has been sanctioned by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, will, it may be expected, suffice to prevent the excitement spreading, and give the people time to quiet down.

3. It appears to me an object of much importance, both in our own interests and those of the Amir, should Kandahar be made over to him, that the Helmand districts, as well as the country immediately about the city, should remain tranquil as long as possible. The likelihood of the province being ceded to the Amir is very generally known and discussed; and the Western Duranis are, without exception, partisans of Ayub as against Abdurrahman, to whom they would, in their present temper, undoubtedly prefer our direct rule.

4. In the course of the last few days I have taken advantage of the uneasy feeling prevailing to ascertain as far as possible the ideas of the leading men as to the result of the evacuation of Southern Afghanistan should such take place in the course of the next three months. All are entirely unanimous as to the impossibility of the Amir holding his own in Kandahar without active support from us.

5. Reports, no doubt exaggerated, of the harshness of his rule, and the disfavour with which he regards Duranis, have been widely spread; and there are now but two parties in Southern Afghanistan, one hoping that we shall remain, the other ready to rise in favour of Ayub, but both equally opposed to Abdurrahman.

6. The two Sirdars, Muhammad Hasan Khan and Muhammad Hosain Khan, brother and nephew of the Wali, who, having been implicated with him in his antagonism to Ayub, have naturally no prepossession in the latter's behalf, told me that, though they themselves would prefer Abdurrahman, as they would have no difficulty in coming to terms with him, it was impossible to deny that the Durani country generally was becoming more and more indisposed to accept him. They believe that, if we leave without establishing his authority by force of arms, a rising in favour of Ayub will take place before our rear guard has reached Pishin. They do not think he can himself leave Kabul or spare any considerable number of troops. The only chance they consider that he would have would be for us to hold Kandahar during the summer while he attacks Herat through Turkistan, an attack which would, in their opinion, be successful. As long as Herat remains in Ayub's power any attempt of Abdurrahman to hold Kandahar must, they consider, inevitably result in failure, with the probable consequence of his expulsion from Kabul.

7. Another Afghan of considerable shrewdness and a half-declared friend of Abdurrahman told me that the supremacy would probably lie with whichever of the two rivals was able to take the initiative. If the Amir contents himself with holding Kandahar after our departure, he will infallibly lose both Kandahar and Kabul. But if he comes with, or sends down to Kandahar, a sufficient force to garrison the city and advance straight on Herat, that place will fall before him, and he will remain undisputed master of the whole country.

8. The feeling of the principal men may be gauged by the fact that all are making preparations to send their families either to the remote northern districts, or the Hazara frontier, or to Pishin, in case of our leaving Kandahar, and I have reason to believe that the majority would hold themselves aloof from the struggle for supremacy which must inevitably ensue, in the confident belief that Her Majesty's Government will at no distant date find itself forced to resume the direct rule of Southern Afghanistan.

9. Advices received to-day from Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan at Girishk appear to indicate that the country in the immediate vicinity of the Helmand is quieting down, though he speaks with some apprehension of the arrival of sowars from Farrah in Washir to levy revenue from the districts of Kandahar between the Khash and the Helmand. I do not think that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, to whom this movement is due, will persevere in it when he finds that the British garrison is still in Kandahar and making a show of force at Maiwand. From Tirin, Shirindil Khan reports, as telegraphed to you to-day, that a nephew of Anbiar Khan of Taiwara, by name Muhammad Khan, had arrived there with thirty-six sowars. They at first took refuge in a village, from which Habibullah Khan, a nephew of the Sartip Nur Muhammad, tried to get the villagers to give them up; and at last succeeded in obtaining possession of the person of Muhammad Khan. A certain Yahiya, Akhunzadah, formerly governor on behalf of the Wali, and a man of considerable influence and ability, though no real friend of ours, got together some Ghilzais and rescued Muhammad Khan from Habibullah Khan. He and his sowars will probably arrive here in a few days.

10. Sirdar Shirindil Khan, who had instructions from me not to venture into danger, has crossed the Kotah-i-Paj into Nish. He writes that the Nish maliks are willing to submit and pay their revenue, but are afraid of the Tirin people, while the latter are divided into two parties, the Barakzais being favourable to him, and the Popalzais against him. He was, however, hopeful of a satisfactory settlement. The false report of our proximate departure, which will no doubt spread to Tirin, will probably have an unfavourable effect there; but a letter which I have sent Shirindil Khan to-day, announcing the early despatch of a force to Maiwand to support his authority on one side, and that of Gul Muhammad Khan on the other, will, I trust, arrive in time to counteract it.

11. I may add that there is but one opinion among the Sirdars and chieftains as to the tranquillizing and healthy effect of the movement of a force to Maiwand.

Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

No. 96, dated Kandahar, 14th February 1881. (Extract.)

From Lieut.-Col. O. B. ST. JOHN, R.E., C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq. C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

KANDAHAR and the neighbouring country remain fairly tranquil under the prospect now universally credited of a very early evacuation by our troops. The 16th proximo having been fixed by the military authorities as the date at which the return march to India may possibly commence, it is generally believed in the city, on the strength, it may be assumed, of information gathered from subordinates of the Transport and Commissariat Departments, that our final departure is arranged to take place at that date. A few Hindus (of Shikarpur) and a lesser number of Farsiwans have already left the city with their families; and a very general exodus of these two classes may be anticipated.

2. Public opinion is much divided as to the candidate to whom it is intended to make over the government, Ayub Khan, the Amir, Sharif Khan, and the ex-Amir, Yakub Khan, being all mentioned as our possible successors. The better classes, I believe, incline generally to the idea that the Amir will receive Kandahar from us, led thereto more by the inherent probability of the case than by the report of the Amir's letter to Muhammad Sadik, Khan of Kelat, which, however, was generally known and excited much comment.

3. The return of the column from Maiwand, on the 12th, completed an expedition for which, I think, entire success may be claimed. It has given nearly a month's rest to the overtaxed resources of the Commissariat by taking away two-thirds of the animals for which they had to find forage; and by opening the roads has enabled them to increase the amount of their purchases. A considerable reserve is now in hand, and the posts on the road are being gradually stocked for the march to Pishin. The presence of the force enabled me to get in some revenue that would otherwise have been lost, and to levy the fine of Rupees 5,000 on the villagers of Kushk-i-Nakhud. Mr. Merk, whose exertions in obtaining supplies deserve great praise, reports that not only were there no cases of ghazeeism, or attempts at annoyance, such as firing into the camp at night, but that not a single instance of serious dispute between the people and the soldiers and camp-followers was brought to his notice during the three weeks the force was absent. This would appear to indicate that the temper of the people is not at present dangerous. Nevertheless, an unfortunate occurrence at the other extremity of the province shows the risk of attempting to control the country whenever the people believe they are not liable to the presence of troops. Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan had sent an accountant to Dahlah, north-east of Kandahar, with the local governor of the district. They went together to Tanachob, a village on the verge of the Hazara country, but inhabited by Duranis. Some report of the British leaving Kandahar appears to have reached the people, and the unfortunate writer (a Farsiwan) was shot in a mosque in the presence of the governor. His Farsiwan companions, five in number, who had been left at a little distance, escaped at the time, but were caught up the next morning, induced to surrender on their pursuers taking an oath on the Koran to spare their lives, and then brutally murdered, after being reproached with being the instruments of taxing the people for the Kafirs, who were themselves leaving the country.

4. After this experience it will, I think, be inadvisable to make any further attempts to raise revenue, except in the immediate neighbourhood of the city.

5. The result of the withdrawal of the force from Maiwand remains to be seen. As far as can be judged from the report of Sirdar Taj Muhammad Khan, Seistani, of whom more hereafter, Gul Muhammad Khan will be unable to remain at Girishk more than a few days longer, and the country, at all events, as far as the Helmand, will be entirely closed to traffic. Before Taj Muhammad's arrival I had written to Gul Muhammad Khan, telling him of our intention to leave Kandahar on or shortly after the Naoraz (the 21st March), and assuring him that, whoever succeeded us, his interests would be properly cared for. He will probably retire at once to his own fort of Jui-Sirkar, near Kalah-i-Bist, and remain there for the present. It is to be feared that the roads to Tirin and Nish, which have lately re-opened, will again be closed, and that we shall be dependent on the districts immediately round Kandahar for supplies. With the reserves now in hand these will be able to feed the force if too severe a strain be not thrown on the Commissariat by

the detention for political reasons of the extra carriage now on its way up to Kandahar from Sibi. It is timed to commence arrival about the 15th March, unless detained by bad weather, and should begin its return journey as soon after as possible. If a large amount of carriage be massed at Kandahar for weeks, or halted on the road, very serious difficulty in feeding it is to be anticipated; and it is thus of the greatest importance that the negotiations with Kabul for the occupation of Candahar should not be protracted. If the final evacuation of the place is not effected by the end of March, it may become absolutely necessary to move troops to the Helmand to obtain grain and forage.

6. The execution of the Alikozai Sirdars, Taimur Khan, Dost Muhammad Khan, and Behbud Khan, was not, I believe, a politic move on the part of Ayub Khan and his advisers. It will certainly still further estrange the Duranis of Herat from him, and may not improbably throw the Alikozais of Kandahar, the most numerous and powerful clan among the Duranis, after the Barakzais, into the ranks of his enemies. It is said to be strongly condemned by Hashim Khan. Yaluntush Khan, son of Khan Agha, Jamshidi, has invoked the aid of the Saruk Turkomans, and is menacing the northern frontier of Herat. Much apprehension of an attack from Turkistan is also felt there. The Aimaks are, of course, ready to rise. The reports that Ayub's followers are industriously spreading over the country that we are about to make the province over to him may betoken conscious weakness; and altogether it may be that an immediate occupation of Kandahar, followed by a prompt initiative in the Herat direction, might place the whole country at the Amir's feet in spite of the ill-will of the vast majority of the Duranis.

Enclosure 3 in No. 9.

No. 102, dated Kandahar, 16th February 1881.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. ST. JOHN, R.E., C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, Kandahar, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

YOUR telegram of the 3rd instant directs me to consider carefully and report by post on the ways and means of introducing the Amir's authority into Candahar, in the event of his accepting and acting effectually on the offer made him to assume its government on our departure.

2. I have delayed submitting the conclusions at which I have arrived for some days, in order to consider the subject carefully in all its bearings, and ascertain as far as possible what measure of support the Amir is likely to receive from the leading men left in the country.

3. The main point is that he should act *effectually* on the invitation given him to assume the government; and I would define *effectually* to be the early despatch of a sufficient body of infantry to occupy Kelat-i-Ghilzai, Kandahar, and Girishk. The minimum number required at first would be 3,500 for Kelat, 1,500 to remain at Kandahar, and 1,000 to go on to Girishk. This total should of course be largely increased, as soon as possible, in view of an attack from or an advance to Herat; but would suffice to keep the country up to the Helmand quiet. It is clear that we cannot make over more to the Amir than we have chosen to take for ourselves, and it may, therefore, be convenient to commence by describing the extent and nature of our hold on the province. Over the outlying districts of Pusht-i-Rud and the Helmand we have no authority whatever, beyond the fact of the fort of Girishk being still occupied by Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, an occupation which may cease at any moment, and can hardly be prolonged till the arrival of the Amir's troops. Unless, however, it is occupied by Ayub Khan's regular troops from Herat, of which there would seem no danger, the place is not defensible against artillery, and can be occupied at any time by an adequate force from Kandahar.

4. Over the three northern districts of Tirin, Nish, and Dehrawud, we have likewise no authority. From the north-north-eastern districts of Jaldak, Mizan, and Dahlah, I have been able to obtain a certain amount of revenue, but the hold on them is very slender. Lastly come the home district of Kandahar and those immediately adjoining it, Kushk-i-Nakhud, Khakrez, Tarnak, Arghastan, and Kadanai, which are as yet entirely under my control.

5. The eastern half of the home district, together with Tarnak, Arghastan, and Kadanai, are governed by Sirdar Muhammad Husain Khan, the Wali's brother; and its western half with, Kushk-i-Nakhud, by Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, his nephew. Both of these consider themselves hopelessly compromised with Ayub Khan's party, and will attach themselves to that of the Amir as the nominee of the British Government. As regards the transfer of the districts now actually governed by us, there will, therefore, be no difficulty; Khakrez, the remaining district, is at present managed by Fath Muhammad Khan, a Popalzai chief, of whose family more hereafter, and who will follow any directions given him. The governors, duly warned beforehand, will simply transfer their allegiance to the Amir's representative; and, as far as the people are concerned, there need be no apprehension of overt resistance, always supposing that he is accompanied by an adequate force. The occupation of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, which must precede that of Kandahar, will suffice to establish the Amir's authority over the neighbouring districts of Jaldak, Mizan, while that of Dahlah is of comparatively small importance.

6. As regards the districts of Nish, Dehrawud, and Tirin, I am not prepared to give an opinion whether they will submit to the Amir's authority without a struggle. They will not, I think, attempt to resist an armed occupation; but will hold aloof until conclusions have been settled with their neighbours across the Helmand, the Alizais of Zamindawar, even if they do not actively join them in resistance.

7. The transfer of authority in the city will be as simple as it was in August 1879, when I made over charge to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan. Our Kotwal, a Pathan Subahdar of native infantry, is the only official who will require to be replaced; all the others are natives of the city. Almost the only reform I have made in the revenue system is that the entire receipts are paid daily into the treasury, instead of running accounts being kept with the collectors as under the native government. The whole establishment will be paid up to the date of transfer and made over to the new governor.

8. The land revenue accounts are more complicated; but the fact of the late Wali's Mustaufi, or head accountant, being the Amir's unaccredited agent in Kandahar will render their transfer from my office comparatively easy. He will simply resume the position that he gave up only two months ago, the minor officials remaining unchanged.

9. It will be necessary to give the Amir's representative some pecuniary assistance towards carrying on the government till the next harvest; and this, taking into consideration that the total revenue of the province is only thirteen and half lakhs, I should be inclined to fix at a lakh of rupees to start with, and half a lakh per month for April and May, after which the annual revenue will again be falling due. This would be independent of any special assistance it may be advisable to give to aid in repelling an invasion from Herat, or for an advance in that direction.

10. Until the Amir's troops have actually reached Kelat-i-Ghilzai at least, it will not be advisable to proclaim him in Kandahar. It will not be necessary for our troops to remain in Kandahar for longer after the arrival of those of the Amir than will suffice for a detachment of the latter to occupy Girishk, say a week or 10 days. The interval would be profitably occupied in assisting the Kabul governor in making his arrangements for the nearer districts. If, as there is reason to fear, the Zamindawaris should seize Girishk in Ayub's name, it would be of great assistance to the Amir's authority were the troops sent there to expel them accompanied by a British column; but this would involve a further delay of a week.

11. As before-mentioned, the two Sirdars, Muhammad Hasan Khan and Muhammad Husain Khan, are prominently assisting me in the government of the country. Both are willing to lend their support to the Amir, and Muhammad Hasan's brothers, Shirindil Khan, Anwar Khan, and Roshndil Khan, would, no doubt, follow them. I have not thought it advisable to write to ask Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan for his views on the subject; but his antecedents make it certain that he would prefer Abdurrahman to Ayub.

Taj Muhammad Khan, Popalzai, and his brothers, are also prepared to transfer their allegiance to the Amir.

Fathi Khan, the Chief of the Achakzais, is already in Kabul; and the most influential man of the clan now in Kandahar, Haji Sarbuland Khan, although no friend of Fathi Khan's, declares his willingness to support the Amir's government. Among doubtful men now here are the Shahghassi Sarwar Khan and Syud Nur Muhammad Shah, son of the late Prime Minister. The latter would, however, I am nearly confident, join the Kabul party.

Beyond the Helmand the Amir would find many supporters, Ahmad Khan of Lash Jowain, with all his tribe, the Ishakzais, the Biluchis of Chakansur, Kalah-i-Fath, and Sistan, with a majority of the Alikozais, besides the Char Aimak tribes. Of the latter

the Taimunis are already preparing to re-occupy Taiwara, whence the regular troops have been recalled to Herat, and it is reported that Yaluntush Khan, Jamshidi, has re-occupied his father's place of Kushk.

12. Thus the Amir, as our nominee alone, be it understood, would have a considerable party in his favour in Southern and Western Afghanistan. It would be for himself or his representative to secure its continued support. The line of conduct pursued by him towards the Duranis and others at Kabul will certainly not do this; but if, on the other hand, efforts are made to attach our friends to himself, and to conciliate the Duranis generally, many of the waverers in Herat as well as here will assuredly pass over to his side; and if, either by direct attack on Herat or by threatening it through Turkistan, he is able to stave off the attack by Ayub, which is sure to be attempted, he should have no difficulty in consolidating his rule.

Enclosure 4 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the Address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 10th February 1881.

After compliments.—I have received your Excellency's kind letter, dated the 30th January 1881, which your Excellency was graciously pleased to address to me, asking me to depute an agent.

I wrote to your Excellency that a thoroughly confidential man, as your Excellency was well aware of the nature (of the people) of Afghanistan, did not exist in this country. But as your Excellency has again written that it is necessary to send a man for certain important matters, I have deputed General Amir Ahmad Khan, and entrusted him with certain important proposals. While I had not yet been informed by your Excellency of his arrival in India, I received your Excellency's kind letter regarding the taking over of the government of Kandahar. Having the well-being of the British Government and of Afghanistan in view, I have given publicity to the contents of your Excellency's letter. All the people wished success. I have repeatedly represented to your Excellency in writing the embarrassed condition of Afghanistan, and I again represent it now, as I find it necessary to do so.

Your Excellency has been pleased to say that arms, cash, and all necessary aid, will be given to my officials who will be appointed in Kandahar. May God ever keep your Excellency exalted. But the state of Kabul is this that when the British troops entered Kabul all the arms and ammunition that existed there were so completely destroyed that no vestige of any implements of war was found in the arsenal. Neither is one-hundredth part of the arms and ammunition forthcoming which was granted to Amir Sher Ali by the British Government.

Howsoever vigilant I may be, yet this world is the world of means. I have neither any good guns nor ammunition which may be usefully employed against an enemy. The muskets of every description that I have collected are without their usual accoutrement, and only exist in name.

I have given a brief account of my circumstances; and, unless the illustrious British Government helps me with ammunition, I should find myself in a very difficult position. Therefore it is necessary that your Excellency should kindly send me ammunition as

* Literally, screen may not be removed from the matter. per list annexed, either 100 cartridges per gun, or more or less, so that my weakness be not* exposed, and the troops have their proper equipment.

I have written what has occurred to me.

Enclosure 5 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of an ABSTRACT of a LETTER addressed by the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWAR to the AMIR of KABUL, dated 27th February 1881.

After Compliments.—I have received telegraphic orders from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to address a letter to your Highness to the following effect:—

His Excellency has, with much pleasure, perused your Highness' friendly letter, dated the 10th February 1881.

General Amir Ahmad Khan, your Highness' confidential agent, has arrived at Calcutta, and has had the honour of waiting upon his Excellency the Viceroy.

His Excellency understands from the said letter that your Highness accepts the offer of the British Government made to you in his Excellency's letter, dated the 30th January 1881, to occupy Kandahar. His Excellency also finds that your Highness is in great want of ammunition at Kabul. Conformably to his Excellency's orders, I write to inform your Highness that cartridges, the nearest possible to those described in your Highness' list, are held in readiness to be made over to your Highness' officials at Peshawur or at Khyber.

His Excellency says that your Highness may remember that it was stated in the previous letter that the British troops intended to abandon Kandahar at the commencement of the (next) spring, and that, as your Highness has accepted and still accepts his Excellency's offer, your Highness should despatch troops to Kandahar. His Excellency now informs your Highness that it is necessary that troops, which are able to uphold your Highness' kingdom, should reach Kandahar before the 15th April 1881, and that a governor should be appointed to accompany them, and should be empowered to take over the administration from the British officers. The British Government cannot undertake to keep Kandahar in possession for your Highness after the 15th April. If arrangements are not made by your Highness to take over the administration of Kandahar before the 15th April, the British Government will not hold itself responsible.

Enclosure 6 in No. 9.

Dated Fort William, 8th March 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of India to His Highness the AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, Amir of Kabul.

YOUR HIGHNESS will already have been prepared, by a letter from the Commissioner of Peshawur, for the return of your representative, General Mir Ahmad Khan, who has satisfactorily discharged the mission entrusted to him, and has obtained all the military stores mentioned by your Highness as immediately needed for the equipment of your Highness' troops.

He has also been made fully acquainted by me, in two interviews, with the views and proposals of the British Government regarding the immediate occupation of Kandahar by your Highness' troops. Under these circumstances it is considered very desirable that he should now return to Kabul with the least possible delay, and report in person to your Highness regarding the state of affairs in general, and the wishes of the British Government. He accordingly leaves Calcutta this evening for Peshawur, with the intention of proceeding direct to Kabul. If, after he has presented himself to your Highness, you desire that he should return to India, it will give me much pleasure to receive him again in Simla, to which place I shall myself proceed from Calcutta in a few days.

In proof of the friendship which now exists between your Highness and the British Government, I am desirous of sending to your Highness' court Wazirzada Muhammad Afzal Khan, a gentleman of good family and position, who is personally known to your Highness, and who, on the occasion of his deputation to Turkistan, was of much service in promoting the interests of the two Governments. He will give your Highness information on any matters of detail regarding which your Highness may wish from time to time to be informed; and his presence in attendance on your Highness in Kabul may be useful and advantageous in the transaction of any business with my officers in India.

Enclosure 7 in No. 9.

Dated 25th February 1881.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. ST. JOHN, R.E., C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

THE only event of importance that has occurred since the despatch of my letter of the 14th has been the arrival of Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan's envoys, who appeared somewhat unexpectedly on the 23rd.

The fact of their approach having become known in the city, a considerable number of people went out to meet them by the Herat gate, and I, therefore, had them brought

in by the citadel entrance. No demonstration, however, took place; but some excitement was caused by a servant of the Sahibzada's, who preceded them by some hours, shouting a religious war cry as he passed through the streets.

The envoys were accompanied by about seventy horsemen and thirty menial attendants. They are lodged in Sirdar Sher Ali Khan's house, which is close to that in which I live. At their own request city people are not allowed free access to them, but anyone they ask to see is permitted to visit them.

Owing to indisposition, I was unable to see them till yesterday (the 26th), when they called on me. They commenced by saying that they had particular orders to express the profound grief of the Sirdar at the death of Lieutenant Maclaine, which he did not hear of till some time after his arrival in Herat. They also affirmed that Lieutenant Maclaine could, if he wished, have gone to the British camp. They then presented Ayub Khan's letter, of which a copy, with translation, is attached. I made no comment on it, and after some conversation on ordinary topics they retired. There is reason to believe that without invitation they will not deliver the message with which they have been charged by Muhammad Ayub Khan; and I propose to ask them what they have to say next Monday, the 28th, when I shall see them again.

With regard to their mission, a correspondent in Herat writes on the 6th instant that when Ayub's messenger, Nihang, arrived, bringing my letter of the 14th December (a simple acknowledgment of his apology for Lieutenant Maclaine's murder), the Sirdar announced in Durbar that the English had written to say that they would give him Kandahar and ten lakhs of rupees; but that he was not satisfied with this, as twenty lakhs would not recoup him for all he had lost at Mazra, and that he also wanted the whole country as far as Quetta. His friends at Kandahar continue to write to him that the English are about to leave, and that, in spite of his defeat, he has a reputation among them greater even than that of the Wazir Muhammad Akbar Khan. His councillors represented to him that it will be to his advantage to send envoys to Kandahar under any circumstances, for, if they failed in their negotiations, they would be able to stir up the people against the English. This, of course, was to be expected, and indicates, I think, the advisability of not dismissing the envoys too hastily. Ayub's pretensions are, of course, mere swagger to cover the act of humility in sending envoys uninvited.

A letter from Hashim Khan to Mirza Hasan Ali Khan, shows that he is uneasy, and that there are two parties at Herat, one consisting apparently of Hashim himself, the two envoys, and probably General Hafizulla Khan, in favour of coming to terms with us; and the other, whose prominent members are, it may be conjectured, the Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan (who believes that his treachery to the Wali will never be forgiven by us) and the Luinab Khushdil Khan, whose proclivities are Russian, who wish to continue hostilities. It is also clear that great apprehensions are entertained in Herat of an advance of the Amir's troops through Maimenah. The Taiwara people also appear to be inclined to renew their rebellion; and between the two it would be very difficult for Ayub Khan to move any of his small force of regulars towards the Helmand for some time.

As anticipated, Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan has left Girishk, and gone to his own fort about fifteen miles to the south, though it does not appear that there was urgent reason for his doing so. The Alizais are, he states, assembling; but unless they stop supplies coming in to Kandahar, of which there is at present no sign, their hostile demonstrations, having no objective, are of little consequence. The fort of Girishk is not tenable against regular troops with artillery.

The only news from the Kabul side is that the Amir, having remitted the poll-tax on the Tarakis, they have submitted to his governor. The report of a considerable body of troops having arrived at Ghazni was untrue. I learn indirectly through the envoys that Asmatullah Khan, General Taj Muhammad Khan, and other Ghilzai chiefs, are in regular correspondence with Herat.

The long expected rain has fallen abundantly during the last week, and has removed all fear of a failure in the spring crops, though very little unirrigated land has been sown. The Commissariat has still no difficulty in obtaining supplies, though their increased demand for grain has during the last few days somewhat raised its price. They have not, however, as far as I can gather, more than a week's supply in hand beyond what is required to store the first three posts on the line of communications, which is to be done from Kandahar.

Enclosure 8 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN to the RESIDENT, Southern Afghanistan, dated Herat, 2nd Rabi-ul-Awal, corresponding to 2nd February 1881.

After compliments.—I have perused, in original, the kind letter which you sent to my respected brother, Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan. From its contents, which display the signs of kindness towards me, I am sure that you have always been disposed to be kind and friendly. Nevertheless (consequently?), since both before this I was desirous of, and inclined for, the friendship of the British Government, and since now also I desire it, I take the liberty of sending to you, without delay, Hazrat Umr Jan Sahib and Sirdar Abdulla Khan, who possess my complete confidence, and are acquainted with the secrets of my private wishes; so that, while they have the honour and advantage of seeing you, they may also make known to you the representations and friendly wishes which I have communicated to them. And from these representations and sincere statements I have a hope that the bond of friendship between myself and the British Government will be satisfactorily restored. Please God, misunderstandings have come to an end, and the permanent friendship that may be arranged between us will remain firm and undisturbed.

Whatever my special messengers may tell you in regard to my wishes please consider to be the unmixed truth.

Enclosure 9 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated February 1881.

After compliments.—Your Excellency's kind letter, dated the 11th February 1881, in reply to my friendly epistle conveying thanks for Kelat-i-Ghilzai, has reached me, and made known to me your Excellency's benign and friendly sentiments. Your Excellency has written that it is the wish of the illustrious British Government that my authority should be strongly established in that place (Kelat) as speedily as possible. I also earnestly desire to attain this important object, (*viz.*) to organize fully and in the best way the government of the Kandahar districts with all possible despatch, with the friendly attention (assistance) of the British Government. And I hope to obtain such an aid from Her Imperial Majesty's Government as would suffice for the settlement of affairs in that direction. The affairs of Kelat, please God, will soon be arranged, and when a man (governor) is nominated by me to take over charge of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, it will be manifest that no mistake has been made. Your Excellency may rest assured.

No. 10.

No. 50 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, March 27, 1881.

In continuation of our Despatch,* dated 14th March 1881, we have the honour

* No. 44.

† Dated 6th March 1881.

‡ Dated 18th March 1881.

to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of a letter† from the Amir of Kabul to the Commissioner of Peshawur, and of the letter‡ from the Viceroy to His Highness.

2. We also forward copies of a letter§ from the Resident at Kandahar, giving an account of his meeting with the envoys sent by Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, and the message delivered by them.

§ Dated 2nd March 1881.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

WHITLEY STOKES.

D. M. STEWART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR, dated 6th March 1881.

After compliments.—I have perused your two friendly letters, dated the 25th and the 27th February 1881 respectively, which made known to me your friendly sentiments. Your first letter informed me of Amir Ahmad Khan's arrival at Peshawur and Calcutta, and set my heart at rest. The second letter, which contained a telegraphic communication from his Excellency the Viceroy respecting the Kandahar question, was fully understood by me.

With regard to the ammunition granted by the glorious Government, it is necessary that it should be made over to my officials at Lundikotal, (*viz.*) it should be brought through the officials of the British Government as far as Lundikotal, whence the men of the Governor of Jellalabad will take charge of it, and will, please God, bring it to Kabul quickly.

I have understood what you wrote that the British troops will abandon Kandahar early in spring; that his Excellency the Viceroy urges that my officers and troops should reach Kandahar before the 15th April, and that the British troops will not undertake to occupy it for me after the 15th April. But I do not know why and wherefore the representatives of the Sublime Government are so hasty and are going to abandon Kandahar so soon and in such a short time, and why they have placed me in such a narrow circle.*

* This may mean either "they have given me short notice," or "they have put me in a difficult position."

I have not omitted and will not omit anything in respect to the administration of Kandahar. I gave wide publicity to the contents of his Excellency the Viceroy's letter

on the day it arrived, and notified to (all) far and near that the glorious Government has made over and granted Kandahar to me; and forthwith I employed myself in getting ready accoutrements for the troops appointed. I had no ammunition. I applied to the Sublime Government for it. I had no camels. I called upon Lughman, Jellalabad, and the suburbs of Kabul, to furnish each their quota. The hire of a camel used to be Rupees 7 per month formerly. I have promised to pay Rupees 40 for a month's journey. Men have been appointed to go in every direction to bring camels. The troops appointed are now ready and prepared; camels will also, please God, arrive; the ammunition will also be brought from Lundikotal to the capital, and the troops will march to Kandahar, where they will arrive five days before or after the 15th April. My affairs are confused and in a very bad state from want of material and resources. It is not that my affairs, like those of the British Government, are in good order, and that I am showing apathy and indifference. Such is the embarrassed state of Afghanistan, and such is the determination of the British officers! However, I will, please God, use my endeavours so long as there is life in the body. Rest assured. But I cannot guarantee the entry of my troops in Kandahar punctually and for certain on the 14th April. As soon as the camels arrive I will put the troops in motion. Should the officers of the British Government lay the blame upon me to-morrow (afterwards), saying that as my troops did not arrive at Kandahar within the fixed period the British troops gave up the possession of Kandahar, I shall not consider myself liable to blame. Should the British Government have anything else in view it will not also give me cause to grieve, nor will it hurt my feelings. I look upon the pleasure of the British Government as my own pleasure.

Although I wish my own advancement, and desire to see my State well administered, I wish more to maintain my good reputation and to be true to my word.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

Khureeta, dated Umballa, 18th March 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, Amir of Kabul.

Your Highness' friendly letter addressed on the 6th March to the Commissioner of Peshawur has been forwarded to me. I reply to it direct, since, although on some occasions it has been necessary, to save time, that the Commissioner of Peshawur should be instructed by telegraph to send letters on my behalf, yet I take every opportunity of corresponding with Your Highness direct.

In regard to the ammunition, General Mir Ahmed has been already informed that not only has the supply required been despatched, but a further supply is available, if required. And if on the arrival of Your Highness' troops at Kandahar it is found that rifles and more ammunition are needed for the equipment of your troops there, these will also be forthcoming, in addition to the artillery already offered, at that place.

Your Highness will now, I trust, feel assured that the British Government is endeavouring in many ways to assist and facilitate your preparations for sending a force to receive charge of Kandahar. It has given me much pleasure to learn that the despatch of this force is only delayed by the want of transport, and that it will reach Kandahar within a few days before or after the 15th April; for, although it is not my intention to circumscribe too narrowly the time within which our joint arrangements must take effect, yet there are very strong reasons why they cannot be delayed.

In the first place, I desire to explain to Your Highness that the greater part of the British troops now in Kandahar must leave Afghanistan in time to march to India before the extreme heat begins; otherwise they will suffer greatly on the road, and Your Highness, who is experienced in military matters, knows the paramount importance of caring for the health of an army. It is solely through my solicitude for Your Highness' convenience that I have deferred the movement until the middle of April; and it is even now to be feared that some of the British troops will be exposed to grave hardship.

Secondly, there is a great and manifest advantage in giving effect, as speedily as possible, to whatever arrangements have been settled between the two Governments in respect to Kandahar. The determination of Her Majesty's Government to offer Kandahar to Your Highness cannot fail to become speedily known; indeed Your Highness has already announced it to your people; so that now the wise and prudent course is to act rapidly upon the plan that has been adopted, lest delay should be prejudicial to Your Highness' interest, and lest the minds of men should become unsettled and the solution of affairs should become less opportune.

I trust, therefore, that Your Highness will perceive that, in advising you earnestly that your troops should reach Kandahar by the middle of April, I have been actuated entirely by a regard for the joint interests of both States and by my sincere desire for the success of this important undertaking.

Enclosure 3 in No. 10.

Dated Kandahar, 2nd March 1881. (Extract.)

From Lieut.-Colonel ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE this morning telegraphed to you the substance of the message from Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, delivered to me yesterday evening by his envoys. As anticipated in my letter of the 26th, they did not attempt to give it until invited. I, therefore, asked them to visit me yesterday, and requested them to communicate any further message they might have from the Sirdar. Abdulla Khan, Nasiri, then said that the Sirdar had ordered them in the first instance to express his profound regret for Lieutenant MacLaine's murder, and, secondly, to give me the following message: "That he considered that Yakub Khan was in the first place the lawful heir of their father, the late Amir; and that this was the view of the Government was shown by their making over the country to him. Fate so willed it, that, either on account of his faults or because Government judged it advisable in their own interests, he was deposed and deported to India. This being the case, Ayub Khan considers himself the next in succession and the rightful heir to the sovereignty of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, he places his affairs unreservedly in the hands of the British Government, looking upon himself as its friend and servant; and will accept any measure of kindness it is pleased to bestow on him, whether it gives him the whole of Afghanistan, half of it, Kandahar only, or a village of Kandahar." If the English

Note.—This would appear only an expression of humility without any definite meaning.

Government accept his friendship, his endeavour and desire will be to do it service, and he will look upon its friends and enemies as his own.

2. Umar Jan, Sahibzada, then said that he was not a person of official rank, but a poor man and a Mullah. Nevertheless, he was able, should the British Government come to terms with Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, to exhort the people of his own race and faith to hold fast to the friendship of the British Government, and look upon its enemies as their enemies. For the British being a great Government and a

74
near neighbour to their country has power of good and evil over it. The interest of Afghanistan, therefore, lies in obtaining the good-will of the English Government.

3. I said to the Sahibzada that I was glad to see that he had so just an appreciation of the true interests of his country, by disregarding which the late Amir had brought about his own ruin. As regards the Sirdar's message, I told the envoys that they were, no doubt, aware that I could say nothing in reply on my own account, but that I would faithfully transmit it to his Excellency the Viceroy of India. They replied, begging my good offices with his Excellency, to which I gave no answer.

No. 11.

No. 51 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, March 27, 1881.

In continuation of our despatch, No. 39,* dated the 28th February 1881,

Letter from Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, No. 1104P., dated 21st February, 1881, and enclosure.

Letter to the Government of the Punjab, No. 479E.P., dated 12th March 1881.

we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers noted on the margin, regarding the arrangements finally concluded with the Khyber Afridis for the

future security of the Khyber Pass.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIFON.
WHITLEY STOKES.
D. M. STEWART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

From Lieut.-Colonel W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 21st February 1881.

I HAVE the honour to forward two copies of the Pass Agreement with the Khyber Afridis, corrected in accordance with instructions and finally signed by them.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

AGREEMENT with GOVERNMENT signed by the KHYBER AFRIDIS.

We agree as follows:

1. On the understanding that the British Government maintain political relations with us, while at the same time our independence continues to be fully recognized, we are bound to exclude all other influence, and not to admit the interference of any other power between ourselves and the British Government.

2. In consideration of receiving certain allowances, the amount of which Government has engaged to fix, we hereby undertake the responsibility of preserving order and security of life and property within the Khyber Pass.

3. All matters affecting the Pass arrangements and especially the security of the road shall be submitted to a combined council of all the Afridi tribes. Through this council, arrangements will be made such as will provide for the security of the lives and property of all who use the Khyber road without distinction of class or race, local being entitled to equal protection with foreign traffic; and care will be taken that no intertribal or personal feuds are pursued on or near the road or posts.

4. No trader or travellers will be allowed to enter the Pass without an order authorizing them to proceed, which will be furnished to persons responsible, together with a sufficient guard for protection.

Should any prospect of danger present itself, owing to the existence or likelihood of any disturbance on or near the road, we will be responsible for closing the Pass, giving notice to that effect to the Khan of Kalpura, and to the Political Officer at Jamrud, and will further make due provision for the safety of any trade, or travellers within the Pass.

5. Our responsibility for the security of the road is independent of aid from Government in the form of troops. It lies with the discretion of Government to retain its troops within the Pass, or to withdraw them and to reoccupy at pleasure.

6. We will provide such number of men as Government may direct to carry on the duties of Jezailchis, of whom some force is absolutely necessary to enable us to render the road secure.

These men, having their head-quarters at Jamrud, will be subject to the inspection of the Political Officer, and all arrangements which we make for the distribution of their duties shall be reported to him. Should we wish to employ them on any other duty than that of protecting the road, the permission of the Political Officer must be obtained.

We fully understand that these Jezailchis are not a Government force, and that, although maintained at Government expense, they are being allowed merely as an additional means of enabling us to fulfil our engagements.

7. So long as we are in receipt of the Khyber allowances the right of collecting tolls rests with the British Government alone. We cannot claim any payments of traders or travellers.

8. All offences committed on the road shall be dealt with by the united council of all the tribes, whether individuals or sections of tribes are concerned.

The council shall inflict punishment after the manner of our tribal customs, and compensation will be awarded to the injured party or parties.

The action taken on the commission of any offence or in regard to the punishment of the offenders shall be reported to the Political Officer, through whom any compensation that is awarded will be paid. If necessary, fines and compensation can be enforced by deductions from the allowances made by Government.

9. In consideration of the allowances of which we shall be in receipt, we further bind ourselves not to commit dacoity, highway robbery, or murder in British territory. Any transgression of this condition will make our allowances liable to forfeiture in payment of fine or compensation due on this account.

10. All arrangements that we make in fulfilling our responsibility for the protection of the road shall be reported to the Political Officer.

All convoys wishing to proceed through the Pass shall be despatched periodically under a guard, and we are responsible for all trade or travellers admitted within the Pass.

11. We will maintain until further orders the standing posts or chowkis which have hitherto been kept up along the road by the tribes and have been paid for from the allowances. The tribal watchmen who occupy them will be employed either in guarding their assigned localities, or in forming part of the escort on the periodical convoys.

12. Of the Government buildings situated in the Pass we consent to take some under our charge, guaranteeing their security; the rest should be dismantled by Government.

We engage to hold the fort of Ali Musjid, understanding that Government will grant an additional company of 100 Jezailchis for this special duty.

13. We undertake to guarantee the safety of the Political Officer, or other official who may have occasion to visit the Khyber Pass; provided that sufficient notice be given us beforehand.

14. It is understood that the boundary fixed by the Treaty of Gundamak, west of Lundikhana, is the limit of our responsibilities. This is liable to subsequent alteration at the discretion of Government.

15. Permanent arrangements will be made by which posts or expresses can be forwarded at any time night or day.

16. We are prepared to take charge of the Khyber Pass in the manner above indicated from Lundikhana to Ali Musjid, and again from Ali Musjid, to Jamrud at once, or so soon as Government directs the withdrawal of troops from the whole of this road or any part of it. Meanwhile the tribes will preserve their present obligations.

17. We understand that we are exclusively responsible for the future management of the Khyber, and that Government in no way shares in this responsibility; and this position we accept.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawar Division.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

No. 479 E.P., dated Fort William, 12th March 1881.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary of the Government of India, Foreign Department, to SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters, reporting the final arrangement which it is proposed to make for the future security of the Khyber Pass. I have already communicated with you by telegram regarding certain parts of the plan which required immediate orders, and I am now to convey to you the orders of the Government of India upon the whole subject.

2. The arrangements impose upon the Afridi tribes entire and exclusive responsibility for the security of the road which passes through the independent tribal territory where the authority of the Kabul Government is not recognized. A subsidy of Rupees 87,540 per annum is to be given in allowances to different portions of these tribes, and a body of jezailchis is, in compliance with the wish of the Afridis, to be maintained at a yearly cost of Rupees 87,392 to the British Government. In consideration of these payments the Afridis undertake all responsibility for management of the Pass in accordance with their agreement, and are bound to occupy with the jezailchis Ali Masjid and other important posts as far as Lundikhana. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor has declared that the groundwork of the Commissioner's proposals has his entire approbation and concurrence, and this opinion, which of course carries, upon such a subject, great weight with the Government of India, the Governor-General in Council has determined to accept.

3. There were, however, certain points of detail which appeared to require special consideration. The correspondence submitted by you showed some divergence of views as to the expediency of levying tolls upon traffic passing through the Khyber. The Commissioner would have deferred for a few months the collection of these tolls, on the ground that by collecting them we assume a more direct responsibility than is contemplated by the agreement for the safety of the convoys traversing the Pass; while his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor sees no sufficient reason for not levying the tolls at once, observing that, whether we do so or not, the public will virtually hold the Government of India responsible for the safety of the Pass. The Governor-General in Council concurs with his Honour in preferring that the tolls should be levied at once. The terms of the agreement expressly reserve to the British Government the right of levying tolls, and it is possible that, if at the commencement this right is waived, it may not be altogether easy to levy them hereafter should it be thought advisable to do so; while the suspension of the exercise of our right may be interpreted as an indication of some uncertainty whether the arrangements made with the tribes will have effectually provided for the security of the road. Further it is hardly to be expected that the exemption from transit dues will procure any advantage to travellers and caravans using the road, as the tolls which we should forego would in all probability be exacted by the Afridis themselves, or by some authority beyond the territorial limit of these arrangements. Under these circumstances, the Government of India approve the recommendations of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor on this point, and I am to request that the necessary orders may be issued at his discretion to the Commissioner of Peshawar.

4. A second question arises as to the responsibility for particular robberies committed within the Pass. The Governor-General in Council observes that the Commissioner of Peshawar would throw upon the tribal union all responsibility for the safety of convoys traversing the Pass, and would decline, on the part of Government, any direct liability to the traders in the event of losses. If robberies occur, the complainants are to be referred to the headmen for their remedy, while the British officers assist them by their influence and advice, and reserve the power, in case the tribes fail to act up to their agreement, to withhold the allowances, disband the jezailchis, and close the Pass. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor would, on the other hand, authorize the Political Officer to enquire into individual complaints, and, after the necessary enquiries, award compensation out of the tribal subsidies. After attentive consideration of the opinion of his Honour upon this particular question, the Government of India have formed the conclusion that it is most expedient, on first bringing these arrangements into operation, to follow strictly the procedure laid down in the agreement, and to refer all complaints in the first instance to the jirgahs. Article 3 of the agreement entrusts the jirgah with the power of award and of levying penalties, and they should have full discretion in exercising this power. It is

any particular case they fail in the performance of their duty, it will be time to bring pressure to bear upon the united jirgah of all the tribes, reminding them that they have undertaken to award compensation which (when awarded) may be deducted from the allowances, and that the maintenance by the British Government of the whole agreement may depend on their fulfilment of an essential condition belonging to it.

5. In a previous communication from you, and in the telegrams from this Office, the advisability of retaining a body of jezailchis for service within the Pass has been discussed. In sanctioning the retention of the force, the Government of India has been mainly influenced by the argument used in your letter to the Commissioner of Peshawur, No. 2140, dated 13th December 1880, and in the letter of the Commissioner to which it is a reply. The special advantage of the plan is understood to be that it will preserve unity of action among the tribes, will give a frame-work and cohesion to the intertribal arrangements, and will provide with regular employ and duties more than 600 men, who might otherwise be disposed to plundering and disorder. It appears to be, moreover, the decided opinion of the frontier officers that, unless the tribes are in this manner encouraged and assisted by us in their attempts at self-organization, they must inevitably fail in combining to fulfil their joint responsibilities. The sanction of the Government of India under certain conditions has already been conveyed to you by telegraph, but I am now to repeat that his Excellency the Governor-General in Council assents to the establishment of the jezailchi corps and to the agreement that our officers shall engage to pay the men, and to do what may be practicable in the way of aiding the headmen to equip and organize the force. But it is understood that the tribal headmen must take actual charge of the corps, and of its recruiting and ordinary management; the British political officers merely assisting by advice, and by their general influence, supported, of course, in this case by the understanding that the allowances are liable to be forfeited or suspended if the arrangements break down. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council would again point out that the essential principle of the whole agreement is distinctly declared to be that the tribes undertake certain specified duties and responsibilities in exchange for certain stipulated payments.

6. I am to inform you that his Excellency in Council agrees with Sir Robert Egerton in thinking that it is not possible, at any rate for the present, to reduce to any considerable extent the amount of the subsidies to be paid in cash to the Afridis for the protection of the Khyber Pass. The Governor-General in Council feels that the arrangements must, to a certain extent, be regarded as experimental. The objects of the Government of India are to keep the Khyber Pass secure and open, to encourage traffic and intercourse with Afghanistan, to establish our political influence over the Afridis, and to exclude the authority of Kabul from the independent border lands. If the arrangements adopted work well and succeed in securing these objects, his Excellency in Council is of opinion that the money payments which may be necessary are well worth making.

7. You also treat of the establishments required by the Political Officers in charge of the Khyber Pass arrangements, and of the rate of pay of the jezailchi force. With reference to the latter point, I am to inform you that the Government of India accepts his Honour's recommendation to retain for the present the rate of Rupees 9 per mensem as the pay of a sepoy in the jezailchi force; and will be glad to receive your further proposals on this subject. As regards political establishments, I am to remark that the estimates submitted by you seem to be capable of material reductions; but the Governor-General in Council will reserve the whole subject for separate consideration.

8. In conclusion, I am to inform you that his Excellency the Governor-General in Council fully concurs in the high estimate which Sir Robert Egerton has formed of the ability with which Colonel Waterfield, C.S.I., the Commissioner of Peshawur, has conducted these negotiations. The settlement which he has effected by the exercise of great patience and address in dealing with the tribes will, if it proves stable and otherwise permanently successful, be a lasting memorial of valuable services rendered by Colonel Waterfield in his political administration of the frontier of the Peshawur Division of the Punjab.

9. I am also directed to acknowledge the good services of Major Conolly, Political Officer in the Khyber, and of his Assistants, and I am to inform you that the work done by them will be borne in mind.

No. 12.

No. 54 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, April 3, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch,* dated 27th March 1881, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of a letter† from the Commissioner of Peshawur to the Amir of Kabul, and of two letters, dated, respectively, 12th and 16th March 1881, from the Amir to the Commissioner.

* No. 50.

† Dated 8th March 1881.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

WHITLEY STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

TRANSLATION of a Copy of an Abstract of a LETTER addressed by the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR to the AMIR of KABUL, dated 8th March 1881.

After compliments.—A telegram, dated the 7th March 1881, has been received from the Foreign Secretary to the effect that, according to his Excellency the Viceroy's command, I should address a friendly letter to you, intimating that General Amir Ahmad Khan has discharged the duties entrusted to him satisfactorily, and has become well acquainted with the views and sentiments of his Excellency the Viceroy, and has succeeded in obtaining the ammunition, mention of which is made in your Highness' friendly letter. It is now deemed advisable that the above-named General should wait in person upon your Highness and represent minutely and in detail the conversations that he has had with, and all that he has heard from, his Excellency the Viceroy respecting matters in general. His Excellency the Viceroy intends leaving Calcutta for Simla in a few days, and so the General has quitted Calcutta this day, the 8th March, with the object of proceeding direct to Kabul to wait upon your Highness, provided he receives no further orders from your Highness on the road. Should your Highness again depute him to India after he has waited upon, and paid his respects to, your Highness, his Excellency the Viceroy will receive him with pleasure at Simla.

His Excellency the Viceroy's friendly letter to your Highness has been made over to the General, who will deliver it to your Highness when he waits upon you.

General Amir Ahmad Khan will reach Peshawur on the 13th March, if he is not delayed on the road.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

TRANSLATION of Copy of LETTER addressed by the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR to the AMIR of KABUL, dated 12th March 1881.

After compliments.—I wrote to your Highness in my previous letter of the 27th February 1881 that cartridges, the nearest possible (to the descriptions given), were held in readiness to be made over to your officials either at Peshawur or at Khyber. Mulla Abu Bakr and Muhammad Akbar accordingly got the camels, received the cartridges from the Peshawur Arsenal, and sent off 202 camel-loads on the 3rd March 1881, and 153 loads on the 6th idem. These were convoyed as far as Lundikhana by a British guard, and thence they were taken over by the men of the Khan of Lalpura, who sent them on.

The detail of the descriptions of the cartridges, &c., will be learned on a perusal of the list enclosed and of the receipt of the above-named persons.

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR to the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR, dated 16th March 1881.

A FRIENDLY letter from you, dated the 8th March, came to hand on the 13th. This letter announced that General Mir Ahmed Khan, after the conclusion of all necessary business, had taken leave of his Excellency the Viceroy. Whatever his Excellency communicated to him and enjoined on him will, no doubt, be a source of benefit for both powers.

Whereas it is necessary to inform the representatives of the British Government regarding the appointment of the Kandahar troops, their officer in command, and his subordinates, I write that 1,000 cavalry, 4,000 infantry, artillery, and khasadars, in all 5,000, have been appointed to proceed in that direction (Kandahar). Of these the cavalry leaving here on the 20th Rabi-ul-Sani (21st March) will arrive in Kandahar between the 2nd and the 5th of Jamaat-ul-Awwal (2nd and 5th April), while the infantry and artillery and khasadars will proceed by regular marches to their destination.

With regard to the governor, the General, and other subordinate officers, General Amir Ahmed Khan was instructed by the representatives of the sublime Government that only such men should be selected to fill these posts who are wholly free from any charge of wrong-doing and have no designs of their own. Accordingly, after thinking the matter over very carefully, and giving one preference over another, I have decided on appointing my cousin, Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, the son of my uncle Amir Azim Khan, as governor, and nominated Sirdar Shams-ul-din Khan Muhammadzai, Ghulam Hyder Khan Sahibzada, Kazi Said-uddin Khan, and several others, for the subordinate posts of government. General Ghulam Hyder Khan, Tokhi, Commander-in-Chief of the God-granted Government, has been appointed to take charge of the troops.

These men, please God, will serve as an excellent guarantee for the good management of the country. Anything that the officers of Government leave in Kandahar in the way of money, material, tools, and arms, and entrust to my agents, will be made over to these men whose names I have mentioned above. They will arrive with the cavalry first, and General Ghulam Hyder will come up afterwards with the infantry and artillery.

I also write to inform you previously I had appointed Sirdar Muhammad Yusuf Khan in the place of Muhammad Hashim Khan as governor of Kandahar, but the officers of the God-granted Government, and those who were intended to proceed to Kandahar, unanimously voted that Yusuf Khan was not fit for a post of such responsibility and importance, and the only result of sending him will in all probability be a complete failure. His appointment was therefore cancelled.

No. 13.

To His Excellency the MOST HONOURABLE the GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

No. 13.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, April 8, 1881.

In conveying to you, in my Despatch of the 19th of November last, the assent of Her Majesty's Government to your recognition of the independence of the tribes who inhabit and border on the Khyber Pass, after the withdrawal from that position of the British troops, I informed you that I left the details of the arrangements to be thereupon made with those tribes with entire confidence in the hands of your Excellency's Government.

2. You now report those details in your letter, No. 39 of the 28th February last, from which I learn that you have concluded a formal agreement with the headmen of the Pass which concedes to their tribes a proper independence within recognized limits, admits the exercise of our own influence over them to the exclusion of that of any other power, invests them with the sole responsibility for the future management of the road, reserves to Government a proper discretion as to withdrawal or possible re-occupation of the Pass, and places the future security of the Khyber on a clear and recognized basis.

3. To effect these objects you have, whilst retaining in your own hands the right of collecting tolls in the Pass, consented to grant annual allowances to different sections of the Afridis to the amount of Rs. 87,540, and to allot a further yearly sum of

Rs. 87,392 to the payment of a corps of Jezailehs which the tribes desire to maintain. You have further arranged to withdraw the British garrisons from the Pass at an early date after the survey of certain alternative routes to Lundikhana and Dakka.

4. Your proceedings appear to be well calculated to effect the objects which Her Majesty's Government have at heart, viz., the proper security of the Khyber Pass and a safe transit through it, with the least possible interference on the part of Government. I have, therefore, to intimate to you their full approval of those proceedings, and their sense of the care with which the arrangements have been conducted and completed by Colonel Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawur, under the orders of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 14.

No. 57 of 1881.

Government of India,—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, April 10, 1881.

In continuation of our Despatch,* dated the 3rd April 1881, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter from the Resident at Kandahar, dated the 22nd March,† enclosing letters from Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan and the Amir of Kabul, and submitting remarks on the course of affairs in Kandahar during the preceding three weeks.

2. We forward also copies of papers and telegrams relating to the instructions issued for the evacuation of Kandahar and to the transfer of the civil administration to the governor appointed by the Amir of Kabul. It will be seen that letters have been addressed to the Amir of Kabul, commending to his care and protection the Sirdars and other persons who have served or otherwise assisted the British Government during the occupation of Southern Afghanistan, and who will remain at Kandahar; and that instructions on the same subject have been simultaneously sent to Colonel St. John.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
G. T. CHESNEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

No. 162, dated Kandahar, 22nd March 1881 (Extract).

From Lieut.-Col. O. B. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, Kandahar, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In forwarding the enclosed copies of letters from Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan to me, from myself to his Highness the Amir, and from his Highness to me, I take the opportunity of submitting a few remarks on the course of affairs in Kandahar during the past three weeks.

2. After the interview with Muhammad Ayub Khan's envoys, of which I had the honour to give an account in my letter of the 2nd March, I refrained from seeing them until the receipt of your telegram of the 20th ordering their dismissal. No restraint was placed on their movements, but they voluntarily remained in the house placed at their disposal, fearing, at least so Abdulla Khan stated, that their presence in the streets or mosques might occasion disturbances which would prejudice the cause of their master. It was not till the 17th that Sahibzada Umar Jan asked leave to visit his father's grave, situated in a garden outside the town. His passage through the streets, being unexpected, excited little curiosity or comment, and the next day (being Friday) he requested permission to say his prayers in a neighbouring mosque. But the envoys' followers,

circulating freely in the town, brought to them the rumours which have been current for some days past of the approach of the Amir's troops, and for the last week they have been very uneasy as to the success of their mission.

3. After receipt of your telegram of the 21st on the same day, I sent at once for the envoys, and told them that Her Majesty's Government, after careful consideration of the circumstances, believed that the best course in its own interests and those of Afghanistan would be to confer the sovereignty of Kandahar on the Amir Abdurrahman Khan; that they had therefore invited him to send a representative and troops to Kandahar as soon as possible, shortly after whose arrival the British army would retire across the Khojak. The envoys stated that the rumour current in the town had prepared them for the announcement I had made; to which I replied that, with the exception of myself and themselves, no one in Kandahar was aware of the settlement made with the Amir, and that I had not lost a day in communicating it to them. Abdulla Khan said that they regretted the decision of Government, both on account of their country and the English, as it would have been a far preferable arrangement to have left Abdurrahman in possession of Kabul and Turkistan, and to have acknowledged Ayub Khan as ruler of Kandahar and Herat. I replied that there could be no use in discussing the matter now; and that for the present the only advice I could give them was to refrain from any attempt to create disturbances, which could only result in detaining the British troops in the country, and to recommend Sirdar Ayub Khan to come to terms, if possible, with the Amir. The envoys then asked when they should leave. I told them that it depended entirely on themselves; and, after a short discussion, it was agreed that they should start to-morrow, the 23rd.

4. The very seasonable and abundant rain which has fallen during the last three weeks has dispelled the apprehension I expressed in former letters of the difficulty, or even impossibility, of feeding the large number of transport animals massed here to provide for the movement of the force on the 15th April. The green crops and young corn, which is here cut for forage, are not only more abundant, but a full fortnight earlier than usual; while the prospect of a good harvest has made sellers anxious to bring their corn to market as soon as possible.

While on the subject of supply, I may mention that the existing contract machinery of the Commissariat should enable them to feed from Kandahar and the neighbourhood a considerable force at Gulistan Karez and Kilah Abdulla, and materially lessen the necessity of bringing large supplies from India for the troops at Quetta.

5. The town revenue, which fell from Rupees 61,000 in December to Rupees 29,000 in January, and again to below Rupees 20,000 in February, is now showing signs of recuperation, the collections for the first 21 days of the current month amounting to nearly Rupees 20,000.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR AYUB KHAN, dated 10th Rabi-ul-Sani—
11th March 1881.

After compliments.—On the evening of the 7th, I received the kind letter of 26th instant (ultimo ?) which you sent me by Yar Muhammad Khan, Peshkidmat. I was very glad to hear that you were well and in good health. The account you give of the honourable treatment you were good enough to show towards my special envoys tends still more to the increase of friendship. It is certain that a man, who puts his hope in, and trusts himself to, the great Government, will succeed in gaining their friendship, and will obtain proper treatment and perfect comfort. Now that Rubullah Khan, Peshkhidmat, is going in your direction, I trouble you with this letter to say that, please God, from your display of hearty kindness, the important business (now in hand) will be settled, and the bond of friendship made strong and enduring. I have nothing else to trouble you with. You will always make me happy by the news of your good health.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from Lieut.-Col. O. B. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Kandahar, to His Highness the AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN of Kabul, dated Kandahar, 19th March 1881.

After compliments.—Having informed Sirdars Muhammad Husain Khan, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and others of the descendants of Sirdar Mirdil Khan that the British

Government has it in contemplation to confer the sovereignty of Kandahar on your Highness; these Sardars ask me to forward the enclosed letter to your Highness, and I trust that your Highness will return them a speedy and kind answer. They have faithfully served the British Government, and, if treated with kindness and consideration, will, I have no doubt, be equally loyal to your Highness.

Time does not admit of my communicating with Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, grandson of Sirdar Kohindil Khan, who is in the neighbourhood of Girishk, but I have no doubt that he will welcome your Highness' accession to power here and do good service as he has done to the British Government. Other supporters upon whom your Highness may count are the Popalzai Chiefs, Taj Muhammad Khan, and his brothers, Ghulam Muhammad Khan and Fathi Muhammad Khan, Shahghassis Sarwar Khan and Sarbuland Khan, Achakzia. In the direction of the west, many people are prepared to welcome your coming. Ismail Khan, Taimuni, brother of Ambia Khan of Tairwan, is with me in Kandahar, and his brother writes that he is ready whenever I give the word. Abdulla Khan, Taimuni, is also here; and it is probably known to you that the Chiefs of the Firuzkohis, the Jamshidis, and the Hazaras are all in rebellion. Sirdar Ahmad Khan, Ishakzai, of Lash Jowain, Ibrahim Khan, Biluch, of Chakansur, Sharif Khan of Kalah-i-Fath, are all devoted to the British Government and ready to support its friend. Taj Muhammad Khan, Seistani, is also here with me. It would be well if your Highness wrote letters of kindness and consideration to all these people, so as to bind them to your interests. About other people, such as the Alizais of Zamindawar and other Deranis, as well as the Mullahs, Mustaufi Abdul Ghias Khan is writing to you.

Enclosure 4 in No. 14.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR to the RESIDENT, Kandahar, dated 25th March 1881.

After compliments.—I have to inform you that I have received a despatch from his Excellency the Viceroy, dated 30th January 1881. With great kindness he has given me the news that I am to have the government of Kandahar, and has informed me that the English Government will support me with money and munitions of war. He also urges me to make speedy arrangements for the affairs of that province. I have made known the Viceroy's joyful communication to all the people in Turkistan and Afghanistan, and it also seemed necessary that I should write and send letters to the people of Kandahar and Pusht-i-Rud, and inform them of the real object of the Government, and of its kindness towards me. Therefore I have written friendly letters to all the nobles and great people of the province, and sent them by my own messengers, and I have ordered Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan, son of the late Khushdil Khan, and Mirza Abdul Ghias Khan, son of the late Mirza Ahmed Khan, to distribute them to the individuals and tribes concerned. For messengers to carry these letters to Pusht-i-Rud, Pishin, and other districts, they will require some money, so (I hope) you will give them Rupees 2,000 from the treasury. Please God, henceforth I will inform you from time to time of any arrangements I may make for the government of the country.

Enclosure 5 in No. 14.

Specimen (translated) of Amir's circular letters.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER addressed by AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to SYUD SHERDIL and SYUD MARWAND of Kandahar, dated February 1881.

After compliments.—Certainly you are aware that I set foot in Afghanistan at a time when the misfortune and trouble of the tribes and the people of Afghanistan had reached their zenith; and that for the well-being of the people I laid the foundation of sincere friendship with the sublime British Government, so that the people of Afghanistan might benefit by any advantages to be derived from (the friendship of) that Government. During the last seven months of my rule in the capital, Kabul, you have surely heard of the remission of "Sarmarda" and other remissions granted to the Ghilzais, the Kohistanis, and the other tribes, as well as of the abolition of arbitrary exactions and of other favours and benefits conferred by me.

The sublime British Government has recently handed over† the government of Kandahar to me. It is therefore necessary to gratify and gladden you by communicating this happy news to you, and to acquaint you with my intentions and wishes. Whereas I look upon you as my devoted well-wishers, whose interests are identical to mine, I intend to spend these few days of my life in promoting your happiness and welfare and, in sympathizing with you. For the purpose of defending your honour, and enhancing your reputation and dignity, I deem it advisable and expedient to administer Kandahar. Rest assured that, as long as you live, you will enjoy happiness, comfort, and prosperity, under the shadow of my kindness and mercy. No doubt you will reply to this speedily; and, in doing so, you will also write regarding your own circumstances.

Enclosure 6 in No. 14.

Khureeta, dated Simla, 2nd April 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

THE city of Kandahar has now been for more than two years in the occupation of the British troops. During this period the British officers have received assistance in various ways from different Sirdars and other persons residing in the country, who have given their services in the maintenance of good order in the town and the adjacent districts, and who have generally shown their friendship and good-will toward the British Government. And since the administration of Kandahar is now to be made over to your Highness' officials, the security, in person and property, of all people in whom the British Government is thus interested, and who will remain at Kandahar and in the neighbourhood after the withdrawal of the British troops, becomes a matter of particular concern to the Government of the Queen-Empress.

I therefore write this letter to commend earnestly all such persons to your care and protection, and to request that your Highness, regarding as your own friends all friends of the British Government, may be pleased to issue speedily the necessary instructions to your governor at Kandahar, enjoining him to consider under his special charge, and to treat with proper consideration, all persons on behalf of whom my representatives there may desire his good offices.

Colonel St. John, who is the British Resident at Kandahar, has been directed to communicate upon this subject with your Highness' governor as soon as he shall have arrived at that place.

Enclosure 7 in No. 14.

No. 618 E.P., dated Simla, 3rd April 1881.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Colonel O. B. C. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Kandahar.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information and guidance, copy of a letter addressed by his Excellency the Viceroy to the Amir of Kabul. You will observe that his Highness has been asked

Dated 2nd April 1881. to lose no time in issuing instructions to his officers at Kandahar for the proper protection, in person and property, of Sirdars and others who have adhered to the interests of the British Government during the period of our occupation of Kandahar, and who will remain there after the administration shall have been transferred to the Amir.

2. I am to request that you will communicate the substance of this letter, in anticipation of orders from Kabul, to the Amir's representatives at Kandahar, that you will impress upon them the importance attached to the matter by the British Government, that you will consider what arrangements may be best adapted for giving effect to the Viceroy's wishes, and that you will submit a report of your conclusions. It is not probable, under the circumstances, that any persons in South Afghanistan who may have identified themselves with our administration will find it necessary to withdraw with our troops, but for such cases, if they occur, you are authorised to make proper temporary provision.

3. I am also to instruct you that all practicable measures should be taken for the preservation of the graves of British officers and soldiers at Kandahar and elsewhere in the vicinity.

No. 15.

No. 60 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

My LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, April 17, 1881.

In continuation of our despatch,* dated the 10th April 1881, we have the honour
* No. 57. to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government,
copies of three letters from the Amir of Kabul to his Excellency
the Viceroy, dated, respectively, the 28th and 29th March and the 1st April, and of the
Viceroy's reply to his Highness.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON,
D. M. STEWART,
W. STOKES,
RIVERS THOMPSON,
J. GIBBS,
E. BARING,
G. T. CHESNEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency
the VICEROY, dated 28th March 1881.

After compliments.—I have perused your Excellency's kind and friendly letter, dated the 18th March 1881, corresponding to the 17th Rabi-ul-Sani. The benign expressions contained therein have gladdened my heart. It is indeed an excellent (arrangement) that your Excellency on certain occasions, in order to save time, telegraphs your Excellency's messages to the Commissioner of Peshawur, who communicates them to me. I too find it necessary in some matters to write to the Commissioner to report them to your Excellency by telegraph.

Regarding the ammunition, your Excellency has written that, besides the quantity requested by me, which has already been sent, if I want any more, it is also ready and available. Your Excellency is very kind indeed. The quantity of ammunition I asked for, and which your Excellency sent, I required for the muskets I had in my possession.

Now that I consider it incumbent upon me to organize Kandahar and strengthen that province, while the affair of Herat stares me in the face, and should not be lost sight of, or be easily passed over, the things that I require and are indispensably necessary are

Note. It is not clear whether he means the guns only to be breech-loading, or both the guns and rifles to be so. 12,000 rifles and two batteries of breech-loading* guns of superior English manufacture. Out of the number 12,000, 3,000 should be cavalry carbines and 9,000 infantry muskets. Therefore I beg to apprise your

Excellency, who is my kind benefactor and who sympathizes with me, that if this my object is fulfilled, viz., guns and rifles are granted, I hope, by God's grace, that all the affairs of Afghanistan will be completely arranged, and that all difficulties will be solved. The fulfilment of this important object is in your Excellency's hands. Your Excellency has the power to grant as many (rifles, &c.) as you like, more or less (than the number requested). The artillery will prove useful and be very acceptable, wherever Your Excellency may be pleased to grant it, whether at Kabul or at Kandahar. The equipment of an army, which I can move and march personally, and which may be equal to great occasions, depends upon muskets.

In regard to the taking over of Kandahar, from the British authorities, I have despatched my governor and other civil and military officers with 5,000 well-equipped troops. The cavalry will arrive at Kandahar first, and the infantry, the artillery, and the Jezailchis afterwards. It is hoped that my troops will enter Kandahar in good condition, and that the British forces will leave it cheerfully and successfully at the appointed time for their destination.

Enclosure 2 in No. 15.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 29th March 1881.

After compliments.—Whereas it is absolutely necessary to arrange the affairs of Kandahar, and the question of Herat is one that, under all circumstances, must be faced,* all my attention and energy must, with the divine help, be devoted to that quarter, so that we, who have the same interests and cares,† may be relieved from anxiety by the completion of its arrangements. But large sums of money will be expended on the materials (required) and on the said arrangements. The five lakhs of rupees, now available at Peshawur, will have to wait there for some time owing to the want of order in the Khyber‡ Pass; but they will shortly arrive by hundis (bills). The five lakhs payable at Kandahar will not be sufficient for the arrangements I have in view. I hope that fifteen lakhs may be granted to me on (my)§ arrival at Kandahar from the Government Treasury. These fifteen lakhs, with the five lakhs payable at Kandahar, will answer all important purposes. All expenses (of the march) from Kabul to Kandahar will be defrayed from the money I have in Kabul. In short, I have acquainted your Excellency with the real state of my affairs, so that at the time of carrying out important projects I may not find myself arrested and embarrassed, and that I may commence the business and engage in the project with my mind at ease.

* i.e., demands immediate attention.
—A. C. L.

† This hints that the two Governments have equal cause for anxiety.—
A. C. L.

‡ The money passed at once through the Khyber, which is in complete order.
—A. C. L.

§ May be, arrival of my troops.—
A. C. L.

Enclosure 3 in No. 15.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 1st April 1881.

After compliments.—I have received your Excellency's kind letter of the 8th March 1881, sent by the hand of General Amir Ahmad Khan, who also communicated to me your Excellency's verbal orders. I have been extremely pleased at your Excellency's kindnesses.

With regard to Kandahar I have been, and am, day and night, busy with preparations and arrangements for despatching troops there.

I divided the troops into three parts. I sent the cavalry, 1,000 strong, with the governor and experienced men first. I then despatched General Ghulam Haidar Khan with three infantry regiments, 600 strong each, and five pieces of artillery, and Sikandar Khan with 1,000 khasadars (irregulars) on the 24th March; and I shall wait myself till the arrival of the first division. I will let your Excellency know what I think proper to do hereafter. I shall take with me to Kandahar as many troops as I can provide with transport and other equipment, as also all the tribal Chiefs of Kabul, whose presence here may be considered injurious, and shall leave faithful servants and conscientious officials at Kabul.

Also your Excellency has been pleased to propose that your Excellency's agent, Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, Suddozai, should reside at my court. This is very considerate of your Excellency. The immediate presence of your Excellency's agent will have no other effect but to conduce to my welfare, to the good management of the affairs of Afghanistan, and to the prosperity and peace of this country. There are many advantages in the presence of your Excellency's agent (here). It will stop the tongues of the enemies from slander and idle talk. But the ignorance of the evil-minded persons, the unwisdom of the principal persons in Afghanistan, and the short-sightedness of this nation, are manifest. They incite the people to tumult and commotion, and drive them out of the path of humanity. A wise man is unwise in their sight. They lead people astray, and for the sake of a trifling gain they prefer disorder and tumult. For, when there is an established ruler in the country, they cannot serve their own ends and cannot make heavy purses. From these ill motives they do not love peace, and prefer disquietude and confusion. For their own selfish ends they wish to see the whole world desolate and ruined. From their ignorance they do not know and see what would tend to their lasting comfort.

For all these reasons, and at this time, when the name of Herat still exists,* and the affair of Kandahar is not yet settled, I feel apprehensive lest something should proceed from the ignorance of the people of this country, in consequence of which the labour of the British officers and my exertions, and the pains I have taken during the last eight months, may be, God forbid, utterly thrown away. In my opinion it would be appropriate, advisable, and advantageous, if your Excellency would kindly defer this matter till I go to Kandahar, and, having arranged its affairs, despatch troops to Herat. Then on my return to Kabul I will bring Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan with me, and, God willing, all matters will (then) be properly arranged. Should your Excellency even now think Muhammad Afzal Khan's presence at Kabul beneficial to the interests of your Excellency's Government, I have no objection. He will be received at Kabul with all due respect. I have written these few remarks as my judgment and reason have directed me. As I am only one person, this is all that my mind has suggested to me. The illustrious British Government has many intelligent and experienced men. Should they think otherwise it will not also be far from right; for they have seen and tried the Afghans well, and are well versed in civil and military affairs. I will agree to whatever they think right. I have expressed my opinion in the matter. I trust, by God's grace, that I shall always be true to my word, that your Excellency will continue to be kind to me, and that I shall maintain my good reputation.

I have postponed deputing General Amir Ahmad Khan (to India) till I hear from the Commissioner of Peshawar. Should your Excellency wish him to come, your Excellency will be good enough to ask the Commissioner by telegraph to let me know, and I will send him.

Further, I continually pray to God for your Excellency's good health.

P.S.—After I finished this letter it occurred to me that your Excellency might suspect that I do not like to receive Muhammad Afzal Khan, and so I assure your Excellency that there are no other reasons than those mentioned above for not receiving him. Should your Excellency depute the Sirdar alone for a week, so that he may interview me and then go back, your Excellency can do so.

Enclosure 4 in No. 15.

Khurecta, dated 16th April 1881.

From His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to His Highness the Amir of Kabul.

I HAVE had the pleasure of receiving lately three letters from your Highness, dated respectively the 28th and 29th March and the 1st April 1881, concerning the affairs of Afghanistan, and particularly in regard to the measures which you have adopted for the establishment of your government at Kandahar.

2. It is a matter of much satisfaction to the British Government that the arrangements for the despatch of your Highness' troops to Kandahar have been ordered with vigour and promptitude. I have issued the necessary instructions to my officers to make over to your Highness' Governor the administration of that city; and the time for the final withdrawal of the British troops has been so fixed as to allow time for the arrival of your Highness' troops from Kabul.

3. With regard to your Highness' representations regarding arms and ammunition, and a further subsidy of money, they have received my careful attention, and I have had much pleasure in making some provision for your Highness' present requirements at Kandahar. Three batteries of artillery and a number of rifles with ammunition are now being sent from India to Kandahar for the equipment of your Highness' forces at that place.

4. I have also caused your Governor at Kandahar to be informed that, besides the five lakhs already given to him there, his resources will be supplemented by a temporary allotment from the British Government of Rupees 50,000 monthly for his expenses in establishing his administration. The question of additional pecuniary assistance hereafter will be fully considered, although in regard to arms the matter is not free from difficulty, and I am at present disposed to recommend your Highness to use every endeavour to purchase arms within Afghanistan itself.

5. I observe that your Highness entertains some doubt as to the expediency of Sirdar Afzal Khan's deputation at the present time to Kabul. Under existing circumstances,

I am willing to defer to your Highness' judgment and to your experience and appreciation of the present condition of Afghanistan. Therefore, since your Highness considers that it will be good policy to adjourn for the present the Sirdar's deputation to Kabul, I agree that the arrangement may be postponed until the settlement of the country shall have been more completely accomplished.

6. In the meantime, as it appears from your Highness' letter that the return of General Mir Ahmad Khan to India is adjourned until you shall have heard again upon the subject, I reply that I shall be happy to receive again in India Mir Ahmad Khan or any other representative whom your Highness may depute to reside near my government.

No. 16.

No. 64 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, April 24, 1881.

In continuation of our despatch,* dated the 17th April 1881, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter from the Amir of Kabul to his Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 12th April 1881.

*No. 60.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPS
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
G. T. CHESNEY.

Enclosure in No. 16.

TRANSLATION of LETTER from His Highness the AMIR to His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA, dated 12th April 1881.

Your Excellency's kind letter, dated April 2nd, recommending the Sirdars and other residents of Kandahar who have rendered service and aid to the British Government during the last two years, to my protection and care, has been received and perused by me, and I have fully understood its contents.

Your Excellency may rest quite assured that I have no other than kindly intentions and benign feelings towards the Sirdars and Chiefs and nobles, and all the people of Afghanistan, especially towards those people of Kandahar who have made themselves conspicuous for their friendship and assistance to the British Government. I have every wish to show consideration and sympathy for them; but with regard to the Sirdars and Chiefs of Kandahar one condition is necessary, namely, that they should show me such devotion and sincerity as cannot be surpassed, for they have been friends of yours as am I, and I sympathise also with them. If under the cloak of friendship they plot mischief and work enmity against me; then shall I, without doubt, punish and chastise them. I will leave no source of disturbance in my kingdom. And as the representatives of the sublime British Government have bespoken my good offices for them, so I hope they too may be directed to practise sincerity and obedience to me, and not to allow vain thoughts or absurd ideas to enter their heads. Please God, provided they obey me and act in concert with me, they will be treated with the greatest consideration and kindness. A list of those persons who have done service for both Governments should be sent to me, so that they may be recognised and treated with kindness.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA
IN COUNCIL.

No. 20.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

India Office, London, April 29, 1881.

Para. 1. I have to acknowledge the receipt of letters of your Excellency's Government, Nos. 21, 35, and 40, dated respectively the 2nd, 21st, and 28th February, reporting the measures adopted or proposed by you, with the object of giving effect to the policy of Her Majesty's Government in respect to Kandahar and the assigned districts of Pishin and Sibi, and transmitting minutes recorded by some of your Excellency's colleagues on the subject.

2. It may be necessary for me, on a subsequent occasion, to make some observations on the minutes above referred to. If I abstain from discussing them in this despatch, I adopt that course from no want of respect to the writers, or from a failure to appreciate the weight attaching to many of the arguments adduced. No good purpose, however, would be served by prolongation of controversy upon a question which had of necessity to be finally determined upon the responsibility of the Home Government, in regard to which much conflict of opinion was known to exist amongst the advisers of your Excellency, and upon which the ultimate decision was not formed without the most attentive consideration of the arguments on both sides, and of the views of the dissentient members of your Government, with the general nature of which your Excellency had taken care to make me acquainted in an unofficial form. As regards Kandahar, moreover, the most authoritative objections appear to me to be less to the principles of the policy enjoined than to details of its execution; while the question of Pishin has, I think, been discussed under some degree of misapprehension as to the immediate purpose of Her Majesty's Government.

3. The question of greatest urgency at the date of my despatch of the 11th November was that of the disposal of the city and province of Kandahar. That despatch, while stating at length the reasons which led Her Majesty's Government to regard as highly impolitic either the annexation of the city and adjacent territory to the British dominions, or the maintenance of a British garrison in support of a native ruler, suggested the transfer of the province to the Amir, Abdul Rahman, as the arrangement which seemed to offer the best guarantees for permanence, and the avoidance of internal dissensions. In opening communication, therefore, with the Amir, in view to an early assumption by him of authority over the city and dependent districts, your Excellency in Council adopted a course which was in complete harmony with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, who equally approve of your determination that the retirement of the British forces, having been decided upon in principle, should not be postponed beyond the date when the movement could be effected without grave risk to the health of the troops.

4. I reserve for a later period, when the movements now pending shall be completed, such remarks as may be required upon the course of the correspondence which has passed with the Amir, and in regard to the arrangements connected with the occupation of Kandahar by his Governor and troops. I content myself at present with expressing the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government that, notwithstanding indications to the contrary, the Amir should ultimately have found himself able to collect and despatch a force, sufficient, apparently, for the immediate purpose, within the period specified by your Excellency, and that, so far as appears from the latest telegraphic reports, the actual transfer has been effected without difficulty or disturbance. Her Majesty's Government feel that the tranquillity which at present prevails can scarcely be expected to remain unbroken, but if, as they trust will be the case, the character of the Amir's internal administration is such as to render the people disinclined to afford active support to attempts that may be made to subvert his authority, his Highness, with the liberal aid in money and material which he will have received from the Government of India, should be enabled to maintain and consolidate his power.

5. As regards Pishin and Sibi, which were assigned to the British Government under the Treaty of Gandamak, and have since been administered by British Officers, my despatch of the 3rd December last stated shortly the reasons which seemed to Her Majesty's Government to recommend retirement from those districts, as from Kandahar, and deprecated the "continuance of any part of an alternative policy which was not distinctly justified on its own merits, or of which the only recommendation consisted in its forming part of a larger scheme, the more essential points in which had been rejected by Her Majesty's present advisers;" but no such positive instructions were conveyed to your Excellency in Council as to preclude you from full consideration of the

question on its merits, or from expressing to Her Majesty's Government your deliberate views in regard to it; and you have rightly understood them as leaving to the Government of India a large discretion as to the time and manner of giving effect to the policy which Her Majesty's Government were desirous should be pursued.

6. From paras. 5 and 6 of your letter of the 2nd February, and from the papers enclosed in subsequent communications, I learn that, while accepting in principle the severance of our political connection with Pishin and Sibi when circumstances permit, your Excellency and the majority of your colleagues are decidedly of opinion that our occupation of those districts cannot immediately be terminated without risk of great injury to the interests of the people, and that its continuance for the present, while of no disadvantage to the British Government, need not involve the serious political embarrassments contemplated in my despatch of the 3rd December. Representations in the same sense have been made to me by Sir R. Sandeman, your Excellency's Agent in Biluchistan, who is now in this country.

7. While, therefore, Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to change their opinion as to the inexpediency of the permanent retention of the assigned districts, they recognize the difficulties in the way of immediate or early withdrawal from them, and they are fully sensible that, in this respect, their policy must be influenced by considerations which did not apply in the case of Kandahar. At no time were the people of that province led to expect the maintenance, in any shape, of direct British rule; while such pledges as were given in regard to the future native government of the country were subject to conditions which were almost immediately violated. In Pishin and Sibi the case is different. The people have no doubt, as your Excellency in Council observes, been encouraged to believe that British rule would continue; their relations with our officers have been conducted upon that assumption; and their behaviour has been generally good. While, therefore, it is the hope of Her Majesty's Government that retirement from these districts, as from the rest of Afghan territory, may take place at no distant date, the decision on the question must evidently in some degree depend upon the course of events at Kandahar. As under these circumstances the existing administrative arrangements will have to be maintained for the present, it is not desirable that the minds of the people should be disturbed by anticipations of immediate change; and I, accordingly, on the 14th instant, authorized your Excellency by telegraph to abstain from any announcement of final retirement, unless you deemed such an announcement to be expedient.

8. In thus communicating to you the assent of Her Majesty's Government to the postponement of the relinquishment of Pishin and Sibi, I rely on your Excellency to take care that no step will be taken which might place any permanent obstacle in the way of the ultimate fulfilment of the policy indicated in my despatch of the 3rd December last. I shall be glad to be furnished at an early date with a full statement of the measures which you propose to adopt for the temporary administration of the districts, with details of the arrangements for their military protection, and that of the line of communication, together with a statement of the estimated cost of those arrangements and of the civil administration, as well as particulars of the extent of the country to be temporarily retained under British control. Upon none of these points have I received any information, either in the political or the military department. From your Excellency's telegrams I learn that Her Majesty's troops will continue at present to hold the positions commanding the passes of the Amran range, by which I understand positions on the western side of the Khojak. I should wish to be informed whether it is contemplated that this arrangement will be necessary for any length of time, and which of the posts to be held are within the recognized limits of Pishin. The strength of the force which, according to apparently authoritative statements in the public press, has been detailed to remain at Quetta and along the line from Chaman to Sibi is largely in excess of what Her Majesty's Government had anticipated would be required, even temporarily, and seems to be inconsistent with the opinions expressed in the papers under acknowledgment as to the facility with which the assigned districts could be held. The retention, therefore, beyond the frontier for any length of time of a force not required for objects of a purely local character, such as from the tenor of your Lordship's despatch you appear to have had mainly in view in desiring to postpone the evacuation of the territory in question, might tend to a belief that it is designed for purposes of possible future intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, which are no less opposed to your Lordship's views and intentions than to those of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 18.

No. 68 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, May 1, 1881.

In continuation of our despatch, dated the 24th* April, we have the honour to

* No. 64.

† Dated 15th April 1881, No. 211.

forward copy of a letter† from Lieut.-Colonel St. John, submitting, with reference to the instructions sent him on the 3rd April, a report on the measures adopted by him in regard to the proper protection, in person and property, of Sirdars and others, remaining in Kandahar, who have adhered to British interests during our occupation of the province. It will be seen also that Colonel St. John has taken steps for the preservation of the graves of British officers and soldiers, and for the care of the cemeteries at Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

D. M. STEWART.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

E. BARING.

G. T. CHESNEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

No. 211, dated Kandahar, 15th April 1881.

From Lieut.-Colonel O. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, Kandahar,
to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 618 E.P., of the
3rd instant.

2. After announcing to the Sirdars and other notables that the administration of the province has been committed to the Amir's representatives, I took the opportunity of stating publicly that His Excellency the Viceroy had written to His Highness the Amir, commending to his protection and favour all our adherents of every rank in Kandahar. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan replied that he had special instructions from His Highness not only to afford full protection to all friends of the British Government, but to treat them with marked favour and distinction.

3. I have no doubt of the sincerity of this declaration, and as long as the Amir's authority is recognised in Kandahar I believe that our adherents will have nothing to fear. The best proof of this is in the action of the people themselves, the majority of our adherents deliberately preferring to remain in Kandahar instead of accompanying us to Pishin. The only exceptions are a few individuals who, having amassed large sums as contractors or employés of the Commissariat, prefer placing themselves and their fortunes in perfect security by retiring with the army to Quetta. It may also be surmised that they have future profits in view, and will continue their trade as purveyors to the army as heretofore. This class does not deserve any particular consideration at our hands. The only other emigrants are certain of the Farsiwan Mirzas, who have been in the confidential employ of the political department as writers and collectors of revenue, and consider that they have made themselves particularly obnoxious to the Afghans. All are people of substance, and for some I shall be able to find employment in Pishin. None are however permanently breaking off their connexion with Kandahar; but are leaving members of their families in charge of their property, alleging a pilgrimage to Kerbala or their duty to us as excuses for leaving the country. A year or two hence, or less, when Afghanistan has settled down, they believe that they will be able to return without risk.

4. The following measures appear to me advisable for the protection of their property. I am having a list made out of all persons, natives of Kandahar, who have obtained permission to retire with the troops to Quetta, with a statement of their property and the names of the agents left in charge. This I propose to

forward to the Amir's governor with a letter informing him that Her Majesty's Government expects him to protect the property of the individuals therein named, as well as to secure any person in Kandahar from suffering injury or oppression on account of any part he may have taken on our side in the events of the last two and a half years.

5. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan's verbal assurances leave no doubt that the answer to this letter will guarantee to the utmost power of the Amir's officials the safety of the lives and property of adherents of the British Government. I am in addition giving letters of recommendation to all those of our friends remaining in Kandahar.

6. The subject of the conservation of the graves of British officers and men has for some time engaged my attention, and has recently formed the subject of correspondence between General Hume and myself. Six places in Kandahar have been used at different times for the interment of Christians of the force. A detailed description of them will be found in the Appendix attached. The first three are in public land. The next two, in which the victims of the sortie of the 16th August are buried, are on private property. I have therefore bought the land from the owners, and obtained formal deeds of sale from them in duplicate. One copy will be left with our agent here, and the other deposited in the records of the office of the Agent to Governor-General at Quetta. Besides the ordinary formula for the transfer of land, the deeds set forth that the ground, being consecrated to a purpose considered holy by Mussulmen and Christians alike, is "wakf," and the fact of its being so is attested on the deed by the principal mullahs of the town. The graves of Colonel Nicholletts and Lieutenant Widdington at Kokeran are on the private property of the Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan. This is at present confiscated, and as long as it is so the graves will be looked after in the same way as those elsewhere. Should the owner return, I do not think that there is any fear of his not protecting the graves from desecration.

7. All the cemeteries in Kandahar are carefully walled in, and will be committed to the care of the agent left here. Before leaving I intend visiting them all in company with the deputy governor to commit them formally to his charge. I have also asked certain respectable merchants to visit the cemeteries from time to time and inform me at Quetta if they are not respected.

8. I have no fear of the burying places being desecrated except in case of an early popular outbreak against the Amir's rule, in which case fanaticism might take the form of destroying the monuments over the graves of the infidels who made the country over to him. But this is hardly probable, and I trust that the measures taken will be efficacious in preserving the graves and monuments from injury and desecration.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

LIST OF BURIAL PLACES AT KANDAHAR.

1. PRINCIPAL cemetery. This is situated about a thousand yards north of the city, exactly opposite the Idgah gate, and near the middle of the large area taken up by Muhammadan grave-yards. It encloses the site of the cemetery used by General Nott's force in 1839-42, which was discovered without difficulty by us in 1879. The surrounding wall had been levelled, and the monuments, if there were any, destroyed; but the graves themselves had not been disturbed, and were easily recognisable by their lying east and west, instead of north and south. This cemetery now contains 437 graves, including those of the following officers, as shown by inscriptions:—

Lieutenants Farrington and Harris, 15th Foot.

Surgeon Walsh, B.M.D.

Captain Weigall and Lieutenant Bishop, 11th Foot.

Lieutenant-Colonel Daubeny, 7th Fusiliers.

Captain Chisholm, 59th Foot.

Surgeon-Major Bolton.

Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, 72nd.

Captain Frome, 72nd.

Captain Stratton.

Lieutenant-Colonel Shewell, Bombay S.C.

Lieutenant Anderson, 25th P.N.I.

Major Powys, 59th Foot.

Captain Sargent, 78th Foot.

There are also monuments to 5 officers and 64 men of the 7th Fusiliers, killed or died of wounds or disease in Afghanistan; and to 2 officers, 7 sergeants, 5 corporals, 3 drummers, and over 100 privates of the 11th Foot, died of disease.

The cemetery is enclosed by a high wall with a solid gate.

2. The second cemetery is in the open ground inside the city, west of the citadel, now used by the Commissariat as a store-yard. It contains 62 graves, including those of Lieutenant Hennell, B.S.C., and Lieutenant Lendrum, R.A.

3. The third burial place is the garden of the citadel, in which are interred the bodies of Major Reynolds, Sind Horse, and Lieutenant Willis, R.A.

4. No. 4 is a piece of ground on the south side of the city, and was taken up as a burial place during the siege. It contains 26 graves, including those of—

Major Vandeleur, and Lieutenant Wood, 7th Fusiliers.

Major Trench, and Lieutenant Hayner, 19th Bombay N.I.

Lieutenant MacLaine, R.H.A., and the Rev. Mr. Gordon.

I have purchased the ground and enclosed it with a wall.

5. No. 5 is a spot about 700 yards outside the town, and 300 from the village of Doh Khoja. It contains but two graves, in one of which are buried the bodies of the Englishmen, and in the other those of the natives of India left behind in the retreat from the sortie of the 16th August. They were discovered on the 25th, and buried the same afternoon in the nearest convenient spot to where they fell. Among them are Lieutenant-Colonel Newport, 28th Bombay N.I., and Captain Cruickshank, R.E. The graves are covered in with masonry, and I am now having them surrounded by a substantial wall.

6. The only graves out of Kandahar are those of Colonel Nicholletts, 29th Bombay N.I., and Lieutenant Widdington, 10th Bombay N.I., which are on the estate of the Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan at Kokeran, seven miles from Kandahar. They are about 60 yards in front of the main entrance of the Sartip's house.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Colonel,
Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

No. 19.

No. 80 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, May 22, 1881.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government,

* Dated 13th May 1881. copies of two letters from the Amir of Kabul to the Viceroy, dated respectively the 29th April 1881 and the 3rd May 1881, and of his Excellency's reply* to the first letter.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 19.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the Address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 29th April 1881.

After compliments.—Your Excellency's kind and friendly letter, dated the 16th April 1881, corresponding to the 16th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1298 H., has reached me; and I am exceedingly gratified at your Excellency's conspicuous favours and befitting kindnesses. I have fully understood all that your Excellency has written in reply to my epistle regarding my want of arms, of ammunition, and of money, (viz.) that at present three batteries of artillery and a certain number of rifles with ammunition have been made

over to my officials; and that, in addition to the five lakhs of rupees, a monthly subsidy of Rs. 50,000 will be granted for expenses to the governor of Kandahar for some time; and with regard to the arms your Excellency intimated that I should use my best efforts to procure them within Afghanistan itself.

I have also understood what your Excellency wrote, that you have, agreeably to my opinion (wishes), deferred deputation (to Kabul) Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan; and that I should appoint an agent to reside near your Excellency's Government in India.

My real object and chief aim in cultivating a sincere friendship and a cordial affection with the sublime Government is to secure credit and character for veracity, faithfulness, and a strict observance of the duties of an engagement. I have never the eye of cupidity and covetousness fixed on worldly pomps and pageants. Had not the resources of Afghanistan (collected) in 100 years been destroyed, and had the old house of our forefathers remained in a flourishing state, I should never have troubled the representatives of the sublime Government about pecuniary aid and the munitions of war. Now that all that constituted the glory and lustre of the Afghan empire has vanished, and that all the accoutrements of the army have disappeared and fallen into many hands, it is impossible to collect the arms that have dispersed and to recover the property that has been plundered and is scattered in the highlands and the outlying districts. Whereas the two Governments have joint interests, I wrote previously what I am writing now, and I write (again) that money, guns, and ammunition, are not such things as can be procured with ease and facility and in a short time in this country. It is absolutely necessary to administer the affairs of Afghanistan (at once), and so this matter cannot be kept in abeyance and deferred to a future time. Further, the matter rests with your Excellency. The more your Excellency attends to, and thinks with care of, the welfare of Afghanistan, the more beneficial it will be to the interests of the two States.

In compliance with your Excellency's wishes, I will certainly appoint a confidential agent to India with the greatest pleasure, and I will shortly arrange this matter. What more can I write than the professions of friendship?

P.S.—Whereas the officers of the sublime Government have, by making over to me the administration of Afghanistan, imposed an important duty on me and entrusted me with a grand project to carry out, of which they and I are well aware, my urgent solicitations for putting to rights the affairs of this country are not for (the exigencies of) to-day, but they are made with regard to the future. The reason why I write so frequently and repeat the subject is that I feel apprehensive for the future, lest, peradventure, when the honourable (British) officers call upon me to perform that important service, I should fail to acquit myself well. The people of Afghanistan are of such a nature that they step beyond the bounds of subjection and aspire to the position of rulers.

Under these circumstances, and with such people, and having regard to my solicitude for the morrow, my demand is not out of place.

Enclosure 2 in No. 19.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the Address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 3rd May 1881.

After compliments.—I beg to inform your Excellency that from the day of the arrival of my Sirdars, officials, and troops, at their destination, Kandahar, up to the moment Her Imperial Majesty's forces marched away and departed from that city, whatever friendship, the community of interests, affection, and concord required was done to the officials of this God-granted Government through the friendly exertions of Colonel St. John, the Resident of Kandahar, and of Nawab Hasan Ali Khan, his assistant; and that the officials of this God-granted Government express themselves, in their letters received by me, pleased and satisfied at the civility and courtesy shown to them by the above-mentioned two officers. Therefore, relying upon (the contents of) those letters, I express what I have in my mind, and write to inform your Excellency that I am exceedingly pleased and satisfied with the Colonel and the Nawab alluded to above, and my pleasure will undoubtedly cause joy and delight to your Excellency's benevolent heart.

Enclosure 3 in No. 19.

Dated Simla, the 13th May 1881.

From His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to His Highness the Amir of Kabul.

After compliments.—I have received and given careful consideration to your Highness' friendly letter, dated 29th April.

I learn with pleasure that your Highness proposes shortly to arrange for the deputation of a confidential agent to India.

It has been a matter of gratification to me that I have been able to inform Her Majesty's Government that, on the withdrawal of the British forces from Kandahar, the administration of the province was placed in the hands of your Highness' governor, and that the city was left in the occupation of your Highness' troops. And since the expenses incidental upon the rapid despatch of a force from Kabul to Kandahar, and upon other arrangements necessary for the assumption of the government of the province, may have caused some temporary pressure upon your Highness' finances, I have directed the sum of 5 lakhs to be placed at once at the disposal of your Highness at Peshawur. The Commissioner will await your Highness' instructions regarding the money.

I trust your Highness will accept the assurance of my sincere wish for your welfare and for your success in the administration of the affairs of Afghanistan.

No. 20.

No. 84 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, June 3, 1881.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch, dated the 29th April, upon the subject of the retention under British administration of the assigned districts of Pishin and Sibi.

2. In the second paragraph of this despatch, some doubt is expressed whether, when the question of Pishin was discussed in your previous despatches, the immediate purposes of Her Majesty's Government had been rightly apprehended. We understand, however, that your Lordship is nevertheless generally disposed to approve and to acquiesce in the views and arguments submitted by our letter of the 2nd February. Her Majesty's Government, while adhering to the policy laid down by your Lordship's despatch of the 3rd December, and while looking forward to the retirement at no distant date of the British troops from these districts, recognizes the difficulties in the way of early withdrawal, and the necessity of maintaining for the present the existing administrative arrangements. And your Lordship desires to be furnished at an early date with a full statement containing all the details of the military and political measures proposed by the Government of India for the temporary administration of the country to be thus retained.

3. Before proceeding to lay our proposals before your Lordship, we think it may be convenient to dispose of a subsidiary point, which is touched upon at the close of your despatch now under acknowledgment. It appears to us important to explain that the retention at the present moment of a force of considerable strength at Quetta, and along the line from Chaman to Sibi, is in no respect inconsistent with the opinions expressed in the papers to which your Lordship has alluded.

4. When, in the minutes transmitted with our despatches of February, the opinion was expressed that Pishin might be held with comparative facility, the subject-matter then under discussion was undoubtedly the indefinite retention under assignment of that district. And although in the sixth paragraph of our 2nd February despatch the view taken was that our political authority might be upheld temporarily in Pishin by a detachment supported from Quetta, yet neither in the minutes nor in the despatch were the references to this question intended to have any bearing upon the state of affairs that might immediately ensue upon the withdrawal of our troops from Kandahar to the Kojak line. It would have been impossible, we submit, to calculate early in last February what proportion of the troops returning from Kandahar might be detained in Pishin and about Quetta during the summer, and, as a matter of fact, the attempt was not made. For, in the first place, if Pishin were to be held at all (and our despatches

assumed that Kandahar and Pishin would not be simultaneously relinquished), the precise strength that might be required in the district was obviously a military question, connected with the general operation of retirement, and dependent, as a mere measure of precaution, on the course of events that might immediately follow our evacuation of Kandahar. In the second place, it was not then practicable to calculate whether there would be time for withdrawing a large proportion of the troops through the Bolan pass and the Sind desert in the spring and early summer. The date at which the evacuation of Kandahar could begin was then far from settled: it had to be adjusted, within certain limits, to the movement of the Amir's troops from Kandahar, and, as the Amir's preparation required all the time that could be allowed, the contingency that a large portion of the Kandahar troops might be unable to reach India before the extreme heat set in had from the first caused much anxiety to the Government of India. The project of withdrawing our surplus regiments by the higher and cooler route of Thal-Chotiali was at one time entertained, but the re-appearance of a force on that line seemed likely to create disquietude among the tribes, so that for this and other reasons the plan was dropped. Meanwhile the state of the weather and the tardy arrival of the Amir's garrison delayed the evacuation until late in April.

5. In these circumstances we decided that sanitary exigencies required us to detain for the summer a large proportion of the force on the high plateau of Pishin and Quetta, and that only those regiments could be brought back at once to India whose passage through the Bolan could be conveniently and prudently managed. That these regiments have fortunately reached India with little or no loss or suffering from the extreme heat is due mainly to the excellent arrangements of the military and the railway authorities concerned.

6. We trust that the foregoing explanation may have satisfied your Lordship that the reasons which determined, in April, the present temporary disposition of our force above the passes are not inconsistent with the opinions recorded in February regarding the ordinary garrison of Pishin. We are anxious that a clear appreciation of these reasons should leave no room for such a misapprehension of the situation as would be involved in the supposition that the strength at which this force happens to be now maintained has any connexion with the future maintenance of an advanced military position towards Afghanistan. Such a supposition would be altogether inconsistent with our view of the policy which should be followed, and would be entirely foreign to the real considerations upon which we desire that our proposals, and the decision of Her Majesty's Government, in regard to the retention of Pishin and Sibi, should be understood to proceed. These considerations, so far as they were stated in our letter of the 2nd February, have been already approved by your Lordship's despatch now under reply, so that we need not again enlarge on the responsibilities imposed upon us by our past relations with the people of the two districts. It is sufficient here to repeat that both districts were taken under our Government at the end of 1878, that they were formally assigned to us by treaty in 1879, and that consequently the inhabitants, who have been frequently assured that they might count upon our protection, have every right to expect that, as to the time and manner of their restoration to Afghan rule, their wishes and interests shall be carefully consulted. The question of ultimate retirement cannot, as your Lordship has observed, be disconnected from the course of events at Kandahar, and the actual condition of parties in South Afghanistan certainly does not yet authorize us to anticipate unbroken tranquillity in that quarter. If a settled and friendly government establishes itself at Kandahar, there will then be no difficulty in concluding such arrangements for the administration of this district as may be deemed advisable; but if affairs take a different turn it cannot in our judgment be either to the interests of Pishin or to our own interests and credit that we should choose such a time for abruptly abandoning this district. Our departure would expose the country to disorder, and our friends to the consequences of having dealt faithfully with the British Government. All the considerations of this nature, by which the British Government was induced to prolong, at some risk and much expense, the occupation of Kabul, of Kandahar, and of Kuram, appear to us to apply with redoubled force to the case of the districts now in our possession in South Afghanistan.

7. Moreover, we are bound to recollect that our responsibilities for the protection of friends and allies from the possible consequences of any confusion that may follow directly upon our recent withdrawal are not confined to Pishin. From the Khan of Kelat and from his leading Sirdars we have received the most unreserved and valuable support during the whole of our operations across the Afghan frontier of Beluchistan. That frontier has a long border line with the lands of Pathan tribes; while Quetta

itself is more or less surrounded by Afghan or independent territory. It is thus of importance that at Quetta we should, for the present, be in a position to assist effectually in keeping the peace and in securing the Khan's territory against incursions or reprisals; and for these objects the advantages of continuing our military and political occupation of the broad valley which interposes between Quetta and the Amran range appear to us incontestable. Our attitude will be entirely precautionary and defensive, but if any troubles are impending in Afghanistan we shall be far better able to hold ourselves clear of complications by confining all disorder to the western side of the range than by allowing it to overflow up to the Biluch frontier.

8. In short, we consider that some prolongation of our present tenure of Pishin and Sibi is necessary, not only for the acquittance of our obligations to those districts, but also in order that during a period of uncertainty we may be able to retain our present influence over the tribes of that frontier, and generally to fulfil the treaty engagement whereby, in return for the subordinate co-operation which we have a right to demand from the Khan of Khelat, and which he has very freely given to us, we are bound to protect his territories from external attack.

9. With regard, therefore, to the extent of country to be temporarily retained under British control, our proposals are to keep the districts of Pishin and Sibi, with any strip of intervening territory that may be clearly necessary for maintaining the communication between the two districts. Their administrative boundaries are so inaccurately defined, and have so often varied, that it is not possible to determine positively whether the two areas actually meet at any point. But in the records examined at Kandahar the Sibi district is described in leases as Zawa Sibi and Thal; while the Barozai Sirdars, who have long been the grantees of Sibi, always lay claim to Hurnai and Thal-Chotiali. The Zawa of the Kandahar records is the valley stretching from the lower end of the Chappar mountain by Spin Tangi down the Nari river. As a matter of fact, however, the Afghan government had, for many years before our latest occupation of Sibi, exercised little or no jurisdiction in the district; the constant incursions of the Marris, and the lawlessness of the lesser tribes, kept the upper valley in confusion, and the lower valley suffered greatly from their depredations. But since the British Government took possession of the district in 1878 our posts have been established along the open tract which runs by Spin Tangi, Hurnai, and Kach, up to where the Chappar hills close in upon it. This tract has now been brought regularly under our administration, and its revenue is quietly collected; while the position of our posts along the northern border of the district, in a climate healthy for the troops, maintains order among the petty Patban tribes beyond the line, keeps the peace in the country within it, secures our communication with Pishin and Quetta, and effectually preserves the Bolan pass from molestation. The occupation of this border has also opened out an excellent road from India by Sibi toward Pishin and Kandahar, which is already very largely used by traders in preference to the Bolan route.

10. We consider it advisable, for these reasons, to retain our posts upon the Hurnai line, and to treat as included within the Sibi district, for the purpose of temporary control and management, the plain country up to the foot of the hills beyond that line, and all the country within it, over which we now exercise jurisdiction. The appended sketch map will show roughly the northern boundary up to which it seems necessary, for the proper protection of Sibi and the Bolan pass, for restraining the Marris and other border tribes, and for the general political supervision of the Biluch frontier toward Afghanistan, that our authority should, for the present, be maintained. It will probably be found difficult to withdraw, for some time to come, the troops now stationed at Thal and Chotiali on the frontier of Sibi toward the north-east. But the object of these posts is exclusively to check and coerce the powerful Marri tribe, by taking up points whence their country can be easily entered, and their retreat cut off, if they attempt any marauding expeditions. And as the arrangements for controlling the Marris must be settled with reference not only to the Sibi administration, but also to the proper system of defence for the Indian border, and the Khan's territory adjoining the Marri country, it would not be convenient in this letter to deal finally with the question of keeping stations at Thal or Chotiali. From your Lordship's despatch upon the subject of the settlement recently made with the Marris, we infer that our intention to postpone final decision upon these provisional arrangements, until our general position upon the border shall have been permanently determined, will be approved.

11. The measures at present in operation for the civil administration of the districts of Pishin and Sibi will not require immediate material alteration, and their cost will not, so far as can be judged from the accounts now before the Government, exceed the revenues collected. For the last two years and a half the administration of these districts has been carried on under the superintendence of the officers of the Biluchistan Agency, to the staff of which one European and one Native officer have been added to provide for the efficient performance of the additional work entailed by the extension of the jurisdiction of the Agency. Revenue and police establishments on a moderate scale have been entertained for the purposes of civil administration, and certain payments have been made to the chief men of the more important tribes—partly in consideration of the lines of road and telegraph being kept free from molestation, and partly in lieu of allowances formerly made to the more turbulent tribes by the Afghan rulers. The sum total of expenditure incurred on these accounts, *viz.*, the addition of officers to the strength of the Biluchistan Agency, the entertainment of revenue and police establishments, including the cost of police on the open line of railway between the Sind border and the Bolan, and the tribal payments referred to—amounts to about Rupees 1,30,000. This expenditure, however, is more than covered by the revenue collected in the districts, the total collections during the past financial year amounting to about Rupees 1,50,000. The tribal payments in Pishin, we anticipate, will now be very largely reduced, while quiet times and the extension of cultivation in the more fertile tracts of Sibi will result in some increase of revenue. In Pishin, owing to three consecutive years of drought, and partly, no doubt, owing to want of careful supervision, caused by the necessity under which our officers laboured of devoting their principal attention to supplying the wants of the army, the revenue collections during the past three years have shown a slight falling off; but in Sibi the revenue realized in 1880-81 was more than double that of 1879-80, the additional collections having been very largely drawn from increased cultivation. To the feeling of security produced among the people by the recent submission of the Maris, and by the belief that they will henceforward be kept within bounds by a strong hand, this rapid spread of cultivation may undoubtedly be attributed.

12. In regard to the force required for the military protection of the country which, as has been above explained, is to be temporarily retained under British control, it is possible that this may depend, at first, upon the further development of the actual political situation in South Afghanistan. But it is our desire and intention, if political circumstances permit, to reduce the force to be maintained at Quetta and in Pishin, after the next cold season shall have set in, to a normal strength of—

- 1 Battery garrison artillery.
- 1 Do. mountain do.

- 1 Regiment cavalry.
- 3 Regiments of infantry, of whom one would be European.

The precise distribution of these troops would be a detail for future determination; though we may state, with advertence to your Lordship's observation upon this point, that we do not contemplate retaining, beyond the end of this autumn, any positions on the western side of the Khojuk, and that all the posts to be held under the arrangements now proposed will be, as in fact they now are, within the recognized limits of Pishin. With regard to the line of communications, the military authorities attach great importance to the stations on the road *via* Hurnai, because, as has already been explained, it turns, covers, and protects the Bolan pass, besides offering easy access at all seasons from Sibi to Quetta and Pishin. For the present, therefore, a regiment of infantry and three troops of cavalry would be detailed to occupy and guard this line; though hereafter a large part of the duties involved might be transferred to a local police force. There is now in Biluchistan the corps of Biluch guides, an irregular corps of about 400 horse, which has performed much useful service during many years past on the Biluch frontier. The present cost of this corps, including the staff pay of the Commanding Officer, amounts to Rupees 10,000 per mensem, and has been defrayed from Indian revenues. We anticipate, however, that it may be found advisable to improve the position and organisation of the corps to some extent, and probably to add to it some footmen in order to provide a local military police such as may relieve the regular troops of various harassing duties.

13. Some troops will also be kept, for the present, at Thal and Chotiali; but for the reasons already mentioned the detachments at these stations are not included in the garrison detailed in the foregoing paragraph; since it is more convenient to deal with them in considering the question of arrangements for the permanent protection of the Sind border.

14. With respect to the cost of the troops to be maintained in Pishin and at Quetta after the beginning of next cold season, we may observe that in any event the regular garrison of Quetta ought to be excluded from the calculation. Assuming the strength

* Garrison of Quetta, 1st July 1878.

2 Regiments native infantry.
Detachment of cavalry.
1 Mountain Battery.

and composition of this garrison to be the same as before the war in Afghanistan,* the additional expenditure involved in the arrangements described in paragraph 12 will be represented by the extra charge of maintaining one regiment of European infantry, part of a regiment of cavalry, and one battery garrison artillery, in these districts instead of in India. The troops now stationed beyond the Sind Frontier are in receipt of certain fixed allowances, which it is intended to discontinue so soon as the force shall have been reduced to its normal strength.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

No. 21.

No. 88 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, June 10, 1881.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* from Colonel O. B. St. John,

* No. 249, dated the 31st May 1881. Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Biluchistan, forwarding news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 21.

No. 249, dated Quetta, 31st May 1881.

From Lieut.-Col. O. St. John, R.E., Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan, Quetta, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a free translation of letters just received from Kandahar, a summary of which was forwarded to you to-day by telegraph.

2. With reference to your request that I should, if possible, continue my diary of political events as in Kandahar, I regret to say that I have not found it convenient to do so owing to the intermittent character of the correspondence. Originally I intended to have all letters received from Kandahar literally translated by a native assistant here and submitted to your office with a covering letter of remarks. But this has not worked well; and I find it better to make a free translation of the letters myself directly they arrive, and forward it to you at once with marginal notes and comments, after transmitting a summary by telegraph. This system I have commenced to-day, and I trust it will meet with your approval.

Enclosure 2 in No. 21.

KANDAHAR NEWS.

May 31st.—Regular post arrived from Kandahar with letters of 27th.

Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan writes that a trustworthy person just arrived from Herat has brought him intelligence of affairs there which he has communicated to Mir Hashim for transmission to me. Encloses a circular letter from Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan to the Chief of Zamindawar. Begs that any news reaching me from Meshed may be sent to him at once.

Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan's letter, which is addressed to Sahib Khan, runs as follows:—

"After compliments.—By God's favour I have arrived in this place (Farrah) on the 17th Jamad-es-Sani (16th May) with one thousand Herati horsemen. One day I shall halt, and the next, the 18th, I shall advance at the head of two thousand Herat and Farrah horsemen. On the same day his Highness Muhammad Ayub Khan will leave Herat with guns and troops. Under any circumstance, be assured that I shall arrive in your country without delay."

* It is worth remark that both seals are purposely blurred and imperfect, a common practice among Afghans when writing on political matters. It is supposed to facilitate repudiation of the authorship, if advisable.—O. St. J.

This letter* is also sealed by Muhammad Hasan Khan.

Mir Hashim writes as follows:—

"A man whom I had sent to Herat returned to-day, having been 14 days on the road. He states that five Herati regiments were present in the city, of which two had been deprived of their arms some time previously, but had since had them returned. There were two regiments of Kandaharis and Kabulis, each 400 strong. Four iron guns had been made, of which one was complete, the other three unfinished. Three batteries of smooth-bores were also complete. A thousand sowars had been ordered with Muhammad Hashim Khan to Farrah, but only 500 had gone. Muhammad Hashim's orders were to halt only one night at Farrah, and push on to the Helmand at once. It is probable however that he has not come further than Bakwa. Muhammad Ayub Khan was very apprehensive as to affairs on the Turkistan side; and had sent men there to give timely warning of any events that might cause disturbances in Herat. Ayub Khan was intending to leave Herat for Zamindawar on the 10th Rajab (5th June). He had not as yet issued any pay to the regiments. He had reminded Hashim Khan and the Waliab's mother of their promise to provide him with funds, but they had taken no notice of the reminder. It had been settled that Muhammad Hashim's wife and the Waliab's mother should go to Anardareh, on account of the heat of the weather it was said; but the real reason is fear of an advance of the Amir's troops from Kandahar.

"The following is the news of Kandahar:—The cavalry regiment ordered to Girishk with two guns and an infantry regiment arrived there on the 26th May. The guns and infantry halted at Sinjiri for some days, but have now gone on. On the 28th Kazi Saad-ud-din was to leave for Girishk with 400 sowars enlisted in Kandahar, to be

Each *bairak* or standard is supposed to count 100 men.—O. St. J.

followed in three days by two guns and an infantry regiment. Six hundred regular cavalry, three infantry regiments, and six standards of Khasadars were to leave Kelat-i-Ghilzai for Kandahar on 28th.

"As regards Herat affairs, if the regiments leave Kandahar for the Herat direction quickly, and a simultaneous movement is made from Turkistan, Muhammad Ayub Khan's position will be very difficult; but if there is much delay, his affairs will wear a very different aspect. A certain Sayyid Hussain who was in Ayub's camp bazaar before Kandahar has been accused by him of sending news to Colonel St. John, and his property confiscated. He himself fled to Meshed. Ayub Khan had declared in the public assembly that the Kabulis were Kafirs. The Heratis say that, if it were a case of fighting against the English, they would not fire a shot; but as they have suffered much at the hands of the Kabulis, they will fight them willingly. This is the talk of the common people. Men of wisdom and experience are in favour of the Amir. There is a certain Muhammad Umar of Ghorian. This man was sent by Ayub to the Wali of Maimanah to ask for assistance in men and money. The Wali replied that he could give neither; for if an army moved from Turkistan, it would be as much as he could do to keep his own *purdah* (i.e., defend himself). Naib Hafiz-ullah Khan had been named

general-in-chief, but the Duranis are much discontented at the appointment. The Herat news communicated by Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan is given separately.

"As regards Kabul, it appears that the Amir was to leave Kalah-i-Kazi* on the 26th May. He was intending to bring all the Ghilzai Khans and Malikis with him. The Turkistan army was at Shibarghan.

* A camping ground, a few miles out of Kabul.—O. St. J.

"Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, at a recent meeting of chiefs at his house, warmly extolled the kindness and generosity of the British Government towards the Amir." He has asked Mir Hashim to arrange for the payment of the third monthly subsidy of 50,000 rupees through the Hindus of Kandahar.

The account of Herat affairs given by the man mentioned in Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan's letter is as follows:—

Troops.—There are nominally three regiments of Kandaharis and Kabulis in Herat;

† This nearly tallies with number given by the other informant, viz., 800 men.—O. St. J.

The discrepancy between this account and that of the other informant as to these Herati troops is inexplicable; but I am inclined to believe that they have been re-assembled and re-armed.—O. St. J.

command of the troops in the hope

‡ Here again is another discrepancy. I doubt Ayub's having so many guns equipped as the first informant says; but he certainly has some.—O. St. J.

After his return from Kandahar,

§ Both informants are unanimous in this point.—O. St. J.

Sahibzadah of Sish Oshan had been sent to Maimanah for help in men and money, but he came back empty-handed, or with only three horses and a post. Ayub had summoned Hashim Khan from Farrah to get money from him; and it is said that he brought some with him and gave it to Ayub. Khan Agha's brother has been appointed chief of the Jamshidis; but Ayub is aware that the Jamshidis, as well as the Alikozai and Isbakzai Duranis, are his enemies. Sirdars Muhammad Hashim Khan and Muhammad Hassan Khan have left for Farrah, but informant saw their tents, and there were only 12. He does not believe they had more than a hundred horsemen with them. Sirdar Abdul Wahab Khan was at Sabzwari, having left a few regular infantry at Taiwara. It is said that Aulia Khan has assembled a strong force and is on his way to attack them. It was currently reported in Herat that Sirdar Muhammad Ishak Khan had occupied Maimanah, and was moving on Herat, and people looked on Ayub's cause as lost. News had arrived from Kandahar that the English had left, and the Amir's troops arrived; it was also reported that Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan was treating the Kandaharis liberally, and paying the soldiers well. This has excited the hopes of the Heratis in the direction of Kandahar.

Thirty Kandahari soldiers belonging to Marut, who had gone to Herat for service, saw the state of affairs there and returned. This latter piece of information appears to have been given by Shams-ud-din Khan.

There is not very much of importance in this news. Neither side appears to be showing any remarkable energy, though both are preparing to make the right bank of the Helmand the battle-field. Delay for the present is doing the Amir's cause no harm, but if he has not sufficient force at Girishk to overawe the Alizais when Hashim arrives there, they may rise *en masse*. It is clear that Ayub is very weak, and that the Duranis generally are wavering. Nothing but the most culpable inertness on the Amir's part can prevent his success in establishing himself.

From travellers I learn that the number of *talibs* in or about the city of Kandahar has noticeably increased, in spite of many having left for Zamadawar. This is supposed to portend a rising in Kandahar in case of the Amir's arms suffering a reverse on the Helmand. It is also said that the five lakhs of rupees given to the Amir's representatives have been kept almost, if not quite, intact.

The postal arrangements with Kandahar are working well, letters arriving in three and a half days. Private parties are beginning to avail themselves of the post.

(Signed) O. St. JOHN,
Lieut.-Colonel.

Biluchistan Agency,
S. Afghanistan Office,
May 31, 1881.

No. 22.

No. 92 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Sinla, June 17, 1881.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the diary of the Resident, Southern Afghanistan, from the 15th to the 27th April 1881.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 22.

No. 252, dated Quetta, 1st June 1881.

From Lieut.-Col. O. St. JOHN, R.E., Officiating Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan,
to SIR ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

In forwarding the diary of the Kandahar Residency for the last few days of its existence, I have the honour to make a few remarks on the circumstances attending the transfer of authority to the Amir's representative.

2. The first of the Amir's officials, the Kotwal, made his appearance on the 1st April, followed on the 5th by the deputy governor, Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, who is practically at the head of affairs, the governor, Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, being a lad of 19 or 20. He remained encamped with the troops 20 miles east of the city.

3. Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan, who has been Kazi of Kandahar during our rule from January to July 1879, was with Shams-ud-din Khan, and our former connexion, as well as the Kazi's straightforward and sensible character, much facilitated the transaction of business.

4. On Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan's arrival, he at once attempted to induce me to permit him to assume charge of the town, alleging that it would show the people our confidence in the Amir, and the mutual trust and friendship existing between him and the British Government, while if we continued to administer it, and levy customs and other taxes, his cause would suffer serious injury. He also asked whether it could possibly be true that I was collecting the land revenue for the year now just commenced. I may remark that I was doing so for two reasons; *first*, to balance the Kandahar accounts, which, owing to entire cessation of land revenue and diminution of proceeds of customs during the winter months, showed a considerable deficit, and *secondly*, to show the people that we were still masters, and intended to be so up to the last moment. On Shams-ud-din Khan making these remarks, I took the opportunity of explaining the situation to him frankly, pointing out that the Amir had absolutely no right whatever in the matter, and no friends among the people, that Kandahar was a pure gift from the British Government to him, and that it was for me as the representative of Government to settle the time and manner of making over charge of the administration. As far as was consonant with our own interests, every regard would be

shown to those of the Amir, which would, however, best be served by showing that he was dependent upon, and not independent of, the British Government. The Sirdar, I said, must be aware that the Amir himself had no power or influence in Kandahar, except as the friend and ally of the British Government, whose material aid alone would enable him to hold his own over the Duranis, who were extremely ill-disposed to acknowledge his authority. As soon as the time had come for our actual departure, and he should have force at his disposal to hold the country, it would be made over to him; but that, as long as any British soldiers remained, I intended to retain the administration of the city in my own hands. As regards levying taxes, it was hardly proper that the Amir receiving lakhs from the British Government should object to their taking thousands from a country of which they were paying the expenses. This lecture had the desired effect, and beyond one or two attempts to persuade me to allow him to collect the customs dues, I had no more trouble with Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan.

5. On the 12th April, the march of the British troops being finally fixed, I formally transferred the administration of the province to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, informing him in the presence of the Barakzai Sirdars and others that I should retain charge of the city till the actual withdrawal of the troops.

6. On the 16th the greater part of the cavalry which had accompanied the Amir's officials from Kabul marched to Kohkaran, which had been evacuated by our troops the previous day.

7. The same day Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan came into the city and exchanged visits with me. In the evening he also visited General Hume, who returned the visit the next morning, after which the Sirdar rejoined the cavalry at Kohkaran.

8. On the 20th I made over charge of the customs and octroi to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan.

9. The next morning, the 21st, the cantonments and citadel were finally evacuated. Between ten and noon all guards on the city and citadel gates were relieved by Kabul Khasadars, and at the latter hour precisely the British flag was hauled down under a salute of 31 guns. Thus closed the second period of direct British administration of Kandahar, lasting nearly seven months from the defeat of Ayub Khan on the 1st September.

10. The next morning, the 22nd, the rear column of the garrison marched for Chaman, which it reached on the 27th without an incident worthy of notice.

11. Nothing could have been more quiet and orderly than the transfer, which was carried out from first to last without the smallest incident worthy of remark. I had no reason to anticipate any serious disturbance, but the result went beyond my expectations, and cannot be regarded as otherwise than very satisfactory, both in the interests of the Amir and our own.

12. As soon as it became known to me that the government of Kandahar would without doubt be transferred to the Amir of Kabul, I did all in my power to pave the way for his reception by the Durani tribes, who were certainly ill-prepared to welcome him. Some weeks have now passed. As yet all is going well, and the Duranis have acquiesced in, and are apparently becoming reconciled to, his rule. Whether they will accept it finally depends, I believe, upon his ability to prevent Ayub Khan from invading Kandahar territory, or, at least, from crossing the Helmand. If the Amir has not sufficient power and energy to block his rival's road to the Helmand, he will, I fear, lose Kandahar, it cannot be said undeservedly.

13. In conclusion, I beg to bring to the notice of Government the valuable assistance afforded me by my assistants, Major the Honourable G. Napier, Captain Yate, Captain Muir, Mr. Barnes, C.S., and Mirza Hasan Ali Khan, Nawab.

14. I also venture to record the obligations I am under to Major-General Hume, C.B., commanding in Southern Afghanistan, for his kind co-operation on every occasion.

Enclosure 2 in No. 22.

DIARY of the SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN RESIDENCY from the 15th April.

15th April.—The 11th Foot and Major Crawford's heavy battery marched to-day for Chaman.

Received a letter from a private correspondent at Kabul, dated 8th March, giving the following news:—Sirdar Muhammad Ishak Khan has not yet occupied Maimanah, but the Wali has sent him presents. The Amir is treating the people of Kabul with justice and moderation, but he is not making himself liked by the nobility. The people of

Jellulabad, Ali Khel, Kurram, and Zurnat are all more or less in rebellion. The Amir has recalled the force he had sent against the Shaikh Ali Hazans. It is reported that he is about to go to Kandahar, and that Sirdar Muhammad Ishak Khan will come to Kabul, but others say that Turkistan cannot do without him. Letters from certain Kabul Sirdars to Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan had been intercepted, and the writers sent in confinement to Turkistan. The Amir had summoned all the notables of Kabul to a banquet at Shah-Mardan, at which he made a speech asking if they were content with his rule, to which they answered unanimously in the affirmative. It is rumoured that the Amir of Bokhara is dead, and that the Russians have occupied the city. A rumour was also current that Yakub Khan, having been released by the English, had arrived in Kandahar.

A servant of the Amir's mother, writing to his relations at Kandahar, mentions that he is about to start with her for Turkistan in a few days.

16th April.—Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, the governor, came into the city at 10 this morning. He was met outside the town by the Muhammadzai Sirdars and other notables. Captain Muir received him at the Kabul gate, beyond which a battery of artillery was drawn up, and fired a salute of 15 guns; the street as far as his house was lined with troops; and in the court-yard a guard of honour was stationed.

An hour later he paid me a formal visit accompanied by Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan and Kazi Saad-ud-din. Shams-ud-din Khan informed me that they had received instructions from the Amir to take over from me 18 field guns, and 3,000 rifles with ammunition. I replied that the guns were on the road, and would be made over before our departure, but that I had no instructions about rifles. He whispered to Mirza Hasan Ali Khan to tell me that the Amir had written to him to ask me to permit him to levy the customs dues and city taxes during the remainder of our stay. To this I answered through Hasan Ali Khan that those who received gifts should not make conditions; that it was highly undesirable to separate the collection of taxes from the general control of the place; and that as long as we paid the expenses and thought it advisable to retain the government of the country so long should we continue to collect the ordinary dues. As regards the soap and other monopolies they had already been made over to him.

Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan delivered a letter from the Amir, stating that his officers had informed him of my advice that his troops should proceed at once, without waiting for our evacuation of Kandahar, to occupy Girishk and Zamindawar. To this he did not agree, thinking it undesirable that his troops should come in contact with the people till Kandahar was in the hands of his representative.

In the afternoon I returned Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan's visit. He is a heavy-looking youth of twenty or thereabouts, and his manners bear traces of his country education. Later on the Sirdar with all the Amir's officials paid General Hume a visit in cantonments.

Ahmad Jan Khan, brother of Sahib Khan, Alizai, returned with an answer to my letter informing him of Kandahar being made over to the Amir, and recommending submission. He excuses himself from coming to Kandahar at once on the plea of awaiting important news from Tairawa.

Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan writes from Girishk that a brother of Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan has come to Kalistan to collect revenue, whence he had gone on to Dunsang in Kandahar territory, and was waiting there to intercept the nomad shepherds on their way back to the hills, and levy the sheep tax on them. One of his men had entered Zamindawar, and was spreading mischievous reports.

17th April.—The 8th Bengal Cavalry, the 4th Bengal, and the 10th Bombay N. I. marched this morning under command of Brigadier-General Henderson.

Major-General Hume and his staff visited Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan. A number of Barakzai Khans and Maliks living in the neighbourhood of the city came to pay their respects to the Sirdar. They were persuaded to do this by Sirdar Muhammad Husain Khan, who is very active in the Amir's cause.

18th April.—The 7th R. Fusiliers and field battery Royal Artillery marched this morning. Mr. Barnes, C.S., accompanied them.

Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan writes from Girishk mentioning that reports had reached him from Farrah, from apparently authentic sources, that a fight had taken place near Herat between the Sartip and Muhammad Hasan Khan on the one side and Ayub's on the other, in which the former was totally defeated. Muhammad Hasan slain. The Sartip, it was declared, had taken sanctuary.

General Ghulam Haidar Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Amir's forces, writes renouncing his arrival at Gachin the Arghastan. In reply I wrote to him that his troops

No. 23.

No. 94 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, June 24, 1881.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* from Colonel O. B. St. John, Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Biluchistan, forwarding news received from Kandahar.

* No. 256, dated the 6th June 1881.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 23.

No. 256, dated Quetta, June 6, 1881.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. C. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward précis of news received to-day from Kandahar from independent sources.

Kandahar News, Sunday, June 5, 1881.—(Extract.)

A correspondent writes from Kandahar on the 30th ultimo that the son of an old servant of their family who died lately at Herat has just arrived from that city, and states that Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan had been appointed to muster the Herat sowars and despatch them in the Kandahar direction. It was reported that there would be between four and five thousand of them. Four Herati regiments, two-and-half of Kabulis and Kandaharis, with the artillery, were encamped at Pul-i-Malan. Three

† See in original. But there can be no doubt that Heratis are meant.

regiments of *Kabulis*† had had their arms taken away and been dispersed among the cavalry as grooms. As informant came along the road from Herat to Farah and Farah to Washir, he passed parties of 50 and 100 horsemen at every stage. Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan was on the point of moving from Herat when informant left. It was said that Muhammad Ayub Khan declared that he had no intention of attacking any one except the English in Pishin, but that of course if any one tried to stop him he would fight them.

When informant was at Girishk the brother of General Ghulam Hyder Khan, who is there with a cavalry regiment, searched the caravan with which he was, and found two men on whom were 150 letters from Muhammad Ayub Khan and Khan Mullah Khan to the people of Kandahar. On this the General's brother ordered the caravan to be plundered, but on the merchants declaring their innocence countermanded his order and contented himself with imprisoning the two messengers.

Kazi Saad-ud-din with one regiment had left Kandahar for Girishk. It is reported that Amir is on his way to Kandahar.

The son of Muhammad Umar Khan, son of the late Mardan Khan, the Nurzai Chief of Farah, is in Kandahar under surveillance, but it is not known why he came.

Merchants from Kandahar who arrived in Quetta to-day state that a caravan has arrived from Herat and another gone there. They also say that the reinforcements moving to Girishk under Kazi Saad-ud-din consist of one regiment infantry, one of

O. B. C. ST. JOHN, R. E.,
Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

No. 105 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

MY LORD MARQUIS.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

No. 261, dated Qaetta, June 24, 1881.

Diary of Kandahar Affairs, Camp Kach, June 16, 1881.

The following is a translation of the despatch from Girishk alluded to by Mir Hashim—

Last Friday at eight in the morning Muhammad Hasan Khan attacked Girishk bringing his force to within a mile of the fort. We, therefore, found ourselves obliged to sally out and draw up our forces and engage him. The Herat horsemen began the attack in their own fashion. We fought in military order and drove them back fighting for a distance of 16 miles when they fled with a loss of 40 or 50 killed. Their horses and arms were plundered by the villagers. Those of their infantry who were killed had three grooved rifles (Enfields). They had about 1,500 horsemen and 500 infantry, all Zamindawaris; but among the horsemen the majority were Heratis, only a few were Zamindawaris. The day before Sirdar Muhammad Hashim had arrived at Khoja Ahmed-i-Naozad and had received there a letter from Muhammad Hasan Khan asking him if he was tired and unable to come on, to send as many horsemen as possible. Muhammad Hashim accordingly sent the greater part of his men to Muhammad Hasan under command of Muhammad Umar Khan, Nurzai, and they were in the fight; on the Amir's side only one cavalry soldier, one Khasadar, and four horses were wounded. On their side it is said that the son of Majid Khan, Alizai, is very badly wounded, as is Muhammad Mir Khan, son of Musa Khan, and grandson of Sultan Muhammad Khan. Two of their men were killed by cannon shot.

Mir Hashim's letter of the 9th states that his messenger from Girishk has returned, and says that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan had rallied his men at Kadanak, and had detached Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan with 300 horse, who had crossed the Helmand and occupied Sangbur. Sayyid Amir Jan, son of Sayyid Kala, with a few horsemen, some 20 in all, were going from Kandahar to Girishk and halted his men at Miskarez. They were surprised by the 300 horse from Sangbur; Sayyid Amir Jan and one or two others taken prisoners, and one killed. The rest fled to Kandahar. Some kasids, too, were taken prisoners with letters from Kandahar to Girishk. On returning to Sangbur the sowars boasted in the villages that they had defeated the Amir's army. They have established themselves at Sangbur, and are raiding on all sides. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan was intending to fall back from Kadanak to Khinjak, and collect his forces there. It was currently reported in the Karcat district that troops were on their way from Herat to reinforce him. One regiment of infantry and one of cavalry with two guns, all from the Amir's force at Girishk, were proposing to march to Kalah-i-Gaz and from there make a sudden attack on Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan.

On the 10th a regiment of infantry marched from Kandahar for Girishk. Two hundred regular cavalry, five companies of militia, with as many Kandahari sowars as could be collected, the whole under Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, son of Sirdar Khunsdil Khan, have been ordered to march to Sangbur and Miskarez to drive out the Heratis. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan declares that the latter numbering three squadrons have recrossed the Helmand and rejoined Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan. Mir Hashim says that he is not sure of the accuracy of this statement. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan also states that 200 regular cavalry, two infantry regiments, and two guns have arrived in Shahr-i-Safir (40 miles from Kandahar on the Kelat-i-Ghilzai road). There is no grain to be bought in the city.

17th June.—Wrote to Mir Hashim acknowledging receipt of letters of 6th and 9th, and informing him of news telegraphed from Teheran on 14th. Wrote also to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan giving him the same intelligence, also that the Amir had (as telegraphed to-day by Foreign Secretary) announced his intention of leaving for Kandahar on the 16th.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Agent Governor-General, Biluchistan.

Remarks on above.

It is not yet clear to me whether Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan's object was merely a feint to ascertain the strength of the garrison of Girishk, or whether unaware of its having been reinforced by regular troops he made a real attack. Anyhow it was repulsed, though his loss, even as stated by the Amir's people, was not serious. That he was not much discouraged is shown by his later daring raid across the Helmand.

The bad feeling between the Amir's officials is evidently increasing, and if he does not appear on the scene himself will alone suffice to ruin his cause.

Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

No. 263, dated Quetta, June 24, 1881.

From Lieut.-Colonel ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, and Officiating Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the précis of Kandahar news received on the 20th instant.

Diary of Kandahar Affairs, dated Camp Kuwas, June 20, 1881.

Kandahar post reached me with letters from Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, dated 10th and 12th June. In his letter of the 10th, Shams-ud-din Khan, after acknowledging receipt of my letter authorising him to draw on me for 50,000 rupees, and stating that he has done so in favour of Hajji Zaman, says that he has, according to the intention expressed in his last letter, sent to Girishk the Tokhi horse, 1,000 militia, a regiment of infantry, and two guns. After them went a regiment of cavalry, 200 militia, and the Kandahar tribal horse. Yesterday (the 9th) 400 infantry, two field guns, one troop of cavalry and 200 militia also started for Pusht-i-Rud.

To-day (the 10th) news arrived from Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan with a number of horse and foot had come to Wakhar. Shams-ud-din Khan had also heard that Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, with two infantry regiments and four guns, had arrived in Washir, and that Muhammad Ayub Khan was following him and had reached Farrah. On this account he (Shams-ud-din Khan) and General Ghulam Haidar Khan, with 800 regular infantry and eight of the guns presented by the British Government with stores and ammunition, also Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan and the Kandahar horse, were intending to start for Pusht-i-Rud on the 13th. 400 regular infantry and 300 police were to be left in the city with Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan and Sahibzadah Ghulam Haidar.

Shams-ud-din Khan's second letter runs as follows:—

Yesterday, the 11th of June 1881, Sirdars Muhammad Hashim Khan, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and Abdulla Khan, son of Sultan Ahmed Khan, with their levies of horse and foot, were at Karez-i-Safed. Two regiments of cavalry, one of infantry, and two mountain guns, attacked them. They came on to meet the attack, but were defeated. Sirdar Abdulla Khan was killed, and his body left on the field. Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan was wounded, but carried off by his men; but it is said that his wound is so severe that it has probably proved fatal. 103 others of their horsemen were killed or wounded and 53 taken prisoners. Their baggage and tents with three standards and a pair of kettle-drums fell into the hands of the Amir's soldiers. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim did not go into the fight, but kept on one side and fled, hotly pursued by the victorious troops. How far they have gone is not yet known.

It is said also that Abubekr Alizai, Akhtar Khan, Achakzai, Colonel of the Heratis, and Abdul Azim and other leaders of the Heratis have been killed. But whether this is true or not will be written in the next letter.

Two letters from Mir Hashim were also received. The first dated the 10th June 1881 gives information that Sayyid Amir Jan, taken prisoner by Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan at Miskarez, had been released, after his arms and horse had been taken from him. When Kazi Saad-ud-din was on his way to Girishk he left at Kushk-i-Nakhud 50 militia to collect supplies. They went after a time to Sangbur, where they were all taken prisoners by the Herati horse, and their arms taken from them. Sirdars Muhammad Hasan, Muhammad Husain Khan, and Shirindil, Kandaharis are ordered to go with one regiment to Kushk-i-Nakhud and to station the Kandahari horse at the fords of Kalah-i-Gaz and Dahana-i-Doab. 700 horse (Kandahari) were appointed to go with Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan, but only 100 horse joined him. There is a report in the bazaar that Sirdar Abdul-Wahab Khan, son of Mir Afzul Khan, is ordered to come through Dehrawud to Khakrez, and so on to the Arghandab districts, but no dependence is to be placed on it. There is no proper system in the management of affairs at Kandahar, and it is impossible to say how they will end. A man arrived from Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan at 1 p.m. of the day, the letter is dated (the 10th), and brings news that four regiments and two guns from Herat have assuredly arrived in Washir, and it is said in the bazaar that Sirdar Ayub Khan is at Rozabagh.

The second letter is dated the 12th, and says that a messenger from Gul Muhammad Khan with a trooper of the cavalry arrived to-day at noon, and states that, on the 11th about 600 cavalry, two guns, and the Pusht-i-Rud horse started from Shoraki* in the direction of the enemy's force, which under Sirdars Muhammad Hashim Khan, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and Abdulla Khan was encamped at Kadanak. Leaving their camp they

* Shoraki is a district on the Helmand between Girishk and Kalah-i-Gaz. Kadanak is 15 or 20 miles due north.

advanced to Karez-i-Safed. The Amir's cavalry on perceiving them charged sword in hand. The fight lasted three hours, after which the Herati force broke and fled. 104 prisoners were taken, of whom 57 were wounded. Sirdar Abdulla Khan, son of Sultan Ahmed Khan, was killed. Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan fled, wounded. Two Kandahari Sirdars who were on that side are prisoners, one of them being wounded. Two leaders of the Herati horse are also wounded and prisoners. Abubekr, Alizai, is said by some to be wounded, by others to be killed. 60 horses and 60 guns were captured. The arms and accoutrements of Sirdar Abdulla Khan have been sent to the General by the Kabul cavalry. 12 letters written by Ayub to the Zamindawaris were taken out of his pouch. With them was a letter from Ayub to Abdulla Khan himself, reproaching him with slow progress towards Kandahar, and ordering him to push on. The letters to the Zamindawaris directed them to join Abdulla Khan and advance on Kandahar; Ayub promising to follow them himself with his whole army.

On the 10th, hearing a number of persons had assembled in the house of Sayyid Muhammad Shah, son of the late Prime Minister, Nur Muhammad Khan, for treasonable purposes, Mir Hashim gave information to the authorities, who arrested and imprisoned Sayyid Muhammad Shah. The others were, Mir Alam Khan, late Kotwal, the son of the Mustafi, Hajji Gul, Barakzai, Ghulam Muhai-ud-din Khan, Achakzai, and Taj Muhammad Khan, Popalzai. They are still at large. Their plan was to raise a tumult in the city as soon as Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan should leave, and seize it on behalf of Ayub.

A letter has arrived from the Amir to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan that the son of Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani, had written to Ayub a letter, which was intercepted. The Amir summoned the Kohistani Chiefs to his presence, and asked them why, having accepted him a ruler, they turned against him. They denied any wish or intention to do so, and declared that, if any one of them should be found to be a traitor, he ought to be punished. The Amir then showed them the letter of the son of Abdul Karim Khan, on which they set on the latter, and killed him.

The following news has arrived from Taiwara:—Anbia Khan had sent a message to Sirdar Abdul Wahab Khan to leave his country, or take the consequences. The Sirdar with 400 infantry, 60 horse, left the fort of Taiwara, moved towards Kalat-i-Nakshi, where Anbia Khan was, and attacked him. About 80 men were killed on both sides. The Sirdar was defeated and retreated to Taiwara, where he is now besieged by Anbia Khan.

A postscript adds that the writer has just heard that, before the fight at Girishk, Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, with his servants and baggage, and 100 horse, left for Naozad, in which direction the defeated Heratis fled, pursued for eight miles by the Amir's cavalry, which had only four wounded. The Amir writes that he is sending at once from Mushiaki two regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and six guns. The Amir himself was to leave Kabul on the 11th. A standard and a pair of kettle-drums were taken in the fight at Girishk. The corpse of Abdulla Khan and the prisoners are expected in Kandahar in a couple of days. The prisoners are said to declare that there was no force from Herat following them. A report is current that Ayub Khan has put to death Muhammad Umar Khan, Nurzai, on account of his son having come in to Kandahar.

June 21st.—Acknowledgments of the above were written to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan and Mir Hashim; and the latter was told to inform the authorities that no restriction was placed on Sirdar Muhammad Alam Khan's movements but that Colonel St. John had strongly advised him to go to Kandahar.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Colonel,
Agent, Governor-General, Beluchistan.

No. 25.

No. 107 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 15, 1881.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter, No. 268, dated the 30th June 1881, from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Biluchistan, submitting a *précis* of news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

D. M. STEWART.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

E. BARING.

T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 25.

No. 266, dated Quetta, June 30, 1881.

From Lieutenant-Colonel ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, and Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan, to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith *précis* of Kandahar news received up to the 29th instant.

Kandahar News.

June 22nd.—Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan writes on the 16th, acknowledging receipt of my letter about Azad Khan of Kharan, and encloses a letter to that chief. States that, as directed by me, he has drawn a bill on the Quetta treasury for Rupees 50,000, as subsidy for June. The body of Sirdar Abdulla Khan, son of Sultan Ahmad Khan, has been brought into Kandahar and buried. The prisoners taken in the battle are expected in Kandahar immediately, and will be sent on to Kabul. Shams-ud-din had given orders for troops to be sent on to Naozad to drive out Muhammad Hashim in case of his having halted there, but news of their having marched has not reached him. In a former letter, Shams-ud-din Khan says he told me that General Ghulam Haidar Khan and himself were about to start for Girishk, in anticipation of Ayub Khan's advance in person. He does not now consider it necessary to do so, but will wait till the reinforcements arrive from Kabul.

Received letters from Kandahar agent, dated 14th June. He writes that the coffin of Sirdar Abdulla Khan has been brought to the city without any mark of respect. It was carried through the bazaar, and stopped in several places, so that the people might have the opportunity of recognising the body. It is now known for certain that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan was not present in the fight. Indeed, he tried to prevent Abdulla Khan from fighting, but finding the latter determined to do so, gave him all his horsemen, except 50 or 60, with whom he went to Naozad. It is reported that Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan has died of his wound. One regiment of cavalry, one of infantry, and two guns, have marched to Naozad, and will go on to Siah Pushieh. The report of Herati troops having arrived in Washir is false.

The Amir has written to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan not to leave Kandahar till he knows for certain that Ayub Khan has left Herat. Whilst agent was writing the letter, the prisoners taken at Girishk reached the city. There are fifty-two of them. Others who were Barakzais were kept at Girishk by Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan. The prisoners state that only 500 sowars from Herat and 400 from Farrah were with Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan. The people of Naozad plundered the baggage of Hashim Khan when he was retreating through their country. He himself fled with a few sowars in the direction of Siabband. This was before the arrival of the Amir's troops at Naozad.

A second letter written by Mir Hashim, dated the 16th and received with the last, states that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan complains that Shams-ud-din Khan conceals from him the news sent from Quetta, and adds that he does not let him (Mir Hashim) know the true state of affairs in Kandahar. Sirdar Muhammad Husain Khan is not properly treated by Shams-ud-din Khan, who is seizing his and other people's bullocks, without payment, for the artillery. Muhammad Husain Khan says that he thinks of asking Colonel St. John's permission to go to Mecca.

A correspondent writes to me from Kandahar that nothing certain is known of the real state of affairs in Herat, but that he expects accurate intelligence to reach him about the 3rd of next month, which he will not fail to communicate. The Amir's officers at Kandahar are not acting on any fixed plan. Orders and counter orders are always being issued, and they are doing their best to spoil their own business.

June 24th.—A person, formerly in our employ at Kandahar, writes to Mirza Yakub Ali Khan that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim's private Mulla has arrived in Kandahar. His alleged object is to obtain possession of the corpse of Sirdar Abdulla Khan, and take it to Herat or to bury it in Ahmad Shah's tomb. His real business is to obtain terms for Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, who, since his defeat, is turning his eyes towards the Amir. "Inshallah," he will now join him. If he does, Ayub's cause will be ruined in Herat. All the Pusht-i-Rud people who had joined Hashim have either come into Kandahar, or gone to Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan at Girishk, or are on their way. Those chiefs who had joined the Amir's party are now quite confirmed in their allegiance. The Amir's army had advanced to Naozad. Muhammad Hashim Khan and Muhammad Hasan Khan crossed the Khash after the defeat with three or four hundred sowars.

In the evening a second post from Kandahar arrived with letters from Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, governor of Kandahar, and from the agent. The former contains nothing but compliments and a request that I will write to him occasionally. Mir Hashim writes that Shams-ud-din Khan wishes to send the Farrah and Herat prisoners to Kabul, that they may be seen by the people; but Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan and the General advise that they should be given presents and allowed to return to their homes. The matter has not yet been settled. The Amir has written to the General and Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan to take the troops now on the way from Kabul to Kandahar with them to Girishk immediately on arrival, sending on the force now there to Washir. It is not true that Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan was killed or wounded. He fled with two or three sowars to Siahband. A caravan from Herat reports having met Hashim Khan making his way to Farrah, with thirty sowars. The prisoners state that they lost 170 killed, and three hundred horses fell into the hands of the Amir's troops. There are fifty-four prisoners, thirty of whom are Farrah men, the remainder Heratis. A Tokhi horseman, in the service of Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, deserted and came to Girishk. He states that Hashim Khan had no idea of fighting, but had proposed to Hasan Khan and Abdulla Khan to take the sowars with them and go to Kabul by the Dahlah road avoiding Kandahar, and place their services at the Amir's disposal. Twelve camel loads of cannon shot have arrived from Kabul. Four men were killed on the Amir's side in the late action.

Mir Hashim gives the following news brought by his messenger from Herat. Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, with two regiments of infantry and six guns, has reached Sabzwar. Three Kandahari regiments, two troops of cavalry, and thirteen guns are in camp at Pul-i-Malan, ready to accompany Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, who, however, had not then left the city. Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan had refused Ayub's first summons to Herat. He has now sent a second messenger, and it is reported that Mir Afzul has consented to come. Ayub Khan was publicly announcing his intention of advancing on Kandahar at once, but really intends to wait and see the success of the expedition under Hashim Khan, whether he is joined by the Kandaharis or not. The news of the defeat had not reached Herat when informant left. He was fifteen days on the road.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan.

Remarks.

THE defeat and dispersal of the force under the three Sirdars seems to have been complete. The failure of this advanced expedition appears to have been mainly due to the small support given it by the Zamindawar and trans-Helmand Duranis. Had Ayub come himself or sent a force of regular troops with guns under one of the Kandahari

Sirdars, the case might have been different; but a thousand Herati irregulars under three Kabuli Sirdars, strangers to the people, could hardly be expected to form a sufficient nucleus for a general rising against the Amir's regulars and artillery. It appears certain that Hashim Khan was averse to fighting, as he is not wanting in personal courage; but I am inclined to doubt the fact of his having proposed to the others to desert Ayub and go to Kabul, or to be thinking of making terms for himself.

It is difficult to say what will be Ayub's next move; but I am inclined to believe that he will not attempt to leave Herat.

(Signed) O. B. St. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan.

No. 26.

No. 109 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 22, 1881.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter, No. 277, dated the 6th July 1881, from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Biluchistan, submitting a *précis* of news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 26.

No. 277, dated Quetta, July 6, 1881.

From Lieut.-Colonel ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, and Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan, to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, herewith, *précis* of Kandahar news received up to the 6th of July 1881.

Kandahar News.

1st July.—Kandahar regular post arrived with letter from Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, dated 27th June. He writes that the people of Washir, Fulad, Naozad, Siah Pushteh, and Dusang, who had joined Hashim Khan, have come into Kandahar to ask pardon for their offences. They have been forgiven, and after receiving khilluts, have been dismissed to their homes.

Private letters state that the families of Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan and Sirdar Ghulam Muhai-ed-din Khan have been sent from Herat to Farrah by Ayub Khan. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan is in Bakwa collecting revenue.

4th July.—Letters arrived from Kandahar Agent, dated 30th of June. A letter had arrived that day in Kandahar from the Amir addressed to Sirdars Muhammad Hashim Khan and Shams-ud-din Khan, Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan and Sahibzada Ghulam Haidar Khan, exhorting them to work in unison, and not to quarrel among themselves. If the Amir writes, one of them should do a piece of notable service without the knowledge or against the wish of the other three, he would be displeased, but no misfortune accruing from the joint act of the four would be considered worthy of censure. The previous day a violent quarrel had taken place between Muhammad Hashim Khan and Shams-ud-din Khan on the subject of unauthorised payments made by the latter, and khilluts given

without Muhammad Hashim's knowledge. Four minor officials send private information regularly to the Amir, and in Mir Hashim's belief he is much misled by them as to the true state of affairs. The following news has arrived from Naozad. The leadership of the Kandahari sowars and khasadars has been entrusted to Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan, but the money and presents in his charge are only given out under the seal of Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, who has control over the Pusht-i-Rud and Helmand districts, including the command of the levies from them. The regular troops are under the command of their own officers, but in case of a fight the chief command is to be vested in Gul Muhammad Khan. Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan has been very insubordinate to Gul Muhammad Khan, and in consequence the latter was very angry and threatened to return to his country house east of the Helmand, but was dissuaded by the officers of the army. General Ghulam Haidar Khan has been ordered to the front to take supreme command in both military and civil matters. Three of the Amir's sowars are said to have been murdered by the people of Naozad. The murderers have not discovered. Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan has sent a messenger to Kandahar complaining of the conduct of Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan. Sultan Muhammad Khan has been sent for by the Amir, and has started for Kabul. The son of Sirdar Muhammad Alum Khan is also going to Kabul. A regiment is expected to arrive at Kandahar from Kabul on the 2nd July. Letters have been intercepted from Ayub's mother to him pointing out that he is not now able to contend successfully with Abdurrahman, and begging him to keep quiet for the present until she has made arrangements for a rising in his favour at Kabul. These letters were sent to the Amir at Kabul, and Ayub's mother has in consequence been placed under strict supervision. Sayyid Muhammad Shah has been released from confinement the Sahibzada of Zakird having stood security for him. Orders have arrived from the Amir concerning the persons alleged to have been implicated with Sayyid Muhammad Shah. He orders the Mustaufi to be degraded to the second place in the account department. The others are to be allowed to go free for the present. Shams-ud-din Khan declares that the reinforcements left Kelat for Kandahar some time ago, but there is no appearance of them.

The following letter has been received in Kandahar from the Amir written after receiving news of Muhammad Hasan's defeat. He orders the troops to be pushed on into the Farrah borders, and directs that arms, horses, and tents be given to the Char

* Ismail Khan, brother of Anbia Khan, and Abdulla Khan, Taimuri.

Aimak Chiefs* in Kandahar, and that they be sent with 500 Kandahari sowars to the assistance of Anbia Khan to combine with him in a raid on the Herat valley. Money and khilluts are also to be sent with them for the Herat chiefs. He notifies the despatch of a regiment armed with breech-loaders from Ghazni for Kandahar and states that another regiment of infantry, one of cavalry, and six guns will leave Kabul as soon as carriage is ready. He gives information of a message from the Char Aimaks and other tribes of Herat begging him to expel Ayub from the country. The governor of Tashkurgan, Kudus Khan, has been accordingly directed to take a lakh of rupees and five hundred sowars and proceed to the Char Aimak country. The Hazaras of Dehjangi, &c., have been into Kabul and received presents. They promised to collect 5,000 men and attack Herat. Thus Herat will be attacked on four directions, and the officers in Kandahar are exhorted to push on without delay.

6th July.—Merchants from Kandahar state that, though the alarm prevalent before the defeat of the Heratis is much diminished, the fact of the Amir's troops having gone on to Naozad leads people to believe that a collision between the main armies is imminent, and that trade is consequently at a stand-still.

(Signed) O. B. St. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Agent to Governor-General, Biluchistan.

Remarks.

Private letters from Kandahar give information that the son of Sirdar Muhammad Alum Khan has been sent for by the Amir.

Note.—The jealousy and ill-feeling between the Amir's officials is apparently on the increase and is most unfortunate. Nothing else was, however, to be expected from the arrangements the Amir chose to make for the administration of Kandahar. To entrust the government to a committee of four persons, the chief of whom is a mere lad, was to invite dissension and disaster. General Ghulam Haidar Khan has now gone to the front with supreme authority, and this is, no doubt, a step in the right direction. But it remains to be seen whether he is able to control Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan and Kazi

Saad-ul-din Khan. If these two take umbrage and leave him, they will be followed by all the trans-Helmand Duranis with whom they have great influence. It is to be hoped, however, that their common hatred to Ayub, which is undoubted, may keep them loyal to the Amir for the present.

I do not exactly know the strength of the Amir's force beyond the Helmand, but believe it to consist of 2,500 to 3,000 regular infantry, 1,000 regular cavalry, with 1,000 Kabuli khasadars, and about 2,000 Durani horse, whose fidelity of course is doubtful. Ayub's four regiments are certainly not more than 400 strong, and his cavalry, including that defeated under Hasan Khan, would not exceed 2,000. The quality and armament of his troops are also probably inferior.

6th July 1881.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Agent to Governor-General, Beluchistan.

No. 27.

No. 111 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

My LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 29, 1881.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 21, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Post from Kandahar arrived last night with news, heads of which are telegraphed from Chaman:—On 19th Ayub had reached Seh-ub or Siahb, thirty-three miles west of Khashrud. General Ghulam Haidar had left Kandahar. Agent writes that there are five regiments at Kalah-i-Gaz. Another informant says four only. There is one regiment in Kandahar and vicinity. Shams-ud-din declares reinforcements have left Kabul, and will arrive about 21st; but impression prevails that they are further off and less numerous than he asserts. Nothing is written about Gul Muhammad Khan; but it is stated that Sahib Khan alone among Alizai Chiefs is with Amir's army.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 21, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SIRDAR Muhammad Hasan Khan writes that Amir's officers are in much anxiety, and that Ayub is increasing (*sic.*).

It appears to me that much depends on strength and timely arrival of reinforcements said to be on the road from Kabul. If they are few and cannot be brought to Girishk in time, I am inclined (?) to believe that Ghulam Haidar Khan will not risk a battle, but will fall back on Kandahar.

Enclosure 3 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 21, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SHAMS-UD-DIN writes late on Sunday night that Ayub Khan having arrived in Naozad has sent inviting Kazi Saad-ud-din to meet Hashim Khan half-way between two camps, and settle terms of peace between him and Amir. Shams-ud-din considers this only an artifice to gain time, and has therefore requested Ghulam Haidar to attack Ayub at once after answering that he cannot treat with Ayub except in Herat.

Enclosure 4 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 22, 1881.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

No news from Kandahar to-day, but from another source I hear that Sartip was at Farrah with Ayub, and not, as often reported from Kandahar, in advance with a separate force. If Ayub was really in Naozad when message was sent in his name he must have preceded his troops, who could hardly have marched 300 miles from Herat in twenty days. Proposition to treat was probably made to gain time for guns and regulars to come up, and to induce Duranis to join him.

Enclosure 5 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 24, 1881.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR Agent, writing on 20th, reports all well there. No fighting had yet taken place beyond Helmand. Shams-ud-din Khan asserts that Ayub has written regarding terms of peace, and that he has replied that peace cannot be made unless Ayub retires one march. Nothing fresh from Tirin.

Enclosure 6 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 25, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING summary of intelligence, dated Kandahar, 22nd, telegraphed from Chaman:—

Ayub Khan, having arrived with his army at Khawaja Ahmad-i-Naogan, is negotiating for peace through Sirdar Ghulam Muhai-ed-din Khan.

Amir's force on Helmand numbers three Kabuli regiments, one raised at Kelat, and one at Kandahar, one thousand three hundred khasadars, two cavalry regiments, eighteen guns, and two thousand irregular horse. One Kabuli regiment is in the city with eight guns. Three regiments of infantry, one cavalry, eight guns, and eight companies of khasadars are on the way from Kabul: one regiment is said to be either at Khel-i-Akhund, or Jaldak, between Kandahar and Kelat, and the remainder at Mukur.

Habibulla Khan, Muhammadzai, has fled from city to Tirin, spreading false reports of defeat of Amir's army. Ghulam Muhai-ed-din is the only surviving son of Kohdil Khan, and has been at Meshed with Mir Afzul for last year and a half. Habibulla Khan is a nephew of Sartip Nur Muhammad, and a notorious intriguer. He has much influence in Tirin.

Khwaja Ahmad-i-Naogan is two marches north of Girishk.

Enclosure 7 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 26, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SIRDAR Shams-ud-din Khan writes from Kandahar, on 22nd, that Sirdar Ghulam Muhai-ed-din Khan has written to Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan that hearing British Government had made over Kandahar to Amir, he was on his way there when he met Ayub and was forced to accompany him. He deplures approaching conflict as contrary to the interests of the family, and asks Shams-ud-din to aid him in bringing about peaceful settlement.

Letter was sent to Shams-ud-din, who answered on the 21st that he could not open negotiations as long as Ayub and his army remained on Kandahar,* but would do so if he retired to Khash. If he remained where he was, he would be attacked.

Ayub's army is reported to be very weak and ill-provided. It is so deficient in transport that each sowar is made to carry two cannon shots.

Shams-ud-din, in answer to a question in my letter, gives Amir's army on Helmand at three thousand regular and one thousand two hundred irregular infantry, one thousand regular cavalry, and eighteen guns, with 1,200 Durani horse.

Other letters, though not explicit, give the impression that the Amir's people are wasting valuable time.

It does not appear that any Durani chiefs or any number of people have yet joined Ayub, but his partizans are actively and openly at work in the districts stirring up the Duranis to join him.

Nothing certain seemed known of reinforcements from Kabul. Shams-ud-din says that he is afraid to leave the city till they arrive, though very anxious to go to Pusht-i-Rud.

There is a rumour that Ayub has returned to Herat in consequence of sickness, or an attack on city by Khan Agha's son.

Enclosure 8 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 27, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR Agent, writing 24th, says that General Ghulam Haidar has sent information that Ayub's army marched on evening of 20th from Karez-i-Safed towards Girishk. On hearing news he followed, but has not come up with it. Ayub is believed to have crossed river below Girishk, and to be marching by Balakhana and Band-i-Taimur. His people are reported to give out that they have no wish to fight the Amir, but only the English. He probably hopes to take Kandahar, which is very slenderly garrisoned, by a *coup de main*, assisted by rising of inhabitants.

I have sent camp to Khojak, and intend riding direct there on Friday.

Enclosure 9 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 28, 1881.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING just received from Chaman:—Kandahar Agent just arrived says action was fought yesterday morning at Karez-i-Atta. Amir's forces totally defeated, eighteen guns taken, all baggage, and five lakhs rupees. The Kelat regiment and Kandahar sowars went over to Ayub.

Ghulam Haidar has fled towards Kabul with 80 sowars. Sirdar Shams-ud-din is still in Kandahar with 400 men of Kabuli regiment and 400 police. *Ends.*

I leave for Chaman to-morrow.

Enclosure 10 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 28, 1881.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SIRDAKS Muhammad Hasan and Shirindil have arrived at Chaman, having ridden straight from scene of action, which began at 8 a.m. and lasted till 11. Kabuli regiments fought at first, but after action Khanabad regiment went over in a body to Ayub. The other three dispersed and fled. They heard firing in Kandahar direction last night, and again this morning. General Ghulam Haidar went first to city before starting for Kabul. They estimate loss at 300 to 400 on both sides. I believe the Khanabad regiment to be a Turkistan corps.

Enclosure 11 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM dated July 28, 1881.

FROM AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FORMER, Simla.

Following just received from Lieutenant Austin, Chaman:—*Begins.*

Chaman, 28th July.—Details as far as can be gathered as follows: Ayub's force took up a position on rising ground at Karez-i-Atta facing north, guns in front and cavalry on left of position. Amir's force facing south, drawn up in column with guns in front, cavalry on right; baggage, treasure, &c., to right rear of infantry. Ayub sent his cavalry round right flank of Amir's force to attack the baggage. Amir moved his cavalry to his left, faced them about, and engaged Ayub's cavalry, who had got completely round the right flank and were to the right rear of baggage. In meantime Ayub's infantry had come into the plain in line, and his right was attacked and driven back by two of the Amir's regiments; but being reinforced he in his turn drove back these two regiments on to guns. The other two regiments in reserve do not appear to have been engaged; and the repulse ended in a general flight. *Ends.*

No. 28.

No. 113 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 29, 1881.

We have the honour to forward for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter from the Amir of Kabul, dated the 7th July 1881, enclosing one from the Officiating Governor-General of Russian Turkistan, regarding the safe arrival at Kabul of His Highness's family.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

P. M. STEWART.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

E. BARING.

T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 28.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the ADDRESS of the SECRETARY, dated July 7, 1881.

After compliments.—I have just received and perused a friendly and complimentary letter from Lieutenant Kolpakofsky, who is officiating as Governor-General of Turkistan. I send you the original letter for the perusal of the representatives of the illustrious British Government, keeping a copy of it with myself.

Let it not remain concealed that, in my opinion, it is useless and unnecessary to send a reply to the letter, nor will one be sent, unless you deem it fit and expedient to do so, in which case a complimentary letter in reply will be drafted and transmitted.

Enclosure 2 in No. 28.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the OFFICIATING GOVERNOR-GENERAL of RUSSIAN TURKISTAN to the AMIR of KABUL, dated Tashkend, May 30, 1881 Russian, corresponding to the 16th Rajab 1298 H. (June 14, 1881).

After compliments.—Be it known to your Highness that the letter you addressed to the Adjutant-General Von Kaubmann the Governor-General of Turkistan, on the

13th Jamadi-ul-Awal (13th April 1881) expressing your Highness' satisfaction and pleasure at the (safe) arrival of your wives and children, reached me at a most auspicious moment. Whereas the Governor-General (Kaufmann) had gone to sleep (had been confined to his bed) on account of a serious illness, I opened your Highness's letter and read it. Having informed your Highness of the above-mentioned event, I beg to express my sincere devotion to your Highness and my constant desire that the Most High God may prosper both your Highness and your Highness' illustrious Government. I have no other wish but that the relations of friendship and amity (between us) may continue to increase.

The Officiating Governor-General put his signature, and affixed the Government seal on the original letter.

No. 29.

No. 114 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 29, 1881.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter No. 279, dated the 11th July 1881, from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General for Biluchistan, submitting a *précis* of news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 29.

No. 279, dated Quetta, July 11, 1881.

From Lieut.-Col. ST. JOHN, Offg. Agent to the Governor-General for Biluchistan, to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith *précis* of the Kandahar news received up to the 11th instant.

Kandahar News.

6th July.—Shams-ud-din Khan writes to me, dated 2nd, that he hears from his advanced posts beyond the Helmand that there are no signs of movement from the Herat direction. Ayub Khan had pitched his tents at Pal-i-Malan with the intention of moving towards the Helmand, but now after the defeat of Muhammad Hasan, and the death of Abdulla Khan, it is impossible to say what he will do. The people of Debrawud, Baghran, Siah Pushteh, Naozad, Washir, and Dusang, who had not before come to Kandahar, have now done so. Khillats have been given them, and they have been dismissed to their homes. Shams-ud-din Khan asks for the subsidy of 50,000 rupees for July.

A private letter of same date gives information that a regiment of infantry, 600 strong, with 200 khasadars, arrived in the city of Kandahar from Ghazni on the 1st. General Ghulam Haidar Khan was expected to arrive in Kandahar from the Helmand. He went to inspect the troops. The Amir's letter appointing him to the government of Pusht-i-Rud arrived after he left Kandahar; when he sees it he will doubtless return at once. A Barakzai traveller from Pusht-i-Rud says that Muhammad Hashim Khan is in Bakwa, and his cavalry in Khash. Two infantry and one cavalry regiment from Herat had reached Farrah. General Taj Muhammad Khan (a Ghilzai who was with

Ayub last summer) has been in Tirin, trying to collect a party to raise disturbances. While there he heard of the defeat of Muhammad Hasan Khan and the death of Abdulla Khan, and immediately started for Herat with a few followers. But he could not make his way through the Siahband country, and returned to Tirin. He is at Chimerak. Shah Aghassi Safa and other Popalzais and Ghilzais have joined him. Shams-ud-din Khan is thinking of sending some troops to Tirin to disperse them, but nothing has been yet done.

9th July.—Mir Hashim writes from Kandahar on the 3rd that a firman had arrived giving Ghulam Haidar Khan the rank of Sipah Salar, and ordering a medal to be struck in Kandahar for the officers of the troops engaged at Karez-i-Safed. General Ghulam Haidar Khan, who arrived in Kandahar on the 2nd, has recalled the troops sent on to Naozad, and encamped them at Kalah-i-Gaz. He says that the troops are full of confidence, and declare that they are ready to go on to Herat without reinforcements. He is much pleased with the troops and with the Alizais. As regards the quarrel between Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan and Kazi Saad-ud-din, the General considers that both are in fault, but believes that he has reconciled them.

Yahya Khan, Akhundzada, writes from Tirin that several persons who had taken letters from Herat to Kabul, were now on their way back with answers, but they were in a place where he could not get at them. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan has sent sowars to seize these persons and bring them to Kandahar. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim wishing to inspect the regiment lately arrived, asked the Colonel to parade it. He did so, when the Sipah Salar coming on the ground, ordered it to be dismissed. Shortly afterwards Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan appeared and ordered the regiment to be paraded again. The colonel refused to do so. This has caused a bad feeling between the civil and military officers. The kotwal of the city having taken offence at some of his people having been punished by Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, withdrew all the police from the streets. On hearing this Shams-ud-din Khan sent for the kotwal and soothed his wrath. The police were then sent back to their posts. Two stacks of wheat belonging to Farsiwans in the neighbourhood of the city have been burnt. Yahya, Akhundzada, has written to Shams-ud-din Khan from Tirin that General Taj Muhammad Khan, son of Arsala Khan, Ghilzai, has arrived there and gone on to Herat. He, Yahya, was unable to stop him. Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, son of Khushdil Khan, has been appointed muster master of the tribal sowars and to the charge of local affairs. Letters from the Amir have arrived conferring supreme authority in civil matters in Kandahar on Shams-ud-din Khan, and military authority on Ghulam Haidar Khan. Inayat-ulla

* Note.—This is the man who probably prompted Hashim Khan to assert his authority, and quarrel with Shams-ud-din.

Khan,* Sadozai, has been ordered to Kabul. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, if he has not already been formally deprived of the government, will be so shortly. Part of

Ayub's army is said to have arrived at Farrah under command of Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan. Sirdars Muhammad Hashim and Muhammad Hasan are said to be at Bakwa, and Ayub to have left Herat. These are bazaar reports. The return of the Amir's troops to Kalah-i-Gaz has caused much excitement and alarm in the city. It is very unlikely that Shams-ud-din Khan and Muhammad Hasan Khan will get on together.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Offg. Agent to the Govr.-Genl. for Beluchistan.

Note.

It is not easy to understand Ghulam Haidar's motive for bringing back the troops to the Helmand, except it was to vindicate his authority, the advance having been ordered by his civil colleagues. He had not, however, then received the Amir's order to go on to the Farrah border. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan was evidently intriguing to get rid of Shams-ud-din Khan, and the latter in consequence appears to have made representation to the Amir, which has ended in all power except over the troops being entrusted to him, thus putting an end to the absurd committee of four in which the administration has hitherto been vested. An insurrection seems likely to take place in Tirin, where Taj Muhammad Khan, one of Ayub's generals, who after the 1st September fled to Kabul, is collecting a gathering.

Quetta, July 11, 1881.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Offg. Agent to the Govr.-Genl. for Beluchistan.



00108678

Digitized with financial assistance from

Government of Maharashtra

on 01 February, 2020

